Philosophical Problems as Inconsistent Sets of Propositions. Tőzsér’s Deductive Argument for Skepticism

Abstract

János Tőzsér’s metaphilosophy became known primarily in connection with his argument based on dissent. His discussions on the nature of philosophical problems generally receive less attention, even though they are interesting not only because they were once used to compellingly prove the correctness of the skeptical position, but also because Tőzsér did not renounce all his related insights even after abandoning skepticism. According to these, philosophical problems are sets of inconsistent propositions, each of which is epistemically equally attractive, and therefore, philosophical problems are inherently unsolvable. In this paper, I attempt to recreate Tőzsér’s relevant line of thought and then give a critique of it. I argue that this metaphilosophical concept does not accurately capture the supposedly specific nature of philosophical problems, but it can still prove to be a useful tool for taxonomizing philosophical theories.