ÖT KONTINENS

Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék Tudományos Közleményei

№2017/2.

**Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST
2020**

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FIVE CONTINENTS

Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History
№ 2017/2.

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First Part

Introduction to the First Part

The Doctoral Program of American Studies, along with the Doctoral Program of Modern and Contemporary Universal History, organized the conference titled „*U.S. Politics and the Media*" on the 29-30th of November, 2019. The goal of the event was to discuss the different faces and complex relationships of American politics and the media, including the historical changes in the media since the 19th c. and the rise of the internet and social media at the beginning of the 21st c, especially in the context of the 2020 American Presidential Elections.

The Ph.D. students, both international and Hungarian, and professors who took part presented their latest research in both English and Hungarian. The topic was examined from an interdisciplinary perspective, with coherent, thorough research that led to valuable and useful conclusions for each participant.

The conference was opened by James G. Land who is the Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy of the United States in Hungary.

The twenty-five academic presenters represented eight universities from five nations. Moreover, in total seven students took part in our conference who study at our university under the scholarship program „*Stipendium Hungaricum*", either as presenters or organizers. They made a large contribution to the success of the conference. Dr. Éva Eszter Szabó, Dániel Cseh, and Dr. Louis Jungmayer were responsible for the professional moderation of the presentations and debates in the panels.

The student panels were sectioned between three professional keynote lectures. The first one was by Dr. Jesse T. Richman, associate professor of Old Dominion University. He emphasized the importance of the agreement about facts in both politics and media-communication, and the harmful effects and possible future of polarization derived from the lack of such. Thus, he set the tone for the discussions of the conference.

Dr. Allison Clark Pingley, associate professor of the University of South Carolina Upstate, examined the active influence and operative consequences of the media on American elections, comprehensively outlining this complex system of relationships. She also highlighted feedback loops in these relationships that are known but frequently overlooked in political discourse.

Dr. Tibor Frank, professor emeritus of ELTE, researched the workings of American journalists operating in Hungary in the interwar period, in an era abundant with fake news and propaganda. The presentation provided relevant background information about, among

others, the 100th Bandholtz Anniversary, but also about the relations of media and politics in general.

The final event of the conference was a roundtable discussion moderated by Prof. Tibor Frank. The members (Allison Clark Pingley – USCU; Jesse T. Richman – ODU; Miklós Lojkó – ELTE; Károly Pintér – PPKE; Tibor Frank – ELTE) detailed and directly debated the topics that were mentioned in the conference. They gave perspective by historical examples, they examined and compared the political and media correlations valid to both the United States and Hungary, and summarized the main findings: the importance of public agreement on facts, the fast nature of technological adaptation today, the expected topics of the upcoming American presidential elections, and the possible antidotes to the polarization of political discourse.

We are especially grateful for the generous supporters of the conference: ELTE Faculty of Humanities, ELTE FoH Student Union, the Embassy of the United States in Hungary, and Mastercard in cooperation with the Treffort-kert Foundation.

Wijdene Ayed[1]

The United States in the eyes of Non-Americans
A qualitative investigation of foreign media representation of the US within university students

This article is broadly concerned with the representation of the United States of America in foreign media. The research seeks to investigate how salient foreign media influences tremendously the image of the US within a global sphere, exclusively among the 1980s and 1990s generation. To examine this media impact, qualitative method is used to depict the instances of international media coverage of American information and news. Interviewing university students who have different backgrounds gives an idea about the crucial role of the media in constructing and shaping the public opinion as well as creating general views about the USA. A number of 16 interviews conducted with participants from diverse nationalities resulted in two main discussions. The first point unveils the fact that media can be very manipulative and manipulated simultaneously. The second point shows that students do realize the existence of a biased image about the United States displayed in this media; exclusively the non-American one. What is seen, heard of or read should make people question this popularity of USA image. In a nutshell, the study demonstrates how persuasive and influential media coverage of the United States of America can be and how the latter is exposed and pictured within international communities based on geographical allocations.
Keywords: media; representation; manipulation; opinionating; pro-Americanism; Anti-Americanism;

The Second World War completely unbalanced the status of the leading nations. Ever since, the balance of power has been turned upside-down. Political tendencies altered the world order from a multipolar one into bipolarity between the East and the West. The collapse of the major empires including the French, the German and the British ones tilled the ground for the US to grow in weight and in sovereignty. By the time the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union lost its reign over the eastern pole leaving the leadership to Americans to rule, creating a unipolar world. „*The United States entered the post war era with a great and unique position because its rivals got defeated and its allies got exhausted"* (ASHFAQ & BIN HUSSEIN 145).
Globalization and modernization are playing a significant role in

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showing this powerfulness to the public. The United States reached a leading position in various fields; needless to say in solely the field of politics. They worked on idealizing the democratic society they aimed to build. They developed some; if not most, of the highest modern technologies used around the planet. They established a capitalist economic system to invade and dominate the world economy.

For countless reasons, our world is becoming more westernized than ever. In order to explore and exploit other countries, Americans invaded most of the world because of their power. For this, they needed a conduit transferring what appears good inside the territories of the country outside its borders; exclusively to universalize their policies of Western liberal democracy and to dominate with „*American capital interests and culture"* and ideologies (ASHFAQ & BIN HUSSEIN 146). Here lies the power of media. Accessibility to the various means of networking is bridging any potential gap between the Far East and the Far West. Connectivity is making everything closer, easier and one step away from the other. Now we can get information at anytime and anywhere we are located. Media in all its forms would serve the purpose and the interest of a country and as for The United States, using such tools is crucially essential.

Back to the 1960s and 1970s, mass communication practitioners declared that international mass media role shifted the attention to First World nations such as the United States (STRAUBHAAR, 1991). The latter is believed to dominate media for its advantage which created a sort of a „*one-way flow of information"* (STRAUBHAAR 2). Many American ideas promoted in media were challenged. Two controversial or opposites arise at this level: Pro-Americans and Anti-Americans. It is up to individuals to decide which part they would want to take aside. However, there are many factors that are directly and indirectly linked to the image that people build about a country such as the United States of America. Geographical, cultural, historical, religious, societal, economic, nationalistic, educational and political backgrounds interfere in the adoption of a particular ideology and the construction of a certain opinion over another. Nonetheless, foreign media „*has been one of the significant dimensions"* and became a massive influencer in shaping the current worldwide views (ASHFAQ & BIN HUSSEIN 155).

While literature focuses on how the American media (local and international) represents the US locally and worldwide as the dream-like nation, there are very few studies which discussed the opposite: USA image in foreign salient media. In this context, I intend to investigate the usage of non-American media in representing the United States of America. My two research questions would be as following:

> – To what extent media can be manipulative?
> – How is the United States of America represented in non-American media?

The article discusses how powerful and extravagant media can be in presenting reality or its falsified versions for young generations. Ashfaq & Bin Hussein stated that *„The global mass media including television, radio, newspapers, blogs, internet social networking and websites are busy in playing a considerable role in constructing and shaping the image of the US"* (147). Therefore, the research is an attempt to see how active university students view and construct their ideas about America through these different mediated sources of information.

Method

Research design

In order to investigate the impact of non-American media in representing the United States of America, a qualitative-type of empirical study has been made for the purpose. An instrument that includes all questions was designed and piloted for this particular research. First, a pilot interview was conducted with one participant in order to modify and finalize the questions. Few modifications were made to the instrument by giving more details to some of the questions and adding a new question. The interview consisted of nineteen questions divided into main constructs: six media-related, nine USA-related, three biographical and one closing question. The questions included:

– Do you think the media can be manipulative?
– If yes, to what extent it can be.
– Do you think the media can be manipulative-manipulated in representing the USA?

Participants

To meet the potential results of the study, a number of 16 active university students were selected based on their nationalities. Participants' age ranged between 22 and 33 years old. ELTE University within different faculties

Number of participants	Media usage
3	3 = Often
4	4= A lot
9	5 = Always

Table 1: *Media usage*

with the majority enrolled at the faculty of humanities, two participants were only language learners attending Hungarian language classes organized by ELTE. One participant interviewed was an active Bachelor Degree student at SZIE University. The participants were all interviewed in a week period with one-to-one interviews that endured between 30 and 60 minutes.

Results and discussion

At the beginning of the interview, participants had to reflect on their usage of media. The table given below summarizes the 16 participants' media use in a Likert scale from 1 to 5 with 1 = never / 2= sometimes / 3 = often / 4 = a lot / 5 = always. They also reflected on their level of dependency for getting information from this media in a percentage scale. It is important to note that the word media at this level does not refer to any particular media but it is only a term in general.

The first table shows that all participants do make use of media, 9 of whom are always using it. The second table shows that those participants have different dependency levels in getting information from media. Nonetheless, 25% of participants declared that they are very dependent on using media to have all sort of information they need, 37.6% of them are mostly dependent on it while only 6.25% or 1 person said that they would not rely on media for any information.

Number of participants	Media dependency level
1	20-40%
5	40-60%
6	60-80%
4	80-100%

Table 2: *Media dependency level*

Table 3 : *types of media tools frequently used by participants*

Offline media		Online media Internet-based			
TV channels	Articles	Applications	Websites	Browsers	Articles
National TV	newspapers	Facebook	Podcats	Google	Newspapers
BBC		instagram	Programs	Google news	
CNN		Twitter	TV channels		
Aljazeera		Youtube	spotify		
Alghad		Messenger	Netflix		
		Telegram			
		Whatsapp			
		VK			
		Apple news			

In this table I intended to list all the media tools that interviewees mentioned during the interview as a response to the third question 'Which media do you use in particular?'

The answers varied between two main categories: online and offline. Most of the participants declared that they use internet and mobile applications including Facebook, Instagram and Telegram. Almost all the interviewees rely on the Google browser to surf on the internet to get

their information. Very few of them said that they watch Television channels such as BBC, Aljazeera or CNN.

Table 4: *Partition of participants based on nationalities*

Asia	Africa	Europe	Americas
Russia (2)	*Egypt*	*Slovakia*	*The United States of America*
Turkmenistan	*Tunisia*	*Hungary*	
Iran	*Algeria*	*Ukraine*	
Jordan	*South Africa*		
Syria			
Lebanon			

During the participants' selection process, I tried to have backgrounds' insights based on different nationalities to meet the expected results of the research. There were 7 participants from Asia; 4 of them are from central and western Asia and the rest are from the Middle East. As for the African continent, the participants were from both North and South Africa. Only eastern European countries were present for interviews and finally two participants were from the USA.

1. *Overview of media and its manipulative aspect among participants*

According to interviewees, media can be very manipulative and manipulated at the same time. *„Media brings about propaganda and the phobias people have"* declared one participant. Media tries to draw attention by using the most common stereotypes and the sensitive topics and use them in opinionating the masses. *„Companies can buy news agencies to promote their own agendas"* expressed another one. *„Sometimes when they endorse politicians, they use media organs to support them"* added the latter. One of the participants discussed the USA elections and saw that there was a *„British company which took information from Facebook and manipulated it in a way that it advertised President Trump to serve his electoral campaign"*. Even in the most democratic countries *„the government controls media because this is the way it keeps the populace in control in order to prevent any form of savagery"*. Mathew Baum (2011) stated that *„a change in public perception of foreign policy may have important implications for public policy"*. This change in perception cannot be done without the massive implication of media in the matter.

A lot of people are influenced by news presented, for instance, in TV channels. Russian participants stated that people in their country following the national TV are so far from being critical thinkers. They

hear news and they just assume that it is right and they would not question whether it is real or fake. „*Media can lie a lot*" voiced an Egyptian participant „*and we cannot have control over this fact*", there is always somebody's opinion behind it.

Hungarian media is believed to be influential as „*those who are really watching it are quite naïve and they believe what is told to them*". The participant from Hungary also claimed that Hungarian TV channels in general are very selective in what they present to people as „*they only give what they want you to hear*". An Egyptian interviewee agrees with this saying that „*we see what is given to us, we do not choose*".

A participant from Iran argued that people do not have the ability to be present in every event happening around the world. That is why they have to watch these events broadcasted. Therefore „*we depend on the way the media wants us to perceive what is happening, not as exactly it has occurred*". An illustration to this can be noticed in the war that took place in the Kurdish part of Iran: what the USA showed about it was completely different from what the Russian media showed. The participant commented that „*it was only one picture but from different angles. They manipulate the data to show you what they want you to believe. There is no 100 percent true news that we can find*".

Soft news media enables the public „*to learn about high-profile issues, like foreign crises*" which can „*influence policy makers*" (Mathew BAUM, 2011, 4). However, people take everything they see for granted, they just „*see and act upon that*" also. Media is indeed shaping „*our mentality and our subconscious even if we are not aware of it. It cannot not to play a role in our lives; it simply affects us even if we are not aware of that. Whether it is directly or indirectly, we act upon it*" claimed a Jordanian participant.

2. Most powerful media for participants

Participants do not rely anymore on books to get general information from them. They would not go to libraries to dig in to sort out what is needed to know or to discover. The 'holy Google' has made everything accessible and few clicks away from everyone. Internet browsers sort out and presents users' preferences and interests-related information. This is an illustration of the method advertisements are made. They look for what people are already looking for and they advertise that for them. The more people click on websites, the more companies behind them would earn.

Based on the participants' answers, one of the most powerful media tools is the online ones. An illustration of this is YouTube. People have the possibility to choose whom they want to follow and to subscribe for. Many

times, this choice they make is more dangerous than benefiting. YouTube poses on its users implicit preferences based on what they checked earlier. Simply, they can continue watching videos inciting for crimes and terrorism acts and end up brainwashed. Some even commented on the fact that YouTube videos are made in a very professional way and content-makers spend a lot of money to produce such content. Now people consume more on what they see and watch. The majority of the interviewees claimed that they do not prefer to read anymore. Things are just made way easier with applications such as YouTube.

Other powerful applications are Facebook and Instagram. One of the participants asserted that „*Twitter is getting also stronger*" and another one said that it is the most „*trendy*" and up to date as „*it talks about current affairs*". Those applications are adjustable, free and available for everyone regardless the age and with no exceptions.

Furthermore, the way Facebook works is very easy and quick. The fact that any person can post anything that can be shared by anyone can be very persuasive. What pops up first in the feed will be the thing they want to influence people with. People prefer it as „*the information given there is built on a nutshell*" and there is no need to spend a lot of time reading an article based on the affirmation of one of the participants. „*There are short videos for example which give you information. This is more entertaining and this is what people need; they do not want to force their brains.*" For some participants, „*Facebook is the most used application in the world*". Interestingly, an interviewee claimed that through Facebook „*we are always getting information from those who go through the things themselves*". It is very natural that we tend to look for the source and people who were on spot to tell us what happened for real. All of this becomes possible with Facebook.

Another interviewee pointed out an important point: how Facebook changed countries and their political regimes. Facebook and social media in general played a crucial role in creating what happened in Tunisia before, other Arab countries which witnessed revolutions since 2011, and what is happening now in Lebanon. People incited each other to go on manifestations in the streets and to call for their liberty and freedom from dictators. Facebook and Twitter chats gathered thousands of young users to unite for one purpose: to gain back their countries. Political systems have been changed and outrages started out of Facebok posts and Twitter tweets. They are „*very life-changing applications*" specified the Lebanese participant.

Another form of influence comes from the movies industry. People simply sit in front of a screen, watch and try to enjoy it. They would very rarely think about the content they see. It works in the same way as videos on YouTube or Facebook: an irresponsible and indifferent

consumption. Movies do represent the life, the culture and the society of a particular country and that is how most people create their idea about a nation. Even though documentaries; as film genres, can be very informative they can give falsified or untruthful information to the public. They only have one side of the story. Movies are also like Instagram in a way that people follow their favorite actors or singers or any public person. They would want to be like them in every aspect. They do not question how fake these peoples' lives can be. A Tunisian participant claimed that they can even lead to mental health issues and depression because people never get enough and they always look for more because of what they see on such applications.

3. *Media-displayed information reliability and validity*

The outcome of 16 interviews led to one main fact: the majority of people do not check the validity or reliability of the information they find in different media. University students will only check if the references they are about to include in their papers are academic or not. It is very rare that one of them would check how reliable websites or news displayed. They said it might take a long time. One of participants even claimed that it is not possible to see how reliable the sources can be as we do not possess „*tools to judge as normal people".* Unless they see with their own eyes, all what is we see in media is unquestionable and trustworthy. However, another one claimed that there are many indicators of credibility that we learn by time and that would show if the information is to be trusted or not. It might still be possible to find unbiased details and that is still faithful to the science used. One of the participants claimed that if he find something really surprising for him he would try to find whether it is true or not, especially if this information would change his view or idea regarding a particular topic. It can be also the content of the headline that would be attractive and insinuating to check. Another participant set forth his experience in depicting fake websites. In general, university students might check the sources depending on the type of information they need to find or gather. This might also depend on the writer and the background of the story being told. One more participant added that checking sources will be based on how big or trivial is the information spread. Interestingly, one of the interviewees mentioned that by the time we grow up more, we will start paying attention to details as we get more experience and we become more independent. We will have our own views and methods to interpret what we see with. That is when checking and double checking would be crucial, especially when the topic is very interesting to the person. Following the wave of digitalization, the world should get more digital literacy education.

4. *Media and the United States of America*

The analysis of the outcome of these sixteen interviews will be themed first, according to the geographical appurtenance of the participants and second, according to the dichotomy of opinionating and creating ideas about the USA through the medium of media.

4.1. Geography-based view of non-American media and its representation of the USA.

4.1.1. Central and Western Asia

The interviewees from the Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkmenistan clearly voiced that *„The United States of America is not colonizing people, but they are in control of their free time and activities".* Still, when it comes to Non-American media they do believe that it is represented *„realistically, showing the good and the bad sides all together".* Still, they believe that Russian media is manipulative as it is controlled by the government and because of the political influence and conflicts between the Eastern and Western powers; they try to show more of the negative side of America. They even get to demonize the country and put the blame on them for everything that is happening around the world. They also believe that the young generation who is having uncontrollable access to internet content is very influenced and shaped by American culture. In Turkmenistan, the younger generations are more attracted to Turkish culture as they are always broadcasting their series on their national TVs and online shows. One of them explained that *„the media is the mirror which is reflecting the USA. There are different channels talking about the country, but they all say contradictory statements and that is when we start to question who is right and who wrong among them".* USA information and news are abundant everywhere at anytime. One of the participants affirmed that 80% of this information is always related to the president Donald Trump which does not seem to be surprising at all. People do not look at the USA now as the country where everything can happen, they just see this person's figure thinking that he represents every American citizen. Iranian media is bombarded with the USA news because of the nuclear and the sanctions they put on Iranians. However, no matter how this seems to be problematic for their nation, Iranians just sees *„comedy shows"* in their national television which are meant to discuss political affairs. According to the Iranian interviewee, all what is shown in their media *„does not make sense at all".* Iranians are simply very pessimistic about the USA. The division of Iranian people is even deeper because of

what they see and hear about the USA. For Russians, the USA is same as Russia: it is a very powerful country, it is economically, politically and socially advanced, it has a big territory, and it is the place that „*everyone is crazy about"*. However, in Russia „*it is popular that America is Satan as they are pressing us, especially after the economic crisis of 2014"* moreover, Russians think that „*this nation is trying to beat us and that they are our absolute enemies especially that Americans are always intervening in other countries which are supposedly under Russian sovereignty such us Ukraine"*.

4.1.2. Middle East

The participants were from Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Coming from the Middle East, the USA is considered to be „*the hottest topic"* claimed one of them. It is very frequent to hear news regarding America. In media, they are portrayed as „*the big whale or the lion"* which means that „*they have total control and every other country is chess in their board"*. They believe that for Arabs „*the United States is the devil"*; more or less according to what is broadcasted in Arabic Media. One of them claimed that if it was international media, they would not show Americans as evil as they show them in our national television channels. Syrians tend to put the blame on the United States because of what is happening in the Syrian Arab Republic as they interfere in their internal affairs. This idea is built based on what those people see in their own media and how they represent the USA. America does have American soldiers in their soil which cannot be accepted by any Syrian. However, the other side of the coin is to understand why they want to show Americans as „*bad"*: they need to protect the interests of Russia within the country. They would not showcase Russians as evil ones but instead they would say that Russians are helping Syrians fighting the devil. Therefore, „*Syria just turned to a Russian-American war-zone to prove who runs the world"*. Syrian channels are partitioned into two parties: some would advocate for American intervention, the others would favor the Russian intervention. This is how the media is influencing Syrians to be apart. Even if „*America is not supposed to police the world"*, it is in fact involved in every country's matters and concerns. „*Americans just want to be leaders in everything, their motivation is they need to be the rulers always, they have to take the decisions"*.

Moving from Syrian and Jordanian media toward the Lebanese one, it is very interesting to see that in Lebanon the USA is seen as an idol. The Lebanese participant declared that they never saw on national television anything harmful for the image of America and Americans. Lebanese productions are following step by step what happens in the

United States. This is illustrated by the fact that in national TV news broadcasting, there is at least 15 to 20 minutes spot that is provided for America-related information and updates. For the participant, this is how Lebanese are influenced by American culture. Through media, it is believed that there is a good connection between the two countries. Nonetheless, this does not negate the fact that this media is governmental and manipulated by Americans themselves. When it comes to famous private channels, most of the owners are American stakeholders or Lebanese businessmen working with Americans investments. These are the people working behind the screen and showing what they want to show. The interviewee added *„Media in Lebanon cannot be trusted"*.

4.1.3. Africa

I had four participants from the African continent: Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and South Africa. What seems to be a shared view is that the United States had and has to exploit other countries in order to become what we know about it as a nation. The US image is not that much present in African media (at least in the countries mentioned above). It might be relatively related to political affairs. What is seen in media about the USA shows two controversial versions: inside the USA people live happily and safely together, whereas outside the frontiers of the country, people are getting killed and exploited every day because of them. Their purpose is to keep war ongoing around the world because this is their way of becoming wealthier and economically stronger. According to one of the participants *„the USA is a type of a hook in every single domain, not just in media and politics. The USA is the type of a country that would take a lot of your effort, time and energy and give you a bit; if nothing, in retur".* In addition *„they use what is called a mapping strategy. They over expose a country with a propaganda concept that the US is the best country and most qualified people should become part of it. This mapping strategy collects those brains from practically everywhere. The question here is: what is the intention of the US behind that?"* So the US does exploit countries even in their people with all methods. What is seen about America is true to high extent as we see how much they invest and provide people in North Africa with many opportunities to migrate there. The participant thinks that the reason they are doing that is that *„if they want to develop, they are already developed. They simply want to leave those countries stagnate. They need to starve every other country and deprive them from their educated and intellectual powers".* This is what media would not show: many countries in Africa are still very dependent on America.

For instance, the United States is not targeting Europe with its using of the mapping strategy. It is indeed targeting the more fragile countries because it is easier to work with them especially with financial investments. Everything is based on wealth, nationality and diplomacy. Based on media, we only see one façade of the story. We have to be aware of the counter side. We have to see more about people who immigrated from Africa and Asia to the USA and how much value they added to it and diversity they created in it. We have to hear about the unheard through our media.

4.1.4. Europe

2 out of 3 interviews with Europeans led to one conclusion: the majority of Europeans are not interested in knowing about the United States and they rarely hear about it. There is rarely something negative mentioned regarding the USA. They would even say that what Americans are doing, others should consider them as an example to act upon. In Hungarian media, America is still seen as a powerful nation and it only wants to welcome „*the best people"* in its territories just like Hungary. The governmental media certainly sympathizes with the US because of the similarity in political affiliations. They try to show how much liberal the country can be which is not really good for Hungary as they don't tolerate it when people want to speak up. At the same time, media tries to show the ideal image of the country where students can go to pursue higher education studies and find great job opportunities. The 3rd interviewee had somehow a different opinion regarding the matter. Based on the background, Ukrainians would hear so often news about the USA, especially recently in relation with the impeachments and the Ukrainian crisis. It seems that the USA is a great helper because they are supporting them financially, which is unlike what they think about the Russian aid. Media is much censored in Ukraine. They have to control everything that can be said about America. Evidently, what they show in Ukrainian media about the US is different from what they show about it in Russian media. For what they did in Ukraine; Ukrainians cannot hold this negative attitude toward Americans.

4.1.5. The Americas

This section is based on 2 interviews with Americans who were asked to answer the interview questions based on what they see in non-American media they have been following. It is important to mention that both interviewees claimed that they rarely check non-American websites or news portals. However, they believe that the United States is

not entirely represented in foreign media in a positive way. They also mentioned that this foreign media tends to be more truthful in showing the USA than what the USA is showing about itself. One of them said that „*foreign media is representing it as an example of what not to do right now*". They also claimed that America does not have to be present in every country around the world just to prove its own power. Unlike as what is portrayed, there are many other countries that have high living standards other than the US. People inside the country are seeing exactly the same things that outsiders witness about the United States. Media is still manipulated and manipulative anywhere around the world even in most democratic countries like the USA.

4.2. Pro-American VS anti-American

Interviewees were asked whether they were pro or anti-Americans. In total, participants expressed their approval and disapproval at the same time. Most of them agreed that there are different facts which make them believe in the United States and support it. However, there were also other facts which most of them disfavored in the American system. The table presented below will give a brief overview of the answers to this question.

Pro-Americanism

America was discovered around 500 years ago. Witnessing how much the country improved and developed since that time is incredibly astonishing. They did succeed in building a strong, independent and democratic country as well as ensuring rights to all human beings.

Internal or domestic affairs are the backbone of the United States. The freedom and liberties the government and the states provide and ensure for its citizens is not comparable to the rest of the world.

America offered a lot to this world. It gave birth to many industries. Still, they should also recognize what the entire world offered to them. The USA would not be such a place if it were not for foreigners' views about it. Diversity in the USA makes it look like it is a very welcoming country and tolerant toward immigrants. The country is so diverse in terms of race, ethnic and religious groups that grabs the attention tremendously.

The USA worked on its image as country that can be young in number but very wise and powerful in actions. They spread their own propaganda of a dream-like country and culture in a way that it reached all corners of the world.

The country seems to attract people as it appears there are more opportunities in every field there. This is quite understandable in an

era in which employability and economic crises have reached their highest percentages. The US is in fact one of the most powerful economic countries.

For those who have been before to the USA, they can admit that Americans are very welcoming and generous. Unlike the individualistic image of the society usually known, they are caring and supporters of diversity and collectivism. What is not pointed in media is that they are for multiculturalism and diversity.

English is the lingua franca. It connected people from all parts of the planet. It created this global-village that uniquely and exquisitely united everyone. The hurdle of language barrier is no longer prevalent. People gained the knowledge of the most used language in the world.

If Americans step out of their own frontiers, they will be very surprised by the beauty and the richness the other countries have to offer. It is important to have eyes that can see the world from different angles. It is also fruitful to learn more languages and gain more knowledge. Openness is a key that America promotes for and that is why Americans should also strive for.

Americans are proud to belong to the United States of America. They believe that the States started from very good foundation principles. National pride is very remarkable within Americans.

Administrative affairs are well organized. Social support is provided to people who are in need. Every citizen seems to be protected. People learned the language

Anti-Americanism

People usually put blame about what is happening in their countries on the United States. This is relatively true as the countries' foreign policies interfere in almost all nations around the world. There is no space for neutrality and impartiality in it.

The current presidential representation among other countries. It has a noticeable influence on how people perceive and think about the States.

Americans life-style shows them as very materialistic people. For them, everything is meaningful in terms of being. The society is built up on a culture of consumerism The country developed its own capitalist economic system which is based on pure business. People who have money will become richer, and the poor will remain poor.

The American dream became an obsession for a lot of people that it turned to be so uncontrollable and impossible for them to make an effort and invest in their own countries. Everyone is running after this very utopian and idealistic image they advertised about the US.

The United States manipulated its own citizens to achieve whatever they always longed for. The country is not blank of

problems. As a matter of fact, there are so many issues foreigners hear about which are very surprising and critical. Exploitation culture and manipulation are achieved inside and outside the territory.

People got very busy with following the Western culture that they forgot about promoting their own cultures and showing their own identities.

American products invaded almost all countries around the world. The consumerism culture did not stop within the US but it is spreading everywhere. People use what is American just because it is actually American. Famous people also play a role in influencing the others, mostly negatively.

Americans are so self-involved and self-centered that they do not really have a vast idea about the rest of the world. They know very few and basic facts. It seems that the society is very enclosed in itself.

The English language has dominated the world in such a speed that it shifted the interest in many other languages and shaked their status among people. Many problems arise because of this linguistic dominance. Pejorative classification in the United States is still considered to be one of the worst in the globe. People are still subject to all sorts of discrimination.

People are very fascinated by and acculturated in the American norms that they are peeling off their own values and customs. Loss of identity is more alarming nowadays than ever. Imitation is the disease of the era.

A country like the US gives shortcuts to everything. People who want to develop and nurture their minds and souls would not be at ease in such places. It would not give as much as it would take from a person.

It is hard to believe that the USA is one of the safest countries in the world knowing that some of their states have laws which allow people to own guns and weapons.

From the point of view of Americans, the USA is always trying to influence other countries and interfere in their internal affairs.

Study limitations

The study lacked deep literature review. There were not enough relevant academic materials that investigated the United States image in non-American media. The last question in my interview instrument is intended to tackle this section of the study. The question states: What should I have asked you that I didn't think to ask? Although the answers I received were not only suggestions of other questions that could have been included, participants gave general comments regarding the matter of representing the United States in non-American salient media. However, some of the propositions I received were to add questions such as:

– How much do you know about the United States?
– Do you think the United States of America is the best country? If yes, why do you think so?
– How important it is for you to get the American citizenship? Elaborate on this.
– How can we help people get to know the real image about the USA?
– How did the image of the US change with the last presidential face in position?

These questions could add more relevance and give more in-depth view of the subject in concern. The interviews were minimized in the number and diversity as there are many regions which are not represented such as Western Europe, Far East and South East Asia and South America which can give a greater insight and various looks about the USA. It is important to note that the term media was used in a very broad sense. There were no specifications for which media to reflect upon as it would definitely depend on the participants' own reality and uses. The study limitation can be seen in the non-specification of the sector we would want to investigate the portrayal of the United States in media such as the educational setting, societal level, economic framework or politics. Furthermore, this study investigated in the topic from university students' perspectives only. The same topic can be looked from non-academicians angles. The ideology behind the Americanism is not very detailed in a sense that it gave only generalities.

Conclusion

Debates regarding pro and anti-Americanism seem to be continuous, if not endless. America is indeed a dominant superpower on the international level. Nevertheless, the American image still ignites very heated talks and discussions. It should be said that a country is not represented solely by its president. Donald Trump does not represent all Americans. The United States should be regarded as a fusion of presidential visions, governmental initiatives, foreign policies, international relations, geopolitical dimensions, societal actions, historical influences, cultural reactions, economic implications and religious backgrounds. It is very important to declare that media plays a central pillar in directing the world toward specific-manipulative tendencies. Media is just one face of many. Still, it is not for what is screened, published or played in media only that would enable for the creation of a holistic idea about a nation but rather a combination of all these factors. In order to understand the nature of a country's image,

one ought to look back to all its constituents and what makes the United States of America the country it is now.

Debates regarding pro and anti-Americanism seem to be continuous, if not endless. America is indeed a dominant superpower on the international level. Nevertheless, the American image still ignites very heated talks and discussions. It should be said that a country is not represented solely by its president. Donald Trump does not represent all Americans. The United States should be regarded as a fusion of presidential visions, governmental initiatives, foreign policies, international relations, geopolitical dimensions, societal actions, historical influences, cultural reactions, economic implications and religious backgrounds. It is very important to declare that media plays a central pillar in directing the world toward specific-manipulative tendencies. Media is just one face of many. Still, it is not for what is screened, published or played in media only that would enable for the creation of a holistic idea about a nation but rather a combination of all these factors. In order to understand the nature of a country's image, one ought to look back to all its constituents and what makes the United States of America the country it is now.

This research fulfilled the aim to study the image of the USA represented in media, among 1980s and 1990s generations of university students. Media and its power of manipulation can bring about a change in the whole world. There is no independent media in the world; everything seems to be linked to the United States of America. That is why media should be always used carefully and safely. Information does not come from one source. To draw our own conclusions, it should be looked upon with an eagle's eye that can catch anything with 360° of sight. Before consuming unconsciously, people should look at all angles and perspectives of the topic. Filtering the information we need and the sources we use will definitely minimize the chances of being manipulated. Media depends very much on how we use it. *„Media can change lives to the better, and it can also ruin lives"* mentioned in one of the interviews. It is a double-edged weapon. There is no moderate point of view or representation of the US. It goes to both extremes: either very idealistic and utopian or very dogmatic and dystopian. The United States of America seems to be either overrepresented or underrepresented in most of the worldwide media. That is proven by the fact that it can be both: the best place to be at or the devilish area of the planet. 'Think smart' is the way how people should see things. At this age, being clever is being able to differentiate between what is true and lie. Being impartial is also very crucial in determining what can be fake and what can be real, especially knowing that American media is fracturing. *„Media is one thing out of many, but you need glasses to see everything.*

There is a fog beneath each country, and to see through that fog we need education. Glasses are the symbol of this education and we need to put them on to see through media channels" – concluded one of the participants.

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Appendix

Interview design

The United States in the eyes of Non-Americans.
A qualitative investigation of foreign media representation of the US within university students

My name is Wijdene Ayed, I am an English MA student specialized in Applied Linguistics at the ELTE Faculty of Humanities. I would like to ask for your help with my research. The aim of the following interview is to examine how foreign media represents the USA. For later purposes, the interview needs to be recorded, the tapes will be only heard by me during the study analysis. The investigation is anonymous and voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at any time.

I am interested in your personal opinion, so please make sure your answers are sincere. This is fundamental for the quality of our research.

Bio questions

– How old are you?
– What is your level of studies?
– What is your nationality?

Media-related questions

NB: think about the word 'media' in general. There is no need to specify it at this level for question 1 and 2.

1.) How frequent is your media usage?
Scale it from 1 to 5 with: 1 = never / 2= sometimes / 3 = often / 4 = a lot / 5 = always.

2.) Do you think you are dependent on the media to get general information?
Put it into a percentage from 0 to 100%
0-20% = never / 20-40% = a bit / 40-60% = moderately / 60-80% = mostly / 80-100% very

3.) Which media do you use in particular?

NB: for the remaining questions, please answer according to the media you use frequently.

4.) Which media do you think is powerful?

5.) Do you think that media can be manipulative ?

       If yes to what extent.
       If no why it can't be.

6.) will you check the validity and the reliability of the sources you used to get information in general?

USA-related questions

7.) Do you hear information about the USA?

       if yes, how often?
       if not, why is that?

       What kind of information do you hear?

8.) According to this media, what is the USA for you?

9.) How do you think foreign or non-American media shows/represents the USA?
10.) Do you think the media can be manipulative-manipulated in representing the USA ?

If yes, to what extent?
If not, why it cannot be?

11.) Will you check the validity and the reliability of the sources you used to get general information about the USA?

12.) As a media follower, do you think the USA film Industry has an impact on the image represented to the rest of the world.

13.) On what basis will you create your opinion/view/idea about the USA?

Think in terms of: Presidents / domestic policies / international affairs and foreign policies / USA culture/ society and people in the USA..

14.) Will you consider yourself to be Pro-American or Anti-American?

15.) Would you consider going to the USA ?

If yes, for which purpose?
If not, why wouldn't you consider it?

16.) Based on Media, to what extent do you think the US is influencing your country?

Closing

17.) What should I have asked you that I didn't think to ask?

Rashideh Badran[1]

Media Representation of Muslim Women Participation in U.S. Politics

Abstract

This essay aims at exploring media representation of Muslim women participation in U.S. politics. It focuses on how mass media reflected, particularly, the participation of Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar in the American Congressional elections of 2018. The article will try to cover how mass and social media presented feedback on the participation of those two politicians to be the first Palestinian American and the first Somali American legislators respectively. Throughout the discussion, the paper will draw on issues like the fighting for recognition by women of color, women who wear hijab, women immigrants against racism and sexism along with their engagement in the political process in the U.S. The essay also aims to reflect on the fact that becoming the first Muslim women elected to the US Congress in 2018 is regarded by the American media and the worlds media as a new step towards writing a new history of legislation that will shake the white and male dominated halls of the US congress.

Keywords: U.S. Politics; Congress; Recognition; Women; Muslims; Women of Color;

The story of women's engagement in political activities in the United States goes back to the early twentieth century when, in 1920, women's right to vote was established in the constitution. Although women's suffrage was established at a national level, women's actual participation in voting and other political activities such as running for elections, office holding, signing petitions and being members of the U.S. congress did not equal men's participation until the 1990s (CONWAY 2000, 37; CONWAY 2001, 231). The late twentieth century has witnessed an increased women's political involvement in the United State. Nevertheless, women holding elected offices were still conspicuously fewer than men holding elected offices. Studies show that women politicians represented 13% of the Senate, 13.6% of the House of Representatives and 22.3% of state legislators in 2001 (CONWAY 2001, 231; Center for American Women and Politics 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000).

Compared to the proportions which were registered during the 1990s and early 2000s, the rate of women's political engagement and gaining

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elected offices became significant lately. The progress in women's rights of employment and education that the United States witnessed after the amendments made to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in addition to the 1972 Higher Education amendments pushed the wheel towards turning from a patriarchal culture that limits women's opportunities, roles and expectations in society to a liberal society that supports freedom, democracy and equality. Women's expectations have not only reached opportunities of voting, writing state legislation and organizing political parties but they have gone further to run for, win and serve in public offices and become members of the congress. Moreover, after being dominated by white males, elected offices gradually became open to both men and women of color to hold.

The Congressional elections event of 2018 is marked as a historic moment in the United States' politics when two Arab American Muslim women of color were elected to the U.S. Congress. It is regarded as an unprecedented incident to have the Palestinian American Muslim Rashida Tlaib and the Somali American Muslim Ilhan Omar as legislators in the U.S. House. Attitudes of the mainstream America towards having two women of color, who are both Muslim and have Arab origins, in the Congress varied from welcoming and supporting to rejecting and protesting against, especially when putting the Western-Eastern conflictual relation on center stage. In this regard, mass media have greatly influenced the public opinion of Americans. Hence, this essay discusses the influence of mass media focusing on three questions: What are the images mass media used to interpret the involvement of Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar in American politics? How did media channels deal with the causes adopted by both representatives regarding recognition of women of color, wearing hijab, fighting racism and sexism towards women immigrants? Do the majority of media channels convey the fact that becoming the first Muslim women elected to the U.S. Congress in 2018 is regarded as a step towards writing a new history of legislation that will shake the white and male dominated halls of the U.S. congress?

Recently, it became inevitable to regard the importance of mass media in affecting society. It is typical that the media should fulfill people's right to know, maintain respectful dialogue with the public and inspect government abuses; however, the media also select what news the public will know creating by that "their own definition of reality" (OSWALD 2009, 392-393). As Kristine A. Oswald maintains, it is crucial to fully understand that the influence of mass media has played a significant role in shaping governments and making political decisions (385). In the same vein, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn asserts that the power of press has surpassed the governmental and political power especially

in the West (cited in OSWALD 385). Hence, the role which mass media performs creates a *„synergetic effect"* in American politics (OSWALD 2009, 385) especially that, lately, media means are highly perceived in the American society. It is important to fully understand that the performance of mass media in shaping public policies is affected to a great extent by various forces such as commercial forces, competitive market and political agendas. The ruling force, represented by governmental authorities, stakeholders, corporates, marketplace, political parties, etc., defines what dictates news coverage and how media interpret reality of issues and events in the political arena to affect the public. This clearly shows that owners or managers of the media seek profit by supporting the politically powerful and in effect control which messages are delivered to audiences. In many occasions, the effect of mass media can reach formidable levels of influence and become a dangerous weapon. Oswald suggests that *„government manipulates the media through the use of deceptive tactics and authorized regulations"* (2009, 385). The implication, here, is that some news covering agencies, journalists and social media commentators use different types of deception including source fabrication, fact fabrication, news faking and plagiarism (Govaert et all 2020, 697-98). Deceptive tactics of mass media which depend on manipulating information to serve certain agendas are *„by no means exclusive to the US"* (98); however, the strategies are *„nothing new to Western democracies"* and are perennial as Miller and Robinson comment (2019, 1-2). Further, they underpin the political discourse of the United States in the twenty first century. Despite the fact that the media are concerned with reporting events as they occur, bias noticeably appears in a bulk of news coverages and among several media corporates. This essay sheds the light on how the media disseminated information about Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar.

The 2018 United States' midterm elections, which were held on November 6, 2018 during the presidency of Republican Donald Trump, witnessed a number of significant successes and electoral firsts for women, religious and ethnic minorities and LGBT candidates. Indeed, 127 women candidates was a record number in the 116th Congress compared to 110 women in the 115th Congress. This increased the share of women members in the 116th Congress to 23.7% compared to the share of 20.6% in the previous elections. In short, Ayanna Pressley became the first Afro-American female Representative from Massachusetts. Sharice Davids and Deb Haaland of Kansas and of New Mexico, respectively, became the first Native American women elected to Congress. At age 29, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York became the youngest-ever female to be elected as member of the House. Moreover, 2018 elections were exceptionally

covered and received by mass media for having Ilhan Omar of Minnesota and Rashida Tlaib of Michigan as the first Arab American Muslim women elected to the House of Representatives for the year 2019.

Mass media, including electronic forms of communication such as television and radio stations, social media and printed press, varied in their coverage of Ms. Tlaib's and Ms. Omar's engagement as members in the United States' Congress. It is quite fair to say that coverage was not neutral and that both Rashida and Ilhan were apparently put under probation. They became targets for either supporting or smearing broadcasts. In this situation, the media were role players in the political war and steered people's attitudes whether in favor of or against both House Representatives. When speaking about news coverages that were in favor of the representatives or that broadcasted events as they occurred, one would observe that the election of both representatives is dealt with the same way news agencies deal with celebrities. The election is conveyed to have marked a number of electoral firsts. The winning of Ms. Tlaib, a lawyer and a member of the Democratic Party, is highlighted by several news agencies, online pages and social media channels not only for her progressive stance but also for being the first Palestinian American Muslim woman to serve as the 2019's U.S. Rep. for Michigan's 13th Congressional district, the first female member of Democratic Socialist of America (DSA) to serve in the Congress and one of the first two Palestinian American members of the Michigan Legislature along with Justin Amash. Likewise, Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party member, Ms. Omar's election as a Representative for Minnesota's 5th Congressional district gained equal attraction of mass media for being the first Somali American Muslim woman in the U.S. Congress 2019, the first woman of color elected from Minnesota and the first African naturalized citizen.

After the elections, newspapers, television channels, magazines, and social media had Rashida and Ilhan in their headlines. *Aljazeera* news agency wrote on the 7th of November, 2018 that „*Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar first Muslim women elected to Congress." CNN Politics* headlines on the 4th of January, 2019 positively observed the change in this Congress: „*No other Congress has ever looked like this," „The new class changing the face of the Congress"* and „*The 116th class of Congress broke barriers before its members even set foot in Washington."* Indeed, to some pro-Democratic or anti-Trump agencies, being both Arab and Muslim is conveyed as making the Congress of 2019 a different one by breaking the barriers and Congressional norms. For example, Ilhan's being the first woman to wear a head cover, hijab, in the Congress has led to the modification of the ban on head-covering 1837

rule to allow religious accommodation. AJ Willingham, a *CNN Politics* journalist, wrote on November 19, 2018 an article with the headline *„New Muslim congresswoman will seek to allow religious headwear in the House."* Rashida was no less trending than Ilhan when she wore a traditional embroidered Arab dress, Thobe, for the swearing-in ceremony introducing by that difference to the Congressional norms as Clare Foran and Phil Mattingly comment in their article published on *CNN Politics* website on January 3, 2019 under the headline *„Rashida Tlaib made history with her swearing-in. Here's what to know about the first Palestinian-American woman to serve in the congress."* This act saw a noticeable coverage in the news headlines and it showed, to a great extent, Rashida's intent to gain recognition for her Arab origins in the U.S. House especially that this act received good response and support through adopting and sharing the hashtag (#TweetYourThobe) as indicated in a *New York Times'* headline: *„As Rashida Tlaib Is Sworn In, Palestinian-Americans Respond With #TwetYourThobe."* What followed next in social media channels, mainly Twitter, is the reflection of this act as support to the Palestinian cause when a number of Palestinians and Palestinian American women used the hashtag, also among Arab countries, to assert the rooted Palestinian identity within the American society and against the Israeli occupation. A social media activist, Salam Halaweh, tweeted in Arabic *„I will not let go of my Thobe how far I go. Our heritage is our identity. In support of Rashida Tlaib"* (translation is mine). Clothing is world widely recognized as a signifier of identity since clothes give a sense of identification and attachment to origins (Qawas 2008, 373, 377; Emery 1990, 39). However, this is not the only case here. In this context, which can be described as a crucial juncture of time in the USA, and from anthropological perspectives, dressing practices imply a variety of encounters and they became in the nineteenth century a flash point of conflicting values and contestation across class, in politics, and in cultural exchange (Hansen 2004, 370-72). Hence, these incidents would suggest the deployment of clothing to write a history of culture recognition and encounters, as Leora Auslander puts it (2014, 157).

Indeed, the question of identity was not the sole matter that news coverage dealt with. Both Ilhan's and Rashida's stances toward many unsolved issues in the districts they serve and that affect the U.S. community were supported by many news agencies. What can be inferred from many contents is the image of two strong women of color who fight for change, social progress and social justice. Rashida is praised for calling to abolish Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) law, for supporting medical care and social security for all society and for advocating improving toxic waste management to protect public

health. Highlighting Tlaib's efforts to make a difference and to serve people, A *Detroit Metro Times'* headline reads „*Tlaib's Washington Battles get the Headlines, but Detroit Comes First.*" Such news hits bring to light a tenacious politician's community concerns which turns her not to a mere politician but also to a local community activist who introduced „*the Petroleum Coke Transparency and Public health Protection Act*" and co-sponsored a housing justice bill that would provide, according to *Boston Globe*, affordable housing units. Ilhan, likewise, joined Rashida's campaign against ICE and campaigned for tuition-free college, improving the minimum wage, improving health care and achieving affordable housing as well. Moreover, the Act which Ilhan introduced, that is, building 12 million affordable housing units for the most vulnerable and homeless people gained popularity and support. The hashtag (#HomesforAll) took the lead on Facebook pages, Twitter, Instagram and other social media channels. Ilhan is described by Jacobin Magazine, in its Twitter account on November 23, 2019, as „*the Fighter the Tenants' Movement Needs*" and who will take the demands for Medicare for all and housing justice to the Congress.

In some media broadcasts, Congresswomen Ilhan and Rashida are presented as fighters who claim change and progress. For example, they are interviewed and photographed for Nate Gowdy's, a Seattle photographer, American Superhero Project, which is a collaborative project that involves storytelling and portraying influential American figures who fight for society's change as superheroes. More particularly, Ms. Omar and Ms. Tlaib, along with many others like Silvia Garcia and Ayanna Pressley who formed the Squad Group, are photographed in November, 2019 in the costume of Marvel Comics' Captain America who will save the vulnerable Americans and change the world. Gowdy's American Superheroes' project resonated in his social media accounts on Instagram, Twitter and Facebook. Further, Ilhan Omar is still presented as a fighter until recently. On the 1st of October, 2020 Ilhan was interviewed in one of Carlos Watson Show broadcasts, a YouTube channel run by OZY media company. This show, which interviewed high-profile guests such as Barak Obama, George W. Bush, Bill Gates and others, hosted Ilhan in a YouTube broadcast titled "Meet the Fighter behind the Caricature," suggesting that Ms. Omar is a fighter who seeks to #Reset America.

However, as in all stories there must be a dark side here, too. Broadcasts featuring the two Congresswomen did not go without meeting counter arguments. For many media channels and news agencies, Rashida's and Ilhan's political views and activism are what made news highlights. According to *Detroit Metro Times*, the largest circulating weekly newspaper in the metro Detroit area and well known for its progressive news, opinion and liberal orientation, what attracts

the United States' national media is the image of Muslim women who are standing up to President Donald Trump and the pro-Israel lobby. Both Congresswomen criticized Trump's administration, especially immigration policies, and advocated his impeachment. Ms. Omar and Ms. Tlaib criticized the Israeli government, called for ending the U.S. aid to Israel, endorsed the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) campaign and supported the Palestinian right of return. In many media contents, their political views and activism were transformed to hate dialogue and anti-Semitic speech especially when their opinions regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were challenged. However, their standpoint aligns more with Senator Bernie Sanders' emphasis, in his speech during the J Street National Conference held on 27/2/2017 at the Washington Convention Center, on not supporting the Israeli government does not equal to being anti-Sematic. According to *HAARETZ*, which is an Israeli newspaper, *„Rashida Tlaib 'anti-Semitism' Slur Reveals the Loud Illiberal Face of the anti-BDS Movement."* The article, which was published on the 9th of January, 2019 shows that the outbursts directed at the Palestinian American Congresswoman Rashida is familiar and it reveals that anyone who opposes the current Israeli politics will be called an anti-Semites.

Anti-Muslim sentiment spread largely on social media during the 2018's Congressional elections and continued after Ilhan and Rashida were elected as U.S. Representatives. An article published in *The New York Times* on the 5th of November, 2019 states that *„The Online Cacophony of Hate Against Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib"* exists in Trump's tweets and in Islamophobia comments. According to *The New York Times*, both representatives became targets of Trump's tweetstorms. The language that is used in social media platforms was obviously Islamophobic, Xenophobic or anti-immigrant. It is apparent that both Rashida and Ilhan were put on probation, condemned, persecuted by the pro-Trump media and even banned from entering Palestine by the Israeli government for their views criticizing pro-Israel lobbies and for advocating the Palestinian cause. Indeed, social media platforms became blatant sites expressing hate against both politicians. This can be attributed to Trump's strategy to smear the reputation of Ms. Omar and Ms. Tlaib and ensure they will not be re-elected. In this sense, the media, especially the big media that control what news the local and national media convey to the public, appear as a role player in the political war, a powerful weapon that can change peoples' attitudes and steer the political wheel.

For example, both representatives were offended and harassed for being Muslims and were described, according to *The New York Times*, as *„sub-humans"* and *„Trojan horses"* who threaten the Congress and

seek to impose Islamic law (Shariah) on the U.S. Negative reflections and accusations of Ms. Tlaib and Ms. Omar as being anti-Semite, Terrorist and Jihadi were frequently tweeted by pro-Trump and pro-Israel commentators including Donald Trump himself and Danny Danon, Israel's Permanent Representative to the United Nations 2015-2020. Moreover, many comments spread on social media ridiculed Ilhan's head cover (hijab) and Rashida's Palestinian heritage and described them as „*a lightning rod,"* with the implication that they are aliens. In the same vein, an article published by *Social Science Research Council* (SSRC) in New York indicated that the social media narrative of manufactured outrage was Islamophobic, xenophobic, racist and misogynist. Indeed, this article „*#Islamophobia: Stoking Fear and Prejudice in the 2018 Midterms,"* written by Dr. Lawrence Pintak, Dr. Jonathan Albright and Dr. Brian Bowe who are research experts of anti-Muslim sentiment on social media, has shown that social media platforms have replaced the extreme-right entities that were primary source of anti-Muslim dialogue in the 2016 presidential campaign.

The pro-Israel/anti-Semite clash prevailed in the US political arena during the 2018's Congressional elections. Extracts from many news resources show that the pro-Israel media tried to undermine both Ilham and Rashida's political and personal integrity. In the article „*Antisemites Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib Honored as 'American Superheroes',"* published on November 21, 2019 in the website (www.israellycool.com), the journalist obviously criticized Nate Gowdy's American Superhero project for featuring and previewing a bunch of minorities that include the anti-Semite Ilhan and Rashida but does not include Jews. The Conservative media, which present opinions from a right-wing point of view and politicize reporting as a counter to liberal media, attempt to spread Anti-Muslim sentiments and this is exposed by the neutral or democratic media An extract from https://foreignpolicy.com, a well-known website that covers the U.S. foreign policy news, says that „*ever since the midterm election, conservative media in the United States have targeted with special zeal Ilhan Omar, an incoming Somali-American Democratic congresswoman and a devout Muslim who wears hijab. In response to Democrats' push to remove a headwear ban on the House floor to accommodate Omar, conservative commentator and pastor E.W. Jackson complained on a radio show that Muslims were transforming Congress into an 'Islamic Republic'."*

Indeed, Ilhan Omar has been targeted to a great extent in discriminative, racist and misogynist media attacks. The images conveyed on mass media and social media platforms did not stop at derogatory descriptions only but also included overt disinformation. Faulty information was transferred about Ilhan supporting female

gentile mutilation and about her having married her brother just because she is a non-white, head-covered and African Arab woman. A news headline in *The Guardian* stated: *„Anti-Muslim poster linking Ilhan Omar to 9/11 sparks outrage in West Virginia."* The news described how the Republican Party printed posters that bear the image of the attacked World Trade Center juxtaposed with a picture of Ilhan symbolizing her connection to terrorism and to the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Rashida Tlaib was in no better place than Ilhan. Every comment and statement she made became a target for misconstruction by pro-Israel mass media. According to *Roll Call*, Tlaib's comments on the Holocaust, in which she sympathizes with the victimized Jews, were misinterpreted and used to incite a backlash and ignite attacks on her.

