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The Cross-border Perception of Bayising (Pansheng 板升) among Government Officials in Ming China

Abstract

The Mongol Yuan dynasty in China officially came to an end in 1368 with the withdrawal of the Mongols from the capital city Daidu (Beijing) and their retreat to the steppes. Nevertheless, a protracted series of military campaigns and conflicts between the Ming court and the Eastern Mongols, Oirat Mongols, and various other Mongol tribes continued for about 200 years. This article examines the discourse surrounding Bayising, where a group of Chinese people settled on Mongolian territory and served the Mongols during the mid-16th and early-17th centuries. The primary population of Bayising consisted of Chinese individuals who had either fled from China or were captives taken by the Mongols from China in border raids. Bayising embodies a unique interaction between China and nomadic communities in a transitional zone between the steppe and agricultural land, where conventional trading and tribute systems encountered difficulties in establishment. After the signing of the 1571 peace treaty, Bayising gradually receded from the focus of the Ming court. Through an analysis of historical documents and records, this article unveils the perspectives held by Ming officials regarding Bayising. Additionally, it probes into how these perspectives influenced Ming China's foreign relations and national security policies concerning the Mongols. The emergence of Bayising was rooted in a distinctive historical context. Moreover, Bayising played an important role not only in shaping Sino-Mongol relations but also in facilitating cooperation between nomadic and agricultural communities in the absence of official trade channels. Neither repatriation nor military intervention proved to offer fundamental solutions to the Bayising issue in the ongoing confrontation between the Mongols and the Ming court. However, the establishment of normalised and stabilised trade, facilitated by a mutually beneficial peace treaty, emerged as a definitive solution that ultimately benefited both parties. This intricate interplay between geopolitical dynamics and cultural exchanges underscores the complexity of historical narratives, emphasizing the enduring impact of the Ming officials' perception of the Mongols on regional stability and economic prosperity.

Keywords: Bayising, Hohhot, Altan Khan, Jiajing, 1571 Peace Treaty, Sino-Mongol relations

Bayising (байисин) is a term frequently employed in contemporary Mongolian to mean ‘house’ or ‘building’. Nevertheless, both *bayising* and its Chinese counterpart, *pansheng* 板升, carry a distinctive connotation referring to a region of Mongolia that bordered China. During the mid- and late-Ming dynasty (1368–1644), this region became home to a community of Chinese individuals who sought refuge and lived under Mongolian leadership.¹ This region, known as Fengzhou 豐州, approximately corresponds to the present-day Hohhot city, the present provincial capital of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in northern China. Several Bayising settlements were established in this region prior to the official founding of the city of Hohhot (also called Kökeqota² in Mongolian), which means ‘Blue city’, in 1572. This region is situated within the current front Yellow River loop of Ordos (also known as the front Hetao of the Yellow River), and although it was reclaimed by the Ming court from the Mongol Yuan (1271–1368) during the early Ming period,³ it gradually fell once more under Mongol occupation in the mid-Ming era.⁴ In present-day Hohhot, traces of the term *Pansheng* persist in certain place names, where ‘pan 板’ serves as an abbreviated form. Some scholars suggest that the term *bayising* is a loanword originally from the Chinese term *baixing* 百姓,⁵ meaning ‘ordinary people’ or literally ‘a hundred surnames’. The semantic evolution of *bayising* 百姓 has transitioned from denoting ‘ordinary people’ to representing a Chinese-style dwelling on Mongolian land, distinct from the traditional Mongol yurt (*ger*). Moreover, in an early 17th century⁶ Mongolian manuscript, *The Jewel Translucent Sutra* (also referred to as *Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur orošiba*), which extols and details the accomplishments of Altan Khan⁷ (Altan Qayan, 1507–1582; also known as

¹ MS 327.8582. *The History of the Ming Dynasty* (*Ming Shi* 明史) describes Bayising as ‘In Fengzhou where Chinese people who fled China gathered. They erected walls for defence, constructed palaces, and cultivated farmland. The places were called Bayising, which means house in the Chinese language’. 時富等在敵，招集亡命，居豐州，築城自衛，構宮殿，墾水田，號曰板升。板升，華言屋也。

² Hyer, 1982:56–59, Kökeqota (Hohhot) was founded by Altan Khan in the 1500s and served as his headquarters in his challenge to China. Bayising people assisted Altan Khan’s campaigns against Ming China. Under Mongolian direction they constructed a walled city on the site of Kökeqota, with the most impressive buildings (*bayising*) that the place had ever seen.

³ DSFYJY 61.2653. ‘In the early Ming, Li Wenzhong settled down in Datong, went west to manage Fengzhou, then was stationed in Dongshen of Shengzhou city and controlled the Hetao area.’ 明初李文忠定大同，西略豐州，遂即勝州城東勝，以統套內之地。

⁴ MSJSBM 58.887. ‘In January of Yingzhong Tianshun’s 6th year (1462), Maolihai entered the Hetao.’ 英宗天順六年春正月，毛里孩等入河套。

⁵ Li–Li, 2007: 18–19. A similar case can be found in other Mongolian words, such as *taiji* (台吉 in Chinese records), which originally comes from the Chinese term *taizi* 太子.

⁶ Elverskog 2000: 21.

⁷ Surrus 1962:357–358. The name Altan Qayan is a title rather than a personal name. Altan, signifying ‘gold’, also carries the secondary meaning of ‘imperial’.

Anda 俺答/俺荅 or 諳達 in Chinese records), the term Bayising is also mentioned.⁸ Altan Khan, the descendant of Chinggis Khan (c. 1162–1227), emerged as the most influential leader among the 12 Tümed Mongol tribes in Ordos during the 16th century. He successfully unified and formed a tribal league between the Khalkha Mongols in the north and the Chahars in the south. Altan Khan became a significant national security concern from the north for the majority of the reigns of Ming emperors Jiajing (r. 1522–1566) and Longqi (r. 1567–1572).

Given the pivotal role played by the Ming officials' perspective on Bayising and its Chinese settlers in shaping the Ming court's foreign policy towards the Mongols, it becomes essential to explore how Ming officials perceive Bayising. Aiming to unravel the nuanced perspectives held by Ming officials regarding Bayising, this paper scrutinises memorials to the throne, essays, and historical records associated with the word Bayising (i.e., 板升 and 版升⁹) in the *Collected Writings on Statecraft of the Ming Dynasty*¹⁰ (*Huang Ming Jing Shi Wen Bian* 皇明經世文編), the *Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty* (*Ming Shilu* 明實錄), and the *Collected Memorials to the Throne During the Jiajing and Longqi Reigns*¹¹ (*Huang Ming Jialong Shu Chao* 皇明嘉隆疏抄). These collections comprise a wealth of historical documents and records authored by Ming officials. Utilising the keyword search function of the Chinese Text Project (中國哲學書電子化計劃), all materials related to Bayising (板升 or 版升) in these three books were identified. Subsequently, the texts were meticulously cross-checked with their respective sources to mitigate the risk of potential errors. Within the *Huang Ming Jinshi Wen Bian*, 63 instances of Bayising (板升 or 版升) are discernible across 37 distinct memorials to the throne, essays, and letters. Authored by 24 individuals during the Ming dynasty, these instances are complemented by a singular occurrence found exclusively in the *Huang Ming Jialong Shu Chao*. Significantly, all authors had successfully passed the *jishi* 進士 exam,¹² securing

⁸ Jurungya 2014: 209. In this book, 'Naiman yeke baising' was translated from Mongolian to Chinese language as 'bada Pansheng' 八大板升 ('eight large Bayising settlements').

⁹ 版升 is a variant of 板升 with the same pronunciation. It appears several times in the materials. Thus, it was added to the keyword search.

