ÖT KONTINENS

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti
Tanszék közleményei*

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*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék közleményei*

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Political position and role of the Upper Chamber of the Hungarian Diet in the process of civil transformation

Abstract

The main and most spectacular scene of the political battles of the Hungarian reform era was thus the bicameral Diet, where, with some simplification, the conservative governing party and the ever-growing reform opposition clashed. There is agreement in the Hungarian special literature that the Habsburg government has been able to exert a greater influence on the Upper Chamber and use them to defend absolutism and to halt progress, but so far historical research has focused primarily on the Lower Chamber, off where the law initiatives were started. This study attempts to show who at all, how many of them and by what political proportions, participated in the Upper Chamber of the Hungarian Diet, and how effectively they could fulfill the role assigned to them by the government.

Keywords: Hungarian reform era; Diet; Upper Chamber; magnates; Pozsony; Count Lajos Batthyány;

In Hungary, the 1848 national liberal revolutionary transformation took place in a peculiar way within legal framework. The bloodless Pest revolution belonging to the „*Spring of Nations*" of Europe was launched to support the reform opposition led by Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894) and Count Lajos Batthyány (1807-1849) in Pozsony (see: Bratislava), and when the absolutistic Habsburg régime yielded to the pressure, all important revolutionary aspirations were enshrined in law by the Diet. The reform opposition, while taking advantage of the foreign policy situation and the support of revolutions, could essentially adhere to the principle what all its defining members, without exception, declared from the beginning of the 1830s: the transformation must happen legally, thus through the institution of the Diet keeping the existing „*rules of game*". The main and most spectacular scene of the political battles of the Hungarian reform era was thus the bicameral Diet, where, with some simplification, the conservative governing party and the ever-growing reform opposition clashed.

There is agreement in the Hungarian special literature that the Habsburg government has been able to exert a greater influence on the Upper Chamber and use them to defend absolutism and to halt progress, but so far historical research has focused primarily on the Lower

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Chamber, off where the law initiatives were started. This study attempts to show who at all, how many of them and by what political proportions, participated in the Upper Chamber of the Hungarian Diet, and how effectively they could fulfill the role assigned to them by the government.

The structure of the Upper Chamber

The structure of the Upper Chamber of the bicameral Hungarian Diet, codified by Article I after the coronation of 1608, was formed and shaped by both written laws and rooted traditions. There are four major groups of participants.[2] Traditionally, the most distinguished order was the high priesthood (see: főpapok), the backbone of which was supplied by the Catholic Church: three archbishops, eighteen county bishops, the principals of the Benedictine and Premonetian monastic orders „re-admitted" by the 1802 royal decree, and so-called titular bishops, who did not have the diocesan governance on the territory of the country, but they were entitled to the title of Episcopal Dignity. In addition to the Catholic High Priesthood, from the Diet of 1790-91, four bishops of the Greek Catholics received royal invitations, and after the Diet of 1792, also the Head of the Orthodox Church and the six Orthodox Bishops. The second most distinguished group in the Upper Chamber was the so-called bannerets (see: zászlósurak): the national high dignitaries and the officials of the king's court. Here were the palatine (nádor) with the greatest realistic power, and his deputy, the Lord Chief Justice (see: országbíró), the Croatian-Slavonic-Dalmatian governor (see: horvát-szlavón-dalmát bán), the Lord Chief Treasurer (see: tárnokmester) and the captain of the Hungarian Royal Noble Guard (see: Magyar Nemes Testőrség kapitánya) established by Maria Theresa in 1760 and finally, two crown guards elected by the Diet from among the candidates of the monarch. In addition to the high dignitaries, most court dignitaries had, for the most part, titles only in name and less tangible power. The third group consisted of Lord Lieutenants (see: főispánok) of forty-six Hungarian, three Slavonian and three Croatian counties, as well as the governor of Fiume and the Hungarian Costal Region. Many of the Lord Lieutenants had eternal titles: the existing palatine was – for example – the Lord Lieutenant in Pest-Pilis-Solt county, the archbishop of Esztergom was in Esztergom county. In addition, over time, many families also received hereditary lord-lieutenancy: the princes Batthyány, for example, in Vas county, the princes Eszterházy in Sopron

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[2] More about the groups which the Upper Chamber consisted of, see: PÁLMÁNY, Béla: *A reformkori magyar országgyűlések történeti almanachja, 1825-1848. 1-2.* Budapest, 2011. 1. 14–23.; SZIJÁRTÓ M., István: *A diéta. A magyar rendek és az országgyűlés, 1708-1792.* Keszthely, 2010. 46–49.; KECSKEMÉTI, Károly: *Magyar liberalizmus, 1790-1848.* Budapest, 2008. 76–78.

county, the Illésházys in Liptó and Trencsén county, and the Pálffys in Pozsony county performed duties of Lord Lieutenant. The last group of the Upper Chamber consisted of aristocracy, so-called magnates (see: mágnások), who, unlike the previous categories, were not present in the Diet by office or ex officio, but by personal right. Theoretically, all men from the family of magnate, such as from family with rank of Baron, Count or Duke, who were of the twenty-first year of life received a letter of invitation, so-called regal (see: regális), signed by the king and had the right to appear in person in Pozsony. The appearance of the invited magnates was mandatory in principle under customary law and many other acts, and they were required to send envoy to the Lower Chamber if they were prevented from attending. The number of potentially invited magnets, along with the nationalized ones, reached four or even five hundred, but the number of attendees was far below this maximum. The reasons for this are manifold: from the high proportion of the nationalized magnates (see: indigena), the lack of adequate Hungarian language skills characteristic of the aristocracy, through the absence of political interest to the essential element that participants had to keep standing accomodation and aristocratic conditions of life for several years generally in Pozsony far away from the family estates, which was financially burdensome for them. In addition, the group's ability to assert its political interests was difficult, as we shall see later. Finally, it is worth noting that Croatia was represented by two envoys in the Lower Chamber and by one on the Upper Chamber.

The appointment of most ecclesiastical and secular high dignitaries was heavily dependent on the goodwill of the respective ruler: the honor, power and, by the way, considerable income, by the appointment, resulted in loyalty to the ruler and government. The only exception was the families with hereditary lord-lieutenancy, where the appointment was not influenced by the mercy of the ruler but by customary law. The magnates, however, represented only themselves or their families, and were not bound by any constraints, restrictions or instructions.

Power relations of the two chambers of the Diet

The reciprocal power relations of the Lower and Upper Chambers of the Diet have undergone significant changes over time. István Szijártó in his work „The Diet" convincingly proved that in the course development of the Diet in the 18th century, the political power of the Lower Chamber became greater than that of the Upper Chamber, as the Hungarian nobility dominated by the wealthy landed gentry (see: köznemesség), the so-called *bene posessionati*, replaced the Hungarian nobility leaded by

aristocracy (see: magnates).[3] This restructuring process continued to grow – albeit not in unbroken manner – from the middle of 18th century to the 1830s, to – in the narrower sense – the reform era. The rearrangement of power relations was due, among other things, to the take-over of the landed gentry in the counties and their social independence.[4] Traditionally, the leadership of the county was widely exercised by the most loyal, Habsburg-friendly Lord Lieutenant appointed by the monarch. However, the actual leadership came under the control of the Deputy-Lieutenant (see: alispán) was in the 18th century. In parallel with eclipsing of the Lord Lieutenants, the wealthy landed gentry took the leadership over from the big landlords in the county general assemblies.[5]

As a result of holding of middle-level, regional governance, the weight of the county envoys continued to increase in the Lower Chamber, and when the vote counting system was finalized between 1790 and 1825, the county envoys clearly played the decisive role.[6] As the county gentry became the leader of the Lower Chamber, the power ratio of the Lower and Upper Chambers shifted towards the former, in its favor.[7] The basic prerequisite for the legislature, symbolizing total public will, was an agreement between the two Chambers. This consensus-based agreement could be solved by exchanging messages in most cases during the 18th century.[8] In the event of a failure, mixed sessions were held and attempts were made to reach an agreement, but in spite of this, separate meetings and the search for compromise with messages were common practice, and by 1825 this system had been finalized. However, as the liberal gentry in the 1830s took over control of the county assemblies and the traditional opposition in the Lower Chamber, two main methods of defense offered themselves for the government. On the one hand, regaining the effective control of the Lord Lieutenant in the counties, and even instead of or beside them, by appointing full-fledged administrators, suppressing the opposition voices. On the other hand, with the help of the palatine and the secular and ecclesiastical high dignitaries, ensuring the rigid resistance of the Upper Chamber to the grievances and demands of the Lower

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[3] SZIJÁRTÓ (2010): 401–405.; SZIJÁRTÓ M., István: *The Diet: The Estates and the Parliament of Hungary, 1708-1792*. IN: Gerhard, AMMERER; William, D GODSEY JR; Martin, SCHEUTZ; Peter, URBANITSCH; Alfred, Stefan WEISS (eds): *Bündnispartner und Konkurrenten des Landesfürsten?* Die Stände in der Habsburgermonarchie. München, Wien 2007. 151–171.

[4] SZIJÁRTÓ (2010): 18.

[5] Ibid. 375–376.; More about the counties, see: Jean BÉRENGER–KECSKEMÉTI, Károly: *Országgyűlés és parlamenti élet Magyarországon, 1608-1918*. Budapest, 2008. 38–41.

[6] More about the Lower Chamber's voting system, see: KECSKEMÉTI: 78–81.

[7] SZIJÁRTÓ (2010): 18.

[8] More about messaging, see: Ibid. 75–76.

Chamber, preventing that any bill which would bring any substantive change could come to the ruler for final adoptation.

On the Diet, held in 1832-36, it was proved that the magnates no longer strived for legislative unity; on the contrary, they had almost a de facto right of veto and applied it in all cases.[9] During the parliamentary debates, the message of the Lower Chamber was sent back seven times during the discussion of religious issues, eleven times during the debate on the wording of the primary grievances, and seven times during the debate about titling King Ferdinand and from the time of the proceeding against Baron Miklós Wesselényi (1796-1850), the leader of the opposition (June 1836), until the closing of the Diet (May 1836), the protest of the Lower Chamber was suppressed sixteen times. The diet correspondent, Lajos Kossuth noted in annoyance in March 1833: „*Therefore what we could say about the members of the Upper Chamber so far, that they do not need either Hungarian language, religious freedom, publicity, no redressing for grievances, no trading certainty, no junction, no Partium, Transylvania. The question is what do they need at all then?*"[10] Ferenc Kölcsey (1790-1838) envoy of Szatmár also sharply criticized and questioned the legitimacy of the procedure used. „*I wouldn't wonder if there was a question between nobility and the taxing people, if there were the whole nobility and here the representatives of the taxing people, [...] but now there are noble and noble, namely there is question between 500 and 700,000 nobles on the one hand. [...] the 700,000 have declared themselves twice, and by what right the five hundred are so hard to resist? I have only one veto in our civil constitution, and that is bound to the crown, [...].*"[11] Thus, Kölcsey questioned the restraint of the Upper Chamber and based his reasoning on the fact that while the Lower Chamber primarily represented the entire nobility of 700,000 through the county envoys, the Upper Chamber only represented approximately 500 ecclesiastical and secular high dignitaries and magnates. In spite of his opinion, however, the process of the Upper Chamber seemed to become rooted.

Political power relations of the Upper Chamber

However, it is quite difficult to find out how many and who participated in the work of the Upper Chamber of a Diet or what proportion they belonged to one or another political trend. It is not

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[9] KECSKEMÉTI: 101.

[10] KOSSUTH, Lajos: *Országgyűlési Tudósítások*. S. a. r.: 1–3. A Történettudományi Intézet munkaközössége, vez. Barta, István, 4–5. BARTA, István, Budapest, 1948-1961. *Magyarország újabbkori történetének forrásai*. Kossuth Lajos Összes Munkái [KLÖM]. 1–5. 1. *Országgyűlési Tudósítások* 22. sz.

[11] Ibid. 1. *Országgyűlési Tudósítások* 24. sz.

enough simply to open official register of the Diet at random, as they may paint an over-representation of the audience: many actors were listed who did not attend the Diet in Pozsony at all, or even they were not present at the solemn opening of the Diet, maybe they visited a couple of sessions. However, there are examples that someone actively involved in dietary negotiations, but we do not find his name in the official list. Even if we take into consideration the other type of official source, the housing books – usually published at the beginning of the Diet, always taking a snapshot of the situation – we can not come closer to the truth. Finally, it is possible to study the Upper Chamber Diary, which accurately recorded who spoke and how many times during the sessions, but they started being kept only in 1840, and thus can only be used in case of the last two dietary assemblies.

With the exception of Béla Pálmány's monumental parliamentary almanac[12] on individual Diets, no one has so far undertaken to assemble participants in the Upper Chamber. Pálmány – aiming at completeness – used the dietary registers and housing books to compile the lists, of course, noting that, in reality, many did not attend the Upper Chamber meetings. In our opinion, we can get much more realistic, though still incomplete picture, if we compile a list of members of the Upper Chamber from those members who were watched closely by the Habsburg court, so that the cumulative secret police characterizations may be ideal sources. In this case, not only a list of magnates can be created, but it is also possible to separate the opposition grouping.

The Habsburg government has sent secret agents to the Diets already in time of the Napoleonic Wars to produce regular reports. In 1825, however, a special organization was created under the name *Geheimer Dienst*, headed by Leopold Valentin Ferstl until March 1848. The intermittent organization, set up over and over again for the duration of the Diet, had two main activities. One of its units dealt with the monitoring of foreigners, busy inns, dietary youth and the most dangerous opponents; the other attended public sessions of the Diets. The so-called *Sitzungsreferents* made detailed records of the sessions for daily allowance, and these reports were subsequently checked by senior informants of the Habsburg government that night. Ferstl also made brief reports on the day of the meeting and then sent also the revised texts the next day. After that, probably the same day or the day after, the reports were put before the ruler or the government. The large amount of documents produced in this way help to formulate various characterizations: from the participants of the four Diets, held between 1825 and 1840, detailed descriptions were provided, which served mostly the personnel policy of the government. The characterization

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[12] PÁLMÁNY

indicated the age, marital status, religious affiliation, and financial status of the individual, usually inaccurately known. In addition, it outlined his political career, his role in the Diet, and his public statements on major issues. It also tuched upon the politician's general judgment, his public ambitions, and proposed possible appointments or honors. From 1830, at the end of the characterization, the „*political classification*" of the person was also included. Diet participants were rated on a seven-point scale: the most trusted politicians were rated as extreme rightist, and the most dangerous opponents rated as extreme and ultra-leftist.[13] Let's face it, the characterizations on the seven-point scale did not fully capture political affiliation, so they did not rank categories ranging from radical liberals to ultra-conservatives, but ranked participants in the Diet based on the level of danger judged by the court and government. In addition the position was influenced by the content of the pro-government or opposition manifestations and several other factors, such as political ability, parliamentary presence, activity at meetings, the number of speeches, their quality, and even one of the main problems – in case of magnates – the knowledge of the Hungarian language, as well as intellectual abilities, wealth and family background, and a mobilizable network of relationships.

According to police profiles, after a long pause, at the Diet convened in 1825-27, the secret police considered only ninety persons of the officially recorded hundred-seventy-eight participants[14] worthy of mention: fourteen high priests, twelve bannerets, twenty-six Lord Lieutenants, the governor of Fiume, thirty-six magnates and the Croatian envoy.[15] In thirty cases out of ninety, the secret police noted that the person was a member of the opposition. The opposition, which was organized mainly on the basis of grievances, was led by a nationally known and newly appointed banneret, Count István Illésházy (1762-

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[13] More about secret police characterizations, see: PAJKOSSY, Gábor: *Kölcsey, ahogy az országgyűlési titkosszolgálat 1836-ban látta.* Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények 2001. 105. évf. 3–4. sz. 458–464.; PÁLMÁNY: 1. 62–64.

[14] *SERIES Statuum et Ordinum Regni Hungariae, ac Partium eidem adnexarum, qui ad Comitia, in diem 11. Septembris Anni 1825. in Liberam et Regiam Civitatem Posoniensem indicta, vel in Persona, vel per Nuncios suos comparuerunt, cum subsequis Mutationibus.* IN: *Felséges Első Ferentz Austriai Császár, Magyar és Cseh Ország Koronás Királyától Po'sony Szabad Királyi Várossában, 1825-dik Esztendőben, Szent-Mihály Havának 11-dik napjára rendeltetett Magyar Ország Gyülésének Írásai.* I. Pozsony, 1825–1826. 1–28.

[15] Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (National Archives of Hungary) [MNL OL] I 58. Bécsi levéltárakból kiszolgáltatott iratok. Kabineti iratok. Jelentések a magyar országgyűlések tárgyalásairól. 10. Ungarischer Landtag vom Jahre 1825, 1826, 1827. Charakteristik seiner Mitglieder zu den Staatskonferenz. Akten gehörig; MNL OL I 50. Bécsi levéltárakból kiszolgáltatott iratok. Hungarica aus der Privatbibliothek S. M. Franz I. Karakteristische Skizze über die Mitglieder des ungarischen Landtags in den Jahren 1825–1827.

1838), who had a strong political experience. Members of the opposition were largely made up of magnates, but, according to the summaries, several Lord Lieutenants and a crown guard strengthened their ranks. The young reform-minded magnates formed a rudimentary social-public club around Count István Széchenyi (1791-1860) and his friend Count György Károlyi (1802-1877). Thus, one third of those in the Upper Chamber were in opposition, but their low political weight was not primarily due to their proportion, but rather to the fact that the majority of the opposition was a magnat. It was not the counting of votes per head but the weighting of opinions that became the dominant practice on the Upper Chamber. The views of secular officials, ecclesiastical high dignitaries and the Lord Lieutenants (sanior pars) pushed much more than those of a few dozen magnates, and even after the speeches had been given, the presiding palatine could go on to consider each comment and then pronounce „*judgment*".

In 1830, at the end of the crowning Diet, which lasted about four and a half months, characterizations were made about a total of sixty-nine people.[16] Thus, the total number of the Upper Chamber differed only slightly from its of Diet 1825-27, but the ratio of the four groups changed to each other: this time twenty-three high priests, nine bannerets, together with the governor of Fiume twenty-six Lords of Lieutenants, the Croatian envoy and ten magnates were listed. Thirteen of them were counted as oppositionists: besides István Illésházy, who was rated „*ultra-leftist*", six Lord Lieutenants and six magnates. In spite of the fact that the crowning of the heir to the throne, Ferdinand, has moved a large section of the Hungarian aristocracy, very few have been able to stand out in the actual political debate, only Miklós Wesslényi – who was placed in the „*ultra-leftist*" category – succeeded in it. Thus, in terms of the number of active politicians, the group of magnates who were present by personal right, was significantly below the 1825-27 Diet, but let us add that the two Diets are not comparable in terms of duration or significance.

At the next 1832-36 Diet, which dealt already with reform issues, the total number of persons undergoing a thorough police investigation by size was at about the same level of the two previous Diets. A total of seventy-two persons were considered worthy of mention: seven high priests, seven bannerets, together with the governor of Fiume twenty-one Lord Lieutenants, twenty-two magnates and the Croatian envoy.[17] In

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[16] MNL OL I 58. Bécsi levéltárakból kiszolgáltatott iratok. Kabineti iratok. Jelentések a magyar országgyűlések tárgyalásairól. 10. Ungarischer Landtag vom Jahre 1830. Geschichtliche Darstellung derselben und Charakteristik seiner Mitglieder, Staatskonferenz. Akten gehörig.

[17] MNL OL I 58. Bécsi levéltárakból kiszolgáltatott iratok. Kabineti iratok. Jelentések a magyar országgyűlések tárgyalásairól. Ungarischer Landtag vom Jahre 1832–1836. 10. Darstellung und Charakteristik seiner Mitglieder zu den

addition to Illésházy, who was already in the „*leftist*" category, this time six Lord lieutenants, the governor of Fiume, and two third of the twenty-two characterized magnates, fifteen received opposition ratings. Wesselényi was repeatedly classified as „*ultra-leftist*" as the opposition leader on both tables of the Diet, and this time also Széchenyi was similarly classified.

In summary we can state, the opposition power in the three Diets, for a number of reasons, still had only weak „*battle positions*". The opposition was not completely entrenched in the magnates: in the first two Diets examined there was clearly one high dignity as a leading personality, however, as the feudal grivance politics was replaced by reform issues, the leadership was noticeably shifted towards the magnates. Within the fourth group of magnates, considering all the three Diets, the opposition had numerical majority, in the two longer and more significant Diets had predominant majority. However, their low number of staff, their short stay in Pozsony, their disorganization, and their customary decision-making, mainly due to the weighting of the Upper Chamber, made it impossible for them to effectively assert their interests.

Ideas for transforming the Upper Chamber

The idea of thinking over and revising the structure of the Upper Chamber and, in this context, that of the Diet, along with the appreciation of the role of the county nobility and thus the role of the Lower Chamber, had been engaging in politics since the 1790s.[18] The criticisms, in addition to questioning the appearance of the title bishops, focused primarily on the magnates capable of producing the highest numbers on paper, who, despite their weak political activity, represented an unregulated and unpredictable mass. The public policy committee set up on the Diet of 1790-91 entrusted Péter Balogh (1748-1818) of Ócsa with the task of reporting on the issue. Balogh insisted that the ruler could only invite a certain number of magnates to attend meetings on the Upper Chamber, which, of course, would not only weaken the aristocracy, but would also include strengthening role of the ruler. However, in the final proposal of the deputation, the interest of a well-off gentry aspiring upwards in the political ladder was more powerfully predominated, whereas someone could not be entered the fourth group

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Staatskonferenz. Akten gehörig; HHStA Ungarn Hungarica Comitialia Fasc 417L. Konv. A.

[18] More about the debate on the Upper Chamber, see: TÓTH-BARBALICS, Veronika: *Reformtervek a felső tábla átalakítására a 19. század első felében*. IN: CSAPLÁR-DEGOVICS Krisztián, TORNYAI Anna (szerk): *Fejezetek a tegnap világából: Tanulmányok a 19-20. század történelméből*. Budapest, 2009. 76–91.

appearing in the Upper Chamber on the basis of magnate title but on the basis of property qualification. In this way, the representation of wealthy magnates would have been extended with the rich members of the gentry, so the aristocracy would not have been a legal group of origin, but a financially distinct entity. Following the revision of the commission's work between 1828 and 1830, the national proposal changed slightly, according to which the number of participants would have been maximized to one hundred and twenty, so only the eldest members of the magnate families would receive a personal royal invitation if they owned landed estate of fifty serf socage at least. Almost all counties, commenting on the National Committee's opinion, were in favor of limiting the number of magnates, and most of them also supported the introduction of a land-based property barrier, but the threshold was generally considered too low. They would have defined the threshold between one hundred and fifty and five hundred serf socage, and they would heve extended even the quota to the whole nobility.[19]

Thus, until the opening of the first reform Diet, there was a majority of opinions that sought to transform the Upper Chamber by reducing the number of magnates of personal right and increasing the representation of the wealthy gentry. However, based on the experience of 1832-36, besides Kölcsey's quoted reasoning that the Upper Chamber has no right to veto, the voices of those were intensified, who saw the solution to the situation in increasing the number of born magnates. Simon Dubraviczky (1791-1849) envoy of Pest county, according to Kossuth's narrative, already on 17 October, 1833, gave voice of his sadness that *„because of the members of the Upper Chamber who are possessing large part of the country and having influence even on issuing of [county] directions they are opposing all matters of the country, so to speak, all efforts are unsuccessful. He is asking worried about what will happen to the country and to the common good if it stays that way? The matter has to be forestalled, and having experienced in the religious subject that many of the magnates are enthusiastic patriots, who are not under supreme influence, have attached themselves to the interests of the home, would like to declare that those who should be here and who leave without legitimation should be posed to legal punishment, [...]"*.[20] Similar opinions were strengthened in 1835, and Pál Felsőbüki Nagy (1777-1857), the envoy of Sopron County, stated upset on 21st January: *„In a week or two, we do as much as we should in a day, and without boredom we can hardly see and listen. And the*

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[19] About this in details, see: VÖLGYESI, Orsolya: *Politikai-közéleti gazdálkodás Békés megyében a reformkor elején. A rendszeres bizottsági munkálatok megyei vitái 1830-1832*. Gyula, 2002. 156–158.

[20] KLÖM 2. *Országgyűlési Tudósítások* 86. sz.

only reason for this sad situation is the Upper Chamber. [...] What is the Upper Chamber now? There are a couple of bannerets, five or six bishops, 10-12 Lord Lieutenants, and punctum. But we can hardly see one of the counterbalancing regalists [magnates]. [...] Why don't they come to protect their ownes? And if they don't come by what they are legally required to do, why not get punished?" [21] The words of the Sopron envoy were not ineffective, and Ödön Beöthy (1796-1854), the envoy of Bihar, considered the words of Pál Nagy to be a motion, citing the envoy instruction of his own county.[22] After a controversy following their two speeches, it was finally accepted, with twenty-one supporters and eighteen opposing votes, that a message to be send to the Upper Chamber calling for law and order to be respected, but this was later rejected – because of re-evaluating the position of four counties – with twenty-two opposing votes.[23]

The views in connection with the group of magnates thus changed: in their new type of opinion, Dubraviczky and Beöthy considered the religious question as a reference, which, by mobilizing the Protestant magnates, resulted in a somewhat positive outcome in their presence in March 1833, and the Upper Chamber begun to discuss it in details at least.[24] Thus, it became obvious for the Lower Chamber opposition that church high dignitaries led by the Catholic High Priesthood, the highly respected bannerets, and the Lord Lieutenants represented by size of twenty-twenty-five persons would, in spite of all their efforts, paralyze effective legislative work. Their rigid resistance can only be – even if not broken – mitigated or positively influenced through a group of magnates. But the basic precondition for this opportunity would have been a massive grouping that was organized and lasting for a long time on the Diet as a whole, but it was missing at that time.

Political rearrangement of the Upper Chamber

At the Diet of 1839-40, the political composition of the Upper Chamber changed significantly. The traditionally loyal Conservatives gathered around the government representatives and palatine József (1776-1847), the new Conservatives led by Count Aurél Dessewffy (1808-1842) held preliminary meetings and developed their own tactics into party political activities, as a third group, under the leadership of Lajos Batthyány (1807-1849), the organization of oppositionist and reformist magnates was also launched with greater force than ever before. Among the secret police profiles this time there were nineteen high priests, eight

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[21] Ibid. 4. *Országgyűlési Tudósítások* 214. sz.
[22] Ibid. 4. *Országgyűlési Tudósítások* 215. sz.
[23] Compare it with: KECSKEMÉTI: 334–335.
[24] About this in details, see: KLÖM 1. *Országgyűlési Tudósítások* 27–31. sz.

bannerets, nine Lord Lieutenants, the governor of Fiume, and sixty-five magnates, a total of one hundred and two participants, who were assigned in ratio of 58:44 in favour of the ruling party.[25] This time all forty-four opposition figures were among the magnates, but inspite of this they were successful on three fronts. On the one hand, the group could not be ignored even in terms of its numberical proportion. On the other hand, opposition magnates began to organize themselves, and in the person of Count Lajos Batthyány they got an exemplary person blessed with excellent organizing and leading ability and extraordinary ambition and dedication, who, at the time of his first appearance, was immediately able to bring people – who became oppositionist for various reasons – together and to give them a program. Thirdly, the launch of the Upper Chamber Diary[26] caused a major change in the power structure of the Upper Chamber, such as the reassessment of the group of magnates, which changed fundamentally the practice of the sitting and decision-making mechanism of the Upper Chamber, since from now on it was clearly the number of votes and not their weight that determined the debates.

During the last two Diets, detailed secret police characterizations are no longer made, so we have to turn to another source type and thus to another „*outside*" observer. In 1843-44, Joseph Andrew Blackwell (1798-1886), correspondent to Sir Robert Gordon the British Ambassador to Vienna, may be called upon. The British diplomat first visited Hungary in 1818, and in the 1840s first sent his diplomatic letters to the British Ambassador in service of the Foreign Office first in semi-official and then in official form. He knew most of the leading politicians personally and felt sympathy for the opposition openly.[27] Considering this study Blackwell's most important report dated on 5 April, 1844, in which he distinguished the participants in the Upper Chamber in three categories: Conservative or Austrian government party; progressive conservatives and oppositionists.[28] He listed a total of twenty-eight high priests, eight bannerets, seventeen Lord Lieutenants, the governor of Fiume, the Croatian envoy and sixty-nine magnates. He considered fourty-one of

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[25] MNL OL I 58. Bécsi levéltárakból kiszolgáltatott iratok. Kabineti iratok. Jelentések a magyar országgyűlések tárgyalásairól. 11. Ungarischer Landtag vom Jahre 1839–40. Darstellung und Charakteristik der Mitglieder des ungarischen Reichstages und Oberhauses zu den Staatskonferenz. Akten gehörig

[26] *Felséges első Ferdinánd ausztriai császár, Magyar- és Csehország e' néven ötödik koronás királyától szabad királyi Pozsony városában 1839-dik évi junius 2-kára rendeltetett magyar országgyülésen a' méltóságos fő-rendeknél 1840. februarius 25-kétől majus 12-ig tartatott országos ülések naplója.* Pozsony, 1840.

[27] More about Blackwell and his missions in Hungary, see: KABDEBÓ, Tamás: *Blackwell küldetése.* Budapest, 1990.; *J. A. Blackwell Magyarországi küldetései, 1843-1851.* S. a. r.: HARASZTI-TAYLOR Éva. Budapest, 1989.

