

ON THE LINGUISTIC POTENTIAL OF ARCHAIC LANGUAGE USE FROM A FUNCTIONAL COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE

GÁBOR SIMON

Abstract

The study intends to establish the stylistic description of archaic language use through the semantic approach of linguistic elements labelled stylistically as archaic. The functional linguistic presuppositions of the investigation are motivated by a comprehensive epistemological starting point, which follows from the hermeneutic critique of the historical cognition of the modern Western episteme. The study approaches the linguistic potential of archaic expressions from a structural and a procedural perspective on the basis of Langacker's cognitive grammar, Fillmore's frame semantics and of the cognitive grammatical model of discourse, bringing also the notions of perspective and grounding in the explanation. In this approach, archaic language use is interpreted as a continuum in a model which explains comprehensively both the phonological and the conceptual, as well as the encyclopaedically and the intertextually motivated use of archaic language from a usage based perspective. The operativeness of the suggested model is demonstrated by the analysis of sample texts.

Keywords: historical cognition, cognitive grammar, frame semantics, grounding, perspectivisation

1. Introduction — defining the subject

The aims of this study are setting out the dilemmas of defining archaic language use as a research topic and reinterpreting the problem of linguistic elements being obsolescent at a metareflective level on the one hand, and initiating the detailed and coherent explanation of archaic language use from a cognitive stylistic perspective (see Tolcsvai Nagy 2004, 2005) on the other. Accordingly, I would like to remark on the modern historical mind and its methodological consequences in cognition, utilising the principles of Nietzsche's critique of historicism, Foucault's theory of archaeology and Gadamer's theses of hermeneutics (2). Then I attempt to explain the linguistic potential of archaism as a stylistic phenomenon from a structural and a procedural perspective, relying on Fillmore's frame semantics and on the cognitive grammatical description of linguistic structure and discourse (3). The study ends with summarising the main consequences of the suggested approach (4).

There is a traditional definition of archaism in Hungarian linguistics from the early seventies, according to which any obsolete linguistic unit can be considered archaic if "it fits into a previous state of the developing linguistic system, or it is peculiar to the previous state of the linguistic system", i.e. if the unit gets into the present discourse through borrowing (Tompa 1972: 167, see also Fónagy 1970: 431). Thus the main basis of comparison in this

narrower, linguistic approach of archaism is the historical formation of the linguistic system itself, in other words an expression is labelled as archaic according to whether it is part of the present system of language or it belongs to a previous state of this system. There is a principle of structuralism in the background of this definition (see Saussure 1997: 103—119, Ladányi—Tolcsvai Nagy 2008: 20—21), which considers the history of language as a temporal succession of synchronic systems, as a diachronic sequence of states. The definition of archaism includes also the presupposition that the states of the linguistic system can be separated clearly, and the linguistic units belong to one or to another state unambiguously.

This approach to archaisms did not alter essentially in Hungarian linguistics in the last four decades: the interpretation outlined above is the vantage point of archaism research until now (see Heltainé Nagy 2006: 49, 2008: 128), although the dependency of archaic labelling on the textual context, on the situation and on the relation to the previous age proved to be important factors (Heltainé Nagy 2008: 128). In other words, while the problems with the definition of archaism and the relativity of archaic labelling became more and more obvious, and the traditional synchronic-diachronic separation became inadequate as a theoretical ground, nevertheless the issue of archaic linguistic expressions is investigated from a formal language theoretical perspective also in recent studies.

This is by no means natural in the present case. On the one hand, it can be stated that there was a dominant structuralist strand in Hungarian stylistic research until the nineties, due to the influence of functional stylistics,¹ and the achievements of the Prague School also affected Hungarian stylistics to a lesser degree (see Tolcsvai Nagy 1996: 18—19). On the other hand, Mihály Péter pointed out in 2006 that the linguists of the Prague School rejected the rigid separation of synchrony from diachrony in linguistic analysis as early as in 1929 and they approached the system of language firmly from a functional viewpoint, with the notion of dynamic synchrony, on the basis of the centre/periphery principle (Péter 2006: 404, see also Humboldt 1985 and Tolcsvai Nagy 1996: 11—17).² Thus, even if somewhat late, the functional principles of the Prague School influence the Hungarian linguistic discourse now. Moreover, the variational paradigm of sociolinguistics also rejects the idealisation of the language user as a single-style speaker as well as the idealisation of the speech community as a homogenous group (see Labov 1979: 180), pointing out the socio-cultural specifications of linguistic structures and the relativity of their categorisation. So in the last decades several functional theories became known in Hungarian linguistics, in which linguistic structures are examined not as autonomous phenomena, but from the perspective of the language user (Ladányi—Tolcsvai Nagy 2008: 28—31). Indeed the problems of the traditional definition of archaism can be realised seeing it from this functional viewpoint: though classifying an expression as a member of one diachronic state of the language seems to be operational from the perspective of autonomous language in archaic label-

¹ It is essential that so-called functional stylistics (arising from the works of Bally) interprets the notion of functionality differently from functional cognitive stylistics. While the latter emphasizes the functional motivation of linguistic structures, the priority of meaning and functions, and it rejects the autonomy of the linguistic system, approaching linguistic structures from the perspective of the language user (see Ladányi—Tolcsvai Nagy 2008: 21—22), traditional functional stylistics accepts the thesis of an autonomous language with its formal language theoretical background, and its functionality is a teleological functional view adopted from the Russian formalism and the Prague School, which examines the structures of a language as goal-directed sign structures (see Szathmári 1996: 14—17).

² It is worth mentioning that — as Tullio de Mauro demonstrates it in his notes in the critical edition — even Saussure did not separate rigidly the synchronic and diachronic aspects of the linguistic system, thus the idea of dynamic synchrony was not alien to him (see Saussure 1997: 313—317).

ling, but from the perspective of the language user it requires the assumption of a homogenous speech community or of countless individual states of the linguistic system. In other words, the traditional separation of synchrony from diachrony is irreconcilable with the perspective of the language user, and if we still make an attempt to do this, the notion of the linguistic system will become tedious, and the possibility of scientific generalisation will slip out of our hands.

From these it follows that a functional approach to archaic expressions requires the rethinking of the conception of archaism. During the redefinition of the research subject not only the traditional notion of archaism needs to be revised, but also the formal language theoretical background, namely the thesis of an autonomous linguistic system and the principle of separating synchrony and diachrony. Nonetheless the question remains unanswered: why did Hungarian stylistics not alter its formal approach to archaism despite the appearing functional theories? I think that it follows not only, not even primarily from the late Hungarian reception of functional linguistic theory, nor can it be explained only with the dominant role of the structuralist strand in Hungarian stylistics. It can be traced back to the heart of modern scientific thinking. The traditional conception of archaism in Hungarian stylistics requires a revision not only in respect of its language theoretical background assumptions; the historical epistemological viewpoint, from which the historicity of man and language are interpreted in the twentieth century, needs some reflection too. The historical mind and the historical method of thinking are products of the nineteenth century's historicism, and they are the characteristic feature of modernity. This study argues that the problems of the definition of archaism follow not only from its language theoretical orientation, but also from the fact that the modern episteme — using the term of Foucault — remained without reflections. Thus redefining archaism — as the foundation of a functional cognitive stylistic research — requires us primarily to explicate and to comment on the traditional presuppositions concerning history and the historicity of language. Only after this theoretical preparation can we initiate successfully the elaboration of the semantic grounds of archaising language use (i.e. a broader functional category) from the vantage point of cognitive linguistics.