¹⁰ The *Huang Ming Jingshi Wen Bian* 皇明經世文編 is a compilation of memorials to the throne, letters, and political essays compiled by the late Ming scholars Chen Zilong 陳子龍 (1608–1647), Xu Fuyuan 徐孚遠 (1599–1665), and Song Zhengbi 宋徵璧 (?–1672). This book consists of 504 volumes plus four supplemental volumes. It constitutes nearly 3,000 memorials to the thrones, letters, and essays of 430 officials and scholars of the Ming period.

¹¹ The *Huang Ming Jialong Shu Chao* 皇明嘉隆疏抄, compiled by Zhang Lu 張鹵 (1523–1598), is a compilation of memorials to the throne addressing domestic affairs, border security issues, and more during the Jiajing and Longqi reigns of the Ming dynasty.

¹² The *jinshi* 進士 exam was the highest-level imperial examination in ancient China. Individuals who passed the *jinshi* exam were awarded the title of 'Jinshi'. Achieving this status was a prestigious accomplishment and opened doors to high-ranking positions in the government.

high-ranking official positions. Some even occupied esteemed roles, such as Chief Grand Secretary 內閣首輔 (e.g., Zhang Juzheng 張居正 [1525–1582] and Gao Gong 高拱 [1513–1578]) or served as Minister of War 兵部尚書. Consequently, their perspectives on Bayising played a crucial role in shaping foreign policy towards the Mongols. Additional details about the 24 authors and their works related to Bayising can be found in Appendix 1.

Studies on Bayising

The exploration of issues related to Bayising in Ming China has captured scholars' attention over the past seven decades. Notably, Jyunpei (1955) investigates Altan Khan and Pansheng, and the relationship between Bayising and Guihua (歸化城; modern-day Hohhot) during Wanli's reign (1573–1620).¹³ Serruys (1959) offers a comprehensive study on the presence of Chinese in southern Mongolia during the 16th century.¹⁴ Cao (1980) investigates Altan Khan and the shift in land use within Fengzhou 豐州.¹⁵ Huang's (1995) study centres on social-economic change in the Suiyuan Guihua (綏遠歸化) area in Inner Mongolia from the mid-14th century to the early 20th century.¹⁶ Takumi (2001) examines the Chinese presence among the 'right wing' Mongols during the Longqi Peace Treaty of 1571.¹⁷ Xu (2012) delves into the social effects and historical influence of Bayising in the Ming dynasty.¹⁸ However, the perspectives of Ming officials on Bayising and their corresponding responses remain an under-researched area deserving of further exploration.

The timeframe and frequency of references to Bayising in documents from Ming China

Thorough scrutiny was applied to the memorials to the throne, historical records, essays, and letters within the *Huang-Ming JingShi Wenbian*, the *Ming Shilu*, and the *Huang Ming Jialong Shu Chao* that encompassed the keyword Bayising (板升 or 版升). The earliest reference to this term dates back to the 25th year

¹³ Hagiwara 1955: 187–199.

¹⁴ Serruys 1959: 1–95.

¹⁵ Cao 1980: 132–143.

¹⁶ Huang 1995: 1–525.

¹⁷ Takumi 2001: 21–34.

¹⁸ Xu 2012: 23–26

of Jiajing Emperor (1546),¹⁹ a timeframe consistent with the entry found in the *Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor (Wanli wugonglu 萬曆武功錄)*,²⁰ authored during Wanli's reign (1572–1620). The final mention of Bayising was in Tianqi's sixth year (1626) in the *Ming Xizhong Shilu*²¹ 明熹宗實錄. A chronological examination of the materials in the *Ming Shilu* reveals that the term Bayising (板升 or 版升) appeared eight times in records from the *Ming Shizhong Shilu* 明世宗實錄 from 1559 to 1565. Additionally, it surfaced nine times in records from the *Ming Muzhong Shilu* 明穆宗實錄 from 1568 to 1571 and 15 times in records from the *Ming Shenzhong Shilu* 明神宗實錄 from 1572 to 1618. Subsequently, in 1626, it was documented only once in the *Ming Xizhong Shilu*. Notably, there are no recorded instances of the term Bayising (板升 or 版升) predating the *Ming Shizhong Shilu*.

The timeframe and frequency of Bayising's references suggest that the matter of Bayising, which generated attention from the Ming court, persisted from 1546 to 1626, encompassing an approximately 80-year period during the late Ming dynasty. However, Bayising must have been established earlier. Records from the *Historical Events from the Ming Period in Their Entirety (Mingshi Jishi Benmo 明史紀事本末)* show that during the 1533 Datong mutiny, rebels fled to Altan Khan.²² Another Ming dynasty record from the *Investigation on Northern Barbarians of the Royal Ming (Huang Ming Beilu Kao 皇明北虜考)* indicates that several thousand rebels went north to join the Mongols in the mutiny.²³ As a matter of fact, during the Tianqi years (1621–1627), Bayising ceased to be a significant concern and threat to the Ming court, with the Manchu

¹⁹ See material 38 in Appendix 1. The memorials to the throne written by Shen Han 沈涵 (1541–?) mentioned that 'people who live in Bayising significantly have grown in numbers since Jiajing's 25th year (1546)'. 自嘉靖二十五年以來，板升漸多。

²⁰ WLWGL 7.422. In *Wanli wugonglu 萬曆武功錄*, it is recorded that 'in April of Jiajing's 25th year (1546), Altan Khan and his wife Usin-qatun constructed a city using bricks and initiated arable farming with cattle.' 嘉靖二十五年四月，俺答阿不孩及兀慎娘子見磚塔城，用牛二軛耕城約五六頃，所種皆穀、黍、蘿、秫、糜子。'It is evident that a substantial number of Chinese settlers inhabited in Altan Khan's territory, contributing their agricultural expertise in service to him.' The identity of Usin-qatun (兀慎娘子) in this record remains unclear. Notably, it cannot be Erketü qatun (三娘子 or 也兒克兔哈屯 or 忠順夫人 in Chinese records), as Altan Khan married her in 1558.

²¹ *Ming Xizhong Shilu* 72.3500.

²² MSJSBM 57.882. 'Datong mutineers looted the city, fled to the north of the Gobi Desert, and persuaded more than 10,000 of the Mongols of the little prince to invade China.' 大同叛卒大掠城中，潛出漠北，誘小王子數萬人大舉入寇。'In the Datong mutiny, many mutineers crossed the border and went north to Anda's tribes.' 大同之變，諸叛卒多亡出塞，北走俺答諸部。

²³ HMBLK 212. 'In the leap-year February of the 13th year, [the Ming court] sent officials to settle and pacify Datong, several thousand traitors went north to follow the Mongols.' 十三年閏二月，遣大臣振撫大同，叛者北走從虜幾千人。

emerging as its foremost threat. Furthermore, the most extensive discussions concerning Bayising likely transpired from the conclusion of Jiajing's reign to the midpoint of Wanli's reign. Refer to Appendix 2 for a comprehensive list of all records mentioning Bayising in the *Ming Shilu*.

Perception of Bayising in terms of geographical location, economy, population, and society

Given Bayising's location within the domain of the Tümed Mongols, situated along the border with China, visits from Ming officials were infrequent. Nevertheless, Ming officials have left various depictions of Bayising, shedding light on its geographical location, population, economy, and society. The subsequent list encapsulates such descriptions by Ming officials.