[28] Ibid. 50–53.

the sixty-nine magnates to be oppositionist, and represented György Károlyi already as an oppositionist Lord Lieutenant. Thus, we can state that the magnate opposition, which was organized in the 1839-40s, was able to retain its weight and its increasing interest enforcing role also in the Upper Chamber of the next Diet. And this fact shows that most oppositionist magnates in the mid-1840s, – when the idea of abolishing the noble immunity from taxation was already in the grip of the general public and other important liberal aspirations dominated politics, – persisted in oppositionist values, since a significant proportion of oppositionits magnates came from participants in the former Diet.

We can use the work of Imre Vahot (1820-1879), a newspaper editor and playwright, to compile the members of the Upper Chamber of the last Diet of 1847-48. Vahot started publishing a dietary almanac at the end of the 1843-44 Diet, and then he – already as the editor of *Pesti Divatlap* – wrote and edited another volume at the next Diet, which was, however, publishable due to censorship only in the summer of 1848, in the midst of the new political system. The article in the volume, entitled *„A Brief Description of Most Members of the Last Diet in Pozsony"* (*Az utósó pozsonyi országgyülés legtöbb tagjának rövid jellemzése*), is said – on his own confession – to have been written in such a way that, by browsing through the housing book of the Diet, he was tempted to classify participants in political respect.[29] So we are faced with a different type of source than before, since Vahot compiled the list based on an official dietary document rather than based on his own memories and experiences. However, if we look at the names and compare them with those listed in the housing book,[30] we can see that Vahot did not merely copy the politicians mechanically, but added more people to the register and left others out of his own work. Vahot divided the participants into three groups: opposition, conservative and centre. All in all, he compiled one hundred and ninety-four members of the Upper Chamber: twenty high priests, seven bannerets, thirty Lord Lieutenants and the governor of Fiume, one hundred and thirty-five magnates, and the Croatian envoy. In the case of one hundred and thirty-five, only two politicians were assigned to the centre, seventy-two to the opposition and sixty-one to the ruling party. In addition to the magnates, he also judged three other Lord Lieutenants and a banneret as oppositionist.

Thus, the opposition of the Diet opened on 11 November, 1847, once again remained in a minority, but retained its character giving strength in the magnate group. For example in December 1847 the opposition dragooned the pro-government side into fight bigger than ever and into

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[29] VAHOT, Imre: *Országgyülési emlék. Politikai, történeti és szépirodalmi almanach*. Pest, 1848.

[30] *Az 1847. évi november 7-én megnyilt országgyülésre egybegyült Nm. Fő-és T. rendek névsora és lakásaik*. Pozsony, 1847.

never seen mobilization. Namely, liberal magnates – utilizing the grievances of government policy, which became more violent from 1845, – were able to mobilize a wider circle and put it on the side of the opposition. Thus, after 1832-36, there was once again also an oppositionist banneret and some left-wing Lord Lieutenants. Lajos Batthyány remained the leader of the opposition of the Upper Chamber, who, in close cooperation with Kossuth, led the national opposition and led the legislative work in the spring of 1848 to bring the civil transformation into being.

Summary

Considering the last six Diets, the Upper Chamber, ruled by ecclesiastical and secular high dignitaries, basically met the government expectations, preserving most of its pro-government majority all the time. However, in the early 1840s, the weak opposition grouping around one person (Illésházy, Széchenyi) was able to build strong „*battle positions*" in the Upper Chamber, which often led to serious headaches for the government. An effective oppositionist force was able to consolidate among born magnates: they were the majority in the category of members in the Upper Chamber. By the way, only one or two members of the high priesthood were from among the aristocrats, and by size one-third of the Lord Lieutenants were only gentrys. However, Hungarian Marxist post-1945 historiography made the „*class of big estate owners*" an internal traitor to the national cause, and this topos had been reassessed in a reassuring way only by the end of the 20th century. According to our research, we can state with increasing courage that the majority of the politicizing Hungarian aristocracy was in opposition and even reformist.

The Habsburg government was expecting historical loyalty from the aristocracy in the Upper Chamber, however, Hungarian aristocrats who did not have national dignity or title of Lord Lieutenants, such as members of the most famous magnate families (Andrássy, Batthyány, Eszterházy, Károlyi, etc.) became oppositionists in large numbers and already in organized frames between 1839 and 1940, to the open astonishment of the Habsburg government and the secret police. Of course, it would be superfluous to deny that the most important social basis of civil transformation was not the Hungarian aristocracy, but it is essential to emphasize that oppositionist magnates, with their authority, influence, relation network and not incidentally with their financial situation were active participants, – and let's say it out – indispensable and decisive actors, and some of them direct leaders and creators of the Hungarian civilian reform process. Thanks to the magnate opposition, a non-negligible opposition force has also appeared in the Upper

Chamber, an oppositionist force supporting the lower-table's advanced reform initiatives and statements of grievance. Although because the structure of the Upper Chamber was not possible to overturn the pro-governmental majority concretized with the help of secural and ecclesiastical officials, the members of the magnate opposition were nevertheless successful. They were able to retain their numerical majority and intellectual superiority in the group of magnates, until in 1848, in the turbulent Europe, the Hungarian Upper Chamber had to carry a bill by acclamation to create a civilian transformation of the country.[31]

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[31] A detailed description of the topic see: MELKOVICS, Tamás: *A főrendi liberális ellenzék (1825-1848). Az 1839–40-es diéta főrendi ellenzékének helye és szerepe a polgári átalakulás felé vezető úton*. Budapest, 2018. (doctoral dissertation).

Anna Kőszeghy[1]

Senator William Butler Yeats and the issue of Irish language

Abstract

The Anglo-Irish Treaty brought about a new state in politics and new legislative bodies in the Irish Free State and this political shift resulted in partial Irish independence, There are several branching ideas on how poetry and the „*ancient, cold, explosive, detonating impartiality*"[2] of the Irish mind intricately manifested themselves in the Yeats's contribution to Irish cultural affairs during his Senate years (1922–1928). Of all the roles, the Irish language question may have laid closest to his heart. Acting as a senator has a strong argumentative base in and might be traced back to a time when Yeats himself wrote of Shelley in *The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry*. Yeats's Manuscript Committee could be considered the most prominent: one that shows the importance of cultured speech for cultural themes. Via, speeches, interview, two volumes of his poems and recollections, I wish to show that Yeats considered the preservation of Irish language of utmost importance but in a unique, modern way that made him clash with contemporary public opinion on Irishness.

Keywords: Anglo-Irish Treaty; William Butler Yeats; Manuscript Committee; Senate; Seanad; Irish poetry; Irish signage; P. B Shelley; eloquence; Gaelic; compulsory Gaelic; Byzantium; Abbey Theatre; Irish Academy of Letters; Michael Robartes and the Dancer; The Tower;

There are several branching ideas on how poetry and the „*ancient, cold, explosive, detonating impartiality*"[3] of the Irish mind intricately manifested themselves in the Yeats's contribution to Irish cultural affairs during his Senate years (1922–1928). The poet fulfilled quite a variety of roles: he was a chairman, inspector and cultural ambassador to prisons, schools and Britain, and a keen whistle-blower when standing orders seemed to be disregarded in the Upper House of the Irish government.

Of all the roles, the Irish language question may have laid closest to his heart. That is why Irish language-related speeches given in the Senate and their possible poetic traces, counterparts and slight allusions of the mind within his poetic volumes published during his Senate years

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[2] YEATS, *'On the Boiler'* Part III in *The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats,* Volume V, *Later Essays*, ed. William H. O'DONNELL (New York: Scribner, 1994), 243.

[3] YEATS, 'On the Boiler' Part III in *The Collected Works of W. B. Yeats,* Volume V, *Later Essays*, ed. William H. O'DONNELL (New York: Scribner, 1994), 243.

(*Michael Robartes and the Dancer* – 1921, *The Tower* – 1928) are worth looking at and will be the focal point of this paper. We will make use of interviews and recollections of Yeats from his letters and reminiscences.[4] However minute these traces may be in his poetry, their nature tells a lot about Yeats circumscribing language itself.

In sum, I shall look into Yeats's speeches, memoirs on language, poems of the period and, as Denis Donoghue has put it, my aim is merely „*to provide an impression of the sustaining context*"[5].

Shelley – the beginnings

Acting as a senator has a strong argumentative base in and might be traced back to a time when Yeats himself wrote of Shelley in *The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry*:

> „*In* A Defence of Poetry [1840], *the profoundest essay on the foundation of poetry in English, he [Shelley] shows that the poet and the lawgiver hold their station by the right of the same faculty, the one uttering in words and the other in the forms of society, his vision of the divine order, the Intellectual Beauty. 'Poets, according to the circumstances of the age and nation in which they appeared, were called in the earliest epoch of the world legislators or prophets, and a poet essentially comprises and unites both these characters. For he not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and discovers those laws according to which present things are to be ordained, but he beholds the future in the present* [italics by A.K.], *and his thoughts are the germs of the flowers and the fruit of latest time.' 'Language, colour, form, and religious and civil habits of action, are all the instruments and materials of poetry.' "*[6]

The „*future in the present*" was Yeats's vision to be realised, and his works and insights proved likewise, condensed, distilled into poetry. Yeats's speeches on the issue of Irish language and the role of Irish Gaelic within the state and in administration can illustrate this spark of Shelley's ideas: poets being the „*unacknowledged legislators of the world*".[7] By admitting as well as accepting unacknowledgement, Yeats let go of unnecessary insistence on ideas, and conceived fresh thoughts on

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[4] Trying to prove Yeats wrong in that he is lost: „*A man in his own secret meditation is lost amid the labyrinth he hath made in art or politics...*" .*Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen*, JEFFARES, 316.

[5] Denis DONOGHUE, *Yeats*, 13.

[6] https://hermetic.com/yeats/ideas-of-good-and-evil/the-philosophy-of-shelleys -poetry Accessed: 30 July 2019.

[7] '*A Defense of Poetry*', IN: SHELLEY: *Selected Prose Works of Shelley*, Watts and Co. London, 1915. 118.

Irishry (occasionally with a spark of humour).

Yeats's leading role in the Irish literary revival, the establishment of the Abbey Theatre and the bouleversement of traditions what is considered to be Irish, put him in the foreground of action. Such „*latest time*" is the starting point of transferring his philosophy into spoken words in a political arena when he enthusiastically accepted a nomination for the new Senate. In this sense, it is all the more captivating that Shelley regards those who are merely poets, lawmakers! „*[T]he poet and the lawgiver hold their station by the right of the same faculty [...] a poet essentially comprises and unites both these characters.*"[8] So what happens when a poet, who is perfectly aware of Shelley's views, accepts an office in lawmaking and even becomes an active agent in it?

Positions in the senate

The Senate of the Irish Free State, born out of the ashes of a compromise between Ireland and Great Britain, was an institution at work from 1922, rather different from its later forms. As can be expected, the first Senate had an immense impact on the main principles, debate culture and legislative bases of the Republic of Ireland with the drafting of bills and amendments. During its first six years, when Yeats sat among its members, it was a gathering of a selected few (a poet, bankers, lawyers, businessmen) who considered Senatorship their first and foremost occupation in times of need, strife and Civil War. Those professions will have a special significance later on within the group dynamics of the Seanad and the admittance of the eloquence of the poet.

Yeats himself was nominated for a *Seanad* position thanks to his friend, the Irish poet Oliver St. John Gogarty. Senators were nominated by the President of the Executive Council on 6 December 1922. Suffice it to say, at this time, Irish Republicans often fired at, kidnapped or mutilated government figures or burnt down their houses. This was the perilous time when Yeats assumed permanent residence in Dublin in 1922. To make matters more interesting, he more often than not sided with Irish Protestant Unionists, those nationalists who wished to retain legislative union with Great Britain, but many times voted against this group, and often spoke in opposition to motions introduced by its members. Another example for him never being keen on „*polite, meaningless words*"[9].

Whenever he strongly raised his voice during these years, it was not in political matters in the usual sense (finance or legal affairs) but in

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[8] https://hermetic.com/yeats/ideas-of-good-and-evil/the-philosophy-of-shelleys -poetry Accessed: 30 July 2019.

[9] *Easter 1916*, JEFFARES, 287.

matters of Irish cultural interest. Accordingly, he acted as chairman for three committees during this six-year period. The Irish Manuscript Committee (1923–24), formed to promote research in Gaelic language, music, folklore, and ancient poetry and to compile and publish an adequate dictionary of the older language. The Coinage Committee (1926-28), delineating the beautiful designs of the present Irish currency. The third was the Committee for the Federation of the Arts in Ireland which sought to establish a College of the Arts along the lines of the Swedish Royal Academy.[10] These aligned with Yeats's previous oeuvre on Irish folklore, his interest and knowledge in the different forms of world art and his artistic sense. His speeches as early as 1923 and 1924 touch upon such topics.

As the father of the Irish literary revival after establishing the Abbey Theatre in 1902 (also being the editor of Cuala Press), and compiling milestone collections of Irish mythology and folk literature, it is no surprise that Yeats still felt closer to the more conservative thinkers within the political body, those who held the Irish language very close to their heart. All these proved to be opportunities that might be first hinted at in the volume of poems, *Michael Robartes and the Dancer*, when he penned that he sees „*Chance being at one with Choice at last*"[11].

Eloquence in the rows – The Manuscript Committee

Yeats's Manuscript Committee speech had not only been his chronologically first, but also the most prominent: one that shows the importance of cultured speech for cultural themes. „*Like Keats, he looked on fine phrases like a lover, and he found them everywhere*"[12]

In his very first rising to speak on the issue of Irish language, the collector of *Fairy and Folk Tales of the Irish Peasantry* (1888) did not counteract his previous works, stance and deeds in advocating Irish plays, folk tales, myths and fairy tales: he fervently supported the translation and edition of saga literature, the translation of old Bardic poetry and the need to create critical editions of the Annals of Boyle, Innisfallen and Connaught (three manuscript chronicles of mediaeval Ireland).

To continue this scholarly undertaking, he advised a proper catalogue to be made of the workings of the Royal Irish Academy. Finally, he emphasised the crucial task of publishing a dictionary of Old Irish. It is important to keep in mind that Irish had been a language he did not

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[10] D. R. PEARCE, *The Senate Speeches of W B Yeats*, Faber and Faber, London, 1961, 17.

[11] *Solomon and the Witch*, JEFFARES, 283.

[12] John EGLINTON, *Dublin Magazine*, XXVIII, No 3 July – Sept 1953, 22–26. IN: E. H. MIKHAIL: *Interviews and Recollections*, Vol 1, 1977.

write and did not speak[13] but it may *„give a little weight to [his] words that the greater portion of [his] own writings have been founded upon the old literature of Ireland."*[14] (*The Rose Tree* is especially fitting in a preservational context because in it he ponders: *„Maybe a breath of politic words / Has withered our Rose Tree"*[15]) The process he described as: determining the meaning and use of Old Irish words after more and more texts are made available by editors and photographers for the work of this dictionary.

From the Senatorial era, the same objective exists in at least two instances in Yeats's lines: *„And may these characters remain / When all is ruin once again:"* [16]

The preservation of what is ancient, of what is Old, let it be Irish language or perhaps somewhat parallelly, *„monuments of unageing intellect"*[17] is a theme that runs through his poetry. In *Sailing to Byzantium*, the city remains a primary embodiment of preserved treasures. The well-known Book of Kells and the lesser-known Ardagh Chalice (a hoard of metalwork from the 8th-9th centuries) were also monuments of unageing intellect mentioned in his speeches.

C. M. Bowra, the Yeats scholar who had the chance to interview the poet, reminiscences that *„[Yeats's] choice of words was as striking as his sentences were well-fashioned"*[18]. Only eloquent phrasing was fit for him to describe the necessity of the conservation of Irish language, as shown by the beginning of his Manuscript speech:

> *In the old days in Ireland when we began our imaginative movement which, for good or evil, had a little share in bringing about recent events, we all looked forward to a time when there would be adequate editions of the old literature in Ireland. [...] there is lyric poetry, great lyric poetry in Irish lyric literature that was matured in the time of Chaucer. The work I hope the Seanad will enable the various scholars to do will be a work of science, that is to say, a study of a language which is of great importance to culture, and a study of this old literature.*[19]

The fourth part of the poem *Sailing to Byzantium* abounds in beautiful allusions to old treasures to be kept and reiterated:

> *Or set upon a golden bough to sing*

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[13] Yeats did try to learn the language but did not speak Irish.

[14] Seanad Éireann, Vol 1, 19 April, 1923, On Irish Manuscripts.

[15] *The Rose Tree, Works*, 154.

[16] *To Be Carved On a Stone at Thoor Ballylee*, JEFFARES, 298.

[17] *Sailing to Byzantium*, JEFFARES, 301.

[18] C. M. BOWRA: *W. B. Yeats in Interviews and Recollections*, p. 395. Extracted from *Memories*, 1898–1939, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1966, 230–241.

[19] Seanad Éireann, Vol 1 19 April, 1923, Manuscript Committee.

> *To lords and ladies of Byzantium*
> *Of what is past, or passing, or to come.*[20]

Interestingly, and perhaps linked to it, Yeats has a strong tendency to use sophisticated, carefully chosen and striking words in connection with articulation or language: *sing, sigh, cry, declare, vow, scream, praise* are just a few that humans make; and there is also a variety of sounds characteristic of the poet, belonging to birds, gongs, the wind and the rain. *Solomon and the Witch*, a poem that itself starts as „*[a]nd thus declared that Arab lady"*[21] could be a poem depicting a plethora of spoken languages.

The delivery of this hopeful Senate speech proves the rightfulness of establishing strong opinions on Yeats's eloquently planned spoken style, inseparable from his views on language use. According to collected interviews „*[h]is reading was unlike that of any other man. He stressed the rhythm till it almost became a chant; he went with speed, marking every beat and dwelling on his vowels."*[22] „*That wavering, ecstatic song [...]"*[23] was not only composed in a sophisticated way but was also borrowed by others very often. Another biographer, J. M. Hone observed that „*[t]he Senators of the group often sought Yeats's advice on practical matters, and one of them said: 'Yeats would have made an admirable banker,' and another, 'A great lawyer was lost in the poet.'"*[24] These were the fellow-Senators who were real bankers and lawyers, among whom the poet was beginning to be considered a professional legislator of the world.

Irish Gaelic occupied a special position for Yeats. The critic Denis Donoghue noted that „*language is a symbol for Yeats in which he hoped to find a proof that aesthetic systems are irresistible"*[25] Towards the centre of the Manuscript speech, to save the extant form of Irish, Yeats came up with a new idea: „*The proposal I make will not require a very large sum of money. [...] I have added a clause which would permit a certain portion of the money being expended in training scholars in phonetics, so that they would be able to take down what of Irish literature still remains in the living tongue."*[26] What was the clause about? It briefly suggested „*the scientific investigation of [rapidly*

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[20] Yeats, *Works*, 164.
[21] Yeats, *Works*, 149.
[22] *Some Memories of WBY*, Macmillan, London, 1940, 8–14 IN: E. H. MIKHAIL: *Interviews and Recollections*, Vol 1, 1977.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] J. M. HONE, '*Yeats as Political Philosopher*', The London Mercury, March, 1939, 494.
[25] Denis DONOGHUE, *Yeats*, 80.
[26] Seanad Éireann, Vol 1, 19 April, 1923, On Irish Manuscripts.

disappearing] living dialects"[27], something that had previously only been done in patches of Irish-speaking regions. A positive note, as in *Demon and Beast, „I saw my freedom won / And all laugh in the sun."*[28] He wished to emphasise that it should be a scientific study, by trained scholars and researchers, and enthusiastically added: *„[h]ow great would be the stimulus given by such training to local workers in Gaelic-speaking regions!"*[29]

The pillars of these irresistible aesthetic systems had thus been erected in his first speech on dictionaries, saga literature, annals and living language preservation. Intriguingly, it roughly coincided with the period of the publication of *Michael Robartes and the Dancer* (1921), the opening line of which might reflect his eloquent and carefully drafted ideas: *„Opinion is not worth a rush"*[30].

After the setting up of this committee, Yeats delineated the objectives in English (*„a scheme for the editing, indexing and publishing of manuscripts in the Irish language"*[31] and the Royal Irish Academy, the Trinity College and other places as wellsprings of Irish heritage), while the text was also composed in Irish. His thinking high of Irish is shown by trying to move an amendment in favour of a future Irish rite: *„Would I be in order in moving as an amendment that the prayer be read in Irish as soon as the majority of the members of the Seanad know Irish?"*[32] But if read carefully, it also underlines the condition: *„as soon as"* the majority know Irish.

When it came to the subject of primary school education, the second stage of the School Attendance Bill[33] brings up a new side of Yeats's support of Irish language. The policy of tolerance. *„I suggest that whether we teach Irish history, Anglo-Irish literature or Gaelic, we should always see that the child is the object and not any of our special purposes."* This person-centred and language-inclusive schooling might remind us of certain ideas from *The Tower*: not to subordinate children to ideas of a nation.

> *„Now shall I make my soul,*
> *Compelling it to study*
> *In a learned school."*[34]

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[27] Seanad Éireann, Vol 3, 4 June 1924.

[28] YEATS, *Works*, 157.

[29] Seanad Éireann, Vol 3, 4 June 1924.

[30] *Michael Robartes and the Dancer* IN: JEFFARES, 281.

[31] Seanad Éireann, Vol 3, 4 June 1924.

[32] Seanad Éireann, Vol 2, 14 November 1923.

[33] Seanad Éireann, Vol 6 24 March 1926.

[34] *The Tower* IN: JEFFARES, 307.

What deeply stirred Yeats's soul, had been the next level: university and postgraduate education. In this context, the School of Irish Learning, founded in 1903 when there was no regular teaching in Dublin of advanced Old or Middle Irish, played pivotal role and proved to be a solid base. It provided travelling scholarships, summer courses that produced all the lecturers of Irish in the National University Colleges. Its journal of Irish philology, *Ériu* collected and published representative works (Old and Modern Irish textbooks), and after the unification of the Academy and the School, or the incorporation of the latter into the Academy, the journal became the common organ of Irish studies. It was Yeats who first proposed the establishment of an academy to standardise the modern language and circumscribed „*a committee that had been dealing with Gaelic studies.*"[35] This was the level on which he wished to see people speaking and learning Irish.

The Abbey Theatre

This is the place to briefly allude to an episode in the history of the Abbey Theatre and its take on Irishness. To begin with, one is in no hard position to realise that – working his own way through myths and folk tales – Yeats had been devoted to Irish themes, and perhaps drew more zeal for Irish national topics than most of his predecessors in either literature or history. And his idea of Irishness during the Abbey director years was a never-before-seen one. His love of Irish was also reflected in his word usage: the habit of calling Celtic *Irish*. Or, in a linguistic context, Gaelic. „*[Celtic Movement]. The word is not mine, I prefer to call it the Irish movement.*"[36] Moreover, the early dramas played in the Abbey converted some youngsters to the nationalist fervour, characteristic of the fin-de-siècle and turn-of-century period. And not only allegedly! One of the members of the seven-man Supreme Council of the I.R.B. who had „*planned that famous Insurrection, tells [Pearce] that he himself entered the political movement the day after he saw the opening performance of Yeats's Cathleen ni Houlihan in April, 1902, prior to which he 'had never had a political thought'*".[37]

This fortunate state of affairs quickly invoke words from Yeats's poem: „*take our greatness with our bitterness*"[38]. The Theatre stood for what the poet considered Irishry and Irishness. The continuation, one act of bravery among the many of his career, was to present fresh dramas on Irishness. Like J. M. Synge's *Playboy of the Western World*, and carrying on with the play despite inimical reception (outbursts and

[35] Seanad Éireann, Vol 3 2 July, 1924.
[36] T. P's Weekly (London) 4 April 1913.
[37] PEARCE, 15.
[38] *Meditations in Time of Civil War, Works,* 170.

revolts among the audience), articulating right after the premiere that „[t]hey have been so long in mental servitude that they cannot understand life if their head is not in some bag."[39] Then he declared that: „I shall lecture on the freedom of the theatre and invite our opponents to speak on its slavery to the mob if they have a mind to."[40] During an interview in the *Evening Herald*, he pointed out „there is an unreal sentimentalising and idealising of the Irish peasant, and possibly there was now taking place a reaction in the other direction in Irish types of character. That was the way of literature."[41] „It is of such as these Goethe thought when he said '[t]he Irish always seem to me like a pack of hounds dragging down some noble stag."[42]

Intriguingly, there is a similar sentiment in one of his poems, entitled *On a Picture of a Black Centaur by Edmund Dulac*. This is in *The Tower* (1928), having all the hindsight of Senatorial debates. An expression as subtle as it is raging.

> *Yet I, being driven half insane*
> *Because of some green wing,*
> *Those horrible green birds.*[43]

Yeats's Irishness

Thus far, it can be seen how greatly Yeats appreciated Irish. How is it possible then that he evoked the following words from a fellow-Senator? Namely, Senator William Cummins, who accused Yeats of „having made a violent onslaught upon all things Irish"[44], during a debate of the Protection Bill. To balance the swing of the public pendulum, another Senator, James J. McKean later acted as a sort of diplomat by stating: „I have read Senator Yeats's works. They are written in English but I think anything that is of value in them comes from Gaelic inspiration [...] and it is consequently from the Irish, rather than the English, language he derives [his themes]".[45] However, as Yeats put it in a poem, „[a]n intellectual hatred is the worst".[46] It is this pivotal moment where we need to look closely at Yeats's specific words, arguments and means. A slight trace of this can be spotted in *On a Political Prisoner* where

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[39] *Evening Telegraph*, Dublin, Jan 29, 1907, 3–4. IN: E. H. MIKHAIL: *Interviews and Recollections*, Vol 1, 1977, 54.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] *'The Poet is Pleased'*, Evening Herald, Dublin, 1 February, 1907, 5.

[42] *Estrangement* IN: E. H. MIKHAIL: *Interviews and Recollections*, Vol 1, 1977, 58.

[43] YEATS, *Works*, 183.

[44] Seanad Éireann, Vol 8, 11 March 1927.

[45] Seanad Éireann, Vol 3, 2 July, 1924.

[46] *A Prayer for My Daughter, Works*, 161.

one's thought is considered „*some popular enmity*"[47], just as Yeats's by Senator Cummins.

In his volume of poetry, *The Tower*, there is an instance in *The Three Monuments* that could bring up like emotions:

> *Admonish us to cling to that*
> *And let all base ambition be,*
> *For intellect would make us proud*
> *And pride bring in impurity.*[48]

The man of thought and the man of action are combined in a sophisticated manner. The father of the Irish literary revival happened to clash with most of those who supported the Irish cause because the majority of them wanted compulsory Gaelic, both in primary and secondary school education and in public signage. Yeats's unique thesis is unfolded in three major types of arguments. The first is where he opposes unnecessary Gaelic usage on the whole. The second, where he opposes it under (and because of) life-threatening circumstances. The third is where he sees educational drawbacks of it being taught in schools on a compulsory basis. Why? „*The mind acts by conflict, sometimes accepting the opposition of the external world.*"[49] „*To put that up in the Irish language is to create a form of insincerity that is injurious to the general intellect and thought of this country, and to create an irritation against the Gaelic language. That causes a general irritation against all Irish thought, all Irish feeling, and all Irish propaganda.*"[50] In the first case, it would have been a simple preamble for a resolution he proposed. But in his own words: „*[P]ersonally I do not get any pleasure when I see my name spelt in a way that makes it look very strange to me at the top of this resolution.*"[51] He merely deemed this instance unnecessary.

The second group of examples has a more serious subject: railway signs and the name of the police. It is undoubtedly crucial to know the exact meaning of warning signs, especially when one's life is at stake. In this case, signage would have been put up solely in Irish, at a time when the majority did not speak the language.[52] On notices where to cross a railway line Yeats stood for giving the best practical information. By the

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[47] *On a Political Prisoner, Works*, 155.

[48] *The Three Monuments, Works*, 193.

[49] DONOGHUE, *Yeats*, 82.

[50] Seanad Éireann, Vol 3, 2 July 1924.

[51] Seanad Éireann, Vol 1, 19 April, 1923, Manuscript Committee.

[52] NB: Neither Yeats spoke it, neither, as referred to earlier, the majority of Senators. Already in 1923, Yeats said it is a condition for Senators to know Irish that they read an Irish prayer. This is where the second part of the sentence, the condition itself comes into the picture.

same token, a legislator rises in Yeats when he reflects on Mr. Haughton's words on how to call the police. (As an extreme example, how to shout for the police on the streets.) Haughton opined that „*it would be more consistent to give [...] the option of calling them Garda Síochána or Civic Guards.*"[53] To which Yeats replies: „*The question troubles me very much. If I am attacked by a footpad and wish for protection, how can I call for that protection by using words that I cannot pronounce?*"[54] He did not want Irish to pop up in places where it might be hated for being there, or to come across as forced knowledge.

