SEMANTIC CONSTRUAL IN METAPHORICAL EXPRESSIONS –
THE EXAMPLE OF SPATIALITY[1]

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Abstract

The study scrutinises the development of metaphorical meaning in Hungarian expressions referring to spatiality. The main presuppositions of investigating metaphorical meaning creation are (i) the distinction between conceptual representation and semantic structure, (ii) the theoretical extension of the usage-based principle, and (iii) the thesis of dual grounding. Adopting the description of construal in Cognitive Grammar, the development of metaphorical meaning can be grasped as the process of intensive reconfiguration of the semantic schema initiated by the autonomous structure in the dependent structure. The main conclusion of the analysis of expressions connected to spatiality is that metaphorization is not limited to the conceptual representation traditionally regarded as target domain, but it also affects the source conception, i.e. the notion of space.

Keywords: autonomous structure, conceptual representation, connectionism, dependent structure, metaphor, schema-reconfiguration, semantic structure

1. Introduction

This study attempts to scrutinise the development of metaphorical meaning in some Hungarian expressions connected to spatiality. On the one hand I elaborate a new approach of the overall issue of metaphorical meaning, in other words, I examine how the metaphorical meaning is constructed through particular utterances (Croft 1993: 336). On the other hand I investigate the validity of the semantic description which follows from the proposed theoretical orientation, in certain Hungarian metaphorical expressions, in which − on the grounds of conceptual metaphor theory − the source domain is the notion of physical space or one dimension of it.

So the aims of the study are as follows: modelling theoretically the metaphorical semantic construal and mapping simultaneously the possibilities of practical use of this model. The main theoretical presupposition of the investigation is that the general problems of theory and the particular problems of analysis and application must be discussed in a tight interrelation, since their separation results either in mere speculation or in dogmatic descriptions. A further presupposition of the study is that the processes of dynamic meaning creation essentially have the same nature in the cases of literal and figurative expressions,

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consequently a rigid distinction between these categories is not justified (see Evans 2009: 25). The specific feature of metaphorical semantic construal can be characterised by the intensity of meaning creating procedures, not by its nature.

These theses follow closely from the usage-based principle (see Kemmer−Barlow 2000, Langacker 2000), which I interpret here not as a methodological principle of data collection, but as a theoretical starting point about the ontology of linguistic structures. According to the principle, our knowledge of language is a complex set of schematic structures. These schemas are entrenched and conventionalised through creating and processing particular utterances; in other words, our knowledge on operating with linguistic structures originates from language use itself. This is also true of metaphorical expressions, since language users process them as semantic structures, based on their knowledge of language. It is precisely this organisation of our linguistic knowledge into schemas, as well as the flexible implementation of these schemas, which makes novel ways of construal, i.e. creating and processing novel metaphoric expressions possible.

It seems necessary to point out in advance that according to the theoretical background sketched above I treat metaphors primarily as linguistic representations, i.e. as semantic structures (as opposed to the conceptual theory of metaphor; see Lakoff 2006, Simon 2014). This does not mean that I question the conceptual nature of metaphor and meaning in general, but I think that these findings have remained unclear in cognitive linguistics despite their central significance. It also follows partly from this that although several details of the conceptual representation of metaphors were revealed in the last few decades, a coherent model about the functioning of particular metaphorical utterances, as well as about their production and processing is not available at present.

It is easy to see that it is essential for elaborating such a model to reflect consistently upon the encyclopaedic character and conceptual nature of meaning. Therefore, the study first discusses in detail the relationship between conceptual representation and semantic structure (section 2), and then it dwells on the processes of semantic construal from a cognitive grammatical point of view (section 3). Following this I scrutinise meaning creation in metaphorical expressions related to spatiality (section 4). I finish the study by summing up the main results of the investigation (section 5).

2. The relationship between conceptual representation and semantic structure

Consider the following clause:

> (1)   Péter a szobában van.
>   Peter.NOM the room.in is
>   'Peter is in the room.'

The semantic ground of this clause (which can be regarded as a complex composite structure) is the process profiled by the verb: the temporal relation of two schematic figures, in which the primary figure (the trajector, in this case a prototypically human being) is located in a container appearing as a secondary figure (landmark). The trajector of the verb is elaborated by the nominal *Péter* ('Peter'), while the landmark is elaborated by the nominal *a szobában* ('in the room') (the latter is itself a composite structure too).