1. 倭有唐街與虜之板升相類。
There is 'Tang street' in Japan. It is like Bayising among the Mongols.²⁴
2. 逆黨板升等處，已成巢穴，鱗次邊疆，朝暮出入，得乘其便。
[There are] traitors in Bayising, which became their nest that borders China. They take advantage of the location's convenience to come and go.²⁵
3. 因河套之利，連年傷殘中國。
They take advantage of the Hetao and hurt China every year.²⁶
4. 豐州地多饒沃，先年虜雖駐牧，每遇艸盡，則營帳遠移，乃今築城架屋，東西相望，咸稱板升，其所群聚者，無非驅掠之民與夫亡命之輩也。
Fengzhou is a fertile land, once occupied by nomads who would relocate their tents when the grass became depleted. Today, settlers have established a city with constructed houses, and the region stretching from the west to the east is known as Bayising. The inhabitants here comprise captives and desperadoes.²⁷
5. 雲中北直虜庭，板升叛逆倚虜為患。
In the north region of Yungzhong, near the Mongols' base area, the traitors residing in Bayising rely on the Mongols and cause disturbances.²⁸
6. 西患在板升。
The disturbances in the west occur in Bayising.²⁹
7. 晉患自板升始也。

²⁴ See material 1 in Appendix 1.

²⁵ See material 4 in Appendix 1.

²⁶ See material 8 in Appendix 1.

²⁷ See material 15 in Appendix 1.

²⁸ See material 17 in Appendix 1.

²⁹ See material 16 in Appendix 1.

Shanxi's disturbance starts with Bayising.³⁰

8. 虜數萬仰食板升。

More than 10,000 Mongols depend on Bayising to produce food.³¹

9. 彼中荒旱飢窘，人思南歸。

Bayising endured a drought, leaving many people hungry and eager to return to China.³²

10. 全有眾萬人，騎五萬。

Zhao Quan³³ has 10,000 people and 50,000 horses.³⁴

11. 十萬板升。

[There are] 100,000 Bayising people.³⁵

12. 板升者華言城也，富等先年皆以白蓮教妖術誘虜。

Bayising in Chinese means city. In the previous year, Qiu Fu³⁶ and his followers used black magic from the White Lotus sect³⁷ to persuade the Mongols.³⁸

In line with these depictions, Ming officials perceived Bayising as a significant threat to the northwest region of China, which shared its border, emphasising its potential impact. Interestingly, Bayising was likened to a contemporary China-town in Japan. The Ming court felt uneasy about a substantial Chinese presence overseas, as Ming officials believed it could potentially lead to disturbances for China. Furthermore, by mid-16th century, Bayising had become a crucial agricultural production centre,³⁹ upon which the Mongols heavily depended. However, one record also shows that during periods of prolonged drought in

³⁰ See material 28 in Appendix 1.

³¹ Ming Muzhong Shilu 64.1533.

³² See material 16 in Appendix 1.

³³ Zhao Quan (趙全 in Chinese), one of the Chinese leaders among the followers of White Lotus sect, fled from China to the Mongols in 1554, causing considerable disruption with China.

³⁴ See material 30 in Appendix 1.

³⁵ See material 34 in Appendix 1.

³⁶ Qiu Fu (丘富 in Chinese), one of the Chinese leaders among the followers of the White Lotus sect, fled from China to the Mongols in 1549.

³⁷ The White Lotus sect, a syncretic religion stemming from the Pure Land tradition of Chinese Buddhism and incorporating concepts from Maitreya, Manichaeism, and even Taoism, has a rich developmental history in China. Throughout successive dynasties, the White Lotus society faced government persecution, primarily due to its rebellious tendencies.

³⁸ Ming Shizhong Shilu 486.8100.

³⁹ Jurungya, 2014: 52; Baddeley 1919: 73–77. This situation is corroborated by two external sources beyond Chinese records. Firstly, the previously cited Mongolian manuscript, *The Jewel Translucent Sutra (Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur orošiba)*, highlights Altan Khan's initiatives in cultivating grains, edible roots, and various fruits, aiming to introduce delectable and flavourful foods to Mongolia. Secondly, a 1619 Russian record mentioning Bayising indicates the cultivation of various types of grain plants, including millet, wheat, and spring-sown crops, along with fruits and vegetables.

Bayising, a considerable number of its residents expressed a desire to return to China for habitation. This suggests that Bayising's society remained susceptible. The population of Bayising reportedly reached 100,000, with Zhao Quan leading an impressive group of over 10,000 people and possessing 50,000 horses—a substantial figure, contributing agricultural products in service to the Mongols. Notably, some among them adhered to the White Lotus sect. According to the record in *Wali wugonglu*, this sect constituted 20% of the population in the Bayising settlements, surpassing the population of the Mongols, who made up a mere 5%.⁴⁰ The fact that significant numbers of Chinese individuals occasionally integrated with the Mongols and established settlements on the borderlands near China suggests a lax control by Ming border officials. Hence, it is reasonable to surmise that smuggling across the border might have been prevalent during the period of Bayising's existence. A record discovered in the *Translation of Language (Yiyu 譯語)*, authored during the Ming dynasty by Su Zhigao 蘇志皋 (1497–1569), substantiates this suspicion. It explicitly mentions numerous corrupt practices taking place at the border, with allegations that border guards engaged in private trade with the Mongols.⁴¹

The emergence of Bayising: Ming officials' views

Bayising arose within a unique historical context. The following excerpts from Ming officials elucidate their perspectives on the factors contributing to Bayising's emergence.

1. 邊鄙日荒廢矣，一則官吏貪殘，軍民困苦，忍棄鄉土，甘從醜類。

The borderland became uncultivated and barren. One of the reasons is because of corruption and outrage among the border officials. Soldiers and people expe-

⁴⁰ WLWGL 8.454. '(During the Longqi reign) Those Bayising settlements, whether large or small, collectively housed approximately 50,000 Chinese residents. Notably, among them, around 10,000 identified as followers of the White Lotus sect, with an additional 2,000 being of barbarian origin. Each Bayising settlement was under the guidance of appointed leaders, overseeing populations ranging from a minimum of 600 to 700 individuals, and, in certain instances, extending to 800 to 900 people at most.' 大小板升漢人可五萬餘人; 其間白蓮教可一萬人, 夷二千餘人, 皆有酋長; 分部諸酋, 少者六七百, 多者八九百。

⁴¹ *Yiyu* 230. 'Lots of corrupt practices happen in the border, which cannot all be told. The most serious thing was that many border guards traded with the Mongols. They gave axes to the Mongols in exchange for fur coats; gave iron in exchange for shoulders of mutton; gave flowerlike earrings in exchange for horsetail, gave flints in exchange for lambskins.' 邊方夙弊不可勝言。其甚者墩軍多與零賊交易, 以斧得裘, 鐵得羊肘, 鈿耳墜得馬尾, 火石得羔皮。

rienced difficult and miserable living conditions. They had no choice but to give up their homeland and follow the ugly Mongols.⁴²

2. 俺答非但外集部落亦且內招我民如板升之屬是也。

Anda [Altan Khan] not only gathered their tribes, but also recruit our people, like those in Bayising.⁴³

3. 初趙全與丘富從山西妖人呂明鎮習白蓮教，事覺明鎮伏誅，丘富叛降虜，全懼召其弟龍、王廷輔、李自馨從富降俺答，徃邊外古豐州地居田作，招集中國亡命頗雜漢夷居之，眾數萬人名曰板升。

In the beginning, Zhao Quan and Qiu Fu learned the White Lotus from Lü Mingzhen, the Shanxi sorcerer. Later Lü Mingzhen was killed and Qiu Fu surrendered to the Mongols. Zhao Quan was afraid and called his brothers Zhao Long, Wang Tingfu, and Li Zhixin to follow Qiu Fu and surrender to Anda. They settled beyond the border in Fengzhou and cultivated land there. They recruited people who had committed crimes and fled China. More than 10,000 people lived with the Mongols in the place called Bayising.⁴⁴

4. 聞其黨多我中國人，方其去時，不陷於搶擄，則迫於逃亡，而非其樂也。

I have heard that most of these people are Chinese. They went there either because they had been kidnapped by the Mongols or fled from China to save their lives. This was not what they were willing to do.⁴⁵

5. 今之板升，皆我中國之人或以亡命而自全，或以虜掠而忘反。

As for people in Bayising today, they are our Chinese people, either who committed crimes and fled China or had been kidnapped by the Mongols and did not want to come back.⁴⁶

6. 失業之民，往往有逃虜中者矣。

Jobless people often fled to the Mongols.⁴⁷

7. 其眾悉叛入虜中居板升大為邊患。

Most of the rebels fled to the Mongols and lived in Bayising. They became big trouble in the borderlands.⁴⁸

It can be inferred that the Chinese settlers of Bayising encompassed various groups, including Mongol captives, rebels, adherents of the White Lotus sect, the unemployed, and individuals with criminal backgrounds. Evidently, Ming officials were cognisant of pivotal reasons behind Bayising's emergence within the Mongol-controlled territory bordering China. The migration phenomena can

⁴² See material 2 in Appendix 1.