Following on from this tangent, the third instance, the case of Gaelic education comes naturally in his line of thought. A knowledge he would have liked to sponsor; a learned few he would have liked to cultivate it. Not surprisingly, he encountered strong opposition when formulating these sentences on the support of unique knowledge: „*I asked the Seanad to support a proposal by which the Government would be asked to give 5000 pounds for the endowment of Gaelic. [...] I do so in the interest of the sincerity of the Irish intellect, and not in the interest of those who pretend they know a language that they do not know.*"[55] Harsh words. And having shielded himself during the Abbey years, he did it once again, in a speech envisioning what would come in the future and reiterating his aim:

I wish to make a very emphatic protest against the histrionics which have crept into the whole Gaelic movement. People pretend to know a thing that they do not know and which they have not the smallest intention of ever learning. It seems to me to be discreditable and undesirable. I hope this will not be taken as being unsympathetic to the Gaelic movement. [...] I think this method of histrionics [...] will ultimately lead to a reaction against the language. I wish to say that I wish to see the country Irish-speaking.[56]

Yeats's sense of justice accepted the necessary sacrifice.

Conclusion

By 1928, the year he left the Senate, Yeats published a new volume of poetry, *The Tower*, in which *All Souls' Night* ends on a reassuring note: „*Being both Chance and Choice.*"[57]

I have attempted to show that Yeats considered the preservation of Irish language of utmost importance. He wished to guard the language

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[53] Seanad Éireann, Vol 2, 15 January 1924.

[54] Seanad Éireann, Vol 2, 15 January 1924.

[55] Seanad Éireann, Vol 3, 2 July, 1924.

[56] Seanad Éireann, Vol 2, 14 November 1923.

[57] YEATS, *Works*, 195.

which he might have „*thought [...] would outlive all future days*".[58] In poetry and politics, within his cherished ancestral shell, there had also been modern thoughts on language use and preservation, always taking into account personal rights and practical sides (the right to life over the preference to speak a language) which more often than not revolted his environs. In a wider, international context, one might hazard the guess that Yeats opined likewise for yet another reason: he might have been anxious not to deepen the abyss between the two Irish states: the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland, the one that had still been controlled by Britain. Perhaps, this excerpt from an interview can be considered a pillar of this specific thought: „*We feel ourselves responsible to Ireland. Our task has been to create a public that will feel joy and pride in its own country; and we realise that we can only get to Ireland through England. [...] No Irish movement can succeed till the intellect of Ireland has been liberated from national obsession. No country can prosper till the greater part of its intellect is occupied by itself.*"[59]

I would, therefore, hazard the guess that Yeats wished to find the aim beyond itself, beyond language. Voting for its compulsoriness under all circumstances would have been polarised and only have brought about short-term achievements. As an unacknowledged legislator, he could behold „*the future in the present*". Being in a constant clash with contemporary public opinion is well articulated in *All Souls' Night* where he unfolds his poetic persona: „*Because I have a marvellous thing to say, / A certain marvellous thing / None but the living mock.*"[60] However subtle allusions to language may be in his poetry, their existence still shows Yeats circumscribing language itself in a broader perspective. In a letter to a trusted friend, Ethel Mannin, he reminisced on the farewell to the Senate: „*I went back to Ireland and after some time decided that I must escape [...] committees and the like; and attempt before it was too late a masterpiece*"[61].

Having glanced at his stirring speeches, one can surmise that he did his best to be heard but could not make the Senate a forum of his ideas. Did he really wish to? It is worth noting that while acting as Senator, he harboured „*[n]or self-delighting reverie, / nor hate of what's to come, nor pity for what's gone*"[62], as put in *Meditations in Times of Civil War*. Perhaps he wished to spread a less radical opinion among his fellow-Senators, one that looks for solving problems in the future by using a practical and only gradually learning a much-cherished traditional language. Among cultural issues he rose for, heritage preservation

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[58] *Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen* IN: JEFFARES, 314.
[59] Hearth & Home (London) 28 November 1912, 229.
[60] *All Souls' Night, Works*, 194.
[61] WADE, *Letters*, 845. Letter to Ethel Mannin, Dec 19, 1935.
[62] YEATS, *Works*, 175.

turned out to be successful, the non-implementation of Irish language did not. The Irish language was eventually voted compulsory in schools in 1928. The Anglo-Irish Treaty brought about a new state in politics and new legislative bodies in the Irish Free State and this political shift resulted in partial Irish independence, desired for seven centuries in a region where, in Yeats's words, „*public opinion [had been] ripening for so long*"[63].

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[63] *Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen*, JEFFARES, 314.

R.J.B. Drake[1]

Sowing the Wind
The Consequences of the Paris Peace
Treaties on Central Europe and the Coming
of the Second World War

Abstract

The failure of the Czechoslovakian state to hold together in 1938-39 can be traced back to the circumstances of the foundation of the state. In an attempt to establish the largest, most economically and strategically viable state possible in the aftermath of the First World War, the founders of Czechoslovakia, particularly T.G. Masaryk and Eduard Benes, sowed the seeds of the future distruction of the state. By alienating all oftheir nieghbors, and in their reliance on the continuing dominance of French power in the interwar years, the Czechoslovakian leadership made a series of ultimately fatal miscalculations.

Keywords: Czechoslovakia; St. Germain; Trianon; T.G. Masaryk; Eduard Benes;

The events of 1938-1939, from the German-Austrian *Anschluß,* through the German-Czech disputes that resulted in the Munich agreement, and culminating in the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, served to highlight the pre-eminent role that Central European issues played in the origins of the Second World War. The disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, the territorial revisions imposed by the Paris Peace Treaties (Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon), as well as the establishment of revolutionary Bolshevism in Russia all contributed to the volatility of the region. Perhaps the most destabilizing factor ultimately proved to be the creation of the state of Czechoslovakia following the First World War.

The roots of Czech-German rivalry in Bohemia could be traced back at least as far as the Thirty Years War, and the „*Bohemian Question"* was one which came to dominate the political life of the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy during its final quarter century.[2] However, the primary cause of instability was the process by which the Czech state achieved its territorial integrity during the period of 1918-1920. The Czech National

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[2] Catherine ALBRECHT, „*The Bohemian Question,"* IN: *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe,* edited by Mark CORNWALL (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 2002), 75.

Council pursued a Western, specifically French, orientation during the Peace Conference. This led them to eschew good faith negotiations with their erstwhile neighbors in favor of a heavy handed and opportunistic reliance on the good graces of their French patrons, with the French army as the ultimate guarantor of Czech claims. After the French decided to reorient their policy to a more defensive minded posture following the Treaty of Locarno (1925), the Czechs found themselves without friends in the region. In addition, many Slovaks were not happy about being the junior partners in the Czechoslovakian experiment. Beset by internal and external antagonists, the Czech state proved incapable of standing on its own without French support. Thus, the decision by the Czechs, with French connivance, to take advantage of their fortuitous position at the end of the First World War in order to control as much territory as possible could be seen as sowing the seeds of their own destruction.

Although the immediate source of Czech–German conflict (which was the most persistent and, ultimately, the most deadly of the many internal contradictions of the Czech national state) resided within the treaties produced by the Paris Peace Conference, there had been a long (and not always mutually inimical) relationship between the two peoples within the historic Kingdom of Bohemia. Bohemia had been recognized as a separate kingdom within the Holy Roman Empire from the late 12th century, under the rule of the Czech Premyslid dynasty.[3] As with the other great East-Central European dynasties (the Piast in Poland and the Árpád in Hungary), the native line eventually died out, and various foreign princes became kings in their stead.

Thus, the Polish Jagiellonian prince Louis found himself king of both Bohemia and Hungary in 1526. With his death following the disastrous battle of Mohács against the Turks, the thrones of both kingdoms were inherited by the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, brother of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. When Charles decided to retire to a monastery, he split the Habsburg lands between his son Phillip, who received the Spanish lands, including those in the New World; and his brother Ferdinand, who became Emperor and got the Central European portion of the Habsburg patrimony. The status of Ferdinand's two new kingdoms was not equal, however. Hungary had been, and remained, outside of the Empire, while Bohemia had been, and remained, firmly within it. Thus, the Germans of Bohemia saw the kingdom as being a historically *'German'* province. It may therefore be argued that the birth of the Habsburg Monarchy can be traced to 1526, when Bohemia and Hungary were added to the hereditary Habsburg provinces of Upper and Lower Austria.

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[3] Piotr S. WANDYCZ, *The Price of Freedom,* 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2001), 20.

In 1618, the Thirty Years War began with the so-called *'Bohemian Revolt'*. The Defenestration of Prague, where three Imperial officials were thrown out of the upper windows of Hradschin castle, signaled the revolt of the Protestant Czech aristocracy against the Catholic and German Habsburgs. The Imperial armies eventually engaged the Bohemian rebels in the battle of White Mountain on November 8, 1620, on the outskirts of Prague. The defeat of the Bohemian forces was comprehensive, and the Habsburg Emperor expropriated the native Czech nobility, to the benefit of his German and Catholic supporters.[4]

Following the suppression of the national revolutions of 1848, politically active Czechs and Germans found some common ground in the struggle against Habsburg neo-absolutism. With the coming of constitutional governance following the *Außgleich* of 1867, the Czechs and Germans of Bohemia once again began to drift apart. Although they could occasionally work together on matters of economic importance to the province as a whole, the *'nationality question'* increasingly came to dominate political life in Bohemia from the 1870's onwards. In order to get a better idea of how the political events of the late Habsburg Monarchy influenced subsequent events in the inter-war period, a brief examination of the nature of the political system of Dualism and the German and Czech political parties that operated within that system could be useful.

With the Compromise of 1867, the Habsburg realms were divided into two constitutional monarchies. The historic Kingdom of Hungary, with its parliament sitting in Budapest, controlled around 55% of the land area of the Dual Monarchy, and 40% of its population.[5] During the last census conducted in Austria-Hungary, the percentage of ethno-linguistic Hungarians (*Magyars*) living within the Kingdom of Hungary was 55%. When coupled with a restricted franchise, this meant that the pro-Compromise National Liberal party returned solid majorities to government in Budapest every election. Although questions might be raised as to the lack of representation accorded to the minority nationalities (with the exception of the Croats, who had significant autonomy within their own historic borders), the system was stable and not very much more restricted than the British franchise prior to the electoral reforms of the 1830's, for example.

The non-Hungarian part of the Monarchy went by the official title of *'the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrat'*, but is usually referred to more succinctly (although technically incorrectly) simply as

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[4] Peter H. WILSON, *Europe's Tragedy: A New History of the Thirty Years War* (London: Penguin Books, 2010), 313.

[5] John C. SWANSON, „*The Body of the Empire*", IN: *The Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy (1867–1918),* edited by Zsuzsa Gáspár (London: New Holland, 2008), 37.

'*Austria*'.[6] These lands, as might be inferred from their official title, had no political, national or geographic logic to bind them together. They had simply been the sum total of kingdoms and lands that the Habsburgs had added to their hereditary holdings through marriage, inheritance or conquest over the course of 400 years of history. No national group formed a majority of the population, though the Germans had a plurality of 35%. The Czechs formed a not insignificant 23% of the population of '*constitutional Austria*'.[7] The lack of any dominant national group, coupled with a wider franchise (eventually universal male suffrage from 1907), made the forming of a governing coalition a much more challenging task than it was in Hungary. So it was that the Czech parties held a significant position in the *Reichsrat*, as they could hold the balance of power for a governing coalition or, at the very least, serve as an insurmountable obstruction to any legislation it found unacceptable.

Prior to the electoral reforms of 1907, the *Reichsrat* was dominated by German and Czech national-liberal parties. The '*Young Czech*' party on the one hand, and the various *Deutchfreiheitliche* parties, of which the *Nationalverband* (National Union) party represented the Germans of Bohemia, were classic 19th century liberal *bourgeois* parties; urban based, and populated and supported by 'men of property and education'.[8] As such, they were all highly sensitive to issues which touched on the state civil service and education policy. So it was that one of the most serious disruptions in the political life of constitutional Austria, and one which would have long-lasting repercussions among the Czechs and Germans of Bohemia, was brought about by the attempt to change the language requirements for the civil service in Bohemia in 1897.

The language law of 1897 was an attempt by the Austrian Minister-President Count Kasimir Felix Badeni to reconcile growing Czech nationalism within the Monarchy, and to help stabilize the increasingly ungovernable nature of the *Reichsrat*. In all of these efforts Badeni proved to be most ineffective. The language law made both German and Czech official languages of the '*inner administration*' in Bohemia. In effect, all civil servants in Bohemia had to be competent in both languages by 1901. The Germans found this to be an intolerable condition, as it would have denied a large number of Germans access to employment in the civil service. As a rule, nearly all educated Czechs were competent in German, while very few Germans had bothered to

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[6] A.J.P. TAYLOR, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 10.

[7] Ibid., 286.

[8] Lothar HÖBELT, „*Well-Tempered Discontent: Austrian Domestic Politics*" IN: *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary*, 51.

learn Czech. German delegates began a policy of parliamentary obstruction, which brought the *Reichsrat* to a complete standstill. By invoking paragraph 14 of the Austrian constitution, Badeni was able to rule by decree while parliament was out of session, but unrest began to spread throughout the German areas of Bohemia, and eventually into Vienna itself. Francis Joseph was forced to dismiss Badeni in November, 1897, and his language laws were never put into effect. The ultimate result of the crisis was the poisoning of Czech–German relations in Bohemia for the foreseeable future.

With the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907, the political balance of the *Reichsrat* was altered, but its national composition was largely unchanged. The dominance of the Young Czechs began to wane, and the Agrarians and Social Democrats gained considerable power. Even in urban areas, the Young Czechs had to compete for votes with various left-leaning parties centered on the Czech National Socialists. Tomas Masaryk's Realist Party was among these.[9] All of the Czech parties, whether old liberals or new populists, adhered to a policy of Bohemian state right, or the indivisibility of the lands of the historic Kingdom of Bohemia, to include Moravia and Austrian Silesia. None of them advocated independence from the Habsburgs; their maximum program would have established a Czech political nation alongside the German and Hungarian nations, or some version of a Trialist Austro-Czech-Hungarian Monarchy. At a minimum, they all wanted some sort of devolution of power to Prague, coupled with cultural and linguistic autonomy.

As for the Bohemian Germans, they were completely opposed to becoming a minority within a Czech dominated Bohemia. At the very least, they desired that Bohemia be divided administratively, so that they could retain their civil service positions and separate German language schools. The Czechs opposed this as being a step towards the political division of historic Bohemia. The maximum program of the nationalist German minority in Bohemia was exactly that political division. The German inhabited areas of Bohemia tended to be compact and located along its borders with Austria and Germany. The Sudeten Germans desired first of all to be attached to Austria, and eventual for the whole of German Austria to be incorporated within the *Reich*.

Ultimately, it can be said that the history of Czech-German relations were complex and did not lend themselves to facile judgments. Certainly, the claims latter advanced by Masaryk and the two Czech delegates to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Eduard Benes and Karel Kramar, that the Habsburg Monarchy had been a *'prison of nations'*, in which the Czechs had been subjected to tyrannical rule from Vienna

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[9] Ibid., 52.

were without merit. All three men had sat in the *Reichsrat* and had participated in the political life of the Monarchy. The Czechs eventually turned the obstructionist tactics first used by the Germans back against them, and became masters of the art themselves. Their further claims that the Habsburgs had attempted to submerge Czech culture through a policy of *'Germanization'* were highly misleading, at the very least. The attempt to turn the Habsburg Monarchy into a centralized state, with German as the language of administration and high culture had died with Joseph II in 1790. While some validity might have attached to that statement during the period between 1848 and 1867, it certainly was not at all a fair statement of the reality of the Monarchy during the half-century prior to the First World War. Revisionist history aside, there was not a hint of revolution in any part of the Dual Monarchy on the eve of the Great War in 1914.[10]

The advent of war in 1914 changed the horizon of possibilities for the Czech nationalists. Tomas Masaryk, the professor of philosophy and leader of the small Czech *'Realist'* party, came to the conclusion by autumn of 1914 that the *Entente* would win the war. With this thought in mind, he met with his colleague and protégé Eduard Benes to discuss the possibilities of Czech independence, and the tactics that would be needed in order to achieve that goal.[11] To that end Masaryk left the Habsburg Monarchy, travelling first to Switzerland and then to France, Britain and eventually the United States on a never ending organizational and propaganda tour of the Allies. Benes joined him a few months later, and two of them were a very effective team for the cause of Czech independence. Their primary concern was to instill the idea of a Czech-Slovak state with a sense of moral righteousness in the minds of the *Entente* powers, as well as to get a Great Power sponsor for the new state. The eventual winning over of the Allies to support the creation of a Czechoslovakian state was almost entirely due to the accomplishments of a small coterie of ex-patriot Czechs centered on Masaryk and Benes.[12]

Since the lands of the historic kingdom of Bohemia were the industrial core of the Habsburg Monarchy, independence for the Czechs carried the implicit understanding that Austria-Hungary had to be dismantled into a number of successor states. Neither the Allied powers nor the majority of the Czech political parties were convinced of the necessity, let alone the desirability, of this proposition from the beginning of the war. The Allies hoped to keep some form of Habsburg rule in Central Europe as a bulwark against future German expansion,

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[10] Ibid., 69.

[11] Ivan T. BEREND, *Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe Before World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 164.

[12] Joseph ROTHSCHILD, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974), 77.

and later the specter of Bolshevism played a role in this line of thinking as well. Among the Czechs, most preferred to consider a place for Bohemia within a future Monarchy built around a federal framework of autonomous nations. There were certain segments of the Czech political scene, most notably Kramar's Populist Party, which were strongly pan-Slavic, and desired to see Prague *'liberated'* by a Russian army, and a Romanov prince put on the throne of a restored kingdom of Bohemia.[13] Masaryk and Benes, on the other hand, believed that the future Czech state should be oriented towards the West, and they sought the patronage of the liberal democracies, especially France.

The Western *Entente* powers initially took a non-committal attitude towards Czech claims. In large part this was due to their own ambiguous plans in regard to the future of the Habsburg lands, as well as the considerations they had to give towards the views of their Russian ally. As well, there were secret negotiations regarding a possible separate peace ongoing with the new Emperor-King Charles up until the spring of 1918. Up until that time, the thinking of the Allies in general can be summed up by the comments of the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd-George, that the *„....breaking up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims."*[14] Even so, the French were especially supportive of the idea put forth by Masaryk that a *„Czech Legion"* should be formed out of POW's from the Austro−Hungarian army in Russia and Italy.

Following the collapse of the Russian Provisional government and the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, together with the breakdown of the secret negotiations with Austria-Hungary, the French recognized Masaryk's Czech National Council as the *'legitimate'* government of Czechoslovakia, which was acknowledged as existing within its *„historic boundaries"*. The exact meaning of this was not spelled out, since there had never been a Czechoslovakian state, and the historic kingdom of Bohemia had never included the Slovak populated lands. The area that was populated by Slovaks had been part of the historic kingdom of Hungary for 1000 years, and had simply been known as Upper Hungary (*Felvidék*).[15]

British and American recognition of the Czech National Council followed soon after the French, and Masaryk began the task of uniting Czech public opinion behind a policy of territorial claims for the new state. Masaryk accomplished much of this in discussions among Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian emigrant groups in the United States. An important principle of that union was put down in the so-called

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[13] Piotr S. WANDYCZ, *France and her Eastern Allies, 1919–1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 12.

[14] Ibid., 14.

[15] Margaret MACMILLAN, *Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World* (London: John Murray, 2001), 242.

„*Pittsburgh Declaration*" during a meeting between Masaryk and the leadership of Slovak–Americans on 30 May, 1918. In that document, Masaryk pledged that the Slovaks would have their own autonomous administration, parliament and court system in the new Czechoslovakian state.[16] So it was that the Czechoslovakian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference was especially well prepared, as they had not only recognition as an Allied and Associated Power, but also a seemingly united front between the expatriate leaders and the native Czechoslovakian political leadership.

Due to several factors, the Czech delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was almost universally well respected and well thought of, and eventually received nearly all that they had asked for, even that which had seemed extravagantly optimistic. These factors must include the patronage of the French for their cause at the forefront. France sought to create a substitute for its lost Russian alliance in order to contain any possible German resurgence. As such, they wanted the states created to the east of Germany to be as strong and strategically viable as possible. With French support, the Czech Legions returning to Bohemia between the signing of the armistice and the opening of the peace conference were sent out to occupy the areas of the nascent state which might be contested by other powers, most notably Hungary. In such cases, the peacemakers were often presented with a *fait accompli* which they did not have the will or ability to alter.[17]

Another factor that played to the Czech's favor was that none of their claims included any German territory. The Big Three thought the „*German Question*" was the over-riding concern of the conference, and devoted the greater part of their efforts to that end. Claims against the other vanquished powers, or of the new states against one another, were invariably handed off to a working committee. Very few people among the western allies had any idea about the complexities involved in the national question in East–Central Europe. Those few '*experts*' as there were, such as R.W. Seton–Watson and Henry Wickham Steed, tended to be pro-Slavic, anti-German and anti-Magyar.

The personal dimension also played a part in the Czech success at Paris. Masaryk was generally well respected, and Benes earned high marks for his work rate and diplomatic acumen. Lloyd George seemed to be one of the few people in Paris that were immune to the charms of the Czechs. He referred to Benes as „*the little French jackal*", and thought the Czech claims to be dangerously excessive.[18] A final, though not

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[16] Peter NEVILLE, *Makers of the Modern World: Eduard Benes and Tomas Masaryk, Czechoslovakia* (London: Haus, 2010), 48.

[17] Zara STEINER, *The Lights That Failed: European International History, 1919-1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 82.

[18] MACMILLAN, *Peacemakers,* 240.

insignificant, reason for Czech success was the exploits of the Czech Legion in Siberia during the Russian Civil War. Quite by accident, they had found themselves in control of the Trans-Siberian railroad and the Czarist gold reserves. This served to make them extremely popular with the French and even the British, as they provided an intervention force on the ground against the Bolsheviks.

Perhaps due to a combination of these factors, as well as an unshakable belief in the moral superiority of their cause, the Czechs, aided and abetted by the French, succumbed to *hubris* in their attempts to build a strong nation-state at the Paris Peace Conference. In the process, they managed to cause deep and lasting resentment amongst all of their new neighbors, as well as to incur internal divisions which would prove to be insoluble. The failure of the Czechs to negotiate their borders in good faith with their neighbors, and an over reliance on the good graces of the French to provide for the security of their territory, meant that when the first serious challenge to the *status quo* came along in 1938, the Czechs found themselves surrounded by hostile nations and riddled with internal dissention. When the French reneged on their alliance commitments, the Czechs seemed to believe they had no options other than to capitulate.

For good or ill, the successes and failures of Czechoslovak foreign policy were almost completely attributable to Benes. From 1918 until 1938, he guided the diplomatic affairs of the nation, first as Foreign Minister, and later as President of the Republic, which office he assumed after the death of Masaryk in 1935. In Paris, he achieved a truly remarkable success in creating an economically and strategically strong state in the heart of Central Europe. At the Peace Conference, Benes switched effortlessly and unashamedly amongst historical, ethnic, strategic and economic justifications for the borders of Czechoslovakia.[19] He was a tireless champion of historic state right when arguing for the borders of the kingdom of Bohemia to be kept sacrosanct, down to the last village. National determination for the Sudeten Germans or the Poles of Teschen was of no consequence to him. He could then turn around and argue for the moral primacy of national self-determination in attaching the Slovak inhabited areas of Hungary to the new state, and the 1000 years of stable boundaries for the kingdom of Hungary carried no weight at all. When neither history nor nationality would allow him to claim a border on the Danube River, he argued that the Czech state required it for strategic reasons. He claimed economic necessity for the Czech state to take the coal fields in Polish Teschen and a port city on the Danube in German-Hungarian inhabited Pressburg/Pozsony/Bratislava.

Benes was also not above taking advantage of the misfortunes of

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[19] ROTHSCHILD, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars,* 82.

other countries in pressing the Czech case against their neighbors, even ostensibly allied countries such as Poland. In 1919, the Czechs sought to take advantage of the chaotic situation surrounding Béla Kun's Bolshevik revolution in Hungary. When the revolution first broke out the Czechs, with French support, advanced troops all the way to the Danube, occupying areas that were of solid Hungarian nationality. In June, they took it upon themselves to occupy the south bank of the Danube as well, going beyond that which their French patrons had thought prudent. The Czech army occupied important rail connections within Hungary, as well as the only remaining coal field left in the country in the region of Miskolc. Once in possession of these areas, Benes suggested that they should be attached to Czechoslovakia on a permanent basis. The Hungarian Red Army counterattacked the Czechs, actually driving them from most of Slovakia proper. During this retreat, Czech forces were attacked in the rear by Slovak irregulars, and a Slovak Socialist Republic was declared. Luckily for the Czechs, the Romanians had possibly even less scruples about taking advantage of a neighbors problems, and promptly advanced beyond their armistice line, eventually even capturing Budapest and leading to the over throw of Kun's regime. Both the poor showing of the Czech army and the manifest unwillingness of a significant number of Slovaks to support the new state boded ill for the future of Czechoslovakia.

In a much more shocking, at least to the Allied peacemakers, display of strong-arm tactics, the Czechs decided to take advantage of the fact that Poland was fighting for its life against Russia to militarily occupy the disputed Duchy of Teschen. This rich coal area was historically part of the kingdom of Bohemia, but had an overwhelming ethnic Polish majority. The Czech and Polish National Committees had pledged to come to a peaceful and mutually agreed solution, but the Czechs reneged on this and moved their army into the area in January, 1920. Perhaps they believed that an overwhelming show of force would cause the few local Polish troops to withdraw, but the Poles decided to hold their ground. So it was that the world was treated to the spectacle of two of the supposed Allied and Associated Powers involved in a shooting incident, with the Czechs being universally seen as the aggressors. Although the situation was eventually resolved by dividing the duchy largely along national lines, the Poles never forgave or forgot what they viewed as a treacherous attack by a supposed ally while they were involved in a fight for their very existence.[20]

Through these aggressive actions, the Czechs managed to make unreserved enemies out of two of their immediate neighbors. The entire foreign and domestic policy of inter-war Hungary revolved around the

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[20] MACMILLAN, *Peacemakers,* 252.

revision of Trianon, although they were too weak to be able to achieve this without a Great Power patron. When they were rebuffed by first the French, and later the British, they finally turned to the two powers which desired a revision of the Paris treaties, namely Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The effect of the Teschen incursion on Czech-Polish relations was of even greater import. It would have been in both countries interest to show a united front against possible German *revanchist* aims, but the bad blood that had been caused by the Czech actions in Teschen prevented this.

Initially the threat from Germany towards Czechoslovakia was seen to be non-existent, as the Germans of Bohemia had been a part of Habsburg Austria, and not the German *Reich*. So it was that the Germans made no complaints on behalf of the Sudeten Germans at the peace conference, and chose to focus on the revision of the German-Polish boundaries during the Weimar Republic. So the status of the Bohemian Germans was, at least until 1933, primarily an internal one. In October, 1918, Emperor Charles had finally consented on the federalization of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, and the German majority parts of Bohemia had been administratively attached to German Austria. When the Monarchy collapsed in November, the Czechs paid no mind to this, and began to militarily occupy the German areas of Bohemia and Moravia. The Germans soon found that Masaryk's conception of the Czech state was not an inclusive one, and he let the German's know that he felt their status was one of „*immigrants and colonists*" in Czech Bohemia.[21] Since the Germans made up a solid block of settlement along the borders of the new country with Austria and Germany, insisting on keeping them within the state while simultaneously antagonizing them towards it was undoubtedly a mistake. Although some of the German political parties did take part in the parliamentary politics of the inter-war Czech state, there was a significant number of Germans who refused to grant recognition of Czech sovereignty over their lands.

As with the Germans, there were a significant number of ethnic Hungarians which had been subsumed into the new state, most of whom lived in a solid block of settlement along the north bank of the Danube River. The Hungarians never reconciled themselves to Czech rule, and constantly hoped for a reunion with the kingdom of Hungary. The Slovaks, ostensibly part of the '*ruling nations*' of Czechoslovakia, were less than happy with being co-opted into what they viewed as a Czech dominated state. The promises made by Masaryk in the Pittsburgh Declaration were never implemented, and Czechoslovakia became a highly centralized state, focused on Prague. While conducting their

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[21] STEINER, *The Lights That Failed*, 264.

propaganda tours of Britain and America, as well as during the Paris Peace Conferences, Masaryk and Benes proclaimed that the Slovaks most urgently desired a union with the Czechs, with whom they shared a mutually intelligible language. However, only the Slovak emigrants to America were really consulted about this, those who remained in 'Slovakia' had not been permitted to make their views known. Indeed, the Czechoslovak government denied passports to those Slovaks who wished to travel to Paris to make their views known directly. A small group, led by the Catholic priest Monsignor Hlinka, was able to make it to Paris by travelling on Polish passports, but the Allies had already decided to grant the Czechs what they wanted in Slovakia and were not willing to reopen the issue.[22] The Slovaks had been part of Hungary for 1000 years, and their entire economy and transportation infrastructure was oriented towards Hungarian markets. Since Bohemia and *'Slovakia'* had been in different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, there were almost no connections between the two at all. Once the Slovaks were separated from Hungary, the Slovak economy collapsed. The administrators, police, school teachers and judges that staffed all state civil service positions were invariably Czech. In addition, those few positions that were opened to Slovaks were given to the small Protestant minority, while the vast Catholic majority of the country experienced discrimination. Many Slovaks began to feel that they were even worse off in Czechoslovakia than they had been under the Magyars.