2. The critique of the historical method

The traditional conception of archaism is problematic since if we explain the archaic labelling consistently in relation to the historic systems of the linguistic system (that is we stick to the diachronic criteria), we cannot elaborate a generalised explanation, that is to say we cannot grasp completely the archaic nature of expressions being obsolescent. In this approach the archaic character follows from the expression's transfer from a previous state of the linguistic system. It was Fónagy (1970: 431) who recognised (on the grounds of ancient rhetoric) that the archaic expression fills a gap in the present, on the other hand it is not obvious, where the gap is and how it arises in the linguistic system, and why the speakers need to fill it. Through the traditional definition, we obtain only a criterion by which the archaic elements of the system can be separated theoretically clearly from the non-archaic ones, but the nature of archaism cannot be explained generally. The application of the traditional definition results in a heterogeneous category which cannot be modelled, it can be classified only: the observable taxonomical complexity in archaism research (see Heltainé Nagy 2008) follows from this heterogeneity. It can be traced back both to the autonomy of the linguistic

system and to the rigid separation of synchronic aspects of the system from the diachronic ones as background assumptions; but we have to recognise that the traditional conception of archaism fits into the modern episteme of Western thought, i.e. into the epistemological field which determines modern science, its experiential sphere and theoretical subjects, as well as its discursive structures (see Foucault 2000: 15—16, see also Kisantal—Szeberényi 2003: 432). Thus, the explanatory power of the traditional definition arises from this epistemological space too. Consequently, if the aim of the study is to establish a new approach to archaisms, we will have to start it not with revising the language theoretical presuppositions, but with clarifying the ways of cognition directed to language as a historical tradition.

The historical mind, namely the realisation of the historical determination of both the cogniser and the subject of cognition, began through rejecting the teleological rationalism of the enlightenment, in the historicism of the nineteenth century. It is not accidental that Leopold von Ranke, the key figure of the historical method opposed Hegel's teleological theory of history, explicating that all generations, states and eras are the direct manifestation of the will of God, so they are not the successive phases of the Spirit (Breisach 2004: 239—241). The main aim of the modern historical mind is to cognise the past in its own individuality. In the background of this aim there is the demand of objectivity (in the sense of "wie es eigentlich gewesen" from Ranke): the past can be cognised as it really is if we lay it into its own life-relations, so if we disregard our cognising position in the present (Breisach 2004: 287—288, see also Nietzsche 1989: 65, Kisantal—Szeberényi 2003: 415). If our present position stood out, the subjective evaluation of the subject would be inevitable.

The modern historical mind is the result of an episteme in which all entities surrounding us in the world become cognisable through their own historicity. By this means, however, the main assumption of the modern historical cognition is the existence of an unbridgeable distance between the present and the historical tradition: cognising a piece of the past is possible only if this piece is terminated, if it has an inherent relation system of its own which can be recognised from a special viewpoint, and for this recognition we have to invalidate our subjective viewpoint in the present (Gadamer 2003: 17, 333). There is a twofold opposition in this conception. On the one hand the claim to objectify and reify the past arises as an obligatory scientific criteria, as well as the epistemological (and ontological) alienation of the cogniser from the subject of cognition, which makes understanding as participation in the tradition impossible (Gadamer 2003: 370). On the other hand, cognising the individuality of the past, i.e. bridging the gap between the present and the past become possible only through the application of a viewpoint standing out from history, i.e. through stepping out from history — to quote Foucault's term, the human mind is able to cognise historically only through its own "unhistorisation", disregarding its own mortality or temporal limitedness. However, it can be recognisable that such an absolute viewpoint can arise only through the extreme idealisation of the cogniser.

Consequently, the way of cognition being initiated by the historical mind makes cognition itself impossible. From this realisation follows the need to reject the historical cognition of the modern mind, as well as to outline a new way of cognition. Nevertheless, this is not equivalent with pointing out a new absolute viewpoint, since in this case we could not go beyond the inherent oppositions of the modern epistemological field. As Nietzsche (1989: 95) remarks, "the ability to forget, and locking ourselves behind a delimited horizon" can lead us from the paradox of historical cognition. Thus, we have to realise that relativity, and

therefore the acceptance of the determined cognising position can lead us to an understanding of the past. For experience itself constituting the basis of cognition has an inherent historicity too: the process of experience is not securing facts, but it is a dynamic setting in action of our previous knowledge and demands; understanding is merging the cognising horizons of the present and of the past (Gadamer 2003: 255, 342). The cogniser opens the real possibility of understanding through accepting his determination, since in this case the temporal distance is the playing field of the tradition and the cogniser. We can quote Gadamer (2003: 332): “The time is no longer a gap primarily, which must be bridged, because it separates and keeps us at a distance, but it is really the carrying foundation of the event, in which the present is rooted. Thus, the temporal distance does not have to be overcome. [...] Our real task is to recognize in the temporal distance the positive and productive possibility of understanding. It is not a yawning gulf, but it is filled with the continuity of customs, practices and tradition, in the light of which the tradition shows itself.”

So the only possible way of understanding is subordinating ourselves to the consequences of the present perspective, “the analytics of mortality” (Foucault 2000: 415—416), realising that we can interpret tradition only with manipulating our previous conceptual structures, thus withdrawing these concepts is not only impossible but also senseless (Gadamer 2003: 440). The cogniser cannot step out from his life-relations, since “cognition requires life, so it is interested in the same way in sustaining life, just as all individuals are interested in their living on” (Nietzsche 1989: 96). It is essential that historical understanding is not the analysis of something given and independent from the cogniser, but it is the dynamic process of revising our knowledge through bringing another viewpoint in it. At this point, it is worth going beyond in some measure to Gadamer. Since he recognized the paradox character of the historical method during the investigation of the history of philosophy, and he applied understanding as a hermeneutic experience primarily to works of art. However, he draws our attention to the fundamental significance of language in the mediation of tradition. On these grounds every intersubjective meaning creation which occurs in the context of language is also a hermeneutic experience (Gadamer 2003: 432). Consequently, language provides context for the simultaneity of non-simultaneity, for the coexistence of the past and the present. Language is one of the main constituents of tradition, so every interpreting of a linguistic utterance is a hermeneutic situation: it is meaning creation in the sphere of harmonising viewpoints and merging horizons.

At this point it becomes obvious that the application of a functional language theoretical vantage point, which consider the perspective of the language user, as well as a cognitive linguistic viewpoint, which consider language as the instrument and the context of cognition, require outlining a general epistemological position. We have to develop a historical thinking which does not reify the past, which does not idealise the cogniser, and which does not make the historical viewpoint absolute. The explanation of the function of archaic language use begins with the acceptance of a fixed historical viewpoint and the acknowledgement of its relativity. This function is realised in linguistic interaction, in the intersubjective creation of meaning. The intersubjective meaning creating process is the conceptual construal of the entity or scene laid in the centre of joint attention by the language users, based on their encyclopaedic and linguistic knowledge, during the act of intersubjective reference (cf. Sinha 1999). In what follows, the archaising function will be modelled on semantic grounds.

