Alkotmányszöveg és értelmező precedens az alkotmánybíráskodásban

Abstract

This study examines the nature of constitutional courts as precedent-setting bodies, the discretion of constitutional judges, and the relationship between the constitutional text and precedents in constitutional adjudication. It distinguishes between vertical and horizontal precedent-bindingness, highlighting that lower courts are bound by higher court decisions, while at the highest level, the bindingness is looser, and the possibility of deviation always remains open. The author presents three degrees of precedent-bindingness through the practice of the United States: the milder, the medium, and the most precedent-friendly positions. According to the milder approach, precedent is only applicable in cases of open constitutional provisions, and the text of the constitution always takes precedence. Those advocating stronger bindingness argue that simply being erroneous is not sufficient for overturning a precedent; it must also cause legal uncertainty or other harm. The most precedent-friendly adhere to the common law concept, where precedents can be superior to the written constitution. The study also addresses the influence of the political values of constitutional judges on their relationship with precedent, particularly the American liberal/conservative interpretive "twist". Finally, it analyzes the proximity/distance of precedent decisions to the constitutional text, pointing out that decisions diverging from the constitutional text have lower binding force, especially in the case of European constitutional courts, where the German model exemplifies a strong departure from the text.