In the end, the Czechoslovakian state was one that was imposed on a disparate group of nations. Among a population of 14 million could be counted 3 million ethnic Germans, close to 1 million Hungarians and 500,000 Ruthenes, along with a lesser number of Poles and Gypsies.[23] Czechs and Slovaks made up about two-thirds of the population of the state, but were by no means united in their national, cultural or economic interests. The Czechs had been part of the industrial and cultural heart of the Austrian Empire, while the Slovaks had been part of the historic kingdom of Hungary for 1000 years. Although it has been pointed out by many historians that Czechoslovakia was the only functioning democracy in Central or Eastern Europe by the time of the Munich crisis, even that statement must be parsed for accuracy. Czech political life was extremely fragmented, not just along national lines but ideological ones as well. No party was ever able to gain more than 25% of the vote in the inter-war period, and coalitions of five or more parties were common.[24] Under these circumstances, the various Czech parties could cobble together a coalition which would effectively exclude the national minorities from meaningful participation in the affairs of state.

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[22] MACMILLAN, *Peacemakers,* 252.

[23] Ibid.

[24] STEINER, *The Lights That Failed,* 266.

In any event, although the Czechoslovakian state that emerged from the Paris Peace Conferences seemed to be a strong and vibrant state from the outside, it was really more of a house of cards from the inside. Even at that, the Czechs could have probably made the state work if National Socialist Germany had not turned its attention to the internal inconsistencies of the nation. Although Hitler's aims in pushing the issue of the Sudeten Germans were, in fact, duplicitous, it was vital for his efforts that the underlying cause be seen as legitimate. The German people were not keen for a war of aggression in 1938, much to Hitler's dismay, so he had to choose an issue that the majority of Germans would find justifiable as a *casus belli*. Likewise, in order to get the British to stand aside, they would have to see the question as being one of legitimate concern to Germany. The policy of Appeasement, after all, was one in which Neville Chamberlin thought that by addressing the *legitimate* concerns of Germany arising from the Versailles Treaty, he could turn Germany into a solid *status quo* power. Unfortunately, the Paris Peace Treaties provided more than enough legitimate issues to start a Second World War. Perhaps no better example than that of the creation of Czechoslovakia can be provided.

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Ramachandra Byrappa[1]

Predatory Nations at the heart of the Indian Federation Systemic resilience and its possible corrosion – Part 1

Abstract

Domination in South Asia is explained through the double prisms of foreign colonialism and the caste system. It is deemed by an overwhelming percentage of historians and experts that South Asian history can be explained through these two filters. Indeed, there is some truth to this but it is my hypothesis that a much more dangerous form of domination exists that has for long gone unnoticed. After careful observation one can discern a highly sophisticated and deeply entrenched form of domination resulting from the competition between what we can call: *Predator Nations*. It is my conviction, until proven wrong, that the division of civilizational South Asia in 1947 and the consequent cycles of national consolidations have been a tailor-made opportunity for Predator Nations to feed upon the dismantled and disarmed nations that were not ready for either disintegration or reintegration. Although this process was in the making over several centuries, as predator nations established their diasporic power bases, it is only since 1947 that there is no paramount power to keep these predator nations at bay. In a sense, the creation of new national borders in 1947 was nothing more than the creation of fences within which predator nations can prey, unhindered. If my thesis is right, the historic trends point to a situation where the conflict between the predator nations could come into the open. This points to tensions and risks of disintegration, creating further disturbances in the peaceful resurgence of the *South Asian Civilization* at a crucial juncture of world history.

Keywords: Predator-Nation; Predator Diasporas; Integration-Disintegration; Indian Federal Structure; dysfunctional democracy; Civilizational South Asia;

Methodology

Logic and rationality seem to go astray when it comes to analysing and understanding modern India and its structural issues. James. K. Galbraith, son of the famous Canadian-born American economist and political commentator John K. Galbraith, tried to give an understanding of the 2008 financial and economic turmoil by using the concept of 'Predatory State' to explain the true nature of the crisis. Galbraith took the right direction but fell short of mentioning the groups that had high-jacked the crucial parts of the United States' state apparatus, and through it had dominated global

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governance. He was describing the end results of the process and predatory nature of certain groups. The United States is fast becoming a republic dominated by ethnic groups, rather than a citizenry that strongly believed in egalitarianism. Galbraith could not bring this structure to the specific 2008 problem he was addressing. Although his work is very pertinent, it does not give the whole picture. I would like to build upon the groundwork laid by J.K. Galbraith and make my own modest contribution by testing my theoretical snippets in the context of India in its historical structural evolution. Before going to the specifics of *Predator Nations* in India, I would like to construct a preliminary outline of the *theory of predation*, borrowing from research work done in natural sciences. We have to see how domination of one group over another is brought about and entrenched inside a state. Given the limitation of essay requirements, on size and scope, I have decided to divide the study into two parts. In part one the conceptual frame-work will be built up. Here I will piece together a rough structure of the theoretical framework. While in part two, in a separate essay, the specifics of each of the predator nations in India will be detailed and their doings illustrated.

When we think of a country's history we generally think of unitary states with unique histories with a pattern of continuity and not multi-ethnic or multi-national states. In the Indian Subcontinent there are regular earthquakes in the sphere of public memory, revealing a deeper problem. What was a constant for the last 65 years has suddenly being pulled down, sometimes literally as was the case of Nehru's statue recently. And there is talk of reclassifying the Taj Mahal as a Hindu temple. Are these tectonic shifts in a society in constant emulations? Is it a necessary reassessment of the recent past in order to produce greater social and political harmony? Societies periodically go through upheavals and adjustments but what is happening in India cannot be described as following any of these patterns. Quite often experts blame India's dysfunctional democracy and jingoistic politicians, who, unable to offer any material improvement in average Indian's living standards, take a short cut into irrational nationalistic tendencies and religious bigotry. They might be right as far as the nominal and generalized picture is concerned but fail to explain the inner dynamics. National integration stopped when Prime Indira Gandhi was assassinated by the Sikh separatists. With her death the power of the state as the paramount power came to a grinding halt. In a sense the Jawaharlal Nehru – Indira Gandhi period provided the function of the paramount power after the British withdrawal. What we are witnessing since then is economic, social and political segregation and disintegration. The roots of these trends however dated back to earlier times.

Since the fall of the Vijaynagar Empire (1336–1646) and the decline of the home-grown paramount power in the Subcontinent, it was mercilessly attacked from all directions and swathes of hungry migrants, fortune-seekers and con men from all corners converged upon it, wave

after wave. They brought with themselves their cultures and ways of ethical conduct that were contradictory to that of the Indian civilization. From the fall of the peaceful civilisation that was defended by the Vijaynagar Empire, it has been one relentless effort by these groups to pull down the whole edifice of what we can legitimately call – the Indian (South Asian) Civilization. From thence onwards, the structural history of the subcontinent has been *predation* disguised as statecraft. In this context the celebration of the memory of the Indian Civilization for example can go two ways: either we can remember the *perdition* (loss) of it or the *predation* that destroyed it; either way there is nothing really much to celebrate. It is equally true that the choice of the Indian state with its colonial heritage, since the birth of the Mogul Empire (1526-), is either to celebrate predation or to shake-off the colonial and the predatory heritage by celebrating the legitimate memory of the Indian (South Asian) Civilization, its glory, morn its predation, or give hope of a revival by learning the necessary lessons. Of course there are suggestions that neither path is advisable, meaning that the selective celebration as being the practical way out of this conflictual dilemma. Currently the situation is that of a civil-war among the predator nations and communities; those that caused the collapse of the Indian Civilisation in the first place.

Unable to find a sense of direction, the paramountcy of the Indian Federal Structure has lost its legitimacy. Indira Gandhi's ambitious 20-point program, launched in 1975, was to build-up the *raison d'être* of the federal state by giving it a strong developmental direction. The idea was to eliminate all possibilities of religious or communal affiliations and associations between the federal state and particularistic interests. The state function was that of a leveller, protect those that needed protection and slap those who needed to be slapped. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's objective was to associate the state directly with the Individual, in the hope of creating a dynamic and active citizenry. The plan further hoped that this would create a virtuous cycle of development with a total mobilisation of the population, putting India back in its historic path of development, similar to Communist China today. The physical elimination of Indira Gandhi and her son, Rajiv, put an end to this. According to my thesis for example, the 1991 economic crisis can equally be seen under a different light. It can be argued that it was engineered to structurally remove the Indian State's paramountcy as a non-communal actor in society, and assigned it directly to serve the purpose of predatory nations.

For purely analytical purposes therefore, it is long overdue to construct a new theoretical framework because the array of analytical tools currently available are insufficient to give us insight into how India has evolved during the last seventy odd years. In a recent publication an

expert was perplexed by the following fact: „*In 2014, then candidate Modi campaigned on a plank of reforming the state to improve governance and deliver inclusive growth to India's 1.3 billion citizens. Over five years in office, the Modi-led BJP government largely ignored administrative reforms that would bolster India's state capacity. Having earned a second consecutive parliamentary majority with a decisive victory in the 2019 general election, Modi and his colleagues have been given five more years to deliver on this promise.*"[2] It was a mystery to this expert but it should not be one. From the time of Emperor Ashoka, the role of the paramount power, in keeping the equilibrium and the rules of the game between various communities, had played a key civilizational function. Today there seems to be a lapse in this function. My theory of the *predator nations* can to a large extent explain why Prime Minister Modi refrained from implementing reforms he had earlier promised. It would provide the historic structure to his non-action in terms of administrative reforms. At the beginning even if my proposition serves to partially explain the chaotic situation in South Asia, and India in particular, I would feel that I have added to a better understanding of today's India and its historical development.

Preliminary theoretical outlines of the Theory of Predatory Nations (TPN)

There is no such theory as the Theory of Predatory Nations as yet, only semblances of it, as I try to put it together. In this predation is used to explain how certain groups, communities or entire nations try to dominate others, to appropriate power and economic resources to fulfil their urge to survive and to dominate. In international relations every nation-state is supposed to be of similar instincts and every single nation-state knowing the dangers and opportunities of this predatory instinct. In the international arena the significance of this theory is known through other theoretical frameworks, like the realist school of thought expounded by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. Although their efficiency is not proven to a convincible extent these theoretical works however try to give a rational framework. Where relations between various entities can be understood in terms of an urge to dominate or reversely to avoid falling victim to this domination.

What makes the theory very potent however is the context of a composite state, which is home to a multitude of communities,

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[2] Milan VAISHNAV: *Transforming State Capacity in India,* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 02, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/02/transforming-state-capacity-in-india-pub-79411?fbclid=IwAR2aroxn Yw95jkfDOPAOmU_dc7hxUe1oJvo6TOkZm01mm0U1FgToPFR4UCk (Accessed: 03-07-2019)

ethnicities and nations; all preserving their distinctive characteristics. The United States and most of the post-colonial states are of this nature. Most of these sub-units of a composite state do not have the appetite to change their status as a sub-unit, neither do they want to challenge the state nor dominate its instances from inside. However some of these units are made of different animus. Each unit competes to control the whole or vital parts of the state-structure. Each and every one of it has a unique strategy to satisfy its desire to dominate, cloistered in the state framework. As James K. Galbraith described the situation: „*It is in the nature of predators, when unchecked, to run wild.*"[3] The essential function of a state, its institutional outlay and the rule of law, tradition of tolerance and responsible citizenry is about keeping at bay all temptations of predations, in the Weberian tradition. According to some historians the foundation of the modern states was to curtail predation.[4] State and constitutional institutions are there to check this kind of unhindered predation, so it is evident that legal and constitutional checks and balances are an impediment to predator nations and communities.

From this, what follows is that predation and domination are very similar in their outward consequences, they are however distinct in purpose and substance. Domination does not always mean the destruction of the dominated. It is in the interest of the dominator to keep the dominated more or less safe and alive, otherwise the structure of the resource base of domination will collapse. In the Indian subcontinent the caste-system could be a very good example of this. It is not in the Brahmin's interest to physically destroy the lower levels. If it happened he would fall from his pedestal, which obviously is not his aim. His resource base would collapse. Predation on the other hand does not always mean that the physical well-being of the prey has to be secured. Predation means consumption and the physical disappearance of the prey. This said, domination can be transformed into predation in extreme phases of survivalist strategies. The caste-system could be transformed from a system of domination to a system of predation if it is deemed that parts of it, the *Dalits* or the *Adivasi* and *religious minorities*, are no longer needed for the survival of the system. It is vital therefore to understand the essence and the differences of these concepts, and how the transition is made from one to the other. This is one of the reasons why there is so much confusion about colonialism: is it a system of domination or a system of predation?

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[3] James K. GALBRAITH: *The Predatory State – How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too,* Free Press, New York, 2009, XII.

[4] Daniel Lord SMAIL: *Violence and Predation in Late Medieval Mediterranean Europe,* Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 54, No 1, Cambridge University Press, January 2012, 7–34.

Domination

The German political economist and sociologist, Max Weber in his *Economy and Society* (1922) provided us with an elaborate and structured definition of domination: „*Domination was defined above as the probability that a certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons. It thus does not include every mode of exercising "power" or "influence" over other persons. Domination ("authority") in this sense may be based on the most diverse motives of compliance all the way from simple habituation to the most purely rational calculation of advantage. Hence every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience.*"[5] In this succinct definition Max Weber touches the various aspects of domination from family life to that of complex stratified social systems. A few paragraphs later Weber also goes onto explaining how the system of domination survives. He says that the system „*attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy*". Which directly has an influence on the habituation of obedience. In short, domination seeks obedience from the dominated. Strategies of constraint and physical elimination come into consideration only when cultural accoutumance fails. Even this violent phase is temporary, until the pattern of obedience gets re-established. Domination therefore seeks to establish authority and legitimacy over a group of people through obedience and compliance by imposing a belief-system that sustains and perpetuates a particular matrix of domination. In comparison we will realise that predation has some fundamental differences, which puts it in a category of phenomena that can cause systemic danger in economic, political and social spheres.

In a context that is similar to South Asia, an expert on South and Central America gave his vision of how domination over there was related to political economy, more than any other reasons; this corroborates with the Weberian vision of domination.[6] This said there are elements of predation in the same domination. Fernando Santos-Granero, the expert in question, himself gives an indication of this double aspect of historic domination in South America: „*Terms used by members of capturing societies to refer to captive slaves—and sometimes also to servant groups and tributary populations—were multivocal; they could designate "strangers," "enemies," and "captives."*

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[5] Max WEBER: *Economy and Society – an outline of interpretive sociology*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, 212.

[6] Fernando SANTOS-GRANERO: *Vital enemies : slavery, predation, and the Amerindian political economy of life*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2009, 14.

This suggests that, at least in some Amerindian worldviews, all strangers were considered to be potential enemies, and all enemies potential slaves."[7] All systems of domination have a „*them and us"* factor but the Amerindian example clearly indicates sharper borders. This leaves open the possibility that domination can be transformed into predation. Given the similarities between the Amerindian and Indian set-up, it is possible to imagine that similar structures are at play.

Defining Predation

Before coming to the process of predation and the various historic structural stages of it, we have to attempt to define the concept of predation. Simply defined, it means 'the action of attacking or plundering'. But Collins English language dictionary goes further and defines it as 'a relationship between two species of animal in a community, in which one (the predator) hunts, kills, and eats the other (the prey)'. Still remaining in biology and zoology, Robert J. Taylor wrote a very interesting book titled *Predation* in which he tried to give us a wide spectrum of definitions of predation. Rather than repeat all of these here I would choose a few examples that would be relevant to this study. Starting from a simple definition of one animal preying on another Taylor takes us to different complexities of predation in a progressive manner:

 a) Predation occurs when one organism kills another for food
 b) Predation occurs when individuals of one species eat living individual of another
 c) Predation is a process by which one population benefits at the expense of another
 d) Predation is any ecological process in which energy and matter flow from one species to another[8]

While the action in context-*"a"* is one-to-one process, which in context-*"b"* is species (group) bound. From context-*"c"* things become more specific, it is about one (cultural) identity sharing swathe makes off a living on another. Context-*"d"* is a real matrix where all energy is siphoned off in a million and one ways from one group by another, leading to a total control of the prey „*resource base"*. Consciously or unconsciously Robert J. Taylor has given us a neat structure of predation at the human-level. As he explained: „*The development of theory of any sort requires, as a necessary first step, abstraction and simplification of the processes under investigation. Given the complexity of predation, the theory of this process will best emerge from precisely defined*

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 [7] Ibid, 106.
 [8] Robert J. TAYLOR: *Predation*, Chapman and Hall Ltd, London, 1984, 3–4.

assumptions manipulated with impeccable logic."[9] It is precisely this deep receptacle of simplicity I was looking for to pour the presumed complexities of the Indian history. These simple formulations, tailored for the natural world, rang a strong echo when I read them because I was thinking the same of the human world. I had this tendency to see things slightly different than others. While others saw consolidated nation-states, I saw consolidated domination and not integration. Reading authors like Robert J. Taylor convinced me that I was not off rails in thinking that in some regions we are ruled by predator nations and communities, similar to what was happening in the natural world.

State Structures and Predation

Although there are at times a lot of similarities between animal and human communities, we have to see how the process of predation takes place among human-beings specifically. For this, research done by Daniel Lord Smail on the subject takes the right direction. Smail says that, in its recent form, predation started as a system of debt collection in Medieval Europe and the manner in which it was undertaken. Not surprisingly predation comes from the Latin word *'predare'*, meaning plunder by predator money collectors. The most interesting aspect of the study is how this happens in relation with the state structure: *„Predation was a state-sponsored spectacle of violence. More accurately predation was a service, bureaucratically bound up, packaged, creditors in exchange for a small fee consisting of a percentage of the debt ... the state as a protection racket."* And he continues: *„The scale of the practice, in the cities I have studied, was startling. Predation exceeded, by distance, other vectors of court-sponsored violence. Spectacles of predation outstripped penal spectacles of pain and humiliation by several orders of magnitude."*[10]

Smail shows us several things concerning the nature of predation. Firstly, how state organs are privatized, how they become instruments of private needs. And secondly, as a consequence of the earlier characteristic, how predation becomes a generalized system of government at every level, how it becomes the primary means of interaction between state and society. Predation becomes the defining element of public morality, attitude towards rights and of course the defining element of identity. Ultimately, it is the primary function of the state to serve the people but it does not mean that it should become the servant of particular groups of people. However, once this happens, the general socio-political vocabulary changes. To understand this we have to understand the various stages of predation.

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[9] Ibid., 6.
[10] Daniel Lord SMAIL: 13.

Stages of predation

Predation is a multi-stage process as well as a multi-level strategy endemic to certain communities who internalise predation as their core ethical value.

Stage one - making predation an ethic

The acquisition of this value is the first stage. Here James K Galbraith's interpretation of Thorstein Veblen serves the purpose of giving a tangible explanation. By reading Veblen one can understand why. Veblen relates predation to what he calls the leisurely classes. Basically, he asks us to watch the level of inequality in the general population and the treatment of women to get an idea of the level of predation and he is not kind in the choice of his words: „*The early differentiation out of which the distinction between a leisure and a working class arises is a division maintained between men's and women's work in the lower stages of barbarism.*"[11] Without overtly mentioning it, Veblen also brings in the concept of property and privilege and demonstrates how both are interchangeable in the creation of predation.[12] This said, as mentioned earlier, privilege produces same results as property and thus need not be physically tangible. The only thing that matters is to create differential, although Veblen stresses the physical part, it need not be that. As we will realise in the context of the Indian subcontinent, an illusory differential does the magic as well. Provoke reverence and deference, that's what counts in the end. An ethic of differential of status is a prerequisite to predation.

Stage two – making predation a core element of identity

The second phase is a real strategic move, predation has to be elevated to be a community trait, it has to become a common cultural phenomenon, predation thus becomes part of the identity of an ethnic community. As Veblen puts it: „*The predatory phase of culture is attained only when the predatory attitude has become the habitual and accredited spiritual attitude for the members of the group; when the common-sense appreciation of men and things has come to be an appreciation of men and things has come to be an appreciation with a view to combat.*"[13] This has a dual purpose: to solidify the predatory

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[11] Thorstein VEBLEN: *The Theory Of The Leisure Class – an economic study of institutions,* The Modern Library, New York, 1899, 22.

[12] Ibid., 24.

[13] Thorstein VEBLEN: 19.

community and at the other end to identify the prey, hence forth to create 'it is us against them' stratagem or attitude.

Stage three – state capture

The third phase is to sway power over the governing institutions, directly or indirectly, and according to James K. Galbraith, this is when the calamity starts to befall: „*What remained was rule by predators, and in particular the transfer of the power of supervision, of regulation, to the organized business and banking lobbies. This is the fundamental source of calamity that now overtakes us, and it is vital to understand why.*"[14] The phase takes predation deeper. It is a transition period when the *abrupt predatory transformation* (APT) is prepared. It is also a crucial period when structures of dependency are created. All phases in the predation strategy are important but this is a determining phase. The objective of this period is, as mentioned earlier, to gather and strategically leverage a maximum of influence. State and private group relations are complex and are further complicated by the nature and degree of independence of the state. But for our purpose, for the predator community, state is an extra community element that is foreign and needs to be conquered; it is an alien element that has to be reduced to its knees. What the predator most prizes therefore is the ideal moment to gain control of the state-structure. In the evolution of the state-structures and governance there are cycles of low and high intensity of control and command. Peace reigns in times of high intensity. And as leaders start to feel that this peace is a given it falls into a trap of thinking no vigilance is needed. Thus this complaisance leads to dissatisfaction of the masses and the body politic is fevered by ever frequent crises due to external factors and the incapacity to handle them internally - a systemic problem.

It is a historic fact that predation happens at periods of low intensity. Here a two-way strategy is deployed by predatory communities. One is to make a deal with the decaying power, to keep it on infusion and use it for gaining lateral power. The other method is to support a viable alternative, in the hope that the existing power structure will collapse in a short period. Both have their benefits and their risks. What is extremely interesting, when it comes to predatory communities going this way or the other is that they decide not to accept this dichotomy because it is either win or lose. When a predator community wins it is guaranteed privileges and access to executive power to strengthen itself. However, if it loses, it will simply be annihilated. For communities looking for a long term penetration strategy, win or lose dichotomy is

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[14] James K. GALBRAITH: *The Predatory State – How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too,* Free Press, New York, 2009, XIV.

not an option. The successful predatory communities adopt a very interesting strategy that guarantees them an optimal result, as James K. Galbraith explains: „*The experience of the past decade permits a very simple summary explanation: they set out to take over the state and to run it – not for any ideological project but simply in the way that would bring to them, individually and as a group, the most money, the least disturbed power, and the greatest chance of rescue should something go wrong.*"[15] The final two phrases of this statement are most revealing. He talks of the *"least disturbed power"* and *"greatest chance of rescue"*. To crystalize this optimal outcome, the community splits into two, moderates and radicals, and whatever branch wins, it will have enough leverage to rescue the other. This does not mean that it will be 100% rescue. Some of the front members will be ritually sacrificed to protect the overall position of the community. After continuous sequences of this power play the predator community moves to a final stage.

Stage four – attaining preponderance

The ultimate stage is gaining preponderance. What we are used to witnessing and what the lessons of history teach us is how these predatory groups, after gaining power try to totalise it and maximise it. What is surprising is that predatory communities, in their big majority, are very wary of seeking total power in a very visible manner. Let us not forget that predatory communities, as was witnessed by Galbraith, are not looking for brute power, they are looking for effective power that can be operationalised, to entrench the long-term invisible control. The reason for this is that visible and brute power very quickly becomes resented and becomes target for regime change with the risk of physical elimination of the community. Creating temporary and sometimes permanent coalitions therefore becomes a realistic strategy to adopt, for the predatory communities.

It is at this point that public memory becomes a primary element of the overall strategy of predatory communities. Public Memory should not be equated with Collective Memory. The principle role of public memory is to deflect negative image of the community to others and reflect a positive picture of the predator community. Once power is gained by means that are either dubious or un-praiseworthy in the eyes of the general 'prey' communities, public memory could ideally be used as a legitimising force to the predators. For this purpose, either a parallel reality has to be created or the reality of others has to be appropriated and transformed into its supporting function of the predators.

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[15] James K. GALBRAITH: 126.

Sometimes this could mean designation of local heroes into traitors while elevating the predators as heroes and saviours. Public memory could play a bigger role in the systemic *abrupt predatory transformation* period.

After centennial domination of the 'prey' people regime change could mean one predatory nation replacing another before it. Here public memory has a double function. The first is as a legitimising structure, saying 'from today we are in control'. For this to happen, public memory has also to play a second role, that of uprooting and eradicating the memory of the other predatory groups.

If there are several predatory groups, then memory becomes selective and remains incoherent compared to other memory systems. The preponderant predator, in order to gain overwhelming control, has to eradicate the memory of certain groups but at the same time has to accommodate the memory of 'allied predators', in a temporary adjustment. Under these circumstances, selective memory could be highly contradictable and conflictual. In this sense, Public Memory does not enjoy consensus but what it does have is a temporary negotiated settlement, until the next battle for control is engaged. Public memory is therefore the product of a negotiated settlement between various predatory groups. If this cycle is repeated over and over again, public memory then becomes a 'negotiated memory'. The legitimizing force behind this memory is a long process of negotiation and not any kind of ethical or historical research. Lacking in popular appreciation, lacking any scientific basis Public Memory loses all its social and cultural value. If one considers public memory as potential means of creating social and cultural cohesion and even harmonization, then negotiated memory provides the impression of social cohesion but what is important to know that it could be reappraised at any moment. Negotiated memory, as its base meaning indicates, should produce stability in the preservation of any particular segment of memory, a result of a negotiated settlement. It is one way forward when no one group has a dominant position to impose a unique interpretation. I am certain there are cases of this nature around the world, but as we will see this is not the case in India in a majority of cases. There is no permanent and definitive settlement, only temporary agreements and adjustments.

In conclusion to the first part, I would like to affirm that in certain contexts, public memory can be considered a commodity that is transactional between predatory groups, it is a result of bargains and negotiations. This type of memory is far removed from the classical scenario where memory is more or less legitimated by independent experts as well as receiving popular support. This memory is therefore collective and serves the purpose of further cementing the various segments of society. The negotiated selective memory on the other hand

has no legitimacy other than that given to it by the various part-taking predatory groups or nations. This radically reallocates the economic, socio-cultural and political function of public memory. In short public memory becomes weaponized to serve the 'inner-colonial' conquest of a particular or group of predator nations, within the context of a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-linguistic composite countries. In the next part I will try to introduce these theoretical snippets to the Indian and South Asian context to see how they stand the test. In such, my ambition in the next part is to see if a theoretical framework of predatory nations can be accommodated to the Indian subcontinent.

Predator nations in India and the context specifics

There is no doubt that history of South Asia was seen in the prism of colonial designs in the past. And this tradition was perpetuated by so called *„Indian Nationalists"*, to whom the British way of thinking was mother's milk. Another reason being that colonial consolidation, initiated by the East India Company, of the now divided parts of South Asia continued after 1947. As India's foremost historian Romila Thapar puts it: *„... colonial administration sorted out Indian society and wrapped it up into neat packages. Unfortunately nationalist historians did not unwrap these packages. We still have them and they have become part how we see ourselves in contemporary society and politics.*"[16] There is an embarrassing show-like routine of anti-colonial rant by populist politicians and the glorification of the mythical past with one single aim: avoiding the reality of today and of yesterday. As Romila Thapar explains: *„Ancient India was projected as a virtual Utopia, starting with the Vedic age and culminating 1500 years later in the so-called 'golden age' of the Guptas. It was supposedly a period of unchanging prosperity. Society functioned according to the norms laid down in the shastras, so historians did not have to investigate the reality.*"[17] Every aspect of Indian History was about who is assigning what labels and to what period. My effort always was and will be to change these labels so that they correspond to the reality and serve the purpose of giving us a clear insight into structures and dynamics of the history of India.

In earlier essays and conference participations I tried to develop the concept of *„Fringe Mesopotamia"* as opposed to the rest of India and this structural dialectic could be instrumental in explaining many political and socio-economic evolutions in India, both recent and not so recent. In conjunction with the earlier purely theoretical appraisals, I

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[16] Romila THAPAR: *Reporting History: Early India, Social Scientist,* Vol. 40, N° 7/8, July–August 2012, 31–42, Social Scientist, 32.

[17] Ibid., 33.

would like to introduce the concept of „*Predatory Nations*" to the research of South Asian history, to explain the conflictual and contradictory nature of historic narrative in India. I will proceed by giving some general aspects and characteristics of the predator nations in India.

Specific characteristics of predation and predatory nations (communities)

a) Perimeter/border cultures

Geographically, all of them sit on the perimeter of India (and South Asia before it was divided). For this reason, historically they were all perimeter cultures. Structurally this is an important factor in the sense that the movement of these predators has been from the perimeter to the centre ground. As Anthony Gideon explains: „*Here again, we have a case where historians and philosophers, claiming for the most part to describe particular circumstances, have provided ideas that have helped to constitute those very circumstances.*"[18] Scholars like Max Müller and British state-sponsored historians have been writing the history of the perimeter people and cultures and giving them a centrality and legitimacy over the real. Marginality has taken over the central ground and incapacitated South Asian Civilisation. As Ian Angus aptly puts it: „*....thinking civilization from its periphery...*"[19] One has to understand the loosely federated nature of the Indian polity before the cascade of invasions, to know that these communities were almost independent. They knew that they were between two civilizations and not integrated as in today's nation-states. For them: „*Life at the frontier consists in escaping civilized constraints ...*"[20] Paul Lawrence speaks of degrees of foreignness, when he explains that: „*Demographic and social relationships within such are commonly both variegated and more fluid than in central areas, and expressions of identity often prove to be correspondingly composite.*"[21] Oneness and composite forms should not automatically mean that there was uniformization in the South Asian context.

