ÖT KONTINENS

Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék Tudományos Közleményei

№2018/1.

Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Bölcsészettudományi Kar

BUDAPEST
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Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary
History
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FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

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Contents

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CEE's Plans for a Resilient Integration with the EU

Abstract

The European Union (EU) has a hierarchy of integration processes and priorities, in the scope of an ever-expanding empire. States in the EU are not equal, especially in their function and assigned roles. In the ever-changing architecture of international order there is a lot of teamwork, sometimes ad hoc and sometimes coordinated. At a regional context, the EU integration process also takes place with the assignment of role-playing, to organize the expansion of the EU. Its favoured instrument of integration was the market. But as China gained control of this market system, the EU is abandoning it in favour of classical geopolitical forms of integration, which might reinstate a degree of belligerence in Europe. The decisive factor in the processes will be the role played by Central and Eastern European (CEE) members of the EU. There are stark differences between CEE countries, but consensus is emerging unto a new Eastern model of integration and reconstruction at national, EU and Transatlantic levels. This will have a profound impact on concepts like sovereignty, nation-state, and the whole idea of integration. After a brief appraisal of theoretical concepts like integration and sovereignty, the study will sketch the Eastern model and the EU integration process.

Keywords: Foreign policy resilience; integration; disintegration; white nationalism; sovereignty; discrimination-state; systemic discriminative order; feudal state; feudal diaspora;

Word of caution: History is happening in front of our eyes. The whole of Donald Trump's presidency was considered as some kind of heresy, out-of-the-norm event, a miss-step of established order. And not seen as a return of something or the beginning of something else. One of the reasons for this is that we, structural historians, refused to be pulled into the debate. A tacit acceptance, that history as a discipline pertains to the past and has little do with the present and even less to do with the future. Firstly, this attitude makes a nonsense of the concept of the *long-durée*. I cannot tell my students that the long durée of Nazism ended with WWII. Or equally that Communism ended with the collapse of the Berlin wall. Secondly, we more than others, should know that historic paths come to life when someone starts to use them, from this moment the present becomes a historian's business. Finally, structural historians map-out past pattens exactly to become a witness to emerging patterns. We have our part to play in showing how future

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patterns impend. The CEE caught my attention, as a historian, because I feel something is moving and conjecturing to create a pattern. The essence of CEE's global history is characterised by fear. Fear of being neither here nor there. The fear of being overran because of a conflict in which it has no stake. Fear of paying the dues for its insignificance. Fear of perpetually being outgunned. And most importantly this fear is coming from intelligent communities. My quest is just to search for a „*pattern"* of explanations and not to legitimise this or that opinion or political consensus.

Introduction

Integration is about building trust since it is mainly about changing the architecture of sovereignty and its centre of gravity. This is especially true in the context of unequal partners. Although moving to a desired situation does involve a conceptual construction, integration should be done by a fundamental understanding of the reality and cannot be built upon a purely conceptual reality. The problem for the new candidates is to benefit from the largess of the European Union and at the same time avoid falling into the trap of extinction or insignificance within the larger Leviathan. New models of existence have to be created before total integration, sometimes perceived as absorption of the smaller by the bigger. This supposes that at some juncture instruments of inequality should be replaced by structures of equality, in order to retain the trust of the integrating elements in the whole process. Over the last twenty years the EU's integration process has entered a period of sustained languidness, pointing to failures at several levels. The EU has failed to produce resilient structures and paths for attaining equality at the level of the citizen, communities and nation-states. Since the last fifteen years, the time when a large number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries joined the EU, not much has been done to deepen integration for the purpose of greater equality among its citizens and communities. This vacuum in constructive policy has led to confusion, disenchantment and loss of confidence at all levels. In the absence of strong guiding principles, fear for the future has become the guiding factor, especially in the eastern league of countries that joined the EU since 2004. To begin with, prosperity and security have lost the national scope of resilience. In effect, the prosperity and security of an Eastern member depends upon the prosperity of the EU, dominated by France and Germany. In turn these two countries depend upon the United States for the same elements. This has been the case since the economic outlay of the Marshall Plan (1948), followed by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) to provide security to Europe. These are layers of entrenched dependencies which are creating fears of a

systemic collapse of these arrangements. This shows a structural weakness in the EU edifice and therefore the integration process. After a theoretical appraisal on sovereignty and integration and its resilience, more light will be shed on the actual process of integration and disintegration in the European Union. In particular, the Eastern members choice of imposing a 'discrimination-state' as a model of integration in an extended White Nation, making the current process as temporary and non-resilient. Could it be that they are imposing disintegration to gain a degree of equality? Although there is no such intention, their actions could be misinterpreted as being that.

Integration and resilience: a theoretical appraisal

Almost all political theories and ideologies, when implemented, tend to lead to either integration or disintegration of units, trends and processes. Under these circumstances it is impossible to point to one set of theoretical precepts which embody the process of integration exclusively. Those who come close to looking at the integration process are the organizational theorists dealing with corporate organization. In this field, optimal integration of units is of the utter most importance for the overall good-functioning of the corporate structure, whose aim is to deliver the awaited results, to achieve specific goals. This is especially true in the context of multi-national companies which sometimes extend their organizational capacity over several hundred units with specific cultural contexts. The corporate world is improving its capacity by constantly addressing integrational problems that might arise or are latent to the initial structure. It is always a question why there is a 1000 year gap between political organization of the world society and corporate organization of our economic existence? There is no simple answer to this question the difference is that one is rational and universalist while the other is feudalist in its function and outlook.

I see four distinct elements that contribute to the organizational integration and its efficiency in the corporate world that could help political integration. The first is *transparency* in the chain of actions and input that takes place, and thus anomalies or barriers to integration can easily be identified. Secondly there is a clear unitary *responsibility* established, who is responsible for what. Thirdly, *trust* in contractual and other patterns of relations is primary, what should the outcome be and if not, what the consequences should be. Trust is the key to a successful and resilient integration process. Trust should be the guiding principle to all steps taken toward integration, because on the other side of the coin, integration always involves sacrifice and some form of irreversible process of disintegration. Without a proper and trustable alternative none will be willing to accept disintegration and sacrifice.

And finally, structural resilience is provided by *movement* of people and procedures (knowledge and know-how), making it essential for survival of the whole structure and its uniformity. Since the lack of necessary skills will reduce the level of optimization and efficiency, and eventually lead to the collapse of that structure. All these four elements are brought together by the building up of a corporate culture, with an eye on its capacity to change and adapt. The idea is that nothing should impede an organization to change and re-optimize its capabilities. Corporate culture is created out of the four elements mentioned above. This culture is at the same time a fine balance between submission to organizational restraint and boundless creative freedom. Not all situations in the corporate world are ideal or optimal but those who excel in their domain and maximise wealth-creation are those that weed out discrimination, anomalies and integrational problems.

Among others around the world, Western Enlightenment was about the same preoccupations but focused on the whole society, if not the Humanity at large. Essentially, the purpose was to dissipate violence and channel the thus gained energy and harmony to extract humankind from misery by the proper organization of the material life. It was thought that rational thinking and science can solve the problems of the whole humanity. (BOURDIEU, 2018, 245.). According to some, the biggest contribution made by philosophers like Saint-Simon was that he showed us the oneness of humanity and provided the precepts by which to achieve this unity. (SIMON, 1956, 316.). From his point of view, there is no other or better resilience than this, a constant movement towards the unification of purpose and objective.

The nation-state and one-humanity universalism are part of the same process – integration. Both got a boost in their functionality after the French Revolution (1789). Organizing *l'Humanité* on the principles of progress defined by Saint Simon and August Comte, meant that structures of organizing capacity, a body of authority, was needed. For the sake of efficiency, mainly language communities became the hosts of these „*structures of authority"*, the Nation-State. Seen from the perspective of the revolutionary heritage, sovereignty was tacitly defined as the unbridled capacity to organize the national community, as a building bloc of a global cohesion. This process was integration, eliminating local and feudal blockages. National administrations were strengthened, national markets created, linguistic codifications streamlined, and national priorities imposed. This process of integration eliminated local sovereignty, at the sub-national level. Only a small number of highly efficient state-systems could preserve a degree of local autonomy. The ultimate beneficiary of this enhanced process of integration, alternately called nation-building, was supposed to be the individual, and by way of aggregation the whole of humanity. The end

game of the process, promise of the revolutionary heritage, was supposed to be the liberation of the individual from all forms of discrimination and sufferance. To this end, the management of violence would be transferred to the state. In practicality what this meant was that the Modern State and its functionalities were created by an absorption of '... *the feudal and patrimonial rights of the Middle Age.*' (GIERKE, 1951, 82.) The feudality was not keen on liberating the individual, its true *feudum*, although the pressure to modernize was increasing. Universal resilience was contrary to feudal resiliency. Faced with this tension, integration was bound to go through periods of convulsions.

Particularist sovereignty as „a right to discriminate"

The fear of losing domanial control led to a feudal panic, and ultimately to belligerence and war. From the humanist and universalist point of view, the two world wars can be signified as a reversion to discrimination as a method of social, economic and political intercourse and classification-stratification process. In short, a conflict between nations that discriminate. The process of integration in Europe regularly erupts into violence and hatred, with catastrophic consequences. For Hannah Arendt, the reasons for this are evident. She argues that the nation-state is a perverse mechanism that is characterised by inherent weaknesses, inhibited by mistrust and antagonism. The heart of the matter, according to the philosopher, is that (feudal-religious) absolutism is a constant that makes any form of integration almost impossible. The perimeters are fixed and irremovable: *'The European nation-state, which has received the inheritance of absolutism, rests on the trinity of people, territory, and state.'* (ARENDT, 2017, 8.). Arendt argues that the nation brings with it the heritage of absolutism, encapsulating both feudal absolutism accompanied by the religious absolutism of the church, when it conquers the state apparatus: *'The nation-state comes into being when the nation takes possession of the state and the apparatus of government.'* (ARENDT, 2017, 9.). This feudal process of the nation and state capture makes everyone else within that territory stateless. When empires were dismantled, this was exactly what happened between the two world wars. (ARENDT, 2017, 10.). The race to build nation-states crystalizes the fact that, in all regions of the world, the constant struggle to define and redefine a national community, the strengthening of particularism, imposes statelessness on large sections of the population: non-nationals, the poor, religious and other minorities; in general, all these groups are considered marginals. Seen from the Hannah Arendt perspective, far from being integrationist under the tradition of universalism, the

nation-state has become an irreducible feudal segregationist with discrimination as its state theology. The feudal element not only appears in the political construction but also in the economic. Since nation-states of the feudal pattern tend to pool the collective resources and attribute them to one particular community, the so called national community, through a system of discriminations and privileges. This is the main reason why nation-states claim exclusivity over people and territory. This fact prevents nation-states from wanting to integrate into larger systems because there will be a loss of feudal domanial control over a „*system of discriminations and privileges"*, since the resilience of the particularistic nation-state depends upon it. This resilience is in turn articulated as national sovereignty, in the process makes change and integration all most impossible.

Sovereignty thus becomes an element that is incompatible with the process of integration. This vision perhaps originates from a misreading of Jean Bodin. He was one, but Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and many others tried to solve the problem of stability and legitimacy. (STRUWE, 2012, 8.). Sovereignty seemed to suit the conditions but in no way were intrinsic to the nation-state. It should in no way be construed as an impediment to change or transfer of authority when needed. (ALTHUSIUS, 1964, 61–73.). In the Weberian thought, sovereignty is no longer an attribute of a single authority but shared by a pattern of institutions; he even talks of a combinations of authority – *'ruling organization'* (WEBER, 1978, 262.). The organizational perimeter of legitimacy is expanded, without the nominal core wanting to give-up feudal tendencies. It is probably from this perspective that Mark Netzloff also sees sovereignty as being: *'a contingent, provisional designation conferred as a means for negotiating overlapping, potentially competing obligations to a variety of political bodies and relations, from those of kinship, alliance, and service, to corporate, civic, and professional affiliations, as well as the transnational loyalties and enmities of confessional identities.'* (NETZLOFF, 2014, 1509.) In contexts where the intermittence of ideologies, alliances and tactical dependencies are high, sovereignty has a whole new meaning. Sovereignty becomes an object of negotiation, give and take, barter at the convenience and discretion of the (state) authority in control. It is a dynamic concept, permanently convoluting and adjusting to the transactional reality of the day.

However, in the feudal-monopolist pattern of sovereignty „*a state within a state"* configuration is difficult to assume. Otto Gierke, the German State theorist writes: *'Indeed we may see that the Philosophic Theory of the State often sets to work with the assumption that there cannot be two States one above the other, and that above the State there is no room for a World-State, while below the State there is only*

room for mere communes.' (GIERKE, 1951, 97.). What this shows is that there cannot be two predators in one compound, even when the grazing ground becomes larger. Gierke's whole endeavour is about creating institutional resilience through a non-conflictual pattern of integration in the form of subsidiarity, all in one unified cultural setting. And he says that this might not work if extrapolated to a higher level. He clearly asserts that in the hierarchy of integration the (nation-) state level is the most resilient: *'The Imperium Mundi, which rose above the Sovereign States, had evaporated into an unsubstantial shadow, and at any rate was stripped of the character of a State, even when its bare existence was not denied.'* (GIERKE, 1951, 97.). Its capacity to outlive and outperform the supra-state is much greater. Unlike the supranational state, the nation-state is ideally placed to look both ways, it is much more efficient in imposing its will both inside and outside. The supranational state (*Imperium Mundi*) is too far from the individual to give legal protection when in need, especially when the individual comes under attack from the (feudal-nation) state. This is the situation of the EU today, it is devoid of a coherent response to the discrimination state ideology modelized and operationalized by some of the members of the CEE.

The three integrations: feudal levers of change and resilience

The CEE's main principles of integration are an overwhelming State with a minimal engagement, primacy of Christianity in all walks of life, traditional self-sufficient family as a bottom-line social unit and white nationalism as a root cultural identifier. These principles are moved incrementally across three levels of geographical integration. The first and foremost is at the national level where a core system of discrimination is created, modelized and exemplified. Second is to provoke change and create belligerence at the European level. And the final level where a systemic unification of the white nation is organized. All these principles and levels of integration are closely related to the perception of resilience and its logic in the CEE region. The idea is that without some form of foundational principles a nation cannot exist. And this nation cannot guarantee its survival in a globalised world without a strong Europe. Furthermore, this Europe cannot be strong enough in the racial competition without the apport of the plinth of white power, the United States of America. The whole structure is unified not on the basis of inter-state interests but integrated through exclusive racial bonds and a system of white-preference in areas like immigration and other opportunities. These perceptions should not be judged in a negative manner but rather one should take time to understand their logic.

1.) National Integration: creating a systemic core (model)

The CEE region suffered from a chronic deficit of capital, native capitalism and local economic development. With low incomes and savings, capital formation was difficult and at the pace of economic growth the region could never level-up with the West. Added to this the whole region started to suffer from labour shortages due to the combined effect of demographic deficits and emigration of qualified workers to the West. In these conditions economic resilience would be difficult to create and maintain, means and methods have to be put in place to create surpluses. Long term economic planning could not happen since forced privatizations meant that effective control and economic sovereignty was transferred to a 'distant' Western Europe and beyond. In a globalized world, this could spiral any country into insignificance.

Domestic and national consolidation is the sovereign right of the government of each country. And the Eastern European member countries made their further integrative process conditional to several elements, which they see as necessary for their systemic resilience over time. Firstly, given their level of development, demographic deficits, geographic location and particular history, they want to reintroduce *discrimination* (WANAT, 2020.) as the guiding principle, as opposed to the established universalist principle of *equality*. (ZALAN, 2020.). This way of thinking sees the socio-political system as a hierarchy, static and immovable. To avoid controversy, one possible way to interpret this desire is to say that in their Christian model of society, as a base unit, is the „*self-regulating and self-sufficient family"* and not the individual. (Holdren, 2020). It is deemed that self-functioning units need an in-built hierarchy, because equality breeds chaos in issues like economic livelihood and the choice of the number of children born etc. Seen from this perspective, in the Eastern *modus operandi*, discrimination is the backbone of national sovereignty. A reaction of small nations from a weaker economic position, as a method of protection. This naturally leads to the next element of national sovereignty. The family units are guided by feudalistic relations (control and ownership) and the same links them to a system of loyalty to the state. As a payment for their loyalties Christian families are bestowed with tax privileges and other benefits. And when full national sovereignty is regained, the individual's place and function will be limited to that within the family unit, the socio-economic *feudum* guided by a patriarch. The state's access to the individual goes through the traditional (Christian) family, and thus the state has no direct responsibility to the well-being of individuals,

considered as marginals. (COMAN, 2019.). This relation leads to a situation where a whole category of people will not have rights but only obligations. As time goes, the consequence will be that this group of state-less individual citizens will increase. (STRZELECKI, 2020.). And because the nation is that which is integrated into the state, these marginals, a relative majority, will also become nation-less, in line with Arendt's explanation mentioned earlier. The third characteristic element is the culturally consensual (press-button) population. The idea behind this line of thinking is that a nation that has confusing ideas on its destiny is a doomed nation. When a government sets national objectives, people should follow these objectives with full dedication and devotion. This is why the sole function of the media systems is the communication of national priorities and there is no place for useless journalistic tug-of-wars. This can make sense. In exceptional moments in a nation's destiny, where collective effort is needed, to achieve the set goals.

This in turn leads to the final element of the CEE model: that democracy is about national salvation and not individual greed and deviance. Democracy and state functions are about pooling the resources and distributing them to a specific *„nation"* which may or may not have fiscal responsibilities, in either paying taxes or debts accumulated by the state. In this sense both Nation and State acquire feudal prefixes. This art of winning elections and harnessing the democratic will of the people is a special craft, fast becoming a speciality of the CEE countries, much in demand in the West.

Some might contest this model and way of seeing things, but it is important to study them from a historic point of view, before judging them. One should understand the fears that bring about such models of integration within a nation-state. And at the same time, we have to consider the CEE *„Discrimination-state"* in light of the English Class-system, the Indian Caste-system and the Chinese Confucian system. All these exist and very few critics seem to see them as anomalies, and yet all of them are semi-officialised systems of tacit or open discrimination. Although in the later examples the discriminatory systems might be considered as not pertaining to the official state system, they do influence state action and the way it appropriates the resources of a country.

2.) European Integration: evacuating colonial heritage and creating belligerence

The CEE project for the whole of the EU could be a necessary catalyser for a bigger change and a better integration that could give greater resilience to the whole Union. President Duda of Poland wants a

'...strong, secure and just Europe built on the foundation of common identity.' (KACZYNSKI, 2019.). After suffering cultural, economic and military domination for almost fifty years the Easterners do not want to be victim to the same pattern in a culturally, economically and militarily weak and disoriented European Union. The biggest fear of the Easterner is that the EU does not have enough belligerence or the military capacity to defend itself, it does not have enough fire power to accompany its feudal expansion into the Russian sphere or secure Africa as its backyard. (OLEWE, 2020.). For this to change Europe should have one identity and one will. The argument goes that this can only happen with a cultural unification. According to the Easterner's logic all „*loss of cultural identity"* has consequences on demographic composition, state spending and unity.

All these have a deep impact on the EU's capacity of belligerence. The idea is that a non-Christian society (traditional family model) has a direct link to welfare spending, for example single mothers depend upon state benefits to raise children. Immigration is supposed to have the same damping effect on white demographic growth and also acts as a multiplier on welfare spending, because poor migrants are more likely to use the welfare handouts. This trend pushes up budget deficits. (ORBÁN, 2013.). These high debt ratios not only weaken Europe's capacity to innovate and invest but they also make higher defence spending impossible. So the capacity of belligerence is directly linked to the level of welfare spending. The general narrative is that a strong Europe (West) was kept in check not only by communism but also by an over-extended welfare state. According to the Eastern logic, the Welfare State has to be supplanted by the Christian Family model. This will bring a much needed relief in demographic growth and reorganisation of budgetary priorities. In essence the Eastern model contradicts modernity in favour of tradition, it opposes universalism in support of particularism. It prefers the „*Right to Discriminate"* and abhors „*Open Universal Equality"* (OUE). By OUE I mean that universalism enjoyed by Europeans is open to everyone on equal footing. But are the CEE countries the only ones who want to take the path of discrimination?

The weaknesses of the Western ideology of open universal equality were laid bare when the Bolkestein Directive was introduced in 2006. The contrast between words and deeds could not have been greater. By 2004, the West had completed an unprecedented industrial raid, appropriation and destruction of Eastern economic capacity. And it was swiftly delocalised to China. All in the name of convergence and accession to the EU. The only asset left at that time for the Easterners was their skilled labour. The Bolkestein Directive on services could have provided relief to the Eastern economies and societies. But the reaction of the West was of near xenophobia and racism. The „*Polish plumber"*

encapsulated these feelings of rejection and stigmatization. (WESOLOWSKY, 2006.). It is true that millions of „*posted workers*" from the East invaded the Western labour markets. (MALHÉRE, 2016.). But it was not illegal, the directive laid down the rules and regulations in detail. The Eastern workers are treated to appalling work conditions with fraction of wages Westerners would accept.[2] And by providing cheap labour to the Western economies the Eastern workers were making Western economies more competitive with greater accumulation of profits and capital. (WESOLOWSKY, 2006.). It is here that the Eastern Islamophobia steps in. (DUDZIŃSKA, 2019.). A feeling swept over Eastern Europe that Western Europe reserves much better treatment for its „*migrant*" Muslim community than them. The argument goes that the French, for example, were protecting their Muslim community through welfare handouts, while they were refusing to do the same to the white Christians from Eastern Europe. It is from this feeling that the Eastern ideology is born: fiercely Islamophobic, against the welfare state and fiercely against multiculturalism. If adopted by the West, this ideology will trap the West in a turmoil and that will make the CEE look like a safe haven. Western Europe has not solved the problem of its colonial heritage. It has not found compensatory mechanisms to redress the ills of the colonial past. Once that is done integration could become more resilient. Until then, the CEE ideological thrust has the potential to rip the EU apart, making disintegration before reintegration a sure possibility. Integrational resilience can be achieved through this model, but it will be a painful one.

