Steps Towards a Pluralist Correspondence Theory of Truth

Abstract

We consider the following statements to be equally true: “Water is the same as dihydrogen monoxide”, “When a young person reaches the age of 18, (s)he is considered to be an adult”. If we are looking for an answer to the question of why these statements are true, then we have to refer to facts, at least according to the “good old” correspondence theory of truth. Whilst in the case of the first statement we posit a natural fact as a truthmaker, for the second statement, we must refer to a social fact, since adulthood is not a property found in nature but a consequence of a rule defined and accepted by a group of people. However, according to the correspondence theory, which tries to ensure the objectivity of truth, such social facts cannot be truthmakers of statements about our social reality, since these facts, if there are any at all, are generally regarded as culturally diverse human constructs. In my paper I argue that a particular pluralist version of correspondence theory could give a satisfactory account of the truth-value of statements about our social reality.