The strategy adopted by perimeter people was to maintain a strong inner identity and give an outer identity that is common to each of the perimeter

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[18] Anthony GIDDENS: *The Nation-State and Violence,* Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, 216.

[19] Ian ANGUS: *Crossing the Border,* The Massachusetts Review, Vol. 31, N° ½, Spring, 1990, 32–47, The Massachusetts Review, Inc., 33.

[20] Ibid., 33.

[21] Paul LAWRENCE, Timothy BAYCROFT and Carolyn GROHMANN: '*Degrees of Foreignness' and the Construction of Identity in French Border Regionsduring the Interwar Period*, Contemporary European History, Vol. 10, N° 1, Mar., 2001,. 51–71, Cambridge University Press, 51.

groups and sub-groups. Maybe this is the key to understanding today's nationalism in South Asia. The perimeter, over centuries, became a collection point for waves of migration. This constant sedimentary change cannot allow for a constancy in the formation of identity. As Ian Angus sums it up: „*Plurality of emigrations means that the "other" is now inside. There is no national origin that can give unity to a people and define its destiny.*"[22] To this Homi K. Bhabha added the idea of a tented community on the move: „*The nation fills the void left in the uprooting of communities and kin, and turns that loss into the language of metaphor. Metaphor, as the etymology of the word suggests, transfers the meaning of home and belonging, across the 'middle passage'...*"[23] So it is logical and natural to believe that the perimeter people do not have the same cultural and moral baggage as people who have been rooted for centuries in one place.

People on the move as Ian Angus explains and 'middle passage' as Bhabha describes them must possess a special mind-set. Angus argues that this cannot be anything other than a garrison mentality: „*... the beleaguered sense of small communities threatened by wilderness and other communities outside, asserting themselves through an undifferentiated, unquestioned morality within. The garrison exists in the wilderness and constructs a border to attain order, identity and self-protection.*"[24] This is reinforced by interesting study by Charles Tatum on life on the borders. He says: „*Each cultural zone has a particular cultural genealogy that is historical in terms of different colonial origins and the different concerns that grow out of them.*"[25] This boils down to saying that the perimeter cultures defined themselves as being fundamentally different from South Asia. They constantly internalised cultural elements from the mainland, what was necessary but kept their basic attitude „*it is you and me... and I am coming for you*" attitude. The Vedas preached something different, living the moment was the name of the game, this was the mainland. Ernest Renan is in line with the Vedas when he affirms: „*A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.*"[26] An attitude not shared by the fringe and perimeter people of South Asia. As Erich Fromm would say: „*By necessity the criteria in authoritarian ethics are fundamentally different from those in humanistic ethics.*"[27]

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[22] Ian ANGUS: 33.

[23] Homi K. BHABHA (editor): *Nation and Narration, Routledge,* London, 1990, 291.

[24] Ian ANGUS: 34.

[25] Charles TATUM: *On the Border: From the Abstract to the Specific*, Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, 2000, 93–103, Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies, 94.

[26] Homi K. BHABHA (editor): 20.

[27] Erich FROMM: *Man for Himself – an inquiry into the psychology of ethics*, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1949, 8.

b) Geographical leverage

Interestingly all the four communities are at pivotal positions of the Indian subcontinent. In a way they are geographically situated in the four key corridors of India (South Asia), the main arteries of trade and gates used by foreign conquers. These geostrategic positions gave the Predators to leverage their position vis-à-vis the invader, asking for advantages once the local Indian civilization, the heritage of both Emperor Ashoka and Vijanagar, was pulled down and the invader system was progressively built-up. Every invasion was thus an opportunity to take their own ambitions for control and conquest much deeper into the Subcontinent.

This is one of the reason why mystical memory is introduced into post-Indira Gandhi Indian politics, to explain how they came to dominate the Indian socio-political sphere. For the predators it is out of the question to state that they accompanied the invader and were part-takers in the proceeding plunder. True colours cannot be avowed so memory has to be invented, which is not that easy given historic records and the deeply entrenched oral history tradition. Max Mueller, German master-creator of Indian Aryanism, provided the ideal solution – going back to those times of which no records exist. Thus the collaborationist past is progressively transformed into a romantic mythical and mystical memory. This legitimacy is then used to establish control of the 'mainland cultural system' (MCS). Once the cultural consolidation happens, a new chapter is opened for political and geographical control beyond that of core predator territory.

c) Collaborators to invaders

The first and foremost characteristics of these predator nations is that during the period of great invasions (7th-17th centuries) of the Subcontinent by hostile powers from outside, these nations collaborated with the invader, in part or the whole period of foreign invasion and rule. These border, perimeter, fringe communities had their own way of helping the enemy or invader to pillage the pillars of South Asian Civilization, to drain it of all its vital energies. Some of them rushed to finance the invasion while others gave their military prowess; and took pride in doing so. For the active collaboration and many services rendered by the perimeter people invaders generally compensated them handsomely. One noted historian of repute describes the situation as follows: „*Especially in north India, a different set of global forces also played an important role in shaping the social structure. Here, certain ascriptively defined groups achieved a rare kind of domination over economy and society. Their landholdings and resource bases were institutionally protected from the competition of the*

marketplace; they received lavish state subsidies and became the object of various development policies aimed at preserving their society in traditional form. Moreover, they were also encouraged to develop martial values and to view other groups in society as inferior and rightly subordinate to their quasi-feudal lordship."[28] Before anything the one thing that the invaders did was to bestow status upon these willing collaborators, thus giving them legitimacy over a society and political system, a power that they did not have before. This bestowed power after the so called independence went unquestioned.

There were other ways in which status was transacted. Trade and finance were the other instruments of active collaboration. In the early 17th century for example, when the British started pitching tents in the subcontinent, they came empty pocketed. The journey to Britain and back would take six months, they were regularly in need of supplies and money to finance their military adventures. They did not have any problems because traders and bankers, all originating from the perimeter, would rush to their help. One historian gave visibility with the following statement: „*The accumulation of wealth among Indian merchants and bankers was potentially destabilizing for the regional states, because the interest of the former were more consistent with those of the Company than of the Indian nobility. The European trade settlements attracted merchants and bankers from all over India. Their role as collaborators and conspirators was so prominent in Bengal that the first major military encounter between the Company and a provincial army, the battle of Plassey (1757), has been described as 'a transaction, not a battle'...*"[29] Loyalty to the mainland and the South Asian Civilization did not rank high in the priorities of the perimeter people, they were more interested in moving from the perimeter to the centre of the power constellation.

Diaspora, mobility and multi – resource base

All most all of the predator nations in India have extensive diasporic networks outside India, acting as a support base of finance and logistics. Inter-diasporic loyalty prevails over loyalty to the Indian nation. And this is logical because of the feeling of one consolidated nation. Contrary to the other communities, they possess a world view of their ambitions and a vision of how to develop their nation, in what they consider to be a borderless world. This multi-spheric position gives them leverage in all directions.

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[28] David WASHBROOK: *South Asia, the World System, and World Capitalism*, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 49, Nº 3, Aug., 1990, 479–508, Association for Asian Studies, 480.

[29] Tirthankar ROY: *Rethinking the Origins of British India: State Formation and Military-fiscal Undertakingsin an Eighteenth Century World Region*, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 47, Nº 4, July 2013, 1125–1156, Cambridge University Press, 1129

In his thought provoking book on maritime trade in early South Asia, Kenneth R. Hall provides us with a map of maritime trade from 1250-1500 CE, in which he divides the maritime activity into seven zones. In these, the two most important zones are centred on South Asia.[30] These two zones were bustling with literally thousands of ethnicities and communities but what is interesting to note is that the maritime part of these two zones is dominated by two diasporas, one principally in the Bay of Bengal while the other pulls the levers in the Arabian Sea. Between the dates mentioned by Kenneth R. Hall, these diasporas have more outside than inside the Subcontinent. The capacity of these nations to gather resources outside the perimeter of South Asia is enormous. The structure of trade in those early stages and the lack of trust meant that people of the same community went to targeted destinations and settled there. This practice grew into a vast operation of global proportions: *„Pre-modern trade, especially the high-volume trade that flourished throughout the IOTE (Indian Ocean Trade Ecumene), needed on-site agents to represent the interests of traders sending goods from far away, and everywhere there was trade those on-site agents established diaspora communities."*[31] There are some scholars that think these were temporary settlements: *„... Indian coastal communities had already developed all kinds of profitable ties with East Asia, East Africa, and Central Asia in pre-colonial times. One of the key characteristics of this so called 'trade diaspora' may be the fact that most of it consisted of 'temporary' or 'circular' migration."*[32] But in retrospect, we realize that these temporary communities transformed themselves into power communities in the host countries.

Since these diasporas were literally anchored into many ports outside India, the community branches inside India were well equipped with speculative information and could leverage their position with the help of the diasporic network. And in time of need, resources could be moved around, one coming to the rescue of the other. Thus prevailing over the others.

Fanatical outlook / attitude

Manuela Utrilla Robles gave us a comprehensive definition of fanaticism to work on and build upon: *„... fanaticism could be described*

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[30] Kenneth R. HALL: *A History of Early Southeast Asia: Maritime Trade and Societal Development, 100–1500*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, 327.

[31] Hugh R. CLARK: *Maritime Diasporas in Asia before da Gama: An Introductory Commentary*, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 49, N° 4, *Maritime Diasporas in the Indian Ocean and East and Southeast Asia, 960–1775*, 2006, 385–394, BRILL, 391.

[32] Gijsbert OONK (Editor): *Global Indian Diasporas - Exploring Trajectories of Migration and Theory*, Amsterdam University Press, 2007, 11.

as a passionate and unconditional adherence to a cause, an excessive enthusiasm or persistent monomania regarding certain subjects, in an obstinate, indiscriminate, or violent way."[33] And she continues: „*It alludes to any belief shared by several individuals or groups of individuals. In cases in which fanaticism outweighs rationality it can reach extreme levels, to the point of justifying the killing, torture, or imprisonment of human beings, and it can mask the unconditional wish to impose a belief considered beneficial for the fanatic, or for a group of fanatics.*"[34] I would like to suggest that predatory cultures ingrain predatorism in such a manner as to make it into a subterranean instinct or characteristic close to fanaticism.

Sitting on the perimeter has also pushed these predator communities to develop a strong sense of religious and ideological self-righteousness. And all have a fanatical outlook, political or religious. This ideology has a purpose, namely that of unifying the predatory community under one banner. To conquer, both nationally and internationally, first the community has to be unified under one banner before attempting to conquer other splintered communities who possess no such unity. More often than once, these ideologies are uncompromising and unforgiving. Since these groups are exclusive, they expect their members to display a high degree of loyalty, especially when occupying key functions in the state apparatus in India and in diasporic host countries.

Maintaining a relative sense of superiority vis-a-vis the presumed prey community

In the study of history concepts like 'superiority' occupy little space. Historians generally relegate these topics to sociology or behavioural sciences, unwilling to understand how these contribute to the structural foundations of historical trends. Especially in a country that puts the caste system at the heart of its existence, it becomes an absolute necessity to study and understand the dynamics of concepts like superiority and how they influence the flow of history. In a more narrow sense, as history is the struggle for vital resources, the armoury of such concepts would help understand how this struggle takes place and how it evolves in time. In the Indian subcontinent the caste system is but one element that exemplifies resource appropriation. On a larger scale, at the level of the whole of the subcontinent, it takes the form of ethnic group or nation's projection of superiority. What I want the reader to understand is that the caste system does not integrate the whole of the Indian population into one big monolith. It has to be accepted, for the

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[33] Manuela Utrilla ROBLES: *Fanaticism In Psychoanalysis - Upheavals in the Psychoanalytic Institutions,* Karnac Books Ltd, London, 2013, 1.
[34] Ibid.

sake of analytical pertinence, that there are other forces of integration at work. Predation is certainly one of these forces and in turn one of the most potent aspects of predation is the group demarcation by a deep-rooted sense of superiority. As such one can assume it to be a cultural cement for the group, built-up over a long period.

Haughtiness, inherited from their British masters is mimicked to utter perfection in South Asia by the predator nations. Even when the member of these predator communities has nothing, he or she has the haughtiness which in times can be used as an asset to gain favours and compliance from those suppressed people that have difficulty in distinguishing the extent of the predator's power. Here I am obliged to quote Veblen in full to illustrate my point: „*A group may evidently attain such a predatory attitude with a greater or less degree of completeness, so that its scheme of life and canons of conduct may be controlled to a greater or less extent by the predatory animus. The predatory phase of culture is therefore conceived to come on gradually, through a cumulative growth of predatory aptitudes, habits, and traditions this growth being due to a change in the circumstances of the group's life, of such kind as to develop and conserve those traits of human nature and those traditions and norms of conduct that make for a predatory rather than a peaceable life.*"[35] Paraphrasing Veblen, Galbraith says the following of what could be the description of the predator communities and nations: „*The leisure classes do not work. Rather, they hold offices. They perform rituals. They enact deeds of honour and valor. For them, income is not compensation for toil and is not valued mainly for the sustenance it makes possible. Income is rather, a testament by the community to the prestige it accords the predator classes, to the esteem in which they are held. It is a way, in other words, of keeping score.*"[36] One only has to walk the corridors of governmental and para-governmental offices to realize that Veblen and Galbraith have drawn our attention to a very important reality. Elsewhere, both authors go on to explaining that in fact predation (scheming) is a fulltime job of these *"leisurely classes"*: „*The relation of overlords to underlings is that of predator to prey.*"[37] Galbraith is more outright in his opinion when he compares predation to parasitism.[38]

Conclusion to Part 1

Predation is a much more dangerous phenomenon than colonialism. Colonial domination can be overthrown, conduced to palpability and

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[35] Thorstein VEBLEN: 20–21.
[36] James K. GALBRAITH: 127.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Thorstein VEBLEN: 209.

progressively tamed by civilized conduct. Predation, in its pure form, on the hand is about elimination and replacement. The obvious examples are the Americas and Australia. Historians, generally, have avoided seeing India in a similar light. There are many reasons for this. One being that it is extremely convenient to see India as a single, monolithic, block. Another is that the situation on the ground confounds all attempts at rational definition. It is very difficult to disentangle the multiple processes at work. There is colonialism and predation but in different and variegated forms. In this I have tried to outline the conceptual framework of what predation could mean in South Asia. In the next essay of the series I will try to investigate the reality of predation by reflecting on dynamic communities to see if they exuberate signs of predation, if their actions fall into the same pattern of predation described above. This will provide us with concrete analysis of the state and condition of the Indian federal system and the state of its resilience.

Anita M. Madarász[1]

The „operation" of the British Council in Hungary, 1957–1963

Abstract

After 1950, the role played by the British Council in the Hungarian context was discussed at almost all levels during negotiations, discussions, or even short meetings. During the negotiations that took place after the British Council's forced closure, the British policy emphasized year after year that it was not possible to talk about normal cultural relations without BC, so the idea and realization of the reopening of the Budapest office was necessary and justified. However, following the events of 1956 when the unacceptable Kádár government was set up, the question arose of how useful it would be for BC if any formal agreement would be reached between the British and the Hungarian government. The relationship system between the two countries must be assessed adequately to this. In this study, we try to confirm with archival sources how tense the relationship between the two countries was, among others, because of the closing and ignoring of the British Council.

Keywords: cultural diplomacy; British Council; forced closure; Kádár government; Hungarian intelligence service;

> *„The British Government publishes the list; is forced to fulfill our wishes, but regards the closure of the British Council as a deliberate interruption of cultural relations between the two countries."*
> (Record, 1960)[2]

By 1957, the British Council had at its disposal over 3,000,000 pounds of cultural propaganda, a small amount compared to Soviet standards, but it was a reflection of the growing importance attributed to this tool of international politics, even by those governments also which traditionally disdain for non-traditional tools of foreign policy such as international broadcasting and wide-ranging cultural exchanges.[3]

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[2] Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (National Archives of Hungary) (MNL OL). MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 289/1960. Feljegyzés.

[3] Frederick Charles BARGHOORN: *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy.* Greenwood Press, CA, 1976.

The role played by the British Council in the Hungarian context was discussed at almost all levels during negotiations, discussions, or even short meetings. „*The cessation of the British Council's operation in Budapest was essentially part of the process of significantly narrowing British-Hungarian cultural relations. In recent years, the easing of international tension has made it possible to reopen our cultural relations.*" At the beginning of July 1957 in London, the House of Lords put the launching the British Council in Budapest and the development of cultural relations with Hungary on the agenda. It is worth pointing out that Lord Ghoster, Deputy Foreign Minister, made a positive statement on this issue and, more importantly, officially declared the British government's intention to do so.[4] Reflecting this, Kenneth R. Johnstone, in his report dated 17 July, looked at the relationship between the BC and the Hungarians from an interesting point of view: „*I am quite certain and always have been that the return of the Council in a visible form to hungary would be enormously popular with the Hungarian public. If we were to open a library I am sure that it would instantly be crowded. It is for this very reason that we have always thought it improbable that the present Hungarian government would allow it. Incidentally, I am quite sure that the head of the French Institut in Budapest is quite wrong in suggesting that our last Respresentative there carried on any kind of political propaganda. It was merely that the Sanders case gave the then Hungarian Government a heaven-sent chance to clear out any unwanted British institutions in Hungary, and they took the opportunity to cast political aspersions and ask us to leave.*"[5] Continuing the thought, he declared: „*The Foreign Office have shown some disposition to open up cultural relations, if the Kádár government were so minded, by instituting exchanges of persons and possibly by some exchanges of exhibitions or artistic events, i.e. by proceeding on the Russian model. We have not been very keen on this for a variety of reasons: first it seemed to us that the Polish and not the Russian model was the proper one for Hungary, since in Budapest as in Warsaw there would be a large public which would be eager to frequent our premises and could not wholly be prevented from doing so. If we show the Kadar government that we are willing to renew cultural relations without insisting on Representation, this would greatly weaken our chances of ever getting Representation at all, since we should have given the Kadar Government what they*

[Princeton University Press, 2015.] 4. In 1957 it was chaired by Sir David Kelly, a former British Ambassador to Russia. Ibid. 5.

[4] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 196/57. Tárgy: A British Council megszűnése Budapesten. Feljegyzés. 1957. július 11. 2–3.

[5] The National Archives of UK (TNA). TNA BW 36/17. General policies: including cultural programmes. Confidential. CY/HUN/680/1. 1957. július 15. 1.

most wanted in the eyes of their own public, namely a show of cultural relations with the West, without having got anything very substantial in return." How Lord Gosford actually felt about the situation in Hungary was answered in the rest of the report: *„[...] is not very enthusiastic about our going back to Hungary, since I noted in the House of Lords debate that he had gone out of his way to hint broadly that HMG would not necessarily insist on Representation as a sine qua non in the re-establishment of cultural relations. I was sorry to see this and only hope that it has not been too keenly noted in Budapest."*[6] Johnstone believed that the Soviet model still had a serious disadvantage, namely doubts were raised how good it would be for the publicity of the Council if there were any agreement with the Kádár government: *„both from the point of view of public opinion here and because we have after all had some relations with the Hungarian refugee students, and there is a limit to the extent to which one can run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. I do not think that this particular stumbling block is insuperable."* Johnstone said it would be desirable if: *„we could get some form of Representation on the ground in Budapest, e.g. a Cultural Attache in the Legation, and a library on the ground floor of the Chancery building (which was what we had before) it would be worth our while supping with the Devil. If not, then I am inclined to doubt whether we could get anything very substantial out of the deal beyond possibly a few Hungarian visits here."*[7] The quotation highlights a behavior on the part of the British which was in some respects contradictory, but adequate to the Cold War situation. During the negotiations that took place after the British Council's forced closure, they emphasized year after year that it was not possible to talk about normal cultural relations without BC, so the idea and realization of the reopening of the Budapest office was necessary and justified. However, following the events of 1956 when the unacceptable Kádár government was set up, the question arose of how useful it would be for BC if any formal agreement would be reached between the British and the Hungarian government. The relationship system between the two countries must be assessed adequately to this.

According to a Hungarian report dated two months later on 2 April, the Government's draft „Overseas Information Service" was presented to the British Parliament in March, 10th points of which dealt with the British Council's education work. The wording concerning Hungary was as follows: *„The financial funds have been provided to enable exchange visits and other activities in the field of education and culture in Czechoslovakia and Hungary."*[8] Possessing this information the

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[6] Ibid. 1.

[7] Ibid. 1–2.

[8] *„Funds are being provided to make possible exchanges of visits and other activities*

Hungarian Legation in London visited the Foreign Office to ask for particulars. Warr, head of the cultural department, welcomed the Hungarian delegation: during the conversation, he said that Parliament had voted £ 15,000 for this purpose. „*The Foreign Office believes that the amount will be managed by the British Council in accordance with government policy. [...] Since the banning of the British Council from our countries, the official cultural relations have been suspended, the Foreign Ministry believes that the exact designation of the task indicated in the draft is not vitally urgent, they want to get information through their legations first.*[9] *They are thinking of a book exhibition, some study and scholar exchanges, perhaps sending artists, perhaps theater performance in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.*"[10] Representatives of the Hungarian Legation emphasized during the meeting that since the country has no official relationship with British Council, it is only possible to start negotiations with this organization at the direction of the Hungarian government. Then they turned the words upon the distribution of the money: Warr said that the money would not be distributed necessarily in the rate of half-and-half. „*We stated* [see: the Hungarian side – remark from the author] *that the amount is not big (it was admitted by him) and that the whole thing can be welcomed as a nice gesture for reviving our cultural relationships. We also intend to bring cultural relations between the two countries to life.*" How much the British Council will play in this cooperation is clear from the next report: „[...] *Discuss the details, use the opportunities available through the British Council, of course, starting from the principle that the Council may not be allowed to operate in Hungary.*"[11] On behalf of the Center (see: Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), István Bitta acting Head of Department agreed with Béla Szilágyi's[12] report, and expressed his firm position on the British Council: „*We do not want to make official contact with the British Council and start formal negotiations on various cultural exchange programs or scholarship exchanges.*" However, in the case of the Foreign Office and the British Legation in Budapest, there was not any refusal, the Hungarian official politics initiated and continued negotiations with pleasure.[13]

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in the educational and cultural fields with Czechoslovakia and Hungary." MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 003117. Tárgy: Angol költségvetési összeg a Magyarország felé irányuló kultúrmunkára. London, 1959. április 2. 1.

[9] According to Warr, this enquiry will take from six weeks to two months. Ibid. 2.

[10] Ibid. 1.

[11] Ibid. 2.

[12] Béla Szilágyi was an ambassador to London in the following period: 1959-1963. In 1963 he was appointed to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Előterjesztés. MNL OL XIX-A-83-b 3236-3280/19633245/1963. Szilágyi Béla rk. és meghatalmazott nagykövetté történő kinevezéséről. 1-2.

[13] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 003117.

According to a document signed by István Bitta, in June 1959, the United Kingdom had several steps that suggested that it intended to move towards the possibilities of normalization in cultural and economic terms.[14] On 24 July, 1959, the intention of approaching of the British part became even more tangible: the British Council organized a reception for foreigners attending a city architecture course (Sándor Deák attended the course on the Hungarian part). It is important to highlight this event because after a long time it was the first time that the Hungarian Legation in London was invited to the programme of the British Council. The report states that BC's „*Heads of Department and subordinates have welcomed the representative of the Legation very friendly. Comrade Baranyi was presented to the East European Division leader and staff. The subject of the conversation was, of course, the expected development of cultural relations. First of all, they expressed their delight to have also a Hungarian participant to this course for the first time on the invitation of the Council.*"[15] In connection with the opening of BC in Hungary, the following statement was made in the report of the Hungarian Legation in London: „*The question of how they see the possibility of establishing official relations between the British Council and the Hungarian authorities, the East European Division leader said, in his opinion the thing is going. There was also evidence at the reception that the British government is trying to take certain steps in the interest of normalization of cultural relations, directing them towards official frameworks.*"[16]

The year 1959 showed significant results in British-Hungarian cultural relations: more initiative, more programs were implemented and a number of proposals were prepared and presented. There was a need for a catalyst that made it possible, or even explicitly necessary, for the Hungarian political leadership to forget the past in some respects and act as an initiator vis-a-vis British Council. The catalyst was born due to a period of relief after Stalin's death. As a member of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary practiced the Soviet model of cultural diplomacy. According to Anikó Macher, historians have explored how Soviet cultural diplomacy was used in accordance with the easing policy to promote rapprochement with the West; while, on the other hand, it was also a means of providing the party with the possibility of control that

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Tárgy: Angol költségvetési összeg a Magyarország felé irányuló kultúrmunkára. 242/1959. Budapest, 1959. június 3.

[14] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 004391. Szigorúan titkos. 004391/1959. Tárgy: Angol–magyar kulturális kapcsolatok. Budapest, 1959. július 1.

[15] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 004391/1. Szigorúan titkos. Tárgy: A British Council fogadása. 560/1/1959. London, 1959. július 30. 1.

[16] Ibid. 2.

was deemed necessary to prevent the disintegration of the empire and ideological unity. In the case of Hungary, this was a rather complex issue. Given that they shared a long-standing cultural heritage with Western countries, the revival of bilateral relations with Western European countries served not only to promote European but also to revive their own national identity. Thus, their cultural diplomacy evolved according to the dual logic of the ideological warfare associated with the Cold War and the *„de-satellite"* process. Their newly discovered European and national identities highlighted the fact that the Soviet bloc was not *„monolithic"*.[17] The fact contributed to all these, that the Soviet Union, together with the United Kingdom and the United States, has also shown willingness to sit at the negotiating table and begin to enter into formal agreements alongside the much-feared cultural and ideological intrusion.

The bumpy road to the adoption of the British Council, 1960–1963

In February 1960, Béla Szilágyi envoy extraordinary accompanied with Counselor László Báti visited the Deputy Head of the Cultural Department of the Foreign Office. During the conversation, the Hungarian side emphasized that they have contact with the cultural department of the FO in cultural matters also in the future, which means that they *are* only *willing* to contact the British Council indirectly through the FO. *„Speaight believed that we could look for the British Council if we wanted to get some information."* Szilágyi wrote a summed-up opinion about the British foreign affairs commissioner that *„although he was received with care, but we have to find out that he is a very persistent, meticulous man, – with whom it will not be easy to establish a more friendly relationship, and – who, in our opinion, hardly will take positive steps to deepen our relations"*.[18] Secretary second-class István Varga the Deputy Head of the III. Political Department said in this regard that building the cultural relations *„[...] is encouraged exactly by the British government, so the »positive« steps are not primarily depending on Speaight's relation to us"*.[19]

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[17] Anikó MACHER: *Hungarian Cultural Diplomacy, 1957–1963. Echoes of Western Cultural Activity in a Communist Country*. IN: Jessica C. E. GIENOW-HECHT–Mark C. DONFRIED (eds.). *Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy*. Berghahn, New York–Oxford, 2013. 75–108. 75–76.

[18] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 002646. Tárgy: Látogatás Speaightnél, a FO kulturális osztályán. London, 1960. február 29. 1–2.

[19] Ibid. Tárgy: Látogatás Speaightnél, a FO kulturális osztályán. Budapest, 1960. március 30.

On 28 March, the report sent by Béla Szilágyi on the British Council confirms that „[...] *British steps are the consequences of political tactical changes to old goals – only methodological changes to facilitate intrusion. The methods of BC are almost the same on every line we have seen from the Hungarian part. The BC usually tries to give free hand to itself and does not want to go into cultural exchange on the basis of conventions or work plans – but like the Czechoslovakian and the Chinese, as well as the Bulgarian examples show – meeting with strong resistance, doesn't stick to this.*" The report also points out that Graham, the Hungarian rapporteur for the Eastern European Department of the British Council, said a week ago, on 16 March, during a conversation: *„The Council would like to establish closer ties especially with Hungary, because Miss* [Brenda] *Tripp, BC East European Director, during her visit to Budapest, was convinced that they had more opportunities to work there than in Czechoslovakia.*" Szilágyi believed that this could be due to the fact that while in other Eastern European countries BC was forced to make compromises during its negotiations, in Hungary *„so far, in most cases it was able to realize its proposals. That is why they want to put emphasis on improving the exchange of visits with Hungary.*"[20] For this reason, the Hungarian envoy in London suggested that if they wanted to get the initiative from the hands of BC, they would have to develop a position and enforce it on cultural contact with the British institution and the United Kingdom as soon as possible. In this connection, the desired suggestions were made, two of which are highlighted:

1. *„In the case of the suggestions and invitations to be put forward by the BC, the Foreign Office and the British Legation, we would like to point out, like the Czechoslovak comrades, that Hungarian writers, scholars, and so on, we know better and therefore want to decide for whom a study trip in England is more useful. Let's add that for the British it is ultimately »irrelevant« who we send. [...]*
2. *From what we heard, some friends (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria) are thinking about setting up a work plan. Considering that the regulation of relationships in this form is, in our opinion, also right, and, as far as we know, the Center has similar plans, cooperation would certainly be useful with the appropriate friends.*"[21]

On 6 May, 1960, Károly Szarka, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to László Gyáros (ICR – Institute for Cultural Relations) regarding co-operation with BC: *„The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers that negotiating with the British Council is inevitable and necessary to take*

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[20] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 003293. Tárgy: Kapcsolat a British Councillal. London, 1960. március 28. 1–2.