3.) Transatlantic Integration: systemic unification of the White Nation

Transatlantic integration chiefly concerns allaying fears and building trust. And trust is the last thing that the Easterners can hope for, since there is very little that can be hoped for. The Westerners in the EU have failed to produce an ideology strong enough to streamline all the members together in one unified goal. Like on all issues, the EU is divided on the North-South lines leaving much of the Easterners on the side-lines. The northern countries believe that NATO security arrangements should form the backbone of the Transatlantic integration. In the southern camp, things are not so clear-cut. Portugal and Spain are traditionally pegged to the south Atlantic, for historic,

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[2] Erika SOLOMON, Valerie HOPKINS and Alexander VLADKOV: *Inside Germany's abattoirs: the human cost of cheap meat*, The Financial Times online, January 8, 2021. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/7b77ec15-7384-42d0-9da0-76c4b7f0872b (Accessed: 10-01-2020)

cultural and mainly economic reasons. This leaves France, Greece and Italy to decide which way to go. All three are traditionally more oriented towards the Trans-Mediterranean and see their future in taking control of that civilizational lake. It was for a long time a „*geopolitical clearinghouse"* for the West and its importance is incremented by the discovery of large deposits of mineral resources. (ZHUKOV, 2013.).

France is in a generalized panic. Twenty years ago it was a leader in most of the high-value infrastructures like: aeronautics, locomotion, nuclear, space and niche defence technologies. Today this position is nowhere. Since the year 2000 the EU expansion process has literally bankrupted France and its resilience. During Helmut Kohl and Gerhart Schröder, France could maintain a relative parity in power and competitivity. The German reunification had already tipped the balance but it was the accession of the Easterners that was detrimental in all aspects. While German influence and economy prospered in the CEE, France was slowly brought to its knees. The European integration was causing the disintegration of the French standing in the EU and globally. The combination of *'China effect'* and the German *'Mutti'* consolidation in the East is causing panic among French military planners and political elite. This is leading to a certain loss of composure and restraint, in favour of right-wing racial rhetoric and radicalism. France it seems is at the brink of belligerence. (FRASER, 2020.). France seems to be adapting a three tier strategy to propel it back to its former self at the global level: 1) taking control in the Sahel, 2) establishing leadership over the Mediterranean and 3) imposing strategic autonomy in Europe.[3] (STEPHENS, 2021.). The biggest threat to this 3-tier strategy is Turkey, because it is the main challenger in all three theatres. Getting rid of Turkey from all three will increasingly align the Easterners with France: on religion, race and European unity and identity. The Northerners see Turkey as a key component of NATO (TAYLOR, 2020.) while Southerners see incompatibility. But the General Secretary of NATO, Stoltenberg, recently declared: *'And any attempt to divide Europe from North America will not only weaken NATO but also divide Europe. So I welcome European unity, but European unity will not replace transatlantic unity.'* (BUCHARD, 2020.). This transatlantic unity further depends upon strong commitment to Liberal democracy, the EU, NATO, human rights and rule of law. (FRIED, 2020.). Complicating things much further.

Among the Easterners the consensus has not yet matured on this issue, Poland and Hungary have shown their diversion as far as the

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[3] Philip STEPHENS: *Emmanuel Macron's France is a post-imperial power in search of a role*, The Financial Times, JANUARY 7 2021. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/ddc3e8a9-ca7e-47c9-8e1d-d0f405fa520a (Accessed: 08-01-2021)

future of European defence is concerned. Poland has its own logic for wanting to reinforce the presence of NATO in the Baltic and the north-eastern part of Europe. But increasingly Poland is treating its security in terms of bilateral relations with Washington. (FRIED, 2020.). Hungary has its own reasons to think that Europe should have a more autonomous stance when it comes to defence (ORBÁN, 2020.). One way or the other, the region believes that Transatlantic relations have to be based on something else, something else that does not depend just upon every in-coming US president and his or her national security projections. America's security commitments to NATO and Eastern Europe in particular come with a bundle of uncomfortable obligations in their opinion. The simple fact is that Eastern Europe is at the mercy of the United States for its security, and it is not a comfortable situation to be in. Each US president has his own visions for security arrangements in Eastern Europe every four years. The region is in a desperate search for permanency in transatlantic relations, neither NATO nor the EU seem to offer it.

Donald Trump's election offered a possible way out. He had the same integrational priorities for the US that the CEE wants for the European Union. Above this, Trump went public with what they seemed silently in favour of – White Nationalism. Even if they might not be convinced of its virtues they might see a tactical advantage. Since Trump's presidency, one can no longer talk of American nationalism. Trump transformed it overnight into the American constituency of a larger white nationalism. (BLAKE, 2018.). As Aaron Blake from the Washington Post puts it: *'Over the years, nationalism has inextricably been tied to race and ethnicity — the very idea of a defined, national identity in which certain people don't qualify.'* (BLAKE, 2018.). It looks very similar to the „*Right to Discriminate"* model undertaken and operationalized by CEE for the EU integration process. The 2020 Trump election campaign and the aftermath was a critical moment, the governments of Eastern Europe openly supported Trump during and after, refusing to congratulate Biden until last the moment. (MATHERS, 2020.). For many this attitude might look irresponsible and highly risky. The issue was widely publicised in the American right-wing media. (CROWLEY, 2020.). Trump's re-election would have enhanced their plans, but it was inconsequential over the long term. The real strategic asset they were after was the American right-wing voters (BLAKE, 2018.), the real source of permanency in transatlantic relations and commitment. And Poland has a very active diaspora to support the effort, in Congress and outside. The tradition started in the 1900s. (PIENKOS, 2011.). No president can do better than a strong bond between the Polish people and the American people, in maintaining a strong commitment of the US to the defence of Poland. Trump might have lost his second term, but

Poland surely won an American constituency, making transatlantic integration hypothetically more resilient for it and maybe to the EU. All depends upon the unity of the American right and its preference for isolationism when it comes to Europe.

Conclusion

There is a noticeable divide between the West and the East of the European Union. The West might have some economic levers, but slowly and steadily the East has control over all the other levers in Europe. They will get what they want. Otherwise, they will switch on the boilers, until the cooker boils over. But at the same time this might act as a catalyser, a wake-up call for Europe to go back to the model universalism dreamt-up by President Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Delors, a harmonious Europe, that became the envy of the world. Chances are that we will never get back there again anytime soon. France, Italy, Belgium and Holland will reverberate the echoes of Eastern ideologies, the wind is blowing in that direction. In its long journey towards civilization, Europe regularly courted darkness, before becoming more resilient and humane. Today's level of political rhetoric and racial hatred makes Europe of the 1930s all too real. Macron's France seems to have bitten the bait and Merkel is waving goodbye. Western Europe is emptied of true leadership. An ideologically resilient CEE is on the verge of becoming triumphant, pushing for belligerence. It feels that it has a legitimate cause. History tells us that in the very long term the EU will be resilient, thanks to the tensions generated by the Easterners.

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Dömők Csilla[1]

A nemzetiségi kérdés alkotmányos szabályozása Ausztriában az 1848-1867-ig terjedő időszakban

Abstract

It is promising, however it is not easy to present the issue of minorities in the Austrian constitutional regulation between 1848 and 1867. It is tempting, interesting and significant, since the main problem concerning the survival of the state of the multinational Habsburg Monarchy was the national minority issue. The question raised seems difficult, multi-layered and partly contradictory, since there were numerous constitution drafts and law proposals came into effect during the period between the Revolution of 1848 and the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and different starting positions were expressed in them.

The general motivation of the civil-democratic movements was emancipation and political participation. Their claims were drafted based on the constitutional rights. Complying with constitution was in the forefront. The need for the recognition of the non-German and non-Hungarian inhabitants' linguistic and political rights was in close relation with these requirements. In the focus of the Individual demands and programmes were self-governance and the autonomy of politics of the nationalities. At the same time raison d'être of the multi-national Habsburg Monarchy also emerged. The role of the Slavic nationalities in the Monarchy only emerged as a marginal issue.

Keywords: national issue; concept; autonomy; Habsburg monarch; constitutional right;

Sokat ígérő, ugyanakkor nem könnyű vállalkozni arra, hogy a nemzetiségi kérdés alkotmányos szabályozását Ausztriában az 1848-1867-ig terjedő időszakban bemutassuk. Érdekes és jelentős, mert a multinacionális Habsburg Monarchiában pontosan a nemzetiségi kérdés jelentette az állam fennmaradása szempontjából a fő problémát. A kérdésfeltevés nehéznek, sokrétűnek és részben ellentmondásosnak tűnik, mivel a forradalom évétől a kiegyezésig terjedő időszakban számos alkotmánytervezet és törvényjavaslat lépett hatályba, amelyekben egymástól különböző kiindulási pozíciók jutottak kifejezésre.

A polgári-demokratikus mozgalmak általános motivációja az emancipáció és politikai részvétel volt. A követeléseket az alkotmányos jogok alapján fogalmazták meg. Az alkotmány betartása állt az előtérben. Ezekkel a kívánalmakkal szoros összefüggésben jelentkezett a nem német és nem magyar származásúak részéről nyelvi és politikai jogaik

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elismerésének az igénye. Az egyes követelések és programok középpontjában az önkormányzás és nemzetpolitikai autonómia álltak. Ugyanakkor a többnemzetiségű Habsburg Birodalom létjogosultságának a kérdése is felvetődött. Annak a kérdése, hogy milyen szerepet játszhatnak a szlávok a monarchiában, csupán marginálisan merült fel. Főként az utóbbi kérdésfeltevés nem volt új, mégis csupán a forradalom évében nyert új aktualitást. Jan Kollár, szlovák költő egy már 1836/37-ben megjelentetett írásában a *„szláv nemzet különböző törzsei és nyelvjárásai közötti irodalmi kölcsönhatásáról"* beszélt. Kollár ezáltal a szlávok kulturális és nyelvi kooperációjának, egyúttal a politikai együttműködés alapelvét is lefektette.[2]

Bécsben, a birodalmi fő- és székvárosban, a szlávok már 1848 előtt is számos alkalommal tartottak összejöveteleket. Az emberek a bálokon, koncerteken, előadásokon és költői felolvasóesteken találkoztak egymással. A Bécsben és Pesten zajló márciusi események után megnövekedett ezeknek a találkozóknak a gyakorisága. Az egyes szláv nemzetiségek Bécsbe érkezett delegációi nagy politikai hangsúlyt kölcsönöztek a március végén, április elején megtartott gyűléseknek. Április végén Leopoldstadtban a Sperl étteremben megtartott szláv gyűlésen fogalmazták meg azon szándékukat, hogy a Habsburg Birodalomban élő szlávok saját gyűléseiken kívánnak összegyűlni és valamennyi őket érintő kérdést megbeszélni. A kezdő lendületet a horvátországi események adják meg majd 1848 végén. Iván Kukuljević, történész, író és politikus egy újságcikkében valamennyi a monarchiában élő szláv konferenciára történő egybehívásáért száll síkra, mely találkozó célja a közös problémák megbeszélése lenne. Ezt a javaslatot nagy lelkesedéssel fogadták, és május végére összehívták Prágába, Csehország fővárosába a *„szlávok kongresszusát"*.

Ezen a kongresszuson a meghatározó szerepet a cseh politikus és történetíró František Palacký játszotta, aki már április közepe táján is aktívan lépett fel az állampolitikai- ideológiai szemléletváltás miatt. A Frankfurti Parlament meghívására, hogy vegyen részt a Paulskirche tanácskozásain, ezt írta 1848. április 11-én híres és sokat idézett lemondólevelében a cseh képviselők nevében: *„Wahrlich, existierte der österreichische Kaiserstaat nicht schon so längst, man müßte im Interesse Europas, im Interesse der Humanität selbst sich beeilen, ihn zu schaffen".* (Valóban, az osztrák császári állam nem létezne, Európa érdekében, és a humanitás érdekében is igyekeznünk kellene, hogy létrehozzuk.) A részvétel lemondásával együtt járt a Habsburg

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[2] Robert A. KANN: *Das Nationalitätenporblem der Habsburgermonarchie. Geschichte und Ideengehalt der nationalen Bestrebungen vom Vormärz bis zur Auflösung des Reiches im Jahre 1918,* 2. Band, (Graz/Köln 1964); Holm SUNDHAUSEN: *Der Einfluss der Herderschen Ideen auf die Nationsbildung bei den Völkern der Habsburgermonarchie,* München, 1973. 129 ff.

Monarchia fennmaradásának igenlése és az ún. *„ausztroszlávizmus"* programjának megfogalmazása. Palacký meg volt győződve, hogy a kisebb szláv nemzetek a monarchia szárnyai alatt és védelmében mielőbb biztosítani tudják egzisztenciájukat a németek és oroszok részéről fennálló veszéllyel szemben. Természetesen egy olyan monarchiában, amelynek az *„etnikai föderalizmus"* értelmében föderatív szövetségi állammá, nemzetiségi állammá kellene átalakulnia.[3] Ebben a szellemben a program is maradt, amelyet június elején a Prágai Szláv Kongresszus fogadott el. Bár a cseh fővárosban levert pünkösdi felkelés nyomán a szláv kongresszus is feloszlott, nemzetiségi és állampolitikai követeléseik egyes részei azonban átkerültek az 1849-es kremsieri alkotmánytervezet idevágó szövegezésébe.[4]

Az 1848. március 11-én a német és cseh polgárok által a prágai Wenzelsbadban megtartott gyűlésen, a bécsi és pesti forradalmak kitörése előtt már két, ill. négy nappal megfogalmazták liberális-alkotmányos és nemzeti követeléseiket. Ezt a programot saját delegáció adta át Bécsben az udvarnak. Az ebben felsorolt cseh nemzetpolitikai követelésekre Ferdinánd császár az április 8-án kibocsátott *„Cseh Chartával"* reagált. Az új szabályozás lényege:

„Der Böhmische Nationalität hat durch vollkommene Gleichstellung der Böhmischen Sprache mit der Deutschen in allen Zweigen der Staatsverwaltung und des öffentlichen Unterrichts als Grundsatz zu gelten." (A cseh nemzetiséget a cseh nyelv és német nyelv egyenjogúsága alapján az államigazgatás és a közoktatás valamennyi ágában alapelvnek kell tekinteni.) Ebből az egyenlő jogállásból következik, hogy ezentúl a közigazgatásban csak kétnyelvű személyeket lehetett alkalmazni. Ezen kívül bejelentették egy saját központi hivatal létrehozását a csehek számára – morvák és sziléziaiak számára azonban nem. A wenzelsbadi gyűlés követelését, a cseh tartományok Csehország, Morvaország és Szilézia egyesítését, a *„Cseh Charta"* az összehívandó országgyűlés kompetenciájába utalta. Ezzel Ferdinánd messzemenőkig eleget tett a csehek kívánságainak. Elsőként mindenekelőtt a cseh nyelv közigazgatásban és oktatásban elért egyenjogúságát mondták ki. Ennek

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[3] Csilla DÖMŐK: *Közép–Európa és a föderalizmus,* Pécs, 2015. 75–87.
[4] Richard G. PLASCHKA: *Von Palacky bis Pekar,* Wien-Köln, 1955. H. HASELSTEINER: *Das Nationalitätenkonzept des Reichstages von Kremsier und der österreichischen Verfassungen bis 1867.* IN: *Friedenssicherung in Südosteuropa. Föderationsprojekte und Allianzen seit dem Beginn der nationalen Eigenstaatlichkeit,* Hrsg: M. BERNATH, K. NEHRING, Neuried. 1985. 51–56.ff Walter FRIEDRICH: *Österreichische Verfassung und Verwaltungsgeschichte von 1500-1955.* ff, Hrsg. Adam WANDRUSZKA, Wien-Graz-Köln, 152 ff.; Gerald STOURZH: *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten und die österreichische Dezember-Verfassung von 1867,* IN: *Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867. Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen,* Hrsg. Peter BERGER, Wien-München, 1967. 188 f.

ellenére a nyelvi vita a Monarchia végéig, mint azt tudjuk, pont Csehországban nem veszített semmit hevességéből. A charta azonban csupán papírforma maradt: az alig három héttel később elfogadott alkotmány teljes mértékben visszavonta a *„Cseh Charta”* nyelvi rendelkezéseit.[5]

A polgári-liberális követelések érvényesítését megelőzve, az uralkodó egyoldalú jogi eljárásaként 1848. április 25-én megszavazták a *„Pillersdorfi Alkotmányt”*. A Habsburgok osztrák tartományai kell hogy képezzék a felbonthatatlan alkotmányos monarchiát... / *„… eine untrennbare konstititionelle Monarchie…”* / - 1. paragrafus -, relatíve korlátozott tartományi autonómiával rendelkezve. A nemzetiségek számára az alkotmány 4. paragrafusa volt releváns: *„Allen Volkstämmen ist die Unverletzlichkeit ihrer Nationalität und Sprache gewährleistet”*. (Valamennyi nemzet számára garantáljuk nemzetiségük és nyelvük sérthetetlenségét.) Ebben az összefüggésben ki kell emelni, hogy a nem német nemzetiségűek számára már az első elemzésül szolgáló osztrák alkotmányban sem csak nyelvi jogokat biztosítanak, hanem azt is rögzítették benne, hogy őket explicite a sértetlenség és ezáltal *„nemzetiségük”* védelme is megillette. Bármit is szándékozott ezzel a törvényhozó kifejezni, le kell szögeznünk, hogy a nemzetiségi törvényhozás a monarchia jelentős részében kezdettől fogva meghaladta a nyelv védelmének kérdését. A *„Pillersdorfi Alkotmány”* sem kerülhette el sorsát, hasonlóan a *„Cseh Chartához”* soha nem lépett hatályba.

A bécsi májusi zavargásokat követően és az úgynevezett *„1848. május 15-i „Sturmpetition”* után Ferdinánd császár úgy látta, hogy kénytelen felhatalmazni a már kihirdetett birodalmi gyűlést az alkotmány megvitatására. Az országgyűlésben folyó alkotmányvita alapjául a *„pillersdorfi tervezet”* szolgált. Ezzel a parlamentet *„Konstituierenden Reichstag”* (alkotmányozó országgyűléssé) minősítették. 1848. július 8-án is ez a birodalmi gyűlés ült össze és már július 31-én kinevezték az alkotmánybizottságot, *„Verassungsauschuß”*. Az újabb bécsi zavargások miatt az alkotmányozó nemzetgyűlést Kremsierbe, az olmütz-i érsek nyári rezidenciájába helyezték. Bizonyára nem volt könnyű feladat a képviselők számára egy teherbíró alkotmánytervezet kidolgozása. Annál is inkább, mivel a birodalmi gyűlés több szempontból is heterogén összetétele miatt – nemzeti, vallási, gazdasági, szociális és kulturális tekintetben is igen tarka kép alakult ki – igen nehéznek, ha nem kétségesnek tűnt egy egységes, mindenekelőtt valamennyi csoport által

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[5] Walter FRIEDRICH: *Österreichische Verfassung und Verwaltungsgeschichte von 1500-1955.* ff, Hrsg. Adam WANDRUSZKA, Wien-Graz-Köln, 152ff.; Gerald STOURZH: *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten und die österreichische Dezember-Verfassung von 1867,* IN: *Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867. Vorgeschichte und Wirkungen,* Hrsg. Peter BERGER, Wien-München, 1967. 188 f.

jóváhagyott javaslat kidolgozása. További hátrányt jelentett, hogy az ellentétes kiindulási pozíciókat is figyelembe kellett venni: egyrészt a történelmi jogot, másrészt a nemzeti követeléseket és természetjogi megfontolásokat is. Az egyik oldal a centralizmust tűzte zászlajára, míg a másik oldal a föderalizmust, annak számos formájában: az örökös tartományi föderalizmustól az etnikai föderalizmus koncepciójáig, mely felfogás tudatosan el akart térni a történelmi tartományi határoktól. Mindezen nehézségek ellenére és a néha egymástól erősen eltérő nézetek dacára megszületett egy kompromisszum, egy a föderatív megoldás értelmében létrejött megegyezés. Ezt a konszenzusos eredményt, amely tulajdonképpen a német-morva képviselő Kajetan Mayer elképzeléseinek köszönhető, bizonyára a Ferenc József trónfosztása után újjáéledő abszolutizmus egyre inkább érezhető nyomása is elősegítette.

A megadott tematika szempontjából három törvényrészlet jelentős. A néptörzsek és valamennyi, a tartományokban használt nyelv egyenjogúságát a kremsieri alkotmánytervezet 21. paragrafusában, a körzetek létrehozását a többnemzetiségű tartományokban a 3. paragrafusban és végül a tartományi kamarák összetételét és kompetenciáját a 99. paragrafusában szabályozták. A 21. paragrafus leírja:

„Alle Volksstämme des Reiches sind gleichberechtigt. Jeder Volksstamm hat ein unverletztliches Recht auf Wahrung und Pflege seiner Nationalität überhaupt und seiner Sprache insbesondere. Die Gleichberechtigung aller landesüblichen Sprachen in Schule, Amt und öffentlichem Leben wird vom Staate gewährleistet." (A birodalom valamennyi néptörzse egyenjogú. Minden egyes néptörzsnek sérthetetlen joga nemzetiségének megőrzése és ápolása, különös tekintettel annak nyelvére. Az állam garantálja a tartományban használatos valamennyi nyelv egyenjogúságát az iskolákban, a hivatali – és közéletben.)

A kremsieri tervezet idevágó rendelkezései kapcsán meg kell említeni, hogy a nemzetiségi kérdés törvényes szabályozásánál nem pusztán egy nyelvi törvényről volt szó, hanem arról, hogy a képviselők a nemzetiségeket tudatosan bevették a törvény szövegébe. És ezt a törvényben körülírt, iskolában, hivatalban és a közéletben biztosított egyenjogúságot az államnak ennélfogva garantálnia kellett. A 3. paragrafusban körzetek létrehozását rögzítik:

„Galizien und Lombardien samt Karakau wird in zehn, Böhmen in neun, Mähren in vier, Österreich unter der Enns in drei, Tirol samt Voralberg in drei (Deutschtirol, Welshtirol und Voralberg), Steiermark in zwei Kreise geteilt. Die Abgrenzung dieser Kreise wird mit möglichster Rücksicht auf Nationalität durch ein Reichgesetz festgestellt. Ein jedes der übrigen Reichsländer bildet ein Kreis." (Galíciát és Lodomériát Krakkóval együtt 10, Csehországot 9, Moráviát

4, az Enns alatti Ausztriát 3, Tirolt és Voralberget 3 (Deutschtirol, Welschtirol és Voralberg), Steierországot pedig 2 körzetre osztották. E körzetek kijelölését egy birodalmi törvényben rögzítik a nemzetiségek messzemenő figyelembevételével. A fennmaradó birodalmi tartományok mindegyike egy-egy körzetet képez.)

És végül a következőket olvashatjuk a tartományi kamarák intézményére vonatkozóan a paragrafusban, amelyek a kremsieri tervezetben a föderatív nézetek erős és konstitutív elemét hangsúlyozták:

„Die Länderkammer besteht:

- aus je sechs Abgeordneten jedes einzelnen Reichslandes, welche durch die Landtage gewählt werden;

- aus je einem durch den Kreistag zu wählenden Abgeordneten jedes Kreises der Länder, welche aus zwei oder mehreren Kreisen bestehen.”

