APOSTROPHIC FICTION AND JOINT ATTENTION IN LYRICS
A SOCIAL COGNITIVE APPROACH

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Abstract

This paper offers a functional, more specifically social cognitive interpretation of apostrophe. Under the proposal, this figure of speech involves the special functioning of joint attention as a feature of linguistic activities (cf. Tomasello 2002, Sinha 2005, see also Tátrai 2011). At the same time, it is also a characteristic, even defining property of lyrical poetry (see Tátrai 2012). The proposal will be backed up by the study of lyrics produced by the Hungarian alternative rock band Quimby.

The interpretation to be offered here departs from the received view that is dominant in the rhetorical tradition; for example, it rejects the need for situating apostrophe in the system of figures of speech. Instead, it makes an attempt at the cognitive linguistic adaptation of certain insights of literary theory (cf. Frye 1998, Culler 1981) about the relationship between apostrophe and lyrical poetry. My departure from the rhetorical tradition is motivated primarily by its basic incompatibility with the view of meaning characteristic of functional cognitive linguistics. From the adopted perspective, meaning is not seen as a mental object existing prior to linguistic activity, but rather as an intersubjective act (within a scene of joint attention) which allows its participants to construe and share their experiences of the world (cf. Sinha 1999, Croft 2009, Verschueren 1999). Once the social character of linguistic cognition is taken as a point of departure, it is worth devoting special attention to apostrophe, given the inherently discursive basis of this figure of speech.

Keywords: apostrophe, lyrics, joint attention, intersubjectivity, fictional discourse, spa- tiotemporal relations, social relations, mental states

1. Theoretical background

Recent decades have seen the publication of several theoretical works which place more emphasis on the social (interactional, discursive) grounding of linguistic cognition, along with its implications (see. e.g. Tomasello 1999, 2003, 2011, Sinha 1999, 2001, Croft 2009).

It is a general feature of functional cognitive linguistic models that (whether explicitly or implicitly) they conceptualise the evolution and functioning of language as an epigenetic interaction between the human brain/mind and the physical/social environment. On the one hand, the concept of **epigenesis** highlights the fact that linguistic cognition crucially depends on genetically based, innate cognitive abilities (processes and structures). On the other, it also ascribes special significance to the constructive role of the physical/social environment in the elaboration of those abilities (cf. Karmiloff-Smith 1996). Under this explanation, environmental stimuli do not simply trigger a fully developed genetic program. Rather, relevant experiences of the environment assume a decisive role in the elaboration and emergent refinement of the initial, genetically determined perceptual and behavioural repertoire (cf. Sinha 2005).

In this context, elaboration refers to the fact that simpler or more general constructs develop into more complex or more specific ones. Emergence, for its part, highlights the tendency that the above development gives rise to new properties and levels of the human cognitive system that cannot be simply deduced from the processes and structures serving as their basis.

It follows from the above that the potential scope of human cognitive development is crucially determined by the simple interactions occurring between the human body (with its characteristic, species-specific biological features) and the physical environment. This **embodied grounding** (Sinha 1999) of human cognition makes an essential contribution to our ability to conceptualise and linguistically construe our experiences of the world. Embodied experiences are mapped onto concepts which are in turn mapped onto linguistic symbols, thus the symbols also (indirectly) map embodied experiences (cf. Lakoff–Johnson 1999, Rohrer 2007). However, recognising the essential dependence of linguistic cognition on embodied experience does not amount to a claim that the former can be reduced to the latter. Our personal "coming into possession" of the world only partially explains the unique emergent nature of linguistic cognition. for a comprehensive explanation, one also needs to be mindful that humans do not simply take the world into their possession but rather also share it in the context of social interactions. Put differently, our embodied experience of the world only "becomes" language by being embedded into the socio-cultural praxis which is formed by our joint social activities (cf. Zlatev 1997). It is in this framework that people can make their experiences of the world accessible to others. In view of all this, the **discursive grounding** of linguistic cognition (Sinha 1999) must also be regarded as crucial.