[21] Ibid. 2–3.

over the cultural initiative so far experienced on English side."[22] Then one day later, on 7 May, he suggested that an agreement should first be concluded between the Institute for Cultural Relations and the British Legation in Budapest (with the active involvement of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) – that is, it is clear that the British Council would still be out of this circle. It is only at a later date that co-operation between ICR and BC would take place. He was made this step dependent on the development of relations between the two countries.[23] On 30 May the British Council held a reception in the honour of Zoltán Kodály, in the course of which one of BC's representatives – J. Graham Hungarian rapporteur – emphasized, notwithstanding that the BC does not have an office in Budapest, *„they consider the opportunities in Hungary as the best ones in terms of additional development of the contacts".*[24] It is readable in Szilágyi's report that according to Graham's *„confidentially told"* information, the United Kingdom considers Hungary as a special country because she belongs to the countries of Eastern-Central Europe, and *„therefore, they are willing to meet travel expenses in case of invitations, though this is not generally usual".*[25] There was another noteworthy dialogue at the reception with British participant *„Miss Lee"*, leader of a group dealing with Council fellowship and other visitors. Szilágyi said that *„from her words it became clear that the so-called summer universities and similar study trips are not so much aimed at increasing the professional knowledge of the invited, but rather at influencing. [...] In these summer courses »participants will be presented with the achievements of Great Britain, the situation in the country and other necessary information, in order that they return home with a better knowledge of England.«"* According to Szilágyi, these statements verify the suspicion that the British Council is trying to influence the Hungarian intellectuals ideologically through various programs. And this *recognition* prompted the Hungarian leadership to place the developing cultural policy with the UK on a more solid foundation, thus limiting BC's *„almost unhindered working opportunities".*[26]

A document signed by István Varga on 1 June, 1960, continues to strengthen the idea of conducting negotiations for the time being

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[22] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 003293. Tárgy: Kapcsolat a British Councillal.

[23] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 001775/1. Tárgy: Magyar–angol kulturális munkaterv. 1.

[24] Graham added to this that three English teachers were invited from Hungary in 1960 and a decision had been made to include students in the summer university for the next year. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 003293/1. Tárgy: Beszélgetés a BC munkatársával. London, 1960. június 1.

[25] Ibid. 1.

[26] Ibid. 1–2.

without the British Council, between the ICR and the British Legation in Budapest.[27] On 15 November, at the invitation of BC, Hungarian writer delegation (Áron Tamási, Géza Ottlik, Ferenc Juhász, Tibor Kardos and Béla Köpeczi) travelled to the UK for two weeks. According to an information material prepared by Béla Köpeczi in the Department of Culture and Science of the Political Committee of the MSZMP, the hosts „*clearly set the goal of familiarizing members of the delegation with English cultural life and thus trying to influence them. At the same time, this invitation was also an attempt by the British Council to act proactively to stimulate cultural relations and possibly resume its activities in Hungary.*"[28]

Speaight's report of 26 January, 1961 stated that Hungarians should work with the Council to let themselves to experience the development of cultural relations with the United Kingdom. „*We have noticed a certain reluctance to deal with the Council at this end and Dr. Báti* [László Báti counselor of legation in London – add. the author] *even went so far as to tell Christopher McAlpine* [diplomat – add. the author]*, over the telephone yesterday that the Hungarian government had no official relations with the Council. If the Foreign Minister takes this line you* [see: N. J. A. Cheetham British envoy in Budapest (1959–1961)] *can point out that the Soviet Embassy are in constant touch with the Council over the detailed esecution of the Anglo-Soviet programme. The same is the case with, for example, the Bulgarians: Kenneth Johnstone visited Sofia as their guest last autumn and the Anglo-Bulgarian exchange programme is regulated by direct correspondence between the Council and the Bulgarian Minister in London. As stated in the Council's letter, they intend to communicate their present proposals to the Hungarian Minister in the same way.*"[29] The British Council's positive relationship with the Soviet Union and the unchanged aversion of the Hungarians are also confirmed by a note written on 6 February, 1961 by Pál Rácz. According to this, Nicolas Cheetham British envoy

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[27] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 004461. Tárgy: 1959. decemberi követi értekezleten tett javaslatok. 2.

[28] The information material also highlighted that members of the writer delegation were not satisfied with the program implemented by BC. They stressed that „*they did not receive proper literary information and the opportunity to get acquinted with the English everyday life more closely*". MNL OL XIX-J-1-k (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 25. doboz. 141. tétel. 001175. Tárgy: Kulturális delegáció látogatása Angliában. Tájékoztató a Politikai Bizottság tagjainak a magyar íródelegáció angliai és franciaországi tanulmányútjáról. Budapest, 1960. december 30. 1–2.; illetve MNL OL XIX-J-1-k (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 27. doboz. 145. tétel. 877/19-3. Tárgy: Kiállításról jelentés. Jelentés a magyar íródelegáció angliai és franciaországi tanulmányútjáról. Budapest, 1960. december 13.

[29] TNA BW 36/17. General policies: including cultural programmes. Confidential. CR 1213/3. R. L. Speaight 1961. január 26-i jelentése. 1.

visited him on 3rd of that month. In the conversation about BC, he said that the Soviet Union was the last one to negotiate with the Council's representative, *„although he did not say that we should do that, I definitely made him feel our intention all the time* [see: Pál Rácz – note from the author] *that we are only willing to negotiate with the English Legation here and that it is out of question to allow the British Council (as an organization) back to Budapest."*[30]

According to another report dated 19 February, Lajos Nagy had an introductory visit three days earlier to the Deputy Head of the Cultural Office of the Foreign Office. Speaight emphasized several times during the conversation that *„they are striving for a closer and more comprehensive relationship on the British side, and would like to see similar good intentions from the Hungarian side, and not suspicion, for example, of the British Council, which essentially plays the role of the Ministry of Culture in England and is the sole responsible managing organization of official cultural relations"*. At this point, Nagy added that *„the Council caused suspicion with his past activities in Hungary"*. Speaight then remarked, incidentally, that *„they are also dislike to remember old things. In his opinion, we need to further develop our relationships based on mutual trust."* Nagy interjected a remark, that to his knowledge, disagreements had arisen only with the British Council's Budapest office, while there was consensus on the overall improvement of relations.[31] At the end of the report, Szilágyi said that this meeting was useful in several ways, because *„we could gain some insight into how the British imagine the relationship with us in the future on the cultural line"*. What did all these mean? These mean, that the *„bringing the importance of the British Council to the fore during the whole conversation, and the chance remark that »we are hoping that our relations will develop very well and the time will come when the British Council will have an office in Budapest,« point out that the British government, if not initially, but will gradually try to give more prominence to the British Council in our cultural relations."*[32] Pál Sztankó counselor II. class the Deputy Head of the Territorial Department IV. in a letter dated 29 March, stated that *„we should elude the substantive discussions, as it would be contrary to our standpoint that we do not want to negotiate with the British Council"*.[33] An

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[30] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 008564. Tárgy: Sinclair angol kulturális beosztottal való KKI beszélgetés. Feljegyzés, Budapest, 1961. február 6. Tárgy: Cheetham angol követ látogatása. 2.

[31] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 002778. Tárgy: Látogatás Speaightnél. 265/1961. London, 1961. február 19. Szilágyi Béla jelentése.

[32] Uo. 3.

[33] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 002778/1. Tárgy: Ebéd Speaight-tel.

interesting addition to the presentation of the „*cooperation*" between BC and Hungarian politics is that Brenda Tripp, head of the Eastern European Department of BC, traveled to Hungary for a week on 13 March, 1961. He had previously asked a representative of the Hungarian Legation in London to give notice to the Hungarian leadership that she would be happy to meet Hungarian cultural leaders during her stay – this could help to build a deeper network of contacts. For this suggestion, Pál Sztankó replied: „*Since the person in question has already been in the ICR, it would be difficult to refrain from visiting it again. However, we should endeavor to give her visit only a polite character. We should elude the substantive discussions.*"[34] It appears from this, that the BC or even the work of its representative has been made impossible by all means, for the time being with success.

In connection with the British Council's annual report of 1962/1963 the Hungarian intelligence service highlighted some data: „[...] *Council officials act as cultural attaches in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As is known, the FO has denied this for years. As a result of the recent intensification of cultural relations between the two countries, they began to admit to sending Council officials to Budapest as cultural attache. Even in the case of secretary Sinclair, they insisted on the fact that he had been named as an FO staff member and got only short cultural training from BC. It was told for the first time, when Bruce present cultural attache was sent to Budapest,*[35] *that he was one of the most experienced officials of BC, and that the fact was mentioned in the Council's annual report for the first time. At the same time, it also shows that the British plan has still not been abandoned to have the BC accepted, and that only the previous Hungarian refusals are the reasons to choose the path of slow, gradual progress.*"[36] It is readable in Szilágyi's report dated on 14 May 1962 that Nagy had a lunch with Syrian diplomat Tahan four days earlier and during their conversation the British Council was mentioned. In Damascus, the organization had a school and a library at that time, but had no office. The BC strongly urged this on, but Tahan said that, as they are well aware that the „*office*

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[34] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 002778/1. Tárgy: Ebéd Speaight-tel. Jelentésmásolat. Kulturális Kapcsolatok Intézete, Pataki János főtitkár et. kezeihez. Budapest, 1961. március 29.

[35] In 1963, a British Council official (R. Bruce) was appointed a cultural attache to Budapest, he was the first cultural attache. TNA BW 36/27. General policy: including Ford Foundation scholarships; visits of ministers; contacts with Hungarian institutions and individuals; status of British Council in Hungary. CL/HUN/680/1. Notes on Council Work in Hungary. 1969. április 30. 1.

[36] Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára (Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security) (ÁBTL). ÁBTL British Council – „*Night Club*" I. kötet. 3.2.5. 0-8-103/1. Tárgy: A British Council 1962/1963. évi jelentése. 33. Aláírás: Molnár István id. ügyvivő.

is essentially a disguised spy center", they will not contribute to this. This view is also supported by the following story: *„According to their experience, the apartments offered by BC are a trap for the scholars staying here. [...] The places offered by BC families are pre-prepared. Families are prepared to influence students and to gain information from them. He himself saw a letter in which the apartment keeper reported weekly comments about Tahan. In addition, being together with a family involves certain obligations, too, it is the right thing to participate in their parties [...]. There are also different student meetings. They systematically and scrupulously question students about issues that are not usually for the public. With the pretext of talking about their home country, they take their views on some government measures and on the leaders. He himself was present for example once at a student meeting of 20-25 person. [...], where the aim was that some foreign scholars should talk about their homeland, they trickyly induced a student from Ghana to express his displeasure about the policy of the Ghanaian government, to which he owed his mission. [...] Students who have been compromised in this way are then easily intimidated and influenced. For example, the mentioned Ghanaian postgraduate was blackmailed later for information."*[37] In a copy of a report dated 3 May 1963, we can see that it is becoming more and more common that our semi-official and *„other travellers – mainly from a financial point of view – visiting the British Council's London office and using, in fact asking the Council to assist them in their program in UK (eg. purchase of free theater tickets for them). Of course, the connection-hunting Council is pleased to make the small but obligatory favors. [...] Since such contacts only facilitate the work of BC, we think that it should be thought that if it is not feasible to do in case of private visits, at least the attention of the semi-official travelers could be drawn to the pitfalls of connections with the British Council."*[38]

On the basis of the above we can state that Hungary strictly insisted on the view that BC was a disguised spy organisation and its admission into the country would have had serious consequences. In this way, the British Council had to find a solution to the problem: in 1963 it called an organization into life to represent British interests in the Soviet bloc: that was the East Europe Committee, but this is an other story.

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[37] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 42. doboz. 141. tétel. 0085/30. Tárgy: 1962/63. évi kulturális munkaterv végrehajtása. 2.

[38] MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia 1945–64). 43. doboz. 141. tétel. 3500/1. Tárgy: East Europe Committee. Másolat. London, 1963. május 3. 3.

Csilla Kővári[1]

The Fulbright Experience: Multicultural and Social Challenges in the Hungarian-American Educational Exchange Program

Abstract

The main goal of the international educational exchange program or Fulbright Program, is to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic and peaceful relations, between the United States and other countries of the world. The program was named in honor of Senator J. William Fulbright (1905–1995) who believed, that educational exchange can turn nations into people, contributing to the humanizing of international relations. In 1946 Senator Fulbright proposed a bill, which was signed on August 1st, 1946 by President Truman and so it became a law, and the largest educational exchange program in history. The program operates in more than 140 countries all over the world. The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 is officially known as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. Hungary joined the Fulbright Program in 1978, to enhance the Hungarian-American mutual understanding and bilateral relations. The Fulbright Commission in Hungary was established in January 1992, after a binational agreement was signed between the governments of Hungary and the United States. Each year 30–35 Hungarians and the same number of American applicants can receive a Fulbright grant.

Keywords: Fulbright Program; Senator J. William Fulbright; The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961; Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961; Fulbright Program in Hungary; U.S-Hungarian Educational Relations; benchmarks in the Hungarian-American Fulbright Program;

Research Objectives

In my study I try to assess the long-run impact of study abroad, by analysing the results of the the Fulbright Program in Hungary, its impact on the participants and their institutions.

As part of the American studies PhD program at Eötvös Loránd University School of English and American Studies in Budapest, I started to do research on American culture. During my previous studies at the University of Szeged, Department of Pedagogy, my major field was American culture, and I completed my Thesis about the history of the American higher education. As a high school teacher, I have been

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coordinating numerous international projects and could get an insight into the effects of international mobilities on school life.

My objectives in this paper are to do further research, focusing on the impact of the Hungarian-American Fulbright Program on the Hungarian higher education and on the personal career of the participants. I would also like to find connection between cultural diplomacy, foreign policy and education. I am especially interested in the role of the educational exchange programs in general and particularly in the educational relationship between Hungary and the United States. I would like to understand the aims, goals, background of the Fulbright Program in general, and Senator Fulbright's motivation in establishing the Program.I started to do research about the Fulbright Program in Hungary by studying reviews about the establishment of the Hungarian Fulbright Commission and about Hungarian grantees. I plan to interview former Hungarian Fulbrighters, focusing on the professional, cultural and social impact of the Program. I plan to search for archival material at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Budapest, to understand better the political and diplomatic background of starting the Program and signing the Exchange Agreement in 1978, and the period after 1989, which means the end of the Communist Regime in Hungary.

After having a deep insight into the history of the Fulbright Program in the United States, where it started from, I would like to focus on the history and results of the Fulbright Program in Hungary. The period of my analysis extends from 1946 to 2017.

I am especially interested in the Hungarian Fulbright experience in the period of 1992–2017, with special focus on the impact on the internationalization of the higher education institutions in Hungary. I also plan to study the impact of the Fulbrigt Program on the employability in Hungary, the influence on research and reasons for staff mobility. Another important question is, how mobility affects the internationalization of higher education institutions in Hungary. To answer these questions, first I gained a proper insight into the working of the Fulbright Program in the United States and Hungary.

Introduction

The main goal of the international educational exchange program or Fulbright program, is to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic and peaceful relations, between the United States and other countries of the world. The program was named in honor of Senator J. William Fulbright (1905–1995) who believed, that educational exchange can turn nations into people, contributing to the humanizing of international relations. In 1946 Senator Fulbright proposed a bill, which was signed on August 1st, 1946 by President Truman and so it became a law, and the

largest educational exchange program in history. The first countries to sign agreement with the USA were China and Burma in 1947; Greece and the Philippines in 1948. The program operates in more than 140 countries all over the world. The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 is officially known as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.

Hungary joined the Fulbright Program in 1978, to enhance the Hungarian-American mutual understanding and bilateral relations. The Fulbright Commission in Hungary was established in January 1992, after a binational agreement was signed between the governments of Hungary and the United States. Each year 30–35 Hungarians and the same number of American applicants can receive a Fulbright grant. In my study I look at the personal experience of some people who participated in the program, the ways they tried to be involved in local cultural events, how they shared their cultural heritage in a foreign country, and how they were accepted on the social level.

Through analysis of interviews with former Hungarian Fulbrighters, who went to the United States as Fulbright researchers, lecturers, students, high school teachers and other participants of the Program, through their personal experience, I highlight the process of reciprocal learning from each other in a foreign country, in an informal way, which stands beyond the professional development. Interviews are made with both men and women participants, from different fields of arts and sciences, taking part in the Program in different periods of time as grantees. I would like to have a look at the connection between the order in which different countries joined the Program and its historical background. It would be as well important to see the Print Materials Collection and the Digital Collections in John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum in Boston, connected to the signing of the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961.

The significance of this program is evident, as grantees, through the network can communicate, share further experiences, plan new activities, and involve other people to join the international group. They may change the world and the specific way of thinking. The program can simply serve as a road sign. It can be a form of intercultural education, according to the original spirit of the Program and according to the American way of thinking.

The migration of scholars seems to be a nearly universal phenomenon, characteristic of most societies. Americans and Europeans tend to associate the phenomenon of study abroad to enhance prestige.

Actually, the phenomenon is much more pervasive, and in industrial societies such as the United States and Germany study abroad also carries high social prestige. The intense competition for the Marshall, Rhodes, and Fulbright overseas fellowships reflects the importance of

study abroad in the United States.[2] In my present school I started international exchange programs with European countries sponsored by the European Union. I was in charge of coordinating the projects. These programs influenced my whole future career as a teacher, and the benefits of the international cooperation with different schools, were obvious.

All these influenced me in starting a PhD research program in the field of cultural diplomacy, so I started to read about the Fulbright program, and I became curious to understand the similarities, differences between programs of the European Union and the United States. Major themes to be investigated, would be: self-discovery, professional enrichment, crossing cultural lines, the discovery of America, self-realization, desire to share the Fulbright experience with others, discovery of country and culture.

I will also examine the U.S. impact on the participants, the possible americanization and internationalization of the involved institutions.

The goal of my research is to rely as much as possible on the participants' views about the topic. In order to achieve my goals, I apply qualitative, quantitative, and mixed research methods. Mixed methods involve combining or integration of qualitative and quantitative research and data in a research study. Qualitative data tends to be open-ended without predetermined responses, while quantitative data usually includes closed-ended responses such as found on questionnaires.[3] In my case dominates collecting data by conducting an interview in which the individual is allowed to talk openly about the topic, mostly without using specific questions. Consequently, the type of data analysed is mostly text information recording and reporting the voice of the participants. In some case quantitative data collection is followed by an in-depth exploratory interview. Oral history as a research method will also be applied.

First, I will try to synthesize the existing literature on the topic, concentrating mostly on possible positive and negative effects of study abroad. Study abroad provides the most effective means to acquire skills for foreign language. Knowledge of an international language opens up access to a wide range of scholarly materials.[4] Negative aspect can be the so-called „brain drain". Approximately one-third of the foreign students

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[2] *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 28, N⁰ 2. *Foreign Students in Comparative Perspective* (May, 1984), 203–220. The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Comparative and International Education Society. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1187348

[3] CRESWELL, John W., *Research design: qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches/* John W. CRESWELL– 4th ed. (SAGE Publications, Inc., 2014).

[4] *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2. *Foreign Students in Comparative Perspective* (May, 1984), 203–220. The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Comparative and International Education Society.

coming to the United States do not return to their countries of origin. This phenomenon is normally referred to negatively as the „*brain drain*". It can also be viewed positively from an international economic perspective. Also, as a by-product of study abroad, foreign students living abroad may become part of consumer-oriented cultures.[5]

> People go to England and forget about their religion and culture. They come back and smoke in the presence of their elders and even shamelessly offer them cigarettes. They are ashamed of their poor farmer fathers whom they introduce to their officer friends in town as servants from their village home.[6]

Educational Exchange Programs and the Cold War

Cultural diplomacy is part of a country's foreign policy and is used as a foreign policy tool. Educational exchange programs are a key component of a country's cultural diplomacy and are a projection of a country's cultural values abroad. The projection of U.S. higher education abroad was not entirely new. American universities had been engaged abroad since the late 19th century.

Before 1938, the initiative was entirely based on the American private sector, and mostly consisted of direct linkages for research, lecturing and student exchanges between American and foreign universities. Scholarship programs were established both for American students to study abroad and for foreign students to attend American universities. These scholarships were funded by American universities themselves and by the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, beginning with the 1920's.

The involvement of the U.S. government was a new factor in the projection of American higher education abroad after 1938. A successful example of American cultural diplomacy with Hungary can be the significant act of the return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary in 1978, which marked the beginning of a new period in U.S.-Hungarian relations by the establishment of first governmental exchange agreement.[7]

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[5] *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 28, No. 2. *Foreign Students in Comparative Perspective* (May, 1984), 203–220. The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Comparative and International Education Society. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1187348 Accessed:14-12-2018 22:44 UTC

[6] SINGH, Amar Kumar, *Indian Students in Britain* (New York: Asia Publishing, 1963).

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *FULBRIGHT–Committed to the Future:* Conference to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Hungarian Fulbright Commission and the Fulbright Alumni Association (Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012), 3.

The Fulbright Program was the main tool for influencing Hungary's higher education system through cultural diplomacy. In case of Hungary it is just one illustration of U.S. government cultural diplomacy during the twentieth century.

Higher education exchange is used as an instrument to promote U.S. foreign policy and to facilitate intercultural dialogue between American society and the rest of the world.

The Cold War and U.S. Educational Exchanges with the Communist Bloc, 1948-1956

The „*hot war*" almost immediately was transformed into a „*cold war*" after 1946. The contest was between two opposing world views.

The Cold War and the division of Europe excluded the eastern half of Europe, actually the whole communist bloc from western scientific and cultural life. This fact contributed to the Soviet Union's inability to keep pace with the technological advances of the rest of the world.[8] There was a realistic danger of a third world war, fought with nuclear weapons. The only way to prevent this was the gradual peaceful penetration of the Soviet Bloc with western culture and consumer goods.

The increasing Sovietization of Hungary between the end of World War II and the end of 1948, and the steadily worsening U.S. – Hungarian diplomatic relations dictated the state of official educational exchanges between the two countries.[9] United States – Hungarian cultural diplomacy was virtually non-existing during this period. The United States had almost no exchange programs, either unofficial or official government-sponsored, from the end of World War II through the 1950s with Hungary. The United States had very little independent policy towards Hungary that was not filtered through the prism of relations with the Soviet Union.

When the communist authorities agreed to start cultural exchanges and joined the Fulbright Program, they intended to have it under close control.

The American relationship with Hungary and the Communist Bloc stood in contrast with the newly enthusiastic cultural diplomacy efforts of the United States government elsewhere in the world. Good relations between the two superpowers, plus the establishment of regular contacts and exchanges between them, were a prerequisite for any warming of

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8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. FULBRIGHT–Committed to the Future: Conference to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Hungarian Fulbright Commission and the Fulbright Alumni Association (Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012), 7.

9 Leonard R. SUSSMAN, *The Culture of Freedom; The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992).

relations and attempts at exchange between the United States and the nations of Eastern Europe, including Hungary.

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its Effect on United States – Hungarian Educational Ties

The United States government's role during the Revolution remains controversial, as Radio Free Europe broadcasts may have indirectly encouraged the Hungarian Revolution, although this was not under orders from Eisenhower or the State Department.

On December 1, 1956 Eisenhower announced that the U.S. would offer asylum to 21,000 Hungarian refugees, and Vice President Nixon visited Refugee Camps in Austria, reporting back to the President that more refugees should be welcomed to the United States. Ultimately, the U.S. offered asylum to approximately 38,000 of the total 200,000 Hungarian refugees across the world.

American educational institutions and organizations expressed interest in aiding Hungarian university students. The IIE (Institute of International Education) and WUS (World University Service) acted as a „bridge" between the Hungarian refugee students and American universities that were interested in offering them academic placements and scholarships.

They established an interview system at Camp Kilmer, the U.S. military base in New Jersey set up to receive the Hungarian refugees. IIE arranged intensive English courses for students, to compensate for their lack of language skills.

The Ford Foundation provided a total of $1,150,000 worldwide to aid Hungarian refugee students, scholars, intellectuals and artists.[10]

Another important indirect result of the failed Hungarian Revolution was that it laid a foundation for later educational exchange between the United States and Hungary.

The Origins of the Fulbright Program

The Fulbright-Hays Act was signed on 1st August, 1946 by President Harry S Truman. It is the charter that continues to set the tone, coordinate, and provide legislative support for different educational and cultural exchanges.

> To enable the government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and

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[10] http://exchanges.state.gov

cultural exchange; to strenghten the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.[11]

The Mutual Educational Exchange Program or the Fulbright Program, named in honor of Senator J. William Fulbright, was established by the U.S. Congress on August 1, 1946. It also authorized the establishment of offices or commissions in participating countries. The binational character of the Fulbright program makes it unique among other educational exchange programs. The J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board in Washington, DC, consists of 12 educational and public leaders appointed by the President of the United States. It has the responsibility for the selection of all academic exchange grantees, and the supervision of the Fulbright Program worldwide.[12] Leonard R. Sussman in the Culture of Freedom: The Small World of Fulbright Scholars, examines how and why this program was created and analyzes the future of the Fulbright educational and cross-cultural exchange.

> Cultural ignorance can kill. Ten of thousands died in the 1991 Gulf war, not only because of a dictator's ato war was sealed by *„cultural misunderstanding"*, said President Bush's intermediary with Saudi King Fahd. Added Senator Sam Nunn, *„We had to put 500,000 Americans... in harm's way because our diplomatic and policy communities were not expert in cultures and languages that encompasses the regions of the world".*[13]

According to Sussman, thousands of Fulbrighters went on to build careers. One Fulbrighter walked on the moon. In addition to two U.S. senators and two librarians of Congress, Fulbrighters became presidents of universities in the United States and abroad.[14] The author provides

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[11] Leonard R. SUSSMAN, *The Culture of Freedom; The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992). 15–37.

[12] *Ibid.*,15–37.

[13] Leonard R. SUSSMAN, *The Culture of Freedom; The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992).

[14] *Ibid.*, 81–89.

clear analysis of the problems as well as the achievements of the Fulbright program. He also recommends improvements. In the White Paper on The Future of the Fulbright Program, prepared by the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, some tangible benefits of the Program are summarized:

– It has done much to build American knowledge of foreign peoples and languages.

– The Program has successfully fostered private institutional relationships between American and foreign universities.

– The Program has helped to expand the influence of the American model of higher education and of American research methodologies.[15]

The Fulbright educational exchange functions as a two-way street in tightening the bonds of understanding between other nations. The prestige of the program is highly assured by the Fulbright Prize established in 1993. It is similarly prominent like the Nobel Prize for Peace. It is awarded to those who have played significant role in increasing mutual understanding between people of the U.S. and the people of other countries. In 1993 Fulbright Prize was awarded to Nelson Mandela, President of the Republic of South–Africa and Jimmy Carter former U.S. President received the 1994 Prize.[16]

The Fulbright Program operates in 166 countries and is motivated by the need to change the United States's isolationist policy. More than 300,000 researchers, lecturers, teachers, students from the U.S. and from the partner countries have taken part as Fulbrighters in the program, so it became the world's largest and most prestigious scholarly exchange program.[17] By 1971 the total number of grantees had reached 104021 (students, teachers, research scholars, university lecturers).[18]

J. William Fulbright, Founder of the Program

> The simple basic purpose of the exchange program we initiated over forty years ago is to erode the culturally rooted mistrust that sets nations against one another. Its essential aim is to encourage people in all countries, and especially their political leaders, to stop denying others the right to their own view of reality and to develop a new manner of thinking about how to avoid war rather than to wage it. The exchange program

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[15] W. Charles DUNN, *White Paper on The Future of the Fulbright Program.* Prepared by The J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board.

[16] http:// www.fulbright.hu

[17] Arthur Power DUDDEN and Russell R. DYNES, eds. *The Fulbright Experience, 1946-1987: Encounters and Transformations* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987).

[18] *Ibid.*, 1–12.

is not a panacea but an avenue of hope- possibly our best hope and conceivably our only hope- for the survival and further progress of humanity.[19]

J. William Fulbright, the founder of the program, was a prominent American statesman of the 20th century. He had profound influence on America's foreign policy and his vision for mutual understanding started the exchange program bearing his name.

He was born in 1905 in Sumner, Missouri. He was educated at the University of Arkansas where he was awarded the B.A. degree in Political Science in 1925. Then he attended Oxford University where he received an M.A. degree and was transformed by his international experience. When he returned to the United States, he studied law at George Washington University in Washington, DC. In 1942 he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. He entered Congress in 1943 and was appointed to the Foreign Affairs Committee. In 1944 he was selected to the U.S. Senate and served there from 1945 through 1974, becoming one of the most influential and best-known members of the Senate. In 1954 he was the only Senator to vote against an appropriation for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which was chaired by Senator R. Mc Carthy. In 1961, he lodged serious objections to President Kennedy in advance of the Bay of Pigs invasion. He was particularly in the spotlight as a powerful voice the Vietnam War era, when he chaired the Senate hearings on United States policy and the conduct of the war. In 1993 he was presented the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Clinton. In 1995, Senator J. William Fulbright died in Washington D.C. at the age of 89.[20]

The Fulbright Program was established in 1946 under legislation introduced by then Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas.