(A tartományi kamarák összetétele:

- minden egyes birodalmi tartományból 6-6 képviselő, akiket a tartományi

parlament választ meg;

- azon tartományok körzetgyűlése által megválasztott egy-egy képviselőjéből, amelyek két vagy több körzetből állnak.)

Azzal a céllal, hogy az alkotmányos határozatok a törvénykezési-joghatósági szférában is érvényre jussanak és kifejtsék hatásukat, a kremsieri tervezet előirányozta egy birodalmi bíróság létrehozását is. Az államhatalmi ágak szétválasztása érdekében be kellett építeni egy további garanciát, nem utolsósorban a nemzet- és nyelvpolitikai szabályozások számára is.

Az 1848-as kremsieri tervezet – történészek és alkotmányjogászok által képviselt – pozitív megítélésében egyfajta nézetazonosság figyelhető meg. A véleményalkotás kritériumainak gerincét az alábbi tényezők adták: a megnyilatkozások kiegyensúlyozottsága, az önként vállalt kompromisszum jelentősége és a gyakran emlegetett *„utolsó esély”* Ausztria számára. Hogy mekkora jelentőséget tulajdonítottak az alkotmánytervezetnek, jól példázza Friedrich Walter véleménye: *„Der kremsierer Entwurf ist das einzige große politische Denkmal des gemeinsamen Willens zum Staate, welches im kaiserlichen Österreich die Völker durch ihre Vertreter geschaffen haben”*. (A kremsieri tervezet az állam felé irányuló közös akarat politikia emlékműve, melyet a császári Ausztriában élő népek hoztak létre képviselőiken keresztül)

Joggal hivatkoznak a nemzetiségi kérdés – az 1867. évi decemberi alkotmány révén létrejött – törvényi szabályozásával kapcsolatban a kremsieri elképzelések szerepére. Mindazonáltal egy kicsit viszonylagossá kell tennünk a tervezet megítélését: ugyanis a kremsieri szabályozás fogyatékosságaként értékelik azt, hogy az 1849 eleji Habsburg Monarchiában kialakult helyzet miatt a magyar területeket, a

magyar korona teljes birodalmát nem vették figyelembe. És egy második *„ellenvetés”*: A birodalmi gyűlés alkotmánybizottsága 1849. március 4-én befejezte munkáját. Ugyanezen a napon a császár kézzel írott levelével feloszlatták az országgyűlést, mivel az nem teljesítette az uralkodó elvárásait. És március 7-én, amikor a képviselők Kremsierben további tanácskozáson akartak összejönni, a birodalmi gyűlés termeinek bejáratait katonai erők zárták le. Így a kremsieri koncepció a nemzetiségi és nyelvi kérdés átfogó szabályozásával csupán tervezet maradt.[6]

A kremsieri birodalmi gyűlés feloszlatásának előkészületei és az új alkotmány kibocsátására tett kezdeményezések már 1849 elején megkezdődtek. Az alkotmányos-liberális törekvésekkel szembeni gyanakvásokat nem utolsó sorban a kremsieri tervezet alapelveinek katalógusában szereplő, Ferenc József és az udvari körök számára néha radikálisnak tűnő megnyilatkoztatások is táplálták. Többek között ezt olvashatjuk az alapjogok jegyzékében: *„Alle Staatsgewalten haben ihren Ursprung im Volk”*. (Az állami hatalom a népből ered.) Az alkotmányos-államjogi irányváltást a magyarországi politikai sikerek is nagyban segítették.

Az ún, *„oktrojált alkotmányt”* a birodalmi gyűlés 1849. március 4-i feloszlatásának bejelentésével egy időben tették közre. A 2. paragrafusban a magyar tartományokat beleértve megalkották a *„ …. Die freie, selbständige, unteilbare und unauflösliche konstitutionelle Österreichische Erbmonarchie”* (szabad, önálló, egységes és felbonthatatlan osztrák örökös monarchiát). A nemzetiségek jogállását tekintve az 5. paragrafusban a kremsieri szövegezés pusztán szintaktikai változtatással olvasható:

„Alle Volksstämme sind gleichberechtigt und jeder Volksstamm hat ein unverletzliches Recht auf Wahrung und Pflege seiner Nationalität und Sprache”. (Valamennyi néptörzs egyenrangú és mindegyik néptörzsnek sérthetetlen joga nemzetiségének és nyelvének megőrzése és gyakorlása.)[7]

Azonban ez az álalkotmányosság, amely messzemenőkig tekintettel volt nemzetiség jogaira, sem tartott sokáig. Az 1850. decemberében a birodalmi tanács elnökévé kinevezett Karl Kübeck báró megnövekedett befolyásának volt köszönhető, hogy az 1851. december 31-i ún. *„szilveszteri pátenssel”* az 1849-es márciusi alkotmányt hatályon kívül helyezték.

A *„koronatartományok és az osztrák császári állam intézményei számára előírt alapelvekkel”* – *„Mit den Grundsätzen für organische Einrichtungen in den Kronländern des österreichischen Kaiserstaates”* – egy leplezetlenül abszolutista, csak az uralkodó korlátlan hatalmán

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[6] Felix ERMACORA: *Österreichischer Föderalismus*. Wien, 1976. 29 ff.
[7] STOURZH: *Gleichberechtigung*, 194f.; Joseph REDLICH: *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem,* 2. kötet, Leizig, 1920/26 1. kötet, 392 f.

alapuló uralkodási forma nyert létjogosultságot. Az alkotmány alapelvét az uralkodó legfőbb autoritása képezte. Ezzel párhuzamosan megfigyelhető az egyes tartományok autonómiájának visszaszorítása és kizárása.

Ez az alapelvek 1. pontjában is kifejezésre jut:

„1. Die unter den alten historischen oder neuen Titeln mit dem österreichischen Kaiserstaat vereinigten Länder bilden die untrennbaren Bestandteile der österreichischen kaiserlichen Erbmonarchie.” (A régi történelmi és új jogcímen osztrák császárállammal egyesült tartományok képezik az Osztrák Császári Monarchia elszakíthatatlan alkotórészeit.)

Az Alexander Freiherr von Bach belügyminiszter nevéhez kapcsolódó közigazgatási rendszer az új alkotmány szempontjából az abszolutizmus vasfűzőjét jelentette. Nem volt még egy olyan időszak, amelyben az alkotmány- és közigazgatási jog szoros összefonódása világosabban kifejezésre jutott volna, mint az 1851-1860 közötti periódus. Változást ebben a rendszerben csak az 1859-es katonai vereségek, a folyamatos pénzügyi nehézségek és az ezáltal kiváltott belső reformokat sürgető követelések hoztak.[8]

Az *„alkotmánykísérletek”* fő motivációja a 60-as évek első felében az a törekvés volt, hogy az összállamiság eszméjét és az uralkodó erős pozícióját a föderalizmus és tartományi autonómia számára tett valamennyi engedmény ellenére illetve az alkotmányosság javára megmentsék. Ezen kísérletek mögött annak a szándéka állt, mely szerint a diktatórikus államot konszolidálni és a Habsburg nagyhatalom belső alapjait stabilizálni kell. Összességében tekintve azonban mindhárom kezdeményezést, az 1860-as októberi diplomát, az 1861-és februári pátenst és végül az 1865. évi februári pátenst felfüggesztő pátenst egyaránt kudarcnak minősíthetjük. Bármennyire különfélék voltak is az egyes megoldási kísérletek mindenkori előzményei, főként az egyes népességcsoportok követelései, végül a magyar kérdés volt az, amely hosszútávon valamennyi megoldási lehetőség tartóssága szempontjából fokmérőnek bizonyult.

A magyar ókonzervatívok és a cseh feudális nemesség együttműködésének gyümölcse az 1860. október 20-án kiadott *„októberi diploma”* volt. Ennek II. és III. cikkelyében a központi parlament és az alapvetően egységként felfogott Habsburg Monarchia tartománygyűlései közötti kompetencia-megoszlásról a következőket olvashatjuk:

„II. Es sollen alle Gegenstände der Gesetzgebung, welche sich auf Rechte, Pflichten und Interessen beziehen, die allen unseren Königreichen und Ländern gemeinschaftlich sind, …. In Zukunft in und

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[8] Fritz FELLNER: *Das „Februarpatent” von 1861. Entstehung und Bedeutung,* IN: *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung.* 1955.

mit dem Reichsrate verhandelt und unter seiner Mitwirkung verfassungsmäßig erledigt werden …" (A törvényhozás valamennyi tárgyát, amelyek a jogokra, kötelezettségekre és érdekekre vonatkoznak, amelyek a királyságban és az összes tartományban közösek, … a jövőben a birodalmi gyűlésben és a birodalmi gyűléssel kell megtárgyalni és ez ügyben annak közreműködésével az alkotmány szerint kell eljárni…)

„III. Alle anderen Gegenstände der Gesetzgebung, welche in den vorhergehenden Punkten nicht enthalten sind, werden in und mit den betreffenden Landtagen … verfassungsmäßig erledigt werden." (A törvényhozás minden más tárgyában, amelyeket az előző pontok nem tartalmaznak, az illetékes tartománygyűlésekben és tartománygyűlésekkel kell az alkotmánynak megfelelően eljárni.)

A konzervatív-feudális föderalizmus koncepciója, a történelmi tartományi egységek egyértelmű helyzetével, csak rövid távú átmeneti megoldásnak bizonyult. Nem sokkal tartósabb volt a néhány hónappal később, az októberi diploma konkretizálásaként 1861. február 26-án kibocsátott inkább centralistának nevezhető *„februári pátens"* sem. Az Anton Ritter von Schmerling irányításával kidolgozott alkotmány-dokumentum a maga bürokratikus centralizmusával és látszólag föderalista elemeivel a 11. paragrafusban a birodalmi gyűlést hatalmazta fel általános kompetenciával, amelynek az ún. *„szűkebb birodalmi tanácsban"* kell egyesítenie az osztrák tartományokat:

„Zu diesem engeren Reichsrate gehören demnach … alle Gegenstände der Gesetzgebung, welche nicht ausdrücklich durch die Landesordnungen den einzelnen im engeren Reichsrate vertretenen Landtagen vorbehalten sind." (Ehhez a szűkebb birodalmi tanácshoz tartozik ezek szerint … a törvénykezés valamennyi tárgya, amely a tartományi rend szerint nem kifejezetten az egyes, a szűkebb birodalmi gyűlésben képviseltetett tartománygyűlések számára van fenntartva.)

Az 1865. szeptember 20-i, a februári pátenst felfüggesztő pátenssel gróf Richárd Belcredi végül kísérletet tett arra, hogy a schmerlingi centralizmustól elfordulva újból az októberi diploma inkább föderatív elképzeléseihez közeledjen, és hogy mindenekelőtt elérjen egy igen fontosnak tűnő kiegyezést Magyarországgal. Az uralkodó kiindulási pozíciója és elvárásai egyértelműen kiderülnek a felfüggesztő pátensből:

„Die Machtstellung der Monarchie durch eine gemeinsame Behandlung der höchsten Staatsaufgaben zu wahren, und die Einheit des Reiches in der Beratung der Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Bastandteile und ihrer geschichtlichen Rechtsentwicklung gesichert zu wissen – dies ist der Grundgedanke, welcher in Meinem Diplom vom 20. Oktober 1860 einen Ausdruck fand, und Mich zum Wohle Meiner treuen Untertanen fortan leiten wird." (A monarchia hatalmi helyzetének a megőrzése a legfőbb állami feladatok közös megtárgyalásával, és a birodalom helyzetének megtartása, tekintettel alkotórészeinek

sokféleségére és történelmi jogfejlődésére – ez az alapeszme, amely az 1860. október 20-án kiadott manifesztumomban kifejezésre került, és amely engem hű alattvalóim javát szolgálva mindig is vezérelni fog.)[9]

Azonban ez a megoldási kezdeményezés is átmenetinek bizonyult. Az összállamiság eszméjének, az államügyek közös intézésének, a föderatív elemek verbális deklarációjának nem sikerült érvényre jutniuk a magyar liberálisok tartós ellenállásával, dualista megoldási elképzelésükkel szemben. A 60-as évek elején az *„alkotmány-kísérletek”* bukására több okot hoztak fel. Ezek közül néhány demonstratív példa:

Elsőként meg kell említenünk a váltakozó jelenlétet és távolmaradást az egész állam szempontjából illetékes *„kibővített”* és az osztrák tartományok számára kompetens *„szűkebb birodalmi gyűlésben”*. A magyarok, a horvátok és az olaszok nem jelentek meg a parlamentben. 1863-ban az erdélyiek ugyan küldtek képviselőket az országgyűlésbe, ezzel szemben azonban ugyanebben az évben a csehek és lengyelek kivonulására került sor. Ezt a csehek, akik korábban távol maradtak az ausztroszlávizmustól, nem könnyű szívvel tették. Palacký veje, Frantisek Ladislav Rieger így fogalmazott még a *„szűkebb birodalmi országgyűlésben”* a csehek hozzáállásáról:

„… es sei das Interesse der zwischen dem russischen und germanischen Völkerkoloss 'vagierenden' kleineren Völkerschaften, … im österreichischen Staate zu bleiben, um sich in diesem Staate und mittels dieses Staates zu schützen und ihre Nationalität zu erhalten.” (Az orosz és germán népkolosszus között 'kóborló' kisebb népek érdeke, hogy … az osztrák államban maradjanak, és hogy ebben az államban és ennek az államnak a segítségével védjék meg magukat és tartsák meg nemzetiségüket.)[10]

Továbbá szó kell, hogy essék a minden erőfeszítés ellenére mindig is fennálló pénzügyi és költségvetési nehézségekről; a külpolitikai kudarcokról, különösképpen a német kérdésben, főként a Habsburg állam és Poroszország között kiéleződött feszültségek kapcsán.

A bizonytalanság és gyengeség jele volt többek között a különböző alkotmány-koncepciókban kifejezésre jutott centralizmus, föderalizmus és a szemérmesen rejtett dualista megoldási kezdeményezések közötti ingadozás is. Az 1865 óta egyre világosabban megmutatkozó kiegyezés Magyarországgal. A legerőteljesebb elemnek a dualizmus és a magyarok államjogi elképzeléseinek messzemenő figyelembevétele mutatkozott. A nem magyarok és nem német nemzetiségűek helyzete ehhez viszonyítva halaszthatónak bizonyult.

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[9] STOURZH: *Gleichberechtigung,* 198–212.; BERNATZIK: *Verfassungsgesetze,* 426 ff.

[10] .Idézet Frantisek PALACKY: *„Politisches Vermächtnis” Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas,* Hrsg: Mathias BERNATH und Felix SCHROEDER, 3. kötet München, 1979. 383 f.

Mindez ahhoz vezetett, hogy az uralkodó, akit a poroszok elleni vereség igen súlyosan érintett, és a magyar országgyűlés között zajló nehéz és tartós tárgyalások eredményeként 1867-ben létrejött a *„osztrák-magyar kiegyezés"*. Győzött a dualizmus, a kiegyezés elismerte Magyarország messzemenő önállóságát. A kiegyezést azonban a *„többi királyságban és tartományban"* is, *„Ciszlajtániában"* és *„Ausztriában"* is el kellett fogadni és egy majdan kibocsátandó alkotmány közjogi formáit is át kellett venni.

A decemberi alkotmány formális megítélését illetően általánosan elmondható, hogy az 1867. december 21-én közzétett öt alkotmánytörvényben sokrétű, részint ellentmondásos törvényhozói kodifikációról van szó. Elsőként említsük meg a magyar kiegyezési törvény szövegezésének differenciáit, amelyek a későbbiekben újfent politikai összetűzésekhez vezettek. Ezen értekezés zárásaként vizsgáljuk azokat a rendelkezéseket, amelyek a nemzetiségeket érintették és a kettős monarchia végéig a birodalom Lajtán túli területe számára érvényben maradtak. A nemzetiségek és a nyelv jövőbeni helyzete szempontjából az *„Staatsgrungesetz über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger"* (az Állampolgárok általános jogairól szóló alaptörvény) XIX. cikkelye a mérvadó. A törvénypasszus jelentősége miatt következzen a teljes idézet:

„Alle Volsstämme des Staates sind gleichberechtigt, und jeder Volksstamm hat ein unverletzliches Recht auf Wahrung und Pflege seiner Nationalitat und Sprache.

Dei Gleichberechtigung aller landesüblichen Sprachen in Schule, Amt und öffentlichem Leben wird vom Staate anerkannt.

In den Ländern, in welchen mehrere Volksstämme wohnen, sollen die öffentlichen Unterrichtsanstalten derart eingerichtet sein, dass ohne Anwendung eines Zwanges zur Erlernung einer zweiten Landessprache jeder dieser Volksstämme der erforderlichen Mittel zur Ausbildung in seiner Sprache erhält."

(Az állam valamennyi néptörzse egyenrangú, és minden egyes néptörzsnek sérthetetlen joga van nemzetiségének és nyelvének megőrzésére és annak gyakorlására.

A tartományokban beszélt nyelvek egyenrangúságát az állam elismeri az iskolákban, hivatalokban és a közéletben.

Azokban a tartományokban, ahol több néptörzs él, az oktatási intézményeket úgy kell kialakítani, hogy ezen néptörzsek mindegyike megkapja a saját nyelvén folyó képzéshez szükséges eszközöket, anélkül hogy egy második tartományi nyelv elsajátítására kényszerítenék.)[11]

A szöveg értelmezése során feltűnik, hogy a XIX. cikkely első bekezdése az *„oktrojált márciusi alkotmányt"* szó szerinti átvette, és

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[11] WALTER: *Österreichische Verfassung – und Verwaltungsgeschichte*, 219–225 ff.

ezáltal az 1849-es kremsieri tervezetet is. A szövegezés átvétele a birodalmi gyűlés alkotmányügyi bizottsága jegyzőkönyvezőjének, a német-morva ügyvédnek Dr. Eduárd Sturmnak köszönhető. A második bekezdés a kremsieri tervezet szövegének szó szerinti idézése, amit a szlovén képviselő és laibachi ügyvéd, Dr. Lovro Toman javasolt.

A harmadik bekezdés tartalma, amely kizárja egy esetleges második tartományi nyelv elsajátításának a kényszerét a többnyelvű tartományokban, volt annak előfeltétele, hogy a német-cseh és német-morva képviselők a XIX. cikkelyt megszavazzák. Ez a posztulátum az ún. *„kényszer-nyelvi törvény”* ellen irányult: 1866. január 18-án szankcionáltak egy törvényt a Belcredi által vezetett minisztériumban, amely Csehországban a német és a cseh nyelv kötelező oktatását valamennyi középiskolában bevezette. Mint ismert, Csehországban a nyelvi kérdés még bizonyára sokáig az összeütközések tárgyát képezte. A decemberi alkotmány kibocsátását követő években fellángolt a XIX. cikkely mindkét – harmadik, ill. második - bekezdésében használt kifejezések, *„Landessprache”* és a *„landesübliche Sprache”* körüli vita. A csehek számára mindkét nyelv – a cseh és a német is – egész Csehországban *„landesübliche Sprache”* (a tartományban ill. országban használatos, beszélt nyelv) volt. A németek ezzel szemben ezt csak a körzetekre akarták vonatkoztatni. A terminológiai különbségre utalva azt követelik, hogy a második bekezdésben kimondott egyenrangúság Csehország tisztán német területeire ne vonatkozzon. Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia fennállásának utolsó fél évszázadában tehát ezekkel és más lényeges kérdésekkel kellett foglalkoznia az alkotmányjogi bíróságnak a jogállamiság értelmében a *„birodalmi bíróság beiktatásáról szóló alaptörvény”* I. és III. cikkelye szerint - nach I und II Artikel des *„Staatsgrundgesetzes über die Einsetzung der Reichgerichtes”.* Ennek a bíróságnak a felállítását is azon elképzelések alapján tervezték, amelyeket a képviselők már kereken 20 évvel ezelőtt Kremsierben kinyilatkoztattak.

Így az 1849-es kremsieri alkotmány rendelkezései és az 1867-es decemberi alkotmány rendelkezései között eltelt időszak egyértelműen és világosan egy ívet képez.

A nemzetiségek és nyelveik egyenrangúságáról szóló rendeleteket átvették, mindazonáltal még egyszer hangsúlyozni kell, hogy itt nem csak tisztán nyelvjogi szabályozásról volt szó. Átvették ugyanakkor a birodalmi bíróság intézményét is, melynek bírói gyakorlatát az 1872-ben létrehozott közigazgatási bíróság idevágó jogi határozatával még kiegészítettek.

Ezzel szemben a nemzetpolitikai szempontok szerint kialakított körzetek szintén alig bukkannak fel a decemberi alkotmányban, hasonlóan a tartományi kamarákhoz, mint a törvényhozás második grémiumai. Azt, hogy a létrejött megoldással a kiegyezés után nem

minden nemzet értett egyet, alátámasztják František Palacký 1872-ben közzétett aggályai:

„Ich lasse nun leider auch selbst die Hoffnung auf eine dauernde Erhaltung des österreichischen Staates fahren, … weil den Deutschen und Magyaren gestattet wurde, sich der Herrschaft zu bemächtigen und in der Monarchie einen einseitigen Rassendespotismus zu begründen" (Sajnos számomra is szertefoszlott az osztrák állam tartós fennmaradásának reménye, … mert a németeknek és a magyaroknak lehetővé tették, hogy birtokolják a hatalmat és egyoldalú faji despotizmust alapozzanak meg a monarchiában.)[12]

És a cseh politikus félelme – a decemberi alkotmány valamennyi pozitív rendelkezései ellenére – csaknem 50 évvel a megírását követően, az elvesztett háború nyomására – a nemzetpolitikai megoldás tartósságát tekintve beigazolódott. Az önrendelkezés, a nemzeti értelemben vett önrendelkezés 1918/19-ben a kelet-európai megújulás legjelentősebb mozgatórugójának bizonyult, mindenképp jelentősebbnek, mint a jogállami, részben föderatív és nemzetek fölötti összefogás gondolata és koncepciója.

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[12] F. PALACKY: *„Politisches Vermächtnis",* 392. f.

