On the Limits of the Purposive Legal Interpretation

Abstract

As of April 1, 2020, the legislator classified our legal system in the limited precedent system. The practical effects of this "name change" are only partly known, but one thing is certain: we must pay more attention to the questions of judicial interpretation. The binding force of the Kúria's case-by-case decisions encourages legal theoretical research to ask theoretical questions of interpretation, with which we can - at least partially - describe the limits of judicial legal interpretation.

               However, our legal system was also affected by another important change regarding judicial legal interpretation, the Alaptörvény prescribed a new interpretive attitude for ordinary courts. Article 28 required the courts to follow teleological legal interpretation instead of the previous textual legal interpretation. However, the existence of an "appropriate" legal interpretation in line with this is by no means a problem-free phenomenon. The study aims to present two aspects of expedient legal interpretation: purposive and reasonable legal interpretation. To describe the operation of these canons of interpretation, it presents numerous practical examples by listing foreign and domestic case decisions.