3. The linguistic potential of archaising expressions

For a stylistic description of archaising language use, according to the functional cognitive presuppositions we have to examine primarily how the forming potentiality available in language (i.e. the inherent variability of language as a potential, see Tolcsvai Nagy 2004: 144—146, 2005: 37—41) activate archaic labelling. The motivation of archaic style attribution can be approached both from a structural and from a procedural viewpoint. Accordingly:

- we have to examine how the semantic structures motivating archaic labelling contribute to creating archaic meaning: whether we can assume a substructure in the semantic structure of the expression carrying the archaic nature of it, and how these expressions make available the knowledge being bequeathed;
- we have to examine how semantic structures are interpreted as archaisms in the discourse, namely by what processes archaism is realised in the linguistic interaction.

The referential function of archaic language use can be grasped by the joint analysis of these two aspects. Thus, in the functional cognitive stylistic approach the archaic nature of an expression does not follow from the temporal formation of the linguistic structure, or from the localisability of the expression in one or in another language historical era, or from its scientific etymology. It is the result of making available such knowledge which refers to the historical tradition of the speech community.

It is essential, however, that the archaic expression does not simply make available the traditional knowledge of the community (since the access to this knowledge can be provided by all stylistically neutral expression through symbolising the encyclopaedic knowledge concerning the past), but it brings the tradition itself in the conceptual construal, since it initiates the conceptualisation of the referential scene through the activation of this traditional knowledge. In other words, archaic language use foregrounds the tradition of the community as a partially independent source of knowledge. (This will be detailed below, in connection with perspectivisation.)

Moreover it is important to note at this point yet, that every style effect develops in text, consequently archaic language use is not equivalent with the sum of isolated archaic expressions, but it is a dynamic meaning creating process, proceeding in the discourse, in relation with the referential scene, as well as with grounding the linguistic symbols directed to this scene (see more detailed in 3.2).

3.1. A structural approach to archaisms

One of the main important questions in relation with the analysis of semantic structures motivating archaic labelling is whether these expressions have an archaic substructure, and if they have how it can be modelled. We have to start to investigate this problem with the usage-based nature of linguistic structures (see Kemmer—Barlow 2000, Langacker 2000), which means that the language user extracts his knowledge about the system of language from the usage events, that is to say the elements of linguistic system are schematised and categorised in actual linguistic interactions. This presupposition is particularly important in studying archaic

language use, because from a functional perspective we cannot assume a prior semantic feature or component which makes archaic labelling possible. From this follows that archaic nature is entrenched and becomes part of the semantic structure through individual practice and usage.

We can rely on Langacker's findings at this point. The elements of a linguistic system in cognitive grammar are conventional linguistic units, which are schematised through decontextualisation. The semantic units developing in this way can be characterised with cognitive domains, and any conceptual knowledge system about the world can serve as a domain, so meaning is encyclopaedic in nature. As Langacker (1987) makes it clear, also the social relations of the language user, as well as the characteristic features of the speech situation (i.e. the socio-cultural factors of the verbal interaction) are elaborated as conceptual structures, thus they can become a part an expression's semantic structure as cognitive domains. In so far as a socio-cultural factor occurs in the interactional context of a linguistic structure with a proper frequency, it "may survive the decontextualisation process and remain a semantic specification of the resultant unit" (Langacker 1987: 63, see also Tolcsvai Nagy 2004: 153). Through this the sociolinguistic status of an expression can become part of its semantic structure as a schematic substructure.

On the basis of all these the archaic nature of an expression (as part of its socio-cultural status) can be schematised too, and it can be appear as a peripheral domain, the domain of time in the schematic semantic structure. In the case of archaic language use the archaic subdomain is always in the foreground of this domain, in front of the neutral and the neologism subdomain. But the measure of archaism can be different. Consider for example the next text:

- (1) És történt, hogy elszánták magokat azon gyár férfiai, hogy gazdaságossá tennék az termelést, és nem fizetnének annak, aki nem dolgozik.
(‘And it happened that the men of that factory made up their mind that they would make the production more profitable, and they would not have pay to the person who did not work.’)

We find in (1) such expressions that can be labelled archaic primarily on the basis of their phonological structure: *magokat* (‘themselves’, instead of conventional *magukat*), *azon* (‘that’, instead of conventional *az*), *az termelést* (‘the production’, instead of conventional *a termelést*). It can be supposed that during the phonological construal of these structures we do not activate any of the particular conceptual knowledge referring to the historical past at all. Nevertheless these phonological structures stand in symbolic relation with such semantic structures (see Langacker 1987: 56—62, 81, 328—368), which have the schematic domain of time as their substructure, within which the archaic value is foregrounded, because these semantic structures are conventionalised through interpreting such utterances, which mediate the traditions of the speech community (e.g. biblical texts, texts of folk-poetry). Wording it in a different way, the conceptual knowledge becoming accessible by these expressions is not labelled archaic in itself, but through the construal of phonological structure and through its individual entrenchment the domain of time becomes part of the semantic structure (along with the symbolic relation between the phonological and the semantic pole), so the archaic value becomes entrenched.

We can explain the archaic grammatical structures such as *gazdaságossá tennék* (‘would make more profitable’, a conditional verb [*tennék*], instead of declarative *teszik*), *nem fizet-*

nének ('would not have pay', again a conditional verb [*fizetnének*] instead of a declarative [*fizetnek*] in the final clause) in a similar way. From a cognitive grammatical perspective, grammar is not autonomous, since it structures and symbolises the semantic content, so grammatical structures also have meaning, even if a schematic one. Thus, morphology, syntax and lexicon form a continuum, and the grammatical constructions can be modelled as a symbolic relation of a phonological and a semantic structure (Langacker 1987: 12). Consequently the predicates in the dependent clauses above can be labelled archaic again due to the archaic phonological structure. That is to say, the archaic style effect of the conditional verb does not come from its schematic meaning (since the conditionality of the process profiled in the verb is not foregrounded during the construal), nor from our language historical knowledge about the use of the conditional in dependent clause. The archaic labelling is the result of using a non-conventional (complex) phonological structure. So, it is likely that the archaic nature of a grammatical structure stands out in the process of phonological construal, i.e. distinct grammatical archaism is not assumed in a functional cognitive approach, though the contribution of semantic construal cannot be precluded.

Based on these we can state that the traditional subcategories of archaism (conceptual, semantic and formal, see Heltainé Nagy 2008: 128—129) are not discrete phenomena, but they are the domains of the archaic continuum. The example above, namely the archaic nature in the phonological structure is probably one of the endpoints on the continuum, while the archaic grammatical construction can be positioned between the endpoints (between the conceptual and the phonological archaism). The basis of archaic labelling at the phonological pole is the experience of interpreting such utterances, which are the parts of the community's tradition. The socio-cultural status of archaism forms through this experience. So the previous utterances contribute to meaning creation as schematic or specific fragments of the common tradition, and these utterances make the context in which the archaic language use can develop. It is essential, however, that the phonological, the grammatical and the conceptual archaism can be grasped from the structural perspective as a semantic phenomenon: as the presence of the socio-cultural domain of time in the semantic structure, as foregrounding or profiling the archaic substructure in this domain, in the process of meaning creation. That is exactly why archaism forms a continuum in the cognitive model.