Yassine Ismaili[1]

The Effects of Online Political Incivility on the Audience Perceptions: A Comparative Approach

Abstract

Incivility in current US politics has become a hot topic of debate. There are those in society on any point of the spectrum who voice their opinions. This study investigates the perceptions and influences that digitalized political incivility has on US citizens. This research uses quantitative methods by presenting a questionnaire survey. The questions are tailored to examine differences in perceptions of various issues surrounding political incivility. Such areas include satisfaction levels with the current situation; content censorship issues; social networking sites responsibility of spreading incivility; and the social impact of incivility. The findings show that gender and age are vital determinants in perceptions of the survey respondents. It also finds that men and women are engaged differently in politics and view incivility online differently. The results also show that young people tend to be more tolerant of political incivility than the older population.
Keywords: Incivility; Social Networking Sites; Lawmakers; Political Discourse; Perceptions;

> *„Language is the true barrier which separates man from beast"*
> Max Müller Popular Science Magazine 1875

1. *Introduction*

Political speech in 20th century America has become very divisive. Research shows that discord and dissension are not new in American political life. Acrimony has survived since the first pilgrims made their way ashore centuries ago. Since the 2017 inauguration of President Donald Trump political conflict has been ongoing between the president and other lawmakers. As a result of the increasing rancor, the language used by the political parties has become more disrespectful, uncivil, spiteful and toxic. Polarization and deterioration in political spheres can be seen daily on tv, radio, social media, in Congress and in the White House. It pervades every aspect of life. To get a more thorough picture one only need glimpse into the Social Networking Sites (SNS) accounts

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of many lawmakers. The climate is indeed toxic. This is nothing new in US politics.

There are some well-known instances that can be cited. John Adams once called Alexander Hamilton „*the bastard brat of a Scotch peddler*" referring to Hamilton's questionable parentage (VANDENBERG, 1921.). Adams himself did not escape slanderous accusations in the 1800 Presidential Election being called by his opponent Thomas Jefferson „*a blind, bald, crippled, toothless man who is a hideous hermaphroditic characte*" (DINNER, n.d.). The October 22, 1944 issue of *Life Magazine* recounts aspects of Andrew Jackson's presidential re-election campaign in 1828 where opposition opponents labeled his mother as a „*prostitute*" of the British also claiming that she married a „*MULATTO MAN*" and Jackson was the progeny of that mixed-race marriage („*LIFE,*" 1944.). In the 1864 Presidential campaign democrats accused Abraham Lincon of miscegenation and was „*hellbent on mongrelizing the white race*" (KEYES, 2021.). More recently, President Barack Obama was charged with being a Muslim bent on imposing shariah law on the country. In a 2010 Newsweek poll the majority republican respondents reported that they felt this way about Obama (BETZ, 2010.). Campaign smears in American politicking are endless. Americans have acclimated themselves to the fact that there will be attacks, vilification, describing your opponents negatively, and slanders in political campaigns. The two most recent presidential elections in 2016 and 2020 illustrate this point perfectly.

Incivility in current politics has generated substantial interest for scholars, in this day and age there is added attention to incivility observed on social media platforms. Polls, that reflect views from 2010 through 2019, show that most Americans believe that incivility is a major problem. Sixty-three percent of respondents felt that social media, politics and media played a major role in the erosion of civility (SHANDWICK, 2019.). One of the foremost problems in scholarship is the dynamic state of incivility and the varying claims by researchers. One researcher feels that political incivility online is an urgent problem that must be urgently dealt with otherwise it might cause an eventual decline of democracy (KLUCK & KRÄMER, 2020.). Just as quickly you will find other scholars who purport that incivility online is merely a „*rhetorical act*" and attempts to curb it would result in „*democratic pluralism*" (ROSSINI, 2019.). This type of research is beyond the scope of this current study. There is, however, a gap in academic research of the actual effects that incivility has on a given audience. This study shows some effects that Americans feel when they experience incivility in their society. There is little debate that online incivility is ubiquitous in the political arena and is difficult to avoid. A majority of Americans believe that this has led to increased violence. This research contributes to the

growing reservoir of study into the effects that political cyber-bullying has.

2. Theoretical Background
2.1. Political incivility through SNS.

Incivility is a concept that is hard to define since what one individual considers uncivil behavior may well be altogether satisfactory to another. There is a wide rift between values that people hold (SCHWARTZ 2011. 38.). Be that as it may, the term is ordinarily utilized more frequently to imply any discourteous or disruptive social behavior that results in physical or mental anguish for the targeted individual(s) involved. It involves displaying discourteous attitudes and disrespect and any kind of offensive and even aggressive or harmful behavior (MARZANO & LIZUT 2019.). *„Civility is a norm which defines the kinds of behavior that people can rightfully expect from others"* (SINOPOLI 1995.). Additionally, civility and incivility can be used as strategic tools for *„seeking dramatic social or political change"* (JAMIESO et al. 2015.). Put differently by Herbst (2010), they (civility and incivility) are employed as strategic tools used to fulfill their users' specific interests, for better or worse.

The relevancy of incivility is recognized only when this strategic tool continues to engage and thrive in political discourse. Though Herbst acknowledges that uncivil debates in current political communication are characterized by racism, sexism, or plain boorishness, she persists in the fact that today's politics has not become dirtier than other historical eras in American political life. She discourages our urge to denounce the boorishness of the American political culture we see today (HERBST 2010.). Instead, Herbst argues that the continuous practice of civility and the tolerance of incivility are keys for creating and promoting a *„culture of argument and debate".* Furthermore, she points out that the major problem for many citizens today is that our psyches are not prepared for discussing contested issues in the current political climate. What the psyche interprets as incivility varies from person to person, making it challenging to come up with a precise definition of what incivility implies or even characterizes. People will act accordingly, civilly or uncivilly, to their own values and disregard persuasion from others in their communications.

Chen (2017) manages to differentiate between disagreement and incivility. According to her, disagreement is not fundamentally troublesome unless it has drifted into incivility which can lead to increasing incivility. It might take the form of an escalation of aggressiveness. Though all Chen argues that incivility must include at least one of three main attributes: 1) vocabulary of provocation or name-

calling; 2) profanity; 3) a broader classification contains prejudices such as homophobia, racial biases, and xenophobia. These prejudices may often slip into hate speech. Properly defining and measuring the term incivility challenges many scholars because there seem to be no universal criteria for measuring it. Making definitions even more difficult, incivility differs from one culture to another, often causing cultural misunderstandings and difficulties across cultures. Impoliteness in one culture may be viewed as totally acceptable by another culture.

Paparacharissi (2004) stated that incivility happens only when individuals speak in derogatory terms regarding racial or other social groups and when individuals challenge the equality or the freedoms of others. Given this, incivility goes beyond impoliteness. It is the implications behind this assertion which has brought about the current political climate. Some scholars go even further, positing the hypothesis that incivility can be detrimental to democracy since insults and anger can destroy the bond between the people and the State. Mutz (2015) argues that incivility can reduce trust in government, decrease corporate morale, and decrease respect for opposing views. Without the confidence of people, it becomes more complicated for leaders to achieve their political aims. For this reason, *„democracy may require withdrawal from civility itself"* (SCHUDSON 1997. 12.). At present, and for purposes of this study, the major problem attached to incivility is its dramatic expansion and infusion into social networking sites (SNS). According to Marzano and Lizut (2019), there is broad agreement that online incivility is an extremely critical issue that is circulating through SNS. Nowadays, incivility has become a general characteristic in many new blogs and influences the political discourse (COE et al., 2014.).

Facebook (FB) and Twitter (TW) have become preferred platforms for many politicians and lawmakers to disseminate information. The ease and user-friendliness of FB and TW are seen as beneficial and advantageous to politicians. As a result, the increasing use of incivility via these platforms can significantly impact particular political outcomes (HMIELOWSKI et al., 2014.). Elmer (2012) has demonstrated how *„micro-blogging sites like TW have become key sites of 'rapid response' to live political real-time events"*. Thus, *„Twitter can be used effectively and strategically by political parties, partisans, and other viewers of the debate, as was observed in the Canadian 2008 election"* (Ibid). In this sense, political leaders view TW as an ideal space to set up the interpersonal communication that they can maintain with their voters (TÚÑEZ and SIXTO 2011.). For example, politicians frequently post uncivil messages to attract constituents' attention with an eye to swaying public opinion in their favor. Burnap and William (2015), states that TW provides a perfect platform for information gathering and social interaction because users who follow their politicians there usually

express themselves more freely. This is due to the sense of feeling anonymous, which can, in turn, diminish inhibitions.

SNS users often repost and retweet the uncivil comments they read on news articles online, rehashing politicians' hostile behaviors (MARZANO & LIZUT 2019.). Politicians′ online demeanor often inspires ordinary citizens drawing in those who are attracted to that particular politician's message. At this point, we can say that SNS have morphed into a cyber-field where thoughts are affirmed, and „*pre-existing values*" are nourished and strengthened (Ibid). Readers of uncivil messages on an SNS judge a post as either offensive or unobjectionable according to their own views and values. Often, the deeper substance of the message itself is only cursorily considered and not given much attention at all (JOHN et al., 2009.). In this sense, the judgment of incivility and its rapid growth is based on ideological views (MILLS 2009.).

2.2. *Impoliteness versus Incivility*

Impoliteness and incivility seem to be two sides of the same coin because they share a common feature and interpretation that involves negative connotations. As such, many people become confused, trying to differentiate between the two concepts. This can be accounted for because they both lead to similar consequences, which is a demonstration of offensive behavior directed toward individuals or groups. For this study, it is necessary to discuss impoliteness to develop a fuller understanding of incivility. Incivility and impoliteness are often viewed as synonymous and are often used interchangeably (COE et al. 2014.; RÖSNER et al. 2016.). Papacharissi (2004) considers them as distinct concepts inasmuch that civility is „*misunderstood when reduced to interpersonal politeness because this definition ignores the democratic merit of robust and heated discussion*".

Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness (1987) is centered on a *Face Threatening Act* (FTA) theory, which is an act that directly or indirectly damages the face (self-esteem) of the hearer or the speaker by behaving in ways contrary to the desires and interests of the other. FTA states that the speaker's intent is not necessarily the main focus of the interaction, but what the hearer perceives as the speaker's intent. Brown and Levinson base their research on Goffman's theory (1967) of face management, where a person's face is classified into two forms: positive and negative. For Brown and Levinson, the positive face is defined as „*the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others*". While the positive face was defined as „*the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others, the negative face is defined as "the basic claim to the territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction – i.e., to freedom of action and*

freedom from imposition". They conclude that the positive face is „*the positive, consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image is appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants"*. In short, the negative face simply means don't step on my toes while the positive face is a desire to be appreciated.

According to Goffman (1967), every interchange between people involves the possibility of a speaker risking insulting the recipient which could end in enmity and aggression. Accordingly, the communicative relationship between the speaker and the addressee can often end up with impoliteness. Brown and Levinson's *Bald on Record Maxim* propose a response to risk exposure in interpersonal interactions. Communication under this strategy should be clear and unambiguous as possible, „*a direct way of saying things"*. As a result of this type of approach to communication, the speaker's message should not leave the hearers with misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or confusion. This maxim is highly employed by US lawmakers in their daily speeches, posts, and tweets on Social Networking Sites. Many politicians leave no ambiguity to what they mean to say. They say exactly what is on their mind. The message content in their communication often reflects an intended high degree of impoliteness. Although Brown and Levinson's theory may seem outdated, its application remains germane in today's political discourse. Accordingly, we propose to test the following hypotheses by assessing five different aspects of incivility:

Hypothesis 1: There will be significant differences in incivility ratings among the five aspects of incivility tested in this study.

Hypothesis 2: Satisfaction and assessment levels of incivility will be rated lower at least by one of the genders.

Hypothesis 3: Censorship of uncivil content on social networks will be approved by both genders and from different age ranges.

Hypothesis 4: Incivility worsens with social networking site coverage.

2.3. Previous Studies

Previous studies have investigated several issues related to incivility. Those studies focused on various aspects of incivility. For instance, Stryker et al. (2016), studied the „*perceptions of the incivility/civility of various categories of speech/behavior;"* and tested the hypothesis of „*whether political incivility is a unidimensional or multidimensional latent construct"* finding it to be multidimensional (STRYKER et al., 2016.). Their study suggests that what might be considered uncivil can vary with the age of the respondent. Younger people can tolerate incivility more than seniors. Kenski et al**.** (2017) examined the public

perception of online incivility by examining the *„types and predictors applied to those perceptions".* The study found that differing types and degrees of incivility, *„more or less distasteful,"* could trigger various responses. Demographics were also important in the study in that they found that women rated incivility higher than male counterparts. They attributed this to different social norms either sex experienced throughout life. According to the study, online incivility can have a very harmful negative impact on the audience. Their findings also show that public perceptions of incivility are unlikely to be consistent. Anderson (2013) studied the effects that online incivility can often have on the audience. Although she sees a potential that the internet can have to enhance public discourse, she disparages the detrimental effect that the internet can have on democracy. Her conclusion is that *„blog comments can polarize online users based on value predispositions utilized as heuristics when processing the blog's information".*

Chen and Lu. (2017), explored the differences in the effects of disagreement, expressed civilly or uncivilly, by reviewing comments made on news websites. According to their findings, incivility functions differently dependent on the severity and controversial nature of the societal issue in question. Their study also shows that pure civil disagreement in an online political discussion is not inherently troubling until it falls into incivility. Their study finds that when faced with incivility and aggressiveness the person will tend to become more politically motivated. They concluded that online incivility is a detriment to democracy. However, they find that forced removal of incivility might not be the quick answer to more civil online communication.

Bratslavsky et al. (2019) focused on the strategic employment of incivility by President Trump through his twitter account. They state that TW is part of the *„infrastructure of incivility"* and imperils democracy by contributing to increasing levels of incivility today. Consequently, they note that mediated political communications, as demonstrated by their case study of Trump's usage of TW, are function-heavy, politically divisive, and outright dangerous. Another study (THEOCHARIS et al., 2020.), investigated the dynamics of political incivility on TW through three levels. It found that uncivil tweets overtime regularly accounts for nearly 18% of all tweets which address lawmakers. Any uptick in uncivil tweets, however, often coincide with controversial public issues and political events.

Political studies have shown that women slightly have higher percentages in voter turnout than men. Studies have shown that women show that levels of engagement in politics is issue related. (GOTHREAU 2020.; The Economist 2019.; WOLAK 2020.). This gap in political engagement is embedded in how women and men perceive their participation in political life. There are many variables that impact

women's attitudes and participation in politics. These include age, race and ethnicity, social class, education level, and ideology (GOTHREAU 2020.). As a consequence, men and women often view politics differently in the US (FRIDKIN & KENNEY 2007.).

The assessment and perceptions researched in this study encompass various aspects that pertain to incivility exposure on SNS. It examines the viewpoints of each gender toward the uncivil language employed through SNS by current US lawmakers during the post-2016 general elections. This study aims to gain insight into public perceptions of political incivility and investigate the degree to which men and women evaluate the five aspects. It will also explore what age distinctions between the two genders might have.

3. Methodology
3.1. Sampling design

The study is based on a survey questionnaire made on Google Forms and posted on two Facebook groups. One group is called *Survey Sharing 2020/2021* and the second group is called *Survey Exchange. Survey Exchange* was created for the task of assisting students in their research goals. *Survey Sharing 2020/2021* provides a platform where researchers can more easily reach people who are interested in participation in the study. Each group has more than 5,000 members from various nationalities. Given that this study focuses only on the US political incivility with the goal of targeting the American audience the survey was open to American citizens exclusively. Out of the 300 members randomly targeted for inclusion in our sample, 118 respondents completed the entire survey. We decided to survey 59 participants from each gender to maintain a numerical balance between the respondents. The age of respondents was categorized into three ranges, 18-29, 30-39, and 40+. All respondents completed the survey questionnaire voluntarily.

3.2. Survey aspects

The survey was based on close-ended questions. Five major aspects were investigated, dealing with the incivility levels employed by current US lawmakers on Social Networking Sites. Those questions ranged from dichotomous questions to rating scale questions.

Satisfaction incivility: Concerning the respondents' satisfaction toward the state of the current political discourse.

Assessment incivility: Assessing the respondents' evaluation of the degree of incivility utilized by lawmakers.

Censoring incivility: Views on the possible censorship of uncivil

content posted on social networking sites.

Social networks' responsibility: Focusing on the responsibility of social networking sites in disseminating incivility via their platforms.

Impact of incivility: Dealing with the potential impact that incivility may have on the social spectrum.

3.3. Data Processing

The study was based on two analytic approaches to identify patterns in our data. First, the data was transferred to excel in order to display the data on graphs. The aim was to compare the different perceptions between the two genders. Second, descriptive statistics were performed by Chi-square to examine the relation between the gender variable and other variables mentioned above in the survey questions section. The authors also examined the relation between the age variable of age and other variables. This comparison aims to explore respondents' attitudes toward lawmakers' online rhetoric and to also investigate age and gender differences in the relative perception of political incivility.

4. Findings
4.1. Satisfaction level

Figure 1. Satisfaction toward civility of the current US lawmakers

The participants demonstrated different viewpoints when we examined their satisfaction levels toward the current political incivility. In particular, we find that male and female perception is highly unfavorable by the majority in those groups; 54% of male and 76% of female respondents showed dissatisfaction in the current political debates. There is a significant disparity between the two genders where 34% of

the males report satisfaction with 14% of respondents show satisfaction. On the neutral scale both genders hover around 10%.

4.2. *Civility Assessment*

Figure 2. Assessment of civility levels

Assessment level of political civility

The bar chart above shows that females were more likely to assess political rhetoric negatively with 69% of females showing a negative assessment compared to 51% of males. On the other hand, 34% of male respondents showed a positive assessment compared to 12% of females. The neutrality rate was closer showing 15% for males and 19% for females.

4.3. *Censorship of uncivil content on SNS*

Figure 3. Views toward incivility censorship on SNS

From the graph above, we observe that both females and males disagree with incivility censorship on social networking sites. 69% of females and 59% of males disagree with censorship of uncivil content on SNS whereas 31% of females and 41% of male respondents agree with the statement that uncivil content should be censored.

4.4. SNS Responsibility for Spreading Incivility

Figure 4. SNS responsibility for spreading incivility

Regarding social networking sites' responsibility in spreading incivility, the clustered bar shows that the vast majority of females and males consider SNS to be responsible for spreading incivil content via their platforms, 81% of females and 75% of males. On the other hand, 25% of female and 19% of male respondents disagree with the statement.

4.5. Incivility Impact

Figure 5: Incivility impact on the social and cultural spectrum

The last question to the respondents is whether incivility has an impact on the social and cultural spectrum. The clustered bar chart shows that the two genders expressed almost complete agreement that lawmakers' incivility can effectively lead to division in the social and cultural spectrum. 80% of females and 73% of males agreed with the statement. 5% of the females and 20% of the males disagreed. 15% of the females and 7% of the males held neutral positions.

4.6. *Age Impact on Incivility Censorship*

*Incivility censorship on SNS * Age Crosstabulation %*			Age			
			18-29	30-39	40+	Total
Incivility censorship on SNS	Disagree	Count	32%	35%	9%	76
		Expected Count	30.3	35.4	10.3	76.0
	Agree	Count	15%	20%	7%	42
		Expected Count	16.7	19.6	5.7	42.0
Total		Count	47%	55%	16%	118
		Expected Count	47.0	55.0	16.0	118.0

The table above reflects the respondents' perceptions of incivlity censorship. The majority of respondents showed their disagreement with incivility censorship. The disagreement of respondents their age range between 18-29 and 30-39 was approximate with 32% and 35% respectively.

5. *Discussion*

This study attempts to contribute to the growing literature on political incivility by investigating five different aspects of incivility issues that a layperson faces while interacting on social network sites. The findings demonstrated that incivility as a phenomenon has prevailed increasingly on social networks by lawmakers. Although research in uncivil discourse seems to have many different aspects this study focuses on the public perceptions of incivility. In investigating the five aspects, (1) satisfaction, (2) assessment, (3) censorship, (4) SNS responsibility, and (5) incivility impact, we expected that there would be some demographic differences in perceptions of political incivility and our study results supported this hypothesis.

We found that there is a significant gender and age disparity in evaluating all the five aspects. We further hypothesized that the satisfaction and assessment rate of political civility would be rated lower

by the two genders, which was supported by the data with females showing more insensitivity to incivility on SNS. The tone of political rhetoric for the majority of respondents (see figure 1) demonstrated dissatisfaction from the majority of both genders. A survey conducted by Pew Research Center (2019), found that the vast majority of Americans say the tone and nature of political debate in the United States have declined in recent years. 85% of US citizens report that political debate in the country has been characterized by negativity and disrespect (DRAKE & KILEY 2019.). According to an Associated Press-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll (2018), an overwhelming majority of Americans, 77%, report their dissatisfaction with the state of politics in the country, including the lawmakers' political tone. In the current political climate, hyper-partisanship has played a pivotal role in escalating the political rhetoric between lawmakers. The more partisan politics is, the nastier and more rancorous the political rhetoric will be (MCLENNAN 2020.). These studies support our findings.

We also hypothesized that censorship of uncivil content on social networks would be viewed as acceptable by at least one of the genders. This was not supported in the data. Females by a 10% spread over their male counterparts reported that SNS should not censor their platforms. A minority of young respondents reported supporting incivility censorship with 15% of respondents ages 18-29 being in favor of censorship. One out of five respondents' age 30-39 also showed supporting censorship. Further studies would be helpful to more adequately assess what impact age has on perceptions of incivility.

The author's interpretation of Figure 3 data is that Americans vigorously defend their constitutional right of freedom of speech maintaining that genuine democracy requires freedom of speech. A 2015 Pew survey titled *Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech: Americans Especially Likely to Embrace Individual Liberties* which encompassed citizens of 38 nations provides corroborating evidence for the data we see in Figure 3 to the extent that the majority of a Americans feel that *„People can say what they want"* and are *„supportive of all forms of expression"*. It also shows that Americans are more tolerant of offensive speech than people in other countries (WIKE & SIMMONS, 2015.).

President Trump signed an executive order on May 28, 2020 in efforts to weaken legal protection that tech companies such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube enjoyed ever since the 1996 passage of *Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. „We're here today to defend free speech from one of the gravest dangers it has faced in American history, frankly"* Trump said from the Oval Office (PETERS & WOOLLEY, 2020.). Trump's words heightened the national debate over censorship. In the same speech Trump added: *„A small handful of*

powerful social media monopolies control the vast portion of all private and public communications in the United States". He also stated that the tech companies have *„unchecked power to censor, restrict, edit, shape, hide, alter a large sphere of human interaction …they have points of view,"* he said. President Trump's statements about the infringement of social media on web-users' freedom of speech are consistent with the perceptions of the participants in our study who opposed censorship from tech companies.