To conclude, mass media attacks stormed against both Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib included inciting public rage against their very existence in the United States and urging them to go back to their home countries although they are American citizens and despite the fact that Ilhan Omar is a naturalized U.S. citizen. In the country of liberal and democratic culture, political participation should be defined, according to Margaret Conway, as *„those activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government authorities, or the policies of government"* (CONWAY 2000, 3). However, in Rashida Tlaib's and Ilhan Omar's case, political participation and plans for social and cultural change were transformed from community serving agendas to a clash of cultures where their ethnicity, color, gender and religion became the focal point, setting aside all activism and the community causes they call for. Indeed, this asserts the notion about Trump's strategy to ruin the reputation of his Arab Muslim opponents and ensure that they will not be re-elected. Nevertheless, the hassle and fuss that accompanied Ilhan's and Rashida's campaigns and service have, unquestionably, shaken the norms in the United States' House.

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Csatári Flóra Dóra[1]

The Players' Tribune – Szerzőiség és közvetlenség a „ghostwriting" problematikus gyakorlata kapcsán

Abstract

In the global media discourse, there is a visible trend: the personal became the general. Publics expect intimacy in the media coverage of sport. On the American market there is a unique media outlet to serve this demand. The Players' Tribune was founded by Derek Jeter a former professional baseball player. This media company publishes first-person stories from athletes. Its site promises to 'provide a unique insight into the daily sports conversation' and to 'bring the fans closer than ever to the games they love'. The stories published by The Players' Tribune create the illusion of intimacy by seemingly bypassing the traditional journalistic methods in the coverage of major sport stories. However, it is not a secret that several texts published by this media company were written by ghost-writers. This paper gives an analysis of the most common approaches of the problematic authenticity of writings published by the website and gives an interpretation of the presumed intimacy of its texts.

Keywords: sport; autobiography; ghostwriting; journalism; intimate publics;

„Megálmodtam, hogy ez fog történni. Néhány nappal korábban, mielőtt elindultunk a Copa Sudamericana döntőjébe. Szörnyű rémálmom volt (…) És aztán láttam, ahogy megtörténik. A gép elsötétült, minden teljesen leállt, én pedig nagyon is magamnál voltam. Aztán lezuhant az égből. Emberként felfoghatatlan volt, ami történt" (LOVAS) – ezeket az erőteljes és megindító szavakat Hélio Hermito Zampiertől, azaz attól a Netóként ismert brazil focistától idézte az Index 2017-ben. A focista a Chapecoense játékosaként egyike volt annak a hat embernek, akik túlélték azt a repülőgépszerencsétlenséget, amelynek összesen 71 halálos áldozata volt, és amelyben a Chapecoense futball klub nagyrésze, Neto 19 csapattárs is életét vesztette. Ezeket a szavakat az Index a The Players' Tribune cikkéből vette át, amely angolul *„Tomorrow belongs to God"* címmel jelent meg (NETO, FOLLMAN és RUSCHEL), és valóban Netót tünteti fel a nemcsak a fenti idézet angol verziójának forrásaként, de a teljes cikk társszerzőjeként. *(A másik két*

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feltüntetett szerző Jakson Follmann és Alan Ruschel szintén focista, Neto két olyan csapattársa, akik szintén túlélői a balesetnek.)

Fontos ugyanakkor megjegyezni, hogy a The Players' Tribune publikálta egy videóinterjú megszerkesztett verzióját is, amelyben Netóék elmesélik mindazt, amire a halálos repülőgép balesetből emlékeznek. Valószínűnek tűnik, hogy a videóra[2] vett interjú során portugálul elhangzó mondatokat fordították le angolra és ez alapján írták, illetve szerkesztették meg azt a cikket, amelynek szerzőiként mégis csak a három játékost tüntették fel. Bár a fenti idézet szerzőisége több szempontból – és nem csak a többszörös fordítás miatt – problematikus, a The Players' Tribune által lehozott sztori bejárta a médiát, és szinte minden esetben a játékosoktól származó direkt idézetekként hivatkoztak a cikk szövegére.[3]

Ez a rövid példa önmagában is rávilágíthat arra, hogy a The Players's Tribune szövegei összefüggenek azzal a '80-as években induló, *„memoire-boom"*-ként emlegetett tendenciával (SMITH és WATSON), amelyben a személyesség, a közvetlenség és az egyéni történetek, egyéni nézőpontok felértékelődnek, a nyilvános diskurzus pedig egyre *„intimebbé"* válik. Ahogyan Gács megállapítja: *„ha 1962-ben igaz volt, amit Jürgen Habermas kétségbeesetten állapított meg, azaz hogy »a nyilvánosság az egyéni élettörténetek közzétételének a szférájává válik,« akkor ma ezerszeresen igaz".* (GÁCS 113) Ő Laurent Berlant *„intim nyilvánosság"*-ról alkotott, habermasi gyökerű elképzelését alkalmazva világít rá arra, hogy a kortárs kultúra nyilvános szférájában az emberek olyan személyes történeteket keresnek, amelyeket a kollektív tapasztalatok egyfajta összefoglalásaként is lehet olvasni, és ez az oka annak, hogy *„a közönségek [publics] előfeltétele az intimitás".* (GÁCS 123)

A szűken értett *„memoár-boom"*-nak a tömegkultúra és a sztárkultusz felől közelítve az egyik oka lehet, hogy az életrajz, mint narratíva eleve a sztárságfogyasztás esszenciális része (ROJEK, Celebrity 44), maga az önéletrajz mint műfaj pedig egy tömegfogyasztásra szánt termék, ami a stílusában és tartalmában, sem csak reprezentálja a *„celebrity system"*-et, meg is testesíti azt. (Lee) Laurent Berlant *„intim nyilvánosság"* elképzelése azonban arra is rávilágít, hogy az önéletrajzi narratívák népszerűvé válásában a nyilvánosság átalakulásának és ezáltal a személyesség iránit igény megnövekedésének is meghatározó szerepe van. A sport mediatizált fogyasztásában az intimitás iránti igény nem meglepő annak tudatában, hogy általános szurkolói és rajongói

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[2] A videó be van ágyazva abba a cikkbe, amely a dolgozat hivatkozásai között a *Tomorrow belongds to God* címen megtalálható.

[3] Néhány példa az Index átvételén kívül a teljesség igénye nélkül: (Sky) (Goal.com) (Kapusa) (nemzetisport.hu) (WINTERBURN).

tapasztalat egyfajta közvetettség, mivel a sportolók szavai elsősorban jellemzően újságírók és kommentátorok tolmácsolásában jutnak el a nagyközönséghez. A ghowstiting, azaz a nem kreditál szerzőiség gyakorlata ugyanakkor megkerülhetetlen, ha annak a megértésére teszünk kísérletet, hogy milyen fajta önéletrajziságot, hitelességet vagy *„közvetlen”* találkozási lehetőséget ígér a sportrajongók számára a nyilvánosság terében a The Players' Tribune. A következő esettanulmányom ez alapján a The Players' Triben kapcsán felmerülő ghostwriting megosztó gyakorlatára koncentrál.

Az újságírók nélküli újságírás ígérete

A The Players' Tribune egy olyan médiaplatform, amelyet egy korábbi profi basaballjátékos, Derek Jeter alapított az üzlettársaival. A 2014-ben indult weboldal sportról szóló, egyes szám első személyben megfogalmozott történeteket publikál, azt állítva, hogy ezeket a szövegeket a jólismert, többnyire világhírű profi sportolók maguk írták. Az oldal lényegét összefoglaló *„Rólunk”* című szekció szerint a platform a sportolók számára a szurkolókkal való közvetlen kapcsolat lehetőségét kínálja fel. Közben a sportrajongókat azáltal igyekszik megnyerni, hogy egy soha nem látott mértékű, *„színfalak mögé való bepillantás”* lehetőségét ígéri, olyan én-elbeszéléseket, amelyeknek a közvetítők nélküliségben rejlik az intimitása és az autentikusságága is. (The Players' Tribune) Felmerülhet ugyanakkor a kérdés, hogy a közösségi média korában, amikor már nincs szükség hagyományos kiadókra, hiszen egy sor nem szerkesztett platformon (pl. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube stb.) keresztül el lehet érni széles közönségekhez, miért lenne bárkinek is szüksége egy szerkesztett és egyáltalán nem interaktív platformra, ahhoz, hogy *„közvetlenül”* (azaz a hagyományos újságírást megkerülve) oszthassa meg a rajongóival a történetét?

Ennek oka egyfelől az újság magazin szerű megjelenésében keresendő és abban, hogy a benne publikáló híres játékosok amatőr *„szerzőkként”* gyakran jólcsengő újságírói titulusokat kapnak (vezetőszerkesztők és helyettes lapvezetők is lehetnek, és annál magasabb *„újságírói”* beosztás szerepel a nevük mellett, minél híresebbek sportókként) ez pedig nagyobb presztízs kölcsönöz, mint a közösségi média, ahol bárki megjelenhet. Ahogy Schwartz és Vogan rávilágít, bár a The Players' Tribune egyfelől tagadja a hagyományos újságírás fontosságát, és az újságírás szigorú protokolljait sem követi, mégis az újságírás bevett formáit utánozva igyekszik megalapozni a hitelességét és a presztízsét is, amikor a szövegeit *„erősen elfogult önpromóciós”* narratívák helyett legitim újságírásként tálalja. (SCHWARTZ és VOGAN 47)

A másik fontos érv, ami emellett a platform mellett szólhat, nem más,

mint maga a ghostwriting gyakorlata: az, hogy az írásban sokszor tapasztalatlan sportolók számára felkínálja a hivatásos írók (jellemzően újságírók) szakértelmét, hogy ők segítsenek szavakba önteni mindazt, amire a sportolók maguktól talán képtelenek lennének. (Carvalho, Chung és Koliska) Ez a két válaszlehetőség ugyanakkor egyértelműen felhívja a figyelmet arra a paradoxonra, hogy a The Players' Tribune ígérete az újságírók nélküli újságírás „autentikusságáról" szól. Mielőtt rátérnék arra, hogy ez a fajta autentikusság és intimitás hogyan konstruálódik meg a The Players' Tribune-ön megjelentetett szövegekben, a ghostwriting jelenségének két meghatározó megközelítésmódját vázolom: azt, amely figyelmen kívül hagyja a meg nem nevezett ghostwriter szerepét és azt, amely a ghostwriterre társszerzőként, szakemberként vagy alárendelt lejegyzőként tekint.

A figyelmen kívül hagyott, meg nem nevezett szerző

Bár Derek Jeter, a The Players' Tribune alapítója maga is elismerte, hogy a weboldalon publikált történeteknek legalább egy részén ghostwriterek dolgoznak,[4] a platform a mai napig olyan írásokat publikál, amelyek azt sugallják, hogy azokat maguk a sportolók írták, a ghostwritereket pedig nem nevesítik.[5] Ahogyan azt már láthattuk, a The Players' Tribune szövegeire a hagyományos és az online hírmédia is úgy hivatkozik, mintha azokat ténylegesen a sportolók írták volna, anélkül, hogy a ghostwriting megosztó gyakorlatára kitérnének. Mi több, a ghostwriting kérdésével a platformot elemző szakirodalom sem feltétlenül foglalkozik. Ez megfigyelhető még olyan szövegekben is, amelyek más szempontból pontosan leírják és kritizálják is a The Players' Tribune vitatható gyakorlatait.

Schwartz és Vogan megközelítése jól példázza ezt a problémát. A szerzőpáros a *The Players' Tribune - Self- Branding and Boundary Work in Digital Sports Media* című tanulmányban azt elemzi, hogy hogyan működik a weboldal az önreprezentáció eszközeként, ezen belül pedig arra koncentrál, hogy a sport klubok, illetve a sportmenedzsment és a sportolók ügynökei hogyan tudnak ezen az oldalon keresztül a

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[4] A weboldal elindítása után egy 2015-ös interjúban Jeter azt mondta: „*Néhány sportoló maga írja meg a történetét, néhány sportoló pedig együtt dolgozik a munkatársainkkal, akik aztán ghostwriterekként megírják a történeteket a számukra. Ebben az esetben a munkatársaink készítenek egy leiratot a beszélgetéseikből és ez alapján íródik meg a történet. Általában a szöveg több kört megtesz oda-vissza a sportolók és a munkatársaink között, és semmi nem kerülhet ki az oldalra a sportoló végleges jóváhagyása nélkül.* (CASTILLO)

[5] Ahogy arra Pipkin is rámutat, a sportolói önéletrajzok kiadási gyakorlatának ezzel szemben jóideje része az, hogy társszerzőkként vagy szerkesztőkként nevesítik a ghostwritereiket. (PIPKIN 9)

hagyományos újságírásra is nyomást gyakorolni. Ez az elemzés fontos kritikáját adja azoknak a PR-szerű módszereknek és annak a fajta *„újságírásnak"*, amelyet a The Players' Tribune megvalósít. Emellett arra is rávilágít, hogy az oldalon tudatosan nincs lehetőség az interakcióra, hogy szándékosan igyekszik eltántorítani az olvasókat a megosztó témák és nézőpontok nyilvános megvitatásától: az oldalon nem lehet kommentet írni, nincs interaktivitás és így nem jelenhetnek meg alternatív értelmezések, nézőpontok, ez pedig lehetővé teszi sportolók számára, hogy nagyobb mértékben kontrollálják az üzeneteiket, sőt azokon keresztül a róluk kialakult nyilvános képet is. (SCHWARTZ és VOGAN 57) Ugyanakkor Schwartz és Vogan szinte teljesen figyelmen kívül hagyja a ghostwriterek *„kulturális közvetítői"* szerepét, mikor arról írnak, hogy a The Players' Tribune lehetővé teszi a sportolók (és a menedzsereik) számára, hogy irányítsák az elbeszéléseiket, illetve ezeken az elbeszéléseken keresztül a róluk kialakult nyilvános imázst is. Szerintük a szóban forgó weboldal úgy használja az újságírókat, (akiket a közönség elől elrejtenek) hogy közben a sportolókat elszigeteli a média hagyományos felfogásától, amelyet a The Players' Tribune egyébként *„torz"* felfogásként pozícionál.

Pedig Rojek híresség-elmélete[6] alapján – amely kulturális közvetítőnek nevez mindenkit, aki úgy vesz részt a híresség nyilvános képének alakításában, hogy az vonzónak tűnjön a rajongók számára (ROJEK, Celebrity 11) – megállapítható, hogy a The Players' Tribune ghostrwritereire nem csak úgy tekinthetünk, mint akiket használnak. A láthatatlan írói szerepükben bizonyos mértékig ők maguk is kulturális közvetítőkként funkcionálnak, hiszen alakítják az írások szerzőiként feltüntetett sportolóknak az (én)-elbeszéléseit, és ezeken keresztül pozitív módon befolyásolhatják a róluk alkotott nyilvános képet is. Ezt a megközelítést, amely a ghostwriterek szerepét figyelmen kívül hagyja, vagy legalábbis jelentősen kisebbíti, erősen bírálja például Carvalho, Chung és Koliska Defying transparency: *Ghostwriting from the Jazz Age to social media* című tanulmánya, jóllehet messze nem előkép nélküli, a sportolói önéletrajzokkal foglalkozó szakirodalomban kifejezetten meghatározó egy ehhez hasonló irány Pipkin *Sporting Lives* című meghatározó monográfiája óta. (PIPKIN)

Társszerzők, szakemberek és krónikások

Az a megközelítési mód, amely a sportolói önéletrajzok – vagy

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[6] Rojek sztárelmélete *szerint „a kulturális közvetítők alapvető szerepet játszanak a híresség gazdaság (fame economy) kialakulásában és felemelkedésében."* (ROJEK, *Niccolo Machiavelli, cultural intermediaries and the category of achieved celebrity* 456).

esetünkben sportolói én-elbeszélések – kapcsán a ghostwriterekre társszerzőkként, írástudó szakemberekként vagy lejegyzőkként tekint, valójában alig különbözik az előző alfejezetben tárgyalt nézőponttól. A ghostwritereket társszerzőkként kezelő elméletek az így megírt önéletrajzi szövegek autentikussága mellett azzal érvelnek, hogy az írás folyamatának kollaboratív természetét hangsúlyozzák. Pipkin felfogása szerint „a *hivatásos író, aki a sportolói önéletrajz megírásában „közreműködik"* nem a szó szoros értelmében vett ghostwriter, *„aki csak az újságokban megjelenő történetek és magazincikkek alapján, a sportoló minimális vagy nem létező segítségével kreálja meg a történetet. A leggyakoribb módszer az, hogy a hivatásos író egy sor interjút rögzít a sportolóval, aztán ezek alapján a felvételek alapján készíti el a kéziratot, amit visszaküld a sportolónak véleményezésre. Ez az általános forgatókönyv nagyfokú rugalmasságot engedélyez azzal kapcsolatban, hogy a folyamat ténylegesen hogyan zajlik le".* (PIPKIN 9) Ebben az esetben nem is az tűnik kulcsfontosságúnak, hogy kié a szöveg tulajdonjoga, sokkal inkább az, hogy kié a szövegben elmesélt történet tulajdonjoga, vagy még inkább, hogy kinek a szemléletmódja, narratív kerete, (ön)értelmezése érvényesül. Pipkin megközelítése alapján Heinecken is azt hangsúlyozza, hogy „a sportolóktól származnak a témák és a sportolók azok, akik meghatározzák, hogy mit fontos elmondani, illetve, hogy hogyan éreznek az elmondottakkal kapcsolatban és hogy a világképük hogyan építhető bele a könyvükbe". Ő nem lát különbséget a *„társszerzővel"* és az egyénileg írt sportolói önéletrajzok között, mivel szerinte mindkettő a sportolók történetét mondja el azáltal, hogy a sportolók emlékeire, én-képére és az élet értelméről alkotott elképzeléseire építenek. (HEINECKEN 340)

Az elképzelés, miszerint a (sportolói) önéletrajz ghostwritere nem több, mint egy írástudó szakember vagy egy egyszerű krónikás, Sparks és Stuart munkájában is felmerül, amely azt állítja, hogy a ghostwriter szerepe csak annyira problematikus, mint amennyire egy interjúkat lejegyző és értelmező kutató, akinek a szövege a kikérdezett személy tapasztalatainak és ötleteinek reprezentációja kell, hogy legyen. (SPARKES és STEWART 117) Csakhogy annak a belátása, hogy a ghostwriting folyamata a sportolói önéletrajzok esetében épp úgy lehet reflexív, és alapulhat egy bizalmi kapcsolaton, illetve épp úgy eredményezhet *„igaz"* szöveget, mint amikor egyfajta *„ghostwriting"* a kutató és kutatott viszonyában valósul meg, még nem visz minket közelebb a személyességben és az intimitásban keresett autentikussághoz. Ebben a rendszerben ugyanis a társzerző (aki nem mellesleg gyakran maga is sportújságíró), ha eltérő mértékben is, de ugyanúgy közvetítőként működik a sportoló és a nagyközönség (jelen esetben az olvasók) között, mint ahogy azt egy a sportolóval interjút

készítő és szöveggé formáló újságíró teszi. Arról nem is beszélve, hogy amíg a kutató munkamódszereit szigorú akadémikus sztenderdek kötik, amelyeknek részben az a célja, hogy a lehető legkevésbé módosítsa a kutató az eredeti narratívát, addig az önéletrajziparban nincsenek ilyen konkrétan megfogalmazott szabályok és előzetes elvárások, vannak viszont megcsontosodott műfaji jellemzők, bevett narratív struktúrák és elbeszélői fordulatok, (épp ezeket azonosítja egyébként Pipkin monográfiája).

Noha a szerzőiség és az autentikusság fent említett értelmezései többféle szempontból is kritizálhatók, azt meg kell jegyezni, hogy annyiban mindenképp hasznosnak bizonyultak, amennyiben a ghostwriterek által írt szövegeket – sportolói önéletrajzokat és én-elbeszéléseket – képesek voltak bizonyos fokig autentikus forrásként megőrizni a kutathatóság számára. Fontos ugyanakkor azt is látnunk, hogy ezek a megközelítésimódok megnehezíthetik annak a megértését, hogy The Palyers' Tribune szövegei hogyan képesek létrehozni a hozzájuk társított hitelesség és intimitás képzetét. Ez a fajta intimitás és hitelesség ugyanis nem származhat egyfajta tényleges közvetlenségből, hiszen ezek a szövegek is lehetnek a hagyományos értelemben vett sportcikkekhez nagyon hasonló módon mediatizáltak és közvetettek is. Ez pedig azt jelenti, hogy a sportolóknak tulajdonított én-elbeszélések intimitása és hitelessége is egy konstruált dolog, amelyben a közvetlenség retorikája (nyelvi és tematikus jegyek, a szerkesztetlenség és a mediálatlanság látszata stb.) kulcsszerepet játszik. Ha kizárólag a történetek eredetére fókuszállunk, könnyen megeshet, hogy nem ott keressük annak az igazolását, hogy a sportolók ténylegesen szerzői-e a The Players' Trbune által megjelentetett szövegeknek, ahol az olvasók egyébként megtalálni vélik azt. Tehát ahelyett, hogy az írás folyamatára vagy annak körülményeire koncentrálnánk, a továbbiakban az önéletrajzi szövegek befogadására szeretnék összpontosítani, Lejeune önéletrajzi paktumelmélete alapján.

Az aláírás mint az én-elbeszélések hitelesítése

A The Players' Tribune vállalása tulajdonképpen azt üzeni, hogy a sportról szóló diskurzus megszokott, *„külső"* és közvetett reprezentációjával szemben, egy olyan médiumot biztosít, amelynek intimitása a közvetítettlenségében és közvetlenségében rejlik. Mivel azonban már megállapítottuk, hogy az itt megjelent szövegek mögött épp úgy állhatnak újságírók, mint a hagyományos, nem ilyen személyes műfajú, sportról szóló cikkek mögött, azt javasolnám, hogy a szövegek feltételezett intimitását egyrészt a nyelvi megformáltságuk, másrészt a vizuális megjelenési formájuk és a tágabb kontextusuk felől közelítsük

meg. A The Players' Tribune ugyanis mindenféle mediális közvetettsége ellenére egy nagyon egyértelmű gesztussal igyekszik az olvasóit meggyőzni arról, hogy az ott megjelent én-elbeszéléseket a sportolók maguk jegyzik, azaz, hogy őket kell a szövegek szerzőinek tekintenünk: minden egyes írás végén ott szerepel az adott sportoló *„aláírása"*. Egyszer a sportoló neve (illetve a klubja is, ha van) *„nyomtatott"* betűkkel, olvashatóan kiírva, felette pedig egy hosszú vonalon maga a *„kézjegy"*, mintha maga a megjelentetett szöveg egyfajta hivatalosan felvett és rögzített vallomás volna. Ezzel a szövegek végén megjelenő *„aláírás"* megidézi azt a három fontos funkciót, amelyet a hagyományos aláírás a hivatalos dokumentumok végén tölt be: *„egyedülálló módon azonosítja a szerzőjét"*, az aláíró részéről *„kifejezi a dokumentum tartalmával való egyetértést"*, ezen túl pedig a dokumentum teljességét és lezárságát is jelzi azáltal, hogy utolsó elemként kerül fel a dokumentumra. (DEKEYSER 78)

A fent felsorolt hitelesítő funkciók jogi értelemben csak akkor érvényesülnének, ha a kézjegy egy fizikailag létező, papírra írt/nyomtatott szövegre kerülne rá manuálisan, ahogy arra Dekeyser is rávilágít. A The Players' Tribune digitális aláírásai pedig, attól függetlenül, hogy milyen eljárással kerülnek rögzítésre, – azaz, hogy egy analóg szignatúrát digitalizálnak, vagy a kézírást eleve valamilyen digitális érintőképernyőn rögzítik – digitálisan módosíthatók és sokszorosíthatók. Ráadásul, mivel egy digitális formátumú szöveg *„végén"* állnak, azt sem tudják szavatolni, hogy a szöveg lezárt, és hogy pontosan olyan formában volt *„kész"* az aláírás pillanatában, mint ahogyan az a honlapon később elérhető. Mégis úgy látom, hogy ezek az aláírások kulcsfontosságúak a hozzájuk rendelt szövegek befogadásakor. Eredetiséget ugyan nem igazolnak, de a személyesség és az autentikusság szimbólumaiként működnek a lejeunei *„önéletírói paktum"* értelmében.

Philippe Lejeune az önéletírást – amelyet olyan „visszatekintő prózaként" definiál, *„amelyet valódi személy ad, saját életéről, a hangsúlyt pedig a magánéletére, különösképp személyiségének történetére helyezi"* (LEJEUNE 133) – az olvasó pozíciójából kiindulva vizsgálja, mivel szerinte az önéletrajzi narratívát valójában az olvasó hozza működésbe. Lejeune rendszerében az önéletírás kulcskérdése, épp ezért nem az, hogy a szövegben megszólaló *„én"* a szövegen túli világban ténylegesen megfeleltethető-e annak, akit a könyv szerzőként tüntet fel – esetünkben a sportolónak. Az önéletírói paktum elmélete szerint az önéletrajz akkor működik, ha a szerzőt, a narrátort és a főhőst azonos személyként ismeri fel (és el) a befogadó. Ezt a problémát a nyelvészetre lefordítva az *„én"* személyes névmás személynévre válthatóságaként értelmez Lejeune. Az önéletírói paktum szerint ebből a szempontból a

főhős és az elbeszélő egyezése az egyszerűbb eset, mivel ez magából a szövegből következik: az *„én"* jelentése a refencia szintjén ugyanis mindig ténykérdés, arra vonatkozik, aki beszél (vagy esetünkben ír). Azaz, ha a történet narrátora a főhősre egyes szám első személyben hivatkozik, a két személy azonosítható. Az elbeszélő-főhős és a szerző azonosként való felismerésének megteremtése ennél ugyanakkor bonyolultabb, hiszen ez a kijelentés szintjén létrehozott jelentés, vagyis mindig megkérdőjelezhető lesz. Lejeune azt mondja, ez a fajta azonosítás épp ezért, már nem történhet meg a szöveg kontextusának (például a könyv borítójának és címlapjának) ismerete nélkül.

A könyvként kiadott önéletrajz szerzőjének és elbeszélőjének azonosítását ez alapján a megközelítés alapján végsősoron egy kétoldalú szerződés megkötése és kölcsönös elfogadása teszi lehetővé, amit Lejeune *„önéletírói paktumnak"* nevez. Ez szerződés már az olvasás kezdetekor létrejön, – az olvasó ugyanis előzetesen elfogadja, hogy a címlapon rögzítettek szerint a szerző megegyezik műve elbeszélőjével és főhősével is – de az olvasás tapasztalata ezt a megegyezést visszamenőleg akár módosíthatja is. Mekis magyarázata szerint az önéletírói paktumot szintaktikailag a címlap és a szöveg dinamikája hozza létre (ezt úgy is mondhatjuk, hogy a *„szerző"* már a kiadáskor, azzal, hogy nevét adja a történtéhez, hogy felelősséget vállal az önéletrajzban foglaltakért, *„aláírja"* a szerződést), paradigmai síkon pedig az olvasás folyamata hitelesíti (azaz, a befogadó azzal fogadja el a paktumot, hogy nekikezd a könyvnek). (MEKIS D. 26)

Lejeune önéletírói paktum elmélete abból a szempontból szigorú, hogy az önéletírást határozottan elválasztja az én-elbeszélések sokaságától (például a memoártól és a naplótól is), ez alapján a The Players' Tribune írásai aligha tekinthetők önéletrajzinak. Ennek ellenére világos, hogy ezek az én-elbeszélések is egy, az önéletíróihoz nagyon hasonló szerződést kívánnak kötni az olvasóikkal, olyannyira, hogy a szimbolikusan értett *„aláírást"* (még mindig szimbólumként, méghozzá digitális szimbólumként, működtetve) ténylegesen láthatóvá is teszik. Ahogy a könyvként kiadott könyvborító sem csak nyelvi, hanem vizuális kontextusként is funkcionál, hasonlóan működik az online *„aláírás"* a The Players' Tribune-ön megjelentetett én-elbeszélések végén. Ezek ugyanakkor (szemben a könyvborítókkal) direkt módon idézik meg a hivatalos dokumentumok, szerződések formai lezárását, ezáltal tovább erősítve azt az olvasókban, hogy a közölt szöveghez a szerzőként feltüntetett sportoló nemcsak a nevét, de a hozzájárulását is adta a, ezáltal jogi értelemben is felelősséget[7] vállal annak tartalmáért. A

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[7] A szerzői felelősségvállalás Lejeune szerint kulcskérdés az önéletrajzok esetében: *„A nyomtatott szövegekbe a teljes megnyilatkozást olyan valaki vállal felelősséget, aki nevét szokás szerint a könyv borítóján és belső címlapján tünteti fel, a cím alatt*

befogadókban valószínűleg a szimbólumként működtetett *„aláírások"* használta nélkül is aktiválódna az az előzetes tudás, miszerint nem lehet *„csak úgy"* visszaélni a híres sportolók nevével, – azaz nem lehetne a hozzájárulása nélkül *„valótlanságokat"* publikálni a nevében – de ez a nyelvi és formai megoldás tulajdonképpen egyfajta offline vallomásosság kontextusát is képes lehet megidézni.

Összegzés

Visszatérve ahhoz a szöveghez, amelyet állítólag Neto és a csapattársai írtak, ha a ghostwriting kérdéskörét azoknak az elméleteknek a segítségével igyekszünk megérteni, amelyek a szöveg autentikusságát abban keresik, hogy kinek a szellemitulajdona maga a történet, illetve hogy kinek a szemléletmódja, narratív kerete, (ön)értelmezése érvényesül, akkor könnyen visszakövethetetlen és bebizonyíthatatlan állításokkal találjuk szembe magunkat. Ráadásul ezen az úton elindulva, hamar megdőlni látszik a The Players' Tribune azon vállalása, amely szerint közvetlen és közvetítettlen kapcsolatot ígér a sportolók és a rajongók között. Ha viszont Lejeune alapján közelítjük meg ezt a kérdést, akkor úgy is tekinthetünk a szóban forgó cikkre, hogy az egyszerű olvasókhoz hasonlóan megkötjük (de legalábbis elfogadjuk) az önéletírói paktumot az állítólagos szerzőkkel. Ebből a megközelítésből ugyanis vizsgálhatóvá válik az, hogy hogyan működik a szöveg azon befogadók számára, akik hajlandóak úgy olvasni, mintha azok valóban a túlélő focisták tényleges szavai lennének: mert formailag és szimbolikusan is úgy épül fel a szöveg, illetne annak a nyelvi és vizuális kontextusa[8], hogy a napjaink médiadiskurzusát uraló intim nyilvánosságban a személyesség és a példaszerű életek iránti igényt szolgálja ki.

Lejeune szerint olvasás közben vagy után az önéletírói paktum megkötése visszavonható, de legalábbis megkérdőjelezhető (ez teszi lehetővé azt az olvasói attitűdöt, amely *„kopó"* módjára *„vadászik"* az esetleges szerződésszegésekre (LEJEUNE 142)). Ez pedig azért fontos, mert a The Players' Tribune szövegének megkonstruált személyessége és intimitása az önéletírói paktum felől vizsgálva anélkül válik lehetővé,

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vagy felett. Ebben a névben összegződik annak a léte, akit szerzőnek nevezünk: a szövegben ez az egyetlen kétségbevonhatatlan szövegen kívülire utaló jegy, ami valóságos személyre utal, s az ő kérése, hogy neki tulajdonítsuk legvégső soron a teljes írott szöveg kijelentésének felelősségét." (LEJEUNE, 139–140)

[8] Kontextus alatt ideértve az alapító személyét, aki maga is egykori profi sportoló; azokat a gyakorlatokat, amelyekkel újságírói szerepben tüntetik fel a sportolókat, miközben a tényleges újságírók és médiamunkások szerepét olyan szinten igyekeznek elrejteni, hogy azok szinte láthatatlanok maradnak; és a szimbolikus hitelesítésként használt *„aláírás"* alkalmazását is.

hogy magát a narratívát igaznak vagy hitelesnek kellene elfogadnunk. Ez az olvasat tulajdonképpen kiegészíti azokat a kritikákat, amelyek szerint az elemzett weboldal megpróbálja kisebbíteni a sportújságírók jelentőségét, miközben az újságírói szakma professzionalizmusának bevett formuláit arra használja, hogy hitelesség képzetével ruházza fel a saját szövegeit. Emellett új nézőpontból is megvilágítja azt, hogy ez az *„ellenkánon"* képzési kísérlet, bár látszólag a blogkultúra és a közösségi média *„őszinteségének"* logikáját követi, valójában a nem transzparens (Carvalho, Chung és Koliska) és nem a sportolók és a rajongók közvetlen kapcsolatát építi. Ehelyett azt a kontrollt, amelyet a jellemzően lojális sportújságírástól bizonyos mértékben elvett a blogkultúra, (SCHWARTZ és VOGAN 49) most nem a sportolók, sokkal inkább az őket képviselő professzionális *„kulturális közvetítők"* kezébe adja vissza.

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Fekete Rajmund[1]

„A világ legjobb 140 karakteres írója"[2]
Donald Trump és a twitter-elnökség

Abstract

With his election in 2016 as president of the United States, we can assert that Donald Trump ushered in a new era in American public life, in administration, in foreign policy and especially in political communication. What Franklin D. Roosevelt was to radio and John F. Kennedy to television, Donald J. Trump is to Twitter. The 45th president of the US broke from President Obama's elitist, intellectual communication and introduced a simpler, louder, more troll-like style of communication in public. His Twitter account, which has almost 80 million followers, serves as his primary channel. During the 2016 elections, his Twitter profile functioned as a *„prototype campaign,"* an example of innovation merging with real-life practice in the world of politics. Equipped with this communications platform and style, he has created a communications space where it becomes impossible to not talk about him. Moreover, with his proactive and innovative approach, the president communicates directly with the American citizens, bypassing the filter of the media.

Keywords: Donald Trump; political communication; Twitter, social media, fake news

A 2016-os amerikai elnökválasztás során mind az elemzések, mind a közvélemény-kutatások (lásd 1. táblázat) már-már technikai K.O-val felérő győzelmet jósoltak a demokraták elnökjelöltjének, Hillary Clintonnak. Sokatmondó adatok ezek: a The Huffington Post 98 százalékos, a FiveThirtyEight 71 százalékos vagy éppen a The New York Times The Upshot című választási rovata 85%-os arányú győzelmet jósolt a demokraták elnökjelöltjének.

	Hillary Clinton	**Donald Trump**
The Huffington Post	*98%*	*2%*
The New York Times	*85%*	*15%*
Predict Wise	*89%*	*11%*
FiveThirtyEight	*71%*	*29%*

1. táblázat: *Amerikai közvélemény-kutatások a 2016-os amerikai elnökválasztásról*[3]

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[2] Donald J. TRUMP 2012. november 10-i tweet-je: *„Thanks- many are saying I'm the best 140 character writer in the world. It's easy when it's fun."* https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/267286471172562944

[3] A közvélemény-kutatások forrásai a tanulmány végén találhatóak.

A sajtó és a politikai elemzők által sulykolt alternatív politikai valóság azonban az urnáknál szembe találta magát az amerikai realitással és Donald J. Trump lett az Amerikai Egyesült Államok 45. elnöke, akiről nyugodtan elmondható, hogy az újvilági nagyhatalom egyik legvitatottabb és legmegosztóbb, ugyanakkor sajátos karakterű vezetője. Az igencsak népszerű egykori hollywoodi színészként tevékenykedő Ronald Reagan elnökhöz hasonlóan Trump is egy különösen harsány médiaszemélyiségből alakult át politikai csúcsvezetővé. Ám amíg Reagan az elnöksége előtt kaliforniai kormányzóként már szerzett államigazgatási tapasztalatokat, addig Trump karrierje során semmilyen közszolgálati vagy választott tisztséget nem töltött be.[4]

Azonban bátran kijelenthető, hogy Trump elnökké választása új korszakot hozott az amerikai közéletben, a kormányzati adminisztrációban, a washingtoni (nem törvényi értelemben vett) lobbitevékenységben, a külpolitikában, de legfőképpen a politikai kommunikációban. Ami Franklin D. Rooseveltnek volt a rádió vagy John F. Kennedynek a televízió, az Donald J. Trump-nak a Twitter.[5] Szókimondó kommunikációs stílusáról, illetve az akár diplomáciai eseményeket, globális trendeket is befolyásoló Twitter-bejegyzéseiről már eddig is sokan értekeztek és vizsgálódtak publicisták, szakértők, kutatók vagy éppen elemzők.

Joggal merül fel a kérdés: mi az oka annak, hogy a 21. századra a közösségi média felületek, köztük a Twitter vált az amerikai politikai kommunikáció egyik legmeghatározóbb felületévé, amely mára bekebelezte a hírek előállítását és fogyasztását? Mi az oka annak, hogy a Facebook globálisan és országosan is jóval több felhasználóval rendelkezik, mégis a Twitter jelent hivatkozási alapot a hírek tekintetében? Mi lehet Trump Twitter-elnökségének titka?

Az online nyilvánosság első számú terepe

> *„A tweetek nélkül nem lennék itt."*
> Donald Trump

Talán Jack Dorsey és Noah Glass alapítók sem gondolták volna, hogy az eredetileg kutatási és fejlesztési projektként 2006. március 21-én útjára induló Twitter mára már az online politikai kommunikációs tér egyik zászlóshajójává és megkerülhetetlen felületévé válik. Azonban, ha

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[4] CSUTAK Zsolt: *Trump és a meghasonlott neokonzervatívok*. Külügyi Szemle 2018/1. 124.

[5] GABLER, Neal: *Donald Trump, the Emperor of Social Media*. Bill Moyers, 2016. április 29. https://billmoyers.com/story/donald-trump-the-emperor-of-social-media/ (2020. április 26.).

csak és kizárólag a statisztikákra támaszkodnánk, akkor egy egészen más képet kellene, hogy kapjunk, hiszen a Twitter globálisan és regionálisan is jócskán le van maradva a felhasználók számának tekintetében a Facebook-hoz képest.

A *Hootsuite* és a *We Are Social* minden évben elkészíti globális statisztikai összesítését az internethasználat és a közösségi média tekintetében.[6] A legutóbbi adatok értelmében ma a világ lakosságának 59 százaléka, több mint 4,5 milliárd fő rendelkezik internet hozzáféréssel. Az internetet használók több mint 50 százaléka, közel 2,5 milliárd fő rendelkezik Facebook-profillal és mindösszesen „*csak*" 340 millió ember rendelkezik Twitter-fiókkal. A globális trendek összhangban vannak az országos trendekkel.

1. ábra: *Social media felhasználók száma (2020 január)*

Az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban a lakosság 87%-a, 288,1 millió fő rendelkezik internet hozzáféréssel, de amíg az amerikai Facebook-felhasználók száma eléri a 180 millió főt, tehát az internetet használók 62% rendelkezik Facebook-profillal, addig a Twitter-fiókkal rendelkezők száma mindössze 59,35 millió fő (alig több mint, a lakosság 20%-a). Hazánk vonatkozásában is hasonló trendeket figyelhetünk meg: a lakosság 79%-a, mintegy 7,64 millió fő rendelkezik internet-hozzáféréssel és ebből mintegy 5,6 millió főnek van Facebook-profilja (73%), míg a Twitter-fiókok száma 433 ezer főre tehető (5,6%).

A Pew Research Center a 2016-os elnökválasztás során készített kutatása[7] az amerikai médiafogyasztási szokásokat vizsgálta a közösségi médiumokon keresztül. Az eredmények egyáltalán nem meglepők,

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[6] Digital in 2020. https://wearesocial.com/digital-2020 (2020. április 26.)

[7] News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016. Pew Research Center. https://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/ (2020. április 26.)

hiszen beleillenek abba a trendbe, amit egy ideje tapasztalni lehet: a Reddit-felhasználók 70 százaléka, a Facebook-használók 66 százaléka, a Twitter-felhasználóknak pedig 59 százaléka a közösségi médiából jut hírekhez.

2. ábra: *Médiafogyasztási szokások a social mediában (2016, Pew Research Center)*

Ha le akarnám egyszerűsíteni, akkor azt mondanám, hogy tízből hat amerikai (62%) a közösségi média felületeken keresztül tájékozódik.

3. ábra: *Tízből hat amerikai a közösségi médián keresztül fogyaszt híreket (Pew Research Center, 2016)*

A korábban említett számok, adatok is alátámasztják, hogy a közösségi média platformok az online nyilvánosság első számú terepeivé váltak, amelyek vitathatatlanul átrendezték a nyilvánosság szerkezetét. Ezeken az oldalakon keresztül tömegek tudják véleményüket közzétenni, mások véleményét megismerni, egymással megosztani információkat, illetve kommentálni. A platformokon keresztül közzétett tartalmak

nyilvánosságának mértéke azonban több változótól is függ: egyebek között a platform méretétől (felhasználói számától), a felhasználó ismerősei számától (barátok, követők), illetve az adott tartalom mások általi továbbításának (megosztásának) volumenétől is.[8]

Eugene Volokh 1995-ben tett közzé egy tanulmányt[9], amelyben az internetes nyilvánosság átalakulásának irányait kívánta megjósolni. Az általa *„olcsó beszédnek"* (cheap speech) hívott jelenséget üdvözölendő fejleménynek tekintette, amely hozzájárul, hogy bárki olcsón (vagy akár ingyen) véleményt formálhasson a közélet kérdéseiről közvetítők (a sajtó, vagyis a televízió, rádió, illetve a nyomtatott sajtó) hiányában is, szélesebb és közvetlenebb alapokra helyezve a demokratikus döntéshozatalt.

Ez az *„olcsó beszéd"* ma, több mint két évtized elteltével, nem érzékelhető feltétlenül pozitív jelenségként. A tömeges online véleményközlés lehetősége és a közösségi média platformok felvirágzása kikezdte a hagyományos újságírás üzleti modelljét és szakmai követelményeinek érvényesülését. A tényfeltáró újságírás visszaszorult, helyébe a gyors impulzusokra épülő, szenzációhajhász és sokszor a valósággal hadilábon álló tartalom-előállítás lépett előtérbe.[10]

A politikai kommunikáció új szintje

> *„Majd megnyomod, hogy »tweet« és az egész világ megőrül."*
> The New Yorker karikatúra szövege

A 2016-os elnökválasztás pedig kiválóan illusztrálta ezt a fajta újságírást, amely sok esetben politikailag motivált és érzelmektől túlfűtött volt. Donald Trump-nak pedig egy ilyen környezetben kellett eljuttatnia üzeneteit közvetlenül a választópolgárok számára, amely egyenesen kampányt indított ellene és politikai aktorként lépett a választás színpadára. Sajnos nem újkeletű jelenség, hogy a sajtó politikai szereplőként lép a színpadra, elég, ha csak a nagy-britanniai Brexit-tárgyalásokat, szavazásokat vesszük alapul.

Ebben az ellenszélben lavírozva Trump részben a jobboldali, baráti médiára tudott támaszkodni (Breitbart, FOX News), de még inkább a Twitter-re, amellyel teljes mértékben kizárta a klasszikus sajtót a közvetítői szerepből és közvetlenül tud(ott) kommunikálni a választópolgárokkal. Sean Spicer a CBS Sunday Morning-nak nyilatkozva azt mondta ezzel kapcsolatosan, hogy a média részéről sokan

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[8] KOLTAY András: *A social media platformok jogi státusa a szólásszabadság nézőpontjából.* In Medias Res 2019/1. 1-56. o.

[9] VOLOKH, Eugene: *Cheap Speech and What It Will Do.* The Yale Law Journal (1995) 1805-1852.

[10] KOLTAY: 10.

érzik magukat fenyegetve, amiért az elnöknek közvetlen kapcsolata van az amerikai néppel.[11] A közvetítő szerepet betöltő sajtónak egy újabb erőteljes jelzés volt az elnök részéről, amikor a hagyományos fehér házi sajtótájékoztatókat (*daily briefing*) megszüntette. A felháborodáson túl azonban a fehér házi üzenetek nem rekedtek meg, sőt, az elnök proaktív *social media* kommunikációjának köszönhetően, továbbra is tematizál.

A Twittert még Barack Obama emelte be az amerikai politikába (bár nála a Facebook mindvégig sokkal fontosabb szerepet töltött be) 2008-as elnöki kampánya során és mutatta meg, hogyan lehet közösséget, valamint a politikus iránti rajongást, lelkesedést, közösséget generálni. Ahogy azonban Barry Burden, a Wisconsini Egyetem professzora nyilatkozott, *„Donald Trump által a Twitter egy új szintet ért el"* és neki köszönhetően a politikai vita egyik legizgalmasabb terepévé változott az elmúlt évek során.[12]

Sokak szerint az amerikai elnök nem igazán rendelkezik koherens politikai vagy bármiféle körülhatárolható eszmerendszerrel, annál inkább az opportunizmus és a voluntarista rögtönzés politikai gyakorlatát követi az állandó médiafigyelem kikényszerítése érdekében.[13] Ennek megnyilvánulása, ahogyan a testhezálló online közösségi médiaplatformok hatékony alkalmazásával, nagyon egyedi és hatásos módon, rögtönzött fősodorbeli gondolat- és véleményirányító csúcstényezőként jelenik meg nemcsak az Amerikai Egyesült Államokban, hanem globálisan is.

Trump figyelemalapú politikát folytat, amely azt a jelenséget írja le, amikor a használt kommunikációs stílus segítségével a politikusok magukra irányítják a figyelmet. Ez a fajta figyelem nem a napirend-kijelölést jelenti, mivel nem a policy értelmében vett politikáról szól, hanem magukról a politikusokról.[14] Trump innovatív technológiahasználatával pedig a *„prototípuskampányok"* közé helyezte el saját kampányát. Ezek azoknak a folyamatoknak a katalizátorai, amikor a politika világában az innovációk összeolvadnak a gyakorlatban.[15] Ennek köszönhetően Trump olyan kommunikációs környezetet tudott teremteni, ahol nem lehet nem beszélni róla. A Twitterbe ültetett kódolt gyorsaságot ültette át saját politikai kommunikációjába. Jellemzően hajnalban írt bejegyzései sokaságával (*tweetstorms*) hívta fel magára a figyelmet, amelyekben sokszor nyers

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[11] MORINI, Marco: *Lessons from Trump's Political Communication: How to Dominate the Media Environment.* Springer Nature, 2020. 6.

[12] KAPKO, Matt: *Twitter's impact on 2016 presidential election is unmistakable.* CIO, 2016. november 3. https://www.cio.com/article/3137513/twitters-impact-on-2016-presidential-election-is-unmistakable.html (2020. április 26.)

[13] CSUTAK: 135.

[14] MERKOVITY Norbert: *A figyelemalapú politika és Donald Trump.* Médiakutató: Médiaelméleti Folyóirat 16: (3-4) 7–16.

[15] KREISS, Daniel: *Prototype Politics: Technology-Intensive Campaigning and the Data of Democracy.* Oxford University Press, 2016.

stílusban támadja az éppen aktuális ellenfelét. A tweetek pedig jó alapot nyújtottak a hagyományos média reggeli műsorainak politikai rovataiban arra, hogy hírt adjanak az elnökválasztásról vagy akár az adminisztrációról, ezzel pedig tematizálja a politikai csatateret.

Trump ráérzett a hagyományos média és vele együtt a rendszer gyengeségeire, miszerint nem tudnak lépést tartani azzal a kommunikációs technikai robbanással, amely az eltelt tíz évben végbe ment. Bizonyos értelemben a hagyományos média is támogatja Trumpot (mégha negatívan is), ugyanis mindenféle kritika nélkül közvetítik rendezvényeit, vagy közvetítették a kampány során. Erről Leslie Moonves, a CBS tévécsatorna vezérigazgatója azt mondta a nézettségre utalva: *„Lehet, hogy nem jó Amerikának, de rohadt jó a CBS-nek”*.[16]

Ebből fakad a második folyamat, mégpedig kommunikációja, amely bombasztikus, rövid, lényegre törő, sokszor érzelemvezérelt és a politikailag korrekt környezet számára teljesen fülsértő és sorozatosan megbotránkoztatást keltő, gyakran pedig személyeskedő.

Ha tweetjeit megvizsgáljuk, először a nyelvezete szembeötlő. Barack Obama elnöksége egyfajta kimért távolságtartás volt mind a sajtó, mind az emberek irányába, nyelvezete pedig elsősorban az elitnek és az elithez szólt. Tweetjeiből a kimértség és a pontosság, semmint az emberközeliség, a lazaság, vagy az egyszerűség érződött.[17] Nem véletlen, hogy egy idő után *„Telepromter President”* becenevet aggattak rá. Az elnökválasztási kampányban ugyanez a trend volt megfigyelhető: hiába volt aktívabb a demokraták jelöltje a Twitteren, mégis Trump tudott olyan üzeneteket megfogalmazni, amelyek folyamatos hírértékkel bírtak a sajtó számára.

	Hillary Clinton	Donald Trump
Követők	*16 750 031*	*33 593 682*
Tweetek száma	*9 887*	*35 244*
Csatlakozás éve	*2013*	*2009*
Két tweet között eltelt leghosszabb idő	*12 óra 56 perc 16 másodperc*	*1 nap 18 óra 48 perc 7 másodperc*
Napi legtöbb tweet	*78 tweet (2016. október 18.)*	*87 tweet (2016. október 19.)*
Napi átlag tweetek	*27*	*11*

2. táblázat: *Hillary Clinton és Donald Trump Twitter-használata (The Washington Post)*[18]

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[16] BOND, Paul: *Leslie Moonves on Donald Trump: „It May Not Be Good for America, but It's Damn Good for CBS”*. The Hollywood Reporter, 2016. február 29.; https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/leslie-moonves-donald-trump-may-871464 (2020. április 26.)

[17] STOLLE, Galen & Caton, Steve: *Twitter, Trump, and the Base: A Shift to a New Form of Presidential Talk?* Signs and Society. Volume 6, Number 1, 2018. 147-165.

[18] KEEGAN, Jon: *Clinton vs. Trump: How They Used Twitter*. The Washington Post, 2017. július 10. https://graphics.wsj.com/clinton-trump-twitter/ (2020. 04. 26.)

Egyes számítások szerint Trump 2016 februárjáig mintegy 1,9 milliárd dollárt érő ingyenes médiafelülethez jutott, miközben 10 millió dollárt értékben vásárolt médiamegjelenéseket. Mindez a szám Clintonnál már csak 746 millió dollárt értékű ingyenes médiafelületet és 28 millió dolláros vásárolt médiamegjelenést jelentett.[19]

Ennek több oka is van: Trump tweetjeiből érződik a természetesség és olvasva azokat, fülünkbe cseng az elnök sokszor megbotránkoztató stílusa. Elütései, hibái csak emberi mivoltát erősítik, amik akár napokig foglalkoztathatják a világsajtót (*covfefe*). Tweetjeinek nyelvezete olyannyira egyszerűek, hogy azt egy negyedik osztályos is meg tudja érteni[20], hiszen nem csak az elithez, hanem mindenkihez kíván szólni. Ennek azonban van egy másik meggondolása is, amely pont azokat a teóriákat cáfolja meg, amelyek szerint az elnök kapkod és az adminisztráció kommunikációs döntései nincsenek végig gondolva, ez pedig az, hogy az első marketinges szabályt tartják be, melynek lényege, hogy úgy kell megírni egy-egy reklámszöveget, hogy azt egy hatodik osztályos is megértse.

A beiktatását követő 33 hónap alatt több mint 11 ezer alkalommal tweetelt, amelyek a politika és az érzelmek teljes skáláját felölelték. Elnökségének kezdetén 9 alkalommal tweetelt naponta, így egészen 2017 júliusáig kellett várni az ezredik tweetjére. Az is kirajzolódik, hogy a 2019. év augusztusától októberéig háromszor annyit tweetelt, mint a 2017-es év ugyanazon időszakában. Ezt támasztja alá 2019 októbere is, amikor egy hét alatt 271 alkalommal tweetelt.[21]

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[19] CONFESSORE, Nicholas & YOURISH, Karen: *$2 Billion Worth of Free Media for Donald Trump.* The New York Times, 2016. március 15. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/upshot/measuring-donald-trumps-mammoth-advantage-in-free-media.html (2020. április 26.)

