BEYOND THE STRATEGY OF IGNORANCE
– HOW AND WHAT CAN BENEFIT
COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS FROM PHENOMENOLOGY?*

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*"Interdisciplinarity is hard,
but it is the only option."*
(Ellen Spolsky)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand I aim to demonstrate the benefits that cognitive linguistics can have from a phenomenological contemplation; on the other I would like to demonstrate that in spite of the anti-philosophical attitude of the naturalizing cognitive sciences, a phenomenological reflection on the subject and the methods of cognitive linguistic research can provide numerous considerations which can help us to avoid both the problematic theoretical presuppositions (e.g. reductionism or the problem of isolated minds) and the conflation of the research field of cognitive linguistics with other fields in cognitive science. To make the case for choosing phenomeonology as one of the metatheories of cognitive linguistics I investigate the problem of representation and metaphor in standard cognitive science and in cognitive linguistics. The phenomenological discussion of the process of cognition has several theoretical insights about the status of the experience and the subject, the meaningfulness of perception, the situatedness of experiencing the phenomenal world, the central significance of meaning as a constitutional pattern, and the implicit horizon of intersubjectivity. The paper dwells on the methodological consequences of these insights too.

Keywords: phenomenology, cognitive linguistics, representation, constitution, intersubjectivity, metaphor

1. Introduction

More than a decade ago a debate was held on the adequacy of embodied realism for cognitive linguistic investigations (See Rakova 2002, Johnson−Lakoff 2002, Krzeszowski 2002, Sinha 2002). Perhaps the most interesting result of it was not the various interpretations of conceptual metaphor theory, but the foregrounded relation between cognitive linguistics and philosophy, since the main arguments and objections shed light on a latent anti-philosophical attitude of the mainstream theory of embodied cognition in linguistics. Though Rakova had made several critical claims about the role of preconceptual patterns in concept formation deserving attention from the representatives of the notion of embodiment, the main answer of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff for the critique was that

"[b]ecause she [Marina Rakova] has successfully mastered and incorporated the Western philosophical tradition and made it part of her mode of thought, she natural-

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ly and systematically misreads our work – and will similarly misread a large body of the research in cognitive linguistics" (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 258).

From this conviction it follows that if one aims at interpreting the philosophical framework of embodied realism from the Western philosophical point of view, he or she will not meet with complete success, because Lakoff and Johnson "hold a third position" from which they can move beyond the rigid, dichotomous formulation of the questions in cognitive science. The essence of this position is motivated by empirical evidence:

> "the question of the necessity and cognitive reality of embodied realism is an *empirical* issue, not a matter of armchair speculation but rather a question of what view of human cognition is supported by the evidence and is necessary to explain human meaning and *all forms* of symbolic expression" (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 246, second emphasis is added).

The skeletal structure of the theoretical argumentation is that (i) embodied realism is based on strong empirical grounds, the evidences of various fields of research (from neuroscience to historical linguistics) support only the embodied notion of meaning; (ii) because of the long standing but senseless speculative philosophical tradition, many of the researchers are not able to accept the new way of thinking; (iii) since embodied realism contradicts the assumptions of the philosophical tradition, (iv) the solutions are ignoring philosophy as it is and directing our attention to the empirical evidences.

Although Tomasz Krzeszowski (2002: 266) raised in his comment that Johnson and Lakoff are forced "to see their data through their own glasses of embodied realism, in a way that best fits their own ideas", i. e. they have their own lenses of theoretical assumptions, and reality is not given in the data, it is the data-driven, radical empiricist scientific position which is worth our attention. From an experientialist (or embodied realistic) point of view, philosophy is mere speculation, a first-person conception of the things in a world, which has nothing to do with reality itself, thus we had better abandon it.

It is the naturalistic attitude towards investigated phenomena and theoretical questions that can be characterized with the above mentioned anti-philosophical standpoint:

> "a philosophical perspective on utterance processing [or broadly on cognition – S. G.] is not reducible to a scientific, psychological one: rather, in the latter there often remain hidden philosophical presuppositions, which may require overt philosophical discussion. What philosophy can say about utterance processing [and about cognition – S. G.], moreover, hardly count as a description of actual processes and is more likely to hold as the rational reconstruction of how a certain understanding may be arrived at and justified" (Sbisà 2011: 7).

Unfortunately, by reason of the mistrust towards philosophy, and despite the fact that they consider their theory as a new philosophical perspective, Lakoff and Johnson are not able to recognize that philosophy is not an unrealistic ("armchair") speculation, but it is a way of scientific thinking which always offers a more comprehensive approach to phenomena than the objectscientific explanation offered by particular disciplines (for objectsciences, see Kertész 2004: 24), which treat things in their own original relations. A philosophical argumentation

takes the phenomena out of their natural context of appearance, and confronts them with the general possibilities of cognition (Mezei 1997: 98). As Dan Zahavi states it,

> "[p]hilosophy is a discipline which doesn't simply contribute to or extend the scope of our scientific knowledge, but which instead investigates the basis of this knowledge and asks how it is possible" (Zahavi 2010: 6).

The other profit of philosophical contemplation is clarifying the core notions of linguistic research (Sbisà 2011: 9), and it is exactly such a clarification of the notion of embodiment which is initiated by Rakova (2002: 218), nevertheless in their answer Johnson and Lakoff refused both the reinterpretation of the core notion in the light of epistemological assumptions and the initiative of rethinking old concepts in view of the empirical evidence: "[w]e reject such classical notions of representation, along with the view of meaning and reference that are built on them" (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 250).

It is clear from the foregoing that the debate on embodied realism seems to be saddeningly unproductive: as Krzeszowski (2002: 266) notes it, even in the case of highly controversial perspectives of the participants, there would be a lot of emerging questions deserving discussion, but the clash of contemplative versus anti-philosophical standpoints makes the debate much less discursive. However, there are two ways out of this gap between first and third personal attitudes, both of which narrow the validity of the third personal attitude reminding us that in humanities the observer is one part of the observed world.

One of the viewpoints making the tightening of the gap possible is offered by the notion of evolution. Though the field of cognitive linguistics is heterogeneous regarding the theoretical presuppositions of the different investigations, there is a very important shared theoretical commitment:

> "the human mind is structured by the evolutionary and developmental processes which underlie, and have been selected by, the interaction between the human organism (brain-in-body) and its (developing) environment" (Sinha 2002: 274).

If we admit the constraints of the evolutionary process on our cognition, we will be able to recognize the predispositions affecting our observations.

The other perspective is the phenomenological one: following Husserl's method "back to the things themselves", we can realize the importance of subjective consciousness in experiencing the world, as well as the multiple possible attitudes toward the phenomenal world, which determine how the world is given to us. The main aim of phenomenology – in contrast with the sciences based on mathematics – is not to explain the world as such but to describe in the most accurate way how the world makes itself evident for consciousness, how the things arise in our direct sensory experience (Abram 1996: 35, see also Reynaert−Verschueren 2011: 218−219). Thus phenomenology can be indeed a productive approach for cognitive linguistics in the field of metascientific reasoning, for

> "[e]ven the most detached scientist must begin and end her study in [the] indeterminate field of experience, where shifts of climate or mood may alter his experiment or her interpretation of »the data«. [...] Our spontaneous experience of the world, charged with subjective, emotional, and intuitive content, remains the vital and dark ground of all our objectivity" (Abram 1996: 33−34, see also Varela 2002: 140).

In other words, phenomenology directs our attention to encountering the world as human beings in an environment which determines and adjusts itself to the structure of our experience. It is the active subject-environment interaction that is studied by phenomenology in a rigorous way as expected from a scientific discipline but with a theoretical attitude inherited from philosophical tradition. Therefore a phenomenological account of cognition can integrate the first and the third personal methods of scientific inquiry: it can highlight not only the experiential grounds of meaning, but also its social aspects, the significant role of the intuitions and intentions of language users, which make the individual meanings conventional and intersubjective.

For these reasons I aim to elaborate an accurate theoretical system of notions and background assumptions on the basis of phenomenology and the cognitive application of its ideas. My hope is that such a philosophical framework can serve cognitive linguistics at a metatheoretical level, making on the one hand the cognitive linguistic enterprise more reflected, and making on the other the move beyond the classical dichotomies possible not without philosophy, but as a result of theoretical contemplation on notions and evidences.

The canonizing efforts of phenomenology in cognitive linguistics is very much on the agenda: though two handbook were published in 2008 and in 2010 about the fruitful interrelations between phenomenology and cognitive sciences (Mattens ed. 2008, Gallagher−Schmicking eds. 2010), in Hungarian cognitive linguistics they remained without reactions: one of the representative handbooks of cognitive linguistics does not mention phenomenology at all (see Kövecses−Benczes 2010), the other more detailed handbook acknowledges a partial effect of phenomenology, but it refers to the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger only in relation to time perception and the semantic structure of verbs (see Tolcsvai Nagy 2013: 35, 72, 74).

The study is structured as follows. First it is demonstrated through the dilemma of representation that the naturalistic attitude in metascience cannot yield a real solution of theoretical problems in cognitive linguistics (2). Then I collect the most difficult notions and epistemological problems of the field in our days, and I attempt to demonstrate how a phenomenological approach can help us give proper answers to the questions which have emerged (3). The study ends with a summary of the most important results of articulating a phenomenological cognitive linguistics (4).