⁴³ See material 8 in Appendix 1.

⁴⁴ Ming Muzhong Shilu 52.1292.

⁴⁵ See material 3 in Appendix 1.

⁴⁶ See material 14 in Appendix 1.

⁴⁷ See material 34 in Appendix 1.

⁴⁸ Ming Shizhong Shilu 478.8003.

be elucidated through the push-pull theory, as articulated by Bagne (1969). The pull factors predominantly originated from Altan Khan's recruitment initiatives and the allure of fertile agricultural land in the front Hetao region where Bayising was situated. Conversely, push factors emanated chiefly from Ming court pressures on mutineers and White Lotus sect followers, coupled with challenging living conditions in the borderlands. These push factors impelled many individuals to cross the border, serving the Mongols and seeking a higher quality of life. Nevertheless, no author has highlighted that the inability to normalise and stabilise the trade dynamics between the Mongols and China during the Jiajing period could have been a primary catalyst for the emergence of Bayising. This is substantiated by the fact that Bayising, perceived as a threat to the Ming court, gradually receded from the historical forefront of conflict following a peace treaty between Altan Khan and the Ming court, coupled with the establishment of regular trading in 1571. Notably, the evolution of Bayising did not conclude in 1571; instead, it advanced to a subsequent stage of prosperity. As documented in the *Ming Shilu*,⁴⁹ responding to Altan Khan's request, the Ming Wanli emperor in 1575 consented to christen a new city as 'Guihua' 歸化 for Altan Khan, signifying 'return and transform' or 'naturalisation'. As a matter of fact, the inception of Guihua and the 1571 peace treaty marked the commencement of Hohhot's development,⁵⁰ subsequently assuming a pivotal role in facilitating trade between China and the Mongols.

Viewing Bayising settlers: Ming officials' perspectives

Upon my examination of the documents and records referencing Bayising, it becomes evident that the term 'Bayising' is frequently associated with negative terms or emotions, such as traitors, hatred, and disdain.⁵¹ To comprehend why

⁴⁹ Ming Shenzhong Shilu 43.971.

⁵⁰ Elverskog 2000: 81, 133. According to the Mongolian manuscript *The Jewel Translucent Sutra* (also known as *Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur orošiba*), the new city built by Altan Khan was called Kōkeqota in Mongolian, intending to mimic the lost city of Daidu (大都). Some scholars propose that this city is none other than the city Hohhot, asserting that Kōkeqota was the largest among the Bayising settlements. Others suggest that Kōkeqota specifically referred to the initial construction of Mayidari juu in 1572. Based on the description from the aforementioned Mongolian manuscript, Kōkeqota was situated on the south side of the Dalan Terigün Mountains (Daqing Mountains 大青山 in Chinese records). Nevertheless, both the several Bayising settlements and Kōkeqota were situated in the front Hetao area of the Yellow River.

⁵¹ Examples include 'We should hate these people and kill them all.' 當切齒此輩，欲盡屠之，'Bayising traitors.' 板升叛逆，板升諸逆 by Zhang Juzheng. See materials 16 and 17 in Appendix 1.

Ming officials held such unfavourable views toward Bayising and its settlers, it is essential to delve into the behaviours of Bayising settlers perceived by Ming officials as contributing to this negativity. A substantial number of descriptions within the documents shed light on this animosity towards Bayising. The following are illustrative excerpts from Ming officials expressing such sentiments.

1. 與虜之板升相類與其甘為賊用。
They are like the Bayising with the Mongols. They are willing to serve the robbers.⁵²
2. 叛人背華向夷。
They turned to the Mongols and betrayed their home country.⁵³
3. 虜中板升諸處，相鄰伊邇，誘我人民，結聚彌多，凡近日奸細得於盤獲者，率我中國之人，為之向導。
There are several Bayising among the Mongols, which neighbour each other. They tempted Chinese people to go to Bayising, and lots of people gather there. Recently those spies detected and captured by us most likely are our Chinese people. They guide the Mongols to attack China.⁵⁴
4. 自全叛後，教虜左右疏計，課校人畜，益習攻取，圍困，掩襲事，而諸鎮疲於奔命矣。
Since Zhao Quan betrayed China, they taught the Mongols the tactics of arranging troops and logistics in the war. Moreover, they helped the Mongols learn how to conquer, capture, besiege, and launch surprise attacks. Thus, our garrisons are exhausted.⁵⁵
5. 自奸民丘富輩授以攻城之術，於是雲中四境邊堡蕭然無復有存焉者。
Since traitors like Qiu Fu taught the Mongols how to attack fortresses, the fortresses of the four border areas in Yunzhong have all been destroyed, and the areas are desolate now without any fortresses left.⁵⁶
6. 板升之眾，皆中國逋逃，築室耕樹，互市時與虜雜而入市，窺我之虛實動靜，日夜教虜以無厭之求，索無端之賄，要挾邊吏。
Those people who live in Bayising are the ones who fled China. They built houses and cultivated land there. They come with the Mongols when trading starts. They spy on us and day and night teach the Mongols to insatiably seek more. They will ask for bribes and blackmail the border officials.⁵⁷

⁵² See material 1 in Appendix 1.

⁵³ See material 22 in Appendix 1.

⁵⁴ See material 25 in Appendix 1.

⁵⁵ See material 30 in Appendix 1.

⁵⁶ See material 15 in Appendix 1.

⁵⁷ See material 32 in Appendix 1.

7. 嘉靖四十五年事也，板升李自馨等欲要率眾投降。
In Jiajing's 45th year (1566), Li Zhixin and his followers of Bayising wanted to come back to China and surrender.⁵⁸
8. 俺答每欲盜邊，必先置酒全家，計定乃行。全為俺答建九楹殿。
Every time when Anda wants to raid China's borderland, he will prepare a feast in Zhao Quan's home and discuss the tactics, then they will implement it. Zhao Quan built a nine-pillar palace for Anda.⁵⁹
9. 板升被鹵萬人，種田千頃，歲收可充眾食
Those 10,000 Bayising people who are captives from border raids cultivate and have more than 60 million square meters of agricultural land. They produce grain to feed many people.⁶⁰
10. 其板升諸逆，倡為流言，殊為可惡。
Bayising traitors spread rumours that are very hateful.⁶¹
11. 此輩甚不樂貢市，利在搶掠。
They do not like tribute and trading. Instead, they like robbery.⁶²
12. 虜人不知所謂礦，皆板升之徒導之，板升之人雖得礦亦不知煎取之法，又內地之人導之。
The Mongols do not know where the mine is. It is the Bayising people who told the Mongols where to get it. However, the Bayising people do not know how to extract although they know where to find the mine. The people in inner China guided them on how to extract.⁶³
13. 大小板升地方皆為中國人民，比屋而居，耕田而食。其雄桀者即為頭領以統之，而總隸於虜，故月錢行票悉其所為，此皆中外諱言，邊臣所不敢言者。
The people in small and large Bayising are all Chinese people. They live in houses next to each other, cultivate land, and feed themselves with their production. Those people who have exceptional ability are the leaders who manage the people in Bayising and report to the Mongols. So, it is known that the collection of a monthly protection racket for the Mongols is done by them. However, both China and Mongols do not want to speak of it, and the border officials dare not speak of it.⁶⁴
14. 上曰：逆賊背華導虜，擾害邊境，罪不容誅。
The emperor said that those traitors betrayed China and guided the Mongols to harass the borderland. Even death cannot atone for their offence.⁶⁵

⁵⁸ See material 6 in Appendix 1.