The censorship issue spurred on by Trump reached into corporate boardrooms. Facebook Co-founder Mark Zuckerberg put out a statement opposing the president's executive order *„I just believe strongly that Facebook should not be the arbiter of the truth of everything that people say online"*. Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey responded, *„This does not make us an 'arbiter of truth" … „Our intention is to connect the dots of conflicting statements and show the information in dispute so people can judge for themselves"*.

Although freedom of speech and expression is protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution, irrespective of the means of communication by which free speech is communicated, censoring content either by the government or by big tech companies remains a continuing subject of debate in the US. The author views the sway between the exercise of free speech rights and the efforts to restrict or ban access of certain speech on SNS as problematic. The ongoing controversy over the issue can be seen as a possible contradiction of the constitution itself (BRANNON, 2019.).

Proceeding to the hypothesis that social networking sites are responsible for spreading uncivil discourse through their platforms, we predicted that at least one of the genders would favor this hypothesis and we found that the data strongly affirms this conclusion. Both genders scored at or slightly higher of 75%. According to both genders, social networking sites contribute to spreading incivility online. Our fifth and final hypothesis that political incivility might impact the social spectrum once again the data supported this conclusion. Both genders scored an approval ratio that exceeds 70%. Based on Brown and Levinson's politeness theory in relation to the analysis we have performed, we can conclude that the political discourse employed by lawmakers often violates the code of political impoliteness running over into incivility. When considering their bald on record strategy we find that the direct and effective way of communication with citizens, regardless of the high risk of the lawmaker losing his/her good image has become commonplace. Politicians utilize both negative politeness and positive politeness often interchangeable. Negative politeness involves indirectness and can have the effect of impersonalizing both speaker and hearer. Positive politeness emphasizes the act of

membership of a group, optimism and is interested in the political interaction (Maia ALAVIDZE, 2019.). These negative tactics and strategy often referred to as incivility may be effective but are overwhelmingly shunned by the respondents in our study.

Overall, our findings exhibit that public perceptions of digitalized incivility are not likely to be totally uniform in terms of gender and age. Research scientists cannot presume that all ordinary citizens would perceive incivility in the same manner. A set of context characteristics, genders, ideologies, adherence to social norms and individual characteristics of agreeability and satisfaction might affect particular audiences' reaction to political incivility. Such distinctions would not be confined to perceptions and may apply to interpersonal reactions to incivility (KENSKI et al. 2020.). Our study evinces these results

6. Limitations of the study

Written during the ongoing COVID-19 crisis this study has some limitations. Access to a wide demographic group was inaccessible to the authors. The Facebook groups used for purposes of this study are not necessarily representative of the infinite diversity, variety and complexity in American life. Case in point are the many recognized genders in American society. Our study was limited to the dichotomous definition of male and female. We also realize that more aspects may have been included in the study with emphasis on probing further to provide a more nuanced picture of the issue. This survey does not claim to make broad sweeping conclusions concerning all aspects of political incivility and Social Networks. This survey is but a small foray into this growing field of study. Nevertheless, we claim that our study contributes to the growing body of research that delves into the dynamic forces in play surrounding political incivility online in the new age of social media technologies. Additional scientific research on this subject is required to form a deeper understanding of the role that political digitized incivility presents on perception. Our findings may help spur changes and present broader awareness of the effects of incivility and its implications on a healthy democracy.

7. Conclusion

In today's day and age, the replacement of print media and traditional routes of mass communication with emerging social networking sites and the instantaneous messaging and feedback these platforms provide has presented a monumental sea change in communication. In matter of fact 93% of American adults use the internet with younger Americans not trailing far behind (Pew Research

Center, 2021.). Social Networking sites have become a double-edged sword. They bear the responsibility for providing platforms that make incivility more inevitable and visible. It promotes free speech while at the same time it is increasingly being asked to restrict and or ban it if it is deemed offensive. A Pew poll shows that the majority of respondents believe that it is the responsibility of Social Networking Sites to monitor and remove offensive content (Pew Research Center, 2019.). The debate is ongoing and ever-evolving.

This study provided a descriptive statistical assessment of the current political discourse employed by US lawmakers. A comparative analysis was conducted based on the gender and age of the respondents. This assessment's objective was to ascertain the views and perceptions of both genders toward several issues surrounding the current political climate in the US. The central focus was the frequent and escalating use of incivility by lawmakers via Social Networking Sites. In the survey, we noticed that respondents' views and perceptions corresponded somewhat closely to each other in some of the issues we addressed while in other aspects we found broader consensus. On the whole, we found, irrespective of the gender of the participants and age that there were similarities of many of the issues. We noticed that the lawmakers' use of incivility is regarded as intolerant by majorities of both genders as well as on the question of whether restrictions should be imposed to limit incivility where both majorities rejected censorship. Respondents by a broad majority reported that incivility has a negative influence on society and the culture. We conclude from our findings that lawmakers' employment of incivility in their messaging on SNS has a detrimental impact on both the political and social spectrum. Our findings transcend the hypothesis that incivility can be useful and healthy for democracy. This is another area of research that future studies will help to elucidate.

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Majoros István[1]

Veszélyben a szabadság! A politikai és társadalmi változások hatása a liberális elvekre a 19. század végén, a 20. század elején

Abstract

By the end of the 19th century, liberalism had won in Europe. Fundamental freedoms appeared in the constitutions. However, we also encounter new phenomena in politics and society. The masses appeared in politics and in the economy. Bureaucracy has played a decisive role ewerywhere. What impact have these new phenomena had on politics, in parliament, in the lives of parties? Were they a threat to freedom? The study presents some political thinkers – Gustav Le Bon, Gabriel Tarde, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto – who have tried to answer these questions.

Keywords: liberalism; masses; liberty; competition; egoisme; danger; ethnopsychology; Le Bon; Wundt; Max Weber; Pareto; leader democracy; elite; leader; guided mass;

A 19. század a liberalizmus[2] győzelmét hozta Európában. Az alapvető szabadságjogok szinte valamennyi ország alkotmányába bekerültek. Ebben az eszmerendszerben az egyén meghatározó szerepet kap. A liberálisok szerint az egyén egyszerre egoista és racionális. Az előbbi azt jelenti, hogy az individuumot saját érdekei, a saját előrehaladása, érvényesülése foglalkoztatja. A racionalitással pedig elkerüli, hogy energiái szétforgácsolódjanak, így minimális erőfeszítéssel is maximális eredményt érhet el. Felmerül persze a kérdés, hogy az egoizmus

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vezethet-e zűrzavarhoz a társadalomban?[3] A liberálisok szerint nem, mert a konkurencia elvének az érvényesítésével megteremthető a harmónia, és az érdekek összhangja is megvalósítható. A konkurencia elve nemcsak a gazdaságban érvényesül, hanem a politikában is. S mivel mindenki egoista céljait követi, ez konfliktusokhoz vezet, melyek feloldása csak kompromisszumokkal érhető el. Az egyéni érdekek közti ellentmondások így feloldhatók és egy harmonikus társadalom valósulhat meg. Ez azonban csak akkor érvényesül, ha a szabadság elve és gyakorlata szabadon működik. *„A konkurenciát lerombolni olyan ––, mintha megölnénk az intelligenciát"* – írja ezzel kapcsolatban a francia Frédéric Bastiat.[4]

A liberalizmus ellentmondásai már berobbanása, kibontakozása idején is megjelentek. A francia forradalom során kiderült, hogy egy maroknyi csoport kisajátíthatja a népszuverenitást. A gyakorlatban ez azt jelentette, hogy a jakobinusok a képviselet elvéből despotizmust csináltak, miközben a közösség érdekeire hivatkoztak. Ezért írja Manent, hogy a szabadságjogokra nézve a liberális politikai rendszer halálos veszélyt is jelenthet.[5] A felvilágosodás filozófusainak un. *Eszményi Társadalmában* is fellelhetjük a totalitarizmus kísértését. Saint-Just eszményi köztársaságában büntetést kap az, aki nem a helyes érzelmeket vallja.[6] Ez a szellem tükröződik Fouquier-Tinville, a forradalom közvádlójának mondatában is, amikor egy vádlott előtt azt hangsúlyozta, hogy *„a szabadság ellenségei számára nincs szabadság",*[7] s ez az út minden esetben a guillotine-hoz vezetett.

A 19. század végén aztán úgy tűnt, hogy a politika új jelenségei, mint az állam fokozatos erősödése, a bürokrácia megjelenése és erősödése a politikai, a gazdasági életben, majd a választójog bővülésével a tömegek bekerülése a politikába, veszélyeztetik a liberális értékeket, s a szabadságeszme illúzióvá válik. A politika új jelenségei szükségessé tették a társadalom működésének alaposabb megismerését, hogy

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[3] Az önzés fogalmával elsősorban az angol politikai gondolkodásban találkozunk. Alaptételnek tartja az ember önző mivoltát, s ez Hobbes szerint államok és egyének között erőszakot, zűrzavart eredményez. Hume már intelligens egoizmusról beszél, amely viszont hatalmi egyensúlyt hozhat létre. Az önérdek Adam Smithnél sem vezet káoszhoz. Ellenkezőleg, szabályozott gazdasági folyamatot hoz létre. Az előbbi vélemények kialakulásában szerepet játszott Mandeville *A méhek meséje* című munkája is, melyben a szerző azt hangsúlyozza, hogy az ember a saját vágyainak kielégítésével az egész társadalmat gazdagíthatja.

[4] Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850), francia közgazdász, politikus. A szabadkereskedelem elvét védi és szemben áll a szocializmussal, s ellenzi a gyarmatosítást. http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fr%C3%A9d%C3%A9ric_Bastiat

[5] MANENT, Pierre: *A liberális gondolat története,* Tanulmány Kiadó, Pécs, 1994. 104.

[6] MOLNÁR Tamás: *Az ellenforradalom,* Kairosz Kiadó, é.n. 19.

[7] FLAMANT: 11.

törvényszerűségeinek feltárásával megmenthessék az európai szabadságeszményeket. Az új jelenségek hatására a politikai gondolkodás képviselői elkezdték tanulmányozni a bürokráciát, foglalkoztak a tömegpártok kialakulásával s mindezeknek a parlamentarizmusra gyakorolt hatásával, a tömegek és a politikai elit viszonyával. Az új jelenségek vizsgálata azonban nem érthető meg az előzmények, a tömegjelenségek vizsgálati módszereinek megismerése nélkül. Ehhez vissza kell mennünk a 18-19. század fordulójára, amikor a társadalmi jelenségeket megpróbálták a pszichológia módszereivel vizsgálni.

A 18-19. század fordulóján a pszichológia útkereséseinek lehetünk tanúi, s ez kiterjedt arra is, hogy a társadalmi jelenségeket megpróbálják a pszichológia nyelvén kifejezni, s kidolgozzák a társadalom lélektanát. Úgy vélték, hogy ehhez a nemzet alkotásait, az irodalmat, a művészeteket, a nyelvet kell tanulmányozni. E vizsgálatok során született meg a néplélektan (Völkerpsychologie), amely egy nép szellemi életével, ennek törvényszerűségeivel foglalkozik. Arra keresték a választ, hogy egy nép szellemi aktivitását mi szabályozza, mi határozza meg, s van-e kollektív pszichikum, amely a szokásokban, az erkölcsökben, s a kulturális alkotásokban nyilvánul meg.

A német néplélektan megteremtője Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) volt, aki Lipcsében alapította meg az első kísérleti pszichológiai laboratóriumot 1879-ben, azt követően, hogy 1875-ben itt nevezték ki a filozófia professzorává. Mint kísérletező pszichológus, a fiziológia és a pszichológia találkozási pontjait, az érzékelést, észlelést, a figyelmet, érzelmeket vizsgálta, az egyén közvetlen tapasztalatait tanulmányozta. A tudat magasabb folyamatait vizsgálva arra az álláspontra jutott, hogy itt a társadalmi jelenségek összehasonlító megfigyelésére van szükség. A pszichológia és a filozófia találkozik munkásságában, s ezzel a szociálpszichológia előfutárának tekinthető. A pszichológia fontos volt számára, mert ennek segítségével magyarázható meg a népek élete. Néplélektan és individuálpszichológia szerinte szorosan összetartozik, mert az egyén pszichikumának fejlődése a társadalomtól függ. Nézeteit a *Néplélektan elemei* című munkájában foglalta össze. A néplélektan feladata az emberi társadalmak fejlődésének alapját jelentő pszichés folyamatok vizsgálata, mivel ezek hozzák létre a közös szellemi alkotásokat. A társadalom és a lelki élet egymásra hatása megjelenik a nyelvben, a mítoszokban, a vallásban, a szokásokban és az erkölcsben. Wundt az emberi kultúrát négy szakaszra – az ősember kora, a totemikus kor, az istenek, héroszok kora, s a humanitásé – osztotta, s azt hangsúlyozza, hogy a társadalom és a történelem alakulásában a pszichikus erőknek meghatározó szerepük van.[8]

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[8] SZCZEPAŃSKI, Jan: *A szociológia története. A szociológia problematikájánál és*

A néplélektan, illetve az a feltételezés, hogy létezik valami kollektív lélek, pszichikum, hatott a tömeglélektan kialakulására, a tömegek vizsgálatára. A tömegekkel való tudományos vizsgálódást a politikai rendszerek fejlődése szükségessé is tette, mivel a 19. század második felétől belépnek, illetve betódulnak a politikába. A választójog kiszélesedése, a tömegpártok megjelenése, a sokezres munkáslétszámmal dolgozó nagyvállalatok, a szakszervezeti mozgalom jelzik a változásokat a 19. század első feléhez képest. Ezek a változások veszélyt jelenthettek az addig kivívott szabadságra, mivel ügyes politikai vezetők oly módon manipulálhatták a tömeget, s így a politikai életet, hogy a liberalizmus alapelve, a konkurencia elve, a nézetek ütköztetésével zajló politikai élet megkérdőjeleződhetett.

A tömeglélektan egyik legjobb 20. század eleji képviselője Gustav Le Bon (1841-1931) volt. Az orvos, pszichológus, majd régészettel foglalkozó Le Bon talán legismertebb munkája *A tömegek lélektana* 1895-ben jelent meg. *„A mai kor egyik legfőbb jellemvonása* – hangsúlyozza a szerző a könyv előszavában –*, hogy a tömegek tudattalan tevékenysége lép az egyének tudatos tevékenységének helyére".*[9] Ez a tömeg viszont hagyja magát vezettetni vezéreitől, mert *„A tömeg engedelmes nyáj, gazdátlanul nem tud meglenni."*[10] Majd később így folytatja: *„A tömeggé verődött emberek elvesztik akaratukat és ösztönszerűleg fordulnak a felé, akiben megvan".*[11] A tömegben ugyanis a szolgaság és nem a szabadság szükséglete uralkodik. *„Annyira vágynak az engedelmességre, hogy ösztönszerűleg vetik alá magukat annak, ki vezérüknek nyilvánítja magát".*[12] S még azt is megjegyzi, hogy a *„tömegek lelki világa rendkívül alantas, ide számítva a kiváló egyénekből álló testületeket is".*[13] A tömegbe került ember ugyanis elveszti személyiségét, s barbárrá válik. Különösen veszélyes szerinte a tömeg forradalmak idején, mert kiszabadulnak a korábban féken tartott ösztönök. A tömeg ugyanakkor a Caesar tipusú egyéniséget tiszteli, mert *„...a gyönge tekintéllyel szemben mindig vérszemet kap a felemelkedésre és szolgailag meghúza magát az erős tekintély előtt".*[14] Le Bon az általános választójog hatására is kitér, és szerinte két veszély jelentkezik ezen a téren: az állami pénzek elpocsékolása és *„az egyéni szabadság fokozatos megszorítása".*[15] Az utóbbi a parlament által hozott

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módszereinek fejlődése, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1975. 268–269.

[9] LE BON, Gustave: *A tömegek lélektana.* Franklin-Társulat Magyar Irod. Intézet és Könyvnyomda, (Reprint: Hatágú Síp Alapítvány, Budapest, 1993), Budapest, 1913. 1.

[10] LE BON: 108 .

[11] Uo. 109.

[12] Uo. 111.

[13] Uo. 2.

[14] Uo. 47.

[15] Uo. 190.

sok törvénynek a következménye, amelyeket egyébként azért hoznak, hogy még jobban biztosítsák az egyén szabadságát és az egyenlőséget. Herbert Spencerre hivatkozik, aki kimutatta, hogy *„a látszólagos szabadság növekedését a valódi szabadság csökkenése követte"*.[16] Hozzáteszi, hogy *„A törvényeknek és korlátozó rendszabályoknak ez a szakadatlan gyártása […] azzal a végzetes eredménnyel jár, hogy hova-tovább mind szűkebbre szorul az a kör, melyben az állampolgárok szabadon mozoghatnak. A népek, áldozatai lévén annak az illúziónak, hogy a törvények szaporításával jobban biztosítják a szabadságot és egyenlőséget, napról-napra több súlyos bilincset vesznek magukra."*[17] Ráadásul azok hatalma nő meg, akik a törvény alkalmazásával vannak megbízva. Hatalmukat pedig az a tény, hogy a kormányok állandóan változnak, csak növeli, mert egyedül az adminisztratív kaszt nem változik. S ehhez még jön a polgárok közönyössége, tehetetlensége, s mindez együtt azt eredményezi Le Bon szerint, hogy *„Az állam mindenható istenné lesz"*.[18] Pontosan annak az intézménynek a hatalma nő, amelyet a liberalizmus a kezdetektől korlátozni akar. S bár hozzáteszi, hogy az ilyen istenek hatalma azért nem tartós és nem is erős, Le Bon korántsem optimista a politika fejlődését illetően. Nem, mert úgy látja, hogy a szabad véleménynyilvánítás lehetősége is veszélybe kerül.[19] A múlt és saját korának tünetei alapján aztán arra a következtetésre jut, hogy *„…a mi mai művelődésünk eljutott a teljes vénhedtségnek ahhoz az alakulatához, amely elöljárója a dekadenciának"*.[20] Le Bon a kultúrák körforgásáról beszél, s nála ebben a folyamatban a tömegek játsszák a főszerepet, amely azonban a hanyatlás felé vezet.[21] A tömeg fogalmát azonban igen tágan értelmezi, s nemcsak a kisebb nagyobb csoportosulásokat, hanem minden olyan közösséget tömegként jelöl, amely kollektív pszichikumot termel ki. Így a parlamentet is idesorolja, mivel a tömegek általános jellemvonásai, mint a gondolatok, a nézetek egyoldalúsága, az ingerlékenység, szuggerálhatóság és a vezetők befolyása, itt is érvényesül.[22]

Le Bon kortársa, Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904)[23] már megkülönbözteti a racionális reflexiókkal jellemzett közönséget és az irracionális

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[16] Uo. 192.

[17] Uo. 193.

[18] Uo. 194.

[19] Uo. 144.

[20] Uo. 194.

[21] Uo. 197.

[22] LE BON: *A tömegek osztályozása és a különböző tömeg kategóriák leírása* című fejezet, 145–149.

[23] Francia szociológus, szociálpszichológus, kriminológus. Kapcsolatban állt Cesare Lombrosoval (1835-1909), de nem fogadta el azt a nézetét, hogy a bűn biológiai eredetű. Tarde inkább a pszichológiai és szociológiai oldalát vizsgálta. A

érzelmekkel bíró tömeget. E felosztást azért tartja fontosnak, mert szerinte a modern demokráciát a sajtó és a könyvkiadás termékeként megjelent közönség létezése teszi lehetővé, mivel ez óvja meg az irracionális szenvedélyű tömegtől. Ez utóbbi alatt olyan csoportosulást ért, amelyet *„az érzések, hitek és cselekvések egysége forraszt egybe”*, a tömeg pedig egy meghatározott helyen összegyűlt személyek sokaságát jelenti.[24] Szerinte a tömeggel mindenütt találkozunk a történelem során, míg a közönség a modern társadalmakban jelent meg. A hatalom és a tömeg viszonyát vizsgálva Tarde megállapítja, hogy az emberek szeretik, ha vezetik őket. És vannak vezetők, akik erre a feladatra különösen alkalmasak képességeik és a Gondviselés adta elhivatottságuk alapján. A tömegek problémája persze nem csupán a politikai gondolkodást érdekelte, hanem a kriminológiát, illetve a szociálpszichológiát is, amely a különböző területekre lépő tömeg –vásárló, kultúrafogyasztó, vagy lázadó, menekülő, stb. – viselkedését, pszichés megnyilvánulásait vizsgálja.[25]

Merre halad a politika fejlődése a 19. század végétől? Le Bonnak van igaza, miszerint a tömegek belépésével a politikába, illetve az állam erősödésével a szabad véleménynyilvánítás, a szabadság egyaránt veszélybe kerültek, és az európai kultúrát a dekadencia irányába vitték? Vagy Tarde árnyaltabb elemzései a tömegek jellegzetességeiről mégiscsak reményt keltőek és lehetőséget adnak az európai szabadságvívmányok megőrzésére? Max Weber (1864-1920)[26] úgy tűnik, talált egy szűk sávot, ahol a politikai szabadverseny minden változás ellenére még tarthatta magát.

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társadalmi jelenségek közül az utánzással és az alkotással foglalkozott.

[24] SZCZEPAŃSKI: 272.

[25] Uo. 275–278. PACZOLAY Péter – SZABÓ Máté: *A politika-elmélet rövid története,* Kossuth, Budapest 1984. 228–229.

[26] Max Weber, német közgazdász, szociológus. Német protestáns gyáros család gyermeke. Anyja szalonjában a kor neves emberei – Mommsen, Dilthey, Treitschke, stb. – találkoztak. Egyetemi pályafutását 1891-ben Heidelbergben kezdte, majd Berlinben folytatta. 1894-ben a közgazdaság tanára a Freiburgi Egyetemen, 1896-ban pedig a Heidelbergi Egyetemre került. 1905-ben oroszul is megtanult, mivel a cári birodalommal, mindenekelőtt az 1904–1905-ös forradalommal foglalkozott. Leghíresebb munkája *A protestáns etika és a kapitalizmus szelleme* (1905). Az első világháború után Münchenben alapította meg az első német szociológiai tanszéket. Szociológusnak azonban sohasem nevezték ki. 1907-ben nagy vagyont örökölt, s életét teljesen a tudománynak szentelhette. 1908-tól felesége szalont vezetett Heidelbergben, ahol a kor tudósait, az egyetem professzorait fogadta. Támogatta a fiatal Lukács Györgyöt is, aki aztán konfliktusba került vele, antimarxistának tartotta, ezért negatívan ítélte meg Weber munkásságát, akinek érdeklődése szinte a társadalomtudományok egészére kiterjedt. Max Weberrel kapcsolatban néhány munka: PACZOLAY – SZABÓ: 234–244. SZCZEPAŃSKI: 371–387. Anthony GIDDENS: *Szociológia*, Osiris, Budapest, 2000. 287–294. ANDORKA Rudolf: *Bevezetés a szociológiába*, Osiris, Budapest, 2000. 61–64.