This roughly outlined cognitive grammatical analysis raises an important problem even in itself if we look at it from the perspective of encyclopaedic meaning. If linguistic meanings make our conceptual knowledge of the world around us available to others, the questions arise as to what portion of this knowledge (for example of the knowledge about the participants of the process symbolised by the verb) is activated, and how this activation proceeds, i.e. how this part of knowledge becomes available in the course of meaning creation. It is worth noting at this point that there are no generally valid answers to the questions above even with the assumption of the encyclopaedic conceptual nature of semantic structures. These unanswered questions lead, however, to the identification of concept with meaning, which raises the problem of predispositional mentalism (the mental determination of linguistic phenomena; see Sandra 1998: 363), and on the other hand it makes it obvious that the main question pertains not to the amount of activated knowledge, but rather to the relationship between conceptual and semantic representations.

It is thus indispensable for the analysis of metaphorical semantic structures to give a full account of this relationship first. Based on Croft (1993: 336−345), it seems productive to model this relationship with the foreground/background alignment, or with the profile/base relation: our knowledge of the world is organised in a complex network in Croft's model; the relatively stable configurations emerge in the foreground of the network through individual practice and conventionalisation. These configurations are symbolised directly by conventional phonological structures of the language. To put it in another way, a semantic structure is an organisation of conceptual knowledge that becomes profiled in relation to a certain part of this knowledge as a base, through the process of language use. It is essential that the representational system outlined in this way is not organised along a taxonomical hierarchy, but in foreground/background alignment, consequently the relationship is not derivative between the conceptual representations, or between the conceptual and semantic structures. It is even more important that the profile/base relationship has an interdependent character; that is, parts of the encyclopaedic knowledge network function as a base through the operation of the profiled configuration, while the entrenched and conventionalised configurations can be profiled only in relation to this base as a conceptual background.

Ultimately, the assumption of the foreground/background relationship, as well as the focus on semantic structure can be related on a meta-scientific level to a perspective change in cognitive linguistics. In the last few years a research orientation has been formulated which is geared toward the detailed examination of linguistic semantic structures instead of the investigation of the conceptual grounds of linguistic phenomena (as backstage cognition; see Fauconnier 1994: xvii−xlvii), so it directs our attention to frontstage cognition (see Evans 2010: 603).

On these grounds, Evans (2009: xi−xii, 42−43) argues for distinguishing meaning representations more firmly than Croft does. He assumes two different representational systems: the system of conceptual structures available as rich meaning representations, and the system of semantic structures considered as schematic meanings. The theoretical vantage point of Evans is based on a very productive distinction: there is a conceptual system which is rich, detailed, but not available directly, whereas there is a linguistic system, which is albeit schematic, but makes access to the conceptual representations possible. Meaning creation results from the continuous co-functioning of these representational systems: "[T]he

linguistic system is evolved, in part, by facilitating more effective control of the extant representations in the conceptual system. That is, linguistic representations are specialized for providing a »scaffolding« to structure conceptual representations, thereby facilitating their use in communication" (Evans 2009: 43). It is important that in this model, conceptual structure is separated from semantic structure considering both its nature and its function: the former is a representation arising from perceptual and subjective states (e.g. from sensori-motor perception, proprioception and introspective states), while the latter is a conceptual representation which is developed for the linguistic coding of encyclopaedic knowledge. Thus Evans emphasises the ontological and functional separations of the two systems.

Before continuing with the details of the relationship between conceptual representation and semantic structure, a terminological specification is necessary. Although Langacker (2008: 30) draws a distinction between concept and meaning, but he identifies the latter with conceptualisation without elucidating the relationship between concept and conceptualisation in general. Croft (1993) uses the term 'concept' for semantic structure and the term 'domain' for conceptual structure, but on the other hand, he regards both as semantic in nature. Evans (2009) implements the above-mentioned accurate differentiation terminologically: he adopts the term 'cognitive model' for conceptual representation and the term 'lexical concept' for semantic structure. I apply the distinction (but not the separation) of conceptual and semantic structure in my own research, as one of its main features, thus it is manifested in terminology too, but I depart from Evans (2009) by using the terms 'conceptual representation' and 'semantic structure'. However, in the case of metaphorical expressions, I also apply the term 'domain' as equivalent to conceptual representation, according to the conceptual metaphor theory.

The most important assumption of my theoretical model is that the differentiation between conceptual representation and semantic structure rests not on their ontological disparity but on their different cognitive statuses. In this respect I disagree with Evans' assumption that there would be two distinct representational systems; I think it is more productive to elaborate a model which takes both the ontological homogeneity and the functional heterogeneity of the representational types into consideration. Since meaning is conceptual in nature, the semantic structures are also of the same character, that is, the representations can be arranged in a space which consists of ontologically homologous elements. Thus, conceptual representation and semantic structure form a continuum regarding their nature. They can be differentiated, however, considering their cognitive status. Conceptual representation is part of our encyclopaedic knowledge of the world organised in a network, it is extremely flexible and mobile, and it can be activated and connected with the other elements of the network easily. By contrast, semantic structure is a relatively stable structure, which makes certain part of the conceptual representation available, structuring it as a profile, in the course of the linguistic activity. The system of conceptual representations organised in a network is the semantic space itself, defined by Langacker (1987: 76) as "the multifaceted field of conceptual potential within which thought and conceptualization unfold", and the semantic structure can be characterised as a configuration developed in this space. The difference between the cognitive status or function of conceptual representation and semantic structure can be grasped along this description: conceptual representation is a potentiality which functions as a base for developing more stable and more specific patterns (profiles) that can