[20] BURLEIGH, Nina: *Trump Speaks at Fourth-Grade Level, Lowest of Last 15 U.S. Presidents, New Analysis Finds.* The Newsweek, 2018. augusztus 1. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-fire-and-fury-smart-genius-obama-774169 (2020. április 26.)

[21] SHEAR, Michael D., HABERMAN, Maggie, CONFESSORE, Nicholas, YOURISH, Karen, BUCHANAN, Larry & COLLINS, Keith: *How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in Over 11,000 Tweets.* The New York Times, 2019. november 2. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html (2020. április 26.)

4. ábra: *Donald Trump tweetjeinek száma heti bontásban. A narancssárgával jelöltek a támadásokat jelölik, ebből világosan látszik, hogy tweetjeinek több mint felében megtámadott valakit vagy valamit (The New York Times)*

Válaszait igencsak vizuálisan fogalmazza meg az amerikaiak problémáira: falépítés, kereskedelmi megállapodások felrúgása, szigorúbb határellenőrzés, szankciók vagy éppen szigetfelvásárlás. Dan Scavino, a Fehér Ház közösségi média igazgatójának ötlete volt a Trónok Harca mintájára készíteni egy *„Sanctions are Coming"* képet, amire aztán az iráni vezetés is kellő humorral reagált. Ebbe a kategóriába sorolandó az is, amikor a Twitteren ígérte meg Trump, hogy nem épít felhőkarcolót Izlandra abban az esetben, ha megvásárolnák a szigetet. De ugyanilyen látványos volt az is, amikor üzleti múltjára hivatkozva mondta, hogy megtisztítja a Wall Streetet és lecsapolja Washington mocsarát.

Ellenfeleire találó neveket aggatott: hazudós (lyin' Ted Cruz), kicsi (little Marco Rubio), csalárd (crooked Hillary), álmos (Sleepy Biden), őrült (Crazy Nancy Pelosi) vagy éppen semmit nem csinálók (Do Nothing Democrats), akiket nem rest folyamatosan támadni. Elnöksége óta tweetjeinek több mint fele szólt arról, hogy megtámadott valakit vagy valamit (5 889) 2019. novemberéig. 33 hónap alatt a demokratákat 2 405 alkalommal, míg a hírcsatornákat 1 308 alkalommal kritizálta. *„Első támadására"* egészen az elnökségének harmadik napjáig kellett várni. Az jól látható, hogy a támadások általában reggel 6 és 10 óra között a legaktívabbak és legharsányabbak, amikor nagy valószínűséggel nincs ott egyetlen tanácsadó, aki jobb belátásra bírja az elnököt.

5. ábra: *Donald Trump tweet-aktivitása egy napra lebontva (The New York Times)*

A Twitteren számtalanszor lehettünk tanúi elbocsátásoknak, kinevezéseknek, kirúgásoknak. Amíg elődjénél a Twitteren sokszor egy hosszadalmas, párbeszédekkel tarkított eljárás, ügy lezárása jelent csak meg, addig Trumpnál éppen fordítva működik: valami kezdetének lehetünk a szemtanúi és mint egy valóságshownál[22], várjuk, hogy mi fog történni. Nem rest néha folyamatban lévő ügyeket a Twitteren keresztül megváltoztatni, megtorpedózni vagy éppen egy teljesen más irányba terelni. Elég, ha csak arra gondolunk, amikor még előző külügyminisztere, Rex Tillerson Kínában tárgyalt az észak-koreai szankciókról és a tárgyalások kellős közepén az elnök kitweetelte, hogy *„csak az idejét fecsérli a Kicsi Rakéta Srácra".*

Konklúzió

> *„Sokan azt mondják, én vagyok a világ legjobb 140 karakteres írója."*
> Donald Trump

Az amerikai elnök közel 80 millió követőjéhez képest mindössze 46 embert követ, azoknak is nagy része családtagjai, republikánus képviselők vagy a FOX televízió és annak vezető arcai. Szimbiózisa a csatornával a kezdet kezdetén nyilvánvaló volt, de ennek egyik jelképes mozzanata volt az, amikor első fehér házi reggelén gratulált a csatorna kiváló teljesítményéhez. Ezt azóta már több mint 750 alkalom követte.

Követői bázisa, valamint elnöki mozzanatának minden pillanata hírértékkel bír. Épp ezért nem véletlen, amikor azt mondja, *„nincs*

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[22] PONIEWOZIK, James: *Audience of One: Donald Trump, Television, and the Fracturing of America.* Liveright, 2019.

szüksége a fake news médiára"[23], hiszen ahogy kitweetel valamit, az *„két másodpercen belül rendkívüli hír lesz".*[24]

Donald Trump kapcsán sokan gondolják azt, hogy egy olyan ember került a világ legerősebb haderejét, politikai és gazdasági hatalmát irányító Fehér Ház élére, aki mögött nincs stratégia, elképzelés, döntései pedig ad hoc jelleggel születnek. Ha egy kicsit távolabbról vizsgáljuk az eseményeket, láthatjuk, hogy egy paradigmaváltás zajlik a világban, amelyre az amerikai elnök próbál válaszokat adni nemzeti, szuverenista szempontból.

Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok 45. elnöke tökélyre fejlesztette elődje Twitter-kommunikációját, mondhatni példátlan módon kihasználta annak valós idejű, 280 karakteres tartalomgyártását, gyorsaságát, egyszerűségét és tömörségét, ami tökéletesen passzol a 21. század felgyorsult, ember-eszköz kapcsolatán alapuló világunkhoz. Sajátos posztmodern módon, annak ellenére, hogy Trump volt a legidősebb korában hivatalba lépő amerikai elnök, a jól felismerhető nonkonformista és progresszív online jelenléte és stílusa nagyon is belesimul a 21. század virtuális kommunikációs trendjeibe.

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Zsolt B. Horváth[1]

US politics and the Cultural Cold War[2]

Abstract

In the early decades of the Cold War, the US had to face the inconvenient truth that it is impossible to defeat the Soviets using the traditional means of war. Propaganda, culture, and education became the tools of this new *„softer"* approach to strengthen unity of the american population and to win influence on both sides of the divided-Europe. Institutionally, via private foundations like the USIA and the CCF, with the invisible support of the CIA and FBI, the U.S. was able to support the birth of many influential educational and cultural products on both sides of the Atlantics. Eventually the strength and the focus of these programs had to change dramatically from the 1960's, due elemental changes in world politics and in public opinion.

Keywords: CIA; Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF); Cultural Cold War; Hollywood; United States Information Agency (USIA); Infinite Games; McCarthyism; State Department;

Oceania was at war with Eurasia: therefore Oceania had always been at war with Eurasia. The enemy of the moment always represented absolute evil, and it followed that any past or future agreement with him was impossible. [...] when the great orgasm was quivering to its climax and the general hatred of Eurasia had boiled up into such delirium that if the crowd could have got their hands on the 2,000 Eurasian war-criminals who were to be publicly hanged on the last day of the proceedings, they would unquestionably have torn them to pieces -- at just this moment it had been announced that Oceania was not after all at war with Eurasia. Oceania was at war with Eastasia. Eurasia was an ally.[3]

It may seem an exaggeration to compare the US and its public to George Orwell's dystopian Oceania from *1984*, a book released in 1949, but it is remarkable to witness the speed of change in opinion in both cases. The public reacts almost instantly to change in World Politics. This becomes immensely visible when we consider public opinion on the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, the American public opinion was polarized regarding the Soviet Union. On one side many considered it a utopist state and urged the adaptation of a similar system in the US as well. On

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[2] This paper is an elaborate version of a magazine article I had prepared entitled *„Az Egyesült Államok szerepe a kulturális hidegháborúban"* found *„ujkor.hu 2020.05.24"*

[3] George ORWELL: *1984*, Part 1 Chapter 3, Part 2, Chapter 9.

the other side many looked at it as a horrible dystopia, a path that the US should never follow. The outbreak of the Second World War started to unify the public one way or the other. Until 1941 anticommunist views become dominant, but it all changed when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union. From that point the formal tyrants became patriots and heroes who were defending their Motherland and the „*Free World"* from German invasion. One of the most iconic pictures about those events is the one taken when a soldier is raising a Soviet Flag over the Reichstag, representing the metaphoric end of the war in Europe. As the euphoria was fading away, a new fear arrived in its place. Between the two superpowers mistrust slowly but steadily grew. By 1947 anticommunist rhetoric returned along with the „*Red Scare"* the fear of a communist takeover.[4] Fueling and using this fear, the government and governmental organizations of the United States waged the so-called „*Cultural Cold War"* (LASCH) to achieve cultural and ideological supremacy at home and around the world. For this fight they had to use a huge arsenal of tools beside the original temptation of the products of capitalism like Coca Cola or Blue Jeans. The „*toolkit"* included most branches of media, NGO-s (like the Ford Foundation, Congress for Cultural Freedom), civil movements, and even student and academic exchanges; arguably, later on, the entire Space Race, too. This war for cultural supremacy continued until the 1960's, when the turns in World Politics, society, and culture changed the means of the Cultural Cold War as well.

After World War Two, the US remained the only major intact economy; they were responsible for half of the global world trade. Simultaneously, the nuclear bomb together with the largest navy and a strong air force made them the number one military might. At the very same time all the great European powers, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, all had a totally or nearly collapsed economy, and had to suffer huge casualties in military power as well. With this in mind one could wonder, why did the US need to engage in a broad ideological fight, when they already possessed military and economic supremacy? Regardless of the economic and human casualties, the Soviet Union was able to rise as the second superpower and, with the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, the threat of soviet dominance in the whole of Europe was clear. Churchill in his „*Sinews of Peace speech"(Churchill), in which he also introduced the* „Iron Curtain" expression, warned about this threat. He suggested the US use her military supremacy to gain as much leverage against the Soviets,

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[4] The original Red Scare was a phenomenon that followed the Bolshevik Revolution. The continuous success of communism in Russia created the fear that the American labor movements and anarchists will turn the USA into a communist state as well.

especially since they were weakened at the moment from the extensive fighting. But President Truman did not want to start a new war, and this hesitation had a heavy cost in geopolitics. Although in rhetorics and legislation[5] the Cold War has started in the years of 1947-48[6], US troops did not engage in any conflict until 1950.[7] By that time, Mao Zedong managed to win the Chinese Civil War and stabilized his power in 1949. With that single victory the country with the largest population in the world joined the Communist Bloc. In the very same year the Soviet Union managed to create and successfully test their first nuclear bomb. This event made US military supremacy in a possible armed conflict, in one blow, irrelevant. When the US decided to act on the „*Rolling Back*" tactic and eventually engaged in the war in the Korean Peninsula, it was already too late.

From that point a global war, using massive armies and nuclear weapons would have resulted in mutual annihilation. The „*War*" became „*Cold*", therefore, the opposing sides had to find new ways to continue the fight. Among these new ways we can list the military race for better weaponry and defense systems, the economic and technological competition among the two World Systems (capitalism, socialism). The actual War was fought in „*smaller*" proxy conflicts where only one of the Superpowers were engaged at a time with militaries in Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan. The sides also started the race for ideological supremacy, to win „*hearts and minds*" for their respective causes, which brings us to the Cultural Cold War.

Building an ideological base at home and waging this ideological war abroad became crucial for the US government for many reasons. First, they had to strengthen the loyalty of the home country. Therefore, every socialist movement had to be oppressed in the country to create a genuine, strong base for the decades long fight. This base included not only winning the opinion of the broader public, but the economic elite and also cultural and academic intelligentsia. Although following the Second World War the US became the dominant political, economic, and military power in the world, they still had a long way to go to prove, mainly to Western Europe, they can be leaders in terms of culture, especially in high culture and the arts. That effort was the extension of the trend called „*Americanization*" which became more and more visible from the beginning of the 20th century. Americanization meant the

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[5] Like the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, section 117/D which excluded most Eastern European Countries from the Marshal Plan (MAGYARICS: 345).

[6] Truman doctrine, Zhdanov doctrine, rolling back etc.

[7] Although the US played a major role in the Greek civil war against the communist rebels after 1947, their role was limited to providing financial and military supplies and training for governmental forces.

spreading and adopting of American values, commodities, and cultural products all around the world. Lastly, to wage this war, it was crucial to have a prompt answer to the challenges posed by the Soviet counterparts with their widespread propaganda and cultural activities.

The administration was not left alone in their efforts. On the political spectrum Senator Joseph R. McCarthy showcased the movement, which made the fear of soviet espionage or possible takeover a daily reality and led the witch hunt against real or suspected soviet sympatries. Many leftist thinkers became blacklisted or even convicted. The most famous case became the trial of the Rosenbergs. The married couple were convicted and executed in 1953 for leaking top secret information about the atomic bomb to the Soviets, helping them advance in creating their own bombs. Senator McCarthy even accused many high ranked officials in the Truman administration and the CIA before he was rebuked and overruled by the Senate in 1954.

Governmental agencies like the State Department, responsible for foreign policy and international relations, and the United States Information Agency (USIA), responsible for public diplomacy and state propaganda all over the world, were the agencies who were the two main official pillars of this fight. But informally the secret services also became very effective tools in this fight. The FBI operated in the homeland and the CIA ran the main operation overseas. The latter sometimes worked more like a shadow government with arguably too much power in its hands (RANELAGH). Funds, the intelligentsia, leaders of the economy, and the entertainment industry, completed the official programs creating a rather effective ideological arsenal.

Securing the Homeland

The term „*Cultural Cold War"* was brought into academic discourse by Christopher Lash in the 1970's. He characterized the 1950's as an era when neutrality, especially inside the United States was not an option. Members of the intelligentsia, like reporters and university professors participated in serious self-censorship. They could not say or publish anything supportive or permissive about socialism and the Soviet Union without risking being condemned or even losing their jobs (LASCH: 347–348). Fighting against communism also became some kind of a trend. Civil society was also on the alert. A movement starting from Miami warned the population if local shops were selling any „*communist"* goods. At its peak, the movement reached 46 states (MAGYARICS: 346). Many young university students volunteered for the secret services. It is remarkable that this kind of homogeneity of opinion was achieved in a fundamentally democratic society by manipulating the media and public discourse. To achieve the same

result, the Soviet Union and its allies had to implement oppressive measures and severe censorship.

By recognizing the important role of the media in this process we have to emphasize the role of Hollywood. Post-World War Two brought the era of mass mediums in the United States with the rapid spread of the custom of visiting the cinema and watching television at home. Therefore, those audiovisual media could very effectively portray American values, the real man, the housewife, or even the hero soldier fighting for his country. Given the importance of those mass mediums it was unacceptable that some leftist authors and filmmakers pinpointed the positive achievements of the socialist system or relativized the soviet threat. Those directors, producers, writers who were accused of having leftist views found themselves blacklisted, banned, and labeled as the „*enemy within*" (SHAW: 42–71). To understand how those artists could work under these circumstances we can take the example of Noam Chomsky (CHOMSKY: 84). He showcases the popular TV series „*The Adventures of Robin Hood*" from the 1950s. The show portrayed many elements that could be interpreted as critical and anti-capitalist. Then he reveals that it was written by anonymous leftist writers who were banned before for their views. We can conclude that in this era the way to achieve some level of success for those artists was to maintain anonymity and work in the background.

From the financial side the FBI (SAUNDERS: 242) and the USIA (SHAW: 167) showed up as producers and started funding movies focusing on American heroism. The patriotic Soviet Soldiers from the Second World War now became the villains aiming to destroy the whole world. On the other side the heroic American Soldiers were constantly saving the world at the very last minute. Telling titles like *Nightmare, The Red Menace, Invasion USA, I Was a Communist for the FBI,* or *Red Planet Mars* showcase this very idea.

Away from the contemporary threat, Hollywood also used historical scenarios to deliver its message. This was the golden age of Western movies, where the hero defies the lawless and defends the small town in the West. All those movies portrayed the wished values and behavioral norms like heroism, self-reliance, resourcefulness, or the greatness of military service.[8] In movies like *They Were Expendable, The Quiet Man*

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[8] This phenomenon of entertainment media raising patriots and promoting the military was not unique for the 1950s. They were always used, aside for religious reasons, to promote state narratives. This can be observed in novels, newspapers, etc., or even earlier military songs, ballads or heroic epics. The new element here was the role of the ever-growing public penetration of the television or the cinema. Those mass mediums managed to achieve the level of influence that earlier mass media like newspapers or the radio could not.

Hollywood portrayed „*Militant Liberty"*, the trope of the hero in the American army with the sole goal of liberating the suppressed, defending the weak, and punishing evil while bringing freedom around the globe. This image is still present in many Hollywood movies even today.

Probably the most iconic male actor of the era was John Wayne. He became the representation of the American Soldier and the Western Hero, and every value connected to that. His performance in westerns like *Red River* (1948) or *True Grit* (1969) helped him achieve this title, but his other roles in war movies like *Sands of Iwo Jima* (1949) became controversial given that in reality he never served in any war.

But there were larger controversies surrounding Hollywood. Soviet critics and critics from the developing world were always eager to point out the racist and oppressive past and present of American society. To counter these arguments Hollywood started to bring in black actors and actresses into upcoming movies. The peak of these early efforts was the Oscar-winning documentary *Nine from Little Rock* which portrayed the success story of how the perception of race changed in America (SHAW: 168). Yet, reality often contradicted these representations, or the black actors were only used as „*token"* characters, in a minor role or in the background, therefore this topic remained the main source of contradiction.

To broadcast the „*right"* message it was not uncommon to change many elements of the narrative from the source material during production. This was the case during the making of the film adaptation of George Orwell's novels. When creating *1984,* mentioned in the introduction, and *Animal Farm*, they had to change many elements to emphasize anticommunist narratives and to create a more hopeful ending. This was necessary since the source material was equally critical of both world orders with a very pessimistic view regarding the future (SAUNDERS: 248–249).

The 1950s was the start of the era of television. In 1950 only 9% of American households had a TV device, in 1962 that number had risen to 90%.[9] By occupying every living room in the US, the focus of evening programs started to become watching television programs together. Since the effect of television was undoubtedly powerful, it is just natural that it became a very useful tool of propaganda. Family comedies like *I love Lucy* or *Lassie* started to portray the American way of life, the model of the American family and consumer society with a loving housewife, kids, a house, a car. Beside series the news played an even

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9 GRANT Cokeley: *Number of TV Households in America 1950-1978*. IN: American Century https://americancentury.omeka.wlu.edu/ files/original/ 60e94905a0e02050a5b78f10b1b02b07.jpg

more important role as the dominant source of information with iconic news anchors like Edward R. Murrow, John Cameron Swayze, or Walter Cronkite. The news filled the role of broadcasting the message of the government, and they mostly did it without too much skepticism or questions even in critical times.[10]

Comics played a very similar role in the life of the youth in the 1950s as videogames do today. They were the main medium of entertainment, they had a major influence. The weekly adventures of Superman, Captain America, or Captain Marvel were the main entertainment of the youth of America. Meanwhile parents looked at comics as the root of evil and that which corrupts the youth, teaching them deviant behavioral norms like love and sexuality in contradiction to the sexual intimacy (GARDNER) or even homosexuality (GREEN). Naturally the government recognized the potential in comics' effect on the youth; Therefore, they used it as a medium to spread their values and messages. Captain America, not long after defeating the Nazis, found his new enemy, the evil communists plotting to take over the world. Superman watched the first nuclear testing live, bringing the concept and the effect to the public. In many comics the hero spies uncovered conspiracies, mostly communist ones, against America and the „*Free World".

Battlefield Europe

Trying to gain ideological supremacy in Europe proved to be more difficult for the US than at home. The western side of the divided continent was conscious of its civilizational and cultural superiority. At the very same time Western-Europe was rapidly losing its economic, but more visibly, its military and political influence worldwide. This became obvious during the independence movements in Asia and Africa when all the great colonial empires collapsed within a few decades. There is no question about the fact that the Marshall Plan was a great help to restoring some of the European economic might, yet it was hard to accept that, compared to the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the USA, they became less significant and more vulnerable.

This national pride was especially strong in France, where the public became mostly anti-American. In Great Britain the public was neutral and critical[11], only the Federal Republic of Germany proved to be

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[10] Noam CHOMSKY and Edward S. HERMAN analyzed published articles and news shows, and concluded that despite a common misconception, the overwhelming majority supported the Vietnam war until the end of the war, and the exodus of the US troops was decided by the government. (CHOMSKY- HERMAN)

[11] Their „*special relationship"* with the US started to develop only after the Suez crisis in 1956.

strongly US friendly, since their whole existence depended on this relationship. The communist parties in all over Europe showcased another threat. They operated relatively freely and in many countries like France and Italy they were quite popular. In Italy they could achieve more than 20% in almost every election. Moreover, in the 1970's they rose above 30% and came close to taking over the government.

Although it was clear that West-Europe is part of the American sphere of interest, that did not stop the Socialist Bloc from fighting for cultural and political influence. They started to organize international events like the World Peace Council from 1950 where the main message was the rejection of American aggression all over the world. Through embassies and economic enterprises the communist countries constantly funded the Western-European communist parties, along with their cultural activities and newspapers.[12]

Given those circumstances it is understandable that until the 1960s the foreign cultural activities of the CIA and USIA were mainly focused on Europe. The aim of the strategy was to win the non-communist leftist intelligentsia. By giving them creative platforms and funding, they could discredit the myths around communism and the Soviet Union. Using those media outlets also created a great opportunity to build relationships and to spread Western ideology and values to the Eastern side of Europe through the Iron Curtain. Platforms like RIAS (1946), Voice of America (1947), or Radio Free Europe (1949) were broadcasting television and radio shows in more than 40 languages all around Europe.

In West-Germany the programs were met with the „*de-Nazification*" of the country, in similar fashion to the „*re-education*" efforts in Italy, Austria, and Japan. American Houses emerged, the curriculum involved changes, and targeted movies were aired, English courses were offered to re-educate the population, so they can learn the basics of democracy, tolerance, and American values. To secure the spread of the „*right*" ideas, until May of 1949 newspapers could only be published with the approval of the American military.[13]

Through funds like Rockefeller, Ford, or Fulbright, the US started to fund exchange programs. Probably the largest effects those programs had were on the intelligentsia from Eastern European Countries. Tens of

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[12] Hungary's role in this secret funding and joint enterprises through export companies called „*impex*" were explored in detail by Zsuzsanna BORVENDÉG in her book, *Az „impexek" kora*.

[13] The controversies surrounding the „*de-Nazification*" were detailed in the study of Tibor FRANK: *Szabadság és felelősség: Az Egyesült Államok és a németországi nácitlanítás a második világháború után*. Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Budapest, 2014.

thousands of mainly Soviet, Polish[14], and among others Hungarian scientists, musicians, writers, and artists had the chance to visit the United States through those programs. Those trips provided opportunities to build connections with the western intelligentsia, and get first-hand experience about the American way of life. Those experiences were not just helpful for the participants to be more open-minded, but those western ideas also contributed to the erosion of the whole socialism system built on autocracy.

Probably the most visible forms of propaganda were the institution of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) and its activities. The CCF held its inaugural meeting in 1950 in Berlin, and later Paris as its center of operations.

The organization, characterized by the leadership of Melvin J. Lasky, Nikolai Nabukov, and Michael Jesselson, operated in 35 countries. They aimed to be constantly present in the life of the local intellectuals providing them cultural and ideological programs and, maybe most importantly, publication platforms. Those platforms in the forms of books and journals gave the non-communist left mostly in Europe and to some level also in South America a chance to share its opinion regularly, speak to the wider public, unless of course those opinions were considered too anti-American.[15] The CCF published more than 20 papers, among them the *Encounter* in the UK, the *Preuves* in France, the *Der Monat* in the FRG, or *Tempo Presente* in Italy. The CCF was also the main organizer and sponsor of many high-profile conferences, exhibitions, concerts, and awards. Good examples for these activities are the concerts of the Symphony Orchestra in 1952 and 1955 or the European concert tour of the Metropolitan Opera in 1956. With those activities the CCF managed to create connections between the intelligentsia of Europe and the USA and less visibly South America. Most of the members were not aware of the intentions and finances behind the CCF, yet they managed to promote the idea of the necessity of US hegemony worldwide.

Just as the foundations, Congress also carried out activities in Eastern Europe. They supplied book and magazine packages for the intelligentsia of the Eastern Block providing them with the works of contemporary writers. It goes without saying that this activity did

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[14] Tamás MAGYARICS points out that supporting Poland was especially important for the USA, not just because of its large population but because of its more than 7 million strong immigrant populace in the United States, especially in some areas around Chicago where they made up the decisive force in elections. (MAGYARICS: 348).

[15] SAUNDERS' books present examples when articles could not be published in the pages of *Encounter* because they were too harsh on American policies (SAUNDERS: 264–267).

depend on the actual rigidness of the communist regimes. There were many examples where the packages were seized by authorities. Members of the CCF were also curious about the works of Eastern authors and artists so they invited them to various conferences, concerts, exhibitions, and created anthologies where they collected their works. With those books, magazines, and invitations, the CCF managed to build connections and linked the Eastern European intelligentsia with its Western counterpart.

The activities of Congress were multiplied when they had to react to some events of international importance, like the Hungarian revolution in 1956. As a cultural organization with many cultural and academic connections, they reacted accordingly. The CCF organized positions in various European Universities for Hungarian refugee students and academics. As a joint program with the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, within a few months they edited and published a white book on the Hungarian events. The book that included the opinions of these three organizations was published under the name of *Le Révolution Hongroise*. The Philharmonica Hungarica, with refugee Hungarian musician-members, was also organized and financed by the CCF (SAUNDERS: 256–257).

Changes from the 1960s

The nature of the Cultural Cold War slowly changed from the 1960s. Many independent events culminated and created some fundamental changes. One of the most important developments started after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the nuclear holocaust suddenly became almost inevitable. Both the Soviet and the American leaders recognized that the all-out demonization of their rivals, and total victory as ultimate zeal, are not real options and they were only leading to mutually assured destruction. From this lesson the coexistence of the two world orders became more acceptable, starting with the coexistence of the two Germanies. When the constant threat of war in Europe was not on the table anymore, the Eastern-Western diplomatic relationship started to be re-established and built up during the 1970s in Europe. The new era, called „*détente*" (an easing of relations), which President Ford continued later on, was perfectly characterized by the meeting of Nixon and Brezhnev, the leaders of the two rival superpowers, in Moscow in 1972.

In the very same timeframe, after Asia, most African countries became independent with the breaking up of the colonial empires. In 1960 only 26 new states emerged. It is no surprise that the year 1960 is often referred to as the „*Year of Africa*". This new geopolitical reality also created new opportunities for both superpowers. It became possible

for both of them to build new economic, ideological, and military cooperations with other parties. In Africa the Soviet Union had a major advantage since the USA had its own colonial past itself and more importantly was allied with the formal colonial powers of Europe. To balance this disadvantage, the US had to channel a lot of resources to Africa, and also to Southeast Asia, as they became more and more engaged in the second Indochina Wars. By 1965 the US troops waged all-out war in Vietnam and gradually in Cambodia and Laos. The „*American aggression"* was condemned not just in the Socialist Bloc, but in most of the world. The events gained huge media publicity all around the globe especially after the surprise attack of the Viet Cong forces during the Tet Offensive in 1968. This created a whole new situation where the allies of the US and even its own population started to question the American intentions and the righteousness of this war and, in general, American ideas. This manifested in many forms like protests and riots, and eventually forced the US government to withdraw from this unwinnable war in Vietnam.

Simultaneously, one of the most important institutions of the American operations in Europe, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, was also jeopardized. In the early 1960s articles started to be published revealing that the CIA had been secretly financing the operations of the CCF. Those allegations were proved by a series of the articles in the *New York Times* in 1966. The leadership of the CCF claimed that they did not know about the involvement of the CIA, but the scandal questioned the intentions behind their programs. Many members, journalists, and editors felt betrayed and left the organization. Eventually the financing was taken over by the Ford Foundation, but the CCF never managed to regain its former fame and importance. They shut down their operations entirely in 1979. It is possible that the inner fights of the CIA led to the leaking of information about the CCF (Leimeiszter), but the very fact of this revelation highlights that the Cultural War in Europe lost its importance for the US government and for the leadership of the CIA.

Conclusion

Naturally one might ask what kind of result was expected from these propaganda programs? They did not stop the communists from gaining popularity in Italy, de Gaulle's France was also shifting further away from the US while nurturing its lost Dominant Power status. The program made even less since the events that took place in Eastern Europe. The US accepted Soviet Rule in the Eastern Bloc since the late 40s. They did not give them any loans, did not support any separation movement with military force. This became painfully evident for Hungary in 1956, when despite the supporting radio shows, there was

not any involvement from the United States or Western Europe to support the uprising.[16] The State Department did not even realize the „*shades of communism*" within the Bloc until the 1960s, all countries were considered to be mere puppets of Moscow (MAGYARICS: 352). Later the chances of separation were even worse, since during the détente Washington did not want to risk losing the goodwill of Moscow, especially while the War in Vietnam was still waging. Magyarics even concludes that those programs were some kind of acts of compensation, where even the leaders did not believe in any actual results (MAGYARICS: 354).

On the other hand, if we consider those programs and organizations not just in the terms of eventually failing finite goals like „*securing the loyalty of the West*", or „*starting rebellions against the Soviets*" or even „*weakening the ties of Eastern Europe with Moscow*" we might come to some other conclusions. If we consider the US's infinite goals were to enhance its civilization and its values, build up networks and friendships all over the world, the programs made significant contributions.[17] The ideologies and cultural products of America were dominant in Western Europe, and significant even in Eastern Europe, the products of the American Academia and Cultural Elite gradually reached their wished high prestige.

The government of the United States and its secret services spent immense resources to unify the American public and the public of the European Allies behind the US leadership and its core ideas. This was one of the basic elements of the fight against the Soviets. Looking back, we can be somewhat cynical with every program in which the FBI or the CIA was involved, but we should not doubt the honest intentions and convictions of most of the participants. The outcry around the financing of the CCF is proof of that. We also should not underestimate the effects of those programs on the participants. There was a discussion in 2019 around a new book about the work of the CCF (Roselyne Chenu: *En lutte contre les dictatures – Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture, 1950–1978) (*LEIMEISZTER). One of the participants of this event was Mária Illyés-Kodolányi (daughter of the Hungarian poet Gyula Illyés). She remembered that the book packages from the CCF were like lights of hope that shined through the Iron Curtain.

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[16] Although Radio Madrid and the West-German NTS claimed that western troops would provide help, the main medium, Radio Free Europe actually never did that, although they encouraged the rebels (JOHNSON: 154).

[17] The idea of finite and infinite games that I am adopting here to this scenario was introduced by James P. CARSE in the book *Finite and Infinite Games*.

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Yassine Ismaili[1]

Trump's Tweeting Discourse on Immigration: A Critical and Statistical Analysis of Trump's Twitter Content

Abstract

Donald J. Trump's upset victory in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections has proved too divisive for the country. One of the hot-button issues as immigration, legal and illegal. This study will show Trump's tendency to target immigrants via his Presidential Twitter account. There seems to be a lack of available studies that delve into this topic in-depth. By using a statistical analysis of a variety of Trump's tweets and speeches, this can provide a glimpse into his unique political viewpoints and his communication style. The findings show that Trump's tweeting penchant on immigration consists primarily of right-wing conservative values than its left-wing liberal counterparts.

Keywords: Donald Trump; Twitter; immigration; nativism; xenophobia;

Politicians take different approaches in paving the way for their presidential election campaign. The most crucial step is to set up a political platform in which to communicate with their constituents and attract more followers. President Donald J. Trump uses Twitter as a direct channel with his supporters. On his presidential Twitter account, he addresses his concerns over controversial issues such as immigration. President Trump considers the immigration issue as one of the most pressing top priority issues in his foreign and domestic policies. Ever since he announced his presidential candidacy in June 2015, he continues to criticize existing immigration policies and blaming the previous administrations for not taking sufficient action by using social networks such as Twitter. Twitter seems to be the favorite platform for Trump to get his message out because Twitter provides instantaneous feedback from his followers and critics as well. Within the immigration issue, in general, there are many subcategories. Some of these are the Trump separation of the family executive order, a travel ban on Muslims entering the country, ending chain migration, immigrant refugee and asylum seekers, to name just a few. All of these actions are attempts by Trump to end the influx of legal and illegal immigrants who try to enter the U.S. These are very controversial issues between both sides of the political debate. Many view

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it as xenophobic and racist while others view these initiatives as necessary for national security and consider it their patriotic duty to support the president. This study aims to investigate the content of Trump's tweets about immigrants. Attention will focus on exploring the rhetoric he frequently employs by analyzing thousands of president's tweets. A look at how Trump's tweets about immigration and the intent used in those tweets provide a clearer picture of Trump's sense of patriotism or nationalistic tendencies as many Americans view him. Statistical analysis will be conducted of over 5,435 content tweets that have been gathered from the verified account in the Twitter database archive of the president of the United States Donald J. Trump before January 20, 2019.

Literature Review

Crisis of illegal immigration

The issue of illegal immigration has been a hotly debated issue for decades in the United States and still causes controversy and contention among most Americans. Politicians especially have had to deal with this issue and try to find fixes for its many aspects. The influx of legal and illegal immigrants who cross the US-Mexico border every year has driven many American presidential candidates, given the prevailing political climate, to adopt specific policies stances that sound unattainable and could never be implemented in reality. President Donald Trump's inability to get his much-vaunted „*wall*" built even while his party was in the majority for his first two years as president proves this point precisely. Candidates will say and promise anything to get elected. Trump's rhetoric on immigration has had a multidimensional impact on immigration in the U.S. Many of the consequences of his actions have caused panic and terror at the southern border of the U.S. with Mexico. Trump's policies have even resulted in the deaths of several migrants. On the other hand, American citizens have been killed by illegal immigrants. Trump's attempts to restrict immigration to the U.S. seem to be stalling, not unlike many previous administrations before him.

New Nativism

Julia G. Young, Associate Professor at The Catholic University of America, Director of Undergraduate Studies in the History Department, in her studies links the Trump era animosity and hostile rhetoric toward immigration, legal and illegal, to nativist immigration policies of the late 19th and early 20th century (2017). Nativism in the U.S. is nothing new. The late 19th and early 20th age were distinguished by many historical

events including the economic Panic of 1893 in the United States, the early beginnings of the Russian revolution, and U.S. homeland security issues in the aftermath of WW1. As a result of these upheavals nativism slowly crept back into the social and political dialogue of the country. Hence, similarities between Trump's views and tweets content are not as new as many think, but their roots date back to the early beginnings of the republic up to the 21st century.

Vincent Doire, Senior Policy Analyst, Finance Canada studied the border security and immigration issue in the U.S. and cited:

> *Current security concerns and the growing fears of Latinos immigrants, Muslims and refugees have already been promoted by the recent immigration policies carried out by the Bush administration in the beginning of 21th century, whose aim was to fight terrorism under the concept of homeland security. In sum, immigration has become more and more unfavorable and negative in the country* (2006)[2].

In this sense, there were significant events that contributed to the promotion of nativism in the past. Today's nativism, however, takes a different shape in which Young refers to Trump's characterization of undocumented immigrants as: „*Mexicans as rapists, drug dealers, and killers; Muslims as terrorists and a national security threat; Mexicans and Central Americans as unassimilable; and refugees as both a security threat and unassimilable*" (YOUNG, 2017). East Europeans and Asians also have experienced racism and xenophobia which prevailed in the U.S. during the late 19th and early 20th century. This form of racist practices argues that they were unintegrated and unassimilable because of their different race, ethnicity, and culture. The Immigration Act of 1924 excluded all immigration from Asian countries to the United States and severely restricted immigration from many other countries. The act intended to eliminate „*undesirable*" immigration to the U.S. As already mentioned, racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and anti-immigrant discourse has had a long history in the United States. The United States Immigration Commission, alternatively known as the Dillingham Immigration Commission, was formed in 1907 in response to the growing political concerns surrounding immigration issues. This bi-partisan commission was established because there was a swelling outcry in the country that immigrants were taking the jobs of native-born Americans. One provision of the act is very telling and germane to

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[2] „*Les récentes préoccupations de sécurité reliées à la lutte au terrorisme, telles que la notion de homeland security popularisé par l'administration Bush, n'ont fait que contribuer à cette crainte grandissante de l'immigration latino-américaine. Bref, l'immigration est vue de plus en plus comme un phénomène négatif dans le pays* " (DOIRE 2).

the purposes of this study in showing the prevalence of past immigration problems in the country.

One need only read the following excerpt from the act to see raw nativism at work: „...*We should exercise at least as much care in admitting human beings [to the United States] as we exercise concerning animals or insect pests or disease germs*". This kind of xenophobic discourse has existed for centuries. The new and emerging influence of social media has made a massive difference between President Trump and other American political figures from the 19th and 20th century. Twitter provides instant and real-time opportunities for today's politicians to get their message out to the public. No need to wait for transcontinental news reports or slow print mediums.

Methodology

In order to conduct a thorough review of the context of President Donald Trump's Tweets which addresses immigrants, it was necessary to collect several relevant tweets. This investigation would aid in observing, analyzing and investigating Trump's frequent tweeting habit through his Twitter database archive, which was used as the primary source. This database includes all of his tweets since he created his verified account @realDonaldTrump on Twitter 2009. In this study, only presidential tweets that he has generated since his inauguration on January 20, 2017, up until January 20, 2019, were considered.

As of January 20, 2019, the number of presidential tweets has reached 5,435 and is continuously climbing since his inauguration in January 2017. For this study, the following three categories of immigrants were investigated; legal and illegal Latino immigrants, Muslims, and refugees. These three groups have accumulated into a considerable portion of Trump's immigration comments via Twitter. With this in mind, tweets were collected and analyzed quantitatively, with statistical analysis aiming at better understanding the context of Trump's immigration tweets. This might help evaluate the intentions of the president's discourse on Twitter as he tries to appeal to many of his followers. Charts will illustrate the three categories used in this study. These charts will demonstrate the numbers of words and phrases contained in each of the categories. After the findings are presented, a discussion will spotlight more thoroughly the political and social dimensions of the immigration policies which Trump aims to implement during his administration.

Findings and Discussion

The study begins with a statistical analysis of President Trump's tweets that surround the immigration issue. The first chart presented

below shows the number of tweets which target the main three groups under consideration. These groups are Latinos immigrants, refugees and Muslims. These three groups have received an appreciable amount of President Trump's comments. As a reminder, only tweets generated since Trump's inauguration on January 20, 2017, are examined in this study.

Figure 1: *Number of tweets since Trump's 2017 inauguration which target the three groups.*

It can be noted that as of January 20, 2019, the total number of tweets generated in Trump's Twitter archive since he officially became president has reached 5,435. Out of this number of tweets, there are approximately 156 tweets which target the three influential groups noted above. This study will show that the content of those tweets almost always seems negative, often including demeaning and degrading language referring to the three groups mentioned above. It will also show that many of the tweets also include upcoming and intended policies and actions planned by Trump's Administration towards Latinos, refugees and Muslims.

In order to better understand where Trump targets immigration, it is necessary to have a closer look at the content of his tweets. It is essential to investigate pertinent tweet examples that involve Hispanic illegal immigrants. The following chart will help elucidate this point. Included in the study are Mexicans and so-called caravans which depart from Central American countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Venezuela in addition to other South American countries.

Figure 2: *Number of tweets which refer to Border Security.*

It is no surprise to see that the majority of the approximately 506 tweets refer to the U.S. southern border crisis (although Trump's detractors would insist that Trump has fabricated the crisis for political aims). Curiously, this issue and Trump's repeated promised barrier and border patrol wall in attempts to stem the crisis, became one of his most sacrosanct presidential campaign promises. This study will further reveal his harsh criticism directed toward the immigration policies adopted by previous administrations. Trump often laments that if his predecessors had been doing their job effectively, there wouldn't be an immigration crisis today that requires him to deal with. president Trump even criticizes democrats for not funding his more than 5 billion dollars promised border wall. The majority of Democrats in the House rejected his border wall plan and in late 2018 continuing into early 2019 they even agreed to a partial shutdown of the government over the issue. The statistics in the charts above, and President Trump's apparent focus on immigration, legal or illegal, prompt a discussion of the content of his tweets which involve immigration. This might help develop a more thorough picture of the president's mindset on the issue. A look at several of his comments concerning the issue may illuminate this point.

Figure 3: *Some demeaning tweets about illegal immigrants*

These four tweets are but a small example of how many times President Trump tweets on immigrants. There are dozens of presidential tweets that are of similar message and tone. The epithets he uses, such as druggies, rapists, killers, aliens, and invaders pose many questions about the reasons behind Trump's seemingly disconcerting discourse used in these tweets. Gustav Jahoda, the Austrian psychologist and writer, examined the many different ways in which ethnic and racial groups are being represented in public. One of those ways is by dehumanizing others by using denigrating terms such as the above-

mentioned belittling epithets used by Trump (1999). At first look, it would appear, based on those epithets that Trump's tweets might appear to be xenophobic. Even if the president was right about border crossings, his lack of political correctness might show a politically inexperienced/insensitive person leading the country.

Most politicians might strongly avoid any appearance of being so vociferous about his disgust. This might leave people, particularly his opponents, with the firm opinion that he could be racist and xenophobic. It would appear that the president, from his comments, might embrace nationalistic characteristics. Further, Trump's credibility is at stake if the president cannot back his words up with facts. For example, are all immigrants who seek to cross the Mexico-US borders indicative of an „*infestation*", as Trump chooses to label them? Or are there legitimate reasons for some immigrants to cross the border?

Figure 5: *Some Crime Statistics Committed by Illegal Aliens provided by Trump.*

It might really be concluded that Trump seems to deliberately use demeaning and denigrating attributes when referring to illegal immigrants. This ploy draws many American's attention, especially his base and right-wing populists. In this way, Trump can raise and empower their awareness toward the accompanying external threats posed by illegal immigrants euphemistically referred to as the „*brown menace*" (brown-skinned people arriving at the American-Mexican border). This might be viewed as indicative that Trump deploys an othering mindset in his immigration stands. Of course, Trump realizes his importance in keeping the country safe and would be derelict in his constitutional duty if he did not bring attention to the problem as he sees it. It can be a natural extension of his immigration concerns to use fear, apprehension, suspicion and at times even panic to alert his constituents of the problem. In so doing, however, he might be alienating most of the left who do not view immigration as the grievous threat that Trump maintains.

President Trump's tweets often cause controversy and discord on Twitter and in the mainstream public. The following picture is taken from a June 22, 2018 conference at the White House when President

Trump spoke about immigration. Accompanying him were family members that have been grievously devastated by crime committed by undocumented immigrants. Trump calls these victims „*Angel Families*". In the speech, Trump made several false statements about the immigration issue. Many people believe that Trump has a penchant for stretching the truth to fit his political aims.

In the speech, Trump provided several statistics about crimes committed by undocumented immigrants. He asserted that illegal immigrants are responsible for tens of thousands of crimes. He relied upon a 2011 study by the (Government Accountability Office), which estimated undocumented immigrants had committed some 25,000 homicides, 42,000 robberies, nearly 70,000 sex offences and around 15,000 kidnappings. Those estimates were extrapolated from a survey of 1,000 undocumented immigrants held in state and federal prison and are indeed factual. Trump went on to state. However, that illegal aliens cause more crime than native-born Americans do. This assertion does not fit with the facts. Many studies have shown that illegal immigrants commit less crime than American citizens do. A study conducted in 2011 by the Government Accounting Office in the same year says that between 2005 and 2010, the increase in incarceration within the United States was higher among U.S. citizens (16% increase) than among foreign-born persons (7% increase; Government Accounting Office, 2011). The Cato Institute, a libertarian organization in Washington DC, also conducted a study which reported that incarceration rates among illegal aliens were less than the country at large (2018). Whether through obfuscation and on purpose or by accidental omission, Trump did not reveal these statistics that belong to the same study he cited.

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) incarceration rate study conducted on the same issue of crimes committed by U.S. citizens in comparison with criminal aliens show similar results:

Figure 6. *Number of Criminal Aliens and U.S. Citizens Incarcerated in Federal Prisons from Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010. Criminal Alien Statistics: Information on Incarcerations, Arrests and Costs.*

There have been additional studies conducted on the same issue regarding crimes committed by U.S. citizens in comparison with criminal aliens. María B. Vélez, Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of Maryland, studied Chicago, IL murder statistics. She looked at neighborhoods that consisted of diverse populations. Included populations were White, Black and Latino neighborhoods. Her findings concluded that the rates of homicide were higher in the African-American communities. She deduced that the black neighborhoods had a „*concentrated disadvantaged"* population which accounted for the higher proportion of homicides (2009). In another research study conducted by Professor Scott A. Desmond, Criminal Justice, using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health found that communities that had a high density of immigrant youth showed lower levels of violent crime. His findings also concluded that a comparison between immigrant children against their non-immigrant peers shows that „*the immigrant youth are less violent and have better academic, social, and psychological adjustment scores"* (2012). Desmond even concluded that research shows that communities of immigrants are safer than their native-born American counterparts.

It might be concluded that, after a detailed look at existing studies on this issue that illegal immigrants can have both a positive and a negative impact on American society. Research suggests that the former is more prevalent. Both legal and illegal immigrants *„are net positive contributors to the federal budget"* (Penn Wharton Budget Model, 2016). While it is true those illegal aliens do commit crimes in the United States, other undocumented immigrants contribute to the economic health of the country, and they struggle day and night to acculturate and assimilate themselves in the country. It might have been reasonable for the president to reveal the whole truth when speaking about immigration criminal statistics as they compare to criminal statistics committed by Americans citizens as well. There can be no doubt that President Trump is exerting his best efforts to keep the country safe and secure from external threats as he sees them. There is little question that the southern border has been and remains a painful area of contention among American politicians and law enforcement agencies. His continual bending of the truth, however, is becoming quite worrisome to many people who do not have the same worldview as he does. Trump's ambitious and grandiose campaign promise to curb illegal immigration by building a „*tough, long beautiful wall"* and have „*Mexico pay for it"* may have come back to haunt him. His ability to fulfil either of those promises has proved so far to be only an illusion. The Congress, specifically the democrats, have staunchly refused to fund his 5 billion

dollars plus the wall. Trump's insistence, combined with congressional intransigence, has even led to the most prolonged shutdown of the American government in history. In summation, slogans such as 'Make America Great Again' and 'America first', which many views as nationalist and intolerant toward immigration, have opened a massive rift in the ideological divide between republicans and democrats. Besides, the frequent negative tweeting habits surrounding immigrants, and the anti-immigrant discourse used by Trump can cause continued conflict and animosity between the two groups. He shows no letting up in his attacks. Trump and his advocates view it as their national and patriotic duty to employ any means necessary to protect the country. At the same time, however, it is viewed as xenophobic and narrow-minded by his opposition. The 180-degree contrast in each side's convictions and worldview outlooks might continue to widen as Trump continues to tweet and speak on the immigration issue.

Conclusion

Donald Trump's Twitter habit shows no sign of retreating. He continues to tweet regularly. His followers eagerly await his tweets. Many of the content in his tweets have caused anxiety and alarm in many sectors of society. The upcoming 2020 U.S. presidential election will have many issues that candidates will have to address. The illegal immigration debate will no doubt once again permeate the presidential campaign. The tactics Trump used in the last elections and as president, including daily use of his Twitter account and use of disparaging terminology to refer to the immigration issue, may not be as compelling in this election as they were in the last election. Trump's 2016 broken campaign promises and his many failed immigration initiatives have alienated many of his supporters on the far right and some even in the middle spectrum of the Republican Party. Also, many of his opponents will undoubtedly rally against Trump's tendency to stretch the truth surrounding the issue. It might prove impossible for him to mislead the public once again with misstatements and half-truths.

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Syrine Jerbi[1]

The Role of Media in Shaping the Arab/Muslim American Identity

Abstract

Media has always witnessed a significant role in directing societies or changing a society's point of view upon an issue or a conflict. Far away from being objective, a lot of articles, movies and advertisements contributed to creating a new opinion about certain political issues or raised and emphasized the negative aspects of certain events that harmed minorities. It is the example of Arab Americans in the United States of America who were looked down upon because of political events they just heard about. Especially before 9/11, Arab Americans were not seen as a minority of citizens, but they were more considered as Muslim terrorists. This identity redefinition created an identity dilemma, a clash between Arabs and other minorities, and civil disobedience in the US. Yet, after 9/11 media witnessed a change in sympathizing with Arabs which again redefined the position of this minority in the US to gain some of its value. Although media teaches people how to criticize, it changed the whole American society from an ethnic to a civic country, then opened the path for its criticizers to point on the civic values which are the basics of the American nation. This article aims to analyze how far Arab Americans and Arab Muslims are defined by the American media and accepted in American society.

Keywords: Arab Culture; American Culture; Media; 9/11; Arab Americans; Muslim Americans; Arab Muslim Americans; identity; terrorism; Multiculturalism;

Albeit being a considerably contentious statement, media has always witnessed a significant role in directing societies or changing a society's point of view upon an issue or a conflict. Good examples of these are the 2011 Lybian, Egyptian, and currently, the Belarussian political revolutions that have seen social media and mainstream media as well play a noteworthy role. Far from being objective, a lot of articles, movies and advertisements tend to contribute to fashioning a new opinion about certain political issues or raise and emphasize the negative aspects of certain events that harm various minorities; this can be observed in a number of developing nations, especially in some African countries such as Mali, where the leadership is corrupt to the extent of sparking extreme revolutions. Another good example of this particular incident is how Arab Americans in the United States tend to get looked down upon

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because of political events they clearly do not have any control over, especially before 9/11. Moreover, this incident made the Arab Americans become alienated since they were not only seen as minority citizens but also they were more considered as Muslim terrorists hence the reinforcement of Islamophobia. This identity perception reinforcement further created an identity dilemma, a clash between Arabs and other minorities, and selective civil disobedience in the US, especially when it came to the polarization and discrimination of the Muslims. Yet, after 9/11 media witnessed a change in sympathizing with Arabs which again redefined the position of this minority in the US to gain some of its value. Although media teaches people how to scrutinize, it altered the whole American society's perception from being an ethnic to a civic nation that does not view people with regards to one's race; this then opened the path for its various civil rights groups, minorities, as well as organizations to point on the civic values which are the basics of the American nation. This article aims to analyze how far Arab Americans and Arab Muslims are identified by the American media and accepted in American society.

Before one looks into the effect of media on Arab Americans, it is important to investigate the American laws on media. Media is supposed to be impartial and as such is meant to reveal and uncover truths. Print Media such as books, magazines and newspapers, broadcast and news media, and mainstream media are all means to approach the truth of events. Yet, they are also used to formulate different opinions. The new opinions are dependent on the subjectivity or objectivity of the opinion sharer or resulted through censorship.

Glenn Halbrooks[2], a former writer for The Balance Careers, mentioned the 5 most common reasons for media censorship. Protecting a Person's Privacy, Avoiding Graphic Details and Images, Concealing National Security Information, Serving Public Interest, and especially Hiding Political Bias. Despite the longstanding tradition of the freedom media, media is still restricted in American society. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) words, images or ideas can be „*offensive*" and it can „*clearly cause direct and imminent harm to an important societal interest*". To avoid harm, the group of minorities who are targeted to be harmed opted to protect themselves. Due to the verity that the interests of individuals are different, the government has no right to interfere with censorship. For example, the terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand on 15th March 2019, was

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[2] Glenn Halbrooks is a former writer for The Balance Careers covering news media. His writing expertise covers the news media industry, journalism standards and media trends. https://www.thebalancecareers.com/ glenn-halbrooks-2314947 (*The Balance Careers website* on Gleen HALBROOKS).

meant to be exposed to people. Tarrant who performed the act of terrorism used live stream on his own Facebook account on which he showed his face, announced his age and nationality and started his terrorist attack[3]. New Zealand police warned people not to watch or share the video, however, it was accessed by millions of media users around the world. As an individual, Tarrant's goal was to share his hatred toward Muslims with the world rather than thinking about protecting his personal privacy. In the beginning, the New Zealand government did not involve itself in censoring the video as the attacker meant it to be published while police warned people to avoid the footage to prevent any anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments. Meanwhile, the American government also did not impose any restriction or censorship to protect its citizens from the offensive footage. President Donald Trump's only reaction was to claim in the National Press that white nationalism is not rising a threat after the mosque massacre.[4]

The team of ABC NEWS is one of the American News Broadcasting channels that succeeded to have the footage. The team did not use the footage to spread any hatred and they did not post any offensive images, but they just posted the parts in which the police are trying to pursue and arrest the attacker. This particular helped sympathize with Muslims around the world and Muslim Americans who are looked down at. After the 9/11 terrorist event was associated with Arabs and conservative Muslims, American media presented Tarrant's act as a representation of a misunderstanding of Islam. It cited that the terrorist believed in the danger of embracing Islam, which is an extreme perception of thinking.