Webert egyebek között a modern politika jelenségei érdekelték, és vizsgálta a racionális állam keletkezésének körülményeit. Szerinte ez Európa nyugati részén keletkezett, melynek alapja a szakhivatalnoki kar és a római jog. Az előbbi a politikai uralmat üzemmé alakította, ahol a hivatalnok nem politizál, hanem pártatlanul igazgat. Az utóbbi pedig egyetemi végzettségű jogászaival forradalmasította ezt a politikai üzemet, s az volt a feladata, hogy érdekeket védjen. S miközben a fejedelem a rendekkel szembeni harcában erre a kiszámítható és racionális nem rendi rétegre támaszkodott, megszületett a hivatásos politikus, akit a szenvedélyes, harcos, akár elfogult politizálás különböztet meg a harag és részrehajlás nélkül dolgozó hivatalnoktól, bürokratától. A modern állam számára viszont mindkettő, a politikus és a bürokrata egyaránt nélkülözhetetlen. S miközben kettőjük együttműködése racionalizálja az állam működését, ez egyben veszélyt is hordoz a felvilágosodás szabadságeszményére, s annak gyakorlati megvalósulására. A bürokrácia racionális tudásuralma ugyanis nélkülözhetetlen, mindent áthat, s talán csak a kapitalista vállalkozó élvez viszonylagos védettséget vele szemben. A társadalom többi része viszont ki van szolgáltatva a hatalmát egyre növelő bürokráciának, amelynek *„vasketrece"* egyúttal az egyéni szabadságjogok korlátozását is jelenti. A bürokrácia a választójog demokratizálódásának eredményeként a tömegpártoknál is jelentkezett a 19. század végén. A párt működtetése, a tömegek megnyeréséért és a hatalomért folytatott harc hatalmas apparátust igényelt. E változások eredményeként az irányítás, a hatalom a pártot vezető kevesek kezébe került, akik élén s a *„politika szinterén megjelent egy cezarisztikus, plebiszcitárius elem, a választási csatatér diktátora"*,[27] akinek a hatalom megszerzése érdekében az apparátus vakon, gépezetként engedelmeskedik. Hasonló a helyzet a parlamentben is – Weber a briteket hozza példaként –, ahol a képviselők néhány kivételtől eltekintve *„fegyelmezetten szavazó nyájat alkotnak"*.[28] A klasszikus liberalizmus alapelve, miszerint a parlament a nézetek konkurenciájának a színtere a képviselők vitájának köszönhetően, úgy tűnik valóban veszélybe került. S Weber következtetése is ezt látszik igazolni: *„a gyakorlatilag plebiszcitárius diktátor fölötte áll a parlamentnek, a "gépezet" segítségével maga mögé állítja a tömegeket, a parlamenti képviselőket pedig csak a kíséretét alkotó politikai javadalmasoknak tekinti"*.[29] A tömegek megjelenése a politikában tehát nem a szabadság kiszélesedését hozza magával, hanem a szükségszerű bürokratizálódás eredményeként egy szűk kör kezébe kerül a hatalom. Weber szerint azonban nem a bürokrácia megszüntetése a megoldás, ez egyébként sem valósítható

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[27] Max WEBER: *Tanulmányok,* Osiris, Budapest, 1998. 185.
[28] Uo. 186.
[29] Uo. 186.

meg, mivel a bürokráciától a modern állam nem tud megszabadulni. A megoldást a vezérek kiválasztásában látja. A kérdés számára az, hogy *„...vezéri demokrácia "gépezettel", vagy vezér nélküli demokrácia, azaz az elhivatottságot, a vezért teremtő benső, karizmatikus minőségeket nélkülöző, "hivatásás politikusok" uralma”*[30] (ez utóbbit a klikkek uralmának nevezi). Weber a szabadság megőrzését abban látja, ha a parlament megőrzi a nézetek ütköztetésének a szerepét. A tömegek korában azonban a parlamentben már nem egyének, hanem pártok ütköznek, ezért fontos a politikai vezetőréteg kiválasztódása, és ellenőrzése is, hiszen a nézetek ütközése a pártvezérek között zajlik. Weber vezérdemokráciája népszavazáson alapul, s nagyon lényeges, hogy a vezér karizmatikus legyen, mert a bürokráciát csak így lehet ellensúlyozni. Weber vezérdemokráciája átvezet minket az elit kérdéséhez, s az elielméletekhez (egyébként Weber vezérdemokráciája is az), melynek egyik megalapozója Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923).

A svájci olasz származású és mérnöki képzettséget szerző gondolkodó a társadalmat mechanikusan szemléli. Először közgazdaságtannal foglalkozott, majd a szociológia felé fordult, s 1916-ban jelentette meg *A szociológia általános elmélete* című munkáját. Szerinte a történelem az elitek körforgásának a története, mert minden társadalmat valamilyen elit irányít, ezért kell vizsgálni e csoport jellegzetességeit. S bár szerinte az elit mindig elnyomja a társadalmat, ezért cserélődése nem sok változást hoz. Ennek ellenére nem mindegy, hogy milyen elit van éppen hatalmon, hiszen ettől is függ, hogy az egyén szabadsága mennyire szenved csorbát, illetve mennyi mozgástere marad. Pareto szerint az emberi cselekvést racionális megfontolások és irracionális ösztönök egyaránt mozgatják. Ez utóbbit, az ösztönökből, érzésekből összetevődő pszichikus állapotot, az un. reziduumot, két típusra osztja: újító vagy kombinatív reziduumok és megőrző vagy konzervatívak. Felhasználja a Macchiavellinél a fejedelemmel kapcsolatban a róka és oroszlán hasonlatot[31] is. Értelemszerűen az előbbi a kombinatív elithez tartozik, míg az utóbbi a konzervatív sajátja. S mivel a rókák rugalmasak, egy ilyen elit hosszú ideig marad hatalmon, a merev oroszlán típusú viszont rövid ideig. Ideálisnak a kettő keveredését tartja, s még azt is, ha az elit nyitott a társadalom alsóbb rétegei felé, s alulról töltődik fel. Zárt elit esetén ugyanis kialakul egy kontraelit.[32]

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[30] WEBER: 193.

[31] Machiavelli azt hangsúlyozta, hogy a fejedelem elveszti a hatalmát, ha erkölcsös marad. A hatalom megszerzése és megtartása érdekében ezért a róka ravaszságát és az oroszlán vadságát kell egyesítenie.

[32] PACZOLAY Péter-SZABÓ Máté: *Elitelméletek a polgári politikatudományban*, IN: POLGÁR Tibor (szerk.): *Politikatudományi tanulmányok*, Kossuth, Budapest, 1982. 86–97. GUCHET, Yves: *La pensée politique,* Armand Colin, Paris, 1992. 132–134. LAVROFF, Dmitri Georges: *Histoire des idées politiques depuis le XIXe siècle*,

Összegzés

A 19. század végén a liberalizmus hanyatlik, háttérbe szorul. Ennek oka az, hogy a liberalizmus, legalábbis Nyugat-Európában győzött, beépült a hatalomba, hatalmi tényezőként viszont dogmává vált. Azzal ugyanis, hogy győztes eszmei irányzat lett, eltűnt az őt éltető feltétel, az abszolút hatalom. Nem véletlen, hogy 20. századi feltámadását a proletárdiktatúra, illetve a nácizmus formájában jelentkező újabb abszolút hatalom jelentkezése tette lehetővé. Másrészt a liberalizmus éppen akkor győzött, amikor a modernizáció, az ipari forradalom hatására az az állam, amely ellen fellépett, folyamatoson erősödött. A megnövekedett külső – pl. gyarmatosítás – és belső feladatok szükségszerűen erősítették a centralizációt, ez viszont kitermelte a bürokráciát. Ennek volt a következménye, hogy nem egyének, hanem pártok vetélkedtek a törvényhozásban, s az egyén alárendelődött (s napjainkban is alárendelődik) a pártfegyelemnek. Igaz, a pártvezérek harca még biztosította a nézetek konkurenciáját, de fennállt a veszély, hogy a politikai élet egy vezér kezébe kerül. A 20. században ez be is következett Németországban. A hatalmi ágak szétválasztása is jelenthet veszélyt úgy, hogy a többségi párt alakít kormányt, így a törvényhozás és a végrehajtás is egy hatalom kezébe kerül, ha az ellenzéknek nincsenek eszközei a többségi párt befolyásolására. A liberalizmus ellenében hat az is, ha híveinek az államhoz kell fordulniuk segítségért, pl. Angliában, amikor az államtól a szociális háló kiépítését kérték, igaz az egyén érdekében, az egyén elnyomorodásának elkerülése miatt. A megvalósult liberalizmus pedig önmaga ellentétébe csap át. Ez azt jelenti: minél teljesebb a liberalizmus képviselte, hirdetett szabadság, minél több törvényi garanciája van, annál inkább korlátozza az egyén szabadságát. Jól mutatja ezt a sajtószabadság megvalósulása azzal, hogy az információáradat legalább úgy korlátozza – ha nem jobban - az információhoz jutást, mint a sajtócenzúra. Így megkockáztathatjuk azt a megállapítást, hogy a sajtószabadságnál nem igen van jobb cenzúra. De említhetjük a tömegdemonstrációkat is, amelyek az egyén gyülekezési jogának érvényesüléseként jelentkeznek, miközben az egyén feloldódik a tömegben, s ennek következtében éppen egyéni szabadsága kerülhet veszélybe. A liberalizmus győzelmével az élet és vagyonbiztonság is veszélybe kerülhet a terrorizmus jelentkezésével. E negatív jelenségek persze nem kérdőjelezhetik meg a liberalizmusnak az egyéni szabadságjogok érdekében végzett munkáját.

Dalloz, Paris, 2007. 171. PACZOLAY – SZABÓ: 229–231. SZCZEPAŃSKI: 319–331. ANDORKA: 65.

Bence Pesenyánszki[1]

A Brief Historical Overview of Drugs and Race in the Modern United States

Abstract

In this paper I intend to argue that the War on Drugs, or American prohibitive drug policy in general, is heavily responsible in driving ethnic conflicts before and after 1970, to contextualize the events of the 2010s in order to provide a historical background. This paper aims to prove that Richard Nixon's War on Drugs was aimed at maintaining a form of social control over the newly equal black community, and at the retention of some previously held executive and political power over them. Prohibitive drug policy is responsible in a large part for the unrests of the 2010s as a result. To be able to draw this conclusion the history of drugs and race in the United States needs to be briefly reviewed and compared with the international drug regulation, because the two frequently influenced each other during the 20th century, and without this history, an organic understanding of contemporary ethnic conflicts in the United States cannot manifest.

Keywords: war on drugs; race; drug regulation; Richard Nixon; marijuana; African-Americans; law enforcement; Prohibition; 1970s; law and order;

Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation applied to the entirety of the United States by 1865, effectively setting the people of African descent free to become citizens of the nation. The former slaves never received any economic aid or compensation, and those who benefited from their free labor did not cease to exist all of a sudden. Fear of the blacks' newfound freedom brought about the Ku-Klux-Klan and a period of lynching, while former slaveholder states were allowed by the Supreme Court to create the Jim Crow laws that barred the African-Americans from exercising many of their constitutional rights, including the right to vote, the right to co-mingle, to use the same public facilities and services as the white majority. Fear, resentment, and inequality before law enabled segregation and ethnically motivated violence to prevail for another century, only to be slowly diminished by the United States Military at first, followed by the Supreme Court, and a large-scale social movement in their wake.

Martin Luther King Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement achieved the

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fulfillment envisioned in the Declaration of Independence cited by King in his famous speech of having a dream in the 1963 March on Washington. The Democratic governance of the 1960s signed three major pieces of federal legislation: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. These pieces of legislation effectively ended segregation, ensured voting rights, labor rights, civil rights, and also aimed to prohibit discrimination in housing. MLK did not live to see the latest one, as he was assassinated in 1968. This clearly indicates that in spite of reaching this milestone ethnic conflicts were far from being settled at the end of the heavily packed 60s. Yet by 1970 African-Americans were technically equal to the white majority in front of the law.

Being a member of the Millennial generation and having finished high school before 2010, the following decades of American history might be blurry for someone in my shoes in the light of the fact that, in 2008, Barack Obama became the first man of African descent who was elected President of the United States. At that point important voices cited the end of racism in a modern world order dominated by the progressive U.S. However, with the proliferation of accessible recording technology, more and more pieces of footage reached the public eye involving the killing of unarmed black suspects by white police officers, indicating that the aforementioned voices were wrong.

In 2014, Missouri patrolmen killed a young African-American under seemingly shady circumstances, and the event prompted the local black community to protest against their law enforcement. This conflict so far seemed quite regular in the American social context, sadly, but what soon made it internationally newsworthy was the response of law enforcement that escalated the protests into a global media sensation and gave fuel to the nationwide movement of the Black Lives Matter. The Missouri police showed up to respond to the originally peaceful protest in force, dressed in military gear, wielding military grade weaponry, dressed in camouflage or heavy riot gear, inducing fear in the predominantly black protesters who were exercising their constitutional rights. Other police killings also started to receive more attention that year, like the death of black New Yorker Eric Garner in police chokehold for selling cigarettes illegally and refusing to comply non-threateningly.

Suddenly all eyes became fixed on the American police and the peculiarity of the events received global attention, as it became known as the Ferguson Unrest. The Washington Post started to tally the people shot and killed by the American police in the absence of easily accessible data, and police culture experts who have been trying to warn the members of the public and decision makers alike with varying success were now being heard. Since the local police force is the foremost manifestation of governmental executive power, we can logically

theorize that, in general, ethnically induced violence by the executive power is scarcer today than previously in history, however, within a better society and by the use of technology, these events could gain a new type of publicity for their unrighteousness that is now even more apparent. The President then spoke out against the violence, maintaining his connection to his roots but somewhat angering those who expected him to became a white conformist instead of the first black president. Change was starting to take root, but the following year of protests didn't remain bloodless.

In 2016 Obama reached the end of his second term, and tea-party fringe Republican Donald Trump was elected as the next President, advertising a „*law and order*" approach regarding the ethnic-crime-police topic during the course of his campaign. In this area Trump's Presidency achieved more than what they promised. In 2020, amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, Minnesota police officers stepped on the neck of African-American George Floyd for at least 8 minutes, killing him in front of hysterical pedestrians who recorded everything on their phones.

As the graphic and brutal piece of evidence for blatant violence from the police gained publicity, it combined with the economic insecurity and the psychological stress of quarantine isolation, turning into a particularly dark, hopeless, and grave series of protests, during which Minneapolis policemen had to give up a police station to protesters. In one of his responses, the Twitter President cited a phrase from a Southern chief of police from the 1960s that was used then for threatening the Civil Rights Movement, fulfilling his „*law and order*" promise by showing its true nature with unusual transparency.

In my dissertation I intend to review the heavily packed decade of the 2010s and analyze the recently prominent ethnic conflicts historically in order to gain a better understanding of such issues for the benefit of a concerned global audience. In this essay I intend to answer the previously mentioned blurriness of the history of ethnic conflicts before and after 1970 to contextualize the events of the 2010s in order to provide a historical background for my dissertation argumentation. This paper aims to prove that Richard Nixon's War on Drugs was aimed at maintaining a form of social control over the newly equal black community, and the retaining of some previously held executive and political power over them. Prohibitive drug policy is responsible in a large part for the unrests of the 2010s. To be able to draw this conclusion the history of drugs and race in the United States needs to be briefly reviewed and compared with the international drug regulation, because the two frequently influenced each other during the history of the 20th century, and without this history, the organic understanding of the War on Drugs cannot manifest.

The prohibition of drugs

> „*Prohibition has not only failed in its promises but actually created additional serious and disturbing social problems throughout society. There is not less drunkenness in the Republic but more. There is not less crime, but more. … The cost of government is not smaller, but vastly greater. Respect for law has not increased, but diminished.*" –
> H. L. Mencken on alcohol prohibition, 1925 (qtd. in Branson)

Most essays discussing the American War on Drugs begin with the statement that Richard Nixon declared drug abuse as „*public enemy number one*" in 1971 and advertised an all-out war that requires global action. While being factually true, it is arguably the most overused statement to start with, and it is also redundant. Substance prohibition almost directly leads to combative methods for suppressing criminal activity that the prohibition itself enabled („*Advancing Drug Policy Reform*" 11.), and prohibition itself generally stands for a criminological approach to drug policy in favor of a medical or healthcare related one.

Substance prohibition has a long history in the United States of America and the world. Starting a drug policy discussion with Nixon's declared War on Drugs implies the neglect of at least a century of history that distorted the picture of drug abuse in our minds, as it frequently shifted from the scientific, medical paradigm to a criminological one, and vice-versa. President Nixon's now undoubtedly failed policy (11–17) is merely a symptom, if not the direct product of history. Whatever it may be, it has changed the course of drug policy and general domestic policy in the United States.

Disruptive patterns in drug policy can re-emerge to change or reset the preceding flow of history, even if this history could involve a societal understanding, and perhaps acceptance, of past events in order to adapt to them, to avoid making the past's mistakes for a better future (OLIVES; „*Cato Handbook*"). In the case of the War on Drugs, this involves a fierce 20th century battle between the two aforementioned perspectives that many times disagree on the same history both are subjected to, producing extra confusion („*War on Drugs: Report*" 2; EDWARDS et al. 85).

This battle between the criminological and the medical perspective, along with the incredible complexity in the nature of substance abuse and its way of societal treatment or mistreatment contribute to the fact that while policies have been changing since the 2010s worldwide, the war on drugs is still an open question and is still taking lives and money around the globe, creating different challenges to the world's governments, despite the fact that humanity now possesses more

reliable data and methods to control drug use than ever before in history, provided the goal was to improve on the drug problem.

After accounting for the relevant aspects of the modern and contemporary history of drug prohibition, especially in the 20th century, and emphasizing the reasons why the war on drugs has been a failed policy from its earliest existence, this part of the essay aims to provide a politically motivated framework for its implementation and prove its conscious political use. By contrasting the approach of different American eras, the paper argues that this kind of policy implementation brings terrible consequences, both domestically and geopolitically. It directly affects the American police culture, and, as this part aims to prove, it is meant to restructure it along ethnic lines creating new divisions after some were eliminated by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. The scope of the argumentation revolves largely around the particular administration of President Richard M. Nixon, but the previous presidency of Donald J. Trump and other eras of mostly but not solely Republican leadership must also be addressed briefly, as these seem to bear remarkable similarities that relate to but also exceed the scope of the drug question affecting the world today. Drug prohibition is an unprofessional policy in the United States, as it is imbued with the undertones of exclusive identity politics, and failed to achieve its promises.

Disambiguation

This essay discusses drugs as the most common illegal (or marginally legal) recreational narcotic or hallucinogenic substances and the fight against them. Drugs that are referred to include, but are not limited to: illegal alcohol, cannabis, amphetamines, cocaine, opiates.

„New psychoactive substances", as categorized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, also called designer drugs, will not be discussed mostly because of their legal nature. These drugs were invented to cheat law enforcement by frequently modifying the chemical composition of substances in order to keep them legal. While they impose a serious threat and concern, and their existence also proves many of the flaws of the prohibitive drug control approach, the traditional drugs are currently more important to our discussion, at least geopolitically („What are NPS?").

Global conventions and American prohibitive practices

There is one thing we can conclude analyzing the goal of drug prohibition as it was advertised by the UNODC: it is „a world without drugs" (qtd. in SEDDON 2). Drug abuse has been present in human

civilization for thousands of years, it was deeply interconnected with religious and cultural events, and it doesn't seem to be close to disappearing anytime soon (ESCOHOTADO 2.). The contemporary American society, or any society in fact, is of course different on many levels than our tribal ancestors, but such a deeply ingrained phenomenon is supposedly going to take longer than a few thousand years to disappear from humanity, if it ever will. The facts support this thinking.

There is existing written and material evidence of substance usage from as far back as 3000 B.C., particularly of poppy heads or hemp, from many of the great early civilizations of humanity including Mesopotamia, India, China, Egypt, Israel, and Greece (6–7). Alcohol has been consumed in Europe in the Roman Empire and through the Middle-Ages. Coffee was common in Africa. Escohotado even suggests the possibility that venomous plants could have interfered in our own evolution by changing our chemical makeup. Considering that drugs can possibly be an integral part of human evolution isn't reassuring for the previously mentioned „*modern"* goal of a world without drugs. It makes the goal ridiculously far-fetched and overly optimistic. It must be admitted that drugs have been a part of humanity's life in one way or another from the earliest civilizations, and that a world without drugs is an impossible concept in our current standards.

Antonio Maria Costa, prohibitionist former executive director of the UNODC, acknowledged that the idea of a world without drugs is unachievable, but still considered it a desirable goal worthy of advertisement in 2007 (qtd. in SEDDON 2.). It is unrealistic to expect drugs to completely disappear, but the problems associated with drug abuse do not necessarily fall into this category. Experts of the field are in consent that the prohibitive approaches, said in the most politically correct *way, are not producing convincing results („War on Drugs: Report"* 2.). But they aren't the only way to mitigate the dangers of addiction and abuse.

Nevertheless, it has been emergent from this discussion that, as drug abuse is a global phenomenon, addressing drug problems requires a global, geopolitically coordinated but localized and tailored approach to gain control over it. The concern has in fact received global attention from the beginning of the 20th century (SEDDON 7.), coinciding with a gradually accelerating globalization process.

The second half of the 19th c. witnessed two remarkable events concerning drug politics. Firstly, the 1860 end of the Second Anglo-Chinese War, or Second Opium War, has shown how an economically motivated drug policy can serve geopolitical interests: the British used opium trade to gain economic advantages and political control, eventually resulting in two armed conflicts between the 1840s and 1860.

The British traded opium produced in India on a large scale to intermediaries in major Chinese ports, and legalization of the opium trade formed an integral part of the peace agreements. Opium trade between India and China through and by the British prevailed until the early 20th century.

Secondly it has to be acknowledged that, at the time, most drugs that existed then were not regulated governmentally. Occasional events of full prohibition for example in some American states by the second half of the 19th c. interrupted the general rule of legal trade. Why global prohibitive action seemed to be the emergent path of general drug policy needs to be understood.