be symbolised linguistically. It is especially important to emphasise that the elements of this complex system, as well as the relationship between them are flexible, they can be shaped in a great variability, since a conceptual representation can serve as the base for profiling some patterns, but the representation itself can become a profile in the foreground of other conceptual representations. The structures with different cognitive status can be arranged in the semantic space mainly on the basis of the centre/periphery principle: while the most entrenched and conventionalised semantic configurations can be located in the central region of semantic space, moving towards its periphery there are less and less delimited structures of conceptual representations connecting to the network, and finally on the periphery there may be conceptual representations which are not organised into semantic structures at all (these are for example certain emotions, sensations, or the fundamental perceptual representations of physical space), as we do not make them linguistically available.

For illustrating the foregoing consider the clause in (1) again. We have very rich encyclopaedic knowledge about the room as a place for human residence, which knowledge – organised into a network – constitutes a part of the semantic space. In this network the concept of ROOM is included; in its background a matrix of the concepts HOUSE, FLAT, RESIDENCE, BUILDING, CLOSED PHYSICAL SPACE functioning as a base, as well as the conceptual representations which characterise, detail and specify the concept of ROOM in different cognitive dimensions, such as canonical size, shape, furnishings (e.g. DOOR, WINDOW, FURNITURE), the canonical function (e.g. SLEEPING, WORKING, EATING, AMUSEMENT) and so forth. According to Cognitive Grammar (see Langacker 2008: 47–50), this complex conceptual organisation as a whole is the semantic structure of the noun *szoba* (*room*), that is to say, when we comprehend the meaning of the noun *szoba (room)*, the whole conceptual network can become activated theoretically in the conceptualiser's mind. It is easy to see that the unlimited nature of meaning follows from this description. Langacker (1987: 163) points out that the entities marked by the symbolic units of language are in fact access points to the network. We can interpret this as follows: although the whole network is available as conceptual potential during meaning creation, the entities as semantic structures profiled by the linguistic symbols are configurations which make only the entry into the network possible (see Croft 1993: 337), but they do not involve the whole network. At this point the conceptual representation and the semantic structure become distinguishable: the former can be conceived as the activation of a (not limited) part of the network-like semantic space (arranged into foreground/background relationship), whereas the latter is a structure organising in the foreground of the activated conceptual potential, and it can be symbolised in language directly. So conceptual representation is a chunk of the encyclopaedic knowledge, a base, in relation to which a part of knowledge is profiled linguistically, and emerges as meaning in the actual utterance (as symbolic structure). In the case of (1) the CLOSED PHYSICAL SPACE, as well as the size (in comparison with the trajector) and the canonical function become profiled as semantic structure in the course of meaning creation.

It is conceivable that meaning as a structure is the foregrounded, profiled part of the conceptual potential, while as a process it is the foregrounding itself, or the act of arranging into structure, configuration (see Sinha 1999: 228–230). Grasped in this way, semantic structure can also be characterised in the dimension of schematicity, since semantic structure in itself is not equivalent to the actual meaning (see Evans 2009: 23). The schematic

semantic structure (the schema) is in fact an intermediary structure between the conceptual potential and the actual, instantiated semantic structure (the instantiation). Seen from the perspective of semantic space, it is the entrenched and conventional, but unspecified way of configuring and foregrounding the complex conceptual representation, whereas seen from the perspective of the utterance, it is the ground of the elaboration and specification in the course of dynamic meaning creation. Thus, the process of meaning creation can be conceived as multiple foregrounding, as multiple developing of profile structures, during which the activated conceptual representation (no matter how complex it is) becomes available as an actual semantic structure. The schematic semantic structures have an overriding importance in this process: by means of schemas, we can enter the encyclopaedic knowledge network with a little mental effort, and we can make it intersubjective through linguistic symbolisation, while in the course of semantic construal even the schemas can be altered, so the conceptualiser can mobilise the conceptual representations as well.