It can be stated further that the archaic nature of a linguistic unit always develops in front of a concrete textual background, which helps the archaic interpretation and contributes to the profiling of the archaic subdomain. This background can be modelled successfully with frame semantics. It is primarily a lexical semantic theory, but it proved to be productive in the investigation of archaic language use. Fillmore (2006) grasps meaning as a categorising act of experiences: in his theory words and other linguistic forms point to semantic categories, which belong to wider conceptual structures. Thus meaning creation is categorising experience in the foreground of the knowledge about the world, however the categorisation and the conceptual system of knowledge itself are motivated by the situation of cognition, i.e. by the context in which the speech community needs to establish new categories (see Fillmore 2006: 373—374, 381). Categorising an entity, namely using the given form in the given situation becomes reasonable, acceptable and understandable in a motivating context. The motivating context consists of social and cultural practices, of traditional knowledge about the social institutions, and of previous interpretations of this socio-cultural practice.

This context makes possible the development of a new category as well as carrying out a categorising act in the speech community. Consequently, this context motivates both the meaning and the use of the linguistic structure, in harmony with structuring the category system itself in the background of the meaning. The categories being initiated by the motivating context and standing in systematic relation with each other constitute the semantic frame of a linguistic unit (Fillmore 2006: 381). It is essential that the semantic frame is not indispensable for understanding an expression, nevertheless the conventional knowledge of the speech community would not contribute to the meaning creation without the semantic frame. It is also important that the motivating context and the semantic frame with it can be formed through processing experience, since the language user applies the frame to the given situation intentionally (Fillmore 2006: 382). Therefore frame semantics is not only a functional but also a usage-based theory, since the frames come from the situations of cognition, and they also form in them.

During verbal interaction, in the course of joint attention the semantic frames make accessible such ways of construal, which are motivated in a community but entrenched individually. A semantic frame is a system of categories; it functions in the foreground of the motivating context as conceptual background. In the act of meaning creation, the language user adopts these frames dynamically to initiate conceptualisations for others: the conceptualiser elaborates conceptually the referential scene and its participants along with the semantic frame pertaining to the expression.

On the basis of all these an expression is labelled archaic from a functional viewpoint if its motivating context contains knowledge about the tradition of the speech community, and this knowledge becomes accessible through the expression's semantic frame. The expression evokes the historical base of its creation (Fillmore 2006: 385), so in the course of meaning creation the entity, process or relation profiled by the semantic structure of the expression is interpreted taking the past of the community as the starting-point, since conceptual knowledge referring to the past motivates the categorisation.

As it can be seen, the crucial factor in archaic language use is not the linguistic form in the functional cognitive research, but the historicity of the categories that motivate the meaning. It is not the knowledge about the history of the structure that initiates archaic labelling for the language user, but the context of interpretation in which the structure becomes motivated semantically.

It is especially true at the other endpoint of the archaic continuum, which is regarded traditionally lexical or conceptual archaism. Consider the next fragment from a novel.

- (2) Leültem az ágy szélére, apám pedig beléfogott a távollétemben történetek elbeszélésébe. Alig két héttel azután, hogy engem fölrakott az Izsákfalvára induló szekérre, levelet kapott az ödenburgi tanácstól, amelyben tudatták velem, hogy fivére, kinek feleségét s két gyermekét már előző évben elragadta a pestis, maga is elhunyt valamely gyors lefolyású betegségben, de mégsem annyira hirtelen, hogy ne lett volna ideje testámentumot tenni, amelyhez tanúnak, annak rendje és módja szerint, a külső és belső tanács két-két tagját kérte fel.

(I sat down on the edge of the bed, and my father began to tell everything that had happened during my absence. Barely two weeks after he had loaded me onto the cart

going to Izsákfalva, he had a letter from the town council of Ödenburg in which he was informed that also his brother himself, whose wife and two children had been seized by the plague a year earlier, had died in a rapid course illness, not so suddenly however, that he would not have had time making his last will and testament, for which he formally asked two members of the internal and of the external council as witnesses.’)

The archaic language use in this example is moderate, nevertheless the expressions *ödenburgi* (‘of Ödenburg’, instead of conventional *soproni* [‘of Sopron’]) and *testámentumot* (‘last will and testament’, instead of conventional *végrendeletet*, with the same meaning) come to the foreground of the attention. The plot narrated in the whole text is set in a Hungarian language area, in western Hungary, so the German name of the town referring to Sopron is prominent: Hungarian speakers indicate the settlements of Hungary with their Hungarian names. From this it follows that the writer does not use her present time language knowledge during the processing of the structure *ödenburgi*, but she interprets the expression with the help of such a motivating context, which activates the language user’s knowledge about the past of the Hungarian speech community. Similarly, the semantic frame of *testámentumot* makes accessible conceptual structures concerning the past, since it elaborates the last will and testament as the entity in the centre of joint attention according to the Latin tradition of legal practice. Of course the phonological structures of both expressions contribute to the archaic labelling.

It is important to note that it is not required to know specifically and in detail the history of the community for understanding the two expressions above, as well as for recognising archaic language use. The language user does not have to know accurately, in what historical era or in what historical status of Hungarian were conventional the German names of free royal towns and the Latin term referring to the last will. It is enough to recognise that these semantic structures are not conventional in the present. This recognition results from the socio-cultural domain of time forming a part of the semantic structures of these expressions, and from the archaic profile of the domain.

To sum up, the structure aspect of linguistic potential in archaic language use can be modelled as follows. Frame semantics helps us to grasp the semantic motivation of archaic language use, directing our attention to the motivating context of linguistic units. In the case of archaic expressions this context is built partly from non-verbal, encyclopaedic knowledge and partly from the fragments of former or historic utterances as intertexts in a wider sense (Gasparov 2010: 3–4), thus archaisms can be characterised with encyclopaedic motivation on the one hand, or with intertextual motivation on the other. (Of course these motivation categories are not separated rigidly and sharply, and in the majority of cases both motivation categories contribute to the categorisation presumably, considering that textual tradition can be activated not only as the entirety of intertexts, but also as encyclopaedic knowledge.) An expression is labelled archaic in this motivating context, thus it has a semantic structure that can be interpreted from the socio-cultural and verbal traditions of the speech community. During the entrenchment of archaic labelling the socio-cultural domain of time becomes part of the semantic structure, and the subdomain of archaism comes to the foreground in the domain. On the basis of all these, the intensity of archaic nature can be grasped with the degree of centrality of the domain of time in the structure: the more central the socio-cultural domain of time is, i.e. the more it pertains to the active zone of the structure activating automatically

in the course of construal, the more intensive the archaic labelling of the expression becomes, and the expression can be considered as more prototypical in archaic language use.