2. A dilemma and what is in the background of it

It seems that the whole story can be grasped with the notion of representations. For one of the most fundamental questions arising in cognitive linguistic research is whether there is any need of representations to explain cognition and the role of language in cognition.[1] The representationalist view (represented by e. g. Leonard Talmy, Ronald Langacker) claims that

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[1] This question has a somewhat simplified formulation. A more sophisticated version of it is whether representations are necessary for explaining all sorts of cognition or only some forms of cognition must involve representation (see Rowlands 2015). The latter can be answered with scalar terms, thus it is not a "yes or no" question, and fits in probably better with the evidences of cognitive science. Nevertheless making a sharp distinction between the representationalist and the anti-representationalist position makes the philosophical differences more visible, and since this study does not aim at scrutinizing the possible alternative adaptations of the notion of representation in cognitive research, my hope is that this simplification is acceptable.

meanings are mental entities residing in the mind and being grounded in conceptualization (see Zlatev 2010: 421, 432−434). Since it attributes meaning to the individual mind, it can be accused with mentalism and subjectivism. The opposite anti-representationalist view (represented by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson [in their important work Philosophy in the Flesh], or Tim Rohrer) identifies representations with the flexible pattern of organism-environment interaction, or with the neural structures of such co-ordinations, and hence rejects the classical notion of representation as a useful device in the explanation of meaning (see Zlatev 2010: 430). This radical view of embodiment can avoid the solipsistic attitude of conceptual semantics (Shapiro 2011: 14), however it cannot explain the large scale of conventional cognitive patterns extending from cognitive maps to highly elaborated meanings.

The problem of representations is a so-called sceptical dilemma (Kertész 2004: 161): if we do not use the notion of representation, we will have to abandon the elaborated cognitive linguistic models of semantic structures, but if we accept the representational view of language, we will not be able to bridge the gap between the elementary events and acts of cognition itself (perception for example) and the higher ordered, systematized linguistic meaning. Thus both standpoints are destructive (hence the question is dilemmatic) and both threaten the possibilities of cognitive linguistics as a scientific project (hence it is sceptical).

Thus the first question of this study can be formulated as follows:

Q1: How can we resolve the dilemma of representationalism?

There are answers to this question which assert exclusively one of the alternatives (as we have seen in the previous paragraph), but these answers cannot solve the problem, since the status of representations is not a dilemma for those radical views. Another solution is the strategy of ignorance: though both alternatives have some validity, the researcher considers the dilemma itself as irrelevant for his or her work, because it can be carried out without answering the difficult question of representations (Kertész 2004: 162−163). In one of the most canonical works in CL, in the first volume of the Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Ronald Langacker seems to follow the latter attitude: when discussing the notion of sensory images, he rejects the classical representational view of the homunculus metaphor (which models mental representations as images analyzed by a homunculus in the head), thus he accepts the non-representational theory of sensory perception, while the cognitive functioning preserves its autonomy in cognitive grammar. Langacker makes

"a general distinction between autonomous and peripherally connected cognitive events. The sensation directly induced by stimulating a sense organ is an instance of a peripherally connected event; the corresponding sensory image, evoked in the absence of such stimulation, is an autonomous but equivalent event." (Langacker 1987: 112)

At first sight this proposal is an efficient solution of the problem of representations, since it can handle the issue of elementary cognitive events and the "representation-hungry tasks", the displacement of reference (see Clark 1999: 349, Sinha 2014, Simon 2014: 254) as well. In this respect it resolves the dilemma through detecting (and rejecting) a twofold overgeneralization: the representationalist and the anti-representationalist views overgeneralize the significance of their own assumptions (the notion of representation or the direct interactions between the organism and the environment) and hence both of them disregard the specificity and importance of the other. Investigating the process of cognition yields the consideration

that there is no uniform organization of human mental properties and abilities, since there are various subprocesses with different degrees of complexity in different contexts, consequently it is unproductive to narrow the organisation of the mind for one or for another structure. From a metascientific perspective, the solution proposed by Langacker is the elimination of the original scientific problem through a careful self-reflection of the cognitive sciences themselves. Consequently, the reflecting argument in the field of the (empirical) objectscience helps us to resolve the metascientific problem. This is the typical strategy of naturalism in metascience: Quine's essential argument is that only the empirical self-reflexivity can eliminate the sceptical dilemmas, the philosophical arguments and methods are not useful in solving epistemological problems (Kertész 2004: 162).

The argumentation above can be summarized as follows: there is a hard theoretical problem in cognitive linguistics, but the classical philosophical method of metascience is not able to solve the dilemma, since both of the alternative answers have their own validity. However, reflecting on the real, empirical subject of cognitive sciences makes it possible to recognize that the radical views are overgeneralizations, thus accepting the validity of both views as a result of empirical self-reflections eliminates the theoretical problem. In other words, the naturalistic attitude of metascience can help us to solve philosophical problems of cognition: the only thing to do is to replace the first-person argumentative method of philosophy with third-person observation of empirical phenomena.

There are, however, additional problems: if we consider − according to Langacker − the mental representations of sensory inputs as autonomous cognitive events, the gap between the "peripherally connected" subprocesses and the detached representations remains unbridged. Cognitive grammar provides a detailed approach to explaining semantic structures as representations, but it does not treat sensory images, the periphery of representation building, although Langecker admits that "sensory stimulation lays the foundation and provides the raw material for the construction of our conceptual word" (Langacker 1987: 112). The wording of the later handbook of CG (Langacker 2008: 31) is more careful in this regard,[2] but it emphasizes again that the task of a cognitive approach to language is to model the mental events of cognition via investigating linguistic structures. This is the reason why I have considered above the attitude of CG as the strategy of ignorance: admitting the importance of the sensory inputs or the embodied neural structures of organism-environment interaction by a theory does not mean that it really treats these aspects of cognition, therefore focusing on the mental representation and disregarding the sensory/experimental base of it makes the theoretical proposal an implementation independent, functionalist model, a useful toolkit of examining meaning, but not its valid explanation. We can point out the instrumentalist attitude of CG and of all the approaches manifesting the strategy of ignorance: these theories of linguistic meaning can be considered well established if they offer useful explanations of it (more accurately, if they provide falsifiable predictions about it), without fulfilling the demand on describing meaning as it is in the real world (on instrumentalist attitude, see DeWitt 2010: 71−79).

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[2] "Ultimately, conceptualization resides in cognitive processing. Having a certain mental experience resides in the occurrence of a certain kind of neurological activity. Conceptualization can thus be approached from either a phenomenological or a processing standpoint: we can attempt to characterize either our mental experience per se or the processing activity that constitutes it."

The problem of representations and the answers of cognitive linguistics (meaning as mental entity or anti-representationalist standpoint in the terms of radical embodiment) highlight the main tension of cognitive linguistics increasing nowadays (see Zlatev 2010): if cognitive linguistics is an enterprise that explains language use as a part of human cognition, then it has to localize its subject, namely meaning in the mind (internalism and subjectivism) or in the empirical data, in corpora or in neural structures (objectivism and redutionism). As we have seen, the solution of the dilemma proposed by CG apparently moves beyond the theoretical dichotomy, in accordance with the self-reflexive method of naturalistic metascience, but it does not afford a real solving of the dilemma: although CG is able to eliminate the strictness of the dichotomy, it ignores the sensory inputs of cognition in the description. In contrast with the argumentation of András Kertész, who claims that reflective empirical observations can resolve theoretical problems, and this can be seen as the main advantage of naturalistic metascience for linguistic research, I do not think that any variant of naturalism can propose true answers for epistemological questions ever. Elimination is not a solution.

Nevertheless, the application of the naturalist metascientific method draws our attention to the latent tendency of ignoring hard theoretical problems in cognitive descriptions of language. Although cognitive linguists claim that meaning is grounded in conceptual structures, and conceptual structures are grounded in experiences, the arbitrary narrowing of the field of research to the semantic representations (which is a strong tendency in cognitive linguistics) has the fallacy of ignorance as its result: the belief that linguists can explain and describe the details of meaning without regard to the structure and process of experience.

Experientialism that is claimed to synthesize the opposite views of objectivism and subjectivism preserves partly the internalistic and solipsistic attitude toward cognition, because from the experiential point of view, meaning resides continually in the individual mind, though not in the form of logical computation but rather as symbolic conceptual structure. Experiential realism as a version of internal realism chooses another strategy for narrowing the epistemological gap between sense/perception and meaningful representation: it explores the continuum along preconceptual and conceptual structures. The central thesis of the experiential strategy with reference to conceptual representations is that

> "[a]bstract conceptual structures are indirectly meaningful; they are understood because of their systematic relationship to directly meaningful structures" (Lakoff 1987: 268).

The "directly meaningful structures" are preconceptual (basic-level and image-schematic) structures that characterize experience through repeatedly emerging (as gestalts) from the functioning of the body in its environment. Consequently for treating experience as meaningful we do not need representations, nevertheless conceptual ones are grounded in experience itself. Taking it seriously and completing it with its theoretical basis, however, we can recognize that experientialism does not offer any solution to the problem of representations in the same way as CG, but it raises additional problems. First, it overextends the notion of representation to the experience: the Putnamian version of internal realism – which is chosen by Lakoff and Johnson as solid epistemological basis – considers experience as being shaped by our concepts, hence our experiential knowledge is "conceptually contaminated" (Putnam 1981: 54). We as humans rely on emergent preconceptual structures of experience in forming conceptual representations, while these representations shape our preconceptual structures – it is this circular argumentation which results in a radical representationalist view in

experientialism though prima facie it grounds conceptual meaning in pure body-environment interactions. (About the problematic role of preconceptual schemas from a developmental point of view see Rakova 2002.)

On the other hand, the notion of experience itself becomes so extended, that it does not serve the empirical validity of experiential realism. As Lakoff (1987: 266) formulates it,

> "»[e]xperience« is (...) not taken in the narrow sense of the things that have »happened to happen« to a single individual. Experience is instead construed in a broad sense: the totality of human experience and everything that plays a role in it – the nature of our bodies, our genetically inherited capacities, our modes of physical functioning in the world, our social organization, etc. In short, it takes as essential much of what is seen as irrelevant in the objectivist account."