The complexity of the semantic space arises primarily from variability, i.e. from the flexible formation of the centre/periphery arrangement: we can access the encyclopaedic conceptual network not only at the conventional points, but also through novel semantic structures; moreover, novel, unusual representations can appear in the entrenched, conventional conceptual representation matrix activated in the background of the semantic structure as a profile. In addition to this flexibility, it is important to see that the conceptual representations of the semantic space have dual grounding (see Sinha 1999: 240−241): our conceptual representations (and the relations between them) emerge as a result of the processing of the fundamental experiences of embodiment on the one hand (embodied grounding; see Simon 2014 for details), but on the other hand there is production and comprehension of particular utterances, that is, of the intersubjective meaning creation (discursive grounding). In fact, this assumption is the extension of the usage-based theory: while linguistic meaning has an encyclopaedic character, not only does our knowledge about language originate from the use of linguistic structures, but also our knowledge about the world derives partly from the linguistic activity itself.

As a consequence of the outlined theoretical orientation, the central concept of cognitive metaphor theory, i.e. the conceptual metaphor, can be conceived as a connection of conceptual representations in the network of semantic space (cf. Croft 1993: 346, "the two base domains are equated"). One of the advantages of this explanation is that it evades the question of mental representation (which cannot be answered with linguistic methods): while the connection of conceptual representations is presumably very flexible and temporary in the case of novel metaphors, i.e. it can be modelled as conceptual integration, then, through the increase of the frequency of its connections, it forms a stable pattern, thus it functions as a conceptual metaphor. In the proposed approach, we can consider conceptual integration and conceptual metaphor not as competing, but as complementary phenomena, as complementary phases of metaphorisation (see Pelyvás 2002: 10−11).[2]

The other advantage of the reinterpretation of conceptual metaphor is that it is in harmony with the extension of the usage-based theory, as well as with the theory of dual grounding: the connection of conceptual representations can be motivated both by our physical experiencing

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[2]   Hereby I would like to give thanks to Péter Pelyvás for making his manuscript available to me.

of the world and by the intersubjective sharing of our knowledge about the world through linguistic activity. In other words, we think of the world metaphorically indeed, but this follows considerably from the metaphorical talking about it.

Nevertheless, conceptual metaphor does not lose its significance in the model elaborated here, since it functions as a base for profiling the metaphorical semantic structure, i.e. for metaphorical meaning creation. On the other hand, I foreground in my research those semantic structures that provide access to the metaphorical semantic space, and not the relationship between conceptual representations (i.e. between domains). I would like not only to define the field of research in a novel way (cf. Steen 2008), but also to scrutinise the problem of metaphorical meaning in cognitive grammatical terms. If conceptual metaphor cannot be considered primary in the explanation of metaphorical meaning (following partly from the usage-based orientation, partly from the dual grounding principle), the latter is not only the linguistic realisation of a conceptual metaphor, but it is a semantic structure that initiates, specifies and details the metaphorical connection of conceptual representations. For this reason, in the description of metaphorical semantic construal we must take the two directional relations between the conceptual representations and the implemented semantic structures into consideration.

3. The processes of semantic construal

In functional cognitive linguistics, metaphor can be regarded as a semantic structure which has a complex representation developing in the network of conceptual knowledge, but on the other hand it is first of all a schema in the linguistic system. The former can be modelled both as conceptual integration and as conceptual metaphor, and the latter can be conceived as constructional schema with the notion of conventional linguistic composite structure. In this approach, metaphorical meaning can be described in two directions: from the perspective of dynamic meaning creation, considering the relation between schema and instantiation, and from the perspective of the conceptual nature of meaning, regarding the profile/base relation between schematic semantic structure and complex conceptual representation. Whereas in the case of non-figurative structures the constructional schema is usually actualised, i.e. specified without structural changes (see Langacker 2000: 23), metaphorical meaning is developed through changing these schemas, and the result of these processes is the rearrangement of semantic space. Of course, the novel schematic structure itself can also become entrenched and conventionalised (reaching the status of unit), consequently changing the schema is not always necessary for construing metaphorical meaning. However, in the case of novel, creative metaphorical expressions it happens presumably always (which is supported by the results of Giora's psycholinguistic experiments concerning the comprehension of figurative language use; see Giora 1997).

As can be seen, in my descriptive model it is the schematic semantic structure which is in the centre of interest, since this structure is linked both with the system of conceptual representations and with the actual meaning in the discourse. Consequently, one aspect of the operation with the schema is the activation of the connection with which semantic structure as a profiled configuration makes the potentiality of the semantic space as structured network of representations (i.e. as a base) available. The other aspect is the process of implementation

of the schematic semantic structure, i.e. dynamic meaning creation. Of course these two subsystems of meaning creation cannot be separated from one another, since on the one hand they are in contact through the structure of the schema, on the other hand their functioning can be assumed only in being interaction with one another: the semantic structure and its implementation can be developed only on the ground of the conceptual base, while the interpretation of the particular utterance specifies partly the actual delimitation and the internal organisation of the base. In what follows I intend to scrutinise this bidirectional system primarily from the aspect of dynamic meaning creation, by the examination of the processes of semantic construal in relation to schema and instantiation.