Brenton's act against Muslims may have been the product of 9/11 and ISIS creation which started spreading hatred toward Arab-Muslims. It is quite perplexing how 9/11 is considered the peak of terrorist attacks around the world and specifically in the United States of America because there were other attacks prior to it. These attacks were achieved by non-Muslims Arabs American, Muslim non-Arabs Americans, and non-Muslim non-Arabs American citizens. Some attacks were even against Arab-Muslim-American. In Santa Ana, California, October 11th 1985, Alex Odah, an officer of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, was killed by a bomb on his face. He was born into a

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[3] The attacker was proud of performing his terrorist attack against Muslims in New Zealand. The video was censored; however, a lot of media users succeed to download parts of it to use it such as ABC NEWS YouTube Channel. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPPeCtO3EPo

[4] On the 16th March 2019, in the White House Press Conference, President Trump was critical about Islam and he described the killer's one of the people who have serious problems. https://www.bing.com/videos/ search?q=trump+on +new +zealand +shooting+&view=detail&mid=6488B320DFE8BCB43 FB86488B320 DFE8BCB43FB8&FORM=VIRE

Palestinian Christian family and was killed by a Jewish American, a member of the Jewish Defense League5 (JDL) in the US. Rubin, the chairman of the Jewish Defense League told the *Los Angeles Times*, „*No Jew or American should shed one tear for the destruction of a P.L.O. (Palestine Liberation Organization) front in Santa Ana or anywhere else in the world"6* As *The Electronic Intifada* mentioned, the FBI requested the cooperation of Israel with the murder of Alex. The Israeli state repeatedly refused to cooperate. The reason for their refusal was the absence of an eyewitness as well as the occurrence of the murder after the murderer became an Israeli citizen.

The murder of Alex was not advertised on media as much as it was the case with 9/11. Objectively, 9/11 was an event that caused injuries, deaths, and chaos in New York City while Alex's death resulted in the death of one person. Yet, both events happened on American soil and resulted in conflicts between minorities. These two incidences may be compared since both infringe on the rights of minorities and the reactionary events that are inclined to ensue when people's right feel like they have been pushed to the wall. On the one side, 9/11 resulted in conflicts between Arab Americans and Muslim-Americans, and all other minorities. It also raised a diplomatic problem between the US and the Middle East countries. On the other side, Alex's death created a problem between Arab Americans and Jewish Americans. Despite the death act happened on American soil, there were no diplomatic problems between the US government and the Israeli state. Both countries had continuous diplomatic meetings, arrangements, and treaties. This may be related to the American continuous support of the war on Palestine.

One may question the role of media; was it censored from writing about Alex's murder while it boosted writing about 9/11? Or the extent to which the media is censored in the US? The question may be subjective from an Arab American or Muslim American point of view. Halbrooks mentioned in his article that „*censorship issues keep some news from reaching you (audience)"* in the US. However, it is important to understand the focus of media in that era when America supported the war on Palestine. Therefore, it is logical to avoid or censor any media creating a problem between the US government and Israel. Indeed, it would be safe for journalists and their intended targeted audience to support the relationship between the two countries, rather than contradicting it which may result in an action against one's nation or

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5 The Jewish Defense League (JDL) is a Jewish far-right religious-political organization in the United States

6 Robin's quote was quoted from the electronic magazine The Electronic Intifada https://electronicintifada.net/content/twenty-years-later-still-no-charges-alex-odeh- assassination/6582

sovereign. Obviously, the murder of Alex was in the 1980s, while written media started mentioning his case only after 2006 which means after the 9/11 attack.

In fact, freedom of *media* and the act *censorship* are two completely different concepts, viz, the media being an entity, while censorship is an act. Cornell Law School states that *„Freedom of the press is a fundamental liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment[7] of the Constitution"* (1992). Nonetheless, censorship is as important in the media as its freedom. However, it is beneficial for the fact that the government does not interfere with the media's freedom. In this case, as media is free, each harmed individual or harmed minority may revolt, disapprove, or boycott against what hurt them through private pressure groups or private censorship campaigns. It is also imperative to note that, Individuals or minorities can also lobby the government to make different laws that govern how the media acts. Freedom of media does not mean there are not any laws at all. It just means that the news does not come straight from the government, because the media companies are in private hands. Indeed, whenever the court comes across a case dealing with freedom of expression, there would be two principles to judge through;

> Two fundamental principles come into play whenever a court must decide a case involving freedom of expression. The first is *„content neutrality"* – the government cannot limit expression just because any listener, or even the majority of a community, is offended by its content. In the context of art and entertainment, this means tolerating some works that we might find offensive, insulting, outrageous – or just plain bad.
> The second principle is that expression may be restricted only if it will clearly cause direct and imminent harm to an important societal interest. The classic example is falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater and causing a stampede. Even then, the speech may be silenced or punished only if there is no other way to avert the harm.
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> *(What Is Censorship?*, 2020)

The first example states that due to the fact that the government cannot limit the expression, individuals ought to respond appropriately to what they may deem as being offensive. If the person feels offended by any information on media, it means he has chosen to be part of the harmed group. For example, a journalist may use offensive words to describe Arab Americans. First, the journalist will not be warned by the

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[7] First Amendment of the American Constitution protects Freedom of the press

Supreme Court until a person claims being harmed by his words. Indeed, the journalist will not be punished only if his offensive words do not lead to any form of bodily harm which is stated in the second principle. The Supreme Court may have put these theories of legislation, yet they were not always applied. Even these laws are imposed on American society because some of the media did not respect individuals' rights such as ethnicity and religion. It is also important to note that some movies and articles contributed to creating a new opinion about certain political issues which raised negative aspects of race and religion, such it is the example of Arab Americans and Muslim Americans.

Before 9/11, there were a lot of movies that targeted the Arabic and Muslim culture. On 15th December 1960, the American theater and film director Otto Preminger's epic movie *Exodus* was released in Hollywood. The film was based on Leon Uris's novel Exodus (1958). Both movies and novels were around the foundation of the Israeli homeland by the British. After the British took over a great part of the Middle East from the Turks, they favored the settlement of Jewish in these captured areas. Despite the consternation of Arab countries and their leaders, the Jews' settlement was forced by the British. The act of enforcement created violence between Arabs and Jewish immigrants. As a response to the civil disobedience, the British gradually restricted Jewish immigration. The movie depicted the events which show Jewish holocaust survivors being kept in a camp and denied entrance to Palestine[8]. The movie also provoked the uncertain life of Jewish people by making of Palestine only a name of a geographical area on which Jewish immigrants can create a nation. The Jewish image of struggle brought up the portrayed idea of fighting for existence and struggling for power to create a nation.

In contrast, the image of Arabs Muslim Palestinians was almost gone. There was no strong presence of Arabic Palestinian Culture, Arabic language, or Palestinian dialect. Palestinians were shown as a violent and dehumanized community out of rejecting Jewish immigrants to enter their country. Unlike the novel which had a softened anti-British and anti-Arab sentiment, the movie's focus was the Arab–Israeli conflict. ('*Exodus,* 1960 film). It is more interesting to know that Preminger also hired Dalton Trumbo as his screenwriter. To create an excuse approving colonialism, Akiva Ben Caanan, a character in the movie who' wife and daughter were killed by Arabs, stated:

> The duty is done (..) It's not the first time this happens in history. I don't know of one nation whether existed now or in the

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[8] The region between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. It is referred to by Jerusalem, the holy land and modern Israel, after the Jewish occupation.

past that was not born in violence. Terror, violence death; they are the midwives who bring free nations into this world. (..) (*„ Exodus: Core Zionist Propaganda"*)

The background of Dalton may explain the focus of the movie and its cultural misconceptions on Palestinians. Nonetheless, the political support of the US to the British Empire also made *Exodus* a successful political project which resulted in the success of the Hollywood movie, in its entirety. On the other side, the support of media to American politics stabilized the American feeling of power to simply having control over certain political, social, and economic interests. Consequently, neither the American Judicial System nor any private group revolted against the movie *Exodus*. The public opinion of Arab Americans focused on the political event rather than their image in Hollywood movies. The public opinion was not supportive of the American government's decisions; this nonetheless made it a success since it had an equal amount of criticism and praise. Together with a response to the American support of Palestine's occupation, the Arab Americans created chaos in the streets. There was a rise of Arab American left and civil disobedience in Michigan caused by Arabs (*„The rise of the Arab American left in the 60s-80s, and the US government's fearful response"*[9]). There was also a rise of a pro-Palestinian Arab movement[10] which pointed on the attachment of Arab immigrants to their background, hence prompting the unrest.

Yet, how will Palestinian immigrants to the US be considered or looked at, as media reflects only the violence and inhumanity of their community and culture? And how far will they accept these prejudices? The American Palestinian writer Eduard Said stated in his book *Covering Islam* that *„it ought to go without saying that the media are profit-seeking corporations and therefore, quite understandably, have an interest in promoting some images of reality rather than others"*. (SAID, 49). The movie exposes the reality of Jewish struggling to survive. The other reality mentioned by Said refers to the struggling of Palestinians to keep their homes. The movie victimized Jewish immigrants; however, it ignored the anger of Palestinians out of fear for losing their sovereignty. It also legitimized the entrance of immigrants to build a nation rather than coexisting within a nation. Said's reality defends Palestine as a nation with boundaries that contain people

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[9] The article was written as a reflection on *The Rise of the Arab American Left: Activists, Allies, and their Fight against Imperialism and Racism, 1960s-1980s,* written by Pamela PENNOCK https://mondoweiss.net/2017/03/american-governments-response/
[10] Ibid.

embracing the same culture. The cinematographic work *Exodus* reinforced the classical stereotypes about Arabs as savages, but it did not explain the reason for this act towards Jewish people. Clearly, no one has the right to come to someone's house, force him to go out from it, and even changes its name.

The pre-9/11 Hollywood movies did not only focus on the themes of war and savageness in the Arabic culture, but they also misrepresented Arabic women. *The Palace of Arabian Nights* (1905) is one of the movies which made women a mere object to please men. Even the movie was around the bravery of prince Sourire (French for „*smile*") to win the hand of his beloved, it did not bring the image of women as a major character. Even the movie treated the issue of loving a woman and being rejected by her parents, the loved character was completely absent from taking part in the main scenes. Princess Indigo had no chance to express her feelings out loud by either rejecting or accepting Prince Sourire. She was deprived of taking any decision concerning her future husband or her marriage. Indeed, female characters in the movie were always presented as maidens' dancers to cheer up the bored male character. They had no real power to express or to share their opinions. They were totally controlled by the male characters all along with the movie. They had no mental presence; however, their physical presence was too emphasized. Producer George Méliès[11] presented women as objects which serve to follow orders. They had no role rather than being submissive elements to man's wishes and desires; thus depicting Arab women as being servants.

Jack George Shaheen mentioned this shortage of making creating likable characters in Hollywood movies. In his book, *Reel Bad Arabs2*, he stated that:

> Think about it. When was the last time you saw a movie depicting an Arab or an American of Arab heritage as a regular guy? Perhaps a man who works ten hours a day comes home to a loving wife and family, plays soccer with his kids, and prays with family members at his respective mosque or church. He's the kind of guy you'd like to have as your next-door neighbor, because–well, maybe because he's a bit like you. (2)

As an American Lebanese Christian writer, Shaheen explains that it is almost impossible to find an Arabic character in Hollywood movies with a normal lifestyle. Away from having ordinary occupations and interests,

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[11] A French illusionist and film director who led many technical and narrative developments in the earliest days of cinema. He treated themes of fantasy in a playful and absurd fashion. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Georges-Melies

Arabs are always misdescribed and misrepresented in the sense that they are viewed as being hard-headed, rebellious, and inferior (ibid). Their inferior constructed image helped to forge the superiority of American identity. The image was created to satisfy the mainstream WASPS who believe that they are of a more superior Caucasian race compared to other dark Caucasians rather than taking into consideration the feelings of other American minorities.

Unlike Shaheen who focuses on the misrepresented image of Arabs in Hollywood, Semmerling Tim[12] links its construction with history. He believes that the Arabic profile was created based on the struggle of the American mainstream to keep its power. The American „anxiety" was the result of the Gulf countries and Middle Easters' growth. The latter's possession of black oil shook the position of power control of Americans. American's fear to be controlled by the other countries was beyond reality which was reflected in Hollywood movies. The American action horror film, *The Mummy* (dir. Stephen SOMMERS, 1999) was one of the movies which reflected this fear and skepticism; indeed even in the 21st Century, the U.S is still fearful and skeptic of the Arab Nation. It centered around an American group that encounters a band of American treasure hunters in Thebes, Egypt. They had to be familiar with the Egyptian desert as well as the means of safety to stay alive in search of a promising treasure. Searching for the treasure points on the American anxiety to get anything by any means to regain power. Despite the treasure was on the Egyptian land, locals were still inferior to Americans in two ways. First, they had dirty faces, wore broken clothes, and behaved in a foolishly. Their behavior created humorous scenes that are opposite to the American serious characters of explorers and thinkers. Second, during the hunt for the treasure, the American group did not rely on the locals. Foolishness made of Egyptians unreliable as well as it questioned their knowledge about their civilization. Yet, it was ironic to have the American Egyptologist solving mysteries and interpreting the old Egyptian scriptures. In Hollywood movies, knowledge is always one of the elements which make Americans succeed over Arabs.

According to Semmerling, what is far more interesting is the probability of American losing against the Arab 'Evil' in the movies. In other words, American characters were always presented in a position of fighting Arabs when at a certain point they risk losing the fight. The American thriller film *Black Sunday* (1977) presented the idea of an

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[12] Tim Jon Semmerling holds a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Languages and Cultures from Indiana University. He also has a certificate in criminal law from DePaul University's College of Law. He also has unique knowledge and experience in Middle East cultural issues, the War on Terror, and criminal sentencing. https://www.apexcle.com/faculty/76

American hero who fell in love with an operative from the Palestinian terrorist group Black September. However, his knowledge about terrorism and his willingness to sacrifice his feeling for the sake of his country defined how a person could save his nation.

All these movies contributed to demeaning Arabs' image and culture. In Hollywood, Americans and westerns, (the genre), were always associated with honesty and bravery while Arabs were associated with savageness, barbarism, and foolishness. Making both cultures completely opposite and parallel as the American and Western cultures presented knowledge, the community represented only ignorance. Such interest is pointed to in the first movie, *Exodus* in which Jews struggled to create a homeland while Palestinians struggled to keep their sovereignty. The pre 9/11 period was mainly related to the American mainstream and how far Hollywood could protect the mainstream's interest. This focus somehow placed the United States of America to become an ethnic and all-community embracing country rather than a just a civic or rigid country. The movie-makers in Hollywood defined the US by language, religion, customs, and traditions, rather than by the unity of its people and the equality of its citizens. As an American Arab, Edward Said believes that media constructed the Arab image, but it does not necessarily refer to the real culture of Arabs (.ibid).

The post 9/11 period combined the miss-distortion and the portrayal of the Arabic character. This change was the outcome of two facts. First, producers became more aware of the Arabic culture. What was screened in movies was the knowledge taken from biased political news rather than real experiences of communication between the movie writer and the Arab community. Communication between both was almost absent which forced the existence of media to create a falsified image of Arabic culture. Such it is the example of *The Mummy* which was supposed to be in Egypt. The movie was shot in the desert of Morocco and the local Egyptian characters spoke the Moroccan dialect rather than the Egyptian dialect, which proves the producer's lack of cultural knowledge. It also demonstrates unprofessionalism as well as the negligence of the linguistic difference of Arabic countries.

The lack of knowledge about Arabs gave the media the chance to formulate a definition and spread it to the audience. Second, Media itself became the target of public opinion's pressure. Since the Second World War, the media's concern was to protect its criticizers from antagonists who would desire to harm them, viz, such as the economic law classes, elites, and war victims. Nowadays, the media's criticizers shifted to the ones who believe that their voice was silenced, and their culture was misrepresented. These marginalized groups include minorities' groups of gays, women, blacks, Arabs, Muslims… shift of criticizers forced

media to look deep into minorities' s issues and to give them a place in Hollywood movies. In his latest book, *Guilty: Hollywood's Verdict on Arabs after 9/11*, Shaheen states that;

> Refreshingly, about a third of the post-9/11 films [...] a total of 29, projected worthy Arabs and decent Arab Americans: Arab champions-men and women-are displayed in 19 movies; Arab Americans appear as decent folk in 10 of 11 films. [...] These films attempt to offer a realistic depiction of Arabs through their focus on the lives of likable Arab characters.

Meanwhile, the post 9/11 era witnessed an increasing number of hate crimes towards Arabs and Muslims. These hate crimes were divided into two major parts. The first type was caused by people who harassed others based on their religious and cultural difference. While the second type is caused by Arab Americans towards Arab immigrants who may enter the US in purpose to harm it. Both examples were screened in Hollywood movies. However, the second example was always more sensitive as it represented a clash between people with the same background. To point on this image, Paul Greengrass has chosen to screen its complete opposite in *United 93* (2006). The title of the movie is the same name as the hijacked plane by the al-Qaeda group in 9/11. The movie screened what happened on the plane and the conflicts that happened between the terrorists, as well as between the terrorist and the passengers.

Figure 1: *Still from the Ad Council's PSA „I am an American." Created pro bono by GSD&M for the Ad Council. Reproduced with the permission of the Ad Council.*

Hopefully, The Arabic culture gained its place in media which lightened the audiences' thought to make a difference between collective behavior and an abstract idea: between culture, and the concept of terrorism. The visual war on culture started mainly after 9/11 with a hope to change the biased image of Arab Americans.

To achieve this change, there were many advertisements published by nonprofit campaigns, such as the Ad Councils *„I am an American"*, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations' *„I am an American Muslim"*. *„I am an American"* aimed to raise awareness and to prevent any discriminatory act against humanity or American citizens. It was also a response to act against distorting Arabs or Muslim identity. It was aired after 9/11 featuring a diverse group stating: *„I am an American"*.

As Evelyn Alsultany describes it in her article *Selling American Diversity and Muslim American Identity through Nonprofit Advertising Post-9/11,* the video included:

> The range of diversity includes Latinos, Caucasians, African Americans, Caribbean Americans, South Asian Americans, Native Americans, Asian Americans, young and old people, as well as urban and suburban men and women, a fireman, and a woman who appears to be a nun. The advertisement ends with the written words *„E Pluribus Unum - Out of Many, One,"* (Fig.1)

The advertisement aimed to discourage violence and hate crimes against any minority and to integrate into the American melting pot. It also encouraged the audience to be more tolerant of any kind of difference. Even the spoken language of the video in English, the audience could notice the different accents. The advertisement was not meant to point on the difference between immigrants as much as it meant to mention how far the first-generation of immigrants are trying to integrate into American society and culture. As the Ad Council Web site explained:

> Diversity is what defines America. In the wake of this national tragedy, it is time to embrace our differences and celebrate that diversity, rather than let it divide us. Our nation's motto sends a message that has never been more appropriate - E Pluribus Unum, or Out of Many, One. We are all Americans and our differences create the very foundation and spirit that define this nation.

Yet, some critics believed that the advertisement limited American diversity. The Scholar of contemporary Arab and Muslim American cultural politics and popular culture, Evelyn Alsultany, raised many questioned around the definition of diversity itself and how far it is accepted. She believes that Arabs, Muslims, and Sikhs do not take part in the American diversity as the advertisement does not show *„no veil, no mosque, no turban, no beard; no distinctive Arab, Muslim, or Sikh clothing; and no Arab accent".*[13] The absence of any religious signs uncovered the hidden opinion of rejection towards Muslims especially that they were associated with 9/11. The advertisement did not anymore reflect the unity of the country, rather it reflected an American patriotism full of conspiracies and identity crises. Alsultany also pointed on the ambiguity of articulating *„I am an American,"* only by the Arab and Asian characters which foreshadow the rejection of these minorities

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[13] Ibid.

in American society.[14] In fact, both minorities were facing attacks and harassment by the public opinion, and deportation by the American surveillance. Even thou the ad was supposed to reduce racial and religious discrimination, it fails to tolerate minorities. Yet, the presence of this problem points also to the awareness of minority Americans to heal this trauma. One sometimes cannot blame the current events but investigate the past which associated the American identity with White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. In fact, the advertisement promotes the WASPS's identity which itself was fought affirmative action programs. It is possible to say that American Multiculturalism is opposing diversity within society. McAlister notes that *„the images of diversity and strength of U.S. armed forces simply did not include Arab Americans"*.

As it was released after the events of 9/11, the advertisement created an imaginary setting of protecting Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. It was used as propaganda to calm these minorities and spread the feeling of belonging to the American nation within them. It created neither an equal America nor a solution for the Americans versus Arabs/Muslims clash. It just supported the war on terror against Arabs and Muslims.

The propaganda of *„I am an American"* advertisement may explain the occurrence of *„I am an American Muslim"* advertisement. The latter was created by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in America. Their mission was to *„enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding"*. (Mission and Vision). CAIR's mission was to promote Islam against terrorism in different ways among them media. Even thou they were attacked by American conservatives and were accused by the terrorist attacks, CAIR was against the US's government meetings with Hezbollah and Hamas' leaders. They also opposed the US's coalition with Israel and any kind of weapons, shipment for war purposes. The goal of their campaign was to give a clear understanding of Islam and to fight any anti-Muslim rhetoric. They sought to change the image that Hollywood created in prior 9/11 and to redefine the relationship between American citizens and Muslim Americans. *„I am an American Muslim"* broke the boundaries of the American traditional definition of Multiculturalism by including Muslims in American society. It also pointed on the diversity within Islam religion and its tolerance towards different races. As a result, it made of ''American Muslim'' a version of identity within diversity-patriotism as well as it included Muslim Americans' legacy in the American military service. In fact, Patriotism is

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[14] Ibid.

defined by one's willingness to fight for his country[15] rather than one's race or religion.

„*I am an American"* and „*I am an American Muslim"* are both different speech acts. The first was created by whites as propaganda to serve the government's mission of the war on terror, while the second was created by Muslim Americans who are well informed about their religion and aim to project its positiveness to the American public opinion.

Apart from advertisements, there are dozens of television shows that are synthesized with Arabic and Muslim American characters. Media increasingly showed how these minorities are provoked by negative stereotypes. The created positive images helped them to be part of American society and to be American citizens who fight for their nation against terrorism. Different shows also pointed on their innocence and victimization in response to their association with 9/11. To subvert stereotypes, positiveness was always brought up in defining an Arab American, Muslim American, or Arab-Muslim-American. The victimization also helped these minorities gaining an important position to fight against terrorism. Evelyn Alsultany mentioned some of these figures:

> Examples of patriotic Arab or Muslim American characters who assist the US government in its fight against terrorism, either as a government agent or civilian, include Mohammad „*Mo"* Hassan, an Arab American Muslim character who is part of the USA Homeland Security Force on the show Threat Matrix, and Nadia Yassir, a dedicated member of the Counter Terrorist Unit on season 6 of 24.[16]

Using these characters may point to challenging the old definition of Arab and Muslim Americans, but it also can be used as propaganda by scriptwriters or producers. They used a direct positive image which also reminds the minorities of their origins rather than reminding them of their Americanness. Many shows screened multiple images of hate acts and harassment towards Arabs and Muslims then it showed right away an image of going against it. Having both at once is proof to point on the existence of hatred within American society. Some critics do not oppose the existence of negative images claiming that they report the reality of what is happening against minorities.

Consequently, American media played a major role in distorting the Arab American and Muslim American identity. Movies and

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Threat Matrix, ABC, September 18, 2003-January 29, 2004; 24, FOX, season 6, January 14-May 21,2007.

advertisements were just propaganda to calm down the ones who think their voices are silenced. Yet, these silenced voices were not really taken into consideration only by their civil disobedience and violence in the street. The American government did not show any interest in protecting the victimized neither media played a convincing role to help minorities be part of American society.

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Gergely Nagy[1]

Woodrow Wilson's effect on the emergence of 'modern' American media

Abstract

The First World War brought change in politics that still have an effect today. The United States, abandoning it's neutrality doctrine, joined the war on the old continent. The President of the United States was Woodrow Wilson who set the goal in 1915 that after the end of the war, the US should become a leader in international politics. To achieve this, the century-old civic attitude of neutrality had to be transformed into a bellicose attitude. Wilson knew that this can be done using modern press and propaganda. In the early 20th century modern telecommunications began to play a more prominent role. The press had access to mass of people hitherto unreached, posters were popular and the motion picture revolutionized the industry. Woodrow Wilson recognized early in his career that in the future of politics, news and propaganda would be the key. He campaigned in 1912 using the press, posters and public speeches. Wilson utilized the media and propaganda after becoming president, and also used them to achieve US wartime goals. The Committee on Public Information (worlds first propaganda ministry) and intelligence service was founded under his administration. By the end of the decade these spanned the entire country and to this day have an effect on the political life of the United States.

Keywords: Woodrow Wilson; world war one; propaganda; media; 1912's campaign; 1916 presidental election; Committee on Public Information; US and the League of Nations;

The United States of America, giving up a century of neutrality joined the war raging the Old Continent in April 1917. At the beginning of the first World War the office of President was held by Woodrow Wilson, who had already in 1915 designated as goal for the US to be beside the Entente powers as an arbitrator by the end of the war, to achieve a leading role in international politics. For this he needed to transform the 'neutral disposition' of US citizens to a wartime mentality. Wilson had realized even before his presidency that news and propaganda would play a key role in the future of politics. His 1912 presidential campaign relied heavily on the press, posters and public speeches. Wilson used the media and propaganda even after his inauguration as president, and so he used the press for the purposes of America's goals in the war. The first propaganda minsitry and intelligence agency in the world were created

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under his presidency. By the end of the decade these enveloped the country and to this day have an effect on political life in the United States. In the following I will present the the processes and antecedents that formed American society during the US participation in the Great War and by which an entirely new United States of America was born.

1. Wilson's road to the White House

Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born in 1856, in the town of Staunton, Virginia, in a family with Scottish-Irish Calvinist roots, descended from Western Ohio. His father, Joseph Wilson was a Presbiterian pastor. The family moved several times: first to Georgia then to South Carolina.[2] The young Wilson's first impression of politics was the election of Abraham Lincoln and the inevitability of the Civil War between the Union and the Confederacy. His father served as a chaplain for the Confederate armed forces and donated his church as a field hospital.[3] Encouraged by his father, Wilson studied law in Davidson College from 1874 but abandoned it within the year and returned home. A year later, by his own choosing he attended New Jersey College to study history and political science. As a student at what later would be Princeton he thrived there, participating actively in student life, organizing debate circles, editing the college newspaper and being a secretary for the football team. He was very industrious during these years and had decided that after graduation he would pursue a carrer in politics. After finishing his studies there, pressured by his father he began once more to study law in Virginia, however again, he dropped out after a year, finishing his final exam at home and practiced as a lawyer for a short time. He then resumed his studies, attending John Hopkins University where he achieved a doctorate in history and political science.[4]

Wilson already began his academic career while researching for his doctorate, and was not satisfied merely by holding lectures. He was a prolific author and published his views for a wide audience to lay the foundation for his planned political career. He published his extended doctoral dissertation *'Congressional Government'* in 1885, which earned him popularity. He then proceeded to write several highly acclaimed publications, such as *The State: Elements of Historical and Practicial Politics*, published in 1889, the five volumes of *History of American People* in 1902 and *Constitutional Governmentinthe United States* in

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[2] LINK, Arthur S.: *Wilson. The Road to the White House, Vol. I.* 3rd ed. Princeton UP, 1965. 2015. 1–2.

[3] COOPER, John Milton Jr:. *Woodrow Wilson. A Biography.* Alfred E. Knope, 2009. 11.

[4] About Wilson's studies and his relationship with his father see also: MULDER, John M.: *Woodrow Wilson: Years of Preparation.* 1978. Princeton UP, 2015. 29–58.

1908.[5] In 1890 he became a faculty member in Princeton and gradually realized that in order to keep pace with other emerging and innovative universities, Princeton would need to implement changes. This conviction led him to advance in academic ranks at the university. When he became the first secular rector, the university was still an old-fashioned New Jersey institution with the goal of educating future Presbyterian pastors. His efforts to transform the university to one of the leading academic institution in the United States was not fruitless, however due to internal disagreements he resigned from his position there in 1910.[6]

Wilson left Princeton at the opportune time to enter into politics. When resigning, he had already achieved national recognition and was invited to be governor of New Jersey. Local political life was centered around party leaders at the time and New Jersey was especially renowned for it's 'dirty schemes and intrigues'. The state's Democratic party leaders therefore invited the popular Wilson as governor to increase their dwindling reputation. However who they considered as a political puppet took the upper hand in a mere year. Wilson's successful and transparent governorship in a state notorious for it's corruption earned him the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912.[7] By this time he had more experience than his rivals and the larger part of the media was also on Wilson's side.[8]

2. Wilson and the American media

2.1. The 1912 presidential election

The 1912 elections where one of the most colorful presidential elections in the history of the United States. A new America was being born which political divides were no longer determined by previous views. The election was the precursor of modern 20th century elections where ideologies, personalities, influential mass media and industrial interest groups weighed in for their preferred candidate. New ideas such as progressivism, socialism and new 'nationalism' appeared. Three candidate ran for the oval office in 1912, an ex-president, an incumbent president and a future president: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson. All three candidates graduated from the oldest universities in the United States, Roosevelt from Harvard, Taft from Yale

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[5] About Wilson's scientific work see also: THORSEN, Niles Aage: *The Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, 1875–1910.* 1988. Princeton UP, 2014. 41–213.

[6] About Wilson's Princeton presidency see also: CRAIG, Hardin: *Woodrow Wilson at Princeton*. Oklahoma UP, 1960.

[7] About Wilson's governorate see also: HIRST, David W.: *Woodrow Wilson, Reform Governor: a Documentary Narrative.* Princeton UP, 1965.

[8] PESTRITTO, Ronald J.: *Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Libaralism.* Rowman and Littlefield 2005. 255.

and Wilson from Princeton. Beside them as a fourth candidate was the socialist 'radical' political veteran, Eugene Debs.[9]

It was apparent even before the election was held that the presidential office would be decided between Roosevelt and Wilson. Both were considered as innovative revolutionaries in their respective parties and promised comprehensive changes. Wilsons most significant Democratic rival for presidential nominee was William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, who was part of the conservative wing had won the nomination three times. With good instinct and considering the traditions of the party did not run again, but stepped down, endorsing Wilson, making him the nominee.[10] Roosevelt's presidency (1901–1909) signified a reorientation in the Republican Party. Roosevelt had huge success and popularity but in 1908 decided not to run a third time and nominated Taft as his successor who won the subsequent election. With the resignation of Bryan the rupture between the conservative and 'revolutionary' wings withing the Democratic Party was prevented, but not so among the Republicans. As suddenly as his resignation, Roosevelt returned in 1910. He did not disappear during the intermediate years and he articulated his political views and ideas much to the delight of contemporary media.[11] As with Wilson, Roosevelt also returned to politics due to the media's influence and 'piublic pressure'. The Republicans however would have none of Roosevelt's new 'progressive' programme and the party was divided. Conservative party members prevented Roosevelt's nomination, who therefore ran in his own 'progressive' colors. President Taft himself did not much care about this reelection campaign, as he never did intend to become president, but rather Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.[12] Neither the party or himself really believed in his victory, but still he did not rescind his campaign to weaken Roosevelt's position.[13]

Mass media played a key role in both candidate's campaigns, they both used the press, public speeches and posters to their advantage. While this might seem natural, this was not the case at the time, which is underscored by the fact that Republican nominee Warren G. Harding could win the 1920 presidential elections without leaving the state of

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[9] COOPER: 133.

[10] On the struggle for the Democratic Party presidential candidacy see also: COOPER: 117–34.

[11] LUIRE, Jonathan: *William Howard Taft: Progressive Conservative.* Cambridge UP, 2011. 129–30.

[12] Taft could only take over the Chief Justice of the Superme Court on July 11, 1921, after lengthy political battles. PRINGLE, Henry F.: *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography.* vol. 2. Farrar&Rinehart Inc, 1939. 949. 956–59.

[13] MURPHY, John: *'Back to the Constitution: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and the Republican Party Division 1910–1912.'* Irish Journal of American Studies, vol. 4, 1995. 110–13.

Ohio.[14] Wilson and Roosevelt by comparison travelled the country and held public speeches for large crowds. The candidates held memorable speeches in a time when sound amplification was not available yet.[15] Although Taft also held public speeches leading up to the election, his campaign was negligible, building upon classical conservative traditions and a firm stance against the 'progressives' lead by Roosevelt.[16] The campaign was not above personal attacks against the candidates themselves. Roosevelt was accused of being obsessed with power, Taft was accused of his inability to tackle new challenges with his old methods. Wilson was attacked for his lack of experience in politics. The press was a perfect platform for such attacks, publishing amateurish caricatures of each candidates shortcomings.[17]

The main issues of the election were trusts, the function of the goverment and social changes within the US. Roosevelt announced *'New nationalism'*, Wilson *'The new freedom'*. The former intending to strenghten the government the latter to weaken it's influence upon the citizens.[18] The candidates were actually debating each other many times holding speeches at the same place where one of them has previously been to. This was the predecessor of the later established presidential debates, which became possible later on due to technological advandements where two or more candidates could debate directly.[19] During the campaign some issues that define American politics were marginally discussed. Wilson was asked about the civil rights of African Americans by the Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the New York Evening Post and the writer W.E.B. DuBois. Both attacked Wilson on his Southern heritage and highlighted the possible shortcomings among the African American community. Wilson gave a cautious answer on both accounts. On October 21st he wrote a public letter where he expressed his *'[…]My sympathy with them is of long standing, and I want to assure them through you that should I become President of the United States they may count upon me for absolute fair[…]'*[20] Another such topic was the issue of women's suffrage. On October 19th a vocal activist distrupted his

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[14] In 1920 Harding conducted his presidental campaign from the porch of his Ohio home. DOWNES, Randolph: *The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, 1865–1920.* Ohio State UP, 1970.

[15] COOPER: 140–41.

[16] About Wilson's campaign speeches see also: WILSON, Woodrow: *Crossroads of Freedom: 1912 Campaign Speeches,* edited by John W. DAVIDSON. Woodrow Wilson Foundation – Yale UP, 1956.

[17] COOPER: 135.

[18] COOPER: 147–49.

[19] During the Election of 1912, Wilson and Taft stayed independently at the Copley Plaza Hotel in Boston, and when Wilson became aware of it, the two candidates met and exchanged ideas. COOPER: 141.

[20] Quoted in: COOPER: 144.

speech to ask him about whether voting rights are only for men. Wilson gave an evasive answer claiming that this is not decided by the federal government, but on the state level. Wilson's answer did not please the activist who loudly exclaimed:*'I am speaking to you as an American, Mr. Wilson.'*[21] However he could not finish posing his questions as the police detained him.[22]

Wilson travelled the country during his campaign, he toured the Midwest in October and held a speech in the western state, Colorado. Roosevelt had a similar itinerary, but on October 14th in Milwaukee a mentally ill man attempted to assassinate him. Roosevelt received a serious injury, and although he tried to finish his speech the public escorted him to the hospital after his situation deteriorated and received medical care for several days. Roosevelt's campaign was abruptly cut short due to this and only held one last speech in Madison Square Garden.[23] Hearing news of the assassination attempt, Wilson suspended his campaign on October 17th and called Roosevelt a *'that gallant gentleman'* who had done *'so much to wake up the country to the problems that now have to be settled.'*[24] Wilson's action was simultaneously chivalrous and cunning. His daughter remembers the decision: *'He laughed when he told us of his decision. I couldn't see why it was funny, and when I questioned him, he said, 'Teddy will have apoplexy when he hears of this.' We were told that it did enrage him, but he made no comment of any sort.'*[25] Whatever Wilson's personal motivation was, suspending the campaign proved to be a good idea. Wilson could reast and hold a nine day long break to then continue with renewed strenght. In the second half of his campaign he toured the East-coast states and within weeks held events in Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey.[26]

Wilson and Roosevelt's campaign are the most disputed events in American history. Their campaigns and ideas were simultaneously similar and antagonistic. They articulated messages in the academic language that were easy to understand, yet complex enough to utilize the publics attraction towards ideologies. Both Roosevelt and Wilson held academically prepared and professional speeches, however both were characterized as presenting very attractive, but abstract ideas to exercise control over the crowds. Wilson himself describes this:*'Only a very gross substance of concrete conception can make any impression on the minds of the masses. They must get their ideas very absolutely put, and are much readier to receive a half truth which they can promptly un-*

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[21] Quoted in: COOPER: 145.
[22] COOPER: 142–45.
[23] COOPER: 143.
[24] Quoted in: COOPER: 143.
[25] Quoted in: COOPER: 144.
[26] COOPER: 144–46.

derstand than a whole truth which has too many sides to be seen all at once.'[27] Wilson and his team built a very effective and modern campaign. They intentionally planned Wilson's trips and speeches, created brochures, distributed flyers and posters, had him attent press club meetings. They also utilized the newest technologies, such as the motion picture, making campaign movies. It is apparent that Wilson's campaign was prospectively modern, as these tools are still fundamental in presidential campaigns ever since. The understanding that the press and media has strategic importance in reaching and winning the masses defines American politics' relationship to the media to this day.[28]

Wilson won the 1912 elections and the results were as 'colorful' as the election itself. He gained the 41,8% of popular votes and a sweeping majority of electoral seats, however the other two candidates' total votes exceeded his: Roosevelt won 27,4%, Taft 23,2% of votes. Wilson's victory therefore was heavily influenced by the Roosevelt-Taft rivalry. Eugene Debs achieved fourth place with 6% of votes.[29] It is worth noting that one of the top candidates was not from the mainstream party ranks, but rather Roosevelt backed by the progressives. The Republican Party achieved the third place. There has never been an election in the US since then, where a candidate from the Democratic or Republican party was defeated by a third party candidate.[30]

2.2. The 1916 neutrality election and the First World War

At the beginning of the Great War Wilson called for American neutrality, however the United States' neutrality was at least from 1915 questionable. Privately owned American banks offered significant financial help to the Entente powers, and Wilson approved state banks in offering loans to them.[31] The President was at the same time cautious and wanted to participate in the war. From his studies of American history and institutions he realized that the archetypical American way of thinking contains not only generosity, practicality, patience, prudence, but also an utopian, uncompromising fundamentalist element, which is always willing to force unto others it's way of life. The president therefore had previously warned of the 'drawbacks' of the war: *'Once lead this*

[27] WILSON, Woodrow: *Leaders of Men*, edited by T. H. Vail Motter, Princeton UP, 1952. 20. 25–26.

[28] COOPER: 145.

[29] About the results of the election see also: LEIP, David. 1912. Presidental Election Results. Dave Leip Atlas of U. S. Presidental Elections. https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1912&f=0&off=0&elect=0. Accessed 7 May 2020.

[30] COOPER: 147.

[31] About the loans see also: WILLIAMS, Andrew J.: *France, Britain and the United States in the Twentieth Century 1900–1940.*Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. 99–101. 106–109.

people into war and they'll forget there was ever such a thing as tolerance [...] The spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into every fiber of our national life.'[32] Another important part of Wilson's ideas was the trust in Anglo-Saxon cooperation and will to create a 'new world', which he wanted to achieve by having the United States be the main arbitrator at the peace process after the war. This could only be achieved through active participation in the conflict.[33]

Wilson nevertheless communicated the importance of neutrality towards the press and the public. As opposed to Theodore Roosevelt, he did not want to immediately intervene in the conflict but to wait to join the fight on the Old Continent at the most opportune time. Wilson conducted his 1916 campaign on the grounds of neutrality. The republicans had learned from their defeat in 1912 and nominated a single candidate, Charles Evans Hughes. The United States did not officially have disputes with the Central Powers, as Prussia's sympathy for the Union and the United Kingdom's favor for the Confederacy was still a vivid memory.[34] Not withstanding the fact that 9% of the US population had German heritage, which meant approximately 10 million people out of a population of 100 million. Wilson had to be cautious in his 1916 election campaign not to exaggerate the commitment to the British, as the Easter Uprising in April, 1916 put a considerable strain on American-British relations. Wilson therefore built on the policy of neutrality and presented Hughes and the Republicans as warmongers. In reality, Wilson had been already preparing for war, but would have lost the German and Irish vote, losing him reelection. Wilson won over his Republican rival narrowly with a majority of a mere 600 thousand votes, less than the number of Irish-American voters living in New York.[35]

After winning reelection in 1916 it was a matter of time before Wilson would lead the United States to war. The 'casus belli' became the German's unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmermann Telegram. With the fall of the Russian Tzar-system, the fight could be presented as a war between despotic systems and just democracies.[36] It was nevertheless not easy to transform the century-old tradition of American neutra-

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[32] Quoted in: DULLES, Rhea Foster: *The United States Since 1865.* Michigan UP, 1959. 263.

[33] About Wilson's political philosophies see also: HECKSCHER, August: *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography.* Scribner, 1991. 10–46.

[34] JONES, Manfred: *The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History.* Cornell UP, 1984. 95–125.

[35] LEARY, William M.: *'Woodrow Wilson, Irish-Americans and the Election of 1916.* 'Journal of American History, vol. 54, nº 1, 1967. 57–72.

[36] On the cause of the US declaration of war on Germany (1917) see also: BIRNBAUM, K. E.: *Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare: Germany's Policy Towards the United States*, April 18, 1916 – January 9, 1917. Archon Books, 1970.; TUCHMAN, Barbara: *The Zimmermann Telegram.* Viking Press, 1958.

lity to a bellicose one, and the numebr of army volunteers did not meet Wilson's expectations. The Selective Service Act was therefore put in place on May 18th 1917 which obliged 24 million citizens to be conscripted.[37]

Propaganda was another important element of mobilization besides conscription. The president realized from his academic studies and political experience that the nascent modern American media could play a key role in promoting and accepting his goals with the public. A week after declaring war, Walter Lippmann sent a note to Wilson asking him to order a sweeping propaganda campaign. Wilson won journalist George Creel to leat the Committee of Public Information (CPI), which funcioned as a ministry for propaganda.[38] In Creel's own words:*'It was a fight for the minds of men, for the 'conquest of their convictions,' and the battle line ran through every home in every country.'* Spreading fear was an instrument of wartime propaganda: *'an important element to be bred into the civilian population. It is difficult to unite a people by talking only on the highest ethical plane. To fight for an ideal, perhaps, must be coupled with thoughts of self-preservation.'*[39] During it's operation, the CPI manufactured millions of posters, flyers and pins in 11 different languages besides English. The Committee had more than 20 subdivisions with offices across the entirety of the Unites States. They published nearly a hundred brochures with a number of 75 million copies. One of Creel's revolutionary ideas were the 'four minute men', the contemporary equivalents to viral marketing. The nearly 100 thousand employees were prepared by the CPI to hold four minute long speeches in town halls, assemblies, restaurants and theaters, wherever a large crowd would assemble. More than 7 million such speeches were held in the one and half year of US participation in the war, helf in 5200 municipalities. The speeches were also aimed in promoting president Wilson as a powerful and wise leader standing against the Germans, presented as barbarians and 'Huns'. To present the real or fictitious wartime atrocities of the Germans, the motion picture was used. The CPI produced propaganda movies such as the *The Kaiser: Beast of Berlin* or *The Prussian Cur.* Besides movies, the CPI organized numerous exhibitions displaying the atrocities commited by the 'barbarians'. During the First World War American propaganda sought to eliminate even names and concepts that could be associated to Germans or the Central Powers. The hamburger became 'liberty sandwich', sauerkraut became *'liberty cabbage'* and german measles became *'liberty measles'*. It was forbidden

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[37] MARVIN A. Kreidberg and MERTON G. Henry: *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945.* Department of theArmy, 1955. 221–28.

[38] LIPPMANN, Walter: *Public Oponion.* Harcourt, 1922. 3–32.

[39] MCGERR, Michael: *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920.* Free Press, 2003. 288.

to play German music or teach German language; intiatives against German culture were encouraged.[40] Mass media were also included as an instrument of the CPI. Hundreds of journalists published pro-war pieces, featuring celebrities, artists, actors and scientist, who were for the US war effort.[41]

The Great War lead sooner or later to rationing and wartime economy, and the US was no exception, war appeared in the heartland and everyday life of civilians. The United States assisted the Entente with huge amounts of agricultural and industrial materials.[42] Therefore rationing in the domestic front became necessary. To help witht the acceptance of the austerity measures, America was flooded by volunteers from the CPI who went dore to door to have people sign an oath promising not only to be patriots, but to forego certain luxuries. To this alone, more than half million volunteers were dispatched. Wartime propaganda reached even the youngest generations and schools. Military skills were introduced into the curriculum of secondary schools and high schools. The government dedicated extra attention to children, who had to sign the pledge:

> *'At table I'll not leave a scrap*
> *Of food upon my plate.*
> *And I'll not eat between meals but*
> *For supper time I'll wait.*
> *I make that promise that I'll do*
> *My honest, earnest part*
> *In helping my America*
> *With all my loyal heart.'*

Yet illiterate small children were taught the poem Little Boy Blue:

> *'Little Boy Blue, come blow your horn!*
> *The cook's using wheat where she ought to use corn*
> *And terrible famine our country will sweep,*
> *If the cooks and the housewives remain fast asleep!*
> *Go wake them! Go wake them! It's now up to you!*
> *Be a loyal American, Little Boy Blue!'*[43]

As with other countries, censorship reached American mass media as well. The Wilson administration enacted the Espionage Act on June 15th 1917 and the Sedition act on May 16th 1918 which 'uttering, printing, writing, or publishing any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive

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[40] KENNEDY, David M.: *Over Here: the First World War and the American Society.* Twenty-fifth Aniversary ed.,OUP USA, 2004. 45–93.

[41] LIPPMANN: 317–27.

[42] HOFF, Joan: *A Faustian Foreign Policy from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush. Dreams of Perfectibility.* Cambridge UP, 2008. 45–46.

[43] Quoted in: MCGERR, 293. 294.

language about the United States government or the military. The Post-master General was authorized to withdraw postal privileges to publications that were violating the acts. Such withdrawal of privileges meant a serious blow to any publisher and in this period 75 periodicals were terminated. If the editors did not heed the examples, they would receive threatening messages, and in worse case were suspended for a certain period. In May 1918, more than 400 periodicals were denied such privileges. The *National* was supressed for criticizing Samuel Gompers. They also attacked the *Public* for suggesting that the war effort should be financed by taxes rather than loans, and the *Freeman's Journal and Catholic Register* for publishing Thomas Jefferson's opinion that Ireland should be a republic. Not even the pro-war *New Republic* was safe: they were twice threatened to revoke their privileges after publishing advertisements for the National Civil Liberties Bureau. Foreign publications could only enter the country if they were first translated and approved by censorship. Journalists were threatened with jail and withholding access to printing presses by the War Industries Board. All articles criticizing the draft were deemed 'unacceptable'.[44] Albert Sidney Burleson Postmaster General notes the following regarding curbing freedom of the press: *'There is a limit'*. These are esceeded *'begins to say that this Government got in the war wrong, that it is in it for the wrong purposes, or anything that will impugn the motives of the Government for going into the war. They can not say that this Government is the tool of Wall Street or the munitions-makers [...] There can be no campaign against conscription and the Draft Law.'*[45]

2.3. The League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles

The United States lead by Wilson had a decisive role in the Entente victory of the war, that up to their entry to the war seemed like a stalemate. The American delegation lead by Wilson arrived in Paris with the intention to create a new world order with American supremacy. Wilson intended the League of Nations as the custodian of his new world - the Covenant of the League of Nations was prepared with Wilson's direction.[46] Wilson however not only failed to pursue American interests at the peace negotiations, but could not make the American public ac-

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[44] See also: SAYER, John: *'Art and Politics, Dissent and Repression: The Masses Magazine Versus the Government, 1917–1918'* American Journal of Legal Historyvol, 32. nº 1, 1988. 64. 99. EKIRCH, Arthur A Jr.: *Decline of American Liberalism*. Independent Institute, 2009. 1967. 216–17.

[45] Quoted in: Brands, H. W. *The Strange Death of American Liberalism*. Yale UP, 2001. 40.

[46] The League of Nation was originally a British idea. LINK, Arthur S.: *Woodrow Wilson, Revolution, War and Peace.*Wiley-Blackwell. 1979. 74.

cept the League of Nations and the Paris peace treaties. His 'failure' in Paris opened the eyes of many Americans and gave a historic opportunity to his rivals. The Republican Party won the 1918 senate elections lead by Henry Cabot Lodge thereby winning them majority in the legislature. Wilson as revenge did not take any republican with him to Paris and effectively misused his presidential powers by exluding the legislature from foreign policy decisions. The violation of the centuries old tradition of separation of powers between the presidency and the legislature caused widespread civil and political unrest. Due to the austerity measures and propaganda the public opinion, as well as the media due to censorship turned against the president. The American press revealed Wilsons failure in Paris to the public, dispeling the illusion of a wise and superhuman personality. By 1919, Americans were disillusioned with Wilson's utopia and public opinion demanded the return to normalcy.[47]

Wilson had to achieve acceptance of the League of Nations in this context. The Covenant of the League of Nations was considered by the peace conference as part of the peace treaties, therefore the Senate had to approve it.[48] Despite these circumstances most republican senators and citizens supported the United States' international role but not in the form that Wilson proposed. The president did not consider these reservations and viewed the organization founded 'under his patronage' as a kind of Old Covenant which human hands could not change. Wilson turned to the old tried method and decided to run a national campaign. As in 1912, he toured the whole country: in three weeks he travelled more than 8 thousand miles by railroad and held numerous speeches. He already suffered a stroke previously and due to the taxing campaign suffered a second one in September 25th, 1919. This was hidden from the public at the time, but a third stroke in October 10th, 1919 resulted in a paralysis of his left side, which was revealed to the public. Wilson, who spent all his political carreer appearing in public spent the last 18 months of his presidency never leaving the White House. The press spread rumours that Wilson had serious third-degree syphilis, is delirious and held in a cage. The Senate vote for the ratification of the Covenant of the League of Nations took place with this background. Between November 1919 and March 1920 the Senate voted on three occasions on separate versions, but as no side was open to compromise, there was no majority to approve any one.[49]

Wilson believed despite his declining health in his third reelection in 1920 and made clear that he views the November elections as a referendum on both his person and the League of Nations. Wilson however did

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[47] JOHNSON, Paul: *A History of the American People.* Harper Collins, 1997. 429.

[48] The Article II. Seét 2. of The Constitution of of the United States, the right to make treaties int he United States is exercised jointly by the President and the Senate.

[49] JOHNSON: 430–32.

not make it to the election. His own party nominated the governor of Ohio, James M. Cox who chose the young Franklin D. Roosevelt as vice-president. The republicans nominated the old fashioned senator from Ohio, Warren G. Harding. Cox consciously avoided the wilsonian utopias and the League, but a significant majority of Americans elected Harding who was starkly different to Wilson - he still represented 'the old America'. Even his slogan was: *'Let us return to normalcy.'*[50]

3. Summary

The 'wilsonian age' left a strong impression in the political culture and societal life in the United States. The American people experienced the dark side of the 'American utopia' and ever since are sceptical of the United State's messianic role and deeply divide American society. At the dawn of the 20th century propaganda was born, mass media is to this day having a strong effect on people's lives and political decisions. After World War I politics and the media became inseparably linked. The economic and industrial prosperity of the latter decades of the 19th century conquered hitherto impossible distances and reached homes with record speed. Through propaganda the war infiltrated American peoples everyday lives and new ideologies, fears and hardships became part of their daily lives. The 1912 presidential elections marked the beginning of a new age. American politics became saturated with national campaign trails, media broadcasted debates, motion picture campaign movies, the appearance of pamflets, personal attacks, propagation of utopias, the expropriation of topics dominating public discourse and the monopoly of the press. In the century that has passed since, public information is still controlled mainly by the press and media. In American politics the methods and roles of the media and propaganda have changed very little, only in respect to informational and technological advances have they shifted to different channels.

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[50] Regarding Wilson's third reelection and the presidental campaign of 1920 see also: BAGBY, Wesley M.: R*oad to Normalcy: The Campaign of 1920.* Johns Hopkins UP, 1962. BAGBY, Wesley: *'Woodrow Wilson, a Third Term and the Solemn Referendum.'* American Historical Review, vol. 60, n° 3, 1955. 567–75.

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Bence Pesenyánszki[1]

Regarding Recent Developments of Ethnic Conflicts in the Police Culture of the Contemporary United States

> *Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.*
> Martin Luther King Jr.