The process of dynamic meaning generation is framed by discourses interpretable as joint attentional scenes (Tomasello 1999, Sinha 2005). Joint attentional scenes are characterised by the fact that their participants, the speaker(s) and the recipient(s) initiate interactions with each other through the medium of some natural language or languages, and by directing and following each other's attention, constructively contribute to the production and comprehension of a referential scene (or scenes) with the aim of satisfying their communicative needs (cf. Verschueren 1999: 61–65).

Thus, one precondition of the employment of linguistic symbols is for humans to regard each other as mental agents similar to themselves, possessing the ability to direct and follow their discourse partners' attention (cf. Tomasello 1999, Sinha 2005). This allows them to bring their own mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs and emotions) to symbolic expression, and at the same time also influence the mental states of others (see also Croft 1994, Searle 1998). The ability to identify with others is presumably an exceptional biological endowment which is put to use and elaborated in social interactions (cf. Sinha 2005, 2009; Tomasello 1999). Hence, a crucial feature of linguistic cognition is its **intersubjectivity**: we learn to comprehend the world through language by comprehending others with respect to ourselves, and ourselves with respect to others (cf. Tomasello 2003, 2011).

An additional feature of the use of linguistic symbols (by no means independently of our ability to interpret others as well as ourselves as mental agents) is **referentiality**. Intersubjective linguistic cognition is characterised by a triadic system of relationships, also known as a referential triangle: somebody [1] directs the attention of somebody else [2] onto something [3] (cf. Sinha 2005). As a result, linguistic reference can be interpreted as an intersubjective act whereby we as speakers use linguistic symbols to direct the recipients' attention to some distinct entity of the world around us (and including us), or better, a referential scene which involves that entity (see also Brisard 2002: xii).

Joint attentional scenes establish the intersubjective **context** in which the referential interpretation of linguistic symbols (their **grounding** in the discourse world) becomes possible (cf. Tomasello 1999). Looked at in this way, context does not have a reality prior to, and independently of, utterances. Rather, it is a dynamic system of relationships which includes the discourse participants along with their physical, social and mental worlds (cf. Verschueren 1999: 75–114, Tátrai 2011: 51–67, see also Croft 2009). The physical world comprises the system of spatio-temporal relations as perceived by the discourse participants. The social world consists of socio-cultural relationships as processed by interlocutors. finally, the mental world includes the mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs and emotions) that the participants are attributing to themselves and each other. Thus, the intersubjective context emerges in a dynamic process: the participants make lesser or greater efforts in order to reach referential interpretations which satisfy their communicative demands, by relying on their knowledge pertaining to the physical, social and mental worlds of the discourse.

2. Method and data

The corpus of my study is supplied by the lyrics of 40 Hungarian songs written by the alternative rock band Quimby. In 38 cases, Tibor Kiss is credited as the songwriter, and in two cases Líviusz Varga. Of the 40 texts, 13 come from the album *Diligram* (1997), 15 from *Kilégzés* (2005), and 12 from *Lármagyűjtögető* (2009).

The selection of these lyrics was motivated by the fact that texts belonging to this genre can be regarded as examples of "occasional poetry" which are aimed at the satisfaction of a widespread everyday demand for lyricism. Lyrics by Quimby are also peculiar, however: as lyrics of "alternative music", they constitute a transition between popular hits and poems belonging to the literary canon. This makes it easier to employ the interpretive model under elaboration, and to potentially extend its application in both directions. The aim of this study is to lay the qualitative foundations for an extended quantitative study, supplying specific hypotheses that can be tested in the future.

3. Apostrophic fiction in the lyrics

3.1. Under an initial interpretation, **apostrophe** is a figure of speech which allows the speaker to exploit the opportunities resulting from the discursive nature of linguistic activities by turning away from the real addressee of her utterance, addressing some other entity instead (which may be present or absent, real or imaginary, human or non-human, with the latter category including living creatures, objects and abstract concepts) (Tátrai 2008: 52, 2011: 58). In contrast with embedded discourses such as quotations (cf. Tátrai–Csontos 2009), discourses created by apostrophe run in parallel and simultaneously with the matrix discourse.