In Cognitive Grammar (see Langacker 1987, 1991, 2000, 2008), linguistic structures − not only lexical units, but also grammatical structures − can be described as semantic structures. That is to say grammar contributes to meaning creation by being itself a meaningful system: the grammatical connection of linguistic elements symbolises their functional relationship, their contribution to meaning creation. Thus this approach is not confined to the configurational analysis of linguistic constructions into sentences (to the study of constituency), but it explains meaning through the complex relation between the grammatical construction and the sanctioning schema.

It is important that in Cognitive Grammar the dynamic nature of meaning creation can be interpreted not only as the temporal process of construal, but also as the relation between schema and instantiation. Grammar (i.e. the language user's knowledge about linguistic structures) in Langacker's approach is a system of conventional schematic semantic structures of different complexity. The semantic structures being in symbolic relationship with phonological structures code our conceptualisations, our conceptual structures linguistically. Coding is creating a linguistic expression which is appropriate to the conceptualisation (Langacker 1987: 65). The result of coding is an actual linguistic structure, a usage event. In the course of coding, grammar offers conventional schematic semantic structures to the language user, and the adequate target structure can be developed through the implementation of one of them. The linguistic structure instantiates the schema in this process and the schema sanctions the instantiations, as well as categorising it (Langacker 2000: 10). The usage event, i.e. the particular linguistic expression specifies the schematic semantic structure in all cases: it details some substructures of the schema, thus instantiation elaborates the schema. On the other hand, the instantiation can be considered a structure of the given language only if a schema categorises it, i.e. if the schema sanctions the expression. In the optimal case, the conceptualisation can be symbolised with a linguistic structure straightforwardly, because grammar includes the appropriate conventional schematic structure. This is the case of full sanction, which is the clearest when the sanctioning schematic structure and the instantiating target structure fully correspond to each other (Langacker 1987: 66−68). But it is important to note that identity, namely zero specification of the schema is quite rare, since the usage events usually elaborate the sanctioning schema to some degree, so there is always some elaborative distance between schema and instantiation (Langacker 1987: 69). In other words, the conventional use of language is inherently dynamic, since schemas of grammar are not simply mirrored in linguistic expressions, but they are instantiated as specific semantic structures in the process of elaboration. (Therefore, actual meaning is not equivalent with schematic semantic structure.) On the other hand schemas are developed as

the results of abstraction and schematisation, i.e. as the result of language use. That is why the usage-based approach is required.

However, in the course of coding it is not always possible to activate the schema appropriate to the conceptualisation (or to select the appropriate one among the competing schemas; see Langacker 2000: 15), in many cases the conceptual representation cannot be coded with any of the entrenched and conventionalised schematic structures. Thus in these cases the selected schema sanctions the instantiation only partially (partial sanction; see Langacker 1987: 68−71). Thus, not only some parts of the schema are specified in the process of elaboration, but the schematic structure itself may not correspond to the conceptual representation completely. Consequently in the course of instantiation the partially sanctioning schema cannot function completely as a sample in construing the linguistic expression, its only role is to categorise the instantiation (Langacker 2000: 18). Therefore, the structure of the schema is changed in the categorisation temporally: it is extended, it is reconfigured, a novel substructure is added to it, or else the function of its substructures within the schema or the relation between them is altered. If this partial sanction is implemented again through the reconfiguration or extension of the schema, the reconfiguration or extension itself can become conventionalised (Langacker 2000: 19), thus a new schema is established.

In my proposal, the processes of semantic construal are interpretable primarily in the dynamic relationship between schema and instantiation. In other words, they can be grasped as the processes by means of which the schematic semantic structures of the linguistic system become particular semantic structures (actual meanings) in the utterance. I describe this approximately as follows. The vantage point in coding and processing is the grammatical construction, the symbolic arrangement of component structures linked with correspondences and categorisation (i.e. the instantiation of the complex composite structure; see Langacker 1991: 548). The grammatical constructions can be characterised with constructional schemas, since these schemas become parts of the linguistic system through schematisation of specific constructions, and then they sanction and categorise the created constructions. A further essential factor is the compositional path of the constructional schema, which in fact can be interpreted as the arranged sequence of the component structures, and which thus contributes to the formation of complex constructions, defining the order of the component structures, their foreground/background arrangement in the course of elaboration (Langacker 1991: 546, 2008: 61). In my interpretation, compositional path is similar to the active zone of a semantic matrix; it is the default way of the structure's semantic elaboration. The formation and process of a grammatical construction takes place in elaborating and implementing the schema sanctioning the construction, according to the compositional path. I interpret the overall process of semantic construal as follows: the complex grammatical construction is processed as a gestalt, so in the process of semantic construal, on the macro-level we create linguistic expressions instantiating the schemas along the compositional path. The semantic construal of component structures fits in this process on the micro-level, since the elaboration of component structures and the establishment of the correspondences between them make the creation of the complex structure possible, on the other hand, however, we perform the integration of component structures along the compositional path of the constructional schema. As a result, we can regard the construction as an emergent semantic structure which is elaborated holistically. In addition, it is worth noting that constructional

schema and compositional path can be transformed flexibly in the formation of the usage event, and if this transformation itself becomes entrenched, a novel schema is established with its own compositional path. We can consider this a temporal or a permanent schema-reconfiguration.