Abstract

Ethnic tensions that have characterized the United States of America throughout its history still have a large social impact, partly due to the availability of mass media and communication. These events still define the political discourse and seem to be especially prevalent in the contemporary American society, indicating that deep problems exist at the bases of the American values of pluralism and individual freedom. The culture of policing, as the most apparent form of governmental executive power, reflects on social problems arising from the interconnected history of the nation and its African-American population. The fact that disturbing footage of violent police misconduct targeting African-Americans appears on the world-wide web is, sadly, an expectable event in contemporary history. But nationwide protests demanding change rarely emerge as a result, and even more rarely gain international following and recognition. But the violent death of George Floyd in police chokehold achieved just that. This essay explains how the case of George Floyd, being just one of many in a history of ethnic conflicts in the U.S., has the potential to become a significant milestone in the improvement of everlasting ethnic tensions in the diverse American society.

Keywords: African-American; George Floyd; police culture; police misconduct; police violence; post-racial; civil rights; due process;

In November, 2019, I gave a presentation entitled „*The Big Apple of America's Personal Lawyer"* at ELTE's Conference on U.S. Politics and Media, a small but timely gathering at the height of the impeachment debates. Rudolph Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City, was involved in the Ukraine scandal acting as the President's personal attorney. I chose to research his political legacy specifically to stay relevant to the goals of the conference, but also because Giuliani's political legacy had an effect on the ethnic conflicts of the contemporary United States. Giuliani was known to be a „*crime fighter"* and was called „*America's Mayor"* on television after the 9/11 attacks.

In my research I concluded that Rudy Giuliani's political legacy is nothing more than keeping an „*illusion of order(liness)"*, radiantly highlighted by the failures of the Broken-Windows Policing (Harcourt

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and Ludwig 3-8, 13-14, 33-34) he advocated during his mayoralty in New York and which he claims to have solved the crime problems of the Big Apple. The first drop in NYC's crime rates occurred at the end of the mayoralty of his predecessor, David Dinkins, the first black mayor of the city. It is also to be noted that it occurred at the end of the 1980s crack cocaine epidemic, which some experts claim to be solely responsible for the drop in the crime rates. Later research in criminology proved that the Broken-Windows policy does not have a measurable effect on crime rates, but police funding that Dinkins first increased actually does. My presentation also discussed decades-long media appearances of Giuliani that supported this thesis.

On the other hand, as most participants of the conference predicted, President Donald Trump did not get impeached, and Rudy Giuliani was not involved in the trials. The events of the following months swept the memory of the impeachment away, and the political legacy of Rudy Giuliani suddenly became much less relevant in discussions of ethnic conflicts and police culture in the United States.

Scope of argumentation

The timeliness of reviewing Rudy Giuliani's politics faded just two months after the conference. The first half of the year 2020 was dominated by the development of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the nations of the globe enacted quarantine measurements to control the infection curve of the new virus. By the end of May the launch of the first manned mission of a private space company provided a reminder of the heavily packed decade of the 1960s, the decade of the Civil Rights Movement and the Space Race of the Cold War.

Reviewing the domestic opposition to Kennedy's Moon incentive and the Apollo program carries great relevance to our present. Kennedy's proposal received heavy criticism from both the political left and the right, but it received wide-scale support from the center. The right was concerned with huge, bloated taxes and overarching governmental policies and controlling bodies. The left cited that the resources had to be spent elsewhere on Earth instead of wasting it on the Moon goal, to produce more equality and freedom at the height of the Civil Rights Movement (LAUNIUS 23).

NASA was mindful of these criticisms and showed sensitivity to these issues which saved its reputation, and consequently the necessary Congressional funding as well, so the program could continue. In retrospect we know the Apollo program was beneficial, even if nothing else had come out if it but having just a „*surrogate for war*" (LAUNIUS 221). Fortunately, that was not the only benefit it brought. The argument of the right quickly lost its wings to nationalist triumph, and the

arguments of the left were less prominent in the light of the achievements of both the program itself and the achievements of the Civil Rights Movement in the meantime.

However, the problems of African-Americans did not end with the busy 1960s. After the assassination of MLK and with the passing of the Civil Rights Acts, the last but not the least important Fair Housing Act of 1968, ethnic tensions lowered in the American society, but never really disappeared, as it was hinted earlier. Two hundred years of culture cannot immediately be overwritten by law, and the same went for complicated phenomena like racism, ethnic politics, and martyrs of freedom. The three major Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s ensured fair and equal voting rights, employment opportunities, and banned segregation and discriminative housing policies. On paper, African-Americans became legally equal citizens to the white majority. But racism could not disappear overnight, and this suggests that efforts for discrimination still had a market, and this „*demand*" could be supplied by new politics. Richard Nixon was elected, citing his „*silent majority*", over the unspoken but suggestively „*rowdy minority*" of African-Americans. In my dissertation I claim that Richard Nixon's War on Drugs is heavily responsible for the police culture of the contemporary United States.

The prevalence of ethnic conflicts could also be witnessed later in the 1992 Los Angeles riots that broke out after a contingent of highway police severely beat Rodney King who fled from a traffic stop. This altercation was captured on amateur video, which was still a relatively expensive and rare technology at the time. The LA Riots erupted after the officers were acquitted of all charges, but this was more of a trigger event than the cause of the riots themselves. The crack epidemic and the following mandatory minimum sentencing, the operations of the CRASH unit that later turned out to be corrupt, and other specific LAPD operations all had a long history of police and justice system misconduct that preceded the Rodney King case, and all of which eventually led up to the turmoil of the LA Riots that necessitated a domestic military intervention.

Within some time the technology of mobile phones with video recording systems became widespread, and more and more pieces of footage started circulating on the world-wide web involving police misconduct of all sorts, mostly but not exclusively of actions targeted towards African-Americans. Many of the encounters were fatal. The people who were conscious of these events could have suspected that the incidents were getting worse and more frequent. However, these events also surfaced at a time of theoretical equality and protection by law, after desegregation, when the effect should have been the complete opposite. I think the reason we can see more cases recently is simply that more can be captured and immediately circulated online with today's technology,

not because there actually are more of these cases happening. The fact that the American police persecutes black communities by nature just remained here as a mainstay of previous eras, largely but not solely by the efforts of the Nixon administration as mentioned, and following Republican governance,

It is startling to consider how many more of such cases could have gone unnoticed in history before this contemporary technology was available for the masses. It is even more startling to consider the fact that the world could bear witness to the evident existence of the „*Code of Silence"* in 2020 once again, on the 26th of May. The code of silence manifested once again: even in spite of incriminating evidence accessible to the general public, the authorities defended their agents, and the agents defended the actions of each other (SONDEL and KNOWLES). This is the „*blue wall of silence"* among police officers, and it became obvious once again to the entire world, with the help of the bystanders' footage of George Floyd's fatal encounter with the Minneapolis Police that showed clear misconduct by all of the acting officers.

Sadly, the case of George Floyd originally sounded like an everyday case once again in America. However, on the 26th of May the footage that was taken by several bystanders became available to the public. And it showed something very different than the claims of the police (see Appendix), something unusually cruel even in the everyday socio-cultural reality of the United States. I had to take a step back to re-prioritize my focus again. Seeing the footage it became obvious that this case is unusually grave, which made it outstanding even after a decade of events that may have normalized the phenomenon in the public eye. And the general public seemed to be in agreement with this presumption, evidenced by the major protests erupting in several American cities in the days following the release of the footage.

Evidently, the post-racial world is an illusion, and any proponents of that theoretical framework can now bear witness to the wrongfulness of the theory. Once-again nationwide protests erupted after the amateur footage surfaced, clearly indicating ethnic tensions in the American society. Because the footage clearly showed that a white police officer knelt for nine minutes on the neck of an unarmed black man, who said he could not breathe 16 times as he begged for mercy before dying of asphyxiation (FLOYD). Two other officers assisted the one kneeling on his neck in the chokehold. A fourth policeman was arrogantly arguing with traumatized bystanders, witnesses, ignoring their pleas to check the man's pulse and stop kneeling on his neck. The policemen were also not bothered by the fact that everyone was recording everything on their mobile phones (HILL et al.). Even in the age when footage of police misconduct is abundantly available to the public eye, this was a rather outstanding encounter in its cruelty and futility.

My second reaction was that this was a control-group case for police culture research. Studying the culture of policing in the United States is inherently difficult due to the peculiar nature of American society, namely that there is potentially a gun in every household by the numbers (MANGAN 10). This normally makes any argumentation about police behavior difficult, as many critical cases involving a gun can be justified as presenting mortal threat to the officers themselves. However, this case involved no guns at all, neither from Floyd's perspective, nor that of the police, although one of them did draw a gun on Floyd early in the encounter (HILL et al.). But nobody fired a shot, and Floyd presented absolutely no danger to the officers or in fact any of the pedestrians earlier.

Yet, George Floyd died in his encounter with the police, and the case qualifies as one of the ugliest I have seen during years of researching the topic. The policemen could not have claimed they acted in self-defense, afraid of an armed suspect. Floyd was subdued, and initially seemed fully cooperative (HILL et al.). This detail and its availability as irrefutable evidence surely has contributed to the major protests that erupted in many cities of the United States afterwards, but as the 1992 LA Riots or the 2014 Ferguson Unrest show us[2], the particular case causing an eruption of protests or riots has less significance than the overall climate of community-authority or government-citizenry relations. I base my dissertation argumentation on that fact.

To understand how the George Floyd case and the events following it redefine the picture, and its implications for the future, I will present my revised thesis and enumerate the subjects of my inquiry in the following chapter. These considerations validate an approach that differentiates in its subject matter and navigates the narrow lines of deeply interconnected social problems and correlations that are not immediately obvious. The goal is to expose the nature and historical relevance of this emergent picture.

Thesis

In my dissertation I theorize that ethnic conflicts in the police culture of the United States are so deeply entrenched in the American socio-cultural reality that the only way to prevent events like the Ferguson or the Minneapolis Unrests is to gravely improve broader community

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[2] The Ferguson Unrest erupted after Ferguson, MO police killed a young African-American called Michael Brown. Many details of the exact encounter remain unknown, but the following year saw U.S.-wide protests erupting by the civil unrest it caused. Two federal investigations were launched shortly after the incident. One acquitted the officers who shot Michael Brown, but the other severely condemned the Ferguson Police Department for racially driven misconduct, worsening community-police relations in the area.

relations and create a systematic social and economic reconciliation of ethnic relations to restore the trust between the citizenry and their institutions of authority and government. This trust, I believe, can be restored if authority is regained by example and not attributed by hierarchy, but it cannot be achieved with current policing standards staying intact. Therefore any top-down reform intention necessarily needs to involve radical policy-shifts like the complete cessation of the War on Drugs, and corresponding difficult political decisions. Bottom-up efforts like community policing should be reinforced, but are also insufficient by themselves, and need to be accompanied by structural change. However, to get rid of ethnic conflicts completely, the entire American socio-cultural reality needs to change radically.

I intend to prove the validity my observations with the presentation of an analysis of a set of primary sources: original footage of police encounters that caused a measurable enough ethnic conflict to be represented in the media. These sources will be distinguished by controlling factors, so the deep network of correlations can be identified, in a process that is somewhat like a game of mills. I attempt to also study the corresponding official documentation of these pre-selected cases, along with reports, and their legislative results where they exist, in order to put these recent developments into perspective. I also attempt to provide transparency in my methodology of source selection, especially with my control groups, and rely heavily on a wide-range of secondary sources as the research basis for an interpretive basic research of these encounters and their effects in the perspective of contemporary American history. In this essay I present the analysis of George Floyd's encounter and its significance in my research and contemporary history.

Background

In my first dissertation outline proposal I suggested a cyclical model to describe the basic progress of ethnic relations in the American society through the history of the nation, focusing on the social equality of African-Americans, based on an observation of historian Gerald Early. He noted in 2011 that referencing the change in the social status of the African-American minority in the U.S. should not be undertaken using the word „*progress*", as what we refer to as progress here is not steady, permanent, or linearly forward pointing on every occasion (EARLY 11-16). This was before the Ferguson Unrest or the George Floyd protests that now reinforce the points of Early retrospectively.

I believe that this claim is generally true even in its literal meaning: every civil rights achievement is followed by a backlash before being able

to *„progress"* further. Progress suggests a linear, upward or forward pointing arrow that at least has a clear direction all the time. The point of this framework is to indicate that these feedbacks exist and that they are informative of the broader power relations, and consequently the cultural climate of equality. In this case, the social achievement that demanded a backlash could have been Barack Obama's progressive victory in the 2008 elections. The struggle against racism takes a visible shape in the American social context, and perhaps that is the area where the model is the most informative.

Every progressive achievement is, indeed, fragile and subjected to new challenges over time. Reviewing some key historical milestone events, I found an appropriate distorted spiral frame of reference for studying ethnic conflicts in the broad history of the American society. This model was aimed to make the points of Early about progress clearer for future discussions and indicate its basis of argumentation, but it can do more than that: prove that Early was not being pessimistic, just

realistic in his selection of words, as it is visible from the recent developments of the decade in the issues he was discussing.

I believe a horizontally growing spiral is the correct model to accurately represent our historical understanding of ethnic conflicts in American society, as the cycle does indicate some optimistic progress with its direction, but also reveals the fragile nature of this progress and indicates all the feedback loops of resistance after every step of social development.

For an enlarged image see the Appendix. The model was created for me by a 3D artist called Javier Leandro Andrade from Buenos Aires, in June 2020, based on my original reference.

The model allows the placement of several historically significant events that can be chosen as arbitrarily as desired, in great detail, each of them should fit somewhere along the spiral while the shape of the body stays intact. A few outlying exceptions exist, but they don't alter the general shape radically. For the purpose of necessary generalization I placed a few key milestones at key points of the model to see whether they would correspond. They did, but my original selection of the events and their placement on the spiral was perhaps too arbitrary and insufficiently detailed, therefore I intended to present a more rigorous explanation of my methodology for a revised model above.

While the model is not heavily restricted to ethnic conflicts specifically in the police culture of the United States, policing became more and more relevant historically in ethnic relations, partly since it is one of the most apparent entities of governmental power, so its internal and external operational mechanisms reveal deeper implications about a nation's culture of authority and power relations. Moreover, as it can be witnessed in the points that this paper makes, the model actually provides an explanation for this increase of the importance of policing corresponding to the aforementioned historical overview of the achievements of the Civil Rights Movement.

Firstly, the model implicitly shows the levels of freedom and social positions of the subjects[3], corresponding to the historical milestone dates that brought about a change in that aforementioned status. The vertical position intends to indicate change in the level of social acceptance or status of the chosen subjects, African-Americans. The horizontal one represents time, indicating contemporary relevance. Secondly, the cyclical nature of the body tries to highlight how the social status shifted, but did not evidently or linearly improve at the same rate throughout history. The non-linear fashion of progress has implications for the future. Even contemporary historiography can present a picture that seems linear in retrospect, but this rarely represents reality accurately.

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[3] And by that, correspondingly, their relation to power is implicitly shown as well.

My general goal is to have a more accurate understanding of such socially sensitive issues that still define public discourse today. American domestic power politics changed in methods but perhaps not in essence. One thing the model can indicate really well is that there were long idle periods involving the worsening of ethnic relations, interrupted only by shorter, more optimistic periods when improvement milestones were achieved.

The methods of oppression can be suspected to have become more and more „civilized". The distorted scaling was originally intended to represent this, but anomalous events seemed to be too abundant to validate that particular type of spiral. This indicates that human lives are not uniformly valued in the diverse United States, or at least these values are not mirroring those of other globally cooperating nations in a direct correlation. However, the effect exists and is to be taken into account. Today human lives are highly valued, more so than 150 years ago, and this fact is responsible for a part of the progress that the spiral shows.

Therefore, the distorted scaling aims to rather represent a distancing in time, as its main focus remains to represent this „progress" in the most contemporary society of the U.S. This is visible in the disproportion in its boundaries and length, and the arrow-headed section. Arguably the era of slavery involved greater dehumanization than the crack-epidemic and the corresponding response from the authorities, even compared to the general social norms of the time. However, the events of the 1980s gain extra relevance for our present because of their proximity in both the time frame and the nature of issues. It also highlights a subjective feeling that the setbacks after improvement milestones may still signify an overall better standpoint in society, but over time even smaller differences in equality become more visible and thus less tolerable. Even a small difference in equality can thus gain importance and visibility.

The era of slavery feels distant, even though its remnants still have an effect on American society in some emergent ways (HOROWITZ et al. 1). Just for a blatant example NASCAR just recently banned the Confederate flag from their races, as a result of the Black Lives Matter movement (MACUR). But the model does not show explicit implications about the time-distancing process, as it aims to highlight strictly the inner movement of ethnic relations focus points particular to the United States, and its relevance to domestic policy today, or the last decade.

The most important thing the model highlights, that progress comes at cost and the path leading there is not straight, may sound evident but is seldom emphasized in the history of African-Americans. The proximity of the George Floyd Protests in time to the Ferguson Unrest, and the historical backlash predicted by Gerald Early, give a clear proof of this fact, as it is represented in the spiral.

The Trump Administration's rhetoric in the questions of policing related to the George Floyd case (ALBA et al.) also made me reconsider my original placement of key events on the model; I was convinced in 2017 that the last downturn cannot possibly reach lower than the Ferguson Unrest of 2014, and the only way is forward and upward from 2018 and onwards for a while, even under a „*law-and-order*" presidency. Being proven wrong about my annotation of the model by the George Floyd protests, however, only provided further evidence for the correctness of the revised cyclical framework.

The methodology of my dissertation research involves the distribution of the primary source footage into exemplary groups distinguished by certain prioritized attributes from others, effectively forming control groups to one another. This enables an analysis of correlations as deconstructing these controlling factors creates what I called a game of mills. The conclusions I reach will be examined in their relation to the presumed spiral model to test its validity.

In a simplified thought experiment we could theorize that, based on many cases, the police culture of the United States is inherently violent because of the danger of firearms. However, the control cases of Eric Garner or George Floyd suggest that there are other relevant mechanisms at work when describing the American culture of policing, as they evidently involved no gun threat. The case of Tamir Rice might even suggest the existence of a more sinister, conscious use of the gun-threat by the police to justify their actions. Since the primary focus of my dissertation is the present and most contemporary history of the United States, the time frame from which I selected cases is the decade of the 2010s. Earlier cases will be mentioned when they are relevant, but not elaborately discussed.

Sources

As it was mentioned before the primary requirement for making a case of a conflict in my paper would be measured in the media presence and accessibility of the issue. If a case is „*loud enough*" to make a wide-spread media appearance, i.e. when it is present in the national television news or in international newspapers, it is selectable. The case of George Floyd unquestionably qualifies as even in spite of the dangers of the Covid-19 pandemic, large masses protested on the streets of Minneapolis and elsewhere in the United States as a result of the case and its publicity.

What I consider a primary source is some form of original footage of an encounter, taken either by bystanders or officer lapel cameras, patrol cars' dash cams, public surveillance, or via some other method, but shows a real-time record of the events.

After assembling a list of possible cases worthy of analysis I intended to cherry-pick them based on the predetermined selection of control factors. It will soon become obvious that many cases selected could be placed in overlapping groupings as reality tends to be more complicated than human simplification would desire, therefore I intended to prioritize what I considered important in each case.

Multiple important details could qualify the Floyd case to form its own group: the disproportionality in the use of force weighed against the pettiness of the possible crime and the resistance of the subject; the slow and graphic nature of the action that caused the death of the victim; constant communication from the victim and several witnesses who were recording; a pending question of drug abuse by the victim; the questionable practice of choke-holds. Still, I believe the most-relevant aspect of Floyd's case is the lack of firearms.

As a brief reminder it is best to provide some statistical evidence for my starting points. I propose that the most important factor to influence ethnic conflicts in general is the police-community trust-relation that can be measured, for example, by the rate of confidence in police. In 2015, still amidst the echoes of the Ferguson Unrest, only a very small majority, 52% of the sample, had confidence in their police forces, lower than the historical average of 60-odd percent (JONES). Even if it had normalized since then it can be theorized that the confidence decreased once again after the George Floyd incident.

But this number concerns the American average. A large majority of African-Americans are in consent about their low opinion of policing (MORIN and STEPLER). They are much more likely to experience some form of force in non-fatal police encounters (FRYER 1, 24–25). They also have a much higher chance of being killed by the police, most importantly (EDWARDS et al. 16793–16794).

They generally have worse experiences in a variety of other social situations too. They are far more likely to have experienced any form of discrimination. They carry negative views on ethnic progress. They see a worsening of ethnic relations under the Trump Administration. They experience discrimination as a real difficulty in life, and they find their „race" to be central to their identity (HOROWITZ et al. 1). A majority of the American people, 58% of all adults surveyed regardless of race, had negative views on race relations, and blacks are more likely to believe it to be worsening (Horowitz et al. 2). While there is a partisan gap in the opinions, it is insufficient to explain discrepancies. It is more likely that whites have a different experience with policing, or feel differently about somewhat similar experiences. As prominent policing expert Radley Balko stated:

"It's true that the problems with modern policing pose a risk to everyone, of every race. It's also true that the same problems

disproportionately affect black and Latino people. And that discrepancy is why we so rarely see protests for white victims of police violence. If you're white, you can view the footage of Daniel Shaver's death, feel some anger and move on. If you're black, viewing the video of George Floyd's death is a reminder that the throat under Officer Derek Chauvin's knee could easily have been your own." (BALKO)

A former Baltimore policeman called Michael Wood gave an interview to Cenk Uygur, host and creator of the Youtube-based progressive/left-wing political show „*The Young Turks*". He voiced the most obvious question to be asked from the American society: „*Did you think the black community was lying for the past 100 years?"*

Based on the aforementioned I elected the case of George Floyd to belong in the same group of cases that ultimately involved no firearms, like the case of Eric Garner from NYC. In my dissertation I present ten distinguishing categories in total but here I will only mention them. These include „*standard cases"* with no outstanding attributes but with a media impact, like Maurice Gordon's case, and its counter group of „*small media impact cases"* that are similar in nature. Another control group balances for racial bias, i.e. when both the victim and the officer were white, like the cases of Daniel Shaver or Zachary Hammond.

The remaining categories are made up of more specialized factors, like the threat perception of officers as the cases of Tamir Rice or Philando Castile showed, or the lack of authority as represented in the recent case of Ahmad Arboury. No-knock raids by heavily militarized police forces like SWAT teams deserve their own group, as they eliminate the viability of the usual excuse that „*victims of police violence have a reasonable anticipation of the consequences of their actions in the response of the police"*. Jose Guerena, Tarika Wilson, or recently Breonna Taylor did not see it coming.

Although Cory Maye's no-knock raid encounter with a SWAT team happened in 2001, it is an informative case of the issues discussed here, but by its outcome it belongs in its own special category of incompetent policing. Other iterations of this group also include a case of a blatant failure of the NYC police in a crowded street shooting (MARTIN). Non-fatal cases can also be very informative: Rodney King was mentioned from an earlier era, but the recent case of a George Floyd protester called Martin Gugino also demands an analysis. The case of James King belongs here too but is most relevant in highlighting the blue wall of silence.

The common attribute of these cases is that they all show some level of misconduct from the police forces of the diverse United States. It is unquestionable that ethnic tensions play a large part in these encounters, but many cases exist that can act as control groups to dig deep down into difficult correlations to uncover the true nature of ethnic

conflicts in the police culture of the U.S. The last category in my dissertation would be the „*misfit*" category where no footage is available, like the case of Freddie Gray. Based on a thorough examination of all of these distinguishing factors I hope that these more obscure cases can be known a little better. The case of George Floyd, thus, should give us clear evidence of the prevalence of police misconduct targeted towards African-Americans regardless of the difficult peculiarity of firearm prevalence in the American society.

The case of George Floyd

Victim: George Floyd, 46, African-American
Date: 25th of May, 2020
Location: Minneapolis, MN
Alleged Crime: Forgery/Counterfeiting ($20 bill)
Agency: Minneapolis Police Department
Cause of Death: Asphyxiation in Chokehold (Conflicting Coroner Reports)
Footage: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AdC2xGvR1hg&bpctr =1592687651
Sources: Bystanders Footage; MPD Public Information Request (See Appendix 2.)
Secondary Sources: Investigative journalism (NYT, local)

On the 25th of May, 2020, a Cup Foods employee called the police on a black man who supposedly used a counterfeit $20 bill in Minneapolis, MN, to buy cigarettes. The caller also claimed the man was „*awfully drunk*" and „*not in control*", which translated to a warning of violent behavior to the police. See the first 911 call transcript at Appendix. According to the security camera footage from the Dragon Wok restaurant across the corner, opposite to the aforementioned store where the 46 year-old African-American George Floyd was sitting in his car, two shop employees confronted Floyd, who did not threaten them in any visible way, but refused to return the cigarettes. Some twenty minutes later George Floyd was already dead in custody (HILL et al.).

According to a reconstruction of events from different cameras collected by the *New York Times*, the two officers who first arrived at the scene were officers J. Thomas Lane and Alexander Kueng (HILL et al.), both of them were rookies with no conduct complaint previously filed against them (BJORHUS and SAWYER). Lane quickly points a gun at Floyd, but similarly quickly holsters it, indicating that Floyd was cooperating initially. But then Lane forcefully pulled Floyd out of the car (HILL et al., BJORHUS and SAWYER). Floyd kept his arms away from his body motionless and straight, indicating a non-threatening standpoint even in spite of lessening cooperation from his part. Lane

handcuffed him and Kueng urged him on the sidewalk next to the Dragon Wok wall. If Floyd did not cooperate in any way, he did it absolutely non-violently, which the officers should have noticed. Arguably the case does not validate handcuffing him or immediately pulling a gun on him, and the heavy response of the rookie officers might have already startled Floyd who, as it was noted by the *NYT*, was „*already in distress"* (HILL et al.).

This indicates that the U.S. gun culture and the corresponding police training did indeed influence a prime „*No Guns"* case; the rookie officers were alarmed by the 911 call and they likely resorted to their defensive training immediately assuming a gun threat, complicating the case, possibly giving a reason for Floyd to not cooperate fully. Floyd's reasons could be more banal than conscious protest: distress and confusion. In the light of the reputation of the American police forces in the eyes of the African-American community (HOROWITZ et al. 1), this could be a fairly common reaction even among the most lawful of black citizens. Even if he was under the influence, he seemed to be physically fine outside of the distress of the encounter.

Footage collected by the *New York Times* then shows that Floyd sits down on the pavement with his hands still cuffed behind his back. He is questioned by Kueng who can be seen to react to Floyd in a frustrated manner (HILL et al.). A few minutes later they try to move Floyd over to the police car parked next to the Cup Foods at the opposite corner, but Floyd falls to the ground shortly before reaching it. The *NYT* report claims that he said he was claustrophobic and refused to enter the police car. Another police vehicle arrived to the scene, but it was a Minneapolis Park Police officer who did not intervene in the work of the Minneapolis Police Department and did not witness Floyd's death in the end.

Nine minutes into the encounter another MPD vehicle arrived, carrying officers Derek Chauvin and Tou Thao. Personnel records show 17 heavily redacted complaints filed against Chauvin, and 6 against Thao. The 44 years old Chauvin had served in the U.S. Army as an army police officer, but he also worked as a security guard and as a McDonald's employee before. He had been working for the MPD for 19 years at that point, and most of his conduct complaints were closed without disciplinary measures (BJORHUS and SAWYER), save two. He was reprimanded after a complaint from a woman alleged that she was pulled out of her car for driving 10 mph above limit, frisked, and put into the police car. Apparently Chauvin and another officer involved had no audio records of the encounter, which is a violation of MPD rules (BJORHUS and SAWYER). Chauvin had also been part of three police shootings, one of them fatal (HILL et al.).

Thao is a native Hmong speaker and has been in the force for 11 years. He had once been dismissed following a budget cut, but was

recruited again two years later. Thao had been involved in a police brutality lawsuit and have allegedly beaten and broken the teeth of a handcuffed suspect in custody. The city of Minneapolis paid a settlement in the suit (BJORHUS and SAWYER).

The footage of the *NYT* shows that Chauvin starts to help the two rookies getting Floyd into the police car while Thao stands by and watches. The moment when they finally succeed in putting Floyd into the car, Chauvin pulls him over the back seats from the other side, and Floyd ends up on the ground next to the rear wheels facing the asphalt. This move seems quite unnecessary as Floyd was effectively in the police car.

Footage taken by the bystanders later shows three of the four offices kneeling on him, and the events that happened between the two publicly available videos may be crucial to understanding the case. This is the point when the bystanders started filming the encounter, and producing the video I consider a primary source, because it has full audio and no redactions of the final minutes of George Floyd.

Analyzing the records it is clear the Chauvin and Thao arrived at the scene as ranking officers in order to show strength and authority by force. The footage clearly shows Chauvin trying to „*teach Floyd a lesson*" by asking him to enter the car while three of them are kneeling on him. As it was mentioned before, Floyd can be heard saying he cannot breathe at least 16 times on record, and Chauvin replies at least once that he does not care, and also says that if he can talk, he can breathe. All the while Thao also arrogantly talks back to the more and more hysterical bystanders, claiming they tried to put Floyd in the car for ten minutes and it did not work, which was at least partly an exaggeration.

Lane questioned the restriction methods of Chauvin twice during the encounter (BJORHUS and SAWYER), and asked Chauvin if they should move Floyd, to which Chauvin replied negatively. Otherwise none of the officers felt appropriate to step in, even in spite of the pleading of the bystanders to „*check the man's pulse*", that „*he's not moving*", and that „*he's bleeding from the nose*". This is clearly incriminating evidence against the other three policemen too. At some point Chauvin looks at the recording bystanders and when they close in on him, he threateningly equips something from his holster, probably pepper-spray, and aggressively points it at one of the bystanders. He is visibly angry, flexing and trying to act tough, all of which, including his truly telling body language, are being called out by one of the bystanders.

Sadly it is possible that the well-intended bystanders just escalated the case by infuriating Chauvin further who was clearly not in the right mindset for policing, being compromised by anger and aggression while he should have been serving and protecting the community that employs him instead. It is possible based on the footage that Chauvin tried to make an example out of Floyd, with a clear intention for homicide. The

reasons why he afforded himself to be so reckless to do this in front of cameras is the same that explains why none of the other officers stepped in to stop him, namely the non-conditioned deference to colleagues, and the ever important code of silence. Historically speaking those officers who step in commit insubordination formally and usually experience heavy repercussions (SONDEL and KNOWLES). Former Buffalo police officer Cariol Horne was fired from the Buffalo PD after a similar incident, and she has been pushing for „*step-in*" legislation ever since. The Minneapolis Police Department actually created a conduct-rule of stepping in when an officer sees misconduct, but clearly it was insufficient to save the life of George Floyd (SONDEL and KNOWLES).

What is most infuriating regarding the George Floyd case is that the originally released General Offense Public Information Report by the MPD described the encounter with the following public narrative:

> „*On Monday, May 25 at 8:02pm, Minneapolis Police responded to a 911 call reporting a forgery in progress at 3759 Chicago Avenue South. Officers arrived and located a suspect in a vehicle. Officers reported that they ordered the suspect out of the vehicle and the suspect physically resisted officers. Officers handcuffed the suspect. The officers restrained the suspect on the ground and an ambulance was called. No weapons were used by anyone involved in this incident. The subject, an adult male believed to be in his 40s was transported to Hennepin County Medical Center where he was pronounced deceased.*" (See Appendix)

This is obviously a blatant white-wash. This is the public narrative offered by the MPD in the world's foremost democracy. This clearly shows that there is a systematic problem with the culture of policing in the United States, and the issues extend far further than „*a few rotten apples*" in the police organization. Those few former or acting policemen who turned out to be serial killers can be called „*rotten apples*". The behavior of the institution cannot be called that, and indicates a systematic error. This is further suggested by the original coroner's report attributed by the county that cited that Floyd had pre-existing conditions that caused his death. Floyd's family demanded a second opinion, and an independent coroner noted the mechanical pressure to have caused the asphyxia (VERA). This suggests a systematic disregard of the constitutional rights of American citizens, once again disproportionately affecting the African-American minority, and it is another manifestation of the blue wall of silence.

This case is not just important because demonstrations erupted following the event, eventually even internationally. Since it involved no guns but other forms of lethal force, it shows that police misconduct can manifest in different ways in its most destructive and disturbing forms,

too. But the public outrage, thankfully, had its effect: while only Derek Chauvin was detained originally who was charged with third-degree murder, later all of the officers involved were arrested, and Chauvin was charged with second degree murder. The analysis of the primary footage and the reconstructed full footage of the events by the *NYT* suggest that all four officers are guilty in the murder by assisting or not stepping in, all the while demonstrating complete disregard for the most basic of public requests by the bystanders and the subjects of their power. The George Floyd case was everything but due process, and quite a transparent one at that. Regardless of the actions and history of George Floyd that some claim to have escalated the case, his extrajudicial execution should deeply worry the proponents of „*law-and-order*".

At the time of writing it can be theorized that the justice system will not be able to avoid the severe punishment of the officers. But, as it will become apparent from my dissertation, most of the guilty officers are usually acquitted (PARK). This time perhaps, in the light of irrefutable evidence and a series of global outrage and protests, this particular case will be different. And the lack of change since the Ferguson Unrest of 2014 further suggests the growing discontent in larger and larger portions of the American public in their law enforcement that needs to be addressed by the American government.

Conclusion

In my dissertation I intend to analyze footage of a few cases of each corresponding group to generate my „*corpus*" for argumentation. Their analysis will involve a variety of secondary sources to guide the argumentation, and supplementary analyses of contributing issues like the War on Drugs or racism in general in the American historical context. In my conclusion I intend to argue that there are systemic correlations that are particular to the American socio-cultural reality that taint the current emergent police culture, and the only reasonable way to encourage improvements in the ethnic relations of the United States is by structural, economic, and ideological reforms intended to restore the trust between the authorities and the communities they are supposed to serve and protect.

In this essay I establish that the George Floyd case highlights several areas of police misconduct disproportionately affecting African-Americans very radiantly. Derek Chauvin and his arbitrary use of force is not a so called „*bad apple*": the assistance of his colleagues, the purposefully ignored bystanders, the white-washing public report, and then the embarrassment and adjustment after civilian footage goes public all show that there is a systematic problem in the American culture of policing, and that the social position of African-Americans is

still not yet equal in the American society, as represented by the nationwide protests as a result.

The United States reached the Moon at the end of the 1960s, and also took a huge step towards racial equality. More than 50 years later ethnic conflicts still seem prevalent. These huge public outrages and the corresponding protests, however, may bring some much needed change and discussion of this problem in an unlikely Presidency, which is ultimately a product of U.S. politics and the media of the contemporary era.

Appendix

MPD Frequently Requested Public Information

Recovered directly from Source: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/records/frequent

May 25, 2020 officer-involved death

Redactions have been applied per Minnesota Government Data Practices Act 13.82 and USC 18, section 2725.
- Minneapolis Fire Department Incident Report 20-0018197
- Hennepin County Medical Examiner Press Release Report
- 911 call transcript
- Incident Detail Report (20-140629)
- General Offense Public Information Report (GO# 2020-140629)
The address of George Floyd is security information under Minn. Stat. sec. 13.37 because individuals may be currently living at that address, and the release of that address may create a high potential for congregation around that address that would be likely to substantially jeopardize the security of persons and property.
- 911 Transcript, May 25, 2020; 20:32:35
- 911 Transcript, May 25, 2020; 20:32:07
- Update Phone Call - 911 Dispatcher to MPD Sergeant (MP3) or alternate file format Update Phone Call - 911 Dispatcher to MPD Sergeant (WAV)

Officers involved in incident:

– Officer Derek Chauvin
– Employee Complaint Profile Card - Public Summary for Officer Derek Chauvin
– Public Personnel File for Officer Derek Chauvin
– Officer Thomas Lane
– Employee Complaint Profile Card - Public Summary for Officer Thomas Lane

– Public Personnel File for Officer Thomas Lane

– Officer Tou Thao

– Employee Complaint Profile Card - Public Summary for Officer Tou Thao

– Public Personnel File for Officer Tou Thao

– Officer J Alexander Kueng

– Employee Complaint Profile Card - Public Summary for Officer J Alexander Kueng

– Public Personnel File for Officer J Alexander Kueng

Body Camera, Street Camera, and Squad Camera Footage

Body worn camera and other video evidence collected in this incident are part of an active investigation by the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension into the actions of the officers responding to a call for assistance. While the investigation and any subsequent prosecution or appeal are active, this data is not available to the public and it will not be posted here.

More details about the classification of body worn camera data and other video involved in an active investigation is available in Minn. Stat. section 13.82, subdivision 7, Minn. Stat. section 13.825, and MN Department of Administration Advisory Opinion 20-004.

Additional data will be released when it is available.

For data related to the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board Park Police, please submit a request online.

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Péter Sasvári[1]

Shadows of the Black Legend: Press Reflections of Mexican Political Events and the Conservative Party in The New York Times, 1851–1867

Abstract

Nowadays Mexico is often in the spotlight of US politics; US interests and prejudices of the press and wider public usually playing important role in the discussion. Theme of my researchs will be the reflections of The New York Times on Mexican political events and Mexican-US relations during the mid-19th century. Starting point of my presentation will be 1851, founding of the paper, while I will finish with 1867, fall of the French-installed Mexican Empire. My focus will be on the Monroe Doctrine and its implementation, anti-Catholic and anti-Hispanic prejudices, as well as the infamous Black Legend (*lejenda negra*). I will analyse how Times approached Mexico's political life and its multiple actors, especially the *„suspicious"* catholic Conservatives. What positions and approaches did the paper took between 1851 and 1867, and what influenced them? I will point out especially, how the Black Legend about the actual and fictional atrocities committed by Spanish colonizers, and its modified anti-Hispanic version influenced the Times. Another key tenant of my presentation will be about what impact did USA geopolitical and economic interests had on the opinion of the paper. Did the generally prejudiced attitude drove them to support these aims, or on the contrary: prejudices served only as a smokescreen of US expansion? Research of these questions can help us in understanding current Mexican-American issues, and the underlying motives.

Keywords: Mexico; United States; New York Times; press; prejudices; anti-Catholicism; racism; 19th century; Conservatism;

The topic of my research is how the New York Times reflected on Mexico's political life. It is largely focused on the Monroe Doctrine, the black legend (*lejenda negra*) and the prejudices about Mexicans and other Hispanic or Catholic European nations. I would like to present how the New York Times had related to the Mexican political life and Mexican political figures: What influenced them when they formed their opinion and what was their point of view on particular issues? I would also like to research how the authors of the New York Times wrote about the Mexican Conservative Party. I would like to point out how the opinion of the Times was influenced by the Anti-Hispanic, and Anti-Catholic sentiment, originated from the black legend. The question

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of how (and how much) did the newspaper violated the principle of objectiveness in order to support the economic, political and ideological interests of the USA is also a subtopic of my research.

The New York Times is today usually seen as one of the most creditable American news sources. It was founded in 1851 by Henry Jarvis Jaymond, a US politician. The paper was much more Conservative during the late 19th century.

Bibliography

Mexico and the history of the country's foreign relations is not a widely researched topic in Hungary. During my research – in the phase of working with secondary literature – I mostly used English and US American works, as well as Hungarian monographies. These works were primarily useful in order to understand and present the historical background of my research, as well as to create the chronology for it. For general information inquiry I have used Latin-Amerika története (*History of Latin America*) by Adam Anderle, and Latin Amerika, 1750-1840 (Latin America, 1750-1840, edited by Viktoria Semsey). Regarding the actual Mexican chronology of events I mainly used A brief history of Mexico and History of Mexico by Lynn V. Foster. In order to understand better the political ideologies relevant in the 19th century Mexico, I have read two journal articles by Gyula Horvath, as well as an 1996 research paper from Valentín Gómez Farías and Will Fawl. Works of Brian Hamnett and Robert Duncan were utilized in order to understand better the rule of Maximilian Habsburg in Mexico, while the doctoral thesis of Adel Palma Farkas was useful in regards of getting a better general image about prejudices on Latin American nations. It is important to mention the work of Marcell Nagy on Latin American Conservatism. I have also used several original sources about US diplomacy and foreign policy, ie. the presidential message laying the basis of the so called Monroe Principle. However speaking about primary sources, the most important source had been the New York Times itself.

Shadows of the Monroe Doctrine and the Black Legend

The Monroe Doctrine, or Monroe Principle was a cornerstone of the US foreign politics for much of the 19th century. Its name and core tenants are originated in the 1823 presidential message of President James Monroe. To sum it up, the Monroe Doctrine declares that the United States refrain itself from colonial ventures, or any type of meddling into domestic affairs of European nations. In turn, it expects them never to intervene in the American continent. Furthermore it

threatens those violating it, with US military or diplomatic reaction.[2] It can also be summarized via the well-known slogan: *„America for the Americans!"* In 1845, President Polk reaffirmed Washington's commitment to the doctrine, while speaking about the need to the perceived renewed attempt by European powers to colonize American territories.[3]

Examining tropes, connected to the Black legend, or lejenda negra, will be a crucial part of my work. Originally the legend was the legend of *„Spanish cruelty and bigotry"*, the trope that Spanish people are somehow default bigoted, cruel, evil, etc, and morally inferior.[4] Its base is the book of Father Bartolomeo de las Casas.[5] The book describes the cruelty committed by Conquistadors in the Americas very graphically, sometimes with hyperboles included. Later the trope, the so called legend was stretched: it was now not used anymore solemnly just against conquistadores, but Spanish in general. And finally it became a possible, prejudiced summary of *„Spanish character"*: cruel, treacherous, selfish, bigoted, and lazy. The legend also started to blame the Catholic faith itself for these very traits, apart from Spanish character alone. The American people (South and Middle) who sought to break independent from Spain embraced and used these prejudices in order to justify their claims of autonomy, and wage propaganda war against Spain.[6] However it turned out to be a double edged sword. Soon, the legend was used against them. And nobody used the tropes so frequently against them and Spain, than the dominant Anglo-Saxon Protestant power in the Americas: the USA. The lejenda supplemented the Monroe Doctrine, serving as an argument for US intervention in the Americas. However the modified version of the legend was a bit different from the original one. The Latin American people were seen less tyrannical, and cruel, or barbaric (although they were seen as such to a certain extent). Lazy, uncultivated, stupid, and bigoted in a superstitious way. These were the outlined putative characteristics, and these were applied naturally onto Mexicans as well.[7]

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[2] URBÁN, Aladár: *Dokumentumok az Egyesült Államok történetéhez, 1774-1918 (Documents of the history of the United States).* Tankönyvkiadó Press, Budapest, 1992. 93.

[3] URBÁN*:* 127.

[4] FARKAS, P. A.: *A „fekete legenda" árnyékában, Spanyolország és az Egyesült Államok kapcsolata, 1923-1930 (The shadows of the „Black Legend", USA-Spanish diplomatic relations between 1923 and 1930.* 2013. University of Szeged, Faculty of Humanities, Doctoral School of History. PhD Dissertation. 34.

[5] FARKAS: 33.

[6] FARKAS: 45.

[7] FARKAS: 55.

The New York Times

„How to tranqulize Mexico": Question of independence and foreign incursion

The first part of my work will be concerned about the articles in The New York Times, which directly or indirectly can be tied to the Monroe Doctrine. These writings are usually about real (ie. French invasion of Mexico) or perceived European threats to Mexico, USA, and the American continent in general, and the sought US retaliations.

The very first relevant article is from 1852. Listing the perils and issues faced by the young Mexican Republic, it mentions the greedy creditor, the „*brit Shylock*"[8]. This is also noteworthy, since this is the very first article in the pages of the Times, which threatens Mexico with US intervention, arguing that the country is drifting into chaos, but since such a warring nation cannot be the neighbour of the States, it shall intervene and restore order. I found much more relevant articles from 1854. In this year, the Conservatives rebelled against the Liberal administration, naming General Santa Anna as their leader and President of the country.[9] In 1853, he named himself dictator for life.[10] Between 1853 and 1855, he ruled the country as a dictator, attempting to abolish the federative government, and restore the feudal system of military and church privilege.[11] Soon however he made an enemy of the conservatives by planning to nationalize church properties.[12] The liberals on the other hand had been his enemies since a long time. The Times, in its first Mexican-themed article from the year (*Europe and Mexico, 1853*[13]) had correctly detected that the dictator vastly lost all his supporters and allies. However, from this they jumped to the hyperbolic conclusion, that the fear of US intervention will drive Santa Anna toward the Spaniards: a Spanish alliance or „*something more*" (probably implying colonialization). So – they continued – there is a real threat of Spanish invasion in Mexico, and re-establishment of Spanish rule over a

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[8] *'Mexican politics'*, The New York Times, 3 June 1855: https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1852/07/03/74861029.html

[9] FOWLER, William and FARÍAS, V. G.: *„Perceptions of Radicalism in Independent Mexico, 1821-1847"*. Bulletin of Latin American Research, Special Issue: Mexican Politics inthe Nineteenth Century, vol. 15, nº 1, 1996. 39–62. 13.

[10] NOLL, Arthur Howard: *„Porfirio Diaz"*. The Sewanee Review, vol. 14, nº 4, 1906. 4.

[11] HORVÁTH, Gyula: *A populizmus kialakulása Mexikóban* (Formation of Populism in Mexico). Kaposi Kiskönyvtár Sorozat Press, Kaposvár, 1996. 12.

[12] FOWLER – FARÍAS (1996): 39–62. 12.

[13] *'Europe and Mexico'*, The New York Times, 16 May, 1853: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res= 9801E2D91438E334BC4E52 DFB3668388649FDE

chunk of the American continent. So USA should intervene, in order to be true to the Monroe Doctrine. This was the first mention of the Doctrine in the Times regarding Mexico, but from now on, it will become a dominant feature n its argument.

In 1858, Mexico was once again ruled by Liberal Party, but Conservatives started to organize a revolt. The country was torn between the warring factions, and the civil war started, which is known today as the Reform War (1858-1861). In 1858, president of the country was the renowned statesman Benito Juárez[14], who sought to transform Mexico into a modern, industrialized and secular nation along his liberal and modernist principles. However Conservative elements of the society, especially the Army and the Church were alarmed by these new developments. In 1858, a group of conservative generals issued the *Plan de Yalpan* (Plan of Yalpan). Its main elements were: return of Santa Anna and his regime, along with preserving the traditional *fuerros*; the church and army privileges[15] (the Church supported the conspiracy, its power and wealth traced back to colonial times[16]). In the start of 1858, the Conservative General, Felix Zuloaga (a *„Spanish reactionary"* according to the Times[17]) took Mexico City, forcing Juarez into exile.[18] At this time, the Times had accused Washington of being too passive, and thus letting Mexico *„slip into the age of barbarism".* [19] The paper also argued that the war itself is threatening US economic and trade interests, and thus intervention is needed. They argued that USA should *„take Mexican matters into their own hand".* They call – for the first time – for protectorate, or some kind of civilisatory regime in Mexico. Times reasoned that since Mexicans are *„accustomated"* for authoritarian rule, they could not transform their country into democracy, thus they need US tutelage. Apart from the geopolitical needs of the US, their ideological argument is that Mexicans are to be civilized, and led to recognize the need for a democratic government. Another article from 1858 reported that Spanish and French battleships

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[14] HORVÁTH (1996): 14.

[15] HAMNETT Brian and DUNCAN Robert: *A concise history of Mexico.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. 6.

[16] SEMSEY Viktória: *Spanyolország és Latin-Amerika 19.-20. századi rövid története* (Concise History of Latin America and Spain during the 19-20th centuries). Zsigmond Király College Press-L'Harmattan Press, 2013. 323.

[17] *'Interesting from Mexico'*, The New York Times, 22 November 1858: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9F0CE2DD1639E733A25751C2A9 679D946992D7CF

[18] HORVÁTH Gyula: *Császárság Brazíliában és Mexikóban a függetlenség kivívása után* (Empire in Brazil and Mexico after the Independence). Világtörténet, Fall issue, 2005. 14.

[19] *Interesting from Mexico,* The New York Times, 22 November 1858.

are approaching the Mexican shores[20]. The French are preparing to invade Mexico, with the support of Mexican clergy, UK, and the Spanish, the piece said. The newspaper had bemoaned that Washington sits idly, while this putative intervention is a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Foreign troops are invading American shores, and the government does not do anything about it!-the article had stated. With its passivity, the *„even-handed government"* (of the USA) risks jeopardizing the Manifest Destiny itself. The threat of European intervention by now became a regular trope on the pages of the paper. The articles are concerned over the Monroe Doctrine, and US influence in Latin America. And the solution proposed by them, is almost always armed US intervention in Mexico. In these times the pieces usually added that Washington must back the Liberals against the Conservatives. Just like in 1859, when the paper again warned about European intervention[21]. The New York Times had argued that this (putative) invasion must be fended off again by US forces, because there is nothing which bars Washington from defending its citizens abroad, and enforcing Monroe Principle. Defending citizens and their properties is a recurring trope on the pages of the paper. However we can say that it is also a recurring one in a wider context. Invading powers very often use it to justify their actions. In the Times, it usually appeared without anything concrete, and always backed up the same conclusion: US intervention in Mexico is needed.

Furthermore, Times had also argued occasionally that the case of Mexico is important in a wider context: regarding spread of Liberal ideas in the American continent.[22] An article for example had stated that Mexicans are longing for Liberal Democracy, yet because of the blood-soaked history of their nation they were unable to attain it so far. And thus US must intervene, and bring it to them. That article warned Washington to refrain from full annexation, rather advising to create a kind of protectorate over Mexico. This would *„educate"* Mexicans until they are able to govern themselves in a democratic manner. According to the paper the Mexicans themselves await US Army (!) to bring them democracy, while Washington had been too passive in that matter so far. I must note that this article is so far the most open about the need and necessity of armed invasion of Mexico by the United States. And this one

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[20] *Important from Mexico*, The New York Times, 16 August 1858.

[21] *The news from Mexico*, The New York Times, 19 March 1859: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9E04E0D91E31EE34BC4C52DFB5668382649FDE

[22] *How to tranqulize Mexico* The New York Times, 6 August 1859: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B03E2D91F31EE34BC4E53DFBE668382649FDE

gives the most detailed programme of „*benevolent tutelage"*, while still refrains from annexation.

The very first remarkable article from 1860 declared that by that time all the European diplomacy had became servant of „*priestcraft and tyranny*"[23] The article „*reported"* that the French ambassador had ordered French troops to shell Vera Cruz. It furthermore had stated that not only the French, but also the Spanish and the British are supporting the Conservative Party. The article' author seemingly had only been appalled by the British support (since it is an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant nation), while reasoning that the French and the Spanish are all supporters of Rome. So here we can see how the anti-Catholic black legend played a part in evaluating diplomatic developments, as well as the prejudices against Hispanic and Mediterranean nations. All the European powers are ready to intervene in Mexico, and decrease US influence, but Washington is still passive, the paper had bemoaned, while urging US government to step up and support the Liberals in Mexico in order to fend off European threat.

It is important to note that these „*reports"* on putative European invasions turned out to be „*fake news"*, until 1861. In that year, the nightmare of the paper finally came true. The Juarez-government suspended debt service payment to European powers due to economic crisis in Mexico. The European creditors had answered by invading Mexico: French, British and Spanish forces landed on shores of the country. The New York Times naturally reported about the invasion amply, as it had vindicated their earlier fears. The paper had had the opinion that the debt payment is only an excuse by the European powers, since they never recognized the Juarez government, but the „*priest party"* instead.[24]

In 1862, Spain and the United Kingdom had made peace with Mexico (Soledad Treaty, 1862), and revoked their troops from the country.[25] In one article, the Times had noticed that the cause of this rupture is that Britain did not wish to strengthen Spain via this venture in Mexico.[26] According to another piece, the only reason why Britain had participated in this on the first place was to inflame tensions between its rivals, the

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[23] *Foreign diplomacy in Mexico*, The New York Times, 24 April, 1860: http://www.nytimes.com/1860/04/24/news/foreign-diplomacy-in-mexico.html

[24] *Affairs in Mexico*, The New York Times, 18 July 1861: http://www.nytimes.com/1861/07/18/news/affairs-in-mexico.html

[25] VILLEGAS Daniel Cosío, et al.: *A brief history of Mexico*. Eötvös József Press, Budapest, 2002. 85.