It is important to add, moreover, that apostrophic discourse may involve either a factual or a fictional turning away from the addressee. In the case of **factual apostrophe**, the speaker turns to another person (subject) who is physically present in the speech situation. To put it in a simpler way: in the course of a conversation, we are dropping a word to somebody and then resume our temporarily interrupted discourse.

> (1) Átmegyünk a felejtőbe
> Ráülünk az énlejtőre

> Csúszunk egész lazáig
> Iszunk egy csésze akármit
> **Taxi**!
>
> 'Oblivion is where we go,
> sliding on the slope of our egos
> we're getting loose with gravity
> and drink a cup of anythin'
> **Taxi!**
>   (Taxi [1997])

In the fictional discourse of (1), whose participants are marked by first person plural forms with inclusive reference (including both the speaker and the addressee), the exclamation *Taxi!* can be considered as an instance of factual apostrophe. It can easily receive a metonymical interpretation, according to which the speaker is addressing a physically present other person (a taxi driver).

However, as the initial interpretation offered above also makes it clear, apostrophe often (and in lyrical texts characteristically) fails to be directed at an addressee who is indeed available for being addressed. In cases of fictional apostrophe, the speaker is creating an apostrophic discourse by ignoring the physiological and discursive grounding of linguistic cognition (cf. Tátrai 2011: 26–35). She initiates linguistic interactions with entities with which this is not strictly speaking possible (unless the limitations of linguistic cognition are ignored), either because they are not physically present, or because they are not human beings.

> (2)   Szeretni, **Istenem**, milyen nehéz!
>   'To love, **my God**, how hard it is!'
>   (Don Quijote ébredése 'Don Quijote's awakening' [2005])

In (2), the form of address *Istenem* 'my God', highly conventional as it is, exemplifies fictional apostrophe: here, the speaker is initiating human communication with a non-human being.

3.2. In view of the above, **apostrophic fiction** can be said to produce a joint attentional scene prototypically characterised by direct interaction. In its context, the speaker is directing the attention of the apostrophic discourse's addressee (with the employment of linguistic symbols) to a referential scene (a linguistically represented event or state) which can be directly observed by both of them. In (3a), this is made explicit by the proximal space deictic pronoun *ez* 'this', while in (3b), by the first person singular form of the verb of perception *lát* 'see'.

> (3a) Tükröm, tükröm, tükröm, mondd meg nékem:
>   Jól áll-e **ez** nekem?
>
>   'My mirror, my mirror, my mirror, do tell me:
>   Does **this** suit me well?'
>   (Don Quijote ébredése 'Don Quijote's awakening' [2005])

(3b) Ismerlek, Mari,
      és kacsintanék,
      mondanám, hogy menjünk, de **látom**,
      hogy nálad még be van ragadva a kézifék.

      'I know you Mary
      and I'd just wink
      and say »Let's go«, but **I [can] see**
      that by your side the hand brake is still stuck'
                    (Mari 'Mary' [2005])

During all this, the addressee of the actual discourse (the lyrics' recipient) fulfils the role of eavesdropper with respect to the apostrophic discourse, listening in to what the interlocutors are saying whilst the latter are unaware of her presence (cf. frye 1957). In addition, apostrophic fiction offers further opportunities as well (for the concept of fictionality, see Iser 1993, Anderegg 1998). The apostrophic fiction's addressee can pose *as if* she were present as an onlooker, with a chance to observe the referential scene, this time with the interlocutors' consent. what is more, she can also act *as if* she were a marginal participant that could be talked to, and even play with the idea *as if* she were also talking as a kind of "vocalist" (on participant roles, see Verschueren 1999: 77–87).

In terms of the organisation of spatial and temporal relations, it has important implications that in cases of apostrophic fiction, the space and time of the joint attentional scene coincide with those of the referential scene. In other words, the events being construed linguistically unfold at the same time and place as the joint attentional scene, and typically feature the same participants as well. This can be contrasted with narrative fiction (characteristic of epic texts and dramas), in which there is spatial as well as temporal distance between the referential scene (the story) and the joint attentional scene (the storytelling) (for details, see Tátrai 2008: 50–54, 2015: 12–16).

