An Eye For An Eye? The European Commission’s Proposal for an Anti-Coercion Instrument and What It Means for Member States

Authors

  • Péter Tüttő

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54148/ELTELJ.2022.2.103

Keywords:

Common Commercial Policy, Anti-Coercion Instrument, European Commission, sanctions, unanimity, qualified majority

Abstract

The European Commission proposed a Regulation for an Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) at the end of 2021, which is the latest example of a protectionist-style shift in EU Trade Policy. The ACI would grant the Commission strong competences to impose economic countermeasures, similar in their scope and effect to the existing sanctions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, as the ACI is to be placed under the Common Commercial Policy, these economic sanctions would be adopted by only qualified majority voting, therefore effectively circumventing the unanimity rule in the European Council when it comes to sanctioning third countries and their legal persons. The article discusses some of these developments in the ACI Proposal in order to provide context for the legislative process.

Author Biography

Péter Tüttő

Péter Tüttő obtained his law degree at ELTE Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, and currently is an LL.M. Candidate at KU Leuven while working as a policy adviser at the Brussels Office of the Foundation for a Civic Hungary. Opinions and thoughts expressed in this article reflect solely the author’s views.

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Published

2023-03-23

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