[26] *The affairs of Mexico: England seconds the idea of a Mexican Empire. The Spanish position defined why France is in the lead*. The New York Times, 16 February 1862: http://www.nytimes.com/1862/02/16/news/affairs-mexico-england-seconds-idea-mexican-empire-spanish-position-defined-why.html

United States and France.[27] However, whether the assumptions of the paper were true, or not, the French Empire continued the campaign nevertheless. Napoleon III saw it as an opportunity to make Mexico a vassal. Napoleon – with support of Mexican clergy and the Conservative Party – made Maximilian of Habsburg Emperor of Mexico[28], under name Maximilian the first in 1864. [29] The New York Times saw it correctly that initially the regime of the new Emperor lied solely on *„French bayonets".* [30] During this time the paper was vindicated in its belief that European intervention is a real threat, and European monarchies are enemies of all American constitutional republics. Their sole aim was in Mexico – the paper argued - from the very start to put Maximilian on the throne via *„Machiavellian scheme".* The article closed with the impressive and pathetic picture: the United States heroically stands alone in its fight against foreign *„evil"* and *„internal traitors"* (The Confederacy), but it will prevail nonetheless. [31] Another article openly threatened Maximilian with US armed incursion. It meant to the domestic readers, that NYT would back an support such step totally: *„He (Maximilian) also must know that the Monroe doctrine is one of the fixed policies of the United States; that this Republic will never recognize his rule, and that it will surely, sooner or later, put forth its gigantic power against him."*

According to an article, the French conquest in Mexico will turn the British on them, since they are not interested in Napoleon gaining more power. [32] I must note that the Times always tried to make a difference between the Catholic powers and Britain. It usually put its trust into the Protestant and Anglo-Saxon power, even when it is not rational to assume discord between these powers. The mentioned piece also warned that the French plan in Mexico *„is so monstrous, so against the regular order of human affairs as marked out by the God of Nature"*[33] that it can only end in failure. However to make sure it will happen, the Time advised the US to intervene.

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[27] *The French in Mexico,* The New York Times, 2 November 1862: http://www.nytimes.com/1862/11/02/news/the-french-in-mexico.html

[28] FOSTER Lynn V.: *History of Mexico,* Pannonika Holding Rt. Press, 1999. 85.

[29] VILLEGAS (2002): 85.

[30] *The Mexican Empire New Developments of French Policy,* The New York Times , 28 July, 1863.: http://www.nytimes.com/1863/07/28/news/the-mexican-empire-new-developments-of-french-policy.html

[31] *Maximilian's Acceptance of the Mexican Crown,* The New York Times, 2 September 1863.: http://www.nytimes.com/1863/09/02/news/maximilian-s-acceptance-of-the-mexican-crown.html

[32] *The French in Mexico,* The New York Times, 2 November 1862: http://www.nytimes.com/1862/11/02/news/the-french-in-mexico.html

[33] *The French in Mexico*, The New York Times, 2 November 1862

Another article[34] – which repeated the threat, but not remarkable because of it – compared the Mexican events to the Roman Revolution, which was suppressed by Napoleon III, who marched on Rome, overturned the rebel Republic of Rome, and reinstalled the pope. The paper argued that France will not be able to repeat it. And what is interesting is the reasoning: the people of Mexico are stronger than the people of Rome and the USA is also a more powerful nation than the nation of Italy. So Mexico relates to US, as Rome relates to Italy! And Rome is – obviously – part of Italy.

„Shall we have Mexico!”: Supporting annexation of Mexico by the USA

While annexationist point of view had become dominant on the pages of the Times much later, this approach had already appeared sporadically as early as 1852. For example an article, I have cited already, reasoned that the only possible solution to the problems of Mexico is full US armed invasion.[35] It proposed that after the conquest, Mexico shall either become a protectorate of the US, or fully annexed in order to *„elevate”* it.[36] While it did appear, pro-annexationism did not become dominant until the Reform War. The most detailed and clear pro-annexation article is from 1860.[37]

It starts out by laying out that more and more Republican politicians would back annexation of Mexico, as a compensation for loss of Southern trade (The Confederate States were already in formation in 1860. I must add that several articles accused it with supporting Mexican Conservatives and European interventionists.) Also they wish to prevent slave trade spreading into the southern neighbour by annexing it, because if USA does not annex it outright, the Southern slaver forces will expand their influence there. The article endorsed this approach, adding that it would be effective solution. But – it continues – the Mexicans themselves would not oppose Southern expansion, because *„in their backwardness and stupidity they would even support a force which destines them for slavery”*.[38] Thus in order to counter Southern influence, or conquest and *„slaver propaganda”*, US must annex Mexico. The Times had also charted out a plan for it. First Mexico should be made into a protectorate, and later fully annexed into the

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[34] *Maximilian's Acceptance of the Mexican Crown*, The New York Times, 2 September 1863.

[35] *Mexican politics*, The New York Times, 3 June 1852.

[36] *Mexican politics*, The New York Times, 3 June 1852.

[37] *Shall we have Mexico!,* The New York Times, 26 December 1860: http://www.nytimes.com/1860/12/26/news/shall-we-have-mexico.html

[38] *Shall we have Mexico!,* The New York Times, 26 December 1860.

USA, when *„Anglo-Saxon intelligence, energy, and liberty will bring order into chaos"*, and when that spirit will be able to make the *„Mexican bandits"* into dutiful workers.[39] The article had added that in order to be *„Americanized"* Mexico must accept US American capital and immigration, as well as free trade with the States. Thus we see again synergy between US values and economic interests. Furthermore the Times believed that US immigration and companies will somehow *„inject"* Protestant work ethic and American values into Mexican society. So Times had indeed actually believed that this scheme will benefit Mexicans as well, adding that it will not only *„civilize"* them, but help them to regain their wealth and well-being, stolen by the Spanish Empire during the colonial period. The article closes ita argument by declaring that if anyone opposes this, must deny also that Anglo-Saxon *„liberty"* is superior to Spanish *„despotism"*. This is of course not the case, so New York Times could declare: what is good for the US that is also good for Mexico!

Can Mexico be Americanized? Voices of relism

The zenith of Maximilian's rule is in 1865. It changed the opinion of the paper significantly. The first sign of it was an article from June of the mentioned year. It is from a local correspondent (*From Mexico*).[40] It shows novel and strong sympathy toward the Emperor, saying he feels sorry for him for applying for such tough job. The correspondent also recognized correctly that Maximilian is trying to push his own agenda, instead of the one of Paris. About Mexicans he thinks that the French struggle to civilize them, but it is not possible. Because – the very bigoted conclusion of the article goes – *„ M e x i c a n   r a c e   i s   s o   d e g e n e r a t e d   t h a t   i t   c a n n o t   b e   b r o u g h t   t o   f e e l   t h e   n e c e s s i t y   o f   (. . .)   a   g o o d   g o v e r n m e n t "*.[41] The article has no doubt: the same will happen to Mexico what happened to California. Mexican race will handle over its place to a more *„industrious and honest people"*. There is no doubt whom he thought of! The the article differs from the usual Times narrative at the point as it declared: The rule of Maximilian is a necessity for Mexico! Because, it reasoned, the US interest is first and foremost a strong and stable government in Mexico. And Maximilian seems fitting to this job. However it still had condemned Mexicans, whom now the paper accused with being passive

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[39] *Shall we have Mexico!,* The New York Times, 26 December 1860.

[40]   *From   Mexico*,   The   New   York   Times,   12   June   1865: http://www.nytimes.com/1865/06/12/news/mexico-imperial-army-suffers-severe-reverse -capture-tacambaro-with-its-entire.html

[41] *From Mexico*, The New York Times, 12 June 1865.

regarding their form of government: „*They know that they have to be whipped into the traces of law and order, and they don't mind who holds the whip".*[42] The conclusion of the article is very novel as it had declared that Maximilian's rule is both benevolent *and* necessary for Mexico. However it also warned that French must leave Mexico, but US must evade a war with Napoleon at all costs.

While the sympathy toward the „*young prince"* had appeared[43] in some other articles as well[44], opposing the French intervention had remained the dominant feeling of the paper. For example an article had warned that the Monroe Principle is applying to Mexico too, and thus US must intervene in order to fend off „*French bayonets".*[45] During the 60s, the New York daily had still occasionally resorted to alarmist reports. One correspondent for instance had warned about a putative plan by Maximilian of creating „*Confederate colonies"* in Mexico by selling valuable land to Southern settlers.[46] Obviously, we can see again that Times had hold the right of US citizens to gain economic leverage and land ownership in Mexico dear.

The next article I will analyse is titled „*Can Mexico be Americanized?".*[47] This article is again a turning point regarding the views of Times on Mexico. It had totally turned the tables on the previous, pro-annexation point, which was articulated most clearly in *Shall we have Mexico!* It develops furtherly the conclusion of *From Mexico*. This 1865 article (Can Mexico...) had pointed out that the most important goal is still to defend Mexico from European incursion. Yet it concluded that Mexico itself cannot become part of USA. It reasoned that it is the case, because in Mexico there are „*many mongrels".* Great number of „ *mongrel pop lation - - in the worst degree indolent, i norant , bigot ed a n d s uperstitious ".*[48] The more resourceful territories of Mexico are the Southern provinces, but there – the article reasoning goes – the climate is unbearable for White people. It is usually believed about the Anglo-Saxons what it is a „*colonizing nation, which has the spirit of endurance and adventure".* It is true, according to the article, but they added also that Anglo-Saxons have very few tropical territories: they could not really colonize tropical lands temporarily.

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[42] *From Mexico*, The New York Times, 12 June 1865.

[43] *From Mexico*, The New York Times, 12 June 1865.

[44] *From Paris*, The New York Times, 29 September 1863.

[45] *Mexico and the Monroe Doctrine*, The New York Times, 17 July, 1865.

[46] *The confederate colony in Mexico*, The New York Times, 12 November 1865.: http://www.nytimes.com/1865/11/12/news/the-confederate-colony-in-mexico-we.html

[47] *Can Mexico be Americanized?,* The New York Times, 16 June, 1865.: http://www.nytimes.com/1865/06/16/news/can-mexico-be-americanized.html

[48] *Can Mexico be Americanized?,* The New York Times, 16 June, 1865.

According to the Times, it is because the Anglo-Saxon is part of the „*Northern race*" according to the article, which struggles to expand southward, and cannot really do it. So, the article concluded finally, the real enemy in Mexico is the climate. This is why the US was never able to hold Mexican territories for a long time. They may will be able to capture Mexico, but Americainizing is not possible-the author answers his own question.

As the Liberal forces, led by Benito Juarez were gaining the upper hand in the war against the French and Maximilian, the paper had put its focus on how to end the conflict. One article had expressed its disappointment over the negligence of Washington over the issue how it could „*help*" ending the conflict.[49] Helping here is to be understood in the context of the approach of the daily on Mexico: US armed intervention. The reasoning of the article is that Juarez is still not powerful enough to win the war alone; however by the help of the USA it would be possible. According to this piece, the majority of Mexican population is composed of „*peaceful Indians",* however the merchant class is troublesome: it is verified by the fact that they supported Maximilian.

In this chapter we have seen how the Mexico-policy of The New York Times had evolved. From the idea of US protectorate over Mexico it got as far as advocating full annexation. However later it had deemed this idea unrealistic, marking a pro-Washington liberal republic as the ideal state of Mexico. Times never gave up however the idea of „*Americanization*" (at least partial Americanization) as we have seen. We must ask the question of why? Why Times sought that Mexicans shall copy US culture, or at least politics and institutions? Why it wanted their character to change? These are the questions; the next chapter may answer, by pointing out how anti-Mexican prejudices shaped the opinion of the paper.

Black Legend: „Catholic priestcraft" és „lazy Mexicans"

The first article, which highlighted these prejudices is from 1852, and I have already mentioned it.[50] It is listing the causes of the „*deplorable*" state of Mexico. However it also mentioned that President Mariano Arista had lived in the US, which – it seems – made him a more competent person in the eyes of The New York Times: he has an „*American side",* and so he „*is said to be destined to much greater things than the miserably constructed Mexican system has ever*

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[49] *The Proposition for American Meditation in Mexico*, The New York Times, 20 September 1867.

[50] *'Mexican politics'*, The New York Times, 3 June 1852.

allowed him to exhibit".[51] Thus the paper had elevated Anglo-Saxon culture to a superior state: solely living in the US apparently better a person. In a later article (*Europe and Mexico*), *The Times* had argued that because Santa Anna started negotiations with the Spanish Empire, he must have been planning to institute a Spanish, absolutist regime, and Mexico being a dictatorship is proof.[52] Thus, *The New York Times* equated Spain and dictatorships. There is no other proof to back it, than stating that his regime is dictatorial, thus equalizing tyranny to *„Spanishness"*. A later piece had even *„warned"* about putative plans of Santa Anna becoming Emperor of Mexico[53], while his military development programme (indeed styled after France) earned him the comparison to Napoleon I, arguing that dictators all over Latin America try to imitate the first emperor, who had great impact on the *„Spanish race"*. The article furthermore bemoaned that Santa Anna refused to sell land to US citizens, or to the United States itself, thus depriving the *„great Anglo-Saxon race"* from new opportunities. Times proposed that then it shall be taken from the Mexicans, by force, if necessary. It is important to write more about this component of the Times's ideology. The paper frequently warned about Mexico trying to sell land to Europeans, instead of US Anglo-Americans, as they *„should"* have done. The reasoning behind this is derived from the Positivist views on land. According to them, it does not belong to the owner, but rather to the one who can take it by force, and extract the most value from it, therefore making the more profit for the wider civilization.[54] And since the Mexicans are *„lazy Catholics"*, while the Americans are *„hard-working Protestants"*, land shall belong to the latter. This mentality is so pervasive that it even comes into play when the paper argues that US Americans should get a better understanding of Mexican culture. Because it reasons that they should understand more the culture that they will replace.[55] Because – the paper leaves no doubt about this – Mexicans will indeed be replaced by a *„more vigorous and enterprising race"*[56]. And we neither can have doubt to whom it refers to.

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[51] *'Mexican politics',* The New York Times, 3 June 1852.

[52] *'Europe and Mexico'*, NYT, 16 May 1853, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1853/05/16/75126544.html?pageNumber=4

[53] *General Pierce, and Mexico: From the London Examiner*, The New York Times, 1853. november 12.: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F10D16F63E5A147A8EDDAB0994D9415B8389F0D3

[54] HORVÁTH (1996): 16.

[55] *The Gadsen Treaty and Our Relations with Mexico*, The New York Times, 14 April, 1854: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9901E5D9153DE034BC4C52DFB266838F649FDE

[56] *The Gadsen Treaty and F Relations with Mexico,* The New York Times, 14 April, 1854.

Santa Ana was finally ousted in 1855 by the Liberal forces led by Ignacio Comonfort, staging a revolt according to the *Plan de Ayutla*. Ironically it did happened after the dictator finally giving in to US demands and selling a huge territory to Washington (Gadson Treaty), and this was the sparkle that inflamed the revolution, as the Liberals saw it as an ultimate insult to Mexican national pride. [57] Comonfort became the President, and saw to Liberal reforms. It had started a new age: the *reforma*.[58] Under the leadership of the next President, Benito Juarez, the reforms intensified: he created a National Guard, nationalized Church property, established state schools, improved civil rights, encouraged immigration from the US, and abolished the *fuerros*, the system of feudal military and church privileges.[59] During this period, as we have seen, the Times had generally supported the Liberals. For example it had called the encouragement of US immigration positive, while labelled its Conservative opponents „*hotheads*".[60] However we can still trace the pattern: the article had lauded exactly those laws as „*enlightened*" or „*intelligent*", which ones had enabled Mexican gains for US capital and personnel. It had also used tropes from the black legend, when stating that all these reform are necessary because Mexicans lack the adventurous and hard-working spirit of Anglo-Saxons.

However the Conservative movement could not been tackled by the Liberal government, which had led to the Reform War. I have discussed its questions above, now I will look into how the tropes of anti-Mexican and anti-Catholic legends were applied to this era!

An article had reported that the Conservatives are preparing to start a revolt, while accusing the Catholic Church, the French and the Spanish of backing it.[61] It furthermore had called envy a natural Mexican instinct. It is noteworthy to mention that three years before the actual invasion the Times had had predicted the 1861 invasion of Mexico.[62] However according to them, this (yet putative) invasion was not motivated by interests of great powers. Rather by the Catholic and absolutistic nature of the French and the Spanish. It had concluded that: their mentality is „*better suited to the military atmosphere of Paris than they are to the*

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[57] HORVÁTH (1996): 12.

[58] HORVÁTH (1996): 12.

[59] ANDERLE Ádám: *Latin-Amerika története* (The history of Latin Amerika). Pannaonica Kiadó, 1998. 103.

[60] *Affairs in Mexico,* The New York Times, 3 May, 1856.

[61] *Important from Mexico*, The New York Times, 16 August 1858: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F0DE4D61331EE34BC4E52 DFBE668383649FDE

[62] *French patronage of Mexico*, The New York Times, 7 January 1859.: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F00D1EFC3D5D12738 DDDAE 0894D9405B8989F0D3

ideas which are entertained by the Anglo-Saxon race, and that we are accustomated to call freedom". The article furthermore added that Mexico should become more like the USA, but it is impossible until the Church wields considerable power. It had argued that while European nations are less accustomated to constitutional form of government, so that may be true to the Mexicans as well, still they should get a chance to try it. In 1861, the long-anticipated European intervention happened, and *The Times* was right: British, French and Spanish troops arriving on Mexican shores aided the Conservatives. The first report about the new war (*„The War of French Intervention in Mexico"),* presented Benito Juarez, the president, as a statesman fighting to preserve religious and civil liberty who had previously defeated the *„Church party"* (Conservatives).[63] According to the article, the true friends of *„constitutional freedom"* rejoiced after his triumph as it seemed to ensure a splendid and prosperous future for Mexico. However, the foreign supporters of the *„Church party"* attacked Juarez. According to the report, Conservatives unleashed chaos through murder and mutiny. *The article* said: *„outside and inside"* enemies of Mexico are weak in numbers, but strong in their evil nature.[64] In brief: the paper presented the Conservatives—and not for the first time—as simple agents of the Catholic Church and the foreign invaders, pursuing their own selfish interests. However it is also important to mention that Times did not only painted Conservatives as agents of the Spanish, collaborators who had the same interests as Madrid. Rather they were presented as actual Spanish people, or at least ones in direct control of the Spanish Crown. For example in the article which states that Conservative forces are marching under Spanish flags, and seek to re-establish Spanish colonial rule.[65]

Another article is titled *„French patronage in Mexico"* (1861) is debated the mentioned French invasion of Mexico. In accord with the legend, Times suspected the machinations of the Catholic Church behind this very war, especially the (initial) Spanish partaking. We are speaking about essentially an expansive, colonial war. Yet the article try to show that it is not, or not just about political and economic gains, but rather about the Catholic and *„Latin",* thus bigoted and backward, absolutist character of the Spanish and French people and the Church. According to the article, the aim of Spain is to restore their own colonial, absolutist rule over Mexico, but somehow it is initiated by the Church. The French, on the other hand, are *„unsure"* (we know how wrong it is!), so they are

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[63] *'Affairs in Mexico'* NYT, 18 July 1861: http://www.nytimes.com/1861/07/18/news/affairs-in-mexico.html

[64] *'Affairs in Mexico'*, The New York Times, 18 July 1861.

[65] *Events in Mexico'*, The New York Times, 31 October 1861: http://www.nytimes.com/1861/10/31/news/events-in-mexico.html

pushed by the Church as well.[66] Another article from this year stated that the final aim of the intervention is to restore the *„rule of the Latin race"* over Mexico. So The New York Times usually suspected some kind of Spanish or Latin conspiracy backed by the Vatican and the Church in order to usurp Mexico. It is important to write about how the Times saw the British partaking in their venture. One hand, by mentioning the loss of British lives and property in Mexico, they quietly legitimized it, or at least tried to rationalize it.[67] Because it was again hard for them to understand: how can London assist the French and the Spanish in essentially *„resurrecting a Catholic empire"*?[68]

An article ('Events in Mexico') also reported that Conservative President Felix Zuloaga resigned from his post. The piece speculated that it was a sign of the then-regent Lucas Almonte gaining ground. Because of this, *The New York* accused him of attempting to restore Spanish rule in Mexico,[69] namely because, according to the reasoning of one article: the 'Church party', aka the Conservatives, convinced the Catholic Church that they could only rule Mexico via a new monarchy, and these intrigues were also successful in Madrid, so the Spanish would reinstitute the absolutistic and "clerical" rule in Mexico. [70]

In 1863, the Conservative Party had actually constructed a monarchic government. However, they were aided by the French instead of the Spanish. *The NYT* did not forget to report on these developments using ideologically loaded terminology. As the 'Council of Notables'—a body of notable Conservatives set to decide the future and fate of the state— started its session, the *paper* branded them a bunch of *„Mexican traitors and brigand chiefs"*.[71] Furthermore, the article found it amusing that a group of *„renegades and Jesuits"*,[72] as it called them, believed that they could decide on the form of government on behalf of the Mexican people. As the piece states: *„this is nothing more than a French agenda, resting on French bayonets. And a top of that they are trying to enthrone an Austrian prince!"*[73] Thus, the *Times* concluded that the

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[66] *Eve Events in Mexico'*, The New York Times, 31 October 1861.

[67] *The European Expedition against Mexico The Claims if France and England* 4 December 1861: http://www.nytimes.com/1861/ 12/04/ news/the-european-expedition-against-mexico-the-claims-of-france-and-england.html

[68] *The Mexican Empire New Developments of French Policy* 28 July 1861.

[69] *'Events in Mexico'*, The New York Times, 31 October 1861.

[70] *'Events in Mexico'* The New York Times, 31 October 1861.

[71] *'The Mexican Empire New Developments of French Policy'*, The New York Times, 28 July 1863, http://www.nytimes.com/1863/07/28/news/the-mexican-empire-new-developments-of-french-policy.html

[72] *'The Mexican Empire New Developments of French Policy'*, The New York Times, 28 July 1863.

[73] *'The Mexican Empire New Developments of French Policy'*, The New York Times, 28 July 1863.

process had no popular support whatsoever, and it would all collapse if the French troops pulled out. Still, the article admitted that this was a great triumph for Conservatives, who the article called the *„bigoted, retrogressive, monarchical priest party of Mexico".*[74]

Conclusion

To sum it up, I can say that the opinion of the articles during the time of my research sometimes diverged, and evolved as a whole, but it still shows a coherent image. The essence of this coherence is that The New York Times saw Mexico via lenses of US interests and values during the whole time. It was a totally Anglo-American angle. The most important priority was always the spread of US values, business interests, the defence of US interests and population in Mexico. The paper handled Mexico as a backyard of USA, Mexican issues debated as United States domestic matters. Another angle of coherence is that the articles saw Mexicans via Black Legend lenses. I must note that US interests and values, pragmatism and idealism here are the two sides of the same coin. The Times genuinely seemed to believe that Mexico must be Americanized and *„civilized"*, made into a Republic, with US-like constitutional structure. However they also thought that it can only be done via US tutelage, and spread of economic and political influence. The industrious and gifted Anglo-Saxon commands, and the stupid, simple Mexican obeys. In the end they both can enjoy fruits of this work. This system must hold until Mexico is americanized, at least politically. This idyllic picture is only threatened by European intervention, which shall always be fended off, in the name of the Monroe Doctrine, which the Times saw as some kind of dogma. But these rival powers are not only pursuing colonial ventures: they are part of the cultural struggle, clash of civilizations. They are the polar opposites of the superior Anglo-Saxon Protestant USA. Catholic European powers, primarily Spain and France are the embodiments of the Black Legend. They embody the original legend, not being so simple-minded and devout as Mexicans are: they are in fact power-hungry, cruel, violent, and ready to restore Catholic absolutism to Mexico. However there were also questions in which the opinion of the Times changed. Initially, the articles simply called for fending off European intervention, and representing US interests in Mexico. They were less concerned with the status of Mexico itself. Later they started to call for US protectorate than full annexation. They believed that the idyllic picture chalked up above can be achieved best by annexing Mexico totally, to be americanized. As we saw it peaked

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[74] *'The Mexican Empire New Developments of French Policy'*, The New York Times, 28 July 1863.

in „*Shall we have Mexico!*", but changed with „*Can Mexico be Americanized?*", in which article the paper abandoned annexationist position, admitting that the climate of Mexico, and its population is simply unfit to be fully Americanized. From this point the aim became political Americanization (constitutional republic as form of government), as well as fending off European influence, replacing it with the own system of the US. Finally The New York Times adopted the position of the Republican Henry Cabott Lodge. He argued that unlike the Democrats unfettered annexationism, the US must hold and consolidate its already annexed territories, and protectorates, but from onward must be more cautious regarding expansion (but „*From the Rio Grande to the Ice Sea there shall be only one flag!*"). Furthermore, the method shall be more economic than political or military. The US must undergo economic ventures (ie. Panama Channel) in the Caribbean and the Pacific areas, in order to spread its influence. This became the leading tenant of US foreign policy, which was shared by The New York Times, and remained leading policy almost until the Second World War.

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Second Part

Dömők Csilla[1]

Az egyesült Európa – történelmi gyökerek

Absztrakt

As all the victorious political concept, the concept of united Europe is diffuse. As a notion, it lacks strict definition, since its content is inexhaustible. Interpretations can be numerous and it offers different opinions which are not compatible with each other. The concept of Europe is against the status-quo of the nation-state, against dissipation, separation, against national egotism and antagonism, against the pursuit of autarky and hegemony. The elimination of these problems are desirable on the other side of the nation-state horizon. This is how the concept of the united Europe connects to the concept of global citizenship. Cosmopolitan features can also be traced in this process. It is not by mistake that Shiller's Ode to Joy („*Ode an die Freude"*), which is about making all the people brothers and sisters, is the official hymn of Europe, setting to music by Beethoven.

Keywords: European culture; identity; the concept of united Europe; global-state; common affairs;

Mint valamennyi győzedelmes politikai eszme, az egyesült Európa eszméje is diffúz. Fogalomként nélkülözi az élesen körvonalazható definíciót, mivel tartalma kimeríthetetlen. Számos értelmezésnek teret ad és egymással össze nem egyeztethető reményeket villant fel. Az Európa-eszme a nemzetállamok status quo-ja ellen irányul, a szétforgácsolódás, elkülönülés ellen, a nemzeti egoizmus és antagonizmus ellen, az autarkiára és hegemóniára való törekvések ellen. Ezen problémák felszámolása a nemzetállami horizont másik oldalán kívánatos. Így kapcsolódik össze egymással az egyesült Európa eszméje a világpolgárság eszméjével. Kozmopolita vonások egyaránt felismerhetők ebben a folyamatban. Nem véletlenül választották Schiller emberiséget egymás testvéreivé tevő *„Örömódáját"* („Ode an die Freude") Beethoven megzenésítésében a hivatalos európai himnusszá.

Az egyesült Európa ügye azonban mégsem a világ polgárságát érinti, mint ahogy az emberi jogok eszméje, amely valamennyi politikai, társadalmi és jogi különbözőséget megszünteti, és nem ismer országhatárokat, és az emberiség univerzumára vonatkozik. Az egyesült Európa nem egy világállam planetáris egységét jelenti, hanem egy az államiságon belüli csoport kontinentális egységét, még ha erre csupán egy az ehhez vezető út átmeneti állomásaként törekszünk is. Egy

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világállamban Európa eszméje egyértelmű. Az európai eszme a világpolgárság és a nemzetállam szembenálló tendenciái között mozog.[2]

Az egyesült Európa tehát nem egy kozmopolita légvár, hanem térhez kötött politikai eszme. Ebből adódik annak a kérdése, hogyan határozzuk meg ezt a politikai teret? Mit takar Európa?

Európa nem egy természetben létező földrajzi egység. Tektonikai és morfológiai adottságai önálló földrésszé teszik.[3] A földrajztudósok szempontjából Európa úgy került a földrészek közé, mint Pilátus a krédóba.[4] Riccolius már a 17. évszázad közepén kétségbe vonta, hogy Európa önálló földrész és hogy Ázsiával és Afrikával egyenrangú; Európát és Ázsiát sokkal inkább az egyetlen és legnagyobb földrésznek tartja, mivel közöttük nem lehet természetes és éles választóvonalat húzni[5]. Alexander von Humboldt Európában csak Ázsia félszigetszerű meghosszabbítását látta nyugat felé:

> Miként a Bretagne félsziget enyhe évszaknak megfelelő tengerparti klímája viszonyul Franciaország többi kompakt területeinek télen hidegebb, nyáron forróbb klímájához, úgy idomul bizonyos mértékben Európa Ázsia nagy szárazföldjéhez, melynek nyugati félszigetét képezi[6].

Herder véleménye szerint:

> Wäre Europa reich wie Indien, undurchschnitten wie die Tatarei, heiß wie Afrika, abgetrennt wie Amerika gewesen; es wäre, was in ihm geworden ist, nicht entstanden. … am meisten aber nutzen ihm seine Ströme und Meere. Nehmet den Dnjepr, den Don und die Duna, das schwarze, mittelländische, adriatische und atlantische Meer, die Nord- und Ostsee mit ihren Küsten, Inseln und Strömen hinweg; und der große Handelsverein, durch welchen Europa in seine bessere Tätigkeit gesetzt war, wäre nicht erfolget.[7]
> (Ha Európa olyan gazdag lenne, átszelhetetlen, mint Tatárföld, forró, mint Afrika, elkülönült mint Amerika; nem jöhetett volna

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[2] Friedrich MEINECKE: *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, 1907.

[3] Fritz MACHATSCHEK: *Europa als Ganzes*, IN: Oskar KENDE (Hrsg), *Enzyklopädie der Erdkunde*, 1929. 1ff.

[4] Oskar PESCHEL: *Neue Probleme der vergleichenden Erdkunde als Versuch einer Morphologie der Erdoberfläche*, 1876, 194.

[5] Riccolius, Joannes BAPISTA: *Geographia et hydrographia reformata,* 1661. 8.

[6] Alexander von HUMBOLDT: *Kosmos I, Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung* (1845), IN: U.A., *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 1., 1889. 1.

[7] Johann Gottfried HERDER: *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, Teil 4., 1792. 328. A tenger és az áramlatok miatti klíma és a földrajzi fekvés hatását és az európai népek különleges voltát az ázsiaiakhoz képest korábban már Montesquieu (Del'Esprit des Lois, 1748) is figyelembe vette.

létre az, ami lett belőle. … a leginkább azonban az itt uralkodó áramlatok és a tengerek hajtottak hasznot Európának. Távolítsuk el a térképről a Dnyepert, a Dont és a Dunát, a Fekete-, Földközi-, Adriai- és Atlanti-tengert, az Északi- és a Keleti-tengert azok partszakaszaival, szigeteivel és áramlataival; és a nagy kereskedelmi egyesülés sem jött volna létre, amely révén Európa jobb cselekedetre volt hivatott.)

A szellemi, gazdasági, politikai Európa valójában térbeli elhelyezkedésének – is – az eredménye. A mérsékelt övi klíma serkenti az emberi képességek aktivizálását. Ugyanakkor a szigorú és szűkös életfeltételek úgyszintén szükségessé teszik a tetterő aktivizálását. A gazdagon tagolt, kis területen elhelyezkedő vidékek kedveznek és táplálják a regionális individualitást és a kulturális sokféleséget.

Mindazonáltal nem vezetnek kulturális elkülönüléshez, mint azt Ázsia ősi magasan fejlett kultúráiban tetten érhető, mivel attól eltérően a természet nem állít áthidalhatatlan akadályokat az érintkezés elé. A térbeli differenciáltság lehetővé teszi a népek sokféle szimbiózisát, cseréjét, a nemzeti sorsok kölcsönös összekapcsolódását.

Ezt a fiziográfiai sajátosságot Európa azonban csak a „félszigetén” mutatja, amely a balti-lengyel szárazföldi hídtól nyugatra, mintegy a Baltikumtól a Duna torkolatáig húzódó vonalon helyezkedik el, ez alatt a „kelet-európai rész” ázsiai jelleget mutat: nagy kiterjedésű, távoli, egyhangú. A földrajztudósok „félszigetről”[8] beszélnek. Kulturális és geopolitikai értelemben ez a rész népszerűen Európa – természetesen óriási – előszobájaként szerepel, míg a tulajdonképpeni Európa mint „félsziget” jelenik meg, amely magába foglalja Nyugat-, Dél-, Közép-Európát és Skandináviát. Európát három oldalról természetes határok veszik körül, a tengerek. A keleti határvonal meghatározása mindazonáltal nem végleges és problémás. Ez a határ ugyanis az emberi szabad akarat műve, az európai földrajztudósok szemszögéből „egy számunkra szükséges, de a természetben nem indokolt választóvonal”. A görögök időszakosan a Dont (Tanaïs) vagy a Riont (Phasis) tekintették Európa keleti határának. Az évszázadok folyamán változott ez a határvonal, a földrajzi ismeretek mértéke és a politikai igények szerint. Majd csak a 18. évszázadban alakult ki konszenzus, amely az Uralt ismeri el határként. Európa kezdettől fogva ellenpontot jelentett Ázsiával szemben. Ennek megfelelően az antik világkép kelet-nyugati tengelyére[9] helyezhető el.

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[8] Vö. MACHATSCHEK: 2.

[9] Helmut BERVE: *Der Europa-Begriff in der Antike*, IN: U.A., *Gestaltende Kräfte der Antike,* 1949. 170–184.; Heinz GOLLWITZER: *Europabild und Europagedanke,* 1964. 18.; U.A.., *Europa, Abendland*, IN: Joachim RITTER (Hrsg.): *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Band 2., 1972. 824ff.

Az Európa szó az asszír erebre (sötétség, nyugat) vezethető vissza, míg Ázsia az açu (napkelte, kelet)[10] szóból alakult ki. Európa etimológiai eredete a mai földrésztől keletre fekvő civilizációjában található meg, mint például a mítosz, mely Európát keletre helyezi, a föníciaiak földjére, ahonnan Zeusz bika alakjában Európát, a királylányt Krétára menekítette. A görögök az Kr. e. 6. század óta az Égei-tengertől és a Fekete-tengertől nyugatra eső területeket *„Europe”*-nak nevezték, az Égei-tengertől keletre fekvő partvidék az *„Asia”* nevet viselte, míg a Földközi-tengertől délre elterülő partvidékeket a *„Libye”* (az olasz nyelvhasználatban *„Africa”*) elnevezéssel illették. Ezek az elnevezések a gyarapodó földrajzi tudással terjedtek el a mindenkori hátországban. A római világbirodalom a három földrészt a Földközi-tenger térségének politikai és kulturális egységévé fogta össze. Az idősebb Plinius így írta le a világ képét:

> *A szárazföld a következő három részre oszlik: Európa, Ázsia és Afrika. Nyugaton a gadesi szorossal kezdődik (sc. Gibraltári szoros), ott, ahol az Atlanti Óceán behatol és szétárad a belső tengerekbe. Innen jobbról Afrika, balról Európa, kettejük között pedig Ázsia terül el.[11]*

A kereszténység kisajátította magának ezt a világképet, azzal hogy a földközi tengeri kozmoszt Noé három fia utódainak tulajdonította: az ázsiai keletet Semnek, az afrikai déli vidéket Hamnak, az európai északot és nyugatot Japhetnak[12]. Az occidens (nyugat) és orient (kelet) közötti megkülönböztetés a Római Birodalom felosztásával politikai jelentőséggel bírt. A nyugati-latin és a keleti-görög világ között immár polaritás állt fenn. A keresztény hitre való áttéréssel ez a polaritás egyházpolitikai feszültségekkel telítődött, és ez a századfordulón skizmához, az egyházszakadáshoz vezetett, a görög-keleti kereszténység és a nyugati latin kereszténység kettészakadásához. Már a 4. században elterjedt nyugaton a latin nyelv, mint a liturgiák nyelve. A latinság és a papság köteléke túlélte, amikor a germán előrenyomulást követően a római birodalom szétesett. A latin kereszténységben kialakult az új vallási-kulturális egység, amely az idők során az Ibériai félszigettől a Baltikumig terjedt és román, germán, nyugat-szláv és más népeket is magába foglalt.[13]

Az Európa fogalom, amely a római korban a Földközi tengertől északra fekvő területeket jelölte a birodalomban, új politikai

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[10] Vö. MACHATSCHEK: 2.

[11] Caius PLINIUS: *A természet históriája*, Bukarest, 1973. III. rész, 118.

[12] Heinz GOLLWITZER: *Europabild und Europagedanke,* München, 1964. 13.

[13] Heinz GOLLWITZER: *Europa,* Abendland, 1972. 826.

tartalommal gazdagodott Nagy Károly, a *„Pater Europae”* uralkodása alatt, a frankok birodalmának megnevezéseként, amely messze a frank törzsek határain kívülre terjedt ki. *„Europa”* egyúttal a *„kereszténységet”* is jelentette és ezáltal Bizánccal szemben politikai-szellemi ellentétet képviselt. A Karoling Birodalom végén a *„terminus politicus”* veszített aktualitásából.

A latin világ nemzetek fölötti egysége azonban eleven maradt a Sacrum Imperiumban, amely követelése alapján a teljes Corpus Christianum-ot, azaz az egész kereszténységet (természetesen a nyugati egyházra korlátozódva) magába foglalta, bár ezzel a követeléssel csak szerencsés történelmi időszakokban tudott élni. A középkori Európa keresztény egységének megszépítő képe a romantikában politikai jövőképpé válik. Novalis ily módon írja le:

> *Szép tündöklő idők voltak, midőn Európa egy keresztény ország volt, midőn egy kereszténység honolt az emberi kéz formálta világrészben; s e tágas egyházi birodalom provinciáit egy nagy közös érdek kötötte egybe.*[14]

Nem csupán a középkori világ keresztény egysége bizonyul követendőnek a jövőt illetően, hanem a császár és pápa, a birodalom és egyház között fennálló polaritás differenciáltsága is. A Nyugat dualizmusában már léteztek a hatalom megosztásának és az államhatalom korlátozásának eszméi, amelyek majdan az alkotmányos államban öltenek intézményes formát. A latin kereszténység az ésszerűség jegyében történő önigazolási törekvésében előkészíti a talajt a racionalizmus és aktivizmus számára, melyek meghatározzák az újkor Európáját.

A késő középkor óta a birodalmi eszme erőtlenné válik, a nemzetek elfordulnak ettől. Ugyanakkor, ha kívülről, különösen az iszlám és a törökök felől általános veszély fenyeget, feléled az európai sorsközösségre való hajlandóság. A világkép, amely a négy földrészre való felosztást takarja, a 15. század második felében, az európai történelem *„tengelyidejében”* kapja meg lényegi sajátosságát, korszakos események időbeli konvergenciája révén. Konstantinápoly elbukik, a török szultán másodszor is meghódítja Rómát, az ortodox egyház és a cezaropápizmus központja átkerül Moszkvába, amely harmadik Rómává emelkedik fel; Granadát, az utolsó spanyol földön lévő muszlim birodalmat a Keresztény Királyok meghódítják; felfedezik Amerikát. A Földközi-tenger, amely az ókorban kulturális és geopolitikai középpont volt,[15] végérvényesen Európa határa lesz a muszlim Déllel és Kelettel

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[14] NOVALIS: *„A kereszténység avagy Európa”*, Attraktor Kiadó, 2014. 63.
[15] Fernand BRAUDEL: *Das Mittelmeer und die mediterrane Welt in der Epoche Phillips II.*, 1. Bd., dt. Ausgabe, 1990.

szemben. A „*tengereken hajózó*" Európa nyugati irányban folytatja hódításait, missziós és gyarmatosító törekvéseit, hogy az új kontinensen egy fiatalabb, nagyobb mását teremtse meg.

Három elementáris vallási erő alakította ki, mindegyik maga számára, az európai terület egy részét: a latin kereszténység, amely a reformáció idején szétvált ugyan, de nem bomlott fel, a keleti ortodox egyház és az iszlám.[16]

Ez a három erő történelmi eredetét tekintve ellenséges viszonyban áll szemben egymással. Az ellentétek a mai napig nem tűntek el. Nyíltan vagy tudat alatt továbbra is működnek a kulturális és politikai életben és rányomják bélyegüket a szellemi infrastruktúrára. A három vallást térségek és határvonalak követik, melyek államokon, etnikumokon és nyelveken túlmenően kulturálisan és politikailag tagolják a földrészt.

Az európai félsziget lényegében latin, míg a kelet-európai rész ortodox jelleggel bír. Mióta a keleti blokk börtöne megszűnt és a népek visszatértek az önrendelkezéshez, a lettek és észtek, a lengyelek és a csehek, a magyarok és a horvátok az európai nyugat értékközösségéhez tartozónak tekintik magukat. A Baltikum és Oroszország, Lengyelország és Ukrajna, Erdély és Románia, Horvátország és Szerbia hajdani vallási határai politikai és kulturális vízválasztónak bizonyulnak. Európa szellemi infrastruktúrája visszanyúlik a valláshoz. A vallási származás ugyanis hatást gyakorol a nemzetek és államok szekuláris megalapozottságára és elkülönülésére. Ez alakítja a kontinens átfogó nagytérségeit.[17]

A Balkánon három alapvető vallási irányzat találkozik. A régi ellenségeskedések nem szűntek meg, a politikai és kulturális ellentétek nem enyhültek. Ezek miatt lángolt fel a jugoszláv polgárháború a katolikus horvátok, ortodox szerbek és a muszlim bosnyákok között. Etnikai és nyelvi különbségek nincsenek. A jugoszláv államban 17 évig tartó kényszerszövetség létezett. Az oktrojált történelem azonban nem képez köteléket; az egykor heterogén népek nem olvadtak össze egy jugoszláv nemzetté. A jugoszláv állam, amely valójában egy nagy-szerb hegemonikus állam volt, a despotizmus eszközeivel nyomta el az ellentéteket. A politikai szabadság feltételei mellett ugyanakkor újfent egy nem várt, iszonyatos erő kel életre. Jugoszlávia szétesése tanulságul szolgál Európának: a politikai egység lehetősége a régi vallási törésvonalakon ér véget.[18]

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[16] Karl Dietrich ERDMANN: *Die Revolution Mitteleuropas*, IN: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 41* 1990. 523.

[17] A nagytérség (Großraum) fogalma, mint egy az állam és nemzetközi jog szerinti világrend közötti absztrakciós szinten lévő kategóra Carl Schmittől származik (*Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte*, 1943.; U.A.: *Der Nomos der Erde,* 1950. S. 207ff.

[18] Csilla DÖMŐK: *Europa der Nationen und Regionen – eine Geschichte von Einheit und Identität,* Berlin, 2018. 11–33.

Európát, mint földrészt nem egy közös szociokulturális kötelék alkotta és tartja össze. Három szociokulturális nagytérségre oszlik fel, melyek államközösségeket és népcsoportokat takarnak.

Ezek azonban a kontinensen kívülre is kiterjednek. A latin államközösség megfelelőjét megtaláljuk az Újvilágban. A szövetségi állam közös hagyományai, értékei és szerkezete kötik össze a nyugat-európai és az észak-amerikai államokat euro-atlanti alkotmányos közösségé. Az ortodox kulturális térség nem ér véget az Uralnál, az iszlám sem a Boszporusznál. Oroszország és Törökország, az államok, melyeken belül ezek a politikailag irreleváns földrajzi határok húzódnak, messze Ázsiáig nyúlnak. Az iszlám szemszögéből az európai körzetek csupán a muszlim világ parányi előretolt állásai. Az Európa-fogalom kulturális és földrajzi értelemben nem vág egybe, ez az inkongruencia válik világossá Nietzschénél:

> Most, amikor a 'modernség' és 'európaiság' fogalmán szinte ugyanazt értik, Európán sokkal inkább tájegységeket értünk, mintsem azt, amit Európa geográfiai értelemben foglal magában, Ázsia kis félszigetét: ugyanis Amerika is hozzátartozik, amennyiben kultúránk leányországa. Másrészt 'Európa' kultúrfogalma nem fedi le az egész Európát; hanem csak azokat a népeket és a népek azon részeit, melyek közös múltja a görög, a római, a zsidó és a keresztény kultúrában gyökerezik.[19].

Hogy mit jelent Európa, azt mindig is kizárólag az európai állampolgár határozza meg. Ez a lényegi különbség az Európa-fogalom és a többi kontinens- fogalmak között: Európa saját magát határozza meg, míg más földrészeket Európán keresztül definiálnak. Európa, csakis Európa rendelkezik definíciós képességgel.[20] Kanttól kölcsönözve: Európa nem transzcendens, hanem transzcendentális nagyságú. Nem létezik *„Európa önmaga"*, hanem csak abban a formában, ahogy az európaiak fejében és szándékaik szerint ez megmutatkozik.

Európa azáltal teremti meg saját identitását, hogy a földrészként jellemzi magát és más földrészektől elhatárolja azt, melyekkel – bármennyire is különbözni akarnak egymástól – közös az a tulajdonság, hogy azok nem Európát jelentik. A nem európai földrészeket lényegében Európával fennálló viszonyuk révén határozzák meg.

Ez érvényes más világtájakkal szembeni viszonyokra is, mint például

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[19] Friedrich NIETSCHE: *Emberi, nagyon is emberi*, II. kötet, 2012, 213.
[20] Josef ISSENSEE: *Europa – die politische Erfindung eines Erdteils, in: Europa als politische Idee und als rechtliche Form* (Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Reden zur Philosophie, Politik und Geistesgeschichte, Bd. 19.) 1993. Dunker&Humblot Verlag, Berlin, 103−135.

a Kelettel, Közel-, Közép- és Távol-Kelettel, keleti és nyugati földgömbbel. A Szuezi-csatorna két földrészt szel ketté, nem utolsó sorban amiatt, mivel abban a Földközi-tenger keleti és déli partjai, Európa túlsó partjai találkoznak. Európa észak-keleti határa nem a földrajzi felfedezések mértéke szerint változik, hanem a kulturális és politikai közösség ügyének eszméje szerint. Mióta Oroszország Nagy Péter uralkodása alatt nyugat felé fordul és mióta a korai Európa államai azt hozzá hasonlóként ismerik el, Európa határa a Dontól kitolódik az Urálig. Ettől fogva ez a hegyvonulat választja el a földrészeken átnyúló birodalmat uralkodó és gyarmatosított részekre, művelt és vad népekre, az államilag közvetített civilizáció adományozójára és az ezt igénybe vevőkre. Európa: olyan, mint a *"jó"* társadalom, amely elkülönül az átlag társadalomtól és dönt arról, hogy ki tartozzon hozzá és kinek van hozzáférési joga, ki marad rajta *"kívül"*[21].

Európa tehát az európaiak öntudatának a kérdése. Elsősorban csak a mérvadó (szubjektív) szempont kérdése, nem az (objektív) jelentőségé. Az öntudat nem jelenti szükségszerűen önmaga túlértékelését. Az Európa-kategória egyúttal magában foglalja annak igényét, hogy a saját mérce a közös mérce is legyen egyben. A történelem folyamán Európát az igaz hit, a műveltség, a képzettség, a szabadság, a tudományos és technikai, a társadalmi és politikai haladás birodalmaként értelmezik.[22]

Európa azonban nem csak maga elé állít mércét, hanem a világnak is. Európa felvállalta az emberiség egyfajta szellemi reprezentációs feladatát. Fejlődése az emberiség fejlődéséé is, azonos az emberiség sorsával. A géniusz, aki Hölderlin szerint országról országra vándorol, egyik kontinensről a másikra jut el. Herder az *"Eszmék az emberiség történetének filozófiájáról"* című művében a kultúra genealógiáját mutatja be, amely Ázsiából és Egyiptomból Görögországba és Rómába és ezáltal Európába helyeződik át; itt ugyanakkor a történelem *"zu Humanität und Vernunft, die mit der Zeit den Erdball umfasst"* humanitáshoz és értelemhez vezet, amely idővel felöleli a földgolyót".[23]

Ha az újkor Európája az Égei-tengert és a török tengerszorosokat szabja meg saját határaiként, akkor Európa elszakad szellemi eredete tereitől; Jeruzsálem szent helyeitől, melyek visszaszerzéséért a középkorban keresztes hadjáratokat indítottak, az ókeresztény zsinatok helyszíneitől és a kappadókiai egyházatyáktól, Homérosz és Hérodotosz, Héraklész és Thalész görög hazájától, a költészet és

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[21] Hans HINTERHAUSER: (Hrsg.): *Spanien und Europa,* 1979.

[22] Európa önértékelését hatásosan ábrázolják a (négy) földrész allegóriájaként, mint ezt a barokk festészet kedvelte. Rubens, Pozzo, Tiepolo, és sokan mások Európának tulajdonítják a többi földrész feletti szellemi és politikai hegemónát.

[23] Vö. *Herder*: 318.

történetírás, a filozófia és Európa természet-kutatása kezdeteitől.

A felvilágosodás korában Európa öntudata csúcsára ér: az, hogy Európa, még ha a természet és a történelem kegye által is, főként magának köszönheti jelentőségét. Következésképp Európa dicsősége a tettein és találékonyságán, a tudományokon és az együttes, versengő igyekezeten alapszik.[24] Európát még az évszázad elején *„az emberi fejlődés mozgatójaként és elősegítőjeként"* értelmezik, amely egy európai világkultúrára vezethető vissza; vezető hatalomként, amely *„nem csak politikai túlsúllyal, hanem a földkerekség fölötti szellemi és gazdasági hatalommal is"* rendelkezik; a világgazdaság nagy műhelyeként és egyúttal nagy kereskedelmi piacaként. Az európai gyarmati hatalmak imperializmusa nem csupán azok öncélú hatalmi és gazdasági érdekeiken alapszik, hanem a küldetéstudaton is, hogy a világban terjessze és biztosítsa az európai szellemiséget, és hogy a Kipling által magasztalt heroikus büszkeséget *„the white man's burden"*-t képviselje.

A politikai és gazdasági világuralom szétesik a második világháborúval. Megmaradt az európai kategóriák világuralma. Az *„one world"*, amely az európai gyarmati hatalmak felbomlása után és az új ázsiai és afrikai államok megalakulása után létrejött, európaizált világnak bizonyul, amely magát természetszerűleg túlnyomórészt az új államok autochton erőivel szemben, szembenállóként határozza meg. Világszerte elfogadott ma a (*„modern"*) állam európai koncepciója és az európai nemzetközi jog, amely az államfogalomra épül fel.

Európa világhatalma 19. században elért tetőpontján, amely az európai nemzetállamok virágkorával esik egybe, a közös európai jólét néha érvként jelenik meg a külpolitikában. Míg az európai hatalmak együttműködését nem külső zavar veszélyeztette, míg Párizstól Szent-Pétervárig a vezető réteg, valamennyi nacionalista hangulat dacára is, európaiként homogén volt életvitelben, etikában, műveltségben, a nemzeti ügyek kiegyensúlyozása nem igényelte a kontinentális szolidaritáson alapuló helyreállítást.

Egy kortárs ebből az időszakból élesen utasította vissza a nemzetállamot és megalkotta az egyesült Európa radikalitás tekintetében nem felülmúlható vízióját: Friedrich Nietzsche. Nem tudott eleget tenni, hogy a *„Väterländerei-t"* (hazafiaskodást) és *„Schollenkleberei-t"* (a röghöz való ragaszkodást) mint az évszázad betegségét gyalázza, a *„nacionalista szájtépés és vérfertőzés, ... melyek miatt Európában jelenleg a népek szinte karanténba zárják egymást, egymás elől"*[25].

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[24] Vö. *Herder*: 328, 329.

[25] Friedrich NIETSCHE: *A vidám tudomány*, 1997. 308.

A nacionalizmus végét feltartóztathatatlannak tartja, már a kereskedelem és közlekedés következményeként és hatásaként is. A nemzetek és fajok megsemmisülése *„egy új, Európa fölött uralkodó kaszt kitenyésztése révén"*[26], megy végbe, *„folytonos kereszteződésekkel"* az *„európai ember"* megteremtéséig. Ha csak az Oroszország felől érkező fenyegetést tekintjük, amely Ázsia előlegezett bosszújává vált, Európának el kell határoznia magát, hogy hasonlóképpen fenyegetővé váljon, *„nämlich einen Willen zu bekommen, durch das Mittel, einer neuen über Europa herrschenden Kaste, einen langen, fruchtbaren eigenen Willen, der sich über Jahrtausende hin Ziele setzen könnte – damit endlich die langgesponnene Komödie seiner Kleinstaaterei und ebenso seine dynastische Vielwollerei zu einem Abschluss käme. Die Zeit für kleine Politik ist vorbei: schon das nächste Jahrhundert bringt den Kampf um die Erd-Herrschaft – den Zwang zur großen Politik"* vagyis késztetést érezzen arra, hogy egy új, Európa felett uralkodó kaszt eszközével, hosszantartó, termékeny saját akarat révén, amely évtizedekre célkitűzést nyújt – végre kisállamisága komédiája és dinasztikus többre vágyása véget érjen. A kispolitika ideje lejárt: már a következő évszázad meghozza a Föld feletti uralomért folyó harcot, a nagypolitika kényszerét...."[27]

Az egyesült Európa, amelynek Nietzsche víziójában le kellene győznie a nemzetállamot, magában véve egy kontinentális méretű nemzetállam volt, mely a nemzetállam valamennyi bűnét utolsó, hibrid konzekvenciává fokozta: a leigázásra, sovinizmusra, militarizmusra, imperializmusra való hajlandósággá. A második világháborút követően az európai államok hatalmának megszűnésével megkezdődik az európai eszme felemelkedése. Tegnap még politikai romantika, intellektuális reflexió és spekuláció,[28] mostantól pedig ez az eszme ösztökél gyakorlatias hatékonyságra.