Regarding the implementation process of the constructional schema we must take furthermore the autonomy/dependency (A/D) alignment (see Langacker 2008: 199−202) into consideration as a general characteristic of linguistic structures. In Cognitive Grammar (in the description of composite structures), autonomous and dependent structures are conceived in relation to each other: a structure is dependent if it has a schematic substructure that is elaborated and specified by another, autonomous structure. Autonomy and dependency is relative, it can be ascertained setting out from the composite structure.

On these grounds I outline the process of dynamic meaning creation with regard to the clause in (1). We can describe the holistic constructional schema with the SOMEBODY IS SOMEWHERE schematic structure, which has the temporal relation profiled in the verb as its semantic ground: the sequential scanning of spatial arrangement of two schematic figures. As I demonstrated earlier, the primary schematic figure (the trajector) is prototypically a human being, and the secondary schematic figure (the landmark) is a physical place that can be interpreted in three-dimensional space. This schema is specified by the nominal *Péter* (*Peter*), and by the composite structure *a szobában* (*in the room*). It can be noted that the verb is dependent structure on the level of the clause, because its substructures (its schematic figures) are elaborated by the nominals.

It is important again that the expression which elaborates the secondary participant of the process profiled in the verb is itself a complex structure: the semantic integration of a case marker and a noun. In this composite, the case marker is the profile determinant, which profiles a closed physical space with a crossable boundary, i.e. a schematic CONTAINER. Since the noun *szoba* (*room*) elaborates the schematic container within the semantic structure of the case marker, the semantic structure of the noun is autonomous whereas the semantic structure of the case marker is dependent.

Thus in this very simple composite structure the composite *a szobában* (*in the room*) takes part in A/D relation of two different kinds: within the composite it is the case marker which is dependent and the noun is autonomous, while in the clause it is the composite itself which is autonomous, and the verb is dependent. The structure *a szobában* (*in the room*) not only elaborates the landmark of the verb, but it also specifies it: the THREE-DIMENSIONAL PHYSICAL SPACE is conceptualised as a CONTAINER in the course of dynamic meaning creation.

We can see that in meaning creation the constructional schema is implemented unproblematically. This is possible because the constructional schema of the clause initiates access to the THREE-DIMENSIONAL PHYSICAL SPACE conceptual representation (i.e. it activates the representation), and the CONTAINER conceptual representation appearing in the course of the instantiation of the schema is not inconsistent with the conceptual base: in fact it functions as a profile in comparison with this base. For this reason there is no schema-reconfiguration, since the actual semantic structure in the foreground of the activated representation network of the semantic space can be interpreted as specification. Thus the schema, albeit partially, sanctions the instantiation, and there is a small elaborative distance between the conceptual

base activated by the schema and the semantic structure developed in the instantiation of the secondary schematic substructure of the verb.

4. The process of metaphorical semantic construal

Consider now the following clauses:

(2)   Péter jó hangulatban van.
       Peter good mood.in is
       'Peter is in a good mood.'

(3)   Péter rossz kedvében van.
       Peter bad humour.PX(3SG).in is
       'Peter is in bad humour.'

According to the conceptual theory of metaphor, the meaning of these utterances results from the STATES ARE CONTAINERS conceptual metaphor (see Kövecses 2010: 39). This explanation is however unsatisfactory in some respects. It can be questioned on the one hand whether the explicated form of conceptual metaphor is adequate in the meaning creation (why it does not have the form EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS or EMOTIONS ARE PHYSICAL PLACES). It is worth citing Evans again in connection with the problem: conceptual metaphors are effective patterns in grasping conceptual structures generally, but the linguistic data show that we can reveal patterns that are more specific. "The problem with the level of generalisation at which metaphor scholars have assumed cross-domain mappings can be stated is that it may simply constitute a post hoc analysis due to the analyst. While the linguistic facts do support the view that there is a primary metaphor which might be stated as TIME IS MOTION (…), there is no reason that just because such a pattern can be adduced by the analyst, that it must, ipso facto, have psychological reality for the language user" (Evans 2003: 75). In other words, though conceptual metaphor can be a useful tool for grasping certain connections, we cannot explain the development of metaphorical meaning with it (since it is a post hoc generalization), neither can we describe accurately the evolving conceptual relations (since it is not elaborated properly).