The broadening of the notion of experience from the actual events to the latent structures in the background of cognition makes the cognizing human being a part of the world cognized. In contrast with the objectivist paradigm (and with its metaphysical realism), and in accordance with internal realism, experientialism does not get the subject and the object of cognition apart, it does not separate them from one another, hence it could stabilize the position of the cognizing human mind in the world. But the price embodied realism pays for this epistemology is giving up the empirical verification. For we cannot experience directly our "collective biological capacities" (inherited genetically), our collective social experiences in an individual experimental design. Cognitive semantics based on experientialism remains thus nothing more than a useful approach for modelling conceptual meaning, which makes falsifiable hypotheses and generalizations possible, but which does not describe meaning as such.

The theoretical problem elaborated in the foregoing can be outlined with the following theses:

a) It is a hard theoretical question in cognitive linguistics whether there is any need of representations for explaining the processes and structures of cognition, as well as the cognitive functioning of language.

b) There are two radical answers to this question. One of them (the principle of mental representations) regards mental representational structures as the main subject of cognitive explorations, the other (the principle of radical embodiment) denies the role of representations in the process of cognition.

c) We can argue that the problem cannot be resolved with classical metatheoretical methods, but if we recognize that the radical answers have the process of overgeneralization in common, since they extend the use or non-use of representations to the whole process of cognition, we will be able to eliminate the dilemma. The representational view can be applied to the higher level of cognition (e.g. language use), while the anti-representationalist approach is very productive in modelling perception. Thus the opposite views have different scopes of research, and the problem arises not in the theoretical field of cognition, but in the empirical field of investigations.

d) If theoretical considerations do not help answer epistemological questions, we have to turn to the empirical results of the objectscience, and through self-reflection the hard dilemmas can be eliminated. This is the methodology of naturalistic metascience, which banishes philosophical contemplation from the field of epistemology.

e) However, this naturalistic metascientific argumentation seems to fail, because it results in instrumentalistic explanations in objectscientific research. One of its precedents is CG, which admits the importance of sensory/peripheral structures, but narrows the scope of investigation to the mental representation of meaning, therefore it instantiates the strategy of ignorance from the perspective of the holistic process of cognition. The other canonical theory on cognitive linguistics, namely cognitive semantics based on experientialism deals with the problem in another manner (it extends the notion of representation to the experiential structure, moreover it extends the notion of experience itself), but it is no less problematic, since it implements circular argumentation, and the results, models of experientialism cannot be verified with empirical experiments because of the collective nature of experience.

f) The main conclusion of investigating – though in the broadest outlines − the problem of representations is that the method of naturalistic metascience does not offer any solution to the theoretical dilemmas in cognitive research: it can only disregard the dilemma, and instead of answering the question, it proposes serious reflections on the scope of theorizing. This has great significance in scientific research, but it yields only instrumentalistic explanations.

The central question is: what is investigated when cognition is investigated? Since language use is part of cognition, the question above is valid in cognitive linguistics too. The endeavour of naturalism regards the cognizing human as one part of the world cognized, but as a psycho-physiological being, therefore the answers to epistemological questions can be given through considering the psycho-physiological characterisation of the human mind and body. There is no autonomous field of philosophy; the realm of sciences includes also the epistemological investigations. This is a viable alternative to Cartesian dualism, since it tries to explain the phenomena of cognition with the methods of scientific research, thus it avoids any reference to an immaterial substance. However, the metaphysical monism implied by naturalism can have two dangerous consequences (see Zahavi 2010: 5−6): on the one hand it looks on the mind as an object explainable like any other phenomena of nature, thus it objectivises the functioning mind, which brings us back to the objectivist view of realism; on the other hand, naturalism can be radicalized as psycho-physical reductionism, which considers the structures and processes of mind caused by neural activity, hence this activity determines and directs our cognitive processes, giving no place and role to interpersonal, socio-cultural factors. As we can see, the radical reductionalism of naturalizing epistemology arrives at the internalistic standpoint of representationalism.

In my view the most difficult problem which cognitive linguistics has to face is the following (paraphrasing the question of Searle 2000: 55):

Q2: How can we avoid both the Scylla of internalism, the solipsistic view of mental representationalism and the Charybdis of determining reductionalism and objective monism in the objectsicentific research?

For getting out of this dilemma we do not need to abandon the naturalistic attitude in epistemology, but we have to be careful in applying the third-person perspective in cognitive linguistics: it must not be the absolute point of view in treating theoretical problems. As we have seen, the third-person naturalistic methodology is tightly connected with objectivism,

whereas one of the most important considerations of the philosophy in the 20th century is that the subject and the object of cognition cannot be separated.

While methodological decision or a specific interpretation of the central notions is the matter at issue, one cannot evade theoretical reflections. Still the proposal of naturalistic metascience to turn to the empirical evidence for eliminating the dilemmas demands reflections. In this study I propose the other way of treating these dilemmas: instead of avoiding philosophical contemplation, I consider it as necessary for solving the hard problems of cognitive linguistics. In other words I try to reverse the attitude of the objectscience toward philosophy, since my conviction is that the rigorous theoretical explication of our background assumptions can help us answer Q2, more accurately to formulate a new alternative direction instead of the radical ones (for an opposite evaluation of metascientific reflection see Kertész 2004: 168). Phenomenology – as a philosophical method of investigating the process of experience and cognition – has particular significance in this endeavour. In the next section these processes are discussed from a phenomenological vantage point in order to renew the theoretical basis of cognitive linguistic investigation.

3. The phenomenological model of cognition

For demonstrating the genuine benefits of phenomenology for cognitive linguistics the main theses of Husserl's philosophy must be surveyed.[3] However, the aim of this section is not merely to enumerate the possible connections between phenomenological and cognitive linguistic principles and concepts, since through it phenomenology would remain only one of the theoretical supports of cognitive linguistics, and it could not initiate reflections on the background assumptions of cognitive linguistic investigations. Nor would I like to recapitulate the phenomenological contribution to the hard problems of the philosophy of mind (e. g. consciousness or the body-mind relation), for it would be a philosophical explanation, which would change the field of contemplation. The real significance of phenomenology for cognitive linguistics would be pushed into the background in both cases, and it would remain invisible how philosophical reflections can contribute to objectscientific research. Instead of these alternatives I demonstrate the phenomenological model of experience and cognition from the perspective of cognitive linguistics to show the potentialities of a theoretical contemplation for moving beyond the strategy of ignorance.

My other preliminary remark is that the titles of the subsections imply the SOURCE-PATH-TARGET metaphorical mapping as if the phenomenological explanation of the process of cognition could be grasped with the COGNITION IS MOTION ALONG A PATH metaphor. Though this metaphorical conceptualization is highly common in cognitive sciences (especially in

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[3] Following Jordan Zlatev (2010: 415) I use the term of Husserlian phenomenology as metonymic for phenomenological philosophy, since although several thoughts of Husserl were developed in the second half of the last century (by e.g. Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty), the core assumptions of phenomenology remained unchanged. The main notion reinterpreted by the followers of Husserl is transcendental subjectivity: Merleau-Ponty rejected the disembodied conception of the ego (Abram 1996: 45), Heidegger considered the notion of the subject without its historical environment unsatisfactory (Schwendtner 2008: 147−148). However, with the notion of "Lebenswelt" Husserl could avoid the ontological idealism (and priority) of the subject, thus Husserl himself integrated the critiques against transcendentalism into his late works (see Gadamer 2002: 56−57). In this study, I outline the theses of phenomenology on the basis of Husserl's works, and I refer to other philosophers only if it is necessary.

functional explanations), one of the main intentions of Husserl and his followers was to re-place such linearity and sequentiality with the concept of direct participation in the situated action of cognition (Gallagher−Zahavi 2008: 8). From this it follows that the process of ex-perience in fact comprises the factors of sensation, subjective intention and impression, schemas and meaning, and assuming the perspective of the other. I preserved in the subtitles nevertheless the convention of sequentiality for it serves as a basis compared to which the phenomenological considerations can be evaluated.

3.1. From perception to understanding: constitution

It is scarcely disputable that "sooner or later any science of cognition has to tackle the fun-damental condition that we have no idea of what is mental or cognitive, apart from their experience by us" (Varela 2002: 126). This condition – inherited indeed from behaviourism − makes the scientific explanation especially difficult in the field of cognitive linguistics which considers meaning to be based on experience. According to Varela, one can experience the outer world and one's own mental states and processes as well, but it does not follow from this that there is a causal relationship between these experiences. We can mention concep-tual metaphor theory as an example: the source domain of a conceptual metaphor is more concrete or physical: "[o]ur experiences with the physical world serve as a natural and logical foundation for the comprehension of more abstract domains" (Kövecses 2010: 7). The ex-planatory power of CMT depends on how we interpret the notion of experience. As Kövecses states, metaphor comprehension is founded on the direct experience of the world, in accord-ance with embodied realism, and it can be a productive explanation in the cases of simple (everyday) source domains, e. g. LOVE IS A JOURNEY, since everybody has experiences of journeys. But the role and the nature of experience is a matter of dispute in the case of ARGU-MENT IS WAR, because it is by no means certain that one has direct/physical experiences of events of war. At this point the extended notion of experience (cited above from Lakoff 1987) can help us arguing for experience based metaphorization, but it causes a tension between the narrower and the wider interpretation of experience: the former refers to the situated encounter with directly perceptible phenomena, related to the embodied nature of cognition; the latter includes everything mediated by the body and the community, and the central role of culture is emphasized. Thus it remains an open question whether metaphor has physical (individual) or cultural (supra-individual) validity.

　　This tension cannot be dissolved unless we differentiate between the actual experiential situation (with its physical factors) and the situated process of cognition in the broader sense: both are important for understanding utterances but they ground meaning in experience in different ways. My opinion is that the omission of this differentiation generated some mis-interpretations of the philosophy of embodied realism in the debate on the pages of Cognitive Linguistics: while Rakova argued for the direct interpretation of experience (and hence she considered experientialism as a radical empirical theory), Johnson and Lakoff rejected this interpretation without outlining their own conception of what experience is and how it grounds conceptualization.