In an interview from 1991, he says:

> *„I introduced the first bill in September 1945, just a few weeks after we had dropped the bomb over Hiroshima. Going in with this bill was another opportunity to do something for peace. I had already responded in my resolution to create the United Nations. There was no opposition to my bill on the scholarships. They didn't have any idea what it was about, and they didn't provide appropriation. The argument I made*

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[19] J. William Fulbright, *The Price of Empire.* http:// www.fulbright.hu

[20] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *FULBRIGHT–Committed to the Future: Conference to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Hungarian Fulbright Commission and the Fulbright Alumni Association* (Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012), 26.

was: Look for World War I debts you got nothing. In 1933, you just wrote off those big debts. Now, we can at least get something. They could at least take our students and let them go to their schools." And that's all the bill provided, just authority to use credits. Appropriations came later, after the scheme proved itself and people could see it was a good thing.[21]

The program is sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State and by the governments of the participating countries.

The J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board (FSB) supervises the Fulbright Program. The Board has twelve members appointed by the President of the United States.

The program is financed by the U.S. government (65%) and by the partner governments (20%) and by private contributions and, in kind support (15%).

The goal of the program is *„to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries".*[22]

The Fulbright Program has provided around 300,000 participants with the opportunity to know each others' political, educational and cultural institutions, to exchange ideas. The Program awards approximately 6,000 new grants worldwide annually.

After World War II, colleges and universities in the United States established international affairs schools and programs. Some sent Americans abroad to study or teach. They brought foreigners to study or teach in the U.S.[23]

The Fulbright program recognized that the most effective persuasion on the long term is advancing American national interests by attracting, not exploiting, but demonstrating mutuality in meeting the objectives and interests of individual citizens, as well as their governments.[24]

American cultural exchange was not totally new when Senator Fulbright globalized the process in 1946. Seven years earlier, Roosevelt's State Department established a division of cultural cooperation to begin exchanges with other American republics under the leadership of Nelson Rockefeller. In 1938, seventeen countries signed the U.S.-drafted Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. The following two fundamental principles of this U.S. program have guided

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[21] Leonard R. SUSSMAN, *The Culture of Freedom; The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 55.

[22] http:// www.fulbright.hu

[23] Leonard R. SUSSMAN, *The Culture of Freedom; The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 15.

[24] *Ibid.,* 16.

the Fulbright scholarships as well:

> First, cultural relations activities of our country would be reciprocal, there must be no imposition of one people's culture upon another; second, the exchange of cultural interests should involve the participation of people and institutions concerned with those interests in the respective countries; that is, the program should stem from the established centers of culture.[25]

In 1946 the first official peacetime program of information and cultural affairs envisioned a long-term operation eliminating the wartime propaganda functions. The new program would focus on „*peoples*" rather than governments. [26]

The first binational Fulbright agreement between China and the United States, was signed in 1947, one year, after President Truman signed the so-called Fulbright Act. This act of Senator J. William Fulbright was approved by the 79th Congress and was administered under Public Law 584 as an amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944. The amendment stipulated that foreign credits earned overseas by the sale of surplus U.S. wartime property could be used to finance studies, research, instruction, and other educational activities of Americans in institutions of higher education abroad. This included payment for travel, tuition and maintenance.[27]

Funding for the Fulbright program began in 1948 with the passage of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act. It focused sharply on the distinction between information and educational activities. There was considerable insistence that the two be kept separate. Information was regarded as propaganda designed to gain acceptance for U.S. policies, and educational exchanges were viewed as cooperative or reciprocal.

The first Fulbrighter went to China in 1948. Within a year, binational agreements were signed with New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. Before 1952 ended, another 17 binational agreements were signed, a total of 28.[28]

In 1961 President Kennedy was in the White House. The concept of binationalism and mutual benefits of the Fulbright exchanges were recognized by the Congress. Technological and scientific education were top national priorities. Education, at home and abroad was a concern of Congress. It consolidated educational exchanges under the basic

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[25] *Ibid.*, 19.
[26] *Ibid.*, 19.
[27] *Ibid.*, 20.
[28] *Ibid.*, 21.

congressional mandate – the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.Senator Fulbright introduced the bill in the Senate and Representative Wayne Hays of Ohio, in the House of Representatives. The Fulbright-Hays Act added significant programs to the original Fulbright Act:

> To enable the government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement , and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.[29]

The Fulbright-Hays Act consolidates all earlier laws adding new features to support American studies abroad and promote modern foreign language and area studies through teacher exchanges and curricular development programs in schools and colleges in the United States.

This last Fulbright Program is conducted by the U.S. Department of Education, not the U.S. Information Agency. In a statement before the Senate in June 1961, Senator Fulbright Declared:

> I utterly reject any suggestion that our educational and cultural exchange programs are weapons or instruments with which to do combat. There is no room and there must not be any room for any interpretation of these programs as propaganda, even recognizing that the term covers very worthwhile and respectable activities.[30]

Fulbright was responding to those who regarded cultural exchanges as a form of persuasion.

The Fulbright-Hays Act is the charter that provides legislative support for diverse educational and cultural exchanges. All these have to maintain their non-political character and shall represent the diversity of American political, social and cultural life.

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[29] *Ibid.*, 23.

[30] Leonard R. SUSSMAN, *The Culture of Freedom; The Small World of Fulbright Scholars* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 23.

The Fulbright-Hays Act is the basic law for all U.S. government-sponsored educational and cultural exchanges which are carried out between the United States and other countries all over the world.

Fulbright programs functioned in 110 countries, in 48 of which binational commissions were set up. New commissions were created with Canada and Mexico, followed in 1991 by binational commissions with Hungary and Czechoslovakia and soon in Poland. By 1992 there were 47 binational commissions.[31]

The main U.S. government bodies concerned are the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA).

The BFS consists of twelve members appointed by the president of the United States from academic, cultural and public life. The intent of Congress in creating the board was to establish an impartial and nonofficial body to be assured the respect and cooperation of the academic world. The BFS sets policies and procedures for administering the Fulbright program. It also approves the selection of all grantees and supervises the conduct of the exchange process both in the United States and abroad. The USIA provides administrative staffs for the program, negotiates agreements with foreign governments, and in Washington seeks the assistance and cooperation of other U.S. government and private organizations as necessary.

The Institute of International Education (IIE) assists in the exchange of students supervising foreign student grantees in the United States and screening American student applicants for awards to study abroad. The Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES) similarly operates the exchange of lecturers and research scholars by conducting the applications process and preliminary selections of American candidates and by supervising the placement within the United States of scholars and lecturers from abroad. Other organizations carry out similar responsibilities for the Fulbright academic exchange program, but with a focus on a specific country or geographic area. The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) of the American Council of Learned Societies conducts the scholarly exchange program with Russia and other Eastern European countries.[32]

The Prestige of the Fulbright Program

The prestige of the Fulbright Program is highly assured by the Fulbright Prize established in 1993.The Prize is awarded to those who

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[31] *Ibid.*, 25.

[32] Arthur Power DUDDEN and Russell R. DYNES, eds. *The Fulbright Experience, 1946–1987: Encounters and Transformations* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), 5.

have played significant role in increasing mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. The first Fulbright Prize was awarded to Nelson Mandela, President of the Republic of South-Africa in 1993. Jimmy Carter former U.S. President received the 1994 Prize.[33]

The hundreds of thousands of participants of the program have become goodwill diplomats as well, and though it may be difficult to prove scientifically, they most certainly contributed to the avoidance of a major war between the two sides during the Cold War and to the promotion of tolerance, mutual understanding, and cooperation between countries, organizations and individuals.[34]

> The very essence of being a Fulbrighter is changing cultural contexts. The importance and persuasiveness of culture becomes obvious when confronted with an unintelligible sign or a different meaning for a common term. For every Fulbrighter, it means dealing constantly with new subtleties. For others, going to Third World countries, the differences are far from subtle. They create puzzles and not all of these puzzles are solved, only endured[35]

Does the Fulbright program serve primarily the government or the scholar?

Foreign scholars reflect not only their country's traditions but often its current politico-economic mission.

Basic Fulbright legislation clearly places the objectives of the program in the American national interest, with strong emphasis on *„mutual understanding, internationalism, which is an active part of national interest".*

J. William Fulbright, the founder of the program declares:

> We must try, through international education, to realize something new in the world-a purpose that will inspire us and challenge us to use our talents and material wealth in a new way, by persuasion rather than force, cooperatively rather than

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[33] Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *FULBRIGHT–Committed to the Future: Conference to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Hungarian Fulbright Commission and the Fulbright Alumni Association* (Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).

[34] http:// www.fulbright.hu

[35] Arthur Power DUDDEN and Russell R. DYNES, eds., *The Fulbright Experience, 1946–1987: Encounters and Transformations* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987), 47.

competitively, not with the intention of gaining dominance for a nation or an ideology, but for the purpose of helping every society develop its own concept of public decency and individual fulfilment.[36]

According to Michael H. Cardozo, Fulbright alumni are different from other people. Before they become Fulbrighters, they are about the same as other scholars, students, professionals, and similar seekers of an international experience. On the other hand, they are likely to have certain special qualities: more than average education and scholarly interest, extra measures of curiosity and qualities are the soil in which the Fulbright experience can take root and grow into the Fulbright difference.[37]

Fulbright seems to be virtually synonymous with self-discovery and, by extension with self-realization. The discovery of self, seems to go hand in hand with the notion of service: commitment to helping humankind. Part of the discovery of self has to do with personal identity, and with this goes the discovery of country and culture.

According to Richard T. Arndt, Fulbright must go steadily forward, seeking ever to change the minds of people everywhere, to build the structure of civil societies and democracies of trust throughout our world, and to set humankind not to seeking but literally to waging the only kind of peace that matters, the peace based on understanding.[38]

The Goals of the Program

– *„to promote better understanding between the United States and other nations"*;
– bridging the wide distances across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans;
– *„cross-cultural impact"*;
– opportunities to meet and work with both American and international people;
– possibility to share professional and creative insights as well as daily life experiences;
– shaping the American image abroad;
– informing Americans about the world;

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[36] *Ibid.*, Foreword; 307. Richard T. ARNDT and David Lee RUBIN, eds., *The Fulbright Difference, 1948-1992: Studies on Cultural Diplomacy and the Fulbright Experience* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 12. 307.

[37] *Ibid., 307.*

[38] Richard T. ARNDT and David Lee RUBIN, eds., *The Fulbright Difference, 1948-1992: Studies on Cultural Diplomacy and the Fulbright Experience* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 12.

Main objective

> To enable the the government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries....and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations, between the United States and other countries of the world.[39]

U.S –Hungarian Educational Relations

After the World War I, The U.S. provided food relief and aid to Hungary in January 1919. The U.S. did not ratify the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, under which Hungary lost approximately two-thirds of its territory. In 1920, the Rockefeller Foundation sent representatives to Central and Eastern Europe, including to Hungary, to provide equipment and training for medical staff. Thanks to Count Kuno Klebelsberg, Minister of Education between 1922 and 1931, there were some significant U.S.-Hungarian educational interactions between the two World Wars. Klebelsberg was one of the most competent and trusted cabinet members of the new government of Count István Bethlen. He oversaw the resettlement of Hungarian Universities from the lost territories. Faculty and staff of the Ferenc József University of Kolozsvár (today Cluj, Romania) formed the University of Szeged, Erzsébet University of Pozsony (today Bratislava, Slovakia) was moved to Pécs.

The Fulbright Program in Hungary

Hungary joined the Fulbright Program in 1978, after improved relations followed the return of the Coronation Regalia to Hungary by the United States. In a few years, the first Hungarian Fulbrighters such as historian Géza Jeszenszky (1984–86), authors Gyula Kodolányi (1984–85) and Imre Oravecz (1985–86), social psychologist György Hunyady (1986–87), historian Tibor Frank (1988–90), as well as statistician György Michaletzky (1988–89) became visiting professors at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Under the umbrella of the Comparative and International Education Society (CIES) Tibor Frank continued as a distinguished visiting professor at the University of Nevada–Reno in the academic year 1990–91).

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[39] Arthur Power DUDDEN and Russell R. DYNES, eds., *The Fulbright Experience, 1946-1987: Encounters and Transformations* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987).

After signing a binational agreement between the governments of Hungary and the United States in December 1990, the Fulbright Commission in Hungary was established in January 1992. The Hungarian government has acknowledged the importance of the Fulbright Program and also helps financially. The Hungarian-American Fulbright Commission for Educational Exchange has been registered in Hungary as a non-profit educational foundation.[40]

The goal of the Hungarian-American Fulbright Commission for Educational Exchange is to support educational and research programs which are in harmony with the spirit of the signing partner states and which receive financial support from the two governments. The aim of the office is to increase the visibility of Hungarian-American relations, and to encourage possibilities for scholarly exchange between the two countries. During the course of the past more than 30 years around 1000 Hungarians and 1000 Americans participated in the U.S.– Hungarian exchange program.[41]

Partners of the Fulbright Program are the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, the Institute of International Education (IIE), the Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy in Budapest and the Ministry of National Resources, which represents the Hungarian Republic in the binational exchange program.

Benchmarks in the Hungarian-American Fulbright Program

1978 – Hungary joined the Fulbright Program, after the return of the Coronation Regalia to Hungary by the United States.

1992 – The Fulbright Commission in Hungary was established, after a binational agreement between the governments of Hungary and the United States was signed in 1990. Exchange of Hungarian and American graduate students, teachers, scholars, researchers, lecturers and artists started between the two countries. Around 1000 Hungarians and 1000 Americans participated in the U.S.- Hungarian exchange program.

1996 – The 50th anniversary of the Fulbright Program was celebrated in Budapest, former president Jimmy Carter and Mrs. Harriett Fulbright participated in the events. Republic of Hungary has established the authority of the Commission to conduct a program of educational and cultural exchange between the two countries. Using funds made available by both governments, to organize regular open, binationally planned and executed competitions for scholarships, to provide

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[40] http:// www.fulbright.hu
[41] Ibid., *The Fulbright Program in Hungary*

educational advisory services, and to serve as a focal point for the organization of activities of an alumni association. The Commission's Board is a binational policymaking and supervisory body which consists of ten members, five of whom are citizens of the United States and five of whom are citizens of Hungary. The Board members are appointed by the U.S. Ambassador to Budapest and the Hungarian Minister of Culture and Public Education. The governments of the U.S. and Hungary are represented by two members each, the others are university professors and representatives of the private sector. The Board meets several times a year to discuss policy and programs. Although the decisions of the Board are subject to the approval of the funding governments, the Commission enjoys a high degree of autonomy. As it operates in the sphere of cultural diplomacy, there is no political direction to its activities. Thus, excellence and integrity, always associated with the Fulbright Program, are ensured.

The Fulbright Commission strives to:

– enhance the Hungarian-American mutual understanding and bilateral relations;
– encourage scholarly exchange between the two countries;
– continue to adapt the exchange program to the present and future needs of the two countries;
– advise those who would like to study or pursue research in the United States with their own funds;
– where appropriate, assist in the reform of Hungarian higher education;
– further increase the visibility, reputation and effectiveness of the Fulbright Program in Hungary.

The Commission's mission is to offer qualified Hungarian and American citizens the opportunity to exchange significant knowledge and educational experience in the sciences and arts, especially in fields relevant to the two countries. Participants thereby contribute to a deeper understanding of U.S.-Hungarian relations and broaden the means by which the two societies can further their understanding of each other's cultures. Other mission is to stimulate the expansion of mutually successful exchanges between Hungary and the United States. The Commission's decisions are based on considerations of academic, artistic, educational, professional and individual merit. The Hungarian American Fulbright Commission for Educational Exchange supports educational and research programs which are in harmony with the spirit of the signing partner states and which receive financial support from the two governments. Besides government funding the Commission

seeks donations from the business community, from foundations and from other benefactors as well. The Fulbright Commission organizes the exchange of Hungarian and American graduate students, scholars, researchers, lecturers and artists. The Commission aims to increase the visibility of the Fulbright Program in Hungary and expand opportunities for scholarly exchange between the two countries.[42]

What Does the Fulbright Program Offer?

– graduate student grants;
– grants for researchers;
– grants for lecturers;
– teacher exchange grants;
– special grants;

What is it Like Being a Fulbrighter?

According to some interviews with participants in the Fulbright Program I would like to sum up the most common experiences:
– „*unique experience, depending on project details, location, language abilities*”;
– „*people might experience the so-called „culture shock” (you might not find life in a foreign country to be particularly easy)*”;
– „*in the U.S. everybody smiles all the time*”;
– schools offer many extracurricular activities;
– teachers are allowed to teach, only if they have a teaching license;

What is Expected from Fulbrighters?

– carrying out their proposed projects;
– to involve themselves in the host community;
– to share their culture;
– to observe the host culture;
– to teach others about the cultures they have experienced;
– to continue the Fulbright experience by participating in Fulbright alumni activities and;
– networking with other Fulbrighters;[43]

CONCLUSION

A participant in the Fulbright Program is a cultural ambassador, in every sense. Cross-cultural education helps to learn not only for

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[42] http:// www.fulbright.hu
[43] http://exchanges.state.gov

ourselves but for all of us. Helps to understand how life today and tomorrow might be better. Competition and hostility must give way to cooperation if we want to survive. This new manner of thinking is the purpose to which the exchange program is dedicated.

> Fulbright alumni are different from other people. Before they become Fulbrighters, they are about the same as other scholars, students, professionals, and similar seekers of an international experience. All those kinds of people, of course, are likely to have certain special qualities: more than average education and scholarly interest, extra measures of curiosity and energy, proven reputations for integrity, reliability, and diligence. These qualities are the soil in which the Fulbright experience can take root and grow into the Fulbright difference.[44]

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[44] Arthur Power DUDDEN and Russell R. DYNES, eds. *The Fulbright Experience, 1946–1987: Encounters and Transformations* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987).

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Csilla Dömők[1]

Europa der Regionen, Legitimation der Regionen

Abstract

Regions appeared as individual characters on the European political stage not only recently. The activities of regions have been recorded for years. First and foremost the national, cross - border cooperation of regions stands in its centre. It was supplemented by the transnational agreements of the regions that served to practice their representation to the governments of nation states and international organisations, in particular to the Council of Europe and the European Community. In recent times, regions have called the attention for themselves more and more energetically and demandingly and gained greater and greater attention while doing so. Currently, the focus of their activities is apparently located within the area of the EU and the integration process. Regions, as the political factors of the EU context, involve highly diverse activities that can be summarised in the denotation of *'the regions of Europe'*.

Keywords: integration process; regionalism; federalism; centre; periphery;

Region und Regionalismus spielen heute eine grosse Rolle, man liest überall verschiede Artikel , mit verschiedenen Titel darüber: Europas unruhige Regionen, die Kraft der Region, Regionalisierung des europäischen Raumes, Regionalismus und die Gestaltung Europas. So lauten nur einige der Titel der in ihrer Vielzahl kaum noch erfaßbaren Veröffentlichungen der letzten Jahre zu diesem Themenbereich. Ohne Zweifel sind Region, Regionalisierung und Regionalismus in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten beinahe zu einem Modethema geworden und das mit steigender Tendenz .[2]

Ein handfestes Beispiel bietet der Brockhaus, dessen neuesteAusgabe von Artikeln zu diesem Gegenstandsbereich geradezu überfließt. Während in den sechziger Jahren der Begriff des Regionalismus im deutschen Sprachraum so gut wie unbekannt und völlig ungebräuchlich war, eine gewisse Ausnahme stellten die Literaturwissenschaften dar, widmet ihm die neuesteAusgabe des Brockhaus mehr als vier Spalten, und er fehlt in keinem der zahlreichen Handbücher der

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[2] Gerhard BRUNN: *Regionalismus in Europa, Comparativ Heft* 4/ 1995, 23–39., H.H. BLOTEVOGEL: *Europäische Regionen im Wandel,* Dortmund, 1991.

Politikwissenschaften, die seit der zweiten Hälfte der achtziger Jahre auf den Markt gekommen sind. Zur sinnvollen Beschreibung dessen, was unter Region und Regionalismus zu verstehen ist, und als Voraussetzung für vergleichendeAnalysen gilt es, einige grundsätzliche Merkmale festzuhalten.[3]

Legen wir den kleinsten gemeinsamen Charakteristika der Begriffsbestimmungen zugrunde, so handelt es sich beim Regionalismus um einen subnationalen oder grenzüberschreitenden Prozeß gesellschaftlicher Mobilisierung und Organisierung zur Verfolgung territorial definierter Interessen kultureller, politischer oder wirtschaftlicherArt. Anders formuliert bedeutet dies: Der Regionalismus begründet neben dem gesamtstaatlichen, von einem Zentrum aus gesteuerten Bezugsrahmen gesellschaftlicher und politischer Orientierungen und Aktivitäten einen zusätzlichen konkurrierenden territorialen Bezugsrahmen. Dem Paradigma des Nationalstaates tritt ein anderes, auf kleinere subnationale oder grenzüberschreitende Räume orientiertes Paradigma zur Seite. Dies kann durchaus ein konkurrierendes Paradigma sein, muß es aber nicht. Genauso gut kann es unterstützende und das nationale Paradigma sogar verstärkende Funktionen erfüllen. Die Territorialität, also der Raumbezug des Regionalismus, stellt sich zu übergeordneten Raumeinheiten her, in erster Linie zum Nationalstaat, in den letzten Jahren in Europa aber immer stärker auch zur Europäischen Union.

Wenn über die sehr allgemeine Definition eine weitgehende Einigkeit besteht, kann dies leicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß es verschiedene Typen von Regionalismen gibt, deren jeweilige Zielrichtung völlig verschieden ist. Gleichwohl läßt sich innerhalb der Vielfalt über eine Ordnung und über Subtypologien anhand der Zielvorstellungen und Aktionsprogramme mehr oder weniger Übereinstimmung herstellen. Die Erklärungmodelle bezüglich der Ursachen und strukturellen Voraussetzungen regionalistischer Bewegungen differieren allerdings erheblich. Für die Entstehung von Regionalismus ist eine Bedingung von grundlegender Bedeutung. Es ist notwendig, daß eine gewisse Anzahl von Personen, in der Regel Mitglieder der Bildungseliten, ein regionales Bewußtsein entwickeln, die Vorstellung, dass normativ gesetzter politischer und/oder kultureller Räume abgegrenzte Subräume existieren, die in sich homogen sind. Die Wahrnehmung und Behauptung der Homogenität dieser Räume richtet sich nach historischen, kulturellen, politischen oder ökonomischen Kriterien,

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[3] T.A.BÖRZEL: *Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain;* Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37. N° 4., 573–596. 1999,
BRUNN, 24.

wobei jedes von ihnen einzeln oder in Kombination mit den anderen konstituierend wirken kann. Als Regionen gelten dabei zum Beispiel Gebiete, in denen bestimmte Volksgruppen bzw. Ethnien konzentriert sind, oder solche Gebiete, für die eine eigenständige Geschichte reklamiert wird. Region kann auch nach relativ weichen kulturellen Kriterien bestimmt werden, nach *„Brauchtum"*, Lebensweisen, dialektalen Eigenheiten. In diesem Kontext verbindet sich die Region mit dem Begriff der *„Heimat"*. Auch Abgrenzungen auf der Basis struktureller, vorwiegend wirtschaftlicher Merkmale, der Unterentwicklung oder Überentwicklung, können zur Begründung von Regionalismus benutzt werden.[4]

Die Versuche, auf der Basis solcher strategisch gewählter Merkmale eine gemeinschaftsstiftende Eigenständigkeit von Regionen zu begründen, setzen sich um in Mobilisierungsstrategien individueller Akteure, die mit der Behauptung gemeinschaftlicher Identitäten und Interessenlagen diese gezielt gegen übergeordnete Macht- und Deutungsansprüche durchzusetzen versuchen. Wenden wir uns den Politikbereichen zu, denen in der heutigen wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskussion Regionalismus zugeordnet wird, so lassen sich drei solcher Bereiche identifizieren:

– Das Bemühen sozialer Gruppen, territorial bezogene interessengeleitete Politik gegenüber den nationalstaatlichen Herrschafts- und Machtstrukturen durchzusetzen.

– Die Bewegung der raumbezogenen, vielfach nationale Grenzen überschreitenden Kooperation zumeist nicht souveräner Gebietskörperschaften.

– Das Bemühen in der Versammlung der Regionen Europas (VRE) und zum Teil im Brüsseler Ausschuß der Regionen vereinigten Länder, Regionen und autonomen Gemeinschaften um politische Mitwirkungsrechte.[5]

Diese Regionen, die in diesem Kontext als unmittelbar unterhalb der nationalstaatlichen Zentralgewalt bestehende Gebietskörperschaften definiert werden, beanspruchen politische Beteiligung innerhalb der EU und die möglichst weitgehende Durchsetzung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips in Konkurrenz zu den Nationalstaaten. Mit dem Subsidiaritätsprinzip ist das Recht zur Regelung eigener Angelegenheiten in Eigenverantwortung

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[4] Dirk GERDES: *Regionalismus und Regionalisierung in Frankreich: Ansatzpunkte einer vergleichenden Regionalismus-/Nationalismusforschung,* IN: *Nationalismen und Regionalismen in Westeuropa,* hrsg. von H.J. PUHLE, Göttingen, 385–401. 1999.

[5] A. GRASSE: *The Future of the Regional Dimension in the EU: Nice and Beyond*; European Integration, Vol. 23., 407–443. 2001.

gemeint. Dies versteht sich sowohl als Strukturelement bei der Zuordnung von Zuständigkeiten, wie auch als Gestaltungselement bei der Erfüllung dieserAufgabe. Dabei werden als eigeneAngelegenheiten alle jene gesehen, die nicht einer einheitlichen europäischen Regelung bedürfen.

Seit dem Beginn der modernen Nationalstaatlichkeit in Europa gibt es die Konkurrenz zweier staatlicher Organisationsmodelle: des unitarischen oder zentralistischen und des dezentralen oder föderalistischen. Das Entstehen oder Wiederentstehen regionsbezogener Politikpotentiale nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war jedoch unabhängig von der zentralistischen oder föderalistischen Struktur der Nationalstaaten. Es betraf zentralistische Staaten wie Großbritannien, Frankreich, Belgien, Spanien, Italien genauso wie das Idealmodell eines föderalistischen Staates, die Schweiz. Die Erscheinungsformen, die Organisationsformen, die Interventionsformen bei der Vertretung angenommener besonderer Interessen der Bevölkerung innerstaatlicher Territorien sind ganz unterschiedlich. [6]

Es gibt Vorstellungen, dass es sich auf der Basis von Sprache, Kultur, Religion nicht nur traditionelle regionale Zugehörigkeitsgefühle, sondern auch ethnische Unterschiede herausbilden. Regionalismus ist demnach eine politische Bewegung, in der ethnische Minderheiten im nationalstaatlichen Rahmen um gesellschaftliche Rechte, vor allem um das Recht der Selbstbestimmung streiten. Hier handelt es sich beim Regionalismus um eine Bewegung raumbezogener politischer Verselbständigung historisch-ethnisch identifizierbarer Bevölkerungsgruppen. Der ethnisch geprägte Regionalismus sieht in der „*Region*" einen Raum, der von einer Mehrheit oder Einheit von Menschen einer bestimmten Volkszugehörigkeit geprägt wird (Monoethnizität), aber (noch) keinen eigenen Nationalstaat bildet. Es wird postuliert, daß eine „*monoethnische*" Region das Recht hat, Unabhängigkeit von einem Großstaat zu verlangen, der ethnisch anders geprägt ist. Je nach dem Grad der verlangten Unabhängigkeit kann eine solche „*regionalistische*" Bewegung als föderalistisch oder autonomistisch charakterisiert werden, wobei die Grenzen fließend sind.

Die politikwissenschaftliche Regionalismusforschung hat sich so weitgehend auf diese spezielle Form von Regionalismus spezialisiert, daß beide Begriffe, „*Regionalismus*" und „*Ethnischer Regionalismus*" heute sehr weitgehend als identisch gesehen werden. Es ist interessant auch die Idee des Regionalismus die politische Konsequenz des zunächst sozialpsychologischen und ökologischen Wunsches, in überschaubaren Lebensräumen zu wohnen, und sich dort als besondere Einheit zu

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[6] K. HANF – SOETENDORP (eds.): *Adapting to European Integration. Small States and the European Union*; Longman, London and New York, 1998.

verstehen. In diesem Zusammenhang erlebt die „*Identität*" seit Jahren eine besondere Konjunktur. Im Zuge der Selbstthematisierung und versuchter Identitätsstiftung regionalistischer Bewegungen sind es immer wieder primäre Elemente wie die Geschichte, die Sprache, die Region oder die eigene Kultur, die herangezogen werden, um die Identität einer Region zu „*beweisen*" und sich dadurch unterscheidend abzugrenzen. Die durch Symbole – zum Beispiel Feste, Jubiläen oder Heimattage – vermittelte Kennzeichnung und Inszenierung der Region dient dabei letztendlich dem Zweck der Integration nach innen und der Exklusivität nach außen. Identitäten beruhen also stets auf der Dichotomie des „*Wi*" und des „*Anderen*".[7]

Da die Erklärungsansätze zum Regionalismus die Entstehung solcher Bewegungen unter anderem als dialektischen Reflex, auf die zunehmende Globalisierung und internationale wirtschaftliche Vernetzung gegenwärtiger Gesellschaften thematisieren, bietet sich hier eine Brücke zu der gegenwärtigen Diskussion über Identitäten. Regionalismus, verstanden als Suche nach Heimat (oder Identität) bezeichnet in diesem Kontext den Versuch, gegenüber anonymen und entfremdeten Funktionsabläufen Überschaubarkeit und identifizierbare Nahräume zu schaffen .Regionalismus kann auch die Forderung nach der Einheitlichkeit der Lebensverhältnisse und nach Instrumenten bedeuten, um eine kompensatorische Politik zumAusbau der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur betreiben zu können.[8]

Hier wird also als Ursache für die Entstehung von Regionalismen die fehlende Integrationsleistung und die „*akzelerierende Instabilität*" des Nationalstaates gesehen. Danach ist der Regionalismus eineAntwort auf die nicht vollzogene soziokulturelle Homogenisierung moderner Gesellschaften. Die unterstützenden Bedingungen für regionalistische Bewegungen sind dabei wie im anderen theoretischen Erklärungsansatz die wachsende Globalisierung, die supranationale Mobilität wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen, der fortschreitende Einbezug von Regionen in den Prozeß der europäischen und internationalenArbeitsteilung, der Funktionsverlust des Nationalstaates und die Regierbarkeitskrise des Wohlfahrtsstaates. Regionalismus wird hier im Kontext der System- und Modernisierungstheorie verortet.