⁵⁹ See material 30 in Appendix 1.

⁶⁰ See material 13 in Appendix 1.

⁶¹ See material 21 in Appendix 1.

⁶² See material 21 in Appendix 1.

⁶³ See material 23 in Appendix 1.

⁶⁴ See material 26 in Appendix 1.

⁶⁵ Ming Shizhong Shilu 505.8334.

15. 板升之人久處夷地，狼子野心，終不可馴。

Those Chinese people who have lived in Bayising for a long time have become like sons of wolves with wild minds. These people cannot be tamed.⁶⁶

In the broader perspective, Ming officials perceived the people of Bayising as traitors who, by serving their adversaries, sought to strengthen the Mongols and guide them in attacks against China—an act that fuelled the deep-seated animosity of the Ming court towards them. Furthermore, the Bayising settlers were viewed as exploiting their strategic location to engage in espionage on behalf of the Mongols and were implicated in running a monthly protection racket. As a result, Ming officials nurtured a sense of distrust towards these individuals. Notably, the construction of a nine-pillar palace for Altan Khan by the Bayising people suggested their allegiance to Altan Khan as their leader rather than recognising the Chinese emperor. This sentiment is reinforced in *A Letter of Gratitude from King Shunyi of North Di (Beidi Shunyiwang Anda Xiebiao 北狄順義王俺答謝表)*,⁶⁷ a letter expressing gratitude from Altan Khan to the Longqi emperor of Ming China following the peace treaty and resumption of trading in 1571. In this document, Bayising leader Zhao Quan 趙全 is portrayed as the one who allegedly tempted Altan Khan to raid China and was consequently used as a scapegoat. The excerpt from *Beidi Shunyiwang Anda Xiebiao* serves as a poignant example of why the Ming court held a deep-seated animosity towards the people of Bayising.

每次因奸人趙全等誘引，入邊作歹，雖嘗搶掠些須，人馬常被殺傷。近年各邊時常調兵出搗，殺擄家口，趕奪馬匹，邊外野草盡燒，冬春人畜難過。實臣等罪惡自取，委因趙全等誘引。

Every time I [Altan Khan] was attempted by Zhao Quan, I entered China to engage in wrongful activities. Although I could seize some possessions, I also lost horses and people in the process. In recent years, each garrison has frequently dispatched troops to combat and kill our people, confiscating our horses. Across the border, all the grasslands have been ravaged by fire, making survival during winter and spring a formidable challenge, all attributable to my actions. I accept the consequences, but it's undeniable that Zhao Quan led me astray.

⁶⁶ Ming Shenzhong Shilu 141.2636.

⁶⁷ BDSYWADXB 1.21–37. This letter is certainly not the original composition in Mongolian by Altan Khan, and it has been translated into Chinese and rephrased to conform to the preferences of the Chinese authorities of that era. Nevertheless, it preserves crucial messages pertaining to the interactions and relationships between the Mongols and the Ming court.

Furthermore, the materials indicate that the Bayising leader Li Zhixin (?–1571) expressed a desire to return to China with his followers in 1566. It appears that the Bayising settlers, serving as labourers for the Mongols, encountered conditions that were different from what they had anticipated.

Addressing the Bayising issue: Perspectives of Ming officials

The emergence of Bayising suggests that neither China nor the Mongols possessed sufficient power to overcome their adversary. Nevertheless, given the Ming court's perception of Bayising as a substantial threat, Ming officials took responsive actions. Within the scrutinised documents, various proposed approaches are evident, with some evolving into policies that were eventually implemented. These approaches are delineated below.

1. 多方設法招回在虜人口，免其糧差，加意安輯。嘉靖末年多有邊民逃入虜中，若板升之眾是也。
Try many ways to call back those people who are with the Mongols, waive their taxes and labour requirements. Pay attention to arranging them. Many people living in the borderlands fled to the Mongols in the last few years of Jiajing's reign. These people are the Bayising people.⁶⁸
2. 一廣招降，此時板升之眾築城近邊故也，臣等議得虜營之兵，多半俱係漢人，豈無父母妻子之念。
Firstly, we should broadly call back these people, as now the Bayising people have built the houses and castles near the border. We discussed and concluded that more than 50% of the soldiers among the Mongols are Chinese people. How can they live without missing their parents, wives, and children?⁶⁹
3. 或購賞以擒渠魁，或遣間以離黨與，務使互相疑貳，莫敢近邊。
We can offer a bounty for the capture of Bayising leaders, or we can send spies to create factions among the people and make them suspect each other so that they dare not to go to the border.⁷⁰
4. 板升之眾亦有謀歸中國者，而以獨力謀，洩事不成者多有，若能用間以招之，當必有應者，復廣募間諜之士。
There are some people in Bayising who wanted to return China. They planned it independently but eventually failed due to information leakage. If we can segre-

⁶⁸ See material 2 in Appendix 1.

⁶⁹ See material 5 in Appendix 1.

⁷⁰ See material 2 in Appendix 1.

gate them to lure them back, there must be some people who respond. We should broadly recruit them as spies.⁷¹

5. 如仍畏避執迷，甘為虜中奴僕，或聽諸逆反役虜地耕納，人心已死，天道必誅。將來進兵，盡從剿殺。

If they insist and still want to serve the Mongols or listen to those people who betrayed China and work with the Mongols, their human hearts are dead. Heaven will punish them, and in the future, we are going to send troops to kill them all.⁷²

6. 請與我諸經籍以教虜，令習章句，通文墨，不數年大弱矣。

The Bayising people asked for various books from us in order to teach the Mongols. So, if we can teach the Mongols to learn Chinese characters and literature, the Mongols will become much weaker in a few years.⁷³

7. 夫板升者未易散也，而散之亦非計也。我有意化虜，即彼既為之兆也，又將為之前茅者也。

It is not easy to disperse those people gathered in Bayising, and dispersion is not a good idea. If we intend to change the Mongols, then these people not only can be an indication, but also can be the pioneers.⁷⁴

8. 責令俺酋將版升諸逆賊首趙全等生擒解送，被掠人口，悉放南歸，然後優加賞給。

Ask Anda to capture and send back the leaders of the Bayising people like Zhao Quan, etc. to China and return the captives. Then, we can offer premium rewards to the Mongols.⁷⁵

9. 或遣善事者，並皆詐逃其地，俾與逃叛人民雜處，務誘結叛民魁桀者，伺虜可乘，則磔取以獻功。虜不可乘，則盡約叛民願歸之眾以受賞，或叛民地方並胡虜巢穴有可陰擊，則設伏掩殺以振威武，使叛眾畏威來歸。或虜與叛民交結已固，尤宜遣最熟間諜，乘隙密間虜心，使之多殺逃叛，激其歸志，蓋虜地既多中國之民。

Or we can send some people who are good at their jobs, pretend that they fled China to live with those Bayising people who also fled China. We must try to connect with those leaders who betrayed China, seek opportunities to kill these people and make contributions. If there is no opportunity, then invite those people who want to return to China and come back for the rewards. Or when Bayising and the place where the Mongols live are defenceless, take the opportunity to kill them in an ambush and show our might, so that the Bayising people will fear for their lives and come back to China. Or in case the traitors have a firm relationship with the Mongols, it is better to send the best spies who are familiar with

⁷¹ See material 3 in Appendix 1.