(4) **Most** olyan könnyű minden,
     szinte csak a semmi **tart**.
     […]
     Alattunk a tenger,
     szemben a nap zuhan.
     […]
     G dúrban **zúgják** a fákon a kabócák,
     hogy **láss** csodát, **láss** ezer csodát,
     láss ezer csodát.

     '**Now** everything is so light,
     it's as though only nothing **is holding us**.
     […]
     The sea is **beneath us**
     and the sun is falling **opposite**.
     […]

Cicadas **are buzzing** in G major on the trees:
see miracles, **see** a thousand miracles,
see a thousand miracles.'
                                (Autó egy szerpentinen 'Car on a serpentine road' [2005])

In (4), the first person plural word form *alattunk* 'beneath us' makes is evident that the participants of the joint attentional scene are at the same time also participants of the referential scene. More specifically, they are participants of a referential scene which unfolds simultaneously with the joint attentional scene (cf. the use of *most* 'now', *tart* 'is holding [us]', *zúgják* 'they are buzzing', *láss* 'see'), and the deictic centre for spatial orientation also lies with the position of the discourse participants (vö. *alattunk* 'beneath us', *szemben* 'opposite [us]'). All this has two major implications. firstly, as illustrated by (5), any linguistic construal of the addressee may result in apostrophic discourse. Here, for example, second person singular is construed in a fictional discourse enacting a face-to-face interaction.

(5)   Hárman egy ladikban,
       evezünk felfelé,
       Hátul egy rablóhal,
       S elöl **te** meg **én**.

       'There's three of us in the boat,
       we're rowing upstream,
       behind us, a predatory fish,
       and in front, **you** and **me**.'
                                Rablóhal 'Predatory fish' [1997])

Secondly, in close correlation with the strategy to ignore limitations of human communication, the spatial and temporal relations of apostrophic fiction become accessible and interpretable as constituting not so much a physical but much rather a metaphysical world.

    It also follows from the above that apostrophic fiction results in the special organisation not only of spatial and temporal but also of **interpersonal relations**. It can be said about linguistic cognition in general that any experiencing of the world is framed by an intersubjective system of relationships. However, apostrophic fiction goes further than this: here, experiencing the world is itself represented as an intersubjective relation (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154).

(6a) Sikítani akarok egyet **Baby**
      Lesz-e szex ma a szabadban?

      'I wanna make a scream **Baby**
      Shall we have sex today in the open?
                                (Country Joe McDonald [2005])

(6b) **Átkozott harangok, tücskök, madarak**!
      Hagyjatok!

'You damned bells, grasshoppers, birds!
Leave me alone!'
　　　　　　　(Álmatlan dal 'Song of insomnia' [2009])

(6c) Mint telihold az éjszakával
　　　Együtt nőttünk fel a fákkal
　　　Te idő sosem vicceltél

　　　'Like the full moon with the night,
　　　we grew up together with the trees
　　　Time, you were never joking.'
　　　　　　　(Aranykor [1997])

(6d) sehol se talállak **téged életem**
　　　'I can find **you** nowhere, **my life**.'
　　　　　　　(Sehol se talállak 'I can find you nowhere' [2005])

Fictional apostrophe makes it possible to take entities which are normally available as objects to linguistic cognition, and construe them as subjects participating in a system of social relationships. In (6a), a desire for the loved one (*Baby*) who is absent; in (6b), certain objects and animals (*harangok, tücskök, madarak* 'bells, grasshoppers, birds'); and in (6c–d), issues associated with abstract concepts (*idő* 'time', *élet* 'life') get construed in a discursive way. Example (6d), in which *élet* 'life' appears not as a metaphorical form of address directed to the loved one but rather in its own right, also aptly illustrates the paradox of apostrophic fiction: while I do not even know where you are, getting in touch (entering a discourse with you) poses no problem. The main lesson to be drawn from this is that in interpreting the "as if" of apostrophic fiction, it is difficult and even unreasonable to ignore the social character of linguistic cognition.