　　Husserl's phenomenology proposes an essential approach to the role of experience: he distinguishes between the psychological concept of the subjective consciousness and the phenomenal aspect of it: the former is the experiencing self with her/his actual psychological processes (perception, concept activation and so on), the latter is the conscious mind which constitutes the world for herself/himself (Husserl 1972: 213). Identifying these aspects would

mean naturalizing the consciousness, reducing it to observable psychological processes and structures and identifying the sensory inputs with an observed entity. When I look at a table, however, I see its profile from my own perspective, I can see one or two sides of it, I can see its surface or its legs, but I cannot see the table as a whole. Nevertheless, I see a table, more accurately I interpret my visual sensations as a table. On the one hand there are partial sensations of an entity in the world, on the other there is a perceived – i.e. consciously processed – object. The formers belong to the psychological self, the latter belongs to consciousness; from a psychological point of view, perception can be seen as partial, non-holistic in nature, but from a phenomenological perspective it is holistic and meaningful (Merleau-Ponty 1992: 215−218, Gallagher−Zahavi 2008: 92−98).

It is worth realizing that our perception is always the perception of something, as our consciousness is always the conscious experience of something – it is this aboutness which differentiates the psychological from the phenomenal, and the root of it is intentionality. As Husserl formulates it,

> "[i]f we pay attention to the stream of the modes of appearance, as well as to the mode of their »synthesis«, then it become evident that every phase and section is in itself »the consciousness of something«, nonetheless during the sequence of the new phases it is the synthetically unified consciousness of one and the same entity which arises" (Husserl 1972: 197).

Since the act of the conscious mind is intentional, i.e. our minds are directed at the world, the objects of consciousness are delimited as entities of the world. To put it differently, our mind always transcends the perceptual sensations to a unified and delimited object of perception and acts of consciousness, hence the phenomena of cognition are transcended constructions. "Transcendental" does not mean in this context something unreal or something not tangible, rather it means a perspective from which we can constitute the entities of the world despite the partiality of our perception: we do not have to fit the psychical sensations together in order to experience something in its totality, because our mind has the capacity to transcend the sensory inputs (see Seregi 2010: 600, Mezei 1997: 127−128).

Because of the mind's intentionality our experience is directly meaningful: there is no need for mediating representations or for any other mental structures to perceive and understand the world from our subjective point of view. Our experiencing look "directs itself exclusively to things, thoughts, purposes, devices at all times, and not to their psychically living experience within which they become the objects of consciousness" (Husserl 1972: 195) – as Ricoeur put it into words, "meaning is always prior to self-consciousness" (Ricouer 1997: 35). From this it follows that phenomenology is not a mere philosophical speculation on the possibilities of cognition: it seems to be the exact theoretical model of everyday cognition. In other words a phenomenological argumentation makes the essential processes of cognition visible and explainable – it is both the valid alternative of a naturalistic-objectivistic attitude and the prerequisite of a hermeneutic investigation (Ricoeur 1997: 33).

The other important consequence of the phenomenological view of perception and cognition is the recognition of the phenomenal world as the base of our experiences. What we perceive is not the physical factors of the environment but the entities in their surroundings. Thus if a theoretical framework considers our conceptual system or the linguistic meaning to be based on experience, then it must be added that experience from a phenomenological point of view must not be equated with physical sensations. We experience the phenomenal

world with our consciousness, and the reflections on the physical appearance of it are secondary in our naive attitude toward the world. At the moment when perceiving the phenomena proves to be unsuccessful, we direct our attention to the sensory inputs for gaining relevant information: we try to get more inputs, or we adjust our (sense) organs or our technical devices to the actual environment. As Merleau-Ponty (1992: 227) points it out,

> "there is a natural attitude of vision in which I make common cause with my gaze and, through it, surrender myself to the spectacle: in this case the parts of the field are in an organization which makes them recognizable and identifiable. The quality, the separate sensory impact occurs when I break this total structuralization of my vision, when I cease to adhere to my own gaze, and when, instead of living the vision, I question myself about it, I want to try out my possibilities, I break the link between my vision and the world, between myself and my vision, in order to catch and describe it."

For phenomenology, perception is a double-edged process: the visible/audible/tangible sensations and the transcended object of consciousness are two sides of the same coin. However, the latter has priority in the explanation, since it is concerned with our naive experience.

Therefore cognitive linguistics, which explains meaning as experience-based representation, has to take it into consideration that neither meanings nor concepts are reducible to physical sensations. In my opinion experientialism – and consequently conceptual metaphor theory – did not take care of this irreducibility, and the theories of embodiment also identify the sphere of experience with the physical, and not with the phenomenal world, while the idealized cognitive models or conceptualizations correlate with the phenomena of consciousness and not with physical entities. The problem of representation remains unsolved in cognitive linguistics unless we recognize the irreducible nature of concepts and meanings to the physical. This irreducibility does not mean of course that sensory inputs are detached from concepts or mental structures, as the classical view of cognition as symbol manipulation stated; there is an obvious relation between the physical process of experience and the phenomenal experiencing, which can be called correlation. However, the phenomenological interpretation of experience (as an intentional act toward the world results in and is based on transcended objects of consciousness) makes the observed action, the socially mediated action, moreover the cultural evaluation of actions real sources of understanding the world. In the phenomenal world observing something or discussing something are experiences in the same way as doing (seeing, hearing and so on) something since these activities are directed equally towards intentional objects; and this is what makes such metaphors like ARGUMENT IS WAR comprehensible, according to the phenomenal interpretation of experience.

This has an unavoidable methodological consequence in cognitive linguistics: we have to realize that we do not know what part of empirical evidence is phenomenologically real. There are artificial stimuli in an artificial experimental situation, which trigger some sort of responses from the subjects, but they reflect in some measure on their mental activity, the secondary process of self-consciousness precedes the primary action of directly meaningful experience; therefore we cannot interpret the results as the data of everyday cognition. We can observe at most the psychical processes that make the experience of the phenomenal world possible, but since the subject of these experiments is the psychological self, the task of mapping how the mind forms concepts from sensations belongs to the field of psychology. As phenomenology can draw our attention to it, explaining linguistic meaning starts with the conceptual level which correlates with the intentional functioning of the conscious mind

wherein representations have a central role. Thus the problem of representation can be re-
solved with the cautious delimitation of the field of linguistic research and with the model of
the intentional mind.

Again the notion of correlations is highly essential at this point: starting from the con-
ceptual does not mean that concepts or meanings belong to the realm of immaterial mind or
soul, therefore the claim that the objects of consciousness are not irreducible to physical
sensations does not mean acknowledging Cartesian dualism in investigating the process of
cognition. Bridging the gap between the sensory inputs and higher ordered cognitive struc-
tures is one of the most difficult tasks for cognitive sciences; though connectionism seems
to provide an adequate model for explaining the emergence of representations, the experien-
tial paradigm in cognitive linguistics ignores the gap and implies the direct identification of
conceptual structures with physical states of the body (and the mind) and with their separat-
ed sensorial effects undergone by the subject. Nor is phenomenology united in this respect
whether intentionality is peculiar to the consciousness (Husserl) or the body itself has a latent
knowledge of transcending the sensations into a holistic view in the process of perception
(Melreau-Ponty), therefore a phenomenological argument in itself is not able to fill the gap
mentioned above. Nevertheless, it can draw our attention to the fact that the physical factors
being observable from a third-person perspective have only secondary significance in expla-
nation, because we do not collect sensory data to orient ourselves and to act successfully in
the natural and naive attitude toward the world, rather we interact with the entities as phe-
nomena of consciousness.

The intentional relation of the mind toward the world is one of the important claims of
phenomenology. The mind does not contain the representations in this sense (the contain-
er-metaphor implies the internalist conception of cognition), rather it participates in an active
relationship with the world and forms (transcends or synthesizes, from the perspective of
perception) representation-like structures in concrete situations for concrete purposes. Con-
sequently the entities of the phenomenal world afford themselves as possibilities of manipu-
lation: a chair for sitting on it, or for standing on it to reach other things being laid on a
higher level, or for closing an entrance and so on. It is the active "interchange" (Abram 1996:
52) between the mind and the environment which determines how the phenomenal world is
constituted in the mind. Thus perception is directly meaningful not only because of the in-
tentionality of the conscious mind (which transcends the perceived profiles to a whole), but
also because of the context of situated action in which the intentional act proceeds – the
situated action is the other pillar of experiencing in the phenomenal world.

The role of the mind-environment interaction, as well as the role of the body in it, i.e. the
active and constructive functioning of the mind gained a central significance already in the
Gibsonian theory of active perception (see Shapiro 2011: 29−37). Yet the standard idea of
embodied cognition partly preserved the black-box schema of behaviourism referring to the
mind. To illustrate this I quote how Vyvyan Evans summarizes the notion of embodied
cognition: its essence is that "the nature of concepts and the way they are structured and
organised is constrained by the nature of our embodied experience" (Evans 2007: 66). As we
can see, in the framework of embodied cognition the environment is the source of the stim-
uli, the body is the apparatus which filters the information or lets it through (the example of
Evans is the human visual system with three colour channels, compared to the system of
rabbits or goldfishes), the response is the conceptual structure being mapped from the lin-
guistic data, thus we can infer the internal representation of the mind from the stimuli and
the bodily devices. This version of embodiment has clear phenomenological roots since it

grounds our cognitive structures in direct interactions with the world. Yet it disregards the different nature of the experience of being embodied and reflecting on being embodied. As Merleau-Ponty says,

> "[t]o say that it is still myself who conceive myself as situated in a body and furnished with five senses is clearly a purely verbal solution, since I who reflect cannot recognize myself in this embodied *I*, since therefore embodiment remains in the nature of the case an illusion, and since the possibility of this illusion remains incomprehensible" (Merleau-Ponty 1992: 213).