Archaism is semantic in the functional cognitive theory even if it is realised on the phonological pole of the linguistic unit. The phonological structure is schematised during the processing of utterances pertaining to the textual tradition of the community. However, the archaic nature of the expression becomes fixed in the semantic structure being in a symbolic relation with the phonological structure. In the case of phonological archaism (as well as of archaic grammatical construction) it is one or another fragment from the textual tradition which comes to the foreground in the motivating context. At the other endpoint of the archaic continuum (in the case of conceptual archaism), it is primarily the tradition as conceptual knowledge which becomes available, nevertheless the socio-cultural domain of time becomes activated again in the semantic structure of the expression.

3.2. Archaic language use in the discourse

With the term ‘archaic language use’, I intend to indicate that archaism develops and becomes interpretable in verbal interaction, in the course of the discourse. Thus, we have to elaborate the procedural aspect of the linguistic potential, so we have to investigate how the semantic structure modelled above contributes to the conceptual organisation of the discourse. Archaism as a referential phenomenon can be modelled only through this, since the conceptual structure construing a referential entity or scene is built in the frames of verbal activity, during meaning creation.

As Langacker (2001: 151) states it, linguistic structures (symbolic units) initiate the (re)formation of the current discourse space in one or another way. The conceptual structure of the discourse is built at many levels simultaneously, and linguistic units function in elaborating these levels. They initiate primarily the transformation of the objective scene: they introduce novel participants, or they change the direction of the attention within the scene (Langacker 2009: 2). However the mental representation of the speech situation (the participants of the verbal interaction, its relationship and the speech event itself), the ground, the scope of awareness containing the ground and the objective scene, and the immediate scope (the physical and social context of the interaction) are also the parts of the discourse space (Langacker 2009: 1—2).

In so far as the discourse is neutral regarding the socio-cultural domain of time, and an entity gets into the centre of joint attention (i.e. into the focus of attention) through processing a linguistic structure, the entity is anchored to the ground, to the interpreted and processed speech event (Tolcsvai Nagy 2010: 130—132), thus the instantiation of the type is interpreted in relation to the ground. It is essential, on the one hand, that in terms of the traditional conception grounding presupposes reference in a narrower sense, i.e. the identification of an entity or process in the text world through using a linguistic symbol, since grounding makes the coordination of references possible in the discourse (Brisard 2002: xvi). On the other hand, grounding i.e. the conceptual access to an entity or process in the text world (and through this bringing the entity or process in the objective scene) does not come in itself to the foreground of the attention, since the scope of attention including the objective scene is encircled and the path of attention directing to the scope is established only by the process of grounding (Brisard 2002: xii—xv). In other words, the epistemically oriented process of elaborating schematic semantic structures makes it possible to

coordinate the instantiations of the types by the participants of the discourse, while the process of coordination itself is not profiled. Semantic structures are interpreted as instantiations of types in the knowledge repertoire of the participants, consequently during grounding the language user not only directs the attention of the other participant(s) onto a referent, supposing that it is identifiable, but also he makes a mental contact with the referent possible: he labels the relation of the entity to the physical, mental and social world of the discourse (Brisard 2002: xiii—xv).

It can be seen that the traditional conception of grounding (elaborated by Langacker and Brisard) considers it as a relation between the conceptualiser and the conceptualised entity, in so far as it is defined as making a conceptual access to the entities in the objective scene. This approach implies a narrower conception of reference that is limited to the type reference of semantic structures: in this approach linguistic symbols refer to types, and they indicate entities in the objective scene only through grounding in the discourse. In other words, the elaborated semantic structure develops in the instantiation process of the schema (i.e. in the process of construal). It initiates the conceptualisation of the observed scene or one part of it from a viewpoint and it is anchored to the ground. In the traditional approach the relation of the instantiation with the conceptualised entity is not referential in nature, since grounding itself is not a referential process, but a process coordinating references (i.e. type references). This conception of grounding makes the notion of reference rather narrow, moreover it considers the processes of dynamic meaning creation and construal as non-referential processes. Langacker (2008: 269—272) dissolves this contradiction to some extent, because he construes reference at two levels: he regards type references as the conceptual level of reference (where the referent is the conceptual profile of an expression), while he assumes a wider reference at the level of discourse (through which an instantiation developing in the construal refers to an entity in the discourse).

However the two-level conception of reference is also problematic in the functional cognitive model of archaism, because it is not clear in what measure the socio-cultural domain of time can come in the foreground within the semantic structure. Therefore, it cannot be answered on the ground of the two-level conception of reference whether archaism as a referential process pertains to the level of conceptualisation or discourse, or if it proceeds at both levels, what is the difference between them. The solution may be extending the notion of reference and grounding on the basis of the functional pragmatic theory of reference: from the perspective of functional pragmatics the whole process of conceptualisation proceeds within the act of reference, thus conceptual elaboration is at all levels (in relation to type and to instantiation) a referential process (Sinha 1999: 231—232). This means that the referential act encompasses the processes of conceptualisation and construal, thus also grounding is considered a referential process: it is a process which not only makes the conceptual access to the observed entity possible, but it initiates the conceptual access from the conceptualiser as a subject. Consequently, the conceptualiser is not only a neutral or abstract factor of the grounding process, but he is one of the participants in the discourse, a subject with mental and socio-cultural characteristics. This model approaches grounding in the complex system of relations between the objective scene and the participants of the joint attentional scene, and it considers grounding as a process which builds the intersubjective conceptual path to the referential scene or entity. So it is indeed coordinative in nature, but it coordinates conceptualisations in a referential act, not references.

The referential function of archaic language use becomes explainable in this model, in relation to grounding. It is important to see that archaism develops in the process of con-

strual, the relation system of the discourse, however, in which construal proceeds, is not a two-dimensional configuration of a conceptualiser and an objective scene (see Verhagen 2005: 5—7). It is a complex, three-dimensional system of relations between the conceptualised scene, the conceptualisers (the participants of the discourse), and the relationship of the participants. The ground itself to which linguistic structures are grounded is intersubjective in nature, since the participants of the usage event have common knowledge, and they consider each other as intentional mental agents (Tomasello 1999). So it is a common ground (Verhagen 2005: 7), and the utterances are used for initiating joint processes of attention and conceptualisation, in relation to the common ground. The participants of the discourse coordinate the conceptualisations through the process of grounding.

It can be stated that the functional cognitive explanation of archaic language use presupposes the extension of the notions of reference and grounding. At the same time, it makes the reinterpretation of the notion of archaism possible. For if the socio-cultural domain of time, as well as the archaic subdomain comes to the foreground of the semantic structure, grounding proceeds in two dimensions simultaneously. The conceptualiser grounds the entity to the common ground on the one hand, since it becomes available in the text world through this process. On the other hand the entity is construed as the instantiation of a type or category that is motivated by the verbal and non-verbal tradition of the speech community, as motivating context, thus the entity becomes available conceptually from the tradition. In other words, the referential scene is construed in two dimensions in the case of archaic language use: the entity is elaborated in the process of conceptualisation as an element of the immediate context (as a participant of the text world) on the one hand, and on the other as a part of the community's tradition. Consequently archaism has its function in the process of conceptualisation and construal, because it makes the entity being in focus within the text world referentially available through the collective tradition. This is the referential function of archaic language use. The phonological endpoint of the archaic continuum serves as a referential structure through foregrounding the utterance itself, its phonological and structural formation. Since in this case the domain of time is profiled again in the semantic structure, the archaic formation serves as a meaning creating component in the conceptual processing of an entity.