From these it follows that it is very important to raise the problem of construing metaphorical meaning, for if we regard the conceptual metaphors as relatively stable patterns being established in the conceptual representation system, the metaphorical meaning cannot be derived from them (although they make it motivated). Moreover, according to the usage-based theory, in a certain phase of metaphorisation conceptual metaphors themselves are the consequences of the processes of metaphorical semantic construal.

Some questions remain unanswered among others in connection with (2) and (3): what part of the structure must be processed for activating the conceptual metaphor that motivates the meaning, and whether the scope of the conceptual metaphor extends over the whole clause or not. In both metaphorical clauses there is one element (a composite structure) through which we can have access to the domains of the conceptual metaphor formulated above, these are the expression *hangulatban* ('in a mood') and the expression *kedvében*

('in his/her humour'). Consequently, the emergence of metaphorical meaning would be described as a process within which the target domain is activated by the noun and the case marker activates the source domain.[3] This extremely simplifying description narrows the scope of metaphorical meaning to a single component of the clause; furthermore, it implicates the idea of compositionality.

At this point let me consider the processes of semantic construal in the metaphorical clauses above, according to the analysis of (1), starting from the composite structures including the case marker. It is the case marker which has a dependent nature, and which profiles a schematic CLOSED PHYSICAL SPACE with a crossable boundary, i.e. a CONTAINER. But this schematic figure must be elaborated in the process of construal with a nominal semantic structure which cannot be characterised as a container-like entity, in other words it has no such cognitive domain in its semantic matrix which characterises the given emotional state as entity in the physical dimension. From this it follows that in the course of semantic integration both semantic structures undergo schema-reconfiguration. The semantic matrix of the noun is supplemented temporally with the domain of PHYSICAL EXTENT in three-dimensional space, within which the CONTAINER is profiled; on the other hand, the schematic CONTAINER figured in the semantic structure of the case marker becomes more abstract, for it is elaborated not as prototypical physical space. That is exactly why it is productive to regard conceptual metaphor as the connection of two conceptual representations in the activated network of semantic space, since in this way the unidirectionality hypothesis on metaphorical mappings can be revised.

The latter of the two schema-reconfigurations is more radical, since it comes more considerably into the focus of attention during the process of construal. This follows partly from the fact that the dependent structure of the case marker can be instantiated only through the contribution of the autonomous structure of the noun, so the language user forms the former more flexibly. According to Croft (1993: 359), we can state that in the grammatical combination of an autonomous and a dependent structure it is the autonomous structure which initiates the cross-domain (metaphorical) mappings in the dependent structure. Due to this, the re-arrangement of the dependent structure becomes more intensive.

In addition to the dependent nature the case marker also has a profile determining function: the whole composite structure fits through the profile of the case marker into the larger composite, into the clause in this case. In these examples too the constructional schema of the clause is the temporal relationship profiled by the verb: locating a prototypically human being in physical space. However, while the meaning of the composite structure including the case marker becomes metaphorical, this process initiates a reconfiguration also in the constructional schema of the clause. This can be described in two ways. On the one hand the actual elaboration of the secondary figure of the verb can be carried out only in the foreground of a conceptual base within which the conceptual representations of THREE-DIMENSIONAL PHYSICAL SPACE and EMOTIONAL STATE are connected with each other. Thus on the holistic level of clausal meaning creation it is the metaphorical connection of the conceptual representations that is initiated again, for this reason metaphor is not limited to the nominal structure even conceptually, so its scope extends to the whole clause. On the

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[3] The corresponding component in English is a preposition (*in*), but since the subject of this study is metaphorical semantic construal in Hungarian, I refer to it as a case marker in the following.

other hand it is the autonomous structure again (the nominal *hangulatban* ['in a mood'] and the nominal *kedvében* ['in his/her humour']), which initiates the schema-reconfiguration in the dependent structure, i.e. in the semantic schema of the verb (and hence of the clause). Therefore the secondary schematic figure of the verb is elaborated not only as PHYSICAL SPACE, but also as EMOTIONAL STATE, in other words as EMOTIONAL SPACE. Consequently, the rearrangement of the constructional schema of the clause can be grasped with the change of the nature of the secondary figure, which involves the process that the base becomes more complex and it is rearranged metaphorically.

Presumably, the metaphorisation of the semantic structure has an effect on directing attention within the clause. Although in the case of non-metaphorical instantiation the secondary figure of the verb comes into the focus of attention only temporally (in fact the structure can be considered a reference point structure; see Evans 2009: 40), but as a consequence of metaphorical semantic construal (i.e. due to the reconfiguration of the schemas) the secondary figure remains in the foreground of the attention. Therefore the compositional path of the construction is changed.