In embodied experience the species-specific biological and physiological systems of the human body determine the "nature and range" of perception (Evans 2007: 67−68), and from this it follows that we can grasp the embodied conditions of our cognitive processes through analysing the bodily perceptual systems. In other words the standard idea of embodiment takes the access to the embodied constraints of cognition for granted, as if the observer of embodied cognition were not herself an embodied subject, and hence she could examine the process of cognition from an outside position. However, there is no external viewpoint for investigating cognition; therefore the standard embodiment thesis commits the fallacy of objectification. It separates the subject of cognition from the object, and considers the body as a mere mediator between them. It is unaware of the fact that phenomenal consciousness interacts with the world in a given situation actively and reciprocally, which has two consequences: on the one hand the real embodied experience is not accessible in its totality for the external observer, and hence on the other hand one cannot make general universal patterns of embodied experience from even the most accurate third-person observation (and thus the empirical evidences of embodiment seem to be overgeneralizations).[4]

There are other extended conceptions of embodiment in cognitive sciences which integrate the phenomenological theses on perception and experience (see Shapiro 2011 for a detailed treatment), but the standard view of embodied cognition canonized in cognitive linguistics ignores the role of the mind in concept formation in so far as it explains linguistic meaning from physical bodily experience. How can we arrive in this framework at the colour concepts of the mind for example? From one perspective, they are determined by the physiological structure of the organism and its visual system, and from the other they are accessible directly via collecting and analysing the linguistic expressions of colours. Hence the structure of the concepts is explainable from the structure of the organism, and language is transparent in this respect since it mirrors the conceptual structures. Consequently we can trace linguistic meaning back to the body: concepts become mere labels, and the mind becomes gloomy. It loses the active role in cognition, and as Varela points it out, we have no idea about the concept-construing function of it. That is why I termed the idea of embodied cognition as a "black-box"-like conception of cognition. The embodied view in cognitive linguistics turns a blind eye to the intentional nature of the mental, to the situatedness of experience, as well as to the tight interrelation between consciousness, body and environment,

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[4] The methodological framework of Gallagher's "front-loaded phenomenology" tries to avoid the reification fallacy and to approach the embodied experience with forming the experimental design on the basis of first-person reports (Gallagher 2010).

consequently it has a latent tendency to regard the mind as a black box, or simply to ignore the aspect of phenomenal consciousness.

I demonstrate this with another example: the vertical sensorimotor stimulus (moving up) is evaluated positively because of the wider sight of the horizon, which makes successful preparation for dangers possible. Since "language reflects conceptual structure then it follows that language reflects embodied experience" (Evans 2007: 66), the experiential correlation between UP and GOOD grounds the conceptual metaphors MORE IS UP, CONTROL IS UP, RATIONAL IS UP, HAPPY IS UP (Kövecses 2010: 40), from which the latter is considered as universal mapping (Kövecses 2010: 195−197). But it is easy to imagine such situations in which moving up does not mean solely and clearly positive changes in mental state: e.g. flying up, moving up in a roller coaster, or being on the top of a cliff. Of course we can argue that these events are artificial in part, therefore our cognitive capacity is not adjusted to these experiences. However the point of this example is not the nature of the event, but the situatedness of the experience. Our biological, physiological, neurological apparatus contributes to the process of cognition in the concrete situation with an action in its centre. The idea of active interaction with the environment − foregrounded by the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty − draws our attention to the body not as a mere filtering and constraining apparatus but a dynamic system which resonates to its surroundings – it is only the extended view of embodied cognition (which regards the body as the active part of the cognitive process, see Shapiro 2011: 158−200) which has phenomenological reality.

The main notion of the phenomenological idea of (embodied) cognition is constitution: the mind constitutes the world for itself in a given situation through bodily interactions with the environment. In this regard the body, its surroundings and the situation are the constituents of the process of cognition which yields intentional objects of the conscious mind. In the phenomenological tradition constitution means being confronted with preliminary conditions, without assuming absolute preconditions in cognition (Seregi 2010: 601). When the conscious mind constitutes the world, it becomes part of the world and at the same time it creates the world in the intentional relation to the world. Therefore as experience is not identical with the physical sensations (it is rather the (re)cognition of a phenomenon), the embodied character of cognition cannot be seen as a mere constraining factor on conceptualization, it is rather the dynamic capacity of interacting successfully in the world and creating meaning as a result.

Some readers may find a contradiction in my argumentation: if the main mistake of embodied cognitive linguistics is to disregard the role of the mind in concept formation, how can we as cognitive linguists start our enterprise from the conceptual terrain of cognition, ignoring the embodied processes? To put it in another way, does the explanation of semantic structures require the description of the brain processes from perception as far as to conceptual representation, or not? The answer is twofold, it depends on the perspective of the investigation, and hence the contradiction is only apparent. If we recall the phenomenological proposal of differentiating the psychological self from the phenomenal mind, we can see that describing the processes of perception and sensation processing makes only the psychological self explainable. From the fact that we know how the brain processes the sensory data and which psychological processes can be localized in the neural structure it does not follow that we have a causal explanation of the mind and its concepts. What phenomenology directs our attention to is the fallacy of determinative reductionism: having experimental evidences about perception or sensory processes is no reason for claiming that these are the evidences of how the mind functions, because mind is intentional in its nature, and intentionality is not

reducible to physiological structures. To claim that intentionality cannot be naturalized (see Searle 2000: 92−94) does not mean that the mind is an immaterial capacity in a dualistic ontology; it only means that the sciences do not have satisfactory devices for understanding the intentionality of the mind.

From this it follows that to understand the functioning of the mind we need phenomenology. Since the body forms part of the world that is experienced by it, and the world offers itself as meaningful through this active participation, cognition is not the process of data-collection and processing, but it is the process in which the environment becomes saturated with meanings for human minds. The physical factors affect the environment and the body in it, but the true task is to understand how the mind experiences this effect, and how it constitutes the world through the experience of it. Since the standard cognitive view reifies the mind and its functioning after the fashion of sciences, it is unable to explain how the mind grasps the world for itself. Instead of this reification we can follow the phenomenological model of experience and cognition: the mind (in the body) takes part in a situation within which the entities gain their significance through the action of the subject of cognition (or through her purposes, intentions and beliefs). This is the process of constitution, and the human mind is adapted to perform it, it is equipped with a neuro-cognitive apparatus that makes constitution possible (see Sinha 2002: 274 cited above).

This redefines the subject of investigation in cognitive sciences fundamentally: cognition is possible not only because the human body and the brain are natural entities (hence the authority of nature prevails in them), but because the conscious mind being in correlation with the actual situation has the capacity of constituting the world as a meaningful environment. We must recognize this twofold determination of cognition, and the aim of phenomenology is to explore the basic structure of it (Mezei 1997: 145). The main function of the mind is to constitute the world for itself, which proceeds intentionally; however it takes place only in situation, and only through the active participation of the body in the situation. From a phenomenological point of view we can interpret the empirical evidences as concerning constitution, and thus it becomes evident that it is the subject experiencing and constituting the phenomenal world that has the central significance in cognition.

As a consequence, phenomenological argumentation reminds us to be careful in planning, carrying out experiments, as well in interpreting their results: cognition is situated, and the subjective consciousness is the focus of it. We can therefore observe a lot of behavioural or linguistic patterns, but these data are connected to the actual situation and to an experiencing subject for her/his consciousness the world affords itself. With the help of this phenomenological reflection we can avoid the overgeneralization of conclusions that can be drawn from the data. As Daniel Casasanto (2009: 127−128) calls our attention to it, the conceptualizations used in language are importantly different from the conceptualizations used in other situations of cognition (remembering, perceiving, acting without words). What can be analyzed thus through linguistic patterns is not the conceptual organization itself, but a way of constituting the world by a conscious subject in a situation, hence conceptual organization must not be identified with the patterns of constitution. To return to vertical orientation as an example, the conceptual metaphors related to the spatial domain UP are the following: CONSCIOUS IS UP, CONTROL IS UP, GOD IS UP, HAPPY IS UP, HEALTHY IS UP, MORE IS UP, RATIONAL IS UP, VIRTUE IS UP (from the metaphor index in Kövecses 2010). However, there are Hungarian expressions like *felbosszant* ('annoy'), *felbőszít* ('enrage'), in which the conceptual domain UP (symbolized in the preverbal element *fel* 'up') is related to the experience of being angry, and this cannot be explained with MORE IS UP, since the expression *lenyugszik*

('calm down', with the preverbal element *le* 'down') demonstrates that there is a constitution-al pattern in which we experience the state of angry and calmness along a vertical axis. Our (not systematic, but intuitively correct) observation is that Hungarian offers a pattern for understanding negative mental states as being up. A standard cognitive linguistic explanation would be that there is a language specific conceptual pattern (ANGRY IS UP) which has univer-sal experience-based conceptualization in its background (ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER). These conceptual structures are in the human mind originated from experiencing the phys-ical world in a human body; hence their activation is automatic in the context of language use. The radical view of embodiment would complete this explanation with the notion of primary metaphor: for INTENSITY IS UP (or MORE IS UP) is learnt from the active experience of the world by the same bodies in the same relevant environment, it can be considered a neural co-activating pattern, which motivates the meaning of the expressions.