⁷² See material 9 in Appendix 1.

⁷³ See material 36 in Appendix 1.

⁷⁴ See material 36 in Appendix 1.

⁷⁵ See material 11 in Appendix 1.

the situation to tear these traitors and the Mongols apart, so that we can make the Mongols kill more of the traitors. This can push more Bayising people to come back to China, as there are so many Chinese people among the Mongols.⁷⁶

10. 因而撫之，明示以聖朝不殺之仁，使之自生自養。

Comfort their minds and express the policy of no killing. Let them be independent and self-sufficient.⁷⁷

11. 開其生路、嘉其順志、因時撫處、輯其心而藉其力。

Make ways for them to survive. Encourage them to be obedient, and take advantage of their forces. We can use them one day when needed.⁷⁸

12. 此輩正宜置之虜中，他日有用他處，不必招之來歸。

These people should still remain among the Mongols. We need not call them back as we may need them one day.⁷⁹

13. 板升徒眾既多，在虜已久，許令照舊耕牧外，自納貢以後，我不受彼之降虜，彼勿納我之叛人。

So many people have already gathered in Bayising. They have lived among the Mongols for a long time. Let them cultivate land and tend to cattle as usual. In addition, since the tribute was re-established, we have not accepted the Mongols who wanted to surrender to us. The Mongols no longer accept our Chinese traitors who want to join the Mongols.⁸⁰

It can be deduced that the Ming court adopted two primary strategies as measures to address the Bayising issue: offering incentives to lure back the Bayising residents and deploying troops to eliminate them. Historical records affirm the implementation of both approaches. Notably, entries in the *Ming Shilu* document the recall of 1,640 Chinese individuals from Bayising in 1558,⁸¹ over 1,800 individuals in 1562,⁸² 1,980 individuals in 1563,⁸³ and 729 individuals in 1564.⁸⁴ Additionally, the records highlight an incident in 1565 where Li Zhixin, a Chinese leader in Bayising, expressed a desire to return to China with his group but faced challenges in doing so.⁸⁵ A memorial to the throne authored by Shen Han 沈涵 (1541–?) further attests that 2,422 individuals were recalled

⁷⁶ See material 26 in Appendix 1.

⁷⁷ See material 14 in Appendix 1. This material was written after reaching the peace treaty in 1571.

⁷⁸ See material 14 in Appendix 1. This material was written after reaching the peace treaty in 1571.

⁷⁹ See material 20 in Appendix 1. This material was written after reaching the peace treaty in 1571.

⁸⁰ See material 22 in Appendix 1. This material was written after reaching the peace treaty in 1571.

⁸¹ Ming Shizhong Shilu 469.7886.

⁸² Ming Shizhong Shilu 518.8497.

⁸³ Ming Shizhong Shilu 530.8543.

⁸⁴ Ming Shizhong Shilu 543.8779.

⁸⁵ Ming Shizhong Shilu 546.8818.

in 1568, 15 people in 1574, and 12 people in 1575.⁸⁶ Additionally, one of the memorials to the throne written by Wang Chonggu 王崇古 (1541–1588), the Supreme Commander of Military Affairs and Director General of Supplies of Xuanfu-Datong, reports that 2,226 people returned to China from the Mongols in 1570.⁸⁷ A record from the *Ming Shilu* also records the return of 4,787 individuals to China in 1571.⁸⁸ Notably, the discernible decline in the number of people recalled in 1574 and 1575 compared to previous years can be attributed to the peace treaty reached in 1571. Given that the Bayising settlers played a crucial role in meeting the Mongols' food production requirements, the Ming court, upon the initial establishment of the peace treaty, hesitated to recall individuals, fearing potential conflict with the Mongols. Fang Fongshi 方逢時 (1522–1596), a key figure in securing the peace treaty, conveyed in his memorial to the throne that the repatriation of Chinese settlers of Bayising may lead to disturbances with the Mongols, jeopardising the newly attained peace.⁸⁹ Zhang Juzheng, in a letter to Fang Fongshi, echoed the sentiment, suggesting that these individuals should remain in Bayising, emphasising their potential future utility.⁹⁰ Wang Chonggu 王崇古 similarly advocated for minimising the recall of Bayising people to avoid provoking conflicts with the Mongols.⁹¹ Furthermore, the agreement between the Ming court and the Mongols specified that if the Ming court accepted Bayising residents, compensation was required to offset the Mongols' losses.⁹² This condition served as a pretext for Ming border officials to abstain from receiving individuals from Bayising.⁹³ Moreover, various authors highlighted the use of Bayising settlers as spies. Notably, a record in the *Ming Shilu* reveals that, before the peace treaty, two individuals residing in Bayising for an extended period received rewards from the Ming court. They facilitated communication with one of the Bayising Chinese leaders, attempting to persuade

⁸⁶ See material 38 in Appendix 1.

⁸⁷ See material 9 in Appendix 1.

⁸⁸ Ming Shenzhong Shilu 3.89.

⁸⁹ See material 14 in Appendix 1. 'Now that the Mongols have submitted, and we have an agreement with them, recalling people would signal our distrust and potentially lead to a quarrel with the Mongols.' 今虜服矣，與之約矣，而複招之，是自示以不信，而啟虜以乘釁之事也。

⁹⁰ See material 20 in Appendix 1.

⁹¹ *Ming Muzhong Shilu* 64.1533. 'Over 10,000 Mongols rely on Bayising for grain production. If we recall them too hastily, it might incite a conflict.' 虜數萬仰食板升收獲，若招徠太速恐啟戎。

⁹² SYCHZK 2.35.

⁹³ See material 38 in Appendix 1. 'The substantial variation in the count of repatriated individuals surely has underlying reasons. It is quite likely that the Mongol chief's requests for rewards will be wielded as a justification by the border officials.' 招降人數多寡懸絕如此，是可謂無其故哉？大抵邊臣每以中國收降虜酋索賞為詞。

him and his followers to return to China, despite an ultimately unsuccessful outcome.⁹⁴ These two individuals later returned to China, providing the court with a map detailing the Mongols' territory.

While the proactive recall of Bayising residents was an approach adopted by the Ming court to address the Bayising issue before the peace treaty, Ming officials observed instances where certain border commanders and soldiers allegedly killed returning Bayising individuals. These officials purportedly portrayed the victims as spies or enemies to claim rewards. In a memorial to the throne, Wang Chonggu expressed the following concern:

諸邊頻年招引人口，率皆中國被鹵奔命投歸，各該將官中間或有陰縱家丁悍卒，戮歸人以冒升賞者。有家丁悍卒，守墩出哨，通同擅殺，捏報將官，而將官反為庇護者。又有歸人叩邊，墩軍不在，或坐視而不肯引送，歸人出不得已，乘空而入，經過地方有司盤獲，因無左驗，誣為奸細而竟坐以斬者，傷天地之和，阻來歸之路。

Several garrisons continuously call back people every year. Most of them were captives who desperately wanted to come back to China. Some commanders secretly allowed their soldiers to kill those who wanted to come back and report that those people were spies or enemies in order to get rewards. Some soldiers killed those people who wanted to return when they were on duty to protect the base or on patrol. They falsely reported to the commanders, and their commanders concealed the truth. Some people returned to the border, but no guard was around, or the guards did not want to assist. Those people who wanted to return had no alternative but to take advantage of the gap to enter the border. Later, these people were captured by local authorities and could not show any documents. They were framed and viewed as spies and then were executed. This damages peace in heaven and on earth, as well as stops those people who wanted to return.⁹⁵

From this statement, it is imaginable how precarious it must have been for those Bayising individuals eager to return to China, faced with the dilemma that they encountered. Regarding the deployment of troops to eliminate Bayising settlers, the *Ming Shilu* records again provide insights into such occurrences. In 1560, Liu Han 劉漢 (?-?), the Datong regional commander, dispatched 3,000 soldiers to assail Bayising, resulting in the deaths of 83 individuals and the capture of 67. The military action led to the destruction of their palaces and houses, though Zhao Quan, a significant Bayising leader, managed to escape.⁹⁶ In one of Wang Chonggu's memorials to the throne, a proposal was made that, as a precondition

⁹⁴ Ming Muzhong Shilu 22.589.