A körülmények szorításában az európai államok egyesülése jelenik meg, mint egyetlen kiút. A hagyományos nacionalizmus halogatva fordul szembe ezzel. Ugyanakkor ez a szembefordulás gyenge és hitelét vesztett, miután az a nemzetállamokat katasztrófába rántotta. A régi nemzeti ellentéteket elfedi a kelet-nyugat konfliktus. Európát annak veszélye fenyegeti, hogy az Európán kívüli hatalmak érdekszférájává degradálódik. Az egykori nyugat-európai gyarmatállamok tengerentúli birodalmaikat elveszítve egyúttal visszavetve érzik magukat európai egzisztenciájukban.

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[26] Friedrich NIETSCHE: *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* 1986. IN: U.A., Werke, Bd. II., 1963. 563.

[27] U.o. 672.

[28] Paul Michael LÜTZELER: *Die Schriftsteller und Europa – Von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart,* 1992.

Az egyesült Európa hatalmas vízióvá emelkedik az új kezdet reményével. Ehhez reálpolitikai érdekek társulnak. Európa államai megértik, hogy politikai, gazdasági és katonai téren csak akkor tudnak helytállni, ha közösen cselekszenek. A közös örökséget felidézve új, európai öntudat ébred a legyőzött népekben. Külső körülmények nyomására arra a kérdése, hogy valójában mi is Európa, magától születik válasz. Európa azon országokból áll, melyek – földrajzilag – a vasfüggönytől, amely a kontinenst a világ-konfliktusban kettéosztotta, nyugatra vannak, és amelyek – politikai szempontból – a nyugat alkotmányos családjához tartoznak. A most formálódó Európa az Atlanti-óceán felé tekint, és hátat fordít keletnek.

A nyugati Európa államai eltérő konstellációban viszonyulnak a megállapodásokhoz és a közös intézményekhez. Az inkongruens szövetségekben azonban meg kell jelölni a legkiválóbb magot, a hat alapító államot, mint európai magot. A primer politikai megegyezés, amely megelőzi a többi egyezményt, és amelytől az összes többi függ, az a Németország és Franciaország közötti megegyezés. Az Európai Gazdasági Közösség, amely kifelé és befelé egyaránt növekszik a tagállamokat, hatásköröket és integrációs koncentrációt tekintve éppenséggel európai szervezetté vált, Európa mérvadó jogi normájává. *„Európa”* a szervezett Európai Közösség szinonimájává vált.

Az Európai Közösség számára megkérdőjeleződik saját európai jellege, mióta Törökország a kapui előtt áll és (teljes) tagként bebocsáttatást kér. Földrajzi szempontból államterületének egy részét tekintve Európához tartozik. Mindazonáltal az államszövetségbe való felvétele ezért még nem kötelező. Megfordítva, a felvétel nem azért hiúsul meg, mivel Törökország Európában fekvő területe az ország összterületének csupán 3 %-át teszi ki. Az Európához való tartozás ugyan a csatlakozás szükséges feltételének számít; ugyanakkor nem ez jelenti az elegendő feltételt. A szocio-kulturális állapot számít érdemlegesnek. Ez azonban nem szükségszerűen igazolja, hogy Törökország az európai államközösség része. Atatürk fentről irányított forradalma ugyan állami és társadalmi rendjét tekintve a nyugat felé fordította az országot (mint 200 évvel ezelőtt Oroszországot Nagy Péter) és eltérítette az iszlám hagyománytól. Azonban minél hatékonyabban fejlődnek ki a nyugati demokrácia jogi formái, annál inkább tudnak érvényesülni az elnyomott autochton erők, megelevenítik az oszmán múltat és felidézik az iszlám világ egységét.

A szovjet totalitárius kényszeruralom bukása után felszámolták Európa – világpolitikai szempontból tekintve – keleti határát. Európa politikai földrajza alapjaiban változott meg. A szocializmus népbörtönétől megmenekült népek sem tekintik magukat kelet-európainak; hanem közép-európainak. A lengyelek és csehek sem vallják magukat kelet-európainak; hanem közép-európainak.

A kulcsszó: európai homogenitás. Itt a közös ügy minimumáról van szó, amit valamennyi szövetségnek el kell várnia a tagjaitól. Ezt az alapot kiépítheti, megújíthatja és erősítheti, de nem helyettesítheti azt. Ezt a minimumot a szövetség teljesen nem nélkülözheti.

A homogenitás a szövetségi állam alapkategóriájába tartozik. Ez az államforma, amely a regionális egyenlőtlenséget legitimálja és a sokszínűséget az egység alapjaként védelmezi, előfeltételezi valamennyi állami szerv egyetértését az összállami egységről és a fundamentális alkotmányos értékeket és az alkotmányos struktúrákat illetően[29]. A homogenitás egy bizonyos foka nélkül egy állam sem képes működni. A politikai egység szándéka, amely egy népcsoportot néppé, mint nemzet enged válni és ezáltal a demokratikus önmeghatározás lehetséges alanyává, objektív adottságokhoz köthető, mint a geopolitikai helyzet, a gazdasági érdekek, történelem, nyelv, civilizációs normák, erkölcs, kultúra, vallás.

Az ismérveket nem lehet teljességgel felsorolni. Ezek nem ugyanazok minden nemzet esetében, és nem ugyanazon súllyal bírnak az egyes nemzeteknél. A nemzet nem egy természeti képződmény, hanem a politikai akarat produktuma. Ezt azonban a reális körülmények alakítják és határozzák meg. Politikai egyezségek és szakítások a helyzet hatalmára adott reakciók – is. A politikai egység szándékának a közösségben rejlenek okai és tényezői, vagy azokban keresi igazolását. Egy autokratikus államban a nép belső összetartása nem játszik szerepet, mivel az államegységet az uralkodó réteg garantálja. A demokrácia ugyanakkor életképes, ha a nép, mint aki a hatalmat gyakorolja belső konzisztenciát mutat, a politikai egység szándéka összetartja és ez az akarat elegendő homogenitás-alapra talál.[30] Csak ezzel a feltétellel viselhető el a kisebbség számára a többségi uralom.

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[29] Carl SCHMITT: *Verfassungslehre,* 1928. 376.
[30] Josef ISSENSEE: *Abschied der Demokratie vom Demos, in: Festschrift für Paul Mikat*, 1989. 705.

Csilla Dömők

Development of regions in the European Union

Abstract

Regions of Europe had already played a significant role in Brussels prior to the Maastricht Treaty. The regional policy of the European Community, aiming at economically disadvantaged areas or underdeveloped peripheral areas, has been a classical sector of intense activity of the Community. However, some politicians and scientists are rather sceptical concerning the results. Regions tried to enforce their interests via their own institutional relations with EU institutions (information offices) and through top organisations such as the Assembly of the European Regions. The European Community supported cooperation between different European regions and cross-border cooperation in their joint efforts to solve problems and complete their tasks. It is debated however, as it is expected in the case of various subnational units, what the notion of European regions means. For some, it is a code word, which defines the EU exclusively from the side of provinces and regions and passes a sentence upon the nation-states concerning their termination before long. Others interpret this notion as a phase which only makes us remember the existence of subnational units in the organised Europe, and it does not have any constructive role otherwise[1]. These two extreme views do not comply with the definition which we intend to describe as the regions of Europe.

Keywords: European cooperation; subnational; decentralisation; regionalism; region;

No doubt, Europe has been radically transformed. Revival of both the regional movements and the micro-regional units can be viewed at the same time. Political, economic and cultural thinking and acting about the subnational unity of the countries has cut its way mainly in Europe. Regional movements demand greater autonomy for their sphere of power and area of influencing. Force has been used to reach separation in certain areas. Different points of reference concerning geographical, ethnical, linguistic, religious, cultural, historical or economic dimensions have been chosen, in order to demarcate an area and mark it as a region. Common features shared by the people of a region create a feeling of special unity and regional identity. The extremely wide range of regions within the European Union has great significance regarding the legal status, competence and financial

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[1] Dirk GERDES: *Regionalismus, als soziale Bewegung*, Frankfurt/New York, 1985.

resources as well as the political quality of the subnational units.

Besides areas demarcated simply by geographical boundaries, one can find districts endowed with administrative authority up to member states having state regulatory and financial powers. Based on this diversity different terms are needed such as region, province, autonomous community, district and zone. In the meantime, in the political and scientific discourse, regions are interpreted as functional elements of nation-states. This notion denominates the level below the federation and above the community. In general, territorial differentiation of the EU member states can be traced, which manifests in the tendencies of decentralisation, regionalisation and federalism.

Rather it is an organising principle which is not defined as an accurate legal term, but it is clearly circumscribed politically. The provinces, regions and autonomous communities pursue to develop a third level in the EU. The „*first floor*" of the house of Europe must be maintained for the regional organisational level, while the „*ground floor*" includes the settlements, cities and districts. The EU member states and communities build the communal and regional level upon this solid base.

The three level Europe fulfils the ever increasing economic and political role of the last decades as well as the cultural characteristic of regions, provinces and autonomous communities. This development reflects upon the advanced self-awareness of the citizens living in the subnational units of the EU member states. Some, centrally organised nation-states of the EU must calculate with this change, from the processes of decentralisation and regionalisation to the ambitions aiming at federalisation.

There is no conceptual contradiction in the goals of the European Regions regarding regions on one hand and nation-states on the other. According to the Treaty on the EU, the national identities of the member states are values that must be protected. The provinces and regions are not alternatives to the nation-states but rather their complementary.

Significant changes can be witnessed today in the European Union. Regions have been competing with each other for long in order to gain comparative advantage and to have European subsidies, but only member states act on the political level. This was a classical foreign policy approach, which indicated that the governments of the member states were the only actors of the interstate stage. „*Europe of the nations and regions*" was an unthinkable expression in the political debate of Europe. Regions were disregarded from the political point of view. There were only administrative units under the level of the member states.

Organising the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe

is a milestone in strengthening European regionalism. This is the advisory panel of the Council of Europe. Its main task is to support the new Central and Eastern European member states concerning the configuration of efficient self-government on the regional and communal level. It also articulates the regional and communal values in shaping the policies of the Council of Europe.[2]

It is more and more obvious that the European policy is not a classical foreign policy. It has long been turned to a European domestic policy. Around fifty percent of each and every important political decision is not decided in Munich, Bonn or Berlin, but in Brussels. Over seventy percent of the decisions in the economy and eighty percent in the agriculture are estimated to be arranged leastwise in Brussels. These decisions do not exclusively concern the member states, but regions as well, to a great extent. This is valid to all the political areas practically. Starting with agriculture, environment protection through tenders and broadcasting to internal security. Thus if regions want to take their responsibility towards their citizens, they need to participate not only in the classical domestic politics within the state, but in the „new" European domestic politics too, which is „made in" Brussels.[3]

Establishing the Assembly of the European Regions (ARE) was a breakthrough in acknowledging regionalism on the European level. However, ARE has only one advisory vote, still, it is the first time when the so called „third level" has taken part institutionally in the EC legislation under the level of EU and the member states. ARE started working in 1994. The result was an obvious change in opinions in Brussels. Most of the European regions operate information offices or representation agencies in Brussels. The mediator role of the regions between the EU and the citizens has become more and more important.[4]

The significance of regionalism in the EU must be more differentiated. On one hand: regional structures in the EU member states differ. On the other hand: they face Europe with new challenges, which soon can change the already existing division of power permanently.

Diversity in Europe exists as a living proof in the different regional structures of the EU member states. This affects, for example, the

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[2] Wolfgang CLEMENT: *Auf dem Weg zum Europa der Regionen*, Baden-Baden, 1991. 15–16.

[3] Hermann LÜBBE: *Die große und kleine Welt, Regionalismus als Europäische Bewegung,* IN: WEIDENFELD, W. (kiadó) *Die Identität Europas*, München, 1990.

[4] Wilfried LOTH: *Der Weg nach Europa,* Göttingen, 1996, Csilla DÖMŐK: *A régiók fejlődése és a szubnacionális mobilizáció az Európai Unióban*, Közép-Európai Közlemények Nº 48–49. 279–289. Szeged, 2020.

representation of regions in the constitutional law, recording the rights of regions in the constitutional law as opposed to the state level, competencies of the regions in the areas of jurisdiction, administration, domestic regional constitution, economic laws and in taxation. We can differentiate regions based on their positions in the constitutional law. We can differentiate regions based on their position in in the constitutional law: – federal states, including Germany, Austria and in the meantime, Belgium, – „*regionalised*" states, such as Italy or Spain, – „*decentralised*" states such as France, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Finland, – „*Unitarian*" states, such as Denmark, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg.

The excessively different legal status of the regions in the state structure of the EU member states results in dissimilar possibilities for the regions to make a difference in the European politics. In Germany, for example, the 23rd paragraph of the Constitutional Law is available for the provinces, promoting the participation of the provinces in the EU legislation. By that, the provinces can effectively be involved in the Europe-policies of the Federal Government via the Federal Council. 23rd paragraph of the Constitutional Law guarantees the provinces to get involved in shaping the European treaties, by actively participating in the so called government conferences. During the debate of the Amsterdam Treaty, the former head of the Bavarian State Chancellery represented the German provinces in the German delegation, as one of the delegates of the Federal Council.

Other European regions mostly dream of participating in the international European politics in such ways. Many times only informal ways are available to take an effect on their own governments. This means that they are depending on their own government's goodwill, if they want to enforce their specific interests in the Council. There is only one tool equally available for all the EU's regions: that is the Assembly of the European Regions. That is why establishing it was a breakthrough on the European level. The goal regarding the conference series of European Regions initiated by Bavaria in the 80s was to create such a regional committee.

Different legal status of the regions within the state is a potential problem, when the unified representation of interest of the European „*third level*" is the issue. We can state, that some regions, which are consoled by central governments, tend to demand more competencies for the EU in certain circumstances in order to take these competencies from their central government. Referring to the saying freely: The enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Awareness concerning the issue of subsidiarity is not a typical feature in the regions with little scope. These are the regions where the

consciousness is extremely low concerning the fact that subsidies from Brussels are not always a real bless. This is more highlighted when the political area, where regions operate is significantly restricted and the regions are walked by a golden leash through the promised subsidies.[5]

At the same time a serious problem occurs clearly obviously: Europe faces huge changes. These changes will affect the future role of the member states and the European regions. Proper scope of the European, national and regional tasks is a key issue of Europe's future.

The reason for this change is that Europe faces fundamental challenges:-ensuring peace in the continent,-protection against genocide and other sins against human kind, – „*European economic stage*" in a globalised world economy, – maintaining the stability of the euro, – elimination of international organised crime, – common solution to the problems of asylum seekers and the rights of refugees, – European answer to the environmental problems, which do not stop at the border.[6]

These challenges force Europe to find new answers. How these challenges will change the rights of the EU, the member states and the regions on the whole, cannot be predicted in detail. There are different concepts which compete with each other. Concepts, which serve absolutely opposite views that can be the bases of the role of the regions and shaping of Europe in the future.

Europe today faces a major reorientation. The euro, in other words, the currency union, can permanently change the image of Europe. As a result of the full transparency of finances the competition has become incredibly harsh. Standards, traditions and distinctive features which have not been involved in the competition yet, have to be re-evaluated.

Euro is the EU's answer to globalisation. The drawback lies in the fact that the convergence of the national economies in the Euro-zone becomes a question of destiny. Each non-convergent development is the focal point of the currency union and the whole Europe. That is why the Euro starts a permanent harmonisation wave. Converging development of the national economies is a must for those member states who participate in the currency union. Whether euro is a condemnation or a blessing is depending on this.

What is the consequence? Some say: we need the same standards everywhere. Concerning social fields, incomes and wages, taxes, pensions and environment protection. At the end, the question is this: Does the European unification need to be reformed into a federal state?

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[5] Ulrich BÖTTGER: *Ziele und Mittel europäischer Integration*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2002.

[6] Christian KONOW: *Die Stabilitäts – und Wachstumpakt*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden , 2002.

Is the European state the forced consequence of the currency union?

It is sure that only few are talking openly about a federal state. These ideas however are discussed more and more openly:- a European society union is a central topic,- European coordination of the income policy, – tax harmonisation in Europe, – European insurance company, – a European employment policy, which is a greatly hoped nostrum for high unemployment rate in Europe – not only in the eyes of the governments, but in the eyes of most of the EU member states.

The question is, how many tasks must be delivered to the EU by the member states and the regions. And to what extent the national politicians assign responsibilities to the EU?

Undoubtedly, the euro leads to a new harmonising pressure. And this is intrinsically all right. The single internal market must be at last consummated. But as a result, is it necessary to extend the harmonisation of tax policies to the whole of Europe? There is nothing wrong with the fact that the member states vote better in the Council about the national employment policy. On the other hand, is it necessary for Brussels to have compulsory objectives about the unemployment rate of the young? The problem is, that the national and regional responsibilities are assigned to Brussels without having any benefit.

Introducing euro leaves its traces on the redefinition of the European, national and regional eligibility. Currency union must be extended with a more proper common foreign and security policy, a more effective coordination of asylum applications and asylum policy, and a more successful fight against the international organised crime. It is welcomed that the Amsterdam Treaty has brought further progress. Currency union however must not offer opportunity for a blind European centralisation, for nation-states and regions to deprive themselves from their own power and the locally elected politicians to escape responsibility. This is mainly true for the fields of social-, employment- and tax policies. [7]

The redefined funding objectives approved by the Berlin Summit result in the fact that most funding fields are not covered by EU funding. The reason is that new priorities are set up to the detriment of the rural areas and for the benefit of those areas, where unemployment is high and many districts are needed to be developed. All of this in the view that the total expenditure on EU structural policy are going to be significantly raised in the next financial programming period. However, the main problem is different: if funding from Brussels is withdrawn from some areas, then the member states and regions must have enough

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[7] Hans-Georg WEHLING: *Regionen und Regionalismus in Westeuropa*, Stuttgart, 1987.

leeway to be able to support the problematic areas with their own national and regional tools. The new concept of the Council prevents this, since it envisages that, in the future, the measures of the member states and regions, aiming at self-supporting can only be realised in areas where sEU-funds are allocated. Those territories which loose EU-funds must be excluded from national and regional structural funds.

What is the goal of the Council with that? It claims with disarming sincerity: the declared intention is the "positive discrimination" of the richer regions. The Council wants to prevent that the EU funds allocated to poorer regions would compensate the regional measures directed at funds allocated by richer regions to themselves. In other words: all the regions of the EU must be brought to the same wellbeing level. Diversity in Europe must be safeguarded and taking own responsibility must be strengthened. The EU must not become a centralist monster. It must concentrate on those problems which can only be solved on the EU level. Those issues that can be realised on the level of the member states and regions, must stay locally in the scope of responsibility of the elected politicians.

The principle of subsidiarity must be applied consequently. The principle of subsidiarity means that the European Union can only act, if the goal cannot be suitably fulfilled on the level of the member states and the regions and acting on the EU level is more reasonable. Redundant provisions harm the EU more compared to the benefits that they might bring. Applying the principal of subsidiarity makes the EU more efficient and brings it closer to the citizens.[8]

Europe cannot give up on the distinctiveness of the member states and the regions, since the identity of Europe itself is deeply rooted in its diversity. EU shall continue to be built upon the statehood of the member states and – in Germany – the provinces, the 1EU must stay a confederation. There are no objective conditions and political intentions for shaping a European state.

Turbulent integration without any direction would lead to centralisation in the long run, which would result in decreasing the rights of the member states and regions. Europe must preserve the vitality of its regions and make benefit of it under the roof of federalism. Diversity and creativity of the regions is one of the main features of Europe which made our continent strong through the centuries. Regions are Europe's weapon in the competition of cultures.

Europe needs the regions in order to balance internal tensions. A Europe-sized area would never be a homogeneous territory. As a result

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[8] Peter WAGSTAFF: *Regions, Nations, Identities*. IN: Regionalism int he European Union, Portland, 1999.

of further expansion, the heterogeneity of EU's internal affairs grows further. Regions create such essential buffer zones, which softens the tensions as a result of differences.

Europe needs the regions in order to save our identity and safety in a globalised world. [9] Many feel insecure and defenceless due to the apparent arbitrariness, economy and opacity of the global world. Europeanisation and globalisation can be processed by the individual, if, within the national framework, his identity can be developed is his homeland that is the region, which is shaped by his own responsibility. The individuals have inevitable connections to the land, the nature, the environment, the fellow humans as well as to the people responsible for the region.

Europe needs the regions for the internal stability of the society. The values are alive in the regions and solidarity is working. Europe needs the regions in order to keep public administration close to its citizens. Seventy percent of the European measures, for example in Germany, have been implemented in the provinces. Responsibility and control can be taken in the most transparent areas. This, again, contributes to efficiency and acceptance of the political order.

And last but not least, Europe needs strong regions in the economic competition. Not all the regions have matured own political responsibility. Regions are central factors in the economy. Not only the states but also the regions are competing in the European internal market as well as in the globalised world market.

The future trend which unequivocally rules the economy, is also relevant in the political field: the trend of smaller units and large networks. There are huge opportunities for the regions in this. That is why Europe has significant interest to have strong regions due to their more effective closeness-to-citizens.

Regions will have even greater significance as information society develops. The economic, social and cultural effects of the epochal change cannot be predicted. But it is being shaped: any information can be gained anywhere and anytime, which will decrease the role of great metropolises such as Paris, London or Madrid. The monopoly of the centres that representing the evolving novelty and modernity in the economy, politics and society is questioned. And this gives opportunity to unfold the profiles of smaller units.[10]

Europe can only participate in this wold competition successfully, if the most regions possible can solve their own problems using their own

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[9] Hermann LÜBBE: *Abschied vom Superstaat. Vereinigte Staaten von Europa wird es nicht geben* , Berlin, 1994.
[10] Wilfried LOTH: *Der Weg nach Europa*, Göttingen, 1991.

power. There are going to be fundamental reversing in Europe: the effects of the euro and globalisation, enlargements and several other changes. In order to fight the challenges Europe needs decisive, strong and responsible regions. A centralist Europe would suppress dynamics. Orientation must be based on the medium-scale and not on high-performance.

Majoros István[1]

Étkezés a palócok földjén[2]

Abstract

The author writes a monograph on a strange people, the Palóc, living in the northern part of Hungary and in Southern Slovakia. This study is one chapter of this book. At the beginning of the study we get to know the opinion of the famous Hungarian writer, the magical Paloc, Kálmán Mikszáth about traditional Hungarian food and the new ones imported from abroad. The author presents a Paloc pig feast. In the rest of the study we learn about the role of the bred, soup, porridges in the diet of the Paloc. We get to know the dishes of the holidays, the eating habits of the land of Paloc and the names of the special Paloc dishes.

Keywords: Kálmán Mikszáth; bred; soup; porridges; eating habits; the dishes of the holidays;

Mikszáth Kálmán a *Magyar konyha* című írásában emel szót a hagyományos magyar ételekért, amelyeket a *„jövevény-ételek”* kiszorítanak. *„Hol van például a »levelensült«, e finom lepény* –írja –, *melyből, az igaz, két szolgáló sütött hajnaltól délig egy emberre való adagot. A levelensült úgy eltűnt a magyar konyhából, mint erdeinkből a bölény”*. Melyek ezek az újdonságok, a jövevények? És sorolja: *„Hogy szorította ki a jó fagyos szalonnát a kávé. Hogy hódított a beefsteak óriás területeket, s különböző nemzetiségre szakadva, majd mint filet de boeuf, majd mint ramsteak, vagy entrecőte vergődött uralomra. A becsületes öreg rostélyosok és borjúszeletek szerényen kucorognak valahol hátul az étlapokon. Szegény, lejárt nagyságok! A galuskák, fánkok, marcipánok még állanak, de ingadozva. A parfait-k tábora már megfújta a haditrombitát, s jönnek különböző színnel, ízzel, hogy leverjék az évszázados bennszülötteket. Kicicomázott, előkelő külsejük könnyűszerrel ejti hálóba az ínyeket is”*. Mikszáth ezért felszólal ..., mit felszólal ..., kiált a magyar konyháért: *„Nem szabad tehát a magyar konyhát pusztulni hagyni. Dőljön, omoljék minden a nagy reformok és divatok mániájában, pusztuljon a vármegye (ámbár ott egészséges, jó gyomrok vannak), pusztuljon a dzsentri, a szűzdohány, de az ősételek maradjanak. Azokat ne engedjük!”* Elismeri, hogy *„a francia konyhában van könnyedség, szellem, ötlet, lelemény, pikantéria, de hiányzik belőle az a masszív alaposság, amit a magyar gasztronómia*

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[2] Ez a tanulmány a palócokról, Nógrád megyéről készülő könyvem (Palócok földjén) egyik fejezete.

felmutat". Azt is tudja, hogy az átmenet a hagyományosról az újra, a jövevény-ételekre lassú és szinten észre sem vesszük. Ezért azt javasolja, hogy utazzunk, hogy aztán hazajöhessünk. S ez azért jó, mert akkor érezzük igazán a különbséget a hagyományos magyar konyha és az újdonságok között. Vagy, ahogy Mikszáth fogalmaz: *"akkor tör ki csak rajtunk a »furor hungaricus«, a rettenetes »etyepetye« (ahogy ezelőtt az étvágyat nevezték), midőn a paprikás pörkölt illata újra megcsapja orrodat, s a túrós csusza haván pirosló tepertyűk nevetve megszólítanak. A kemence mályában sült pecsenyék szaga megbódít, az ősi mártások íze bizsergésbe hozza véredet".* S ezt a bizsergést érzem magam is, amikor a hagyományos palóc ételekre gondolok.

Gyerekkoromban libákat és kacsákat is tartottunk, s ősszel a Mama – így hívtam édesanyámat – elkezdte kukoricával tömni ezeket az állatokat, *"s a hízott liba, kacsa szolgáltatta a finom pecsenyéket, a tepertőt és a májat a hosszú őszi, téli estéken. Az emlékezetes liba vagy kacsavacsorákhoz sütőben sült burgonya készült, s a meghámozott, kissé szétomló, gőzölgő krumplit meglocsoltuk liba vagy kacsazsírral, megszórtuk tepertővel, májdarabokkal, comb vagy mell szeletekkel. S ehhez finom, vékony szeletekre vágott vöröshagymát ettünk. Ezt a fenséges ételt csak a disznótoros vacsora múlta felül".*[3] És ismét idézet a könyvemből.

"Húslevessel kezdődött az egész napos kemény munkát lezáró esti étkezés. Mit étkezés! Lakoma! A háziasszony elővette a zsemlekockát, melyet napok óta a sparhelt sütőjében pirított. Mindenki bátran szórhatott a tányérjába annyit, amennyit akart, majd erre merték a forró levest, amely a tányérba kiszedve aranylott, csillogott az apró zsírfoltoktól. A leves gőzölgött, s az ember először csak szívta, csak szívta magába az illatát. Aztán, aki akarta, apró vöröshagymát apríthatott a levesbe. Nagyon vékony szeleteket kellett vágni, hogy megmaradjanak, ússzanak a leves tetején. Aztán kezdődhetett az élvezet, a kanalazás, lassan, komótosan. Időt kellett hagyni, hogy az ember szájában a zsemlekocka szétolvadjon és a hagyma meg a húsleves íze, illata keveredjen egymással, átjárja a szájpadlást, az egész szájüreget és behatoljon az ember egész testébe. Ezután a főtt hús következett, meg a káposzta. A hús a csontról szinte levált, leomlott, hogy aztán a szájban elolvadjon, mint a vaj, miután az ember kicsit megsózta. S ehhez jött a káposzta savanykás íze, hasonló ízharmóniát teremtve, amit a levesnél már említettem.

Az est fénypontja a hurka és a kolbász volt. Már a sütőből kiáramló szag, a sült fenséges illata áthatotta az ember egész lényét, beivódott a pórusokba. A látvány pedig, a hurka és a kolbász csillogó

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[3] MAJOROS István: *If váránál a tenger… Vallomások prózában és versben*, Underground Kiadó, Budapest, 2017. 60–61.

színe, a zsír rotyogása, gyöngyözése pedig lenyűgöző volt. A tepsiben ott tekergett, gőzölgött a sok disznóság, s ebből mindenki tetszése szerint vehetett magának. Palócföldön, ahonnan származom, májas, rizses hurkát készítettek, s ezt a sütőben pirosra, ropogósra sütötték, ahogy a kolbászt is. A máj és a rizs fűszerezett íze az ember szájában ért össze, valami csodálatos ízharmóniát teremtve fogyasztójának, olyat, amelyet még a nagy ínyenc, a bűvös Palóc, Mikszáth Kálmán is megirigyelhetett volna. Ehhez a fogáshoz friss kenyér vagy sütőben sült krumpli dukált, amely aztán a hurkával és a kolbásszal együtt gőzölgött a tányérban. A krumplit még egy kis olvadt zsírral is meg lehetett locsolgatni. Savanyúságként szilvát, édesen vagy savanyúan tálalt a Mama, s e finom falatokat vörös borral locsolgatták. Közben móka, kacagás, anekdoták, viccek és danolászás, míg a vendégsereg el nem fáradt."[4]

A mindennapok étkezése korántsem volt ilyen gazdag és fenséges, mint a disznótor. Azt is mondhatom, szegényes ez a táplálkozás. A szegény szóval azonban óvatosan kell bánni, mert pl. a szegényesnek tartott paprikás krumpli már évek óta jelen van az éttermek kínálatában tepsis burgonya néven. S említhetem a héjában sült krumplit is, amely ugyancsak kedvelt köret az étlapokon. Cs. Schwalm Edit, a palóc népi táplálkozás jeles szakértője írja, hogy éttermek, idegenforgalmi rendezvények szervezői keresték meg, hogy állítson össze számukra menüsorokat jellegzetes palóc ételekből.[5] Viga Gyula pedig fotókkal illusztrált szakácskönyvet publikált Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén megye ételeiről.[6] Előtte azonban bemutatja a térség hagyományos kultúráját és a táplálkozási tradíció jellemző vonásait, az ételkészítés változásait és az étkezés eszközeit. S a könyvben palóc ételek is találhatók.

Cs. Schwalm Edit szinte könyvterjedelmű tanulmányt közöl a palócok táplálkozásáról a Bakó Ferenc által szerkesztett *Palócok* című munka harmadik kötetében.[7] A szerző itt bemutatja a palóctérség gazdasági-társadalmi viszonyait, a növényi és állati eredetű termékek szerepét az étkezésben, majd megismerjük a különböző alkalmak ételeit, elkészítésének módját, az étkezés eszközeit, formáját és az étkezéseket meghatározó szokásokat.

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[4] MAJOROS (2017): 61–62.

[5] CS. SCHWALM Edit (2002): *A palóc népi táplálkozás jellemzői,* IN: KAPROS Márta – LENGYEL Ágnes – LIMBACHER Gábor, (szerk.): *Palócok a múltban és a jelenben. Milleneumzáró tudományos konferencia és kulturális napok a Magyar Tudomány Napja alkalmából,* Palócmúzeum, Balassagyarmat, 2001. november 9-10, Balassagyarmat – Salgótarján, 2002. 427.

[6] VIGA Gyula: *Tájak, ízek, ételek Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén megyében,* Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Megyei Múzeumi Igazgatóság, Miskolc, 2004.

[7] CS. SCHWALM Edit: *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): *Palócok* III. *Termelés és a javak felhasználása*, Eger, 1989.

A kenyér

A palócok táplálkozási hagyományai gazdagok, ételeik változatosak, a mindennapok során azonban mégis egyhangúak és szegényesek. A kenyérnek meghatározó szerepe volt. Búza, rozs, árpa, kukorica, sőt a konkoly őrleményét egyaránt felhasználták a kenyér készítéséhez. A liszteket általában keverték, s a leggyakoribb az volt, hogy kétharmad búzaliszthez egyharmad rozslisztet adtak, vagy fele-fele arányban használták fel a két lisztet. Ínséges időkben árpából vagy kukoricából sütöttek kenyeret, illetve abból, ami éppen volt. A liszthez korpát is kevertek. A kenyérkészítés összetett és bonyolult művelet, mondhatnám művészet, s ennek részleteiben nem merülök el. A kenyértésztához erjesztőanyagot használtak. Búzakenyerek esetében ez a *pár* volt, rozskenyérhez pedig *kovász*t használtak. Mindkettőnek különböző variációi voltak attól függően, hogy hol készült a kenyér. Volt, ahol a párhoz a komlóvirág főzetét adták. A kovász többféle név alatt ismert, mint *anyakovász*, *magkovász*, *morzsóka*, *élesztős kovász, kiskovász, nagykovász*. Egy 15-20 fős családnál hetente kétszer sütöttek 5-6 kenyeret, kis családnak az egyszeri sütés is elég volt. Egy kész kenyér legalább 4 kg volt, s ez egy 7-10 fős családnak egy napra volt elég. Általában szombat vagy kedd reggel sütöttek. A 19. század végén még volt nagykemence, amelyet belülről fűtöttek. Ha ezt megszüntették, akkor az udvaron építettek kemencét. A sütéshez legalább 2-3 öl (1 öl = amennyi fa a karban, az ölben elfér) hasábfát használtak fel, s amikor a kemence fala már fehéren izzott, kihúzták a tüzet. A kenyereket sütőlapáton rakták be a kemencébe, és legalább másfél óráig sült a kenyér. A megsült kenyeret általában a gazda szegte meg, de előtte a katolikusok a késsel keresztet rajzoltak a kenyér hátára. Kenyérsütéskor nemcsak kenyeret, hanem más tésztát is készítettek. A kemence pofájában lángos vagy lepény, kis kenyér vagy cipó is sült. A dagasztóteknőben maradt tésztát tepertős zsírral összegyúrták, pogácsa formájúvá alakították, s ez lett a *vakaró, zsíros vakarcs, zsíros puffancs, pipics, tubuka*, stb. Az elnevezés falvanként változott. Kenyértésztából készült a *guba*. Rudakat formáltak, megsütötték, fogyasztás előtt kis darabokra vágták, forró vízzel leöntötték s mákkal vagy dióval fogyasztották. Ez kedvenc ételem volt gyerekkoromban. Édesanyám december 24-én készítette, s nagyon finom étel. Manapság kifliből csinálom. A száraz kiflit felszeletelem, forró vízzel leöntöm (van, aki ezt tejjel csinálja), s ugyancsak mákkal, dióval ízesítem. Túróval és tejföllel is felséges csemege. A kenyérhez számos szokás, szólás, hiedelem kapcsolódik. Ha pl. tűz volt a faluban, a kerítésre egy egész kenyeret szúrtak, hogy elfordítsa a tüzet. Anyám arra tanított, hogy a kenyeret ne fordítva tegyem le, hanem mindig a lapjára, különben a családba

beköltözik a szegénység. Katolikusoknál szokásban volt, hogy a kenyérkészítés minden fázisa előtt keresztet vetettek. Ha a kenyér leesett a földre, felvették és megcsókolták. Mindkét nagyanyám engem is erre tanított, jelezve a kenyér fontosságát az ember életében. A kenyér egyébként az európai kultúra egészében is fontos szerepet játszott, tehát ez nem palóc sajátosság. Rotterdami Erasmus (1466-1536) *A gyermeki erkölcsök illendőségéről* (vagy egy másik fordításban: *A gyermek illő magatartásáról*, 1530) című illemtankönyvében írja: *„Ha a kenyér a földre esik, vedd föl és csókold meg"*. A kenyeret tehát ily módon is meg kellett becsülni, mert az ipari korszak előtti, az un. hagyományos társadalomban az alsóbb rétegek alapvető élelmiszere a kenyér, a burgonya s valami zöldségféle volt. A 19. század első felében az átlagos kenyéradag 50 és 80 dekagramm körül mozgott, s ez a fekete kenyér zömmel rozsból, hajdinából és tönkölyből készült. A fehér kenyér a század derekától kezdett hódítani, ami annak volt köszönhető, hogy a vashengeres malmok fehérebb lisztet őröltek. Igaz, a fehér liszt tápértéke kisebb volt, de a fehér kenyérnek nagyobb volt a társadalmi presztíze. Az ipari korszak előtti francia paraszti konyhában is a legfontosabb élelem a kenyér volt, s egyes helyeken a családi költségvetés harmadát vagy felét jelentette. Még Angliában, az ipari forradalom hazájában is a 19. század elején az ipari munkások alapvető élelmiszere a tea és a kenyér volt.[8]

Kenyérpótlók is készültek, mert főleg a nagy mezőgazdasági munkák idején sok kenyér fogyott. De nemcsak ezért sütötték, hanem azért is, mert igen finomak voltak. Ilyen volt a *krumplilángos*, a *krumplilaska*. Ezt a sparhelt tetején sütötték (de készült kemencében is) és zsírral kenték meg, vagy különböző lekvárokat tettek bele, főleg akkor, ha palacsinta formájút készítettek. Kenyérpótló volt a *bodag* vagy *bodak*, amely sós változatban készült, s ezt a lepényformájú tésztát vagy kemencében sütötték vagy hamuban. Készült édes, lekváros változatban is, legalábbis borsosberényi származású feleségem így hívja azt a kelt tésztából készült süteményt, amelybe lekvárt tettek. Buktának is hívják. S ez igazán akkor finom, ha baracklekvár van a bodagban vagy a buktában. Kukoricalisztből készült a *málé*,[9] vagy a *bocskoros málé*.[10] Lenézett étel volt, szegényesnek tartották, de a cukor elterjedése előtt az édesség egyik változata a paraszti társadalomban, s nemcsak a palócoknál. Kisbán Eszter szerint *„A XVIII–XIX. században hazánk*

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[8] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 390–402. MAJOROS István: *Fejlődési utak a 19. századi Európában* III. *A hétköznapok világa*, General-Copy Kft, Pécs, 2001. 6–10. 19.

[9] Többféle elnevezés alatt ismert: édesmálé. csipásmálé, görhemálé, görhönymálé, máléédes, laskás málé.

[10] *Aljas málénak* is hívták, mivel a búzalisztből készült gyúrt tészta alapra öntötték az előző este leforrázott kukoricalisztet, ezért a tészta szélét felhajtották, hogy a pép ne csurogjon le róla.

nagy részén ez volt az országlakók többségének egyetlen édes süteménye”. Mármint a kukoricamálé. A kukoricaliszt ugyanis forró vízzel keverve, majd megsütve édes ízű lesz. Általánosan elterjedt étel volt, s főleg a téli hétköznapokon készítették és fogyasztották. Kukoricalisztből készült a *görhe*, amelyet keményre gyúrtak, pogácsaformát készítettek a tésztából, majd zsírozott tepsibe rakták és sütőben sütötték ki. A kukoricaliszthez rozslisztet, sőt búzalisztet is tehettek. Elsősorban kukoricalisztből készült a *ganca* is, amelyhez azonban árpalisztet is használtak, sőt krumplit is tettek bele. Az említett liszteket fazékba tették, leforrázták, majd hagyták főni, rotyogni, ügyelve arra, hogy ne csomósodjon. Ezután egy nagy tál szélére kiszaggatták, majd zsírral, kender vagy tökmagolajjal, illetve tojással és liszttel kevert forró tejjel öntötték le.[11] Gyerekkoromban én már nem ismertem ezeket az ételeket. Apám néha mesélt róluk, nem nagy lelkesedéssel. A vegetarius étkezés azonban manapság újra felfedezte ezeket az egyébként egészséges ennivalókat. Oláh Andor Morvay Juditot idézi: *„a köztudatban ... az úgynevezett magyaros ételek nagy része még ma is fűszeres, zsíros húsokat jelent, a tepertővel dúsan meghintett tészták garmadáit, amelyek mellől megelégedetten, de agyonterhelt gyomorral kel fel az ember, s ezért az ilyen ebéd után elengedhetetlen egy-két pohár bor feloldó elfogyasztása. Ez a kép, bármennyire elterjedt is, hamis. A magyar parasztságnak csak egy kis része ismeri, süti-főzi ezeket az ételeket ... A többség, az alföldi, a nyugat-dunántúli szegényparasztság, a palócok vagy a keleti területeken lakók ételkultúrája egészen más volt”.* Oláh példaként a palócokat hozza fel azzal kapcsolatban, hogy zsírt például nemigen használtak, tejjel habartak, erjesztéssel savanyítottak, vajjal zsíroztak, erős paprikának a hírét sem hallották. Legalábbis a 19. században.[12]

Levesek

A palócok étkezésében fontos szerepet játszott a leves is, és mindennap megtalálható a kínálatban. Cs. Schwalm Edit Istvánffy

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[11] A ganca elnevezései: árpaganca, kukoricaganca, krumpliganca, kanállal szaggatott, haluska, kukoricazsámiska, árpazsámiska. A ganca a puliszkához, másképpen a tört péphez hasonlít, amely Erdélyben, Moldvában ismert. Nevezik málénak is Csíkban, Háromszéken, Moldvában és Bukovinában. A Felső-Tisza vidékén pedig tokánynak. A puliszka hasonló az észak-itáliai polentához. A puliszka név a 17. században jelenik meg. Magyar Néprajzi Lexikon.

[12] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 404–405. VIGA Gyula: *Tájak, ízek, ételek Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén megyében,* Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Megyei Múzeumi Igazgatóság, Miskolc, 2004. 30. 33. 82. Magyar Néprajzi Lexikon. DR. OLÁH Andor – KÁLLAI Klára – VADNAI Zsolt: *Reformkonyha. A természetes életmód és étrend elmélete és gyakorlata,* Mezőgazdasági Kiadó, Budapest, 1989. 51–52.

Gyulát idézi, aki szerint az volt a jó lakodalom, ha *„lé féle volt hét féle"*. S a lakodalom nem is volt igazi levesek nélkül. Növényi és állati nyersanyagból egyaránt készült ez az étel. Népszerű volt a bableves, amely szárazbabból és zöldbabból egyaránt készült. A bab lehetett fehér, sárga vagy tarka. Készülhetett habart vagy savanyú változat. A bablevesbe tettek zöldségeket, így vöröshagymát, sárgarépát, fokhagymát, petrezselyemgyökeret, petrezselyem zöldjét és krumplit, de főztek bele füstölt húst is.[13] Általában sűrű rántással készült. Családunkban is kedvenc fogás volt a bableves, amelyet friss kenyérrel ettük, mert így volt finom. Sőt, a kenyeret beleaprítottuk a levesbe. Apám mesélte, hogy a régi világban egy ifjú legény csak akkor szegődött el a juhászhoz bojtárnak, ha arra a kérdésére, hogy mivel a hűtik a bablevest, azt a választ kapta, hogy friss, foszlós kenyérrel. A bablevest akár napokig is ettük, mert minél sűrűbb volt, annál finomabb volt.

Készült aztán leves krumpliból. A savanyú krumplilevest tejföllel habarták, ecetet tettek hozzá és babérlevéllel ízesítették. Voltak tésztalevesek, amelyek gyúrt tésztából készültek. Nem tartoztak a kedvenceim közé. Anyám szerencsére ritkán készített ilyen ételt. Kedveltem viszont a rántott levest, amelybe tojást ütöttek, s így tojásos levesnek is nevezték vagy rongyos levesnek és köménymaggal készült. Gyomorkímélő ételnek is jó volt. Kedvenceim közé tartozott a paradicsomleves. Édesanyám ezt nagyon jól csinálta (S mást is, teszem hozzá mindjárt). Minden évben nagyobb mennyiségű paradicsomlevet készített. Augusztus végén a faluba érkezett árusoktól vásárolta a paradicsomot, s ebből készült ez a nagyon finom itóka, amelyet anyám palackokba töltött. S valóban italként is fogyasztottuk, főleg késő ősszel és télen, s anyám ezt használta a paradicsomleveshez. A kertben termett paradicsomot pedig salátaként fogyasztottuk el, például zsíroskenyérhez. Ezek az ötvenes-hatvanas években termett paradicsomok teljesen mások voltak, mint a maiak. Az illatuk augusztusban betöltötte a kertet, zamatosak voltak és nedvdúsak. Most is érzem az illatát. Sajnos a mai paradicsomokban ezt ritkán fedezem fel. Gyerekkorom és kortársaim egyik kedvenc étele a zsíroskenyér volt. Ehhez a zsírosbödönből vettük ki a disznózsírt, de felhasználtuk a kolbász vagy a hurka zsírját is. Vagy a sült húsét és a tepertőét. Az igazi csemege pedig az volt, amikor liba vagy kacsazsírral kentük meg a kenyeret, amelyre nyáron a kertben termett uborkát szeleteltük. Iskolába is zsíroskenyeret vittünk, s az órák szüneteiben ezt ettük jóízűen. Sőt, cseréltünk is egymással, attól függően, hogy kinek milyen zsírt kentek a kenyerére.

Apám volt a specialistája a lebbencslevesnek. Igaz, ez nem feltétlenül

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[13] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 411–414. CS. SCHWALM Edit (2002): *A palóc népi táplálkozás jellemzői,* IN: KAPROS – LENGYEL – LIMBACHER (szerk.): 422.

palóc specialitás. Viga Gyula is bodrogközi ételként mutatja be, illetve a ruszinok fogásaként, akik zöldséges lebbencslevest készítettek. Valójában alföldi ételként lett ismert, s innen terjedt el. Ennek ellenére a palóc ételek közé is beveszem, mert a pásztorok, a juhászok is főzték bográcsban. S nagyapám, dédnagyapám juhász volt. Ehhez a leveshez lebbencstésztát (szabálytalan alakúra vágott, szaggatott vagy tördelt tészta, amelyet *galuskának*, *haluskának* és *lacsuhának* is neveztek), füstölt szalonnát, vöröshagymát, zöldpaprikát, paradicsomot, fűszerpaprikát és sót használnak.[14] Nagyon finom és laktató étel.

És készültek húslevesek. Leggyakrabban baromfiból, főleg vasárnap. S délben már ott gőzölgött az asztalon, benne finommetélt, amelyet a háziasszony készített aznap délelőtt. Anyám is maga gyúrta, nyújtotta a tésztát, aztán nagyon vékonyra szeletelte, majd kifőzte. Ez került a levesbe. Melléktermék a *laksa*[15] volt. A kinyújtott tésztából kivágott egy nagyobb szeletet, és a sparhelt szélén megpirította, majd olvasztott zsírral megkente és megsózta. Általában ez volt a vasárnap délelőtti csemegém. Amikor a gőzölgő levest elkezdtük kanalazni, a rádióban megszólalt a *Jó ebédhez szól a nóta* című műsor, magyar nótákkal, cigányzenével. Évtizedekkel később is a gőzölgő tyúkhúsleves az említett zenéket juttatja eszembe, és fordítva. Húsleves persze nem csak tyúkból, hanem libából és kacsából is készült és természetesen disznóhúsból. Kacsa- és libaleves családunkban alig készült, a marhahúsleves pedig meg sem ragadt az emlékezetemben. Vagy nem volt, vagy oly ritkán, hogy erre már nem is emlékszem. Marhahúst egyébként nem volt könnyű beszerezni. A falu hentese alig árult ilyet. Legfeljebb apám hozott, amikor Pesten vagy a környékén dolgozott.

Cs. Schwalm Edit leírja, hogy a 19. század végén s a 20. század elején gyakran fogyasztott étel volt a *kiszi*, *kiszli* vagy *cibere* leves. Ez úgy készült, hogy a kenyérsütéskor használt kovász egy részét langyos vízben eláztatták, s ezt egy 15-20 literes cserépedénybe tették, sózták, s beleraktak kb. 1 kiló korpát. Az edényt lekötötték, meleg helyre tették, s néhány nap múlva kellemes, savanyú folyadékot kaptak. Ezt az alapanyagot aztán sűrítették lisztes tejjel, tejföllel. De készülhetett hozzá fokhagymás rántás is. Ez volt a *rántott cibere*, az előző pedig a *habart cibere*. Ebbe a levesbe kukorica- vagy köleskását is főztek, s tehettek bele krumplit vagy gyúrt tésztát. A cibere gyakori böjti étel volt. Istvánffy szerint még reggelire is kiszit ettek, *„de kivált a rossz gyomrúaknak nagyon egészséges, amennyiben azt tartják, hogy a gyomrot megszívja, s a csömört megszünteti”*. Az aszalt gyümölcsből készült habart levest is ciberének hívták vagy kiszinek.[16] Megjegyzem, emlékeim

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[14] VIGA Gyula (2004): 46. 134. 148.

[15] A kenyérsütés egyik melléktermékét is laskának, laksának hívták.

[16] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és*

szerint a cibere nálunk nem leves volt, hanem a szilvalekvár mellékterméke. Amikor nagyanyám az ötvenes években egy hatalmas rézüstben készítette a szilvalekvárt, nagy fakanállal kavargatta, s a már szétmálló, folyékonnyá váló szilva, ami még nem nevezhető lekvárnak, lerakódott az üst szélére. Néha meg is pirult. Kanállal ezt leszedte, kis edénybe rakta, s miután meghűlt, megehettem. Nagyon finom volt. No, ezt az édeskés, savanykás nem lekvárt, nem levest hívtuk ciberének.

Böjtös étel volt a *zsupa* vagy *zsufa* leves is. Az olajütéskor keletkezett tökmagpogácsát kézzel vagy mozsárban összetörték, lereszelték, cserépfazékba tették és forró vizet öntöttek rá, majd leszűrték. Az így kapott levet tűzhelyre tették, hogy besűrűsödjön. Fogyasztották habart tejjel, tojást ütöttek bele. Leggyakrabban csak kenyeret aprítottak a levesbe. A *„szegényebb népnek"* volt kedvelt étele – írja Istvánffy, de főleg a gyerekek kedvence volt.[17]

Az a csodálatos krumpli

A krumpliból nem csak leves, hanem más ételek is készültek. A paprikás krumplit már említettem. Igen finom és egészséges étel a zöldséges újkrumpli. A kertünkben minden évben termett krumpli is, ez az étel ebből készült. Az itt termett krumpli persze nem volt elég egész évre, ezért anyám feles vagy harmados krumplit vállalt, s ezzel kihúztuk a következő őszig. Krumpliból a Mama nagyon ízletes főzeléket is készített. Ugyancsak ebből készült a *nudli*, amelyet anyám lekváros vagy szilvás gombóccal együtt főzött meg. Nagyon szerettem a nudlit. Délben prézlivel és cukorral megszórva ettük, este pedig a meztelen változatát fogyasztottuk. A meztelen változatra semmit sem tettünk, csak sót és zsírral locsoltuk meg. Az igazi azonban az volt, amikor anyám pirosra, ropogósra sütötte, s ezt szintén zsírral öntöztük meg és sóztuk és főleg vacsorára ettük. A családban mindenkinek kedvence volt, apámnak különösen. És készült törött krumpli. A héjában megfőzött krumplit anyám letörte, s ezt zsírral ízesítve lehetett fogyasztani. Igazi szegény étel, mondanánk rá, és gyerekkoromban valóban ezt mondták erre az ételre, de én nagyon szerettem.

A téli esték kedvenc étele a sütőben, a rúrában sült krumpli volt. Disznózsírral, liba- vagy kacsazsírral lehetett fogyasztani. De nagyon finom volt tepertőzsírral, vagy azzal a zsírral, amelyben valamilyen húst sütöttek ki. A sült krumpli ma is kedvelt étel. Nagyon szeretem a svábos változatot, amikor tejfölt és túrót keverek össze, s ezt eszem a krumplihoz. No, és szeletekre vágott lilahagymát.

Egy másik változat burgonyából. A megfőtt krumplit liszttel keverték,

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hétköznapokon, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 411–413. VIGA Gyula (2004): 81.
    [17] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 413. VIGA Gyula (2004): 81–82.

forró vízbe szaggatták, szűrték, ízesítették hagymás zsírral, túróval, tejföllel, savanyú káposztával. Többféle elnevezése ismert: *trapacska*, *sztrapacska, vízen kullogó, kompri galuska, krumplihaluska, uccurajta, nyikorgó, nyikkancs, nyögve nyelő, verett haluska*. Ha pedig lereszeljük a nyers krumplit, összekeverjük liszttel, ízesítjük sóval, fűszerekkel, pogácsa vagy lepény formát készítünk, majd kisütjük, akkor megkapjuk a *tócsni*t. De ismerik *macok, mackó, baki, macker* néven is. Feltehetően a szlovákoktól terjedt el.[18] Ma már az egész országban ismert és készítik is. Egyik fonyódi ismerősöm szerint ez fonyódi specialitás. Fel kellett világosítanom, hogy ez tévedés, mert szlovák, tót hatásra terjedt el. Ma már a balatoni éttermek kínálatában is szerepel, pl. tejfölös bakonyi szelet tócsniba tekerve. A legjobb változatot azonban Szombathelyen ettem a karácsonyi vásárban. Hozzáteszem, a tócsni főtt krumpliból is készülhet, ha pedig cukkini az alapanyag, ez legalább olyan ízletes, mint a krumpliból készült.