What is the alternative phenomenological answer? In a given situation the subjective consciousness constitutes intentionally the world for herself/himself, and the basis of this process is the access to the phenomenal world offered by the body, in other words the expe-rience of being in the world. The state of being angry is experienced differently in different situations, depending on e.g. the cause of the anger, the physical circumstances and so on. In one of the potential experiences the subject feels herself/himself as being in a more and more intensive physical, mental, emotional state (correlated with the needs of action in the actual situation, e.g. the need of physical motion), and this experience of increasing intensity (or increasing preparedness for action) can be related to the process of moving along a vertical axis. It is important not to consider experiences as mere states and directions, since they are processes experienced by a subjective mind. It follows that constituting the experience of being angry does not have universal validity, though linguistic patterns offer intersubjective-ly acceptable (and analogically reusable) ways of constitution. A vast number of constituting possibilities are available theoretically, from which language offers for the subject some patterns. There are several other intentional relations toward the phenomena of the world and of the subjective consciousness in it, as we can observe other gestures which manifest the constitution of anger on a horizontal axis, e.g. the move of the hands rapidly away from each other referring to the tension of anger. What we can explore through linguistic investigations is not conceptual structures but the alternative ways of constitution. Another example is constituting the domain of time: while the conceptualization paradigm claims that it is the sagittal axis (front/back) which structures the experience of time, analysing co-speech ges-tures of English informants demonstrates that the horizontal (left/right) axis is also essential in time-constitution (Casasanto 2009: 130).

Consequently the important conclusion of the phenomenological argumentation is that linguistic meaning represents constituting patterns and not conceptualization. While the latter refers to the content of human mind, and thus it implies both the internalistic concep-tion of cognitive (mental) representations and the radical reductionist approach to them from the perspective of embodiment, the former means that the human mind is always a conglom-eration of dynamic acts within which the subject create her or his attitude to the experienced world. As a result of phenomenological contemplation we can avoid both internalism (con-sciousness is not a container but it is an active constituent of embodied experience) and re-ductionism (the phenomenal experience is not reducible to sensory inputs), and the homun-culus-problem does not arise either.

At first this seems to be a mere terminological specification, but there is an essential differ-ence between the standard (or embodied) view of conceptualization and the phenomenological

approach to meaning and cognition: the conceptualization paradigm is theoretically deductive, whereas the phenomenological approach uses induction in explaining the process of cognition. The conceptualization theory uses double deduction: (i) it assumes the priority of conceptual structures over meanings (hence meaning can be deduced from conceptualization), and (ii) it assumes the priority of the physiologic body over conceptualization (hence concepts can be deduced from bodily organisation). In comparison with the deductive theorizing of conceptualization, phenomenology begins the investigation by mapping the situation and the active consciousness correlates with it; on the one hand it makes possible not to reify the constituents of cognition, and to avoid ignoring one or another constituent though simplifying its role; on the other hand it determines the boundaries of generalization: not every observed behavioural pattern is general, but only those which follow from the correlation of the consciousness with the world, since these have intersubjective validity.[5]

The central notion in conceptualization is causal motivation: the direct cause of meaning is the conceptual (for it determines what mappings evolve in understanding), the indirect cause of it is the body (for it determines what conceptualizations emerge during learning processes). By contrast, the central notion of a phenomenological epistemology is correlation: the constituted world and the constituting consciousness cannot be reduced to each other, however their relation is not accidental, since the cognitive apparatus with which the human mind adapted to survive provides a common ground for experiencing and understanding a shared world.

Looking at the problem of representation (Q1) from the phenomenological perspective, the main question is not whether there is any need for mental representations in explaining linguistic meaning, since experiencing the phenomenal world involves some kind of mental structures which transcend our sensations to phenomenal objects for the purposes of representation-hungry tasks (planning, memorizing, discussing etc.), and these structures cannot be reduced to physical-physiologic data. The real question is what the representations stand for: the standard cognitive answer is that these are the representations of the mind's concepts, whereas the phenomenological answer is that the mental structures represent alternative constitutions of the phenomenal world. They are flexible and dynamic patterns of cognitive acts being suitable for adapting them in a given situation. The constitutional patterns i.e. the mental representations are in other words possible attitudes of the mind toward the environment and toward itself, and because of the ability to act without words we can assume that there is a representational mind prior linguistic meaning.

In the process of constitution, the experiencing self becomes a subject. It is therefore not an unreliable point of view with restricted validity, but the main result of every cognitive act, as well as the vantage point of understanding and explaining everyday cognition. From a phenomenological perspective, experience is always subjective, which means that it is the constitutional act of a subject within which a possible correlation between the conscious mind and the world becomes visible. But a difficult question follows from the subjective nature of

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[5] I do not follow the husserlian argumentation in this regard, since it proposes an idealistic method for the problem of generalization: for Husserl it is the transcendental subjectivity, and idealized being which grounds the individual behaviours in the generality of humankind, and which can be revealed through phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1972: 214−215, see Gadamer 2002: 62). Since cognitive linguistics dose not assume a priori entities for elaborating general explanations, this kind of reduction (and the idealistic metaphysical background of it) is alien to its nature. It is a difficult but promising task for cognitive linguistics to find and integrate such theses of phenomenology with which the explanation of cognitive functioning of language becomes more natural and not more obscure.

experience: how can we be sure of experiencing the same world as others? How can we find ourselves in a shared world, and how does the world not collapse into an infinite number of subjective phenomenal worlds? This is the hard problem of solipsism; in the next section I demonstrate how phenomenology moves beyond it.

3.2. From the subject to the other: intersubjectivity

The foregoing demonstrates that phenomenology proves to be productive for cognitive linguistic research at a metatheoretical level: the reflections initiated by it explicate important presuppositions, e.g. the differentiation between psychological self and phenomenal mind (through which we can re-evaluate the methodological and theoretical significance of experimental investigations), or the prevailing first-person perspective of experience (which directs our attention to the importance of constitution instead of generalized patterns of conceptualization). The latter claim, however, leads us to the problem of solipsism, and unless it is not reflected, phenomenology cannot be applied as epistemological background for cognitive sciences, since a solipsistic attitude toward the world is inconsistent with any scientific enterprise which has the aim of exploring the world in itself. The claim that world appears always for a subject, hence there is no world in itself (or we are not able to reach it, as Kant stated) would make the modern scientific endeavours senseless.

But if one interprets carefully the notion of correlation in phenomenology, the objection of solipsism does not arise either. For correlation means that two entities (the constituted world and the constituting consciousness) are not reducible to each other (Mezei 1997: 100). As Husserl notes it,

 "The following should be noted in this connexion: Just as the reduced Ego is not a piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly object is a piece of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life ar a really inherent part of it, as a complex of data of sensation or a complex of acts" (Husserl 1982: 26).

And though Husserl makes his claim about the phenomenologically reduced ego, the essence of his words is that the affordance of the world in the consciousness does not mean that the world exists only in the field of consciousness, or that it forms a part of it. Idealism states that one of the two entities (the constituted world or the constituting consciousness) is a priori: either the world (objective idealism, as we find it in Kant's epistemology and in the notion of the world in itself [Ding an sich]) or the subject (solipsism, as we find it in the philosophy of Berkeley). The subjective consciousness has the priority in the process of experience, because the world appears from its perspective, thus subjectivism is peculiar to phenomenology,[6] yet the perspective of the subject is not only prior but also partial: the acts of consciousness cannot grasp the world as a whole; that is why consciousness needs to transcend the sensations to a phenomenal object. Because the subjective consciousness never can cognize the world in its totality, the priority of the subject is tenable without any idealism (Mezei

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[6] It is this subjectivism which received a serious critique from hermeneutics (see Ricoeur 1997: 29−31), but if one conceives the subjective consciousness as a vantage point and as an inherent factor of every experience, whereas the subject is the (self-)reflecting consciousness which find herself/himself in a relation to the world (see Maclaren 2009, Ullmann 2013), the epistemological subjectivism does not mean ontological apriorism of the subject.

1997: 129). Husserl himself regards transcendence as the central notion of correlation between the world and the consciousness:

> "[t]his »transcendence« is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, despite the fact that anything worldly necessary acquires all the senses determining it, along with its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, valuing, or doing, at particular times" (Husserl 1982: 26).

In my interpretation, the act of transcendence (or the act of intentionality in other words) links the world in itself and the consciousness, making correlation, becoming the psychological self (being one part of the nature) a phenomenal consciousness (participating in the world as a subject) possible. Intentionality is therefore the essential capacity of our cognitive apparatus. It is one of the adaptations of the human mind, thus it can be naturalized only with evolutionary and not with neurobiological terms. The question, however, that why the subjectively constituted world is valid for others remains unanswered. On the one hand intentionality is a common inheritance of humankind, on the other one can experience only through her /his own intentional acts.

The dilemma can be solved with the Husserlian notion of horizon, which presupposes that we do not experience the world as isolated intentional fields (Husserl 1972: 201), our intentional acts direct toward the other too in the world. We experience the other as intentional subject of the same kind, so the consciousness of the other forms a part of my consciousness. As we can interpret the notion of horizon as a latent field of possibilities (Spielraum der Möglichkeiten), the unbroken system of possible acts and actions setting the directions of the experience (see Ullmann 2013: 35), we can also assume an intersubjective horizon around our conscious acts. The perspective of the other as intentional consciousness (intentional mental agent, intentional being having purposes, attention and the ability decision making as Tomasello terms it, see Tomasello 2002: 83) appears implicitly in every act of the conscious mind. The intersubjective horizon, and the perspective of the other figured in this horizon can become explicit, which is a special kind of intentionality called empathy (Gallagher−Zahavi 2008: 183), but as a latent field of experience it is implied in every acts of consciousness from perception to decision making.