It is very important to see that by archaic language use we elaborate conceptually an entity in the text world at a higher level of representation, through labelling the entity in the system of encyclopaedic and verbal knowledge of the community considered as tradition. From this follows however the epistemic nature of archaic language use as well as its relation to the deictic process: during the intersubjective referential interpretation of archaic semantic structures a part of the community's tradition as common knowledge appears as an independent perspective, relating the context of the speech event with the context of the collective past.

Therefore in archaic language use the complex process of grounding itself comes to the foreground of attention, and the scope of awareness is changed as a consequence. We categorise and ground the focused entity in the motivating context of the tradition too, and through this our attention is directed not only to the focused entity, but also to a part of the tradition. The scope of awareness becomes open to the past structured as conceptual knowledge, it does not close at the boundaries of the immediate context (of the speech event). For that reason archaism is a specific type of perspectivisation (cf. Sanders—Spooren 1997: 89—90): the perspective of tradition appears in the process of dynamic meaning creation, namely the validity of the conceptualisation

is attached not only to the conceptualiser, because the process of conceptual elaboration itself is embedded in a wider discourse space being open to the collective past. This goes hand in hand with the partial transfer of the subject of consciousness, since the speaker himself does not take full responsibility for the conceptualisations symbolised with linguistic structures, but rather also brings in the canonical (encyclopaedic and verbal) knowledge of the community's tradition. In other words, tradition becomes a partly independent subject in the archaic language use.

The transfer of the subject of consciousness can proceed in different ways and measures. There is an explicit perspectivisation if a previous utterance from the textual tradition of the community is cited as intertext, since in this case a previous speaker (a concrete subject) can be identified more or less in with knowledge of the textual tradition, whether the citation is marked or not. This is also the case when a concrete text is evoked through the application of its characteristic expressions or phonological structures, since we can identify a particular subject, the speaker of the text evoked, even if this subject remains schematic in relation to our knowledge about him. Evocation is thus the transitional domain of archaic perspectivisation, its explicitness can be varied to a certain measure, but in every case a subject can be identified approximately. At the other endpoint of the scale of archaic perspectivisation the change of the perspective remains implicit. It is the case when the conceptualisation is embedded in the encyclopaedic knowledge referred to the community's past: it is the tradition itself, which appears as the partial subject of consciousness. For a piece of the community's past is activated not only as a system of knowledge and values, so as a base of comparison, but as a conventional and complex conceptual structure with which conceptualisations have to be harmonised. In the case of implicit archaic perspectivisation, tradition is a generally defined subject that however has an autonomous epistemic status in the course of intersubjective use of language. It is important moreover that the transfer of the subject of consciousness can be regarded partial, since the speaker remains the source of conceptualisation, so he has the active consciousness.

All these can be harmonised with the theory of grounding explicated above: the archaic conceptualisation can be grasped not through the narrower conception of reference as active mental process, but through the process of grounding proceeding in the act of reference (in wider sense). Since the process of grounding remains in foreground, also the subject of tradition contributes to the coordination of conceptualisations, nevertheless this subject does not have autonomous conceptualising activity, but it can be interpreted in the consciousness of the conceptualiser.

The better knowledge we have about collective traditions, namely the better the motivating context of the expression is elaborated, the more specified the direction of the awareness into the past is. However it is worth mentioning again that for archaic language use it is not required to know an elaborated, specified motivating context, it is enough to open the scope of awareness to the past (instead of closing it in the present), i.e. the subject of consciousness is transferred partially to the tradition. Taking this into consideration it can be stated too that from a functional cognitive perspective there are not any clear criteria for defining and delimiting archaic language use. Nevertheless the functional cognitive model does not aim at predictability, since the language user's perspective cannot be harmonised with an a priori definition of archaism. The relative nature of archaism is not problematic from a functional view, because it follows from the individual access to the traditions of the community.

To investigate archaic language use in discourse, consider the next example:

- (3) Ország- és világszerte ismert híres emberek mellett egy-egy kisebb vidék — falu, város — megemlékezik olyan szülőttéről vagy helybéli lokálpatriótájáról, aki a szűkebb haza dicsőségére, netán még boldogítására is alkotott valami maradandót. Többféle lehet ezen alkotás is: az építéstől a versekig, illetve a népjóléti cselekedetekig. Dunavecse a száz esztendővel ezelőtt született *Molnár Lajost* kiállításal köszöntik földijeit. A sokoldalú férfiú egymásnak látszatra ellentmondó területeken bizonyította tehetségét, viharos történelmi időkben tanúsította emberségét. Volt költő és pap, politikus és családapa, lapszerkesztő és a dunavecsei kaszinó elnöke. ('Among well-known men being famous all over the country and the world, there are natives and provincialist who are commemorated by a lesser region (village or town), and who created something lasting for the glory of their homeland, or perhaps even for making it happy. The creation can be of several kinds: from building to the poems, as well as welfare acts. In Dunavecse Lajos Molnár, who was born a hundred years ago, is greeted with an exhibition by his fellow-countrymen. The versatile man proved his talent in many apparently contradictory areas, attested his humanity in stormy historical times. He was poet and priest, politician and father, editor and chairman in the noble club in Dunavecse'.)

The text has a slightly archaic nature that can be grasped by the model suggested in the study: the perspectivisation does not become explicated during dynamic meaning creation, the subject of tradition can be circumscribed only very generally, so the measure of transfer of the subject of consciousness is only small. Nevertheless some expressions are clearly archaic (at least for the author of this paper), for example *cselekedetekig* ('to acts', instead of conventional *tevékenységekig*), *földijeit* ('his fellow-countrymen', instead of more conventional *honfitársai*) or *kaszinó* ('noble club'). The archaic nature of these expressions follows in the functional cognitive approach from the motivating context of categorisation in the semantic frame during meaning creation, i.e. from the activation of the textual tradition of the community and of knowledge about the past of the community, as well as from grounding meaning in this knowledge and tradition. Describing these partly conventional, partly archaic motivating contexts requires more research, thus they can be circumscribed in this study only approximately.

It seems appropriate to set out from the organisation of discourse as macro-perspective. The example initiates leaving the immediate context of verbal interaction with its first values, since it points out the scope of awareness in the sphere of the tradition of a small community. It is essential that this subprocess cannot be seen as perspectivisation, because it delimits only the text world schematically. Within this scope attention is directed to authors and works, then a concrete person (Lajos Molnár) get to the centre of joint attention. In fact the text elaborates conceptually the figure of the person, through its activities in the past, so the text refers primarily to Lajos Molnár. The example is very interesting, since the text world is constituted within the tradition itself, consequently it is worth investigating how archaic language use contributes to perspectivisation.