Finally I consider the effect of metaphorical meaning creation on the semantic space. In accordance with the conceptual theory of metaphor, in the metaphorical expressions scrutinised above it is the CONTAINER as physical space which functions as the source domain and with which the target domain (in this case the EMOTIONAL STATE) is conceptualised. It would follow from this explanation that it is the target domain's conceptual representation which is changed radically, whereas the source domain remains unchanged in the process. Such unidirectional process cannot be assumed even in conceptual processing, as it follows from the recent analysis. As we have seen, the metaphorical semantic construal induces schema-reconfiguration in the elaboration of the nominal semantic structure being profiled in the foreground of the target domain, and the semantic structure of the case marker as well as the verbal semantic structure being profiled in the foreground of the source domain. Furthermore, the reconfiguration of the case marker and the secondary figure of the verb is more radical, which follows partly from their dependent nature, partly from the more permanent direction of attention on them. It results from the findings demonstrated here that the metaphorisation of meaning concerns not only the target domain, but also the source domain. Not only does EMOTIONAL STATE become metaphorical through the conceptual representation of CONTAINER, but also the CONTAINER, i.e. the PHYSICAL SPACE representations become available in the semantic space in another (non-conventional) way. In general: as the conceptual representation of PHYSICAL SPACE (grounded in direct experience) functions as scaffolding for mapping more abstract conceptual structures, this conceptualising process also alters the conceptual representation of PHYSICAL SPACE, more accurately the conceptual access to this representation, thus the metaphorisation of space also needs to be included in the account.

5. Conclusion

In this study I approached metaphor from the aspect of dynamic meaning creation, according to the conception of cognitive linguistics as the research of frontstage cognition. I regard metaphor as a semantic structure which emerges through the processes of semantic construal implemented more intensively. The fundamental background assumption of the examination is the distinction between conceptual representation and semantic structure. The differentiation between the semantic space with encyclopaedic nature and network structure and the semantic configuration developed and stabilised in this space proved to be productive, because it makes conceivable that metaphorical meaning is operationally more complex and more specific in comparison with metaphorical conceptual pattern. Moreover, it became discernible through the assumption of a foreground/background relationship between semantic structure and conceptual representation that metaphorical conceptualisation is also motivated by language itself: since semantic structures function as scaffolding for more effective use of the conceptual potential, the schema-rearrangement peculiar to metaphorical construal makes it possible to access the network of semantic space in a non-conventional way. This means that metaphorical conceptual patterns rest not only on experiencing of the world physically, as well as on conceptual processing of the experiences, but also on the semantic construal of particular utterances. Ultimately, this is an extension of the usage-based theory.

The concept of schema has a central significance in modelling metaphorical meaning creation with cognitive grammatical terms. The schema-reconfiguration observed during the analyses is the implementation of the partial sanctioning relation between schema and instantiation, thus metaphorical meaning can be approached through conventional construal processes in the model proposed here. It is important, however, that metaphorical reconfiguration is initiated in the dependent structure by the autonomous structure, consequently it takes place in the dependent structure more intensively, although it concerns both structures. On the basis of the observations, the reconfiguration process affects the constructional schemas of the composites at higher level, as well as on the compositional path. From this it follows that the scope of metaphorical meaning extends to the autonomous and dependent structures whose semantic integration results in schema-reconfiguration. Generally the semantic structure of the clause can be considered as a gestalt which is the conventional scope of the construal of metaphorical meanings.

If we regard semantic schemas as representing an intermediary structure between the actual meaning and the semantic space, they have even more crucial role in the explanatory model. It is the schema itself which is changed due to the rearrangement in metaphorical construal in order to sanction the target structure, and through which the language user enters the network of semantic space at a new point, which initiates the novel, metaphorical conceptualisation. This finding is essential because it shows that metaphor conceived to be a conceptual phenomenon is not unidirectional in its nature: it does not fit in the experience → conceptual thinking → linguistic activity model of cognition considering its motivation, nor is the source domain → target domain mapping schema appropriate regarding its inherent structure. We must assume bidirectionality in both respects, as it can be seen in the metaphorisation of space by the expressions being connected with spatiality. If we make

the network of encyclopaedic knowledge available in another, non-conventional manner, it produces an effect on each activated conceptual representation.

Based on all these, it seems necessary to extend the investigation to further metaphorical expressions with spatial reference. First of all the orientational metaphors are worth scrutinising since presumably not only the construal of spatial direction contributes to metaphorical meaning, but also the force-dynamic schemas of the verbs participating in the structure. As can be seen, multiple additional research areas can be defined in the examination of metaphorical semantic construal, and there is no doubt that the detailed description of them will take us closer to the systematic description of Hungarian from a functional cognitive vantage point, making the continuity between literal and figurative language graspable.

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