A rábírás mint elkövetési magatartás értelmezésének kérdései részesség, illetőleg öngyilkosságban közreműködés esetén

Abstract

This study examines two main areas of the criminal law interpretation of inducement as a form of perpetration: complicity and participation in suicide. In the context of complicity, particularly incitement, the central problem is the question of liability for the perpetrator's qualitative and quantitative excess. The author analyzes the legal-historical background, the dilemma between parification and differentiated sentencing systems, and the different schools of interpretation of accession. He presents the contradictory positions of Hungarian legal scholarship and judicial practice on the extent to which the instigator is liable if the perpetrator commits a more serious crime than the one he was induced to commit. The study points out that the current Criminal Code does not provide clear guidance, so the issue still requires de lege ferenda proposals. The second part focuses on participation in suicide, where inducement appears as a form of perpetration. The author traces the historical development of the criminal law assessment of suicide from archaic Roman law to the present day, emphasizing the pioneering role of the Csemegi Code in regulating participation in suicide as a separate offence. He analyzes in detail the factors relevant for qualification, such as the age and volitional capacity of the person committing suicide, and examines the problem of distinguishing between inducement and assistance. Particular attention is paid to a critical analysis of the Curia's decision 3/2013 BJE, challenging its interpretation of aggravated cases and the assessment of assistance. In conclusion, the author proposes the abolition of the distinction in qualification between inducement and assistance, and suggests a distinction in sentencing.