The first highlighted expression, *cselekedetekig* ('to acts') profiles the endpoint of an action, the executed act, in addition its semantic frame contains the dimension of moral evaluation, namely the goodness or badness as moral quality of the act. This substructure of the semantic frame has its origin in the literary tradition of the Hungarian speech community,

especially from the Károli Bible, cf.: “Ímé szövetséget kötök; a te egész néped előtt csudákat teszek, a milyenek nem voltak az egész földön, sem a népek között, és meglátja az egész nép, a mely között te vagy, az Úrnak *cselekedeteit*; mert csudálatos az, a mit én cselekszem veled” (2Móz 34,10). Of course the archaic labelling cannot be derived from the cited fragment or from any other concrete text, nevertheless the citation demonstrates that the textual tradition of the Bible is an important source of the archaic nature of the expression *cselekedet* (‘act’): the archaic nature of the expression is schematised in the socio-cultural domain of time through interpretation of the original text or of the literary works paraphrasing it. In this case it is the speaker of the Bible who appears as a partial and schematised subject of consciousness, and the validity of moral evaluation is the consequence of this perspective.

The expression *földijei* (‘his fellow-countrymen’) can be approached in a similar way. The semantic structure profiles the members of a community in their regional togetherness, that is to say the semantic frame foregrounds the collective geographical origin of the members. This way of conceptualisation is characteristic of small communities as a socio-cultural practice, consequently the meaning of the expression is grounded in the tradition of a small community as motivating context. The subject of consciousness can be characterised as a member of a small community in this explanation.

The archaic motivation of the expression *kaszinó* (‘noble club’) can be interpreted more clearly: the encyclopaedic knowledge about a historical social institution is activated and makes the history of the community available in the course of meaning creation. Thus the motivating context is more specific, however the subject of tradition seems the most schematic in this case. The highlighted expressions can be labelled archaic through their abstraction and categorisation in the process of becoming acquainted with the tradition of the community, so in the course of their construal the tradition is brought into the meaning creation, the meanings of the expressions are grounded as semantic structures in the tradition. These processes can be modelled in the discourse: the expressions open the scope of awareness (delimited as a text world in the past of the community of Dunavecse) towards the tradition of the Hungarian speech community, applying another perspective more or less specifically or generally (see *kaszinó*, as well as *cselekedetekig* and *földijei*). While the language user conceptualises the entity being in the centre of attention, he performs such processes of construal through the semantic frames of the expressions, which come to the foreground of conceptual structures relating to the community’s tradition, as well as to the foreground of the textual tradition of the community. As a result of these processes, schematic or specific elements of knowledge about the community’s past are built into the meaning of the text, referring to the entity in the text world through the tradition. And the language users coordinate their conceptualisations not only with each other, but also with the subject of tradition.

4. Conclusion

This study initiated a functional cognitive explanation of archaic language use. First I abandoned the formal approach to archaism, which defines archaism in the autonomous system of language, through the rigid distinction between synchronic and diachronic dimensions of this system, as such expressions that are transferred from previous, obsolete states of the system. Archaism can be explained from a functional cognitive perspective with the historicity of the conceptual structure made available, and not with the historicity of the linguistic

structure. The archaic nature comprehended in this way can be investigated from a structural and from a procedural viewpoint. From the former, the socio-cultural domain of time can be modelled as a part of the semantic structure of the expression, in which the archaic value comes to foreground, and the domain itself gets to the foreground of the semantic structure. Since cognitive grammar models linguistic structures as symbolic relations between a phonological and a semantic structure (pole), the structural explanation of archaism can be applied to the phonological and to the grammatical archaism as well. In the explanation of the archaic nature of a semantic structure, frame semantics proves to be productive, since it can be explained with the theory of semantic frames how encyclopaedic and verbal knowledge about the history of a community can motivate the archaic nature of a semantic structure. Through the procedural approach, we can investigate the discursive functioning of semantic structures, considering that on the one hand there is a complex process of grounding in archaic language use, namely the simultaneous grounding of the schematic type to the speech situation and to the tradition, and on the other the foregrounding of this grounding process itself, which results in perspectivisation, in partial transfer of the subject of consciousness.

In drawing the conclusions from the functional cognitive modelling of archaism it is considered necessary first of all to relate the structural description to the procedural explanation in more details. For it is essential that archaism as complex grounding becomes possible only through the existence of categories activating tradition in the semantic frame of the archaising expression, so these semantic structures carry the possibility of perspectivisation schematically. On the other hand, these semantic structures become entrenched through the process of archaic utterances, i.e. through the recurring successful coordination of conceptualisations. From a functional cognitive perspective, the structural and the procedural explanations require each other: in the discourse the conceptualiser uses structures that make knowledge about the past available, and mark this process semantically in the socio-cultural cognitive domain of time, these structures are schematised however in previous discourses. Modelling the place and nature of the domain of time in semantic structures needs further research.

The continuum structure proved to be appropriate in several respects in modelling the linguistic potential of archaic language use. It is worth summarising and relating to each other these aspects of the archaic continuum. The archaic language use can be modelled as a scale:

- in respect of which pole of the linguistic symbol dominates, with phonological archaism as one endpoint and with conceptual archaism as the other endpoint, taking into consideration however that the whole scale is motivated semantically;
- on the basis of the nature of the motivating context, with encyclopaedic as well as intertextual endpoints and with a transitional domain between them;
- on the grounds of the centrality of the socio-cultural domain of time, namely of the intensity of archaic labelling;
- according to the mode of perspectivisation, as a continuum between explicit archaism with a specific subject of consciousness different from the speaker (subject of tradition) and implicit archaism with a schematic and general subject of consciousness/tradition.

From these the second and the fourth aspects are in a strong relation with each other: in the case of intertextual motivation the perspectivisation becomes more explicit. There can be a

relation between the third and the fourth aspect as well: if the socio-cultural domain of time becomes active with ease, the explicitness and markedness of archaic language use, and therefore the profiling of archaic grounding becomes more intensive. It follows from these that further investigations of the relations between these aspects are indispensable.

The following stage in the functional cognitive stylistic explanation of archaic language use is elaborating and detailing the semantic model, since through it the contribution of archaisms to the meaning of the text can be modelled more accurately. Moreover, it is important to compare the socio-cultural factor of time with the other factors on the basis of the explanation of linguistic potential suggested in this study, as well as to investigate the co-occurrence patterns of the factors in the Hungarian speech community. The structural aspect of the linguistic potential can be elaborated in greater details on the grounds of these additional investigations, while the procedural aspect can be refined through analysing the stylistic structure of texts labelled archaic.

Finally, it is worth referring the functional cognitive explanation of the semantic grounds of archaic language use back to the hermeneutic epistemological starting point, reflecting the relations between the general epistemological and the linguistic theoretical presuppositions. The historical mode of cognition following from the modern Western episteme is not appropriate for explaining archaism, since it implies absolutising the position of cognition (displacing it from history), objectivising the object of cognition (separating the past from the present), as well as idealising the human subject of cognition (and its epistemological superiority). The functional approach which foregrounds the perspective of the language user, cannot rely on these presuppositions, consequently it has to keep the historical determination, the limitedness and the transience of the cogniser's position. In consequence, from a functional cognitive perspective a theory of archaism with general validity and predictability cannot be elaborated. Nevertheless, in the light of the fundamental relativity of cogniser we can realise that linguistic activity, as well as the formation of an utterance as meaning creating component proceeds in a dynamic, complex system of relations, and its scientific explanation is possible only in the framework of a complex research with the investigation of several perspectives simultaneously. Moreover, modelling archaic language use as a way of perspectivisation becomes established concerning the hermeneutic experience of cognition and from the cognitive and socio-cultural embedding of language use: tradition has to be considered as a semi-autonomous subject since only by this subject can we interpret the cognition of tradition constituted by language as a dialogue with tradition, namely as a real understanding.