⁹⁵ See material 9 in Appendix 1.

⁹⁶ See material 9 in Appendix 1.

before reaching a peace treaty with Altan Khan, Zhao Quan and other prominent leaders should be repatriated to China.⁹⁷ Remarkably, this proposal was accepted and transformed into policy by the Ming court. Consequently, in 1571, Zhao Quan and other Bayising leaders were sent back to the Ming court and subsequently executed.⁹⁸

Conclusion

The materials in the *Huang Ming Jinshi Wen Bian*, the *Huang Ming Jialong Shu Chao*, and the *Ming Shilu* illuminate Ming officials' perceptions of the Chinese residents in Bayising, the underlying reasons for the emergence of Bayising, and the Ming officials' approach to the Bayising threat. Primarily, the Bayising residents, particularly the Chinese leaders of Bayising, were labelled as traitors aiding the Mongols. This accounts for the prevalent negative impressions towards those Bayising residents who were originally from China in the historical records of Ming China. Nevertheless, certain Ming officials expressed profound sympathy for the Chinese inhabitants of Bayising. Additionally, Ming officials considered Bayising and its residents a national security concern near the Chinese border. The disdain towards the Bayising Chinese inhabitants stemmed not only from their residence in Mongol territory but also from their actions against China. Following the 1571 peace treaty with the Mongols, bringing back Bayising people was no longer a primary focus for the Ming court in addressing the Bayising issue. Instead, the number of individuals returning to China significantly declined. After 1571, the Ming government acknowledged the advantages of allowing Chinese Bayising residents to remain in the region. This decision was driven by the anticipation of their potential future utility for the Ming court and the desire to maintain the newly established Sino–Mongol relationship, as the Mongols heavily depended on Bayising for food production. The materials also delineate the timeframe during which the Bayising issue notably concerned the Ming court: approximately 80 years, starting from 1546, though the establishment of Bayising likely predates this period. As Bayising gradually ceased to be a major concern for the Ming court after the 1571 peace treaty, it integrated into the subsequent tribute and trade system between the Mongols and Ming China. The Ming emperor's christening of the new city built by Altan Khan as 'Guihua' and granting permission for Bayising people to stay among the Mongols symbolised this transformative phase.

⁹⁷ Ming Muzhong Shilu 486.8100–8101.

⁹⁸ See material 11 in Appendix 1.

Furthermore, we observed that a significant number of memorials to the throne and letters from relevant officials, particularly Fang Fengshi, Wang Chonggu, and Zhang Juzheng, are highly aligned with the actual process and conditions of reaching the success of 1571 peace treaty. Notably, key examples include proposals urging Altan Khan to return Chinese leaders of Bayising to China as a precondition for the peace treaty. Another pivotal incident centred on the repatriation of Baya Ači (1552–1583, 把漢那吉 or 大成台吉 in Chinese records), which means ‘little or younger grandson’, also known as Daičing Ejei Tayiji,⁹⁹ Altan Khan’s grandson who sought refuge in China in 1570, serving as a diplomatic pawn to initiate peace talks and facilitate the exchange of Bayising Chinese leaders.¹⁰⁰ Reviewing these historical documents from Ming China that mention Bayising, we reveal a progression of shaping perceptions to formal proposals through memorials to the throne and letters, ultimately translating into implemented policies in the realm of foreign affairs with the Mongols.

In summary, the emergence of Bayising was grounded in a distinctive historical context. Additionally, Bayising played a crucial role not only in shaping Sino–Mongol relations but also in facilitating collaboration between nomadic and agricultural communities when official trade channels were absent. Neither the repatriation nor military intervention proved to be fundamental solutions to the Bayising issue amidst the ongoing confrontation between the Mongols and Ming court. However, the establishment of normalised and stabilised trade, following the mutually beneficial peace treaty, emerged as a definitive resolution benefiting both parties.

⁹⁹ Temule 2016: 125. According to *Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur orošiba*, his name was recorded as Daičing Ejei Tayiji.

¹⁰⁰ See material 11 in Appendix 1; *Ming Muzhong Shilu* 50:1252; *Ming Muzhong Shilu* 51:1277.

Appendix 1: List of the material and authors in the *Huang Min Jinshi Wen Bian* 皇明經世文編 and the *Huang Ming Jialong Shu Chao* 皇明嘉隆疏抄

Material code	Author name	Year of <i>jinsshi</i> (進士) exam passed	Highest position held	Title/Source
1	Qian Wei 錢薇 (1502–1554)	1532	Supervising Secretary of the Office of the Scrutiny of Rites (Li ke ji shi zhong 禮科給事中)	<i>Yudangdao Chuwoyi</i> 與當道處倭議 HMJSWB 214:254.
2	Zheng Xiao 鄭曉 (1499–1566)	1523	Minister of Justice (Xing bu shang shu 刑部尚書)	<i>Huiyi Datong Xunan Shangyue Tibingxiang Shu</i> 會議大同巡按尚約題兵餉疏 HMJSWB 217:288.
3	Cheng Wende 程文德 (1487–1559)	1529	Zhejiang Provincial Administration Commission (Zhejiang cheng xuan bu zheng shi si 浙江承宣布政使司)	<i>Mielu Liushi Shu</i> 滅虜六事疏 HMJSWB 221:331.
4	Zhao Bingran 趙炳然 (1507–1569)	1535	Minister of War (Bing bu shang shu 兵部尚書)	<i>Tiwei Jinglüe Zhongzhen Bianwu Yijituanrang Dajishi</i> 題為經畧重鎮邊務以極圖安攘大計事 HMJSWB 253:688.
5	Yang Bo 楊博 (1509–1574)	1529	Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent (Tai zi tai shi 太子太師) Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Luzhong Xiangren Chuanbao Yiqing Shu</i> 虜中降人傳報夷情疏 HMJSWB 275:231.

6	Yang Bo 楊博 (1509–1574)	1529	Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent (太子太師) Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Fuxuanda Zongdu Jiangdongzhuoyi Bansheng Guizheng</i> 覆宣大總督江東酌議板升歸正 HMJSWB 276.249.
7	Gao Gong 高拱 (1513–1578)	1541	Chief Grand Secretary (Nei ge shou fu 內閣首輔)	<i>Luzhong Neifu Bianhuan Shaoning Qijishi Daxiubianzheng Yiyongtu Zhian Shu</i> 虜眾內附邊患稍寧乞及時大修邊政以永圖治安疏 HMJSWB 310.490.
8	Cai Runan 蔡汝楠 (1515–1565)	1532	Right Vice Minister of War (Bing bu you shi lang 兵部右侍郎)	<i>Shuyugeyanbianqing Zanxiurang Yiguangshenwushishu</i> 攄愚個言邊情贊修攘以光神武事疏 HMJSWB 315.656.
9	Wang Chonggu 王崇古 (1515–1588)	1541	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Hegongshi Gengshangge Yikai Guiminxianghua shu</i> 核功實更賞格以開歸民向化疏 HMJSWB 316.674.
10	Wang Chonggu 王崇古 (1515–1588)	1541	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Yanchi shanxi Neijun Bingwu Zhuanzeren Yifalumou Shu</i> 嚴飭山西內郡兵務專責任以伐虜謀疏 HMJSWB 316.670.
11	Wang Chonggu 王崇古 (1515–1588)	1541	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Weiyiqiu Kuansai Zhuoyi shiyi Shu</i> 為夷酋款塞酌議事宜疏 HMJSWB 316.676.