It was established that the drug question is a global question, and the Opium Wars serve as proof for its increasing globalization, as the particular British drug trade operation very apparently crossed borders and affected multiple nationalities. Although the two extremes, free trade and full prohibition weren't the only options even for the governments of the time as prescription, registration and taxation existed, it is reasonable to think that the perspective of these governmental regulating bodies of the time was narrow. These times lacked the advanced science and reliable, long-span statistical data we possess in the 21st century. Witnessing for example the ill effects of opium usage without a thorough understanding of its medical, sociological and psychological effects and without advanced technology that would make a legal but controlled option easily viable, prohibition might have been seen as the only possible solution to combat the ill effects of drug use.

The ill effects associated with opium and other drugs may have influenced the American public opinion to a great extent (CARSTAIRS 46, NEVIUS). There was a sizeable Chinese community situated near the Pacific Coast, particularly in San Francisco, consisting of workers who immigrated from the early years of the Gold Rush and later to work on big American construction projects like transcontinental railroads. Therefore these individuals were predominantly young or middle-aged males, who were separated from their families for long time periods. The American government discouraged them from staying in the states, largely by barring family members who left their home to enter the country from as early as 1858 (NEVIUS). Those lonely males who stayed with their payment in hand could easily have fallen for prostitutes and opium, most likely leading to the eventual proliferation of Chinese opium dens and the negative effects associated with them in the West of the U.S.

The American people connected opium, race, deviance, or criminal activity in these times, which, among other things, eventually resulted in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 preventing any Chinese immigration,

and the 1909 Opium Exclusion Act prohibiting the opium imports (NEVIUS). The connection of race and drug abuse was prevalent, and in the American eye, other ethnicities fell under similar consideration. African-American people were, at the time, associated with cocaine use. In the meantime, soft-drinks like Coca-Cola also contained cocaine in small amounts, and the drug was widely available and used for a wide range of medical and household applications (CARSTAIRS 46–47; NEVIUS), along with heroin and cannabis.

The ethnicities living in slums or ghettoized neighborhoods could have been more susceptible to drug use anyway (GHULAM et al.). It is needless to mention that drug users were increasingly viewed as inferior or even dangerous people in United States. While previously either just „*sick, luxurious, or lazy"* (NEVIUS), the drug user became the menacing, evil minority member, a homicidal black man or an immoral Chinese immigrant trying to seduce white women with opium (CARSTAIRS 56; NEVIUS). This was the belief with which the United States initiated the first global drug meetings, starting with the 1909 International Opium Commission in Shanghai (SEDDON 7.).

Without global regulatory institutions the unprecedented 1909 international meeting only gave recommendations but paved the way for the 1912 International Opium Convention in The Hague. In that convention twelve nations, including the U.S., the UK (including British India), China, Germany, Russia and Japan signed the agreement „*to control"* the production, sales and export/import of „*morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts"* („*International Opium Convention"* 33; „*Advancing Drug Policy Reform"* 8). According to a 1961 UNODC Bulletin, the U.S. wanted to include „*Indian hemp drugs"* a.k.a. cannabis in the data exchange proceedings in the very same convention, but there was no data available on cannabis („*The Cannabis Problem"*).

Although the name „*Indian hemp"* refers to the origins of the plant, and not the „*harmful substance"* semantic in question, it could already put hemp in a negatively exotic cognitive framework, especially in the light of the previously discussed American background on the connection of drugs and race. The name „*marijuana"* was also invented stemming from similar considerations. Around the time cannabis use was associated with Mexicans in the American eye (CARSTAIRS 47.). These prejudiced, observational generalizations can be theorized to have informed, if not influenced or formulated, the future war on drugs policymaking in the States, according to the theory this paper presents. Any legitimate piece of data that suggests disparities in drug consumption only by race or ethnicity is yet to emerge.

As it was mentioned before, the multilateral meetings emerged by an observed necessity and prohibitive action may have seemed to be the best solution of the time. Progress towards American and later global

prohibition was achieved gradually, as witnessed in, for example, the Harrison Narcotics Act of the U.S. from 1914 which only takes a small step towards it. Although now we are aware of the consequences of the prohibitive policies that originated from these meetings, the notion that the powers of the time recognized the need for international cooperation and managed to achieve cooperative results in the shadow of incoming global conflicts is remarkable, even if we think that these nations took the wrong approach.

It proves that drugs were indeed considered to be a serious problem requiring global, multilateral solutions, as these proceedings took place when geopolitical tension was already building up resulting in the First World War in just two years from the convention. The proceedings of the meeting were made official after the war in 1922 by the new League of Nations („*International Opium Convention*").

The 1920s continuation of these efforts brought hard line policies for the United States and the expansion of regulation for the participants of the international conventions. The 1925 meeting in Geneva was the first to declare Indian hemp to officially mean *cannabis sativa*, rendered its export illegal, and almost managed to officially prohibit recreational use by the advice of a sub-committee („*The Cannabis Problem*"). The decision was strongly opposed by the participating India who noted that social and religious customs would be violated and serious difficulties would arise since hemp abundantly grows wild in India; a fact that hints the disconnect of prohibitive approaches from realism („*The Cannabis Problem*").

The conference at the time listened to reason, so India only had to agree on stopping the export of hemp. The debate about the differentiation of the drug and the industrial material hasn't crystallized until as far as 1961 („*The Cannabis Problem*"). What the sub-committee meant under harmful uses of cannabis remains obscure but can be suspected that it was its addiction potential when used recreationally according to the discourse of the era. The conclusions included those forms of the substance that „*couldn't be used for anything else but recreation*", like hashish or cannabis resin, wrongfully attributed by the sub-committee. Still, the multilateral treaty advises less strict regulations concerning cannabis than concerning other substances („*The Cannabis Problem*"). The „*gateway theory*", that smoking cannabis could lead to the use of harder drugs, has never been proven inconclusively, and is likely a myth. If it really exists, the real gateway drug can be suspected to be tobacco or something even more basic.

The year of 1920 brought the 18th Amendment to the Constitution and the corresponding executive Volstead Act into effect for the American state, initiating the famous alcohol Prohibition, the stereotypical era of Al Capone, speakeasies, liquor smuggling, and

Tommy guns. This decade of substance prohibition makes a prime example for argumentation about contemporary drug regulation. A prohibitionist movement formed from the previous decades' temperance societies, which were largely motivated by religious intentions. These movements originated from New England areas, a historically puritan land. In the eyes of the Anti-Saloon League drinking was a *„corrupt, ungodly"* activity (*„Prohibition"*).

In 1917, when the U.S. entered the First World War, Congress ordered a wartime prohibition for caution, trying to be economical with the grain reserves (MIRON and ZWIEBEL 2; *„Prohibition"*). The relatively large public support and the experience with the wartime prohibition directly led to the birth of the 18th Amendment, coming into effect in January, 1920, four years earlier than originally scheduled. However, public support for the bill was waning in less than a decade.

The 21st Amendment of 1933 finally repealed the Prohibition. From its beginning liquor prices started to rise immediately, giving the mafia the lucrative business of bootlegging, giving birth to legendary gangsters like Al Capone. It also only achieved its intended results for a short time. For a richer urban citizen it wasn't a big problem to have access to alcohol, unlike for those living the country, particularly in poorer, rural areas (MIRON and ZWIEBEL 2; *„Prohibition"*).

In 1991 Jeffrey Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel published a study for the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research about the effect of the prohibition on alcohol consumption in the era. What they found was that, after a sharp decline in consumption, the numbers started growing again and came relatively close to pre-Prohibition levels in the last years (MIRON and ZWIEBEL 2–3.). It serves as evidence that outside of other unforeseen consequences, it also wasn't overwhelmingly effective, as the price of alcohol rose, but consumption didn't decrease on the long term.

It is currently evident that the famous American Prohibition was a failed policy weighing the costs and benefits retrospectively. While it managed to deter some consumption, this reduction was, on the long run, modest to non-existent at best compared to the highly increased prices of alcohol. The disadvantages, for example the enrichment of the mafia through illegal trade opportunities and the increase in violence outweighed the benefits by large and ultimately had dire consequences (5–8). The cost of lives lost to the resulting violence cannot be accurately measured, but surely adds to the bill to a great detail.

The authors of the same consumption study state that in the course of a possible drug legalization the feared increase in consumption is likely to remain modest on the long run as well (8). This has been a relevant objection against decriminalization or legalization practices, but the conclusion of this 1991 research suggests that it's less relevant in the measurement. In the light of the recent wave of recreational cannabis

legalization in some American states the theory of the experiment can be tested again in comparison with cannabis criminalizing states in around 8 to 10 years. Current data suggests no strong claims opposing cannabis legalization turned out to be true (DILLS et al. 11.).

Strangely, even though the Geneva Convention of 1925 advised for a less strict regulation of cannabis, the 1936 Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs includes it among the dangerous drugs to be regulated. The U.S. delegation was led by the head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, Harry J. Anslinger, the author of „*Marijuana, Assassin of Youth"*, known for his openly racist views (KREBS). The American propaganda film, the far-fetched and since then ridiculed Reefer Madness targeting the white middle-class was released in the same year as well. Anslinger's agency should serve as evidence for the globally advertised prohibitive approach of the U.S., and explains the shift of the convention towards stricter regulation. While the oeuvre of Harry Anslinger is perhaps one of the best testaments to the connections of race and drug prohibition in the United States, this paper doesn't aim to discuss him further in light of the fact that his wrongdoings are more and more frequently cited.

Journalist Johann Hari's book entitled „*Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of the War on Drugs"* gives a much better account of the man who was the head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, however, it is unproductive to attribute too much relevance to even a particularly powerful individual in American (and, undoubtedly, global) drug regulation. His views and deeds resonated with many at the time, and he would not have been able to operate without some form of consent from the citizenry and their governments. We have to admit however, while Anslinger represented the U.S. early in his career in the 1936 Convention, he retired in 1964 from a job in the successor United Nations, and during all the time in between, he held his responsible office in the U.S., so his influence on policymaking is undeniable. For now, the mere fact of the existence of a racist person in an influential position on drug regulation in the United States for three decades proves its point.

After the emergence of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs prohibited the use of marijuana as the last substance of the original trio with cocaine and opiates. During a process between 1954 and 1957, the organizations advised participating nations to discontinue its medical use, based on a 1953 WHO report claiming cannabis is dangerous „*from every [unspecified] point of view"* („*The Cannabis Problem"*). The only exceptions to the decision were the designated scientific purposes and some Indian and Pakistani medicine systems („*The Cannabis Problem"*).

The decision was finalized in the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic

Drugs (*„The Cannabis Problem"*). By this time, the American federal government and the states had relatively uniform, strict drug control laws prevailing (KREBS). China, Malaysia and Iran enabled capital punishment for drug offenses between 1948 and 1957 (*„Advancing Drug Policy Reform"* 8.)

It can be witnessed in these events that while the level of cooperation among a wide variety of parties had increased, the problem constantly staying in agenda stood for the inefficiency of most approaches. The United States was always participating in these events and was always influencing them to a large degree. The prohibitive practices can be theorized to have followed for the same reason as previously discussed, insufficient scientific research and methodology, combined with propaganda and the new addition of having sometimes heavily prejudiced individuals in responsible positions, like Anslinger. Iran and China had autocratic regimes at the time of the enactment of severe punishments for drug abuse.

Today it is harder to deny that marijuana doesn't kill, this rhetoric seems ridiculous to our contemporary eyes. The official 1971 launch of the War on Drugs and the coinage of the name by President Richard Nixon followed these events, and it has to be understood partly as a product of its time. Prohibitive measurements were the natural course of action for a conservative president's policy shift, but Nixon, ingeniously, having to follow strict international regulations and agreeing with them in accordance with the formal and public American opinion, connected the two moralities and converted them into a powerful populist tool for domestic policy. We can theorize that a war on drugs would have been launched under a conservative cabinet without Nixon anyway, based on the international and domestic trends, but with reduced attention, importance, funding, and possibly harmful effects as well.

Nixon and the W.O.D. in America

The election of Richard Nixon as President of the United States was not surprising considering that Lyndon B. Johnson didn't accept the nomination and the next most obvious Democratic candidate, Bobby Kennedy, was killed by Sirhan Sirhan (JOHNSON 879). Nixon defeated Hubert Humphrey with relative safety even under low participation (879–880), and immediately got to work in the Office in 1969, to launch a failed project trying to curb cannabis smuggling in the U.S.-Mexico border entitled *„Operation Intercept"*.

The Federal Government already decided to pull out from Vietnam before Nixon took office (JOHNSON 878.). Paul Johnson, renowned conservative Historian, states in his book entitled A History of the American People that this decision was largely influenced by the

opinions of „*liberal newspapers*", most notably the New York Times and the Washington Post (878–890). The same newspapers, according to Johnson, never gave Nixon a break during his political career, undermined the authority of the Presidential Office, and published secret documents that severely hurt national security interests (881–900). Johnson enumerates a number of illegal or immoral activities of previous presidents, most notably John F. Kennedy, and states that these newspapers had used to be more careful on which dirty laundry of the Presidency they would write about, but they were never moderate with Nixon. All throughout his discourse Johnson stays very apologetic to Nixon, which decreases his credibility.

While this paper doesn't aim to make further judgment in that question, it proves that Nixon was under severe domestic pressure and opposition. In 1970, when the President appeared on television to inform the citizens of the U.S. that the number of recruits to Vietnam has to be temporarily increased in consideration of the „*Cambodian Situation*", numerous student protests erupted in several university premises, sometimes escalating into more serious conflicts involving the National Guard occupying campuses (JOHNSON 885). The conflict had its casualties in four students shot by the Guard, which further escalated the protests, unsurprisingly. Note that the United States of the time was already through a long period of unrest accompanying the Civil Rights Movement, and Nixon ran a campaign on „*law and order*".

Johnson notes that Nixon appeared to be in trouble, in political trouble, facing the media and the students of the state, but he doesn't take note of Nixon's 1971 declaration of the War on Drugs in this book (886). He failed to realize its importance. The groundwork of Nixon's war was founded in 1970 with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. The Act introduces two important details, the federal classification of drugs into schedules, and enables law enforcement agencies to conduct no-knock raids in the possession of a search warrant (DANSKY 2–6.). The former represents an important step in institutional regulation, and latter one crucially affected the police culture of the U.S. until this very day.

As it was already touched on before, international opinion favored a prohibitive approach to the drug question (largely by a long-term prohibitive agenda pushed by the U.S. itself), and drugs were many times unofficially connected to a particular race or subculture in American discourse. Due to the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement, it was illegal to suppress possible opposition on the basis of race, so the Nixon administration had to look for other ways to undermine their domestic, public opposition: black people and students opposing the Vietnam War. Even though its morality is questionable, with the kindest words, politically it was ingenious from Nixon to declare drugs as public

enemy number one. With that move Nixon concomitantly appeared in a positive light while he created a new tool to bar a number of people from voting, as a known felon loses the right to vote temporarily.

Nixon could officially declare war on his opposition, as students of the Woodstock era were widely associated with the use of cannabis, hippies with LSD, and black people with cocaine. On the same hand, it also directed the opinion of the "silent majority" against these protesting groups, presumably the rowdy minority of the previous decade's Civil Rights Movement, associating them with drug use. These fears also manifested later in the "*crack epidemic*" of the 1980's (KURTZLEBEN).

The declaration worked. The War on Drugs largely contributed to the "*landslide reelection*" of Nixon (OLIVES). His reelection immediately enabled the establishment of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the famous DEA, to coordinate all drug war efforts, as it was foretold in his declaration ("*Advancing Drug Policy Reform*" 8.).

The most damning evidence for these claims came from John Ehrlichman, former domestic policy advisor and loyal member of the Nixon government (JOHNSON 879–881; BAUM). While arguably he had grudges held against Nixon for the Watergate scandal (BAUM), his message confirms the already suspected and discussed framework behind the war on drugs. Being an important part of the Nixon cabinet, Ehrlichman probably knew of any possible misconduct that he could have used to take revenge on Nixon, if he ever thought that the war on drugs was justified and needed to be defended. But he didn't. In fact, his statements about the war on drugs made in 1994 to Harper's Magazine are fairly blunt and straightforward.

> *"The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I'm saying? We knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did."* (qtd. in Baum)

It was a pyrrhic and immoral victory in the battle for reelection looking at the situation today, especially considering that Nixon preemptively resigned before impeachment by the Congress for the Watergate scandal, so the term he won by implementing a harmful policy with a harmful political intention fell rather short.

The domestic-international war

While Jimmy Carter, the president following Gerald Ford, took steps to decriminalize cannabis, the consequent Reagan administration loyally continued Nixon's drug war and injected new funds, advertising it largely in connection with a broader fight against organized crime, ironically. The First Lady, Nancy Reagan also launched the *„Just Say No"* prevention campaign that received federal funding as well. While this seems to be all right at the first glance, it has to be taken into consideration that it is prohibition itself that enables organized crime to have the lucrative untaxed business opportunity of drug trafficking (*„Advancing Drug Policy Reform"* 11–17; OLIVES; VÁSQUEZ 571.).

At least the Reagan administration recognized the importance of prevention, even though prohibitive practices still remained dominant, reinforced by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 that reintroduced the mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses that would eventually lead to the serious overcrowding in American prisons today, and is arguably a racist policy. Mandatory minimums first appeared in the 1950s and, surprisingly, the Nixon administration repealed them in 1970 (EDWARDS et al. 86). The mindset behind mandatory minimums was harsh punishment for deterrence, but deterrence as a concept has been long debated in criminology, and it is by now proven to be non-existent in drug punishment by several independent reports since then (WARNER; *„Advancing Drug Policy Reform"* 11, 16). The following Bush and Clinton administrations further increased the funds for law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of the war.

The Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 88 required the certification of economic partner countries by the government, particularly the President, for the *„cooperation [of drug-source countries] in counternarcotics efforts"* (VÁSQUEZ 567–571.), using market access and other types of economic coercion (571). In 1995 the Sentencing Commission, an advisory body of the Congress, called for the revision of mandatory minimum sentencing without effect, which is relevant here because these events highlight the firm grip of the drug war on presidential administrations.

The former indicates that the United States was exporting its war. The latter indicates that the U.S. failed to acknowledge flaws in its policy. Together they mean retention of the war, and the police culture of today. The relevance of the presidential certification of foreign countries had a deep impact in Latin-America, and mandatory minimum sentencing affected the domestic African community disproportionately.

Mandatory minimum sentencing introduced an obligatory minimum prison sentence for drug offenses, even for possession, until it was relaxed in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. These differed from drug to

drug, but it was especially high for crack cocaine, making it a prime test subject for discussion. The original explanation for this huge difference was the observation that more violence is involved in the crack business than in the powder cocaine business, although these ratios were not in proportion with the observed difference in violence (KURTZLEBEN).

In 2009 roughly 30% of crack cases involved a weapon over 15% of powder cocaine cases (KURTZLEBEN), providing a valid explanation for an approximate 1:2 ratio between crack and p.c. sentencing. If we assume that harsher punishments have a deterrence effect, which they do not, but let's pretend to be naïve, then an approx. 1:4 ratio could arguably be validated. Crack and powder form cocaine are exactly the same substance with exactly the same effects, except crack is cheaper, which means it was more accessible to users living in poverty. These mandatory minimums, though, had a 1:100 (1:18 after the 2010 Obama administration relaxation) ratio discrepancy between the two forms of the same drug. A first time trafficking offense involving 5 grams of crack meant a five year minimum prison sentence, which was equal to the minimum sentence involving the trafficking of 500 grams of powder form cocaine (KURTZLEBEN).

Why legislation like this affects ethnicities in minority disproportionately is a complicated and long story, but it is not directly because of their race or the color of their skin, but rather complicated socio-economic and cultural factors related to poverty and urbanization. Statistical data offers a quicker and more accurate description. By 2010 it became apparent that while studies show an equal ratio in drug use among the different American ethnicities, African-Americans were overrepresented in crack police cases by a large margin (KURTZLEBEN).

There also were other unforeseen domestic consequences of the war. It might seem surprising that racial tensions seemed to peak and erupt during the presidency of Barack Obama, but these tensions had never been fully resolved and were building up since the last historical landmark when progress was achieved, the Fair-Housing Act of 1968, signed into law after the assassination of Martin Luther King.

Shortly after this historical landmark Nixon declared his war. And Ehrlichman said it was targeted at special groups of the society, notably at African-Americans (BAUM). The following administrations, with little variation, continued the war, some even increased its funding which has „*more than quadrupled*" by 2002 (VÁSQUEZ 567.). It is difficult not to consider the drug war as a tool for social control, which raises difficult concerns about its exportation. Nevertheless, racial tensions surfaced in the 2014 Ferguson unrest, a year long series of nationwide protests that followed the shooting of a young black man by the Ferguson police.

Conclusion

From an analytic perspective the Michael Brown case, unfortunately, isn't unique or interesting, just one of many in a long history of similar cases, stemming largely from the unique American cultural context that created its unique police culture. Many times heavy protests follow the news of these events, as it happened in this case as well. What differentiated the Ferguson Unrest from other cases was the heavy response by the local St. Louis police, who „*secured*" even peaceful daytime protests by large numbers policemen who wore heavy riot gear and looked exactly like soldiers.

Since this event was well documented and broadcast over the world, it received global and nationwide attention. It became apparent that the federal government has been militarizing the local police forces through a previously unknown 1033 Program and others similar that armed the police forces nationwide with decommissioned military gear free of charge, sometimes to the extremes, from smaller arms to armored vehicles. The number of SWAT teams has also increased in huge steps from the 1960s, and their deployment became more and more frequent, not for high risk situations, but in pursuit of drug search warrants (DANSKY 1–11.). The independent police-issues journalist Radley Balko claims in his book „*The Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America's Police Forces*" that the war on drugs is largely responsible for that.

Moreover, a 2014 report from the American Civil Liberties Union reached similar conclusions, that the war on drugs was the major driver of these events as police forces in the possession of heavy military gear but not much funding started using their SWAT teams to pursue federal grant quotas. These quotas allocated extra funding for showing „*results*" in the pursuit of war on drugs goals. The consequences were dire, to say the least, from the spectrum of measurable data like the number of innocent lives taken to the immeasurable like the loss of trust between the community and their police forces, something which contributed to events like the Ferguson unrest or the birth of the Black Lives Matter movement (DANSKY 11–38.).