In addition to processing spatial, temporal and interpersonal relations, comprehending the **mental states** of the participants (their beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions) is also an integral part of the processing of apostrophic fiction. Such "embarrassing" manifestations of the human mind as apostrophe ought not to be exclusively explained by reference to emotions (Culler 1981). Rather, it is worth highlighting that even in this case, intersubjective linguistic cognition involves the three dimensions of knowledge, action and emotions (cf. Croft 1994). In the context of the intersubjective directing of attention, the speaker of an apostrophic discourse not only brings her emotions to expression but rather also her beliefs, and she does so in order to influence the beliefs held by the apostrophe's addressee and (with a fictional transfer) by the addressee of the actual discourse. The aim is either to get her to recognise something she has been familiar of, or to share with her some new knowledge about the world surrounding (and including) the interlocutors. Additionally, the power of apostrophe is manifested not only in the sharing of particular experiences but also in attempts at getting someone to act (cf. Culler 1981: 137–143, Tátrai 2008: 54). This is what we find in cases when the addressee (and by a fictional transfer also the recipient of the lyrics) is encouraged to bring about some change in the world surrounding her: do something she has not previously done or stop doing what she has been doing up to this point.

(7a) **Pofozzatok fel**, bajszos angyalok
　　　Mutassátok, hol van a szerelem

>**Give me a punch**, you angels with a moustache,
show me where love is.'
(Homo Defectus [2005])

(7b) **Menj** már a pokolba,
Vagy **menj** felőlem a mennybe akár,
sodorj egy cigit, kannibál!

>**Go** to hell, come on,
or **go** to heaven, I don't care,
roll me a cigarette, cannibal!'
(Kannibálkarnevál [1997])

(7c) **Küldj át** a szőrös szívbe markolót
S **nyúzzuk le** az égboltról a rákfogót

>**Send me** over as I'm grabbing a hairy heart,
and **let's strip** the lobster trap **off** the sky'
(Dal Lászlónak 'Song for *László*' [1997])

(7d) Gyűlnek a gerlék, várni kár
Leteperhetnél végre már

>**The doves are gathering, it's a shame to wait,
You should overpower me at last.'
(Haverom a J. J. Cale 'J. J. Cale is my pal' [2009])

In (7a–c), the highlighted imperative verb forms *(pofozzatok fel* 'give me a punch'*, mutassátok* 'show me'*, menj* 'go'*, sodorj* 'roll'*, küldj át* 'send [me] over'*, nyúzzuk le* 'lets strip off'*)* make it explicit that an apostrophic address is often also an apostrophic command (with 26 out of 40 songs including imperative forms). Moreover, it is not to be overlooked that getting others to act also has indirect forms of expression, as exemplified by *leteperhetnél* 'you should/could overpower me' in (7d). Thus, apostrophe cannot be interpreted exclusively as an outburst of passion, of emotions. It provides a special opportunity for the expression of beliefs, desires and intentions, and for influencing the corresponding mental states of others.

3.3. When the above considerations are brought to bear on the relationship between apostrophe and lyric, then it is worth regarding apostrophic fiction as a characteristic property of lyric as a general literary form and of (song) lyrics as a specific lyrical genre. It should be noted at the outset that from a functional cognitive perspective, the concepts of **literary form** and **genre** are open, prototype-based categories organised as complex systems of properties and expectations (cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2001: 331–338, 2008, see also Genette 1988). **Lyric** as a general literary form is not a basic level category, rather it is at a higher level of abstraction (cf. Tátrai 2008: 49–50). By contrast, **songs** can be treated as representing a basic level category and at the same time a prototypical lyrical genre (besides the genre of odes, cf. Culler 1981: 135–145). Songs rarely include epic or dramatic elements, the employment of fictional apostrophe is, however, one of their essential properties.

The theoretical insight implied by the previous section, namely that the lyrical speech situation is basically created and evoked by apostrophic fiction (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154), is also confirmed by the corpus of lyrics under study. Of the 40 songs, 38 include fictional apostrophe in some form, i.e. explicit marking of the speaker's turning away from the actual addressee of the song. This exceptionally high proportion overwhelmingly supports the hypothesis that apostrophe belongs to the central properties underlying lyric as proto- type-based category.