12	Wang Chonggu 王崇古 (1515–1588)	1541	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Queyi Fenggong Shiyi Shu</i> 確議封貢事宜疏 HMJSWB 317.684.
13	Wang Chonggu 王崇古 (1515–1588)	1541	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Zhuoxu Luwang Qingqi Sishi Shu</i> 酌許虜王請乞四事疏 HMJSWB 318.701.
14	Fang Fengshi 方逢時 (1522–1596)	1541	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Weichen Bianwu Shenluqing Yi dingguoshi Yiyong Dajishi</i> 為陳邊務申虜情以定國是以永大計事 HMJSWB 321.20.
15	Huo Ji 霍冀 (1516–1575)	1544	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Yangzun Mingzhao Gongjin Jiubiantushuo Yibian Shenglanshi</i> 仰遵明詔恭進九邊圖說以便聖覽事 HMJSWB 323.35.
16	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Yujiliaozongdu Mouandabansheng Zhishi</i> 與薊遼總督謀俺荅板升之始 HMJSWB 326.80.
17	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Dajizhen Fuyuan Wangjianchuan Lunjibian Wuhuan</i> 荅薊鎮撫院王鑿川論薊邊五患 HMJSWB 326.79.
18	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Yuwangjianchuan Mouqu Bansheng Zhiluchuni Zhilu</i> 與王鑿川謀取板升制虜 HMJSWB 326.82.

19	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Dawangjianchuan Jigongshi Lihai</i> 答王鑾川計貢市利害 HMJSWB 326.83.
20	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Dajiliaozongdu Fangjinhu Jichubansheng Nizhong</i> 答薊遼總督方金湖計處板升逆種 HMJSWB 327.91.
21	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Dafangjinhu</i> 答方金湖 HMJSWB 327.92.
22	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Dashanxi Cuixunfu</i> 答山西崔巡撫 HMJSWB 327.99.
23	張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Daxuanfuzongdu Zhengfanxi</i> 答宣府總督鄭範溪 HMJSWB 328.110.
24	Zhang Juzheng 張居正 (1525–1582)	1547	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Dasanbianzongdu</i> 答三邊總督鄭範溪 MJSWB 328.115.
25	Zhang Lu 張 鹵 (1523– 1598)	1559	Chief Minister of Judicial Review (Da li si qing 大理寺卿)	<i>Xianyuzhong Yiyuchifangqiu Dajishu</i> 獻愚忠以預飭防秋大計疏 HMJSWB 364.524.
26	Wei Shiliang 魏時亮 (1529–1591)	1559	Nanjing Minister of Justice (Nan jing xing bu shang shu 南京刑部尚書)	<i>Tiweishengming Jiayilufang Gongchendaji Yishibayi Shu</i> 題為聖明加意虜防恭陳大計一十八議疏 HMJSWB 371.599.

27	Zhang Siwei 張四維 (1526–1585)	1553	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Yuwangjianchuan Lungongshi Dijiu Shu</i> 與王鑿川論貢市第九書 HMJSWB 373.633.
28	Yu Youding 余 有丁 (1527– 1584)	1562	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Kuanlu Cewen</i> 款虜策問 HMJSWB 391.92.
29	Wang Jiaping 王家屏 (1537–1604)	1568	Chief Grand Secretary (內閣首輔)	<i>Dashidongquan Sima</i> 答石東泉司馬 HMJSWB 393.107.
30	Feng Shike 馮 時可 (1549–?)	1571	Right Administration Vice Commissioner of a Province (Bu zheng si you can zheng 布政司右參 政)	<i>Anda Houzhi</i> 俺答後志 HMJSWB 434.612.
31	Tu zongjun 涂 宗濬 (1555– 1621)	1583	Minister of War (兵部尚書)	<i>Subuchongbian Jiangling Fajiaomou Shu</i> 速補衝邊將領伐狡 謀疏 HMJSWB 450.86.
32	Chen Yidian 陳懿典 (1554–1638)	1592	Hanlin Academician Reader-in-waiting (Han lin yuan shi du xue shi 翰林院侍讀 學士)	<i>Choubianyigao Xu</i> 籌邊移稿序 HMJSWB 465.244.
33	Li weizhen 李 維楨 (1547– 1626)	1568	Nanjing Minister of Rites (Nan jing li bu shang shu 南京禮部 尚書)	<i>Jiubianjilüe Xu</i> 九邊輯略序 HMJSWB 466.260.
34	Song Yihang 宋一韓 (?–?)	1592	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for War (Bing ke ji shi zhong 兵科給 事中)	<i>Fuzhenqididanlu Qingchakan Yizheng Qijunfuguo zhizui Shu</i> 撫鎮棄地啖虜請查勘 以正欺君負國之罪疏 HMJSWB 467.263.

35	Song Yihang 宋一韓 (?-?)	1592	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for War (兵科給事中)	<i>Bianfang Nanyu Xuanda Jiyu Jizhen Jingchenmoyi Yibei Sheng ming Caize</i> 邊防難於宣大急於薊鎮敬陳末議以備聖明採擇疏 HMJSWB 467.269.
36	Xu Guangqi 徐光啟 (1562–1633)	1604	Minister of Rites (Li bu shang shu 禮部尚書)	<i>Furongce</i> 服戎策 HMJSWB 492.598.
37	Li Tang 李棠 (?-?)	1538	Right Vice Minister of Personnel (Li bu you shi lang 吏部右侍郎)	<i>Zecheng zhongchen Jishi Jinglüebianwu Shu</i> 責成重臣及時經畧邊務疏 HMJSWB BY1.687.
38	Shen Han 沈涵 (1541–?)	1571	Investigating Censor in the Investigation Bureau (Jian cha yu shi 監察御史)	<i>Tiwei Kubaobianguan Choushi Xiangren Yinhuaibianshi Kenqi</i> 題為酷暴邊官讎視降人陰壞邊事墾乞 HMJLSC 16.691.

**Appendix 2: Instances of words associated
with the term ‘Bayising’ 板升 / 版升 in the *Ming Shilu***

Instances	Year	Reign of Emperor	Source
1	1559	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 478.8003
2	1560	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 486.8100
3	1560	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 486.8100
4	1560	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 486.8100
5	1562	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 505.8334
6	1564	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 539.8732
7	1565	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 546.8818

8	1565	Jiajing 嘉靖	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 553.8905
9	1568	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 22.589
10	1568	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 22.597
11	1568	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 23.616
12	1570	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 50.1252
13	1570	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 51.1277
14	1570	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 52.1292
15	1570	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 52.1292
16	1570	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 52.1293
17	1571	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shizhong Shilu</i> 64.1533
18	1572	Longqing 隆慶	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 3.67
19	1576	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 52.1229
20	1577	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 67.1458
21	1582	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 129.2406
22	1583	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 141.2635
23	1583	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 141.2636
24	1583	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 143.2666
25	1583	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 143.2666
26	1583	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 143.2666
27	1586	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 172.3158
28	1586	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 172.3158
29	1587	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 189.3548
30	1591	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 238.4409
31	1611	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 485.9146
32	1612	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 503.9562
33	1618	Wanli 萬曆	<i>Ming Shenzhong Shilu</i> 576.10903
34	1626	Tianqi 天啟	<i>Ming Xizhong Shilu</i> 72.3500

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