The war on drugs has failed in every possible aspect (DANSKY 2; „*Cato Handbook*"; „*War on Drugs: Report*" 2.). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime still failed to acknowledge that in their 2017 World Drug Report but strangely they avoid mentioning criminalization efforts and finally focus on prevention, treatment, and note the overcrowding prison population (*„World Drug Report*"). The United Nations Commission on Drug Policy, however, released an influential report back in 2011 which, for the first time, openly supports legalization and decriminalization efforts („*War on Drugs: Report*" 2–4.).

The report, among other things, mentions that between 1998 and 2008 drug consumption has increased (e.g. cocaine consumption by 27%), that prohibitive policies have a high impact on HIV prevalence among those who use injection, give criminals a valuable black market, that drug production evades law enforcement inevitably, that new substances can substitute illegal ones, and that there is a social stigmatization of even non-violent users („*War on Drugs: Report*" 2–9.).

Based on the aforementioned, we can conclude that the War on Drugs was an ill conceived attempt to arm and fund the governmental executive force that only succeeded in filling prisons with members of minorities or occasionally killing them ever since its first iteration during the Nixon cabinet, shortly after the milestones of the Civil Rights Movement. The War on Drugs seems to be the backlash of a predominantly white Republican leadership for the social progress achieved in the 1960s, and its consequences by now have taken root and created undesirable produce, while also having a degree of global influence. The responsible global drug regulatory commissions should recommend an approach involving harm reduction and control through legalization, loosely following the footsteps of the successful Swiss drug policy model (NEBEHAY). Regarding the United States, the police-related unrests of the 2010s ought to be understood in the historical context presented in the aforementioned.

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Book Review

KUPCHAN, Charles A., *Isolationism, A History of America's Effort's to Shield Itself from the World.* New York, NY, 2020, 446 s. ISBN 978-01-9939-302-2

American isolationism has captivated academic life for over a century. The newest product of this fascination is Charles A. Kupchan's work which aims to place the US foreign policy doctrine in it's wider „*ancient*" historic context. Kupchan is himself a seasoned expert in academia and foreign policy: he is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University in the Walsh School of Foreign Service and Department of Government. Between 2014 and 2017 Kupchan also served as special assistant to the president and senior director for European affairs on the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) in the Barack Obama administration. The book was published in fall 2020 and in it's introduction aims to reflect on and contextualize the recent changes in US foreign policy. The US's international engagement was reformed by Barack Obama, then with Donald Trump's 2016 election victory the doctrine of „*America First*" had been implemented. Trump's „*America First*" slogan however has deep roots dating back to the Founding Fathers, which is isolationism.

Isolationism is a complex and complicated idea, which was introduced by the Founding Fathers: George Washington laid down it's foundation in his farewell address, and has since influenced US foreign policy. According to isolationist thought, the US must refrain from involvement in foreign affairs outside of the New World, to safeguard it's republican institutions and values. As the author writes, isolationism is a „*story of America's efforts to shield itself from the World.*" The book itself is not merely a geopolitical analysis or history of the idea, but a complex „*story*" of isolationism. This „*story*" is presented in an academic fashion, which examines American isolation from many angles. The author introduces the idea of isolationism and also presents a historical, geopolitical, strategic, political and foreign policy background.

The book has a framed structure, between the introduction and conclusion there are three parts which focus on the history of isolationism from the beginning to the 2020 Democratic primary elections. In the introduction we learn the anatomy of isolationism, and that the US foreign policy doctrine has it's roots in geography. The young Northern-American nation lay far away from the epicenter of the rivalry between the great powers and isolationism was hence hardwired in US

foreign policy. This geographic position enabled the US to keep distance from the „*bloody*" wars of European powers. The North-American settlers did not exclusively enjoy this reality, as in their early history Britain and Japan also shared this and could follow a policy of development behind the shield of geography. Besides geography, isolationism was influenced by other causes and it's internal logic can be summed up in six points: 1) capitalizing on natural security, 2) serving as redeemer nation, 3) advancing liberty and prosperity at home, 4) preserving freedom of action abroad, 5) protecting social homogenity, 6) promoting pacifism. These six factors make up the core of the idea. In the introduction, the author debunks the notion that isolationism can be tied to a single political party or social class. Kupchan concludes that isolationism supercedes party lines and is a fundamental part of American foreign policy thinking, affecting even political and social movements as well. To illustrate this the three parts of the book gives an overview of the influence of isolationism on three distinct historical periods. The first is titled the „The *era of isolationism*", the second „*The defeat of realist and idealist internationalism*", the third „*The rise and fall of liberal internationalism*".

The first part encompasses the American Revolutionary War to the Spanish-American War of 1898. The isolationist thought is outlined in George Washington's farewell address which had geographical roots. The young republic needed the support of France to secure independence, but to remain, it needed to distance itself from European alliances. For the US to fulfill it's „*messianic role*" it had to aim for neutrality, as it was encircled by Britain from Canada, Spain from Florida and France from Louisiana. In this position, the Founding Fathers determined that it is in their interest to preserve their institutions, homogenity and reach the shores of California i.e. *Manifest Destiny*. The United States was from the beginning vary of inner and outer enemies that could pollute the „*purity*" of their republic. These enemies have changed during history, but the fear of of them influences public thinking in the US to this day. The young republic attempted to expand towards Canada in 1812, however besides this exception, the 19th century was influenced by the Monroe-doctrine, which isolated the US from major wars until 1898. As an American author Kupchan considers the American-Mexican war and the conflicts with Native Americans as „*domestic*", as these did not antagonise isolationist policy. Conquering the inner parts of North-America and the borderlands of Mexico was all aimed at realizing *Manifest Destiny*.

In the second part the author highlights the changes in the age of isolationism and internationalism, from the Spanish-American war up to the event in 1941 at Pearl Harbour. Kupchan presents how the US, after fulfilling *Manifest Destiny*, became an „*imperialist*" power. The author

does not consider the US's Pacific and East-Asian expansion as colonialism, but as empire building. According to him, the 1898 war was the precursor to the Wilson administration's aim to build an *„American world"* after World War I. The americanization of international life is a fundamental tenet of internationalism with different approaches to implementing it: *„fleet diplomacy"*, *„dollar diplomacy"* or liberal internationalism. Isolationism reached it's peak between 1920 and 1941, not only in the Republican Party but the Democratic Party and other political and social movements have been inspired. The golden age of pacifism was between 1898 and 1941, which is illustrated by the fact that Democrat William J. Bryan ran for presidency on three occasions and was the Secretary of State in the Wilson administration. Kupchan debunks the long standing myth that isolationism was a reaction to World War I and a tool of the Republicans to dominate interwar US politics. In this period each administration considered the new international role of the United States of America. This serves as an important note on US foreign policy between the world wars, from the League of Nations debate to the Washington Conference, the law of neutrality and the Great Depression.

The third part of the book encompasses the period from 1941 to contemporary politics. The author identifies the post-Cold War American foreign policy as an age of liberal internationalism and claims that the US was forced into involvement in the world to antagonize the Soviet Union. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US became the sole superpower, but the new millenia began with endless wars in the Middle East and and became overburdened by support of it's European and Asian allies. According to Kupchan the war in Afghanistan was necessary, but maintains that the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a mistake. The author concludes with analysis of recent events and points out that the US must reevaluate it's role in the world. Barack Obama began this process, which was amplified by Donald Trump's policy of *„America First"*, by bringing back isolationism from the Founding Fathers and the early 20th century dollar diplomacy. Kupchan ponders on the present and future of the United States. He agrees that the US is no longer a sole superpower and that a rising China could overtake this position. He agrees with the opinions of many that the US should focus on domestic issues, should pull out of the Middle East, but maintain it's alliances with fairness, and with allies also taking their responsibilities and contributions seriously. An imbalanced Europe and Asia, just as in the 19th century could push the US back to being one of many great powers. The advances of technology and science has evaporated the *„ocean shields"*. Kupchan concludes that the US must face these new challenges and give an appropriate answer without becoming isolationist or continuing to export democracy via liberal internationalism. There

should be a middle way between the 19th and 20th century methods that the US could follow in the 21st century.

Kupchan's work is a complex and interesting read for the layman and the academic as well. It's language is not too complicated, apart from the necessary technical terms the text is easy to read. The author used a large pool of sources, due to the complexity of the topic mostly contemporary sources were favored e.g. memoires, speeches or press releases. Due to this, the book is rich with citations. This does not diminish the virtues of the text, on the contrary, this can provide the reader with a more comprehensive understanding of American political, social and religious thought throughout the centuries. The complexity of the book is advantageous and is a useful source for researchers of American political thinking, geopolitics or historians of diplomacy. The most unique part of Kupchan's work is the part discussing 1898-1941 where the author includes less known ideas and issues, such as 19th century dollar diplomacy, the League of Nations debate in the Senate and the domestic politics after World War I, or the Harding and Coolidge administrations' foreign policy.

The only drawback of the book is that after the Great Depression the discussion is quite selective, only highlighting single events from the time of the Cold War and recent times. Although the work mentions internationalism as well, an in-depth presentation is out of scope and the relation between isolationism and internationalism is only briefly outlined. If someone wishes to become familiar with isolationism and internationalism we can recommend to compare Kupchan's work with Colin Dueck's „*Age of Iron: On Conservative Nationalism"* from 2019, which presents American internationalism from beginning to today.

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Necrology

Minden elmúlik, mint az álom,
Elröpül, mint a vándormadár,
Csak az emlék marad meg a szívben,
Halványan, mint a holdsugár.
Friedrich Schiller

Búcsú egy nemzedéktől

A rendszerváltás előtt négy professzor dolgozott az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszéken (akkor Új- és Legújabbkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék volt a neve). Valamennyien megszerezték a kandidátusi fokozatot (azóta PhD a neve), és az MTA doktora címet. Nemcsak itthon, hanem nemzetközileg is ismert, elismert szakemberek voltak. Már egyikük sem él. Velük egy generáció távozott az egyetemi életből. 1929-ben, 1930-ban születtek és történelmi időket éltek. Világháború, forradalom, rendszerváltások között zajlott az életük és történelmi változások közepette dolgoztak. Nem panaszkodhattak, nem voltak unalmasak az átélt évtizedek. Olyan idők voltak ezek, amikor még az életük is veszélybe kerülhetett, hiszen a háború alatt menekülni kellett a front, a bombák, a lövedékek elől. Szerencsére túlélték a viszontagságokat. A történész sokáig él. Talán azért, hogy ne csak levéltári dokumentumokból ismerje meg a történelmet, hanem a saját bőrén érezze, mi a történelem. S még az un. rendszerváltást is megélték. Nem is tudom, hányadik rendszerváltás volt ez születésük óta. Ha jól számolom a hetedik váltást is megérték. S a hetes szám varázslatos, mágikus, misztikus. A világmindenség szerkezetét a hetessel fejezik ki. Egyiptomban kultusza volt a számnak. A matematikában a hetes boldog szám. A szivárványnak hét színe van. A Göncölszekér hét csillagból áll. Az ókori görög bölcsek heten voltak. Az ókori világnak hét csodája ismert. A meséknek hét tündére és hét törpéje van. A bibliai József hét szűk és hét bő esztendőről beszélt. A magyar történelemben pedig hét vezér hajtotta végre a honfoglalást. A népmesékben is fontos a hetes szám. A legkisebb fiú hétmérföldes csizmában indul az élet nagy kalandjára, s legyőzi a hétfejű sárkányt. Professzoraink nemzedéke is legyőzte a maga hétfejű sárkányát, hogy megtalálja önmagát. Ahogy József Attila írja: *„E világon ha ütsz tanyát,/ hétszer szüljön meg az anyád”*. Hogy aztán felnőtté válva *„A hetedik te magad légy”*.

Én egyiküknek sem voltam a tanítványa, mivel nem az ELTE-n végeztem, hanem Szegeden. Könyveik, tanulmányaik alapján jól ismertem őket. Egyetemistaként az ő munkáikból is készültem a vizsgákra, felhasználtam a szemináriumi dolgozatokhoz. Az ELTE-re akkor kerültem, amikor ők már nyugdíjasok voltak, így csak azoknak lehettem a kollégája, akik a nyugdíj után is tanítottak.

Kis Aladár (1930–2002), az olasz ügyek szakértője volt, s én személyesen nem ismertem Az 1975-ben megjelent *Olaszország története 1748-1968* című munkája, valamint az 1989-ben publikált, *A duce* című kötetét egyetemi hallgatók, történészek még ma is használják és a történelem iránt érdeklődő szélesebb közönség is forgatja, olvassa. 1973 és 1977 között a Római Magyar Akadémia igazgatója volt.

Vadász Sándor (1930-2017) kitűnően ismerte a francia forradalmat és a munkásmozgalom történetének is szakértője volt. Az *Emberek és eszmék a francia forradalomban (1789-1799)* című 1989-ben megjelent munkájával szerezte meg az MTA doktora címet. 2000-ben vonult nyugdíjba, de ezt követően is tanított, egészen 2012-ig. Megkapta a professor emeritus címet is. A hallgatók szerették az óráit. Szenvedélyesen tudott vitázni történelmi kérdésekről vagy éppen aktuálpolitikáról. S annak ellenére, hogy nem volt könnyű ember, jó társalgó volt. A tanítás mellett fontosnak tartotta a tudományos ismeretterjesztést. Rádiós műsort vezetett, amelyben a magyar és az egyetemes történelem jelentős kérdéseit mutatta be neves szakértők bevonásával. A rádiós beszélgetések egy része nyomtatásban is megjelent *Rádiós történelem* címmel (2007). Több helyen is kutatott. Szívesen emlékezett Stockholmra és különösen Párizsra. Ez utóbbira azért, mert 1968 tavaszán volt a francia fővárosban, amikor kitört a diákok lázadása. S ennek ő szemtanúja volt a Quartier latinben. Itthon is volt forradalom élménye 1956-ban, s ez bizony kissé megtörte személyes karrierjét is.

2012 után sem szakadt el a hallgatóktól, a kollégáktól. Gyakran feltűnt a karon, a tanszéken. Megkereste kollégáit, ismerőseit és jókat beszélgetett velük. Sok terve volt. A 80. születésnapjára megjelent vaskos tanulmánykötet végén a vele készült interjúban, megemlítette, hogy még egy könyvet szeretne megírni, *Egyetemek és állambiztonság* címmel. Ebben mutatta volna be az Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltárában végzett tíz esztendős kutatásainak eredményeit. Ez a könyv sajnos nem készült el. Az égi történész klubban azonban biztosan tart előadást erről a kérdésről is.

Néhány évvel később *Urbán Aladár* (1929–2019) távozott. Kollégái, tanítványai a 80. születésnapjára tanulmánykötettel tisztelték meg. *Két világ kutatója* címmel jelent meg ez a könyv. S joggal kapta ezt a címet ez a kötet, mert Urbán professzor a 19. századi magyar és az USA történetének is elismert kutatója, művelője volt. Amerika történetéről több könyvvel, dokumentumgyűjteménnyel segítette a hallgatókat, hogy megismerjék az új világot és sikeres legyen a kollokviumuk és a szigorlatuk. Az igazi szerelme azonban 1848-1849 volt. Különösen az első magyar miniszterelnök, Batthyány Lajos életét kutatta, s több könyvet, tanulmányt írt róla. 1848 és Amerika 19. századi története egész életre szóló munkát adott Urbán professzornak. Egyszerre gondolkodott magyar és egyetemes összefüggésekben. Hallgatók nemzedékei ismerték

meg kutatásainak eredményeit. S a pálya valóban hosszú volt, hiszen 1952-től tanított az ELTE-n. Szigorú vizsgáztató volt. A tanítás és a kutatás mellett a Századok egyik szerkesztőjeként is dolgozott (1975-2007). 2000-ben megkapta a professor emeritus címet.

Diószegi István (1930-2020) volt a diplomáciatörténet. Híres könyve, az 1967-ben megjelent *Klasszikus diplomácia – modern hatalmi politika* nemzedékek számára meghatározó élmény volt. Számomra is. Ennek hatására kezdtem el foglalkozni a diplomácia történetével. S hogy mi volt a könyv hatásának a titka? Elsősorban az, hogy a hatvanas évek végén Diószegi professzor könnyed, olvasmányos stílusban írt a történelem fajsúlyos kérdéseiről. S ebben a korban ez nem volt könnyű. Nem, mert mozgalmi zsargon és napi politika felhang nélkül nem igazán lehetett tárgyalni olyan kérdéseket, amelyek Európa és a világ története szempontjából meghatározóak voltak.

A professzor mélyről indult, hiszen ahogy magáról írja *„Felmenőim kisföldű parasztok, nincstelen mezőgazdasági munkások voltak, apai nagyszüleim írni-olvasni sem tudtak”*. S ha ehhez még azt a megjegyzését is megemlítem, hogy a gimnáziumban különösebb tehetséget nem mutató diák volt, a későbbi pálya ismeretében szinte hihetetlennek tűnik. A magyar házidolgozatát ugyanis nem egyszer *„írói tehetséggel megáldott”* András bátyja készítette el helyette. S ez azért meglepő, mert kevés ilyen jó tollú történész van, mint Diószegi professzor volt.

1978-ban lett egyetemi tanár, s egyúttal megkapta a tanszék vezetését is, amelynek élén 1995-ig állt. 1979 és 1982 között ő volt a Bölcsészkar dékánja, 1991-től 1999-ig pedig a Magyar Történelmi Társulat elnöke. Nyugdíjba vonulásakor (2000) ő is megkapta a professor emeritusi címet.

Elmentek professzoraink, egymás után. Már az égben művelik szakmájukat vagy egy másik univerzumban. Ha hinni lehet annak az elméletnek, amely szerint számos más univerzum is van, sőt, párhuzamos univerzumok is léteznek. Akár így van, akár nem, a földi életből kollégáink eltávoztak. Nyugodjanak békében.

Majoros István

S aztán követik őket az újabb generációk, mert ez az élet rendje. Tragikusnak tartjuk azonban, ha valaki idő előtt hagyja el a földi pályát.

Lugosi Győzőtől búcsúzunk

Az ELTE BTK Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszékének nyugalmazott egyetemi docense, Lugosi Győző (1952-2021), életének 69. évében eltávozott. Hosszú küzdelmet vívott a vírussal, hetekig hol

csüggesztő, hol bíztató híreket hallottunk felőle, a remény végül kihunyt. Annak ellenére, hogy váratlanul és fájdalmasan korán ragadta el a sors, Lugosi Győző teljes életet élt, tanárként, kutatóként, tudományszervezőként, szerkesztőként, magánemberként egyaránt. Öt gyermeke, tanítványai hálás emlékezete, magyar és idegen nyelvű publikációi, társadalmi szerepvállalása ékes példái ennek.

Lugosi Győző az 1970-es évek első felében volt az ELTE Bölcsészkarának hallgatója. Számos neves tanára közül mindig különös szeretettel emlegette Borsányi Károlyt, a keveset publikáló, de rendkívül szuggesztív tanáregyéniséget, aki sok fontos, további életét meghatározóan befolyásoló könyvet adott a kezébe. Az egyetem elvégzése után egyéves *„szabad kutatói"* ösztöndíjat kapott a párizsi elitképzőbe, az École Normale Supérieure-be. Kiválasztását szerényen inkább a szerencsének, mintsem kiválóságának tulajdonította. Az ösztöndíjas munkája belépést biztosított egy másik *„grande école"*, az EHESS, a braudeli Társadalomtudományi Főiskola és a CNRS (Országos Tudományos Kutatási Központ) posztgraduális szemináriumába, amely Paul Ottino vezetésével az indiai-óceáni közép- és kora újkori érintkezés kultúrtörténetével foglalkozott. Itt írta meg a gyarmati hódítás előtti Madagaszkár államiságáról szóló *„kisdoktori"* értekezését, amelyben a marxi elmélet alapján ábrázolta a gyarmati hódítás előtti malgas viszonyokat, fölhasználva a *„polányista"* gazdaságelmélet, a durkheimi-maussi-shalinsi szociológia/antropológia eredményeit.

1980-tól tanított az ELTE BTK Új- és Legújabbkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszékén, ahova Salgó László professzor, a tanszék kebelében működő Afro-Ázsiai Tanszéki Szakcsoport vezetője *„csábította"*, s nyugdíjazásáig, 2018-ig a tanszék oktatója maradt. Legközelebbi munkatársa Balogh András volt, aki Diószegi István után Lugosi Győző tanszékvezetője lett. Korai éveiben végzett kutatásai alapján vált nem csupán a malgas történelem legjobb és sokáig egyetlen hazai művelőjévé, s emellett nemzetközileg is számon tartott Benyovszky-kutatóvá. A tanszék oktatási feladatai megkövetelték a szélesebb oktatói-kutatói palettát, így vált Lugosi Győző az 1980-as évektől *„Az európai koncert és a keleti kérdés"*, *„A Közel- és a Közép-Kelet diplomáciája a XX-XXI. században"*, valamint a *„Világrendszer-elmélet, nemzeti kérdés és globalizáció"* kutatási-oktatási területek elismert szaktekintélyévé. S ez egyáltalán nem kegyes túlzás. Amihez hozzáfogott, azt roppant alapossággal, maximalizmusra törekvéssel, mégis szakmai alázattal csinálta. 2002-ben doktori fokozatát átminősíttette PhD fokozattá, amely után docensi kinevezést kapott. 2014-2018 között az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék doktori programjának vezetője volt. Az általa szervezett kutatóhelyi viták népszerű tudományos fórumokká váltak. Tudományos pályafutására jellemző, hogy nem

„*termelte*" a publikációkat, csak akkor írt, ha belső késztetést érzett, akkor viszont alapos és minőségi munkák kerültek ki a keze alól.

A rendszerváltás után sem váltott köpönyeget, maradt, aki volt, a társadalmi emancipáció elkötelezett híve. Ez vezette a tudomány elefántcsont tornyából a népműveléshez is, számos kiváló tudós-tanár példáját követve a Tudományos Ismeretterjesztő Társulat népszerű előadójává, majd a budapesti TIT szervezet vezetőjévé vált. 1993 őszén a Kossuth Klub igazgatói tisztségét is átvette – a feladatra nem maga jelentkezett, hanem az egyesület munkatársai kértek fel erre. 2008-ig igazgatta az intézményt, majd az elnöke lett. Másfajta közéleti szerepet is keresett, vagy inkább teremtett magának: 1990-ben megalakította a Budapesti Condorcet Kört, egy pár évvel korábban létesült francia baloldali-republikánus, értelmiségi hálózat egyedüli nem frankofón mutációját, amely 1998-ig sikeresen működött. Innen egyenes út vezetett az Eszmélet folyóirat szerkesztőségébe, amelynek Lugosi Győző haláláig felelős szerkesztője volt.

Egyetemi kollégái, barátai, s tanítványai nevében búcsúzunk tőle!

Búr Gábor