Having said this, it is worth taking a closer look at the two songs which do not employ the figure of speech of apostrophe.

(8a) kettesben élünk, én és a bank, az első közös kis lakásban.
      meztelen testünk összefeszül a hitelből vett nászágyban.
      ő kölcsönadott nekem egy lehelletet és én cserébe gazdagon jutalmazom
      beengedtem és most már marad, hosszú évekig baszhatom.

      'we are living here just the two of us, me and the bank, in the first small flat
         we own.
      our naked bodies stretch out in the matrimonial bed bought by credit.
      she lent me a breath of air and in return I'm rewarding her generously
      I have let her in and now she's staying, I can screw her [or: 'I'm screwed'
         [figurative meaning] for years and years.'
                    (Én és a bank 'Me and the bank' [2009])

(8b) Üdvözlöm érintem nem mutatom
      Nem emlékeztetem nem kutatom
      Nem zavarom zavarom csak figyelem
      Belefeledkezem vele utazom

      'I'm greeting,[1] I'm touching, I'm not showing,
      I'm not reminding, nor searching,
      I'm not disturbing, I'm only watching,
      I'm getting immersed [in it/her], I'm travelling along.'
                    (Magam adom 'I'm giving myself' [2005])

with regard to (8a), presenting the full text of the song in question, it may be suspected that we are faced with a non-prototypical song, given the shortness of the text and the punch line relying on the polysemy of the final word (with *baszhatom* meaning either 'I can screw her' or 'I'm screwed' in a figurative sense). The same point about non-prototypicality may also apply to (8b), which is based on the figure of speech of isocolon. However, we need not be satisfied with this overly trivial argument. Rather, it should be noted, for example, that the "real-time unfolding" character of lyrical texts is found in both songs, as suggested by the use of tenses, and creates a sense that the joint attentional scene and the referential scene are

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[1] Due to the special property of Hungarian that definite objects can be morphologically marked by the verb, but with an inherent ambiguity regarding gender, the transitive verbs in this song can be interpreted as having either *azt* 'it' or *őt* 'her'/'him' as their syntactically unelaborated complement.

simultaneous. In addition, the notion of apostrophic fiction need not be completely discarded either, despite the fact that the speaker's turning away is not made linguistically explicit. It may be presumed that the speaker is turning here not to a person outside of the speech situation but rather to himself; he is acting as if he were talking to himself (cf. frye 2007). The actual addressee of the discourse is eavesdropping on him, as it were; alternatively, she can also pretend that she is the one who is talking (as suggested before).

The study also investigated the question as to what typical patterns of apostrophic fiction could be detected in the 38 songs which included explicit markers of the speaker's turning away. Of the 38 lyrics, 15 consist entirely of apostrophic utterances, thus these examples can be interpreted as texts in which the speaker is talking to the same apostrophic addressee from the beginning to the end. However, seven songs have also been found in which the apostrophic addressee is only addressed for part of the text's length.

> (9)　Most mondanám, de nem bírom.
> 　　　Megtehetném, mégsem szidom.
> 　　　Liliom volt az éjben, kósza sugár.
> 　　　**Látod Nyina**, múlik már.
>
> 　　　'Now I would say it but I can't.
> 　　　I could do that but I'm not scolding her.
> 　　　She was a lily in the night, a ray gone astray.
> 　　　**Can you see Nina**, it's going away.'
> 　　　　　　(Nyina 'Nina' [2005])

In the first three lines of (9), Nina is marked by third person forms; in the fourth line, however, she appears as an addressee marked by second person singular. The corpus includes nine additional texts in which multiple apostrophic discourses are initiated by the speaker.