Examples

- (1) Komlós János 1965. Ott fenn... Némileg klerikális színezetű Tan Mese az Mai Példabeszédek Könyvéből. *Népszabadság* 23: 8.
- (2) Rakovszky Zsuzsa 2002. *A kigyó árnyéka*. Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó. 244.
- (3) Zsolnár Melinda 2002. A dunavecsei politikus—lelképásztor. *Magyar Nemzet* 65: 15.

References

- Ankersmit, Frank R. 2000. Nyelv és történeti tapasztalat. [Language and historical experience.] In: Thomka, Beáta (ed.): *Narratívák 4. A történelem poétikája*. [Narratives 4. The poetics of history.] Budapest: Kijarat Kiadó. 169—184.

- Breisach, Ernst 2004. *Historiográfia*. [Historiography.] Budapest: Osiris Kiadó.
- Brisard, Frank 2002. Introduction: the epistemic basis of deixis and reference. In: Brisard, Frank (ed.): *Grounding. The epistemic footing of deixis and reference*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. xi—xxxii.
- Fillmore, Charles J. 2006. Frame semantics. In: Geeraerts, Dirk (ed.): *Cognitive linguistics: basic readings*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 373—400.
- Foucault, Michel 2000. *A szavak és a dolgok. A társadalomtudományok archeológiája*. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó.
- Fónagy, Iván 1970. Archaizálás. [Archaism.] In: Király, István (ed.): *Világirodalmi lexikon 1*. [World literature encyclopaedia 1.] Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 431—433.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg 2003. *Igazság és módszer. Egy filozófiai hermeneutika vázlata*. [Wahrheit und Methode.] Budapest: Osiris Kiadó.
- Gasparov, Boris 2010. *Speech, memory, and meaning. Intertextuality in everyday language*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Heltainé Nagy, Erzsébet 2006. Archaizálás és retorizáltság. Az archaizmusok tipológiája és retorikai funkciói. [Archaism and rhetoric. The typology and rhetorical functions of archaisms.] In: Szathmári, István (ed.): *A stilisztikai alakzatok rendszerezése*. [The system of stylistic figures.] Budapest: Tinta Kiadó. 49—60.
- Heltainé Nagy Erzsébet 2008. Archaizmus. [Archaism.] In: Szathmári, István (ed.): *Alakzatlexikon. A retorikai és stilisztikai alakzatok kézikönyve*. [Handbook of figures.] Budapest: Tinta Kiadó. 127—132.
- Humboldt, Wilhelm von 1985. Az emberi nyelvek szerkezetének különbözőségéről és ennek az emberi szellemre gyakorolt hatásáról. [Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts.] In: *Válogatott írásai*. Budapest: Európa Kiadó. 69—115.
- Kemmer, Suzanne — Barlow, Michael 2000. Introduction: a usage-based conception of language. In: Barlow, Michael — Kemmer, Suzanne (eds.): *Usage-based models of language*. Stanford: CSLI Publications. vii—xxviii.
- Kisantal, Tamás — Szeberényi, Gábor 2003. A történetírás „nyelvi fordulata”. [The linguistic turn in history.] In: Bódy, Zsombor — Ö. Kovács, József (eds.): *Bevezetés a társadalomtörténetbe. Hagyományok, irányzatok, módszerek*. [Introduction to social sciences. Traditions, trends, methods.] Budapest: Osiris Kiadó. 413—442.
- Kiss, Jenő — Pusztai, Ferenc (eds.) 2005. *Magyar nyelvtörténet*. [The history of the Hungarian language.] Budapest: Osiris Kiadó.
- Labov, William 1979. The study of language in its social context. In: Pride, John — Holmes, Janet (eds.): *Sociolinguistics*. Middlesex: Penguin Books. 180—202.
- Ladányi, Mária — Tolcsvai Nagy, Gábor 2008. Funkcionális nyelvészet. [Functional linguistics.] *Általános Nyelvészeti Tanulmányok XXII*: 17—58.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 1987. *Foundations of cognitive grammar 1. Theoretical prerequisites*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 2000. A dynamic usage-based model. In: Barlow, Michael — Kemmer, Suzanne (eds.): *Usage-based models of language*. Stanford: CSLI Publications. 1—64.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 2001. Discourse in cognitive grammar. *Cognitive Linguistics* 12: 143—188.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 2008. *Cognitive grammar. A basic introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Langacker, Ronald W. 2009. *Substrate, system, and expression: aspects of the functional organization of english finite clauses*. Manuscript.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich 1989. *A történelem hasznáról és káráról*. [Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben.] Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Péter, Mihály 2006. Szinkronia és diakronia a prágai iskola felfogásában. [The Prague School on synchrony and diachrony.] *Magyar Nyelv* 102: 400—407.
- Sanders, José — Spooren, Wilbert 1997. Perspective, subjectivity, and modality from a cognitive linguistic point of view. In: Liebert, Wolf-Andreas — Redeker, Gisele — Waugh, Linda (eds.): *Discourse and perspective in cognitive linguistics*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 85—112.
- Saussure, Ferdinand de 1997. *Bevezetés az általános nyelvészetbe*. [Cours de linguistique général.] Budapest: Corvina.
- Sinha, Chris 1999. Grounding, mapping and acts of meanings. In: Janssen, Theo — Redeker, Gisele (eds.): *Cognitive linguistics: foundations, scope, and methodology*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter. 223—255.
- Szathmári, István 1996. A funkcionális stilisztika megalapozása. [Foundations of functional stylistics.] In: Szathmári, István (ed.): *Hol tart ma a stilisztika? Stíluselméleti tanulmányok*. [Papers on style theory.] Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó. 13—33.
- Tolcsvai Nagy, Gábor 1996. *A magyar nyelv stilisztikája*. [The stylistics of Hungarian.] Budapest: Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó.
- Tolcsvai Nagy, Gábor 2004. A nyelvi variancia kognitív leírása és a stílus. Egy kognitív stíluselmélet vázlata. [The cognitive description of linguistic variation, and style. Outlines of a cognitive theory of style.] In: Büky, László (ed.): *A mai magyar nyelv leírásának újabb módszerei 6*. [New methods for describing the Hungarian language 6.] Szeged: SZTE. 143—160.

- Tolcsvai Nagy, Gábor 2005. *A cognitive theory of style*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Tolcsvai Nagy, Gábor 2010. *Kognitív szemantika*. [Cognitive semantics.] Nyitra: Konstantin Filozófus Egyetem.
- Tomasello, Michael 1999. *The cultural origins of human cognition*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Tompai, József 1972. *A művészi archaizálás és a régi magyar nyelv*. [Artistic archaisms and the old Hungarian language.] Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Verhagen, Arie 2005. *Constructions of intersubjectivity. Discourse, syntax, and cognition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.