The Problems of the Inferior and Superior Soul in the Enneads

Abstract

Concentrating on the individual soul in Plotinus, we are inclined to think that it only has aspects, and no consistent philosophical view can be found in his Enneads. This impression becomes particularly strong if we turn to the so-called inferior and superior soul in order to try to demarcate them. In my paper, I survey the greatest problems of the two souls and the main positions found in the literature. Then, I examine different texts with ethical or action-theoretical contexts which give a dynamical view on the soul. I will argue that these texts offer the proper criterion, the criterion of free choice, for harmonizing the various aspects of the soul and for solving the demarcation problem of the inferior and the superior souls. In the last part of my paper, I discuss the Epictetian background of the theory of desire in the Enneads and the differences rooted in the different metaphysical presuppositions.