Kásák, pépek

A különböző pépeket és a kásákat is jól ismerték, fogyasztották a palócok. Disznóöléskor készítették az abált kását. Az *abálás* az élelmiszerek forráspont alatti hőmérsékleten történő hőkezelése, tartósítása. Disznóvágáskor az udvaron egy nagy üstben készült az abalé, amelybe sót, borsot, fokhagymát, babérlevelet tettek, s az így előkészített lébe tették a szalonnát, a hurkába való disznóságokat, a disznófejet, bőrkéket, belsőségeket, majd az elkészült hurkát, és a szalonnát is ideraktak. Ezt az egészet lassú tűzön főzték. S amikor a szalonna megpuhult, kivették, pirospaprikába forgatták. Ez a szalonna igazán akkor finom, amikor megfagy egy kicsit. Főleg reggelire ették. A megmaradt abalé sok mindenre felhasználható, pl. különféle káposzták készítéséhez (toros káposzta, székelykáposzta, stb.), de bablevéshez és tojásfőzéshez is jó. A palócok az abalében –vért is raktak bele –, kását, elsősorban kukoricakását főztek. De volt, aki árpát, árpagyöngyöt, azaz gerslit használt, később mindezt rizzsel helyettesítették. Ez volt a *szárikása, szarikása, abált kása*.[19] A szüleim nem készítettek abált kását. Ennek ellenére ismertem, mert anyám, dejtári származású lévén, mindig kapott kóstolóba testvéreitől ebből a kásából. S Dejtáron, Patakon készítettek ilyen ételt. Nem igazán rajongtam ezért a kukoricából készült disznóságért, de hősiesen mindig megkóstoltam.

Már említettem, hogy az árpát, kukoricát a rizs váltotta fel, s ebből

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[18] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 407.

[19] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 403. 443.

készítették a tejben főzött rizst, amely a lakodalmak étrendjében is szerepelt. Gyerekkoromban az egyik kedvenc ételem volt, s még ma is szeretem. Búzadarából készítették a *dinsztelt* vagy *pirított gríz*t. Anyám finom lekvárt adott hozzá. A lekvárt egyébként mindig maga főzte. Így készített eperből, málnából, szilvából, sőt bodzából is. Ami a dinsztelt grízt illeti, megjegyzem, hogy ez az étel szinte ugyanaz, mint amit az indiai konyha *halava* néven ismer. S egy másik hasonlóság: amit mi laksának, laskának nevezünk, az az indiai konyhában *parata*.[20] Lehet, hogy érdemes az étkezés történetében a kölcsönös egymásra hatást tágabb összefüggésben is megvizsgálni, s nem csak mondjuk palóc és tót viszonylatban, vagy a palócok étkezését az ország többi részével összevetni. Csak példaként említem, hogy a közel-keleti konyhának mezopotámiai, asszír, perzsa alapjai vannak. Ez feltehetően azzal függ össze, hogy a perzsák, az arabok, oszmánok többé-kevésbé ugyanabban a térségben hódítottak, s így alakult ki a közel-keleti konyhaművészet. Vagy, a francia konyhára hatással voltak az itáliai városok, hiszen a választékos és gazdag konyhaművészet itt alakult ki a 15. századtól kezdődően.[21]

Ünnepek étkei

Az ipari korszak előtti, az un. hagyományos társadalomban az alsóbb néprétegek a mindennapok egyhangú és hiányos táplálkozását bizonyos ünnepi alkalmakkor igyekeztek bepótolni. A palócoknál ilyen volt a már említett disznótor. A másik ünnepi alkalom a lakodalom volt, ahol nemcsak húsból volt bőség, hanem édes, cukros ételekből is. Lakodalom idején a vőfély verses mondókákkal mutatta be és dicsérte az ételeket. A következő rigmust Malonyai Dezsőtől idézem: *„Itt az jó marhahús ecetes tormával, / Vagy akinek tetszik, savanyó mártásval. / Vagyon ám tyúkhús is, fajn iborkával, / Bion nem kiméték, levágták sorjával. / Hát sertés orjából honne tálalnának, / Enné jobb eledelt bion nem tanának. / Liba, kacsa, jérce piros pecsenyéjét, / Kévánatos izvel már meg sorra hoznék. / De vagyon itt módval disznó meg marha is, / Ki léve, megsütve, ki meg mártásval is. / Aki meg kedveli a csontos hús izit, / No meg az fogában derekasan bizik: / Annak im ajálom fejit a disznónak, / Nagyjártányi fődön ez tartatik ám jónak, / Bizony némely részi félnapi nyárson sült, / Sorosángyom sütte, mindég melletti ült.* S

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[20] A halavának többféle változata van: gyümölcsös halava, kesar halava (ez esetben a búzadarát nem pirítjuk barnára, s a vízbe sáfrányt teszünk), burgonyahalava, répahalava, banánhalava, stb. A parata is készülhet burgonyásan vagy karfiolosan. EGYEDI Péter: *A vegetárius főzés örömei. 200 felséges recept az indiai vaisnava hagyomány alapján*, megjelent az International House Budapest Kiadói Iroda gondozásában, Révai Nyomda, Eger, én.

[21] MAJOROS (2001): 5. 16.

az édesség dicsérete: *Hozom a herőcét, a csőröge fánkot, / Meg a vékony rétest, a jó turós lángost. / Sercegő zsírba sűt az herőce szépen, / Sütőbe az rétes haonlatosképpen. / Almáva, turóva, van tőtve az rétes, / Maruzsáva szinte, attó olyan éldes. / Cimetve, cukorva is meg van ijesztve, / Sorjáva, rendive az tálba illesztve.*[22] Lakodalom idején vált valóra a mese, amikor a résztvevő úgy érezhette, hogy a bőség asztala előtt ül. A puszták népének lakodalmai *„mindig tékozlóan gazdagok voltak; az uradalomtól kölcsönkért hosszú babszemező asztalokon vastagon folyt a bor és a zsír, a három pusztából összehordott tepsikben a sült tyúkok és kacsák füzérei sorakoztak, a káposzta gyerekfej nagyságú töltelékeit a vékony nyakú cselédek tejeskaláccsal tömték magukba – egy egész évi koplalásért vettek kárpótlást: a két násztárs családjának egész évi élelmüket fölzabálták”* – írja Illyés Gyula.[23]

A 16. század közepétől Európában a bőség egyre inkább a mese világába tevődött. Azért a 16. század közepére tehető ez a változás, mert az élelmezési helyzet ekkortól kezdett rosszabbodni. Növekedett a lakosság, így a mezőgazdaságnak több embert kellett eltartania. Másképpen fogalmazva, romlott az életszínvonal a társadalom alsóbb rétegei körében. Az életszínvonal ugyanis az a viszony, amely az emberek száma és a rendelkezésre álló élelmiszerkészletek között áll fenn. Az ezt megelőző két évszázad, pontosabban 1350 és 1550 közötti időszak a francia Fernand Braudel szerint a boldog egyéni élet kora. Legalábbis Franciaországban. S mindez a pestis pusztításának köszönhető. *„Hol van az az idő, komáim -* idéz egy breton parasztot 1548-ból Braudel - *amikor nehezen látott az ember olyan egyszerű ünnepi alkalmat, hogy valamelyik falubeli ne hívta volna meg magához ebédre, csirke-, liba-, sonka-, kisbáránypecsenyére, disznótorra az egész falu népét.”* A nürnbergi takácsok is arról panaszkodtak 1601-ben, hogy hetente csak háromszor kapnak húst. A húsfogyasztás a 19. század közepéig csökkent, s Németországban a 19. század elején nem érte el az évi 20 kg-t, holott a középkor végén 100 kg hús jutott egy főre. *Dínom-Dánom* vidékeket, *Boldogságfalvakat*, ahol az utcákon kövér libák sülnek, a szőlőt sült kolbásszal kötözik, kolbászból van a kerítés is, az utakon pedig élelemtől roskadozó asztalok állnak, már csak a mesék világában találunk. Ha megnézzük gyerekkorunk meséit, ezek arról szólnak, hogy a legkisebb fiú

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[22] MALONYAI Dezső (szerk.): *A magyar nép művészete. V. Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Gömör, Borsod magyar népe. A palócok művészete*, Budapest, 1922. 274. Csak összevetésképpen egy nem palóc lakodalmi rigmus az édességről: „*Finom fehér lisztből készült a sütemény/ Cukorral vegyítve, s nem is nagyon kemény. / Mazsolaszőlővel van telidestele, / Csak jó dolgokat tettek ám még bele … / Tehát násznagy uram mutasson jó példát, / Harminchárom foggal szerelje fel magát …*". DR. OLÁH Andor – KÁLLAI Klára – VADNAI Zsolt (1989): 48.

[23] ILLYÉS Gyula*: Puszták népe*, Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1974. 225.

sikeres karriert csinál, mert kalandok és veszélyes próbák teljesítése után feleségül veszi a király szép lányát, s megkapja melléje a fele királyságot. És ezzel biztosítja magának és családjának a mindennapi bőséges étkezést, így nem kell tartania az éhezéstől. Még egyértelműbben fejezik ki ezt azok a mesék, ahol a legkisebb fiú szolgálataiért egy asztalt nyer, hozzá a varázsigét, *terülj, terülj asztalkám*, s ezzel bárhol, bármikor biztosítja a szükséges ennivalót. S általában még furkósbotot is szerez hozzá, és az *üssed, üssed botocskám* jelszóval képes megvédeni szerzeményét. A karrier tehát az élelmiszerbiztonság megteremtése akár a királylánnyal és a fele királysággal, akár a terülj, terülj asztalkámmal. Egy olyan korban, ahol az éhezés ciklikusan fordult elő, az emberek a mesékbe helyezték, ott fogalmazták meg azt, amit a mindennapi életben nehéz volt megszerezni. Az étkezés bősége, fényűzése persze létezett a valóságban is, de csak a társadalom felső rétege számára. Volt idő, amikor a fényűzés alapvetően a mennyiség, a zabálás fényűzése volt. Egy példa: 1344. május 19-én nagy lakomát tartottak Avignonban VI. Kelemen pápa (1342-1352) tiszteletére. Ehhez levágtak 118 kövér marhát, 1.023 birkát, 101 borjút, 914 kecskét, 60 disznót, 1.500 hizlalt kappant, 3.043 tyúkot, 7.428 csirkét, 1.446 libát, s felhasználtak még 68 mázsa szalonnát és sózott húst. Ezen kívül 50 ezer tortát készítettek 3.250 tucat tojásból és 36.100 almából. Azt persze nem tudom, hány embert vendégeltek meg. Egy másik példa Itáliából, ahol a fényűzést jelezte az ebédlői művészet kialakulása, amikor különböző építményeket készítettek élelmiszerből. 1487-ben, Giovanni Bentivoglio fiának esküvőjén például cukorból készítettek várat, amelynek bástyáit, tornyait élő madarakkal rakták tele, amelyek aztán a lakoma közönsége előtt repültek ki.[24] Az ehhez hasonló bőség és fényűzés még talán a palócok meséiben sem jelenik meg. A szegényes étkezés ellenére azonban náluk is voltak édes tészták, sütemények.

Már említettem a tejberizst vagy a málét, s főleg ez utóbbi jelentette az édességet a cukor használata előtt. A lekvárral készült tészták is idetartoznak, vagy mondjuk a lekváros kenyér, illetve a mézes kenyér. Ami a mézet illeti, Manga szerint a méhészet jelentős foglalkozási ág volt a palóc falvakban. Farkas Pál pedig azt írja, hogy 1908-ban Nógrád 270 községében 13.164 méhcsalád volt. Hozzáteszi, hogy a lakodalomból a méz sem hiányozhatott, mert ez jelképezte a közös élet édes boldogságát. Mézzel, mákkal meghintve fogyasztották a palócok jellegzetes süteményének tartott *fentő, ferentő, frentő* nevű, csigaformára összetekert kalácsot. A lakodalom és a karácsony kelt tésztából készült ínyencsége volt. Ünnepi sütemények voltak a kalácsok, amelyeket üresen vagy töltelékkel fogyasztottak. Cs. Schwalm Edit szerint palóc jellegzetesség a *morván*, a *morványkalács*, a *morvány* vagy *morva*

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[24] MAJOROS (2001): 4–6. 16.

kalács. A rudakra sodort tésztát több ágból (2-3-4-5-6) fonták össze, majd az utolsó ággal körbetekerték. Cukros vízzel vagy tojással kenték meg a tetejét. A fentőt és a morvánt lakodalmakba is vitték. A közeli rokonok több darabot is. Lakodalmakba egyébként nagyobb morványkalácsot készítettek, s ezt már *köszöntőkalács*nak vagy *nagykalács*nak hívták. Volt, ahol zászlóval, mézeskaláccsal, gyertyával díszítették, s ez volt az *örömkalács* vagy *menyasszonykalács*. Lakodalmakba is vitték, de a mindennapok során is fogyasztották a *túróslepény*t. Kelt tésztából készült ujjnyi alapra vastag túrótölteléket tettek, amelybe tojássárgáját, tojásfehérjét, cukrot kevertek, majd sütőben megsütötték. A töltelékbe tehettek kaprot, krumplit, szilvát, mazsolát, de akár sonkát is. Igaz, ez már a 20. század. Gyerekkoromban anyám is készített túróslepényt, főleg télen, karácsony idején. És farsangkor a *pampuska* (matyóknál *pampucka*), vagy *fánk* (*puffancs*) mellett a *herőke* volt a kedvelt sütemény. Porcukorral meghintve nagyon finom. Nógrád megyén kívül *herőce* a neve, Fülek környékén pedig *herőcze*. Egyébként *csörögefánk* néven is ismert főleg a nem palóc vidékeken. A paraszti konyha egyik jól ismert sült tésztája a *pogácsa* (bodag). A palócok is gyakorta készítették, s ez inkább hétköznapi tészta volt. Anyám az őszi, téli hónapokban gyakran sütött pogácsát, egy nagy zománcozott tálba tette, s ezt berakta a *telázsiba* (stelázsi), ami egy polc volt a konyhában, amelyet *firhang*, azaz függöny fedett le, hogy az ide betérő ne lássa, mi van a polcokon. Ha enni akartunk, csak benyúltunk a tálba és elfogyasztottuk ezt a kedvelt tésztát. Ha pedig vendég jött, akkor anyám egy tányérba rakott néhány darabot, s megkínálta. A palóc ugyanis vendégszerető, s ha más nincs, legalább egy szelet, azaz karéj kenyérrel, no meg egy pohár borral kínálja meg a vendégét, vagy, ahogy Farkas Pál írja: azokat, akik a *„látóba gyüttek”*. Anyám nem csak egy sima sós pogácsát sütött, hanem tepertőset, abból a tepertőből, amelyet ő sütött ki a disznótor utáni napokban. Ez aztán kitartott legalább a tavasz végéig, a nyár elejéig. Azóta is keresem ezt a tepertőt, vagy legalább ennek az ízét. Készített aztán hájas pogácsát, amelybe lekvárt is rakott. S ez már nem csak hétköznapi, de ünnepi sütemény is volt. S nem szabad kifelejtenem a rétest sem, amelyet vasárnapra, ünnepre sütöttek. S készült túrós, mákos, diós, almás, meggyes, káposztás, vagy gyümölcsös, esetleg tökös változatban. A tészta elkészítése, nyújtása nagy ügyességet kíván.[25]

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[25] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és hétköznapokon*, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 423–429. CS. SCHWALM Edit (2002): *A palóc népi táplálkozás jellemzői,* IN: KAPROS – LENGYEL – LIMBACHER (szerk.): 424–425. FARKAS Pál: *Nógrád vármegye népe*. IN: BOROVSZKY Samu (szerk.): *Magyarország vármegyéi és városai. Nógrád vármegye,* Budapest, 1911. 156–158. VIGA Gyula (2004): 30–31

Étkezési szokások

Az étkezés kitűnő téma, akár egy külön könyvet is lehetne erről írni. CS. Schwalm Edit sokat írt erről, magam is lényegében az ő munkái alapján foglalom össze ezt a területet. S még kitérhetnék további részletekre, de már nem teszem a terjedelmi korlátok miatt. Arról azonban még írnom kell, hogy milyen volt az étrend, milyen étkezési szokásokat ismerünk a palócok életében.

Általában el lehet mondani, hogy télen naponta kétszer, nyáron pedig háromszor ettek.[26] Kivételek persze mindig voltak, s a 20. században pedig már télen is naponta háromszori étkezés volt. Télen a reggeli vagy früstök 8 és 10 között volt. Nagyanyám is ez utóbbit használta, és früstökölni hívott nem pedig reggelizni. A főétkezést pedig 4 és 6 óra között tartották. S amikor elkezdődtek a munkák a földeken, tehát tavasszal és nyáron, a reggeli általában fél hatkor, hétkor volt.[27] Az ebédet 12 és 1 óra között tartották, a vacsorát pedig 8 óra körül. Dologidőben az étkezés a munkákhoz igazodott, így akár naponta négyszer is étkeztek. A nehéz munkákhoz kellett is a kalória. Cs. Schwalm Edit írja le azt az esetet, hogy Visontán volt olyan földbirtokos, aki elküldte azt a napszámosát, aki nem szalonnát evett, mert enélkül nem bírta volna a munkát. S nyilván nem csak Visontán fordult ez elő. Az aratás például ilyen nehéz, sok kalóriát igénylő munka volt. Bizonyos szabályszerűséget ki lehet tapintani a heti étrendben. Általában a kedd, a csütörtök és a vasárnap húsos nap volt, a hétfő és a szombat húsnélküli, a szerda és a péntek pedig tésztanap. Falvanként, családonként azonban lényeges változások, eltérések lehettek. Nálunk például valójában csak a

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[26] A régi világban, tehát még az ipari korszak előtt más volt az emberek életrendje, mások voltak az étkezési szokások is. A mai rend a reggeli, ebéd, vacsora hármasa nálunk a 18. században kezdett meghonosodni. Előtte naponta kétszer ettek. Az első étkezés délelőtt 11 és 12 óra között volt, a második pedig délután 5 és 6 óra között. Este, sötétedés után az emberek aludni tértek, reggel viszont korán keltek. Egy középkori francia mondóka a napi kétszeri étkezést így foglalta össze: *„Ha ötkor ágyból kibujsz,/Kilenckor ebédhez eljutsz./ Vacsora délután ötkor,/ Kilenckor mindenki horkol./ Hosszú lesz majd az öregkor".* Debrecen orvosa, Weszprémi István 1760-ban egyik könyvéhez egészségügyi szabálygyűjteményt csatolt, s ebben azt tanácsolja a diákoknak, hogy este feküdjenek le nyolc, kilenc vagy tíz órakor és keljenek fel négy, öt vagy hat órakor. Ebbe a világba illeszkedtek a palócok is az étkezéseikkel. Természetesen voltak különbségek. A francia forradalom előtt a francia parasztok ugyanis már háromszor étkeztek. Reggel ötkor keltek, reggeliztek, az ebéd kilenc óra körül volt, a vacsora pedig délután ötkor. S kilenckor mentek aludni. MÉSZÁROS István: *Mióta van iskola?* Móra Ferenc Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1982. 130–131. MAJOROS (2001): 21. DR. OLÁH Andor – KÁLLAI Klára – VADNAI Zsolt (1989): 187.

[27] Amikor háromszor étkeztek, akkor a reggeli 8 óra körül volt, az ebédet 12 és 1 óra között tartották, hat és hét óra körül pedig vacsoráztak.

vasárnap volt húsos nap, mert apám szombaton jött haza, s amikor a szabad szombatot bevezették, akkor már péntek este otthon volt. Hétvégére ezért anyám csirkét, tyúkot vágott, s finom húsleves – vékony, házi metélt tésztával –, valamint rántott hús volt a vasárnapi menü ebédre. Esetleg disznóhúsból készült a második fogás, ha apám hozott húst, vagy a hentesnél be lehetett szerezni. A hét többi napján egyébként nem igen ettünk húst, s ezzel nem voltunk egyedül. Hét közben a disznótor után lesütött és zsírban eltett húsból is ettünk, s anyám ehhez készített valami köretet, vagy kolbászt ettünk. Vacsorára pedig szalonnát vagy zsíros kenyeret. Természetesen megettük a vasárnapi maradékot, és minden maradékot hét közben. S ettünk tojást, rántva, főtt változatban, illetve az un. lábatlan tyúkot. Bár Farkas Pál szerint ez kuglófalakú kalács volt, nálunk a tojásból készült ételt nevezték lábatlan tyúknak. Két – három tojást vagy többet felvertünk, beletettünk lisztet és elkavartuk, majd kisütöttük, mint a palacsintát. Természetesen lehetett fűszerezni zöldségekkel, hagymával. Reggelire a palóc ember gyakran evett főtt ételt, például rántott levest, köménymagos levest vagy sült krumplit, főtt krumplit. S természetesen kenyeret szalonnával. Nekem gyerekkoromban a reggelim a tej volt, illetve a tejes kávé. A tejet a kecskénk szolgáltatta. Bár a kecskét a szegények tehenének nevezték, a teje kitűnő és egészséges. A kávé cikóriából és az un. családi kávéból készült, s én ezt ettem úgy, hogy a tányérba öntött kávéba aprítottam a kenyeret. A kecskénk azonban csak őszig adott tejet, ezért tehéntejet hoztunk valamelyik közeli vagy távolabbi szomszédtól. Mindig este mentem tejért, s köcsögben vagy kandliban hoztam el. Tavasztól aztán megint kecsketejet ittam, ettem. Anyám a süteményekhez is ezt használta. Az ebédet és a vacsorát anyám a már említett, leírt ételekből válogatta össze. Ettünk aludttejet is kenyérrel, s ez nyáron kitűnő vacsora volt. Ez az étel az európai paraszti társadalmakban szinte mindenütt előfordul. Egy irodalmi példa: A *Csendes Don* főszereplő családja, a kozák Meljehovék gyakran ettek aludttejet kenyérrel, s nemcsak vacsorára. Meg kell említenem még a halat. Egy öreg halász gyakran hozott ipolyi halat, s anyám ezt sütötte meg általában vacsorára. Apám különösen a kis halakat szerette jól besózva. Ebédre, vacsorára nyáron többször ettünk gombát is. Ehhez azonban el kellett menni az erdőbe. Főleg eső után. Cs. Schwalm Edit az ételek gyakoriságát illetően írja, hogy a sorrend a bab, a krumpli, a főtt tészták és a káposzta volt. Vagy, ahogy a mondóka mondja: *„Kétszer krumpli, kétszer bab, nemmeg* (megint) *krumpli, nemmeg bab, majdcsak eljön vasárnap”*. A palóc konyha jellemzőjeként pedig ezt a mondókát idézi: *„Káposztalé, ne hozd elé!”* A káposzta azonban nem mindenütt volt meghatározó a palócok földjén. Családunkban biztosan nem.[28]

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[28] CS. SCHWALM Edit (1989): *A palócok táplálkozása ünnepeken és*

Ami az étkezési szokásokat illeti, az asztalhoz csak a felnőttek ültek, s közös tálból ettek. A nők a férfiak háta mögött álltak, s a vállukon átnyúlva szedtek a közös tálból. A gazdasszony felszolgált, s a kemence mellett fogyasztotta el az ételt. Külön ettek a gyerekek is. Az öregeket szintén félreültették. A 20. században ez megváltozott, s családunkban férfiak, nők együtt ettek. Általában csak kanalat használtak az étkezéshez, amely fából vagy alumíniumból készült. A villa és a külön tányér az első világháború után kezd elterjedni. S még egy dolog: az étkezésekhez hozzátartozott az imádkozás. Az ötvenes években ez a mi családunkban is létezett, hangosan imádkoztunk. A hatvanas években aztán eltűnt ez a szokás. Fokozatosan, először a hangos imádkozás maradt el, s étkezés előtt mindenki magába fordulva mormolta el a szokásos imát, aztán ez is megszűnt, elhagytuk ezt a szertartást. [29]

Összegzés

Farkas Pál úgy összegzi a palóc étkezést, hogy *„a mindennapi táplálkozás csodálatosan szegényes"*. A télit egyenesen elszomorítónak tartja, mert *„száraz hüvelyesből, krumpliból, sült tökből, tökmagból áll"*. Hozzáteszi, hogy a jobb módúak, azaz *„a jobbágyember természetesen jobban él, annak nem kell »zsirzónak« egy-egy vén tyúkot levágni, van elég zsírja a kamrában s husvétra marad mindig disznóláb (sonka) is. Rendszeresen issza a kávét meg a »tehát«, sőt akárhányszor »bádoghalat« (szárdinia) is eszik a »puffancs« (zsemle) mellé"*. A többség számára nem ez volt a jellemző. A szegénység érzékeltetésére Szabó Zoltán a mezőkövesdi orvos statisztikáját mutatja be. Az orvosnak 3.540 étkezésről van adata: *„Az összes étkezésekben háromszor szerepelt főtt tojás, kétszer rántotta (3540 étkezésből!). Tej az összes étkezéseknek 1,35%-ában fordult elő, és ebben benne vannak az iskolai tejadagok is. Szűzkenyér és olajos kenyér az összes étkezések 41,28%-át teszik. Gombotalevest esznek és lebbencslevest, rántottlevest, csíklevest és krumplilevest, ez az ebédjük. A vacsorájuk csaknem mindig, az ebédjük igen sokszor kenyér. Szalonna az összes étkezéseknek mindössze 5,67%-át teszi ki"*. Ez a két világháború közti helyzet Mezőkövesden.[30]

Az ételekről szóló fejezetet Farkas Pál megjegyzésével fejezem be: A

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hétköznapokon, IN: BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): III. 476–478. CS. SCHWALM Edit (2002): *A palóc népi táplálkozás jellemzői,* IN: KAPROS – LENGYEL – LIMBACHER (szerk.): 426–427.

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palóc ember *„aratás idején 9-10-kor lefekszik, a hajnali harangszó már munkában találja s 5 óra felé früstökre, sokszor éhomra, bevág egy nagy bögre »huborkasaloátoát« s a savanyú levit úgy felhörpinti utána, hogy láttára holmi »maznahasú« kabátos ember menten hideglelést kapna. Neki kutyabaja se, nagyokat szippant rá a kurtaszárú veres pipából, pedig az étetős madár kiejti a bogarat a szájából, ha a füstjén keresztülröppen. A pipa a leghűbb barátja, mindig ott szorong hátul a gatyakorcz kötőjére akasztva, vagy 3-4 szál masina (gyufa) társaságában a kalapzsinór megett és elkíséri gazdáját még abba a sírgödörbe is, a hol már csak »befelé nő a bajúsz«. Legtöbb embert »hektyika« (tüdővész) visz oda s véle csak a köszvényes hasogatás mérkőzik, mert a többi rossznyovolyát és czifranehéssíget könnyen kiheveri a palócz”.*[31]

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[31] FARKAS Pál: *Nógrád vármegye népe.* IN: BOROVSZKY Samu (szerk.): *Magyarország vármegyéi és városai. Nógrád vármegye,* Budapest, 1911. 157.

Tássia V. Brandão Teixeira[1]

Between history and law:
reflections about the history and
legal fundaments of the recognition
of Quilombola communities in Brazil

Abstract

Originated in the context of a slavery regime in Brazil which lasted up to 1888, quilombo communities were an expression of resistance against such a system of oppression and through its existence faced marginalization and in were forced to secrecy, which imposed several challenges to the legal recognition of such remaining communities in the last decades. They were first referenced to in official documents of the Portuguese Empire dating back to 1559, all the same not being seem as subjects to rights. Brazil's first Land Law from 1850 effectively deprived quilombo communities of rights over the lands they inhabited by excluding forms of land occupation other than purchase or granting by the State from legal recognition. It is only by the 1990's that the public authorities' commitment to legitimate and issue land titles for remaining quilombo communities is finally set through legal dispositives. This paper aims to reflect on the developments on recognition of quilombola communities in Brazil through listing and examining legal provisions published in the last decades regarding the subject matter.

Keywords: quilombos; afro brazilians; tribal peoples; ethnic communities; slavery; land rights; collective property;

According to Clóvis Moura,[2] the first reference to the existence of quilombos in official documents of the Portuguese Empire dates back from 1559. However, it is in 1740 that Portugal's Overseas Council defines quilombo as *„all housing of over five runaway blacks, partly unpopulated, even though having not raised up ranches nor pestles may be found in them"* (MOURA: 1988, 16). The author himself defines quilombo as a form of socio-political organization linked to the concept of resistance, inserting quilombos beyond the context of slavery and extending it to the dynamics of ethnic territorialization that occurred after abolition. Currently, from the text of article 68 of the Federal Constitution of 1988, the term quilombo has taken on a new meaning to indicate the situation of segments of the black population in different regions and contexts in Brazil, referring to the lands purchased by freed

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blacks; peaceful possession by ex-slaves; land abandoned by landowners in times of economic crisis; the occupation and administration of the land donated to the patron saints or lands that were delivered to or acquired by former slaves organized in quilombos, and other forms of land occupation that allowed the maintenance of community ties based on the experience of Africans and Afro Brazilians who were enslaved in the country.

So far there is no consensus on the number of quilombola communities that exists in the country but official data from Secretaria Especial de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial (SEPPIR) (Special Secretariat for Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality) and Instituto de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA) [Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform], point out that there were, up until January 2019, 2682 quilombola communities officially certified by Fundação Cultural Palmares [Palmares Cultural Foundation], from the Ministry of Culture, and 1290 land regularization processes underway at INCRA. Coordenação Nacional de Comunidades Quilombolas (CONAQ) (National Coordination of Quilombola Communities), estimates that we have more than four thousand remaining quilombo communities nationwide.

The very first Land Law in Brazil was published in 1850, in the wake of Eusébio de Queirós Law which banned the entrance of enslaved Africans, legally abolishing the slave trade through the Atlantic in the Brazilian Empire. Thus, in September 18, only 14 days after, Law Nº 601 was signed, regulating unpopulated lands of the Empire and restricting legal possession over land to those purchased or directly granted by the State. Therefore, the Land Law excluded forms of land occupation such as pacific possession, which effectively deprived quilombo communities of rights over the lands they lived on. It was only in 1964 through Law Nº 9504 that it was recognized the State's role in guaranteeing access to land in a very thorough statute.

In 1995, due to a delay and in the absence of a specific law for regulating the matter, INCRA, through Regulatory Ordinance Nº 307, enacted several regulations in order to solve pending issues. Among these regulations it should be highlighted the guideline that each project should take into consideration the "status quo" in the community.

It is true that Instituto de Terras do Estado de São Paulo (ITESP) (Land Institute of the State of São Paulo) was the pioneer in setting up regulation and legitimation of rights to public lands by the remaining quilombo communities with Law No. 9757 from September 15, 1997. The law set the commitment of the public authority in the issuance of public land titles to attest the legitimacy of settlements by the remaining quilombo communities, as well as guaranteed that the issuance of the

titles would be free of cost for the communities, which would be represented by their respective associations. Another important aspect of the law refers to the requirement of an inalienability clause to be included in the issued title.

Further analyzing the law, it is deserving of note the provision in Article 3 which stipulates a period of 60 days for establishing directives to define the beneficiary subjects, as well as the criteria related to territoriality in the demarcation of ownership over the lands occupied by the quilombo communities. In 1998, the Ministry of Culture, through Fundação Palmares, went on to issue norms referring to the identification, recognition and delimitation of quilombola lands at federal level.

In 2001, Decree Nº 3912 was issued which discontinued a long process of congressional debate over the need for a new law to regulate the Article 3 provisions, negotiated amongst a wide range of actors involved in the issue. It established a time criterion for the recognition of rights of the remaining quilombo communities. The Sole Paragraph of Article 1 of Decree No. 3912 from 2001 determines the following:

> Sole Paragraph: *ownership can only be recognized over lands that:*
> I – *were occupied by quilombos in 1888*;
> II – *were occupied by remnants of quilombo communities by October 5, 1988*.

However, this legal provision ended up hampering the effectiveness of the constitutional mandate, considering that this temporal condition would mean excluding those who had fought against the slavery system in the previous period and by some way no longer had hold of their lands.

In this sense, it is worth quoting jurist Brito Pereira:

> *It would be offensive to the principle of equality that the right should be acknowledged for remnants of quilombos established in 1888 and not to those that existed in times past and did not manage to proceed in its permanence until the appointed time*.[3]

Thus, the Decree failed to achieve the objective of Article 68 from Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias (ADCT) (Temporary Constitutional Provisions Act) of the Brazilian Constitution, which is guided by a contemporary perspective aiming to ensure that ethnic groups closely linked to the slavery process exercise their rights of self-

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[3] BRITO PEREIRA, Deborah M. D.: *Breves considerações sobre o Decreto* nº 3.912/01, apud ALMEIDA, Alfredo Wagner: *Os quilombos e as novas etnias.* 122.

determination, taking in consideration the individual dynamics of each group. And if the offense to the principle of equality was not enough, Decree Nº 3912 from 2001 was also arbitrary by preventing the conception of diverse ways of collective life as of October 5, 1988, which was contrary to social dynamics since lifestyle changes do not affect the cultural identity of the remaining communities.

Therefore, on November 20, 2003, Decree Nº 4887 was signed by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, regulating the procedures for identifying, recognizing, delimitating, demarcating and titling of lands occupied by remnants of quilombo communities referred to in Article 68 of the ADCT and repealing Decree Nº 3912.

Before its publication, the abovementioned decree was the subject of many discussions with the involvement of all sectors engaged in achieving the rights of the remaining communities in order to improve the heavily criticized administrative procedure in Decree Nº 3912.

Decree Nº 4887 explicitly revoked Article 25 of the previous decree and brought in its own Article 2 the following wording:

> Art. 2 *For the purposes of this Decree, are considered remnants of quilombo communities, according to self-attributed criteria, ethnic-racial groups with their own historical trajectory, endowed with specific territorial relations, with presumable black ancestry related to resistance to the historical oppression suffered by them.*

Consequently, the main criterion for identifying a quilombola community is self-attribution, an identification method by which the communities are self-assigned as remnants of quilombos, in compliance to Article 12 of International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169, to which Brazil is a signatory country. The paragraphs from Article 2 of Decree Nº 4887 bring more defining elements related to the remaining communities, such as the territoriality indicated by the remnants of quilombo communities, among which spaces for housing, economic and social exploration and cultural activities are considered.

The Ministry of Agrarian Development is responsible, through INCRA, for identifying, recognizing, delimiting, demarcating and titling the lands occupied by the remaining quilombo communities. It is worth noting that such competence will not be exercised at a loss for competing competencies of States, Municipalities and the Federal District that already deal with the subject.

Finally putting an end to the intense controversy regarding the land model for the identification and delimitation of these areas, the procedure for the recognition of quilombola territories is described in Article 3, which thus provides:

Art. 3 *The Ministry of Agrarian Development, through Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária - INCRA, is responsible for identifying, recognizing, delimitating, demarcating and titling of the lands occupied by remaining quilombo communities, without prejudice to the competing competence of the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities.*

§ 1 INCRA shall regulate administrative procedures for the identification, recognition, delimitation, demarcation and titling of lands occupied by the remnants of quilombo communities within sixty days of the publication of this Decree.

§ 2 For the purposes of this Decree, INCRA may establish accords, contracts, agreements and similar instruments with agencies of federal, state, municipal and Federal District public administrations, non-governmental organizations and private entities, observing the relevant legislation.

§ 3 „The administrative procedure will be initiated officially by INCRA or at the request of any interested party.”

The titling of lands occupied by quilombolas was addressed in Article 17 of the decree based on the communal occupation of the lands, granting a collective and *pro indiviso* title, with insertion of an inalienability, imprescriptibility and unenforceability clause being mandatory. The collective titling of quilombo lands proved itself to be a wise measure since such a system prevents the fragmenting of territories into small individual titles of property, protecting quilombola communities against real estate speculation, considering the prohibition on transferring these properties to third parties.

Therefore, collective property is defined as not only the specific place where members live, but also the ones used for agriculture, cattle rising and extractive activities, with due regard to the seasonality of activities, spaces for recreation, religious activities and also the necessary factors for their physical, socioeconomic and cultural reproduction, aiming to preserve cultural identity.

Finally, Decree Nº 4887 from 2003 can be considered as a significant step forward in solving the problem of quilombola property by guaranteeing land titling and, most importantly, by corroborating the use of self-identification criteria of remaining quilombo communities in accordance with ILO Convention 169.

Quilombola communities stand out for being groups of ethnic identity distinct from other groups present in brazilian society. The Associação Brasileira de Antropologia (Brazilian Association of Anthropology) defined quilombola communities as being „*groups that developed resistance practices in maintaining and reproducing their characteristic ways of life in a given place*”.

These groups have their origins linked to the resistance against the

slavery regime in Brazil, which was based on the subjugation of black people forcibly brought from the African continent to the country as slave labor. The constitution of these communities took place according to a dynamic based on ethnic and cultural diversity in the formation of quilombos, including the presence of white and indigenous people as well as *mestizos*, which occurred for the duration of the slavery regime and even after its abolition in 1888.

For being characterized as groups that adopt the common use system of their conceived territories, in which the collective and indivisible space is occupied and exploited through consensual rules by the diverse family groups that compose the communities, quilombola communities can be considered a tribal community and therefore ILO Convention 169 is applicable.

The right to self-identify as a quilombo descendant community finds solid backing in Anthropology, as Article 1 of ILO Convention 169 provides in its item 2:

> Article 1
> [...]
> 2. *Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.*

Identification and recognition procedures can be carried out officially by INCRA or at the request of any community that self-identifies as a descendant of quilombos – an identification that will be registered in the Registro Geral de Comunidades Remanescentes de Quilombos (General Register of Remnant Communities of Quilombos] by Fundação Cultural Palmares, which is responsible for issuing the certificate of the act in accordance with Article 3, § 4, of Decree Nº 4887 from 2003. Afterwards, a whole set of actions – such as anthropological research, compilation of technical reports, assembling of factual, historical and social data, survey of the property's chain of ownership up to their myths of origin – are initiated to implement constitutional rule

Regulatory Ordinance Nº 98 published by Fundação Cultural Palmares on November 26, 2007 established that the issuance of the „*certificate of self-identification as remnants of quilombos"* and the entry of the community in the general register is subject to procedures such as presenting a summarizing account of the group's common trajectory and submitting documents such as photos, news reports, studies, among others, that can attest to the group's common history or its cultural manifestations. By imposing the requirement of justifying its remaining quilombo character to the communities, said Ordinance represents a restriction of the right to self-identification.

In face of the debate over the criterion of self-identification and the need to recognize this new category of subjects of rights, production of reports to substantiate the recognition of these communities became subject to discussion in the juridical environment and the academia as well as there was legal provision stating that the recognition criterion would be self-identification.

One of the major stalemates was related to territoriality, given the difficulty in establishing territorial limits, observing spaces for housing and for economic, social, cultural, religious and leisure activities.

Anthropological studies also observe that in order to verify if a certain community can be recognized as quilombola, analyzing the social construction inherent to that group, how the social agents perceive themselves and how they aimed to build the category they consider themselves belonging in is necessary. Such a construct is more efficient and suited to the reality of quilombola communities than the simple imposition of temporal or any other criteria that date back to the colonial concept of quilombos.

Ensuring land access for the remaining communities is a model of reparation for the injustice suffered by the black population in Brazil for centuries. However, ensuring access to land does not meet all the needs of these communities who suffer from gaps in areas such as education, health, basic sanitation and power supply, among many others.

In many cases the isolation in which these communities live made it incredibly difficult to obtain accurate information and to broaden the population's knowledge about the remaining quilombo communities. However, this same factor contributed to the survival of organized groups with their own traditions and territorial relations, forming an ethnic and cultural identity that must be respected and preserved.

Nowadays the reality of these communities is well known and, therefore, the State has a duty to develop policies to guarantee not only the preservation of Brazilian material and immaterial heritage, but promote the social and economic development of the remaining quilombo communities as well, enforcing Article 3 of the Brazilian Constitution in which the fundamental objectives of the Federative Republic of Brazil are laid out.

Therefore, it is up to the public authorities in all spheres of power to promote actions with the clear objective of establishing material equality and to, in some way, repair the injustices suffered from the slavery process and its damaging consequences.

Public policies can be considered as the actions taken by the State within scope of achievement and attainment of established goals – the public administration being responsible for its implementation. They are characterized as state action programmes, of which main objective is enabling the realization of fundamental rights.

However, it should be noted that such policies arise from the united efforts of organized civil society, political parties and the government and therefore the process of shaping public policies in a Democratic Rule of Law must include citizens in order to demand action towards the intended purposes by the State.

The elaboration process is characterized by the participation of various segments of society which oversee its implementation. The public power, on the other hand, must not only implement, but also oversee and coordinate tasks to put these policies in place. Dallari Bucci addresses the matter as follows:

> *Public policy is the governmental action program that results from a legally regulated process or set of processes - electoral process, planning process, judicial process - aiming to coordinate the means available to the State and private entities, for the achievement of socially relevant and politically determined goals. As an ideal type, public policy should aim to achieve defined objectives, expressing the selection of priorities, the reserve of means necessary for its achievement and the timetable in which results are expected to be achieved.* (BUCCI, 132.)

It can be said that such guidelines and directives of public administration's responsibility must achieve the common good, having as subject matters of general interest, reflecting the idea of government planning or action program for a specific sector of interest of the collectivity, influencing the life of all citizens or at least part of them.

Thus, public policies became a fundamental instrument for the preservation and guarantee of fundamental rights present in the Federal Constitution, which will only be realized with the implementation of these policies. In this sense, State action must be accurate and objective.

Under the coordination of SEPPIR, the federal government designed an innovative project for the nation, which demonstrated its commitment to the realization of citizenship rights for the remaining quilombo communities. The relevance and need for universal public policies cannot be denied. On the other hand, in order to fight and overcome inequalities, development of universal policies must be combined with actions that take into consideration the historical record of discriminated ethnic groups.

Consequently, the federal government created the Brasil Quilombola Program under de coordination of SEPPIR in March 12, 2004, with the objective of consolidating the State policy milestones for quilombola areas. Through which it presents actions that focus on positive change in living standards and on organizing the remaining quilombo communities, promoting a set of social goods and services necessary for

their development, always in accordance to the social and cultural reality of these communities. As a development of the Program, the Quilombola Social Agenda instituted by Decree No 6261 from 2007, grouping courses of action aimed at communities in different axes.

The overall coordination of the Program is the responsibility of SEPPIR, which works in coordination to the 11 Ministries that make up its Management Committee. However, it is noteworthy that often the actions to be carried out go beyond the powers of these bodies, making it necessary to establish partnerships with other Federal Government bodies. SEPPIR performs technical visits to the remaining quilombo communities to gather information about their needs in order to identify which actions should be implemented by government agencies and serve as a communication channel with these communities and their leaders.

The government's activities in regards to Brasil Quilombola Program should be directed towards rationalizing the use of natural resources, sustainable development initiatives, guarantee of social rights and access to social security, encouraging the strengthening of cultural identity, implementing governmental action towards the remaining quilombo communities and encouraging Municipalities and States regarding the access of said communities to public policies.

In the rational use of natural resources, agroecological production methods are emphasized in the context of the communities' subsistence and income generation, in the designing of policies and actions capable of increasing the competitiveness of their productive structures, always with the assistance of a managerial, technological and marketing support network.

In reference to sustainability, improved quality of life in tandem with the recovery of economic stability is observed, in order to expand structural reforms and provide sustainable development with equality for all, as well as the development of communities based on the use of alternative technology for land fertilization.

In the cultural context, ensuring the continuity of the remaining quilombo communities is the main focus, by preserving access to land - on which cultural practices and management of the environment are based. It is also worth mentioning the promotion of cultural exchange between black artists and black people from urban and rural populations, rescuing values capable of envisioning the reality experienced by the Brazilian quilombola population, providing a better understanding concerning the ethnic identification of the community.

In regards to food security – defined as the guarantee of conditions to access enough quality food for all based on healthy eating practices - the program envisages the planning of actions to overcome poverty and misery, including actions possibly carried through Fome Zero (Zero

Hunger Program). However, the program also preconizes the need for affirmative actions, improvements in education and in the access to social services, job creation and, as a consequence, the improvement of socioeconomic conditions so as to not rely solely on providing social welfare benefits.

On the subject of healthcare, it must be taken into consideration the occurrence of unsafe living conditions in addition to physical and psychological violence to which the majority of the black population is subjected to, thus requiring specific actions aiming to guarantee physical, psychological and social well-being to the communities. In view of this, a course of actions for prevention, promotion and recovery of the quilombo populations' health in an integral and continuous way is of acute necessity.

The need for housing and basic sanitation to improve the community's living standards is a major subject covered in the program as well, given the hindrances faced by the remaining communities in such aspects. Related projects include rural electrification in all remaining quilombo communities, sewage treatment and construction of a drinking water supply network, setting radio stations to improve communication in communities as well as implementing of mobile and fixed telephony, promoting improvements in infrastructure and social facilities in communities located in the country's border regions, and facilitating area access for the population and transport of goods.

Another subject of the program is income generation aiming at inserting the population in the labor market, increasing production and productivity in addition to expanding the variety of tasks carried out by associations and cooperatives in developing agriculture as well as fish farming and crafts.

The slavery system in Brazil left its remains and one of the problems that arose from it was the social marginalization and exclusion of the remaining quilombo communities, both in trying to legitimize hold over the lands they traditionally occupy and in accessing the social services network.

In the whole process of formation of agrarian property in Brazil, legal means were used based on the privilege of a class in prejudice to the other classes. During the whole process the black population and its descendants were in the undermined classes, either by having the right to property denied or by having to live in hiding on the lands they occupied.

Since a new category of subjects of rights emerges, a new problem emerged related to the identification of this group for the recognition of said rights. As it deals with ethnic groups, it is concluded that the Science of Anthropology is the most apt branch to proceed in the

production of reports that can attest the groups' condition as remaining quilombo communities.

By excluding those who occupied lands before 1888, the time criterion for the recognition of lands occupied by quilombos established by Decree Nº 3912 from 2001, by offending the principle of equality which is an elementary condition of a Democratic Rule of Law, was decisive for its own repeal. In this sense, the publishing of Decree Nº 4887 from 2003 not only amended such unconstitutionality but also entailed a new approach to the recognition of the remaining communities by adopting the criterion of self-identification.

It is true that such criterion is subject of debate, however it is about the applicability of the provisions of the ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples that has been in force since 2003 in Brazil and it is applied over the remaining communities of quilombos that are characterized as tribal peoples as determined by said convention.

All things considered, the fundamental nature of the remaining communities' right to land is not up to discussion, besides the fact that property is not only related to housing, but also works as a link to these individuals' ancestry, thus being considered an extremely important element for the continuity of their traditions.

Even so, the Brazilian State took 15 years to regulate the administrative procedure to identify the subjects of such rights, evidencing its lethargy in face of the commitment made to society regarding fundamental rights. This traditional slowness constituted an offense against constitutional principles, especially that of human dignity.

The public policies carried out, whether at the federal level through the Brasil Quilombola Program or by the States and Municipalities, brought improvement for the communities in view of results achieved. However, the struggle of remaining quilombo communities for the realization of their rights to exercise their citizenship is still evident.

Therefore, the remaining quilombo communities continue to suffer still from the remnants of a past living in hiding, but the results obtained by the constitutional recognition of their rights are already seen through implemented government actions, thus emphasizing the need for the State to fulfill its fundamental objectives as stated in Article 3 of the Federal Constitution.

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Book Review

HENNLICHOVÁ, Marcela, *Entente Cordiale: Development of Anglo-French Relations on the Way to the entente, 1898–1904*. Prague, 2020, 282 s. ISBN 978-80-7308-976-4.

Signing of the so-called Entente Cordiale from 1904 is undoubtedly one of the turning points in the development of Anglo-French relations. At the beginning of the 19th century, the differences between both nations seemed irreconcilable due to the Napoleonic Wars. Although the following decades did not bring significant changes and in 1898 both powers even stood on the brink of war, in April 1903 Lord Lansdowne and Paul Cambon signed a series of agreements that became a springboard for Anglo-French cooperation in the two following world wars. Topics connected with the development of both great powers in the 19th century belong among very attractive and popular areas of historical research in the Czech environment, however, the *Entente Cordiale* lies on the periphery of the general interest of the researchers. Historian Marcela Hennlichová decided to change this and in her first monograph *Entente Cordiale*: *Development of Anglo-French Relations on the Way to the entente, 1898–1904,* she thoroughly explores the genesis of Anglo-French relations at the end of the 19th and the beginning of 20th century culminating in signature of the treaty of 1904.

Right at the beginning of the book the author asks several fundamental questions; firstly, she looks into factors leading to the improvement of mutual Anglo-French relations that enabled concluding the *entente*, she logically does not omit consequences of such a step and at the same time she is interested in territorial claims of the great powers and in their political leaders, who mediated mutual negotiations and helped the British and French find common ground. The readers will familiarize themselves with a detailed analysis of secondary Czech and international literature connected to this topic. The author's work with sources is based on principles of a direct method of historical research with thematically arranged chapters. The structure of the book is simple, apart from the introduction and conclusion, the whole text is divided into seven chapters. System of subchapters would probably enable a better orientation in the text, nevertheless, the chosen concept allows smooth reading and does not disrupt the presentation.

The author analyses overseas positions of both great powers with special attention to the centres of the conflicts. Hennlichová identified three areas essential for the development of Anglo-French relations: 1) Morocco, whose territory excited interest of, apart from France and

Great Britain, also Spain and Italy at the end of the 19th century, 2) Egypt with its tense atmosphere caused by British and French colonial plans in the 1980s escalating into the Fashoda crisis in 1898, and 3) the island of Newfoundland that was considered a strategic commercial point by both signatory countries. The author sees the period of 1902 – 1903 as an important milestone in the Anglo-French relations and bases her claims on a series of steps in British foreign policy: 1) concluding an alliance agreement with Japan, 2) end of the Second Boer War, 3) replacing Prime Minister Marques Salisbury with Arthur Balfour 4) stay of His Majesty in Paris and subsequent French President's visit in London. (HENNLICHOVÁ, 253 – 254)

The author further summarizes the factors that made Great Britain abandon the policy of so-called Splendid isolation, examines the impact of the Dreyfus affair, Second Boer War and Russo-Japanese war on both signatory countries and analyses relations of Great Britain and France to other rivals in matters of power in colonial policy questions, i.e. German Empire, Italy, Spain, Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire. As for the relation of Great Britain and Germany, Hennlichová finds the German maritime expansion a less weighty incentive for stimulating French friendship. „*The Anglo-French relations were supported much more by the anti-British antagonism that appeared in Germany in spring 1903, especially by the attacks the British faced in German press. […] In the context of the above, common Anglo-French entente seemed to be an increasingly desirable alternative.*" (HENNLICHOVÁ, 254 – 255)

The text also emphasises British and French objectives in Niger, Siam, Madagascar and also negotiations about Pacific colonies of New Hebrides and New Caledonia based on mutual correspondence of leading politicians such as French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé, diplomat Paul Cambon, French ambassador to Great Britain Baron de Courcel, British Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Marques Salisbury, Consul-General in Egypt Lord Cromer and Lord Lansdowne, British Minister of War and Foreign Minister.

The seventh chapter informs the reader about the detailed circumstances under which lord Lansdowne and Paul Cambon signed the three agreements, later known as the Cordial Agreement, in April 1904. Communication between particular politicians and submitted proposals for resolving the financial situation of Egypt are being tracked, Hennlichová directly states what territorial changes both parties tried to push through at the last moments before the signature, she outlines the concerns of all involved parties about possible future development as a reaction to signing the *entente*. She also highlights the role of the press, or rather the way the periodicals of both countries commented on the (planned) agreement. The last chapter is concluded with impressions of

individual participants and hopes to put into the *Entente Cordiale*.

The monograph is an important contribution to the study of the history of France and Great Britain in the period before the outbreak of World War I not only because the author deals with a rarely reflected topic, but especially because she bases her conclusions on a broad selection of sources. Hennlichová's research of *The National Archives* in London and *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères* in Paris rates her first book among highly regarded literary works. Although the text is closely focused on a specific topic from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, it is very likely that not only academics, but also layman history readers interested in modern French and British history will find the book appealing.

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