Why is the phenomenological idea of intersubjective horizon important for cognitive linguistics? What are the main differences between the standard cognitive scientific and the phenomenological approach to intersubjectiviy? The first is that cognitive sciences have thematized the notion of intersubjectivity as the problem of cognizing the other in the context of discoursive and cultural practices. This thematization regards the subject as an individual embodied conscious mind, thus it maintains the isolation of it in spite of directing our attention towards the social life (see Zlatev−Racine−Sinha−Itkonen 2008: 1). Contrary to the standard approach, phenomenology considers intersubjectivity an essential terrain of experiencing the world, hence it is significant not only in social acts, but in cognition in the broadest sense. And while the standard approach preserves partly the solipsist attitude in explaining cognition, since individual minds turn to the others only if they have something communicable for them, Merleau-Ponty (1992: 361) notes:

> "[s]olipsism would be strictly true only if someone who managed to be tacitly aware of his existence without being or doing anything, which is impossible, since existing is being in and of the world."

Since humans live evidently in a social world, and since sociality is one of the most important evolutionary developments in and for human cognition, the perspective of the other must be an inherent (explicit or latent) factor of cognition.

The second difference is the model of intersubjectivity: while cognitive science elaborated the analogy + inference model of recognizing other minds, phenomenology rejects the analogical modelling (for a detailed discussion of analogical modelling and implicit simulation in phenomenology see Gallagher–Zahavi 2008: 177–183). The reason of rejecting analogy in understanding the other is complex. On the one hand it implies the assumption of one's own mind's transparency for itself: one can identify the conscious state with one's own, but this procedure is successful only if one's own states are totally known to oneself. To put it differently, analogical modelling presupposes the knowledge of the subjective mental states by the subject through introspection. However, introspection presupposes the separation of the external from the internal, and renders the mind an internal entity not participating in the world, phenomenology therefore rejects introspection as a valid method of cognizing the consciousness (Gallagher–Zahavi 2008: 21). The consciousness itself cannot become the object of the acts of consciousness, consequently the mind is never immanent for itself, and the subjective consciousness has to transcend itself through constituting the other if it wants to know something about itself. Hence analogy never leads us to understand other minds.

On the other hand, as Merleau-Ponty argues (relying on Scheler's declaration, see Merleau-Ponty 1992: 352–353), analogy always presupposes what it is called on to explain. It takes the sameness of one's own and the other's mind as a starting point; hence through analogy we lose the otherness of the other, and instead of mapping the other mind, we analyse our own projected mind as other. Analogy makes a double failure in explaining cognition: it preserves the individual mind as a central and transparent vantage point, which results in the illusion of understanding otherness. Analogy is the true but hiding solipsism.

The inferential processes of analogical modelling are simulations: I try to understand the perspective of the other from my own one, and then I can infer through simulating the situation from the other's point of view. Explicit simulation (in which comprehending one's own intentional state is prior to understand the other's) raises however the homunculus-problem, and it has no objective verification from a developmental viewpoint (Tomasello 2002: 85); whereas implicit simulation (in which simulation proceeds directly in cognition, thus there is no mediating phase of introspection-like comprehension) is not distinguishable from direct perception and action: the neural activations which are identified with simulation can be interpreted as the subprocesses of perception, and the mirror neurons (which are said the most powerful evidences of simulation) can function in the sensori-motor process of perception. The main difficulty with implicit simulation is that its empirical evidence is a matter of interpretation: if we extend perception from a passive to an active process and we interpret it as a kind of action (as phenomenology does), it includes the firing of the mirror-neurons as well. The important conclusion is that the question of simulation – like the question of representation – cannot be answered from an empirical standpoint with naturalistic argumentation, because the evidences are interpretable either as supporting or as opposing the existence of a simulating process. Scientific research needs theoretical contemplation and philosophical reflection in order to interpret carefully the empirical evidences.

According to phenomenology, intersubjectivity is an essential dimension of conscious life. The appearance of the other in the horizon of subjective consciousness is not equal with the perspective of the other, or with the implicit or explicit knowledge of what is in the other's mind, since successful interaction (with or without words) presupposes that (i) the other

experiences the same phenomenological world (though not the same physical one because of the different perspectives), and (ii) the vantage points, the backgrounds and the situations are in principle shareable, thus the other would or could be in the situation of the subject (though not exactly in the same situation). Consequently, intersubjectivity is to be conceived primarily not as perspective taking (for it preserves the separate view of individual minds) but as the origin of understanding the world:

> "this intersubjectivity of cognition and language relies on the notion of 'truth' which implies that what is true or false, correct or incorrect, is also true or false, correct or incorrect for other persons" (Praetorius 2010: 308).

Intersubjectivity ensures that the phenomenal subject is able to understand the environment as a meaningful world and she/he can manipulate the entities around herself/himself to execute successful actions, despite her/his limited cognitive abilities. The human mind needs the other for constituting the world as such through perception, cognition and action, since it experiences the world with others, and it experiences the others as intentional mental agents of the same kind – this is our cognitive inheritance and the main factor of our cultural evolution.

The importance of intersubjectivity is far from new in cognitive linguistics: in the last two decades, fundamental theoretical and empirical investigations have been conducted on developmental psychology and language acquisition with the recognition of the central role of intersubjectivity (i.e. the understanding of the other as an intentional mental agent similar to me) as a result (see Tomasello 2002, Sinha 2014 for details). However, the notion of intersubjectivity has not gained its real significance in the theory of linguistic meaning. In the pragmatic tradition, the term is conceived as "mutual attribution of intention and understanding", hence it is the context of language use which is intersubjective in nature (Harder 2009: 67−70, Tátrai 2011: 30). The pragmatic interpretation adheres itself to the attribution of intentions, but it implies the priority of the individual mind (and the subjective vantage point as well), a monolithic theory of mind (which developmentally questionable), and an analogical-inferential model of interpersonal epistemology with its view of separated minds. Another important model on intersubjectivity in cognitive linguistics is due to Arie Verhagen: he considers some areas of grammar (negation and negation-related costructions, complementation, discourse connectives) as the scaffolding devices of engaging in "deep cognitive coordinations with others" (Verhagen 2005: 4). In his framework it is not the context of the discourse, but linguistic structures themselves are regarded as intersubjective constructions, hence the notion of intersubjectivity gets central significance in describing linguistic meaning. Nevertheless this significance does not extend to meaning as such: only one part of grammatical constructions proves to be intersubjective, and though it is the core of their meaning, intersubjectivity remains the dimension of coordinating meanings being otherwise individual and isolated.

A phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity can not only explicate the erroneous presuppositions of investigating human meaning creation from a cognitive point of view (e.g. the solipsistic attitude towards the other mind, the fallacy of analogy in explanation), but it also extends the application of intersubjectivity in semantics. Merleau-Ponty (1992: 354) describes the event of a discourse as phenomenal experience:

> "[i]n the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my

words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and
they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have
here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my
transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate
reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a com-
mon world."

It is worth recognizing that the process of experience is itself intersubjective, namely it pre-
supposes the consciousness of the other, consequently not one or another linguistic construc-
tion has intersubjective character. We can distinguish the phenomenological notion of inter-
subjectivity from the canonized one: whereas the latter can be seen as an explicit interpretation
(which presupposes the individual meaning, and according to which intersubjective construal
consists of specific subprocesses like perspective taking, inference, coordination through
constructions, negotiation on meaning), the phenomenological interpretation conceives inter-
subjectivity as an implicit factor of every meaning (from the nominal/verbal/adjectival ones
through indexicals and pronominal meanings as far as to clausal meaning), it is the substrate
of conceptualizing or construing entities and events of the world (hence it is not confined to
verbal discourses, see Harder 2009). To interpret the clause *Just put it on the table!*, it is not
enough to know that the reference of *it* is elaborated in relation to the common ground; it is
not enough to know what the verb *put* means in the context of use and what kind of interper-
sonal relations are symbolized in the imperative construction; we need to know what *table*
means and why can we use the *on* preposition with the *table* nominal in the context of the verb
put. The latter knowledge is intersubjective, though we do not make any negotiations on it, as
well as no perspective taking is needed for meaning creation: knowledge of the table (as a
phenomenal object having an extended vertical surface that can be used to laying something
on it) is shared, i.e. it is intersubjective knowledge. It must be realized that meaning has an
implicit intersubjective character in its every aspect; to put it differently, intersubjectivity of
meaning is prior to its subjectivity. As Praetorius (2010: 308) notes,

"intersubjectivity must be the rock bottom, the very point of departure from which
any discussion about our knowledge and description must be based and proceed –
whether such discussions concern our knowledge and description of thing in publicly
observable reality, or our internal states, such as our emotions, thoughts or feelings
of pain."

Cognitive linguistics can profit from the phenomenological interpretation of intersubjectiv-
ity on multiple fields of explaining linguistic structures. At first it is worth noting that the
schematic semantic descriptions provided by the most elaborated theories in cognitive lin-
guistics model the intersubjective ground of the meaning of linguistic structures being spec-
ifiable in the discourse. The so called idealized cognitive models are based on experiencing
the phenomenal world; their validity is therefore not universal but intersubjective. Also the
semantic matrices of cognitive domains elaborated in cognitive grammar demonstrate that
core of linguistic meanings originating from the intersubjective experience of a shared phe-
nomenal world, just as the semantic descriptions of frame semantics can be regarded as in-
tersubjective categorizations of experiencing the world, hence they can motivate actual
meaning in a discourse. Phenomenology as a metatheoretial perspective does not serve for
refining the proposed schematic structures (although it directs our attention to the synthetic

configuration of sense experiences in spite of their separated description in domains for example), the real benefit of its application is to redefine the character and significance of the elaborated models.