> (10)　Sikoly a sorsa,
> 　　　ha magába száll.
> 　　　Szponzora: téboly,
> 　　　bilincs és halál.
> 　　　Ez az útvesztőhely, **Mari**,
> 　　　nem túl előkelő.
> 　　　**Őrlángon égő, üregi szenvedély**,
> 　　　most jöjj elő!
>
> 　　　'Her fate is a scream
> 　　　when she's lost in herself.
> 　　　Her sponsors are madness,
> 　　　handcuffs and death.
> 　　　This maze is the scaffold, **Mary**,
> 　　　it's not the most elegant.
> 　　　**Passion burning in a cave on pilot-flame,**
> 　　　it's time to come forward!
> 　　　　　　(Mari 'Mary' [2005])

Example (10) begins in a way very similar to (9), with Mary first described in third person singular before the speaker is addressing her. However, the speaker then moves on to open up a new apostrophic discourse, using the address *őrlángon égő, üregi szenvedély* 'passion burning in a cave on pilot-flame'. The remaining seven lyrics feature apostrophic discourses in which both participants get to talk.

> (11a) Mondd,
>   Hol van az a furcsa fény
>   Ami az éjt szúrja át?
>   **Hol lenne... ugyan már**
>   **Jó éjszakát!**
>
>   'Tell me
>   where is that strange light
>   that pierces through the night?
>   **Where would it be… forget it,**
>   **good night!**'
>   (Hol volt hol nem volt 'Once upon a time' [1997])

> (11b) Valami nem hagy békén, valami jár a parton...
>   Lefogadom, hogy a szerelem, **na, ezt a fogadást tartom**.
>   […]
>   felel a szellő értőn, felelek én is.
>   Kérdőn eljött értem az ágyad,
>   Üzen a vágyad és most bennem árad szét.
>
>   'Something doesn't leave me alone, something is walking on the shore.
>   I bet it is love, **hey, that's a bet I'll take**.
>   […]
>   The breeze is answering in a savvy way, I will answer too.
>   Your bed has come to ask for me,
>   your desire is sending out a message and now it's spreading in me.'
>   (Cuba Lunatica [2009])

In examples like (11a–b), fictional apostrophic is so successful that the speaker even receives a verbal response. This discursive relationship even becomes the subject matter of reflection in (11b) (cf. *Felel a szellő értőn, felelek én is* 'The breeze is answering in a savvy way, I will answer too.').

4. Conclusions

The goal of this paper has been the elaboration of an interpretive model which accounts for the role of apostrophe in lyrical texts from a functional cognitive perspective. Although the theoretical and empirical grounding of the model requires further investigations, some general remarks are already warranted.

Apostrophe, understood as the speaker's turning away from the actual addressee, often (and in lyrical texts characteristically) initiates discourses with entities that cannot be (strict-

ly speaking) addressed, unless the physiological and discursive limitations of linguistic cognition are temporarily ignored. Crucial features of apostrophe include the following:

- fictional apostrophe construes a joint attentional scene prototypically characterised by direct interaction, in which the fictional speaker is directing the fictional addressee's attention to a referential scene which both of them are able to observe directly.
- Apostrophic fiction makes it possible to take entities which are normally available as objects to linguistic cognition, and construe them (in the referential scene) as subjects participating in a system of social relationships.
- Apostrophe cannot be interpreted exclusively as an expression of the speaker's emotions in the context of her intersubjective directing of attention. Rather, it provides a special opportunity for the expression of beliefs, desires and intentions as well, and for influencing the corresponding mental states of others.

Thus, apostrophic fiction is a characteristic property of lyrical discourses in that it creates the lyrical speech situation (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154). However, it cannot be equated with lyricism. In particular, it must not be overlooked that the construal of referential scenes in apostrophic fiction also affords an important role to rhythm (cf. Simon 2014) as well as metaphorisation (cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2003). In addition, it needs to be emphasised that apostrophic fiction only creates an opportunity for aesthetic experience, in other words for transcending meaning generation (cf. Andreregg 1998), but does not guarantee its attainment. It does not suffice to ignore the embodied and discursive grounding of linguistic cognition; for an aesthetic experience that dual grounding needs to be transcended as well.

Source of the lyrics

http://www.zeneszoveg.hu/egyuttes/264/quimby-dalszovegei.html

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