How Courts React, or Would React, When Faced with a Procedural Contract in Hungary?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54148/ELTELJ.2026.1.163Keywords:
procedural contract, party autonomy, civil procedure, comparative civil procedure, due process, jurisdictional agreementsAbstract
This article examines the legal nature and admissibility of procedural contracts under Hungarian civil procedure law, with particular attention to how courts respond when parties seek to regulate procedural aspects of litigation by agreement. While common law jurisdictions accept certain forms of procedural contracting, civil law systems remain resistant, emphasising judicial control and mandatory rules. The paper reviews the limited scope for party autonomy in Hungary under the Code of Civil Procedure, focusing on pre-dispute and post-dispute agreements, jurisdiction clauses, evidentiary pacts, cost-sharing arrangements, and class action agreements. It also considers comparative developments in EU and German case law, and the human rights constraints derived from Article 6 ECHR. The analysis concludes that, although Hungarian law acknowledges narrow exceptions – such as choice of court agreements, mediation settlements, or class action contracts – procedural autonomy remains tightly constrained. The study argues that this strict model is rooted in constitutional guarantees of due process and efficiency, but also notes recent legislative initiatives (eg the proposed simplified civil procedure) that cautiously extend the role of party agreements. Overall, the article highlights the tension between judicial control and contractual freedom, and maps the limited corridors where procedural contracting may gain legal relevance in Hungary.