Nevertheless we can build new explanations on phenomenological claims about intersubjectivity in the cases of (creative or poetic) innovations. Creativity has a strong intersubjective character: it is neither creating something from nothing (Pope 2005: xv), nor a purely subjective act of cognition. Instead of a binary (yes/no answer for the question whether something counts as innovation) and subjectivist approach in which innovation is a solely act of the individual, the phenomenological reflection can propose a scalar idea of innovation ranging from the conventionality of intersubjective constitution of the phenomenal world to the more and more subjective constitution patterns. If semantic descriptions provided by cognitive theories of linguistic structure are the models of the intersubjective ground of meanings, then the process of subjectivization can be grasped on the level of semantic structures, and not only on the level of the discourse: in so far as conventionality carries out the intersubjective constitution, in which the conscious mind does not want to step out from the shared phenomenal world, every departure from conventionality highlights a new way of constituting the world from a consciously changed perspective, be it an archaism, a neologism or other poetic formation;[7] yet every innovation is only partial departure, since the intersubjective ground of meaning does not disappear, it only goes to the background (see the principle of optimal innovation in Giora 2003: 176−184). The exact, absolute degree of departing from the conventions (and hence from the intersubjective constitution) cannot be measured, but from a phenomenological point of view (as from a cognitive linguistic one, see Zawada 2005) innovation and creativity are relative phenomena. The benefit coming from phenomenology is again not the elaboration of a strict methodology but of a theoretical frame in which innovation is interpreted as the symbolic marker of relatively subjective constitution.

The phenomenological idea of intersubjectivity can put the canonized notions of cognitive linguistics into a new light. One of the examples is the generic space in the model of conceptual integration: according to Turner (2007: 378) it "contains what the inputs have in common". However, this definition does not elaborate the status of the generic space in the blend: it is open whether the generic space is the result of an a posteriori generalization or it is the prerequisite of creating a blended space. Considering the famous example *This surgeon is a butcher*, is the generic space needed for interpreting the metaphor, or is it a useful device for analyzing the semantic structure? Well, if we recognize that the generic space summarizes such aspects of the blended entities or events which are indisputably valid in the shared world (the use of sharp devices, the process of cutting flesh or meat for executing the purposed act successfully and so on), we can conclude that the generic space functions as the intersubjective ground on which the new (metaphorical) meaning emerges. In other words, the reference of the butcher to the surgeon, as well as the emerging conceptualization of incompetence is meaningful only for those who have the intersubjective knowledge of what a surgeon and a butcher do in the shared phenomenal world. As we can see, even in creative conceptual integration, there is an intersubjective substructure, since without it the blend

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[7] The redefinition of subjectification from a phenomenological perspective as a new way of constituting the phenomenal reality is of specific importance in cognitive stylistics and in cognitive poetics: insofar as nonconventional linguistic solutions symbolize the subjectivized perspective in experiencing the world, stylistic and poetic formation can propose new constituting relation or attitude towards the shared world.

would be totally incomprehensible. The generic space ensures that the emerging meaning remains intersubjectively understandable. Therefore blending seems to be a useful device for constituting the phenomenal world from a new perspective without abolishing its shared character. Mark Turner formulates this phenomenal function of conceptual integration as achieving a human scale (Turner 2007: 382−383).

The other example comes from the theory of grammaticalization and from the theory of construction grammar: the term constructionalization designates the process when a construction becomes more schematic and less compositional in its meaning, hence the increase of its use results in the increase of the emergent character of its meaning; the new construction is a new node at a higher level in the network of linguistic knowledge, thus constructionalization leads to convergent use of linguistic structure, in other words to a shared grammar (see Hilpert 2015: 134−140). The emergence of a construction is the stabilization of an intersubjective constituting pattern in the discourse community. As it was demonstrated above, innovations count as departures from the conventional, intersubjectively valid constitution of the phenomenal world. Constructionalization can be seen as the reversed process through which a subjective way of experiencing the shared world becomes intersubjective. From this it follows that the corpus-based investigations are of overriding importance, because the quantitative analyses can demonstrate what kinds of constituting patterns are accessible in a language community, and through measuring their frequency we can infer their degree of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology leads us to the claim that language is not only the medium of cognition but it is the socio-cultural context of emerging new patterns of cognition, thus language use can yield new insights into the world around us.

4. Back to the problem of representation: conclusion

The aim of this paper was twofold: on the one hand I aimed to demonstrate the benefits that cognitive linguistics can have from a phenomenological contemplation; on the other I wanted to demonstrate that in spite of the anti-philosophical attitude of the naturalizing cognitive sciences, a phenomenological reflection on the subject and the methods of cognitive linguistic research can provide numerous considerations which can help us to avoid both the problematic theoretical presuppositions (e.g. reductionism or the problem of isolated minds) and the conflation of the research field of cognitive linguistics with the other fields in cognitive science. Though I agree with András Kertész that metascientific reflection "is not capable of *solving* objectscientific problems per se" (Kertész 2004: 168), the contribution of metascientific reflection to objectscientific investigation is not limited to motivate ignoring certain phenomena or aspects in explanation – an accurate theoretical reflection can set the task of taking new realms of cognition (e.g. phenomenal consciousness, the implicit intersubjectivity of meaning) into consideration, and it helps to define the subject of objectscientific researches.

The main theses of a phenomenological contemplation on cognition are:

a) the differentiation between the psychological self and the phenomenal consciousness; between the actual situation of experiencing and the situated process of cognition;
b) the direct meaningfulness of perception;
c) the recognition of the phenomenal world as the basis of our experiences;
d) the irreducibility of concepts and meaning to physical sensations;

e) the secondary importance of direct empirical (external) observations in investigating cognition;
f) the inherent situatedness of experiencing the phenomenal world, in which not only the body, but also the situation becomes the constituent of the intentional object;
g) the definition of cognition – instead of mere data-collecting and data-processing – as the process in which the environment becomes saturated with meanings for human minds;
h) the recognition of constitution as the active functioning of the human mind;
i) the recognition of the subject's central role in the process of cognition;
j) modelling linguistic meaning not as conceptual but as constitutional patterning;
k) the recognition of intersubjectivity as an implicit horizon of the conscious mind;
l) attributing an implicit intersubjective character to linguistic meaning.

As we can see, a phenomenological argumentation can alter the subject of the inquiry and the interpretation of the central notions as well. The naturalistic metatheoretical reflection eliminates some of the research dilemmas construing new conditions on the grounds of empirical evidences within which both of the destructive alternative of the dilemma become avoidable, limiting their application to only one part of the investigated phenomena. Thus if we consider the behavioural aspects of cognition, we do not need representations, but if we consider the higher ordered tasks of cognition, representations are needed. In comparison with it – and this is the central metatheoretical claim of this study – a philosophical reflection carried out as phenomenological argumentation can solve the dilemma without ignoring important aspects of the phenomena investigated.

To recall the problem of representation I reformulate it with the terms of standard cognitive science. The representationalist alternative claims that we need representation-like structures in order to understand and explain cognition, and hence the main purpose of cognitive linguistics is to model the (conceptual or semantic) representations in the background of actual meanings. In the course of this endeavour we can maintain the embodied (experience-based) nature of these representations, but we can ignore the specific explanation of it – a rigorous description of semantic or conceptual representations. The anti-representationalist alternative goes as follows: because of the non-observability of representations these are mere labels of the analyst, there is no evidence for using intermind structures; thus the only vivid and true alternative is to consider representations as neuronal activation patterns, and though in a special sense they can be seen as (bodily) representations, the actual representations of these physiological structures (in language, in discourse and so on) are of secondary significance, i.e. ignorable.

Phenomenology ignores neither the embodied, nor the representation-like aspects of cognition: by placing the human mind into a situation of action which is meaningful through the acts of the participating mind it can balance the significance of body, mind, and environment. The intentionality of the subjective consciousness pervades the process of cognition making both the correlation between the mind and the world and the correlation between the subject and the other possible; however, neither aspects of cognition can be reduced to intentionality, since it is the factor of correlation, not of causal relation. Intentionality is the characteristic feature of the human mind, an adaptation to acting successfully in the world, yet it cannot develop without (epigenetically) interacting with the world. In so far as the cognizing human mind directs itself toward the world through intentional acts, explaining cognition

needs representation in any aspect of the process, but these representations are subjective representations of the shared world having intersubjective (not universal) validity.[8]

To the question whether phenomenology also ignores something, namely the psychological self and the empirically tested process of cognition, the answer can be given that phenomenology does not ignore it, but it limits the validity of the results of empirical observations and testing. We can explore many important details of cognition through third-person observation, but neither linguistic structures nor cognition itself can be explained causally with it. The data need to be interpreted from a theoretical point of view, and phenomenology serves as an accurate and reflected device for this interpretation. The only thing being ignored in a phenomenological contemplation is the naturalistic attitude toward the mind: I admit that a phenomenological perspective is not promising regarding the wished synthesis of humanities and sciences. However, a synthesis must involve an active discourse between humanities and sciences which will initiate the redefinition of the central theoretical constructions such as cognition, experience and representation. Instead of being dominated by the ideal of sciences, humanities – and especially philosophy – can offer theoretical considerations which are essential for scientific explanation, and phenomenology carries the promise of a two-directional, real interdisciplinarity of humanities and sciences – it can lead to a new cognitive linguistics.

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[8] This answer for Q1 coincides partly with the conclusions of Mark Rowlands (2015: 28−29): he argues that the yes or no answer has no theoretical or practical utility, because "some items that seem to be involved in cognitive processes may satisfy some commonly accepted conditions of representations but not others. Other items may satisfy different constraints. And that is all we can, fruitfully, say on the question of whether cognition requires representation" (Rowlands 2015: 29). The main point of Rowlands' argumentation is that "craving for generality" leads us to close both the notion and the question of scientific terms, and because of this closing we cannot answer satisfactorily the hard theoretical problems. The clear categorization and definition of our notions and the investigated phenomena is expected by the rigid empirical methods of the sciences; philosophy always opens the notions to reinterpretation, and hence makes us enable to reflect on them continually. The answer phenomenology offers is not the absolute necessity of representations in investigating cognition, but the necessity of them in so far as cognition is concerned as the active participation of the intentional conscious mind in a shared world. This claim does not exclude other possible answers from other scientific perspectives, but it leaves the terms representation and cognition open to further reflections, which is the most important advantage of a phenomenological argumentation.

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