In vielen Ländern Europas betrieben die Regierungen seit den letzten Jahren eine Politik zur Pazifizierung des regionalistischen Potentials. Regionale Gebietskörperschaften wurden neu geschaffen. Im Ergebnis

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[7] M. KEATING: *The New Regionalism in Western Europe*; (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar) 1998. J. LOUGHLIN: *Regional Authonomy and State Paradigm Shifts in Western Europe;* Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 10. Nᵒ 1., 10–34. 2000.

[8] R. HRBECK/S. WEYAND: *Das Europa der Regionen, Fakten,* Probleme, Perspektiven, München, 1994.

hat diese Entwicklung dazu geführt, dass für viele Länder die Regionen als nach verschiedenen Zwecken eingerichtete administrative Untergliederungen der Zentralregierungen sind. Da gibt es aber unterschiedliche Formen. Viele historische und sozialwissenschaftliche Untersuchungen kommen in der Regel zu dem Schluss, dass diese Reformen wesentliche Forderungen des Regionalismus der damaligen Zeit aufgesogen und neutralisiert haben.

Sieht man heute auf der einen Seite eine Fülle kooperierender Regionsgemeinschaften, so verstärkten die europäischen Regionen zugleich in ihrer Gesamtheit ihre Bemühungen, sich in dem integrierenden Europa als agierende Politikeinheiten zu etablieren.

Majoros István[1]

A palócokról[2]
Gondolatok, megjegyzések

Abstract

The author writes a monograph (Palóc Land) about a strange people, the Palóc, living in the northern part of Hungary and in southern Slovakia. Material poverty and spiritual riches are the main characteristics of the Palóc. They speak a special and interesting dialect. This study is a part of the mentioned monograph. In this study the author presents the meaning of the Palóc and he presents the regions where they live. And he presents also different opinions of these questions.

Keywords: Palóc; Nógrád, Balassagyarmat; Hont; Fábián Szeder; folklore; history; Sándor Pintér; Kálmán Mikszáth;

Régóta foglalkoztat a gondolat, hogy könyvet írok szülőföldemről, Nógrád megyéről. Eredeti elképzelésem az volt, hogy a szegénység kérdését helyezem a középpontba, mivel a megye mindig a szegényebbek közé tartozott. S ma is az, sőt, talán a legszegényebb.

A Napi.hu internetes portál 2018. szeptember végén jelentette meg azt a hírt, hogy a jóléti mutató, az egy főre jutó GDP, Budapesten 4,7-szer nagyobb, mint Nógrád megyében. Virág Barnabás, a Magyar Nemzeti Bank ügyvezető igazgatója egy közgazdász vándorgyűlésen beszélt az ország nagyfokú regionális fejlettségi különbségeiről.[3] Egy 2016-os adat szerint az egy főre jutó GDP az uniós átlaghoz képest Budapesten 136% volt, míg Nógrád megyében csak 29%. Még Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg megye a maga 38%-val is megelőzte Nógrádot. S még egy példa: *„Nógrád megyében jelentősen az országos átlag felett van a halálozás, a férfiaknál 12, a nőknél 9 százalékos az eltérés, emellett a várható élettartam mindkét nem esetében alacsonyabb a magyarországi átlagnál - derül ki a megye egészségi helyzetéről készült beszámolóból"* – olvashatjuk a Blikk.hu szeptember 20-ai számában.[4] Kitér a jelentés arra is, hogy a 15 és 64 év közötti nők

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esetében a légcső-, a hörgő- és a tüdőrák halálozási adatai 17%-kal rosszabbak az országos átlagnál. A férfiak körében a prosztata daganata okozta halálozási arány pedig 20%-kal rosszabb a megyében.

Az előbbiek megerősítettek eredeti elképzelésemben, s az is, hogy Szabó Zoltán[5] a múlt század harmincas éveinek végén megjelent könyvének már a címében – *Cifra nyomorúság* – is érzékelteti, hogy a szegénység a Cserhát, a Mátra és a Bükk térségében a mindennapok meghatározója: *„szegénységben gazdag táj veszi körül … Palócország fővárosát"* Balassagyarmatot, olvasható könyvében.[6] A szegény, a szegénység szavak gyakran fordulnak elő munkájában, mert szerinte ez az állapot hozzátartozik az észak-magyarországi régióhoz, éppúgy, mint a szépség. A szegény élet gyűjtőhelye ez a táj – írja.[7]

Úgy tűnik, a harmincas évek óta nem sokat változott a helyzet, pedig azóta néhány politikai fordulat, rendszerváltás lejátszódott Magyarországon. Ennek ellenére ma sem lehet írni a palócok földjéről a *szegény*, a *szegénység* szavak nélkül.

Szabó könyvében azonban a *szegény* mellett a *gazdag* jelző is megtalálható, mert az általa bemutatott táj nemcsak szegénységben gazdag, hanem színekben és mesékben is. A *„nógrádi úrnép"* –ről, e *„jórészt középbirtokos dzsentri"* –ről pedig megjegyzi, hogy *„valamikor nem volt érték nélkül való"*, mivel a kastélyaikban *„még ma is sok helyütt gazdag könyvtárak pihennek régi polcokon, tanúsítván, hogy az egykori urak nemcsak erdei vadak húsával és gravámennel[8] éltek, hanem kultúrával is."* Nagy Iván[9] nevét említi ezzel kapcsolatban, aki

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[5] Szabó Zoltán (1912-1984), író, falukutató. Egyetemi tanulmányait a Műegyetemen kezdte (gépészmérnök hallgató), majd a Pázmány Péter Tudományegyetemen előbb nyelveket tanult (francia, angol, latin), ezután jogot hallgatott. Költőként indult, majd falukutató lett. *A tardi helyzet* és a *Cifra nyomorúság* című könyvek tették híressé. Fellépett a nemzetiszocialista és a nyilas befolyás ellen. Kiadta a népi írók könyveit. Tagja volt a Nemzeti Parasztpártnak, az Írószövetség főtitkára is volt. 1949-ben emigrált, s Londonba költözött. Dolgozott a Szabad Európa Rádiónak, a BBC-nek. 1979-ben Franciaországban, egy breton kisvárosban telepedett le.

[6] SZABÓ Zoltán: *Cifra nyomorúság. A Cserhát, Mátra, Bükk földje és népe*, Cserépfalvi, Budapest, 1938. 218.

[7] Uo. 14.

[8] A rendi alkotmányon elkövetett sérelem. A 16. századtól 1848-ig használt kifejezés.

[9] Nagy Iván (Balassagyarmat, 1824 – Horpács, 1898). Köznemesi család sarja. Történész, családkutató, heraldikus. Jogi végzettségű (Losonc és Pozsony). Részt vett a szabadságharcban, s Guyon Richárd nevezi ki főhadnaggyá. Ezután bujdosás, amnesztia. 1855-től a pesti Egyetemi Könyvtár munkatársa. 1858, a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia levelező tagja, 1874, rendes tagja. 1870-től szerkeszti az Országgyűlés Képviselőházi Naplóját. 1878-ban Horpácsra költözik s a falu bírája lesz. Idejét elsősorban a tudományos munkára fordítja. Neki köszönhető, hogy 1891-ben megalakul a Nógrádvármegyei Múzeum Társulat, s még ebben az évben a múzeum is, amely ma a Palóc Múzeum nevet viseli.

tízezer kötetes könyvtárat adományozott a Nógrádvármegyei Múzeumnak.[10] Hausel Sándor szerint Szontagh Pál,[11] Nagy Iván horpácsi szomszédjának a könyvtára, valamint a Ghiczy-féle könyvtár 3.536 kötettel is a gyűjteménybe került.[12] Nagy Iván nem csupán a könyvtárát ajándékozta a múzeumnak, hanem egész vagyonát.[13] *„….a Haza iránt beoltott eszményi szeretet ösztönöz és indít arra, hogy összes csekély fekvő vagyonunkat aprólékos megosztás helyett a közügynek oltárára szenteljük"* – írja Nagy Iván a végrendeletében.[14]

A palócok földje irodalmi vonatkozásokban, kapcsolatokban is gazdag. Csáky Károly több írást, könyvet szentelt ennek bemutatására a történelmi Hont és Nógrád vármegyéből. Szabó Károly könyvéből viszont megismerjük, hogy Balassagyarmat milyen szerepet játszott az irodalomban.[15] A néprajzi anyag pedig óriási és rendkívül gazdag. Bakó Ferenc szerkesztésében négy vaskos kötet jelent meg a palóc tájról, a palócok földjéről, a Felföldről.[16] Joggal állapítja meg Kósa László, hogy *„a*

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[10] Uo. 222.

[11] Szontagh Pál (1820–1904), politikus, a Nógrád vármegyei ellenzék egyik vezére a reformkorban. Államtitkár Esterházy Pál első magyar külügyminiszter mellett 1848-ban. A szabadságharc után két év börtön Olmützben. Tisza Kálmán barátja, a képviselőház alelnöke, a főrendiház tagja. 1850-től horpácsi birtokán él.

[12] HAUSEL Sándor: *Nagy Iván horpácsi évei (1878–1898),* IN: TYEKVICSKA Árpád: *Nagy Iván emlékezete*, Balassagyarmat, 2000. 149.

[13] A múzeum gyűjteményének 80%-a (benne Nagy Iván hagyatékával) az első világháború alatt elpusztult. A múzeum épületét laktanyának és kórháznak használták. A második világháború szintén jelentős pusztítást okozott a gyűjteményben. 1949–1950-ben pedig központosították a könyvanyagot, amely az Országos Széchenyi Könyvtárba került, jóllehet Nagy Iván az adományait a balassagyarmati múzeum javára tette. Az 1970-es évek elején aztán Nógrád megye új múzeumai között osztották szét a balassagyarmati gyűjteményt szakágak szerint. Így a régészeti és a történeti anyag egy része Szécsénybe került (Kubinyi Ferenc Múzeum), a természettudományi a Pásztói Múzeumba, a történeti anyag másik része, a numizmatikai, az irodalmi és a művészettörténeti gyűjteménnyel együtt pedig Salgótarjánba (Nógrádi Sándor Történeti Múzeum). A Palóc Múzeumban a néprajzi, a paraszti kultúrát képviselő anyag maradt. Limbacher Gábor ezért joggal veti fel, hogy Nagy Iván hagyatéka akaratának megfelelően kerüljön vissza az általa alapított múzeumba. 1930. szeptember 15-én döntöttek arról, hogy az intézmény Nagy Iván nevét veszi fel (Nógrádvármegyei Nagy Iván Múzeum), 1950-ben államosították, s ekkor kapta a Palóc Múzeum nevet. LIMBACHER Gábor: *Nagy Iván hazaszerete*, IN: TYEKVICSKA Árpád: *Nagy Iván emlékezete*,Balassagyarmat, 2000. 67. http://palocmuzeum.hu/a-muzeumrol/a-muzeumrol/; Palóc Múzeum – Wikipédia.

[14] Idézi LIMBACHER, IN: TYEKVICSKA (2000): 66.

[15] CSÁKY Károly: *Irodalmi kapcsolatok* I. (Klasszikusok nyomában), Lilium Aurum, Dunaszerdahely, 2004. CSÁKY Károly: *Szülőföldi vallomások*, Madách, 1989. DR. SZABÓ Károly: *Balassagyarmat az irodalomban,* Balassagyarmat, 1972.

[16] BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): *Palócok I. Kutatástörténet, föld és nép*, Eger 1989. pp444. BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk): *Palócok II. Újkori történelem és népi társadalom*, Eger, 1989. pp504. BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): *Palócok III. Termelés és a javak*

palóc kérdés a magyar néprajzi kutatások egyik fontos katalizátora volt, maradt és reméljük marad is".[17] A vállalkozás nagyságát mutatja, hogy a négy kötet 2.760 oldalt tartalmaz, s 33 szerző 37 tanulmánya található benne. Maga a kutatás több mint tíz évig tartott, a kutatók által összeállított kérdőívet 500 településen töltötték ki, az egri Dobó István Vármúzeumban 700 kitöltött kérdőív és 700 kézirat található 60 ezer lapnyi terjedelemben. A kutatás Nógrád, Heves, Gömör és Borsod megyékre terjedt ki, jóllehet a palócok élettere ennél jóval nagyobb. A török uralom megszűnése után egyes csoportjaik a Duna-Tisza közére, a Bácskába és a Bánátba is eljutottak. Ezért *„a palóc a legnagyobb területre kiterjedt néprajzi egységünk."* –írja Balassa Iván.[18] Kósa László szerint azonban a palócok területét ma sem lehet pontosan körülhatárolni.[19]

A palócok földje tehát egyszerre szegény és gazdag, egyszerű és bonyolult. Készülő könyvemben ezt az ellentmondásos kettősséget igyekszem sokoldalúan és árnyaltan bemutatni, megfejteni, feloldani. Jelen tanulmány azonban csak arra vállalkozik, hogy megmutassa a palóc szó jelentését, értelmezését, s arra, hogy bemutassa, hol éltek, hol élnek a palócok, hol lehet meghúzni – ha ez egyáltalán lehetséges – e népesség földrajzi határait.

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

Nógrád megyéről nem lehet írni a palócok nélkül. Nem, mert a megyét a palócokkal azonosították, napjainkban pedig ez az egykor gúnyként használt elnevezés a reneszánszát éli a megyében. Limbacher Gábor a gazdasági élet, a kultúra és a sport területéről több tucat

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felhasználása, Eger, 1989. pp890. BAKÓ Ferenc (szerk.): *Palócok IV. Rítus és folklór*, Eger, 1989. pp892.

[17] KÓSA László: *Bevezető előadás*, IN: KAPROS Márta – LENGYEL Ágnes – LIMBACHER Gábor, (szerk.): *Palócok a múltban és a jelenben. Milleneumzáró tudományos konferencia és kulturális napok a Magyar Tudomány Napja alkalmából*, Palócmúzeum, Balassagyarmat, 2001. november 9–10, Nógrád megyei múzeumok évkönyve, Balassagyarmat – Salgótarján, 2002. 257. (KAPROS-LENGYEL-LIMBACHER). Voigt Vilmos jegyzi meg, hogy a palócok kutatása már a reformkorban elkezdődött, s hozzáteszi: *„A magyar néprajz, a magyar népköltészeti kutatás nem fogalmazódott meg, nem fejlődött volna ki olyan módon, ahogyan ez megtörtént, ha nem lett volna „palóckutatás" már ettől kezdve,"* VOIGT Vilmos: *Egy új palóckutatás az új évezredben*, IN: KAPROS – LENGYEL – LIMBACHER: 299.

[18] BALASSA Iván: *A palóc monográfia bemutatása elé*, IN: PETERCSÁK Tivadar – SZABÓ J. József (szerk.): *Konferencia a Palócok I–IV. kötetek megjelenése alkalmából*. Budapest, Néprajzi Múzeum, 1991. május 9. Agria XXIX–XXX. Az egri Dobó István Vármúzeum évkönyve, Eger, 1994. 5–6. (Későbbiekben: PETERCSÁK–SZABÓ). Lásd még: BAKÓ Ferenc: *Szerkesztői tájékoztató*, IN: PETERCSÁK – SZABÓ: 19.

[19] KÓSA László: *A magyar néprajz tudománytörténete*, Osiris, Budapest, 2001. 22.

elnevezést sorol fel, jelezve, hogy a palóc szó márkanévvé vált.[20] Ízelítőként néhány elnevezés: Palóc Házi Sörfőzde (Balassagyarmat), Palóc Áruház (Szécsény), Palócrutin Autósiskola, Palóc Nagyker Kft., Palóctáj Szövetkezet, Palócgazda Mezőgazdasági Kft., Palóc Múzeum, Palócföld Szerkesztőség, Palócokért Keresztény, Kulturális Alapítvány, Palóc mesemondó verseny, Palóc Nyár, Palóc Tábor, Szent Anna-i Palóc Búcsú, Palóc Kézilabda SE, Nemzetközi Palóc Triatlon, stb. Limbacher egy mondatot idéz egy tv műsorvezető életrajzából: „....*a Palóc Athénben, azaz Balassagyarmaton*" születtem. De említhetem a Palóc Pompei elnevezést az Ipolytarnóc – Salgótarján túraútvonallal kapcsolatban. S van Palóc Grand Canyon elnevezés is (a Szécsény fölötti Paris patak völgye), és a Szent-Anna-i Palóc Búcsúban Palócország Szépeit is megválasztják. A szerző különlegességként említi, hogy a Palóc Szépe versenyen a résztvevők fehérneműben és estélyi ruhában mutatják meg magukat, s nem hagyományos palóc viseletben. A nemzetközi műkörömdíszítő versenyen pedig a magyarországi résztvevő rimóci népviseletben mutatta be matyómintás műkörmeit.

Úgy, tűnik, a Nógrádban élő emberek többsége ma már felvállalja a palóc nevet, akár palóc, akár nem. Joggal állapítja meg Petercsák Tivadar, hogy „*a palóc néprajzi csoport hírneve, társadalmi megítélése átalakult*". S ez szerinte „*a palóc öntudat megkésett kialakulása*".[21] Ezt a 2018 augusztusában Honton, szülőfalumban készített interjúim is alátámasztják. Balla Györgyi, a *Kutyorikonyha Kft* tulajdonosa, vezetője egyértelműen kijelentette, hogy ő palóc, és szerinte a falu is az. Igaz, amikor megmondtam neki, hogy a palóc elnevezést *együgyű* értelemben használták a múltban, meglepődött, de palóc voltát változatlanul felvállalta. Gál Gyula Balassagyarmaton tanító tanárember még büszke is arra, hogy palóc. A palóc elnevezéssel kapcsolatos ellentmondásos helyzetet az interjúk is tükrözték. Pál Gábor, Hont egykori polgármestere[22] határozottan kijelentette, hogy ő nem palóc, és a falu sem az.

A 19. század elejétől megnőtt az érdeklődés a magyar tájak, népcsoportok iránt, s a tudományt, a történelmet s a még meg sem született néprajzot elsősorban a palócok érdekelték. „*1825-35 között valóságos «palóc-lázon» esett át a pesti szellemi élet.*" – írja Kósa László.[23] Az érdeklődést a nemzeti romantika ösztönözte, s úgy

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[20] LIMBACHER Gábor: *A palóc régió kutatási programja a jelenben*. IN: KAPROS – LENGYEL – LIMBACHER: 314–319.

[21] PETERCSÁK Tivadar: *A palóckutatás célkitűzései, megvalósulása és eredményei*, IN: KAPROS–LENGYEL–LIMBACHER: 297.

[22] 1989 és 1993 között volt polgármester, s utána még három ciklusban alpolgármester.

[23] KÓSA László – FILEP Antal: *A magyar nép táji-történeti tagolódása*, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1978. 11.

gondolták, ha megismerik a palócokat, megismerik azt is, hogy a régi magyarok hogyan éltek, milyen állapotok voltak a honfoglalás korában.[24]

A palócokat híressé és elfogadottá Mikszáth Kálmán tette a *Jó palócok* című 1881-ben megjelent novelláskötetével, amelyben *„az anekdotahős, ostoba parasztokkal szemben rokonszenves alakokkal ismertette meg a közvéleményt".*[25] A pozitív hatás azonban először csak az értelmiség körében figyelhető meg, pontosabban folytatódott a palócok iránti érdeklődés, amely Szeder Fábián[26] 1819-ben megjelent *A Palóczok* című tanulmányának a következménye volt. Kósa ennek alátámasztására Bajza József Toldy Ferencnek 1829-ben írt leveléből idéz: *„Vörösmarty múlt héten ment Bugáttal Heves, Borsod és Gömör megyébe. A palóczok nagyon interessálják".* Hogy a társadalom többi részében, s főleg a palócoknál ez a pozitív hatás még nem volt kimutatható, Kósa két példája is tanúsítja. A 19. század végén kiadott vármegyei monográfiák Nógráddal foglalkozó szerzője minden településre kérdőívet küldött ki, hogy palócnak tartják-e magukat. Csak egyetlen jegyző vállalta el, hogy faluja palóc. Malonyai Dezső, *A Magyar nép művészete* című több kötetes vállalkozás szerkesztője szintén próbálkozott közvélemény-kutatással. Az eredmény: sorra érkeztek vissza a palóc mivoltot tagadó nyilatkozatok.[27] Miért e tartózkodás, tagadás?

A palóc szó jelentése

Szeder Fábián a már említett tanulmányában írja: *„Ismertetni, nem pedig kinevettetni akartam ezen becses jószívű földünket; és a józan Olvasónak eszébe se juthat csúfot űzni valakiből azért, hogy másutt lett a világra, és honnyi szokásait, akár millyenek legyenek azok, követi;"*[28]Ha Szeder jelzi, hogy nem akar sem csúfot űzni a palócokból, sem kinevettetni őket, akkor ez azt is jelenti, hogy ezek megtörténtek velük.

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[24] Uo. 10.

[25] KÓSA László: *A palócok néprajzi kutatása a kezdetektől az 1960-as évekig.* IN: BAKÓ Ferenc: *Palócok* I. Heves Megyei Múzeumok Igazgatósága, Eger, 1989. 10.

[26] Szeder Fábián, Csáb, 1784 – Komáronfüss, 1859. Bencés pap. A magyar néprajz úttörője, nyelvjáráskutató. Tanult az esztergomi gimnáziumban, ahol a költészetre Révai Miklós, nyelvész, író, oktatta, s aki arra biztatta, hogy őrizze meg palóc magyarságát, mert az anyanyelvnek sok kincse van elrejtve benne. Bölcsészetet Pozsonyban hallgatott, teológiát Győrött és Pannonhalmán. 1804-ben lépett a bencés rendbe, s 1808-ban szentelték pappá. Tanított Pannonhalmán, Esztergomban, Győrött, Sopronban s Dömölkön. 1831, a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia levelező tagja, 1837-ben azonban lemondott tagságáról. Pannonhalmán levéltáros, majd könyvtáros. 1841-től a rend komáromfüssi birtokát irányította.

[27] Uo. 10.

[28] SZEDER Fábián: *A Palóczokról*, Tudományos Gyűjtemény, VI. kötet, 1819. 6. Hasonmás kiadás: Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó, Dunaszerdahely, 2005.

Pintér Sándor[29] az 1880-ban megjelent *A palócokról* című munka szerzője bevallja, hogy neki többet kell tudnia a palócokról, *„mert szép apám, s dédanyámnak is hamisítatlan palócvér lüktetett ereikben, és így önmagamat is tőről sarjadt palócnak ismerem"*. E vallomás után hozzáteszi: *„illő, hogy szégyenletemben kis körmömig elpiruljak, mert tudod-e mit tesz magyarul e szó „palóc"? Sem többet sem kevesebbet, mint „együgyü".*[30] A palóc szónak erre a jelentésére, pontosabban, hogy ilyen értelemben használták a szót, már Horvát István történész is utalt a 19. század húszas éveiben, miszerint a *„Te Palócz!"* annyit jelent, hogy *együgyű*.[31] Pauler Gyula is hangsúlyozza az 1877-ben megjelent tanulmányában (*A magyarok megtelepedéséről*) a palóc szó lenéző, gúnynév jelentését.[32]

A fentiekhez hasonló elmarasztaló jelentéstartalommal a *palóc* nem volt egyedül. A csángót és a matyót is említeni lehet ezzel kapcsolatban, és a Göcsej, [33] a göcseji is megbélyegző volt a 19. században. Ez a zalai táj azért kapcsolódik témánkhoz, mert az itt élő nép egy eredetmonda szerint palócnak tartja magát, mivel Göcsej országában, tehát a palócok földjén élt a *„nagy palóc herceg"*, akit egyszer Attila király hatalmas seregével meglátogatott. A monda arról is szól, hogy Attila népe, azaz

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[29] Pintér Sándor (Etes, 1841 – Szécsény 1915), ügyvéd, néprajzos. 1901-ben a szécsényi kerület országgyűlési képviselője. A néprajz mellett régészeti kutatásokat is folytatott. Nyáry Albert az ugyancsak amatőr néprajzos arisztokrata így ír mesteréről, a Pintérről írt nekrológban: *„Dilettáns maradt egészen haláláig. Rajongó, idealista, csapongó gondolatmenetét fékezni nem tudó és nem akaró dilettáns. Olyan, aki folyton elméletek felállításán törte a fejét, amelyek nagy része a paradoxon határán állott, s melyek mégis mindenkor tagadhatatlan elmeéllel voltak felállítva – értékes mag körül szivárványos szappanbuborékok."* S még hozzátette: *„Járt-kelt, kutatott, kérdezősködött, hogy adatokat találjon arra nézve, hogy a tündéreknek a birodalma a Mátra völgyeire terjedt ki, hogy Tündér Ilona palóc menyecske volt..."* Nyáry a dilettáns szót egyértelműen elismerően, pozitív értelemben használta. KÓSA László: *A palócok néprajzi kutatása a kezdetektől az 1960-as évekig.* IN: BAKÓ Ferenc: *Palócok* I. Heves Megyei Múzeumok Igazgatósága, Eger, 1989. 17.

[30] PINTÉR Sándor: *A palócokról. Népismertető tanulmány*, Aigner Lajos, Budapest, 1880. 6.

[31] MANGA János: *Palócföld*, Gondolat, Budapest, 1979. 12. Horvát Istvánról lásd SOÓS István: *Romantikus őstörténet,* História 1984/4. A Tudományos Gyűjtemény I. kötetében 1817-ben *Hazafi* néven Horvát István az aláírója a palócság leírására szóló pályázatnak, ráadásul 12 császári aranyat is felajánlott a nyertesnek. Szeder Fábián erre a felhívásra küldte be tanulmányát.

[32] MANGA: 12.

[33] Zala megye délnyugati részén található, s az Árpád-korban határőrvidék volt. Miután Horvátország Magyarországhoz került, a térség elvesztette stratégiai jelentőségét. A reformációnak köszönhetően a térség lakói reformátusok lettek. A 18. században azonban jobbágyságát rekatolizálták. A nemesek, kisnemesek között azonban megmaradt a protestáns vallás. A társadalmi szerkezet, a szellemi műveltség archaikus, konzervatív vonásokat őriz. KÓSA László – FILEP Antal: 100–101. A *Göcsej* szócikk Filep Antal munkája.

Árpád magyarjai szlávokkal és avarokkal, tehát palócokkal találkoztak.[34]

Egykori történelemtanárom, a már említett Szabó Károly jegyzi meg, hogy *„Göcsejben nem lehet utolérni a tájnyelvet. Mindenütt a szomszéd faluba utasítják az embert. „Itt még nem, de ott már »göcsejiesen« beszélnek”.* Tanárként és szakfelügyelőként hasonló tapasztalatai voltak Nógrád megye középiskoláiban. Ha rákérdezett valamilyen palóc nyelvjárási jelenségre, azt a választ kapta diákjaitól, hogy náluk ezt nem mondják, de a szomszéd faluban már hallották.[35]

A palóchoz hasonló megbélyegző elnevezés Európa más területein is előfordul. A németalföldi szabadságharc idején (1568–1609) Charles de Berlaymont gróf 1566-ban a helytartóhoz, Pármai Margithoz kérvénnyel forduló nemeseket *koldusok*nak (les gueux) nevezte az egyszerű ruházatuk miatt. A felkelők aztán büszkén felvállalták, viselték ezt a nevet. Franciaországban ugyancsak lekicsinylően használják a belga elnevezést, s erről személyes tapasztalatom is van. Egyik párizsi kutatói ösztöndíjam alkalmával láttam, hogy egy autós az ellenkező oldalról hajt be az egyirányú utcába, amely a boulevard Saint-Michelbe torkollik. A vele szemben szabályosan közlekedő autós megállt, kiszállt a kocsijából és odament a szabálytalan autó vezetőjéhez, majd megkérdezte: *Mondja uram, maga belga?* Ami ezúttal azt jelentette, hogy ostoba, hülye. A konfliktus azonban franciásan, azaz udvariasan oldódott meg.

A palóc szót nemcsak *együgyű* értelemben használták. A szakemberek abban megegyeznek, hogy az elnevezés szláv eredetű, s a magyar nyelvbe több néptől kerülhetett be, így az oroszoktól, a lengyelektől és a csehektől a 10–12. században. Jerney János szerint az orosz évkönyvekben *polovc* alakban 1061-ben jelenik meg először. Az orosz forrásokban azonban *polovici, plavec, plavci, polovci, polovec* formában egyaránt előfordul a kunok megnevezéseként. Hogy milyen kapcsolat, összefüggés van a kunok és a palócok között, könyvemben térek vissza. Mindjárt hozzá kell tennem, hogy a magyar források soha nem nevezték a kunokat *polovecek*nek. A palóc elnevezést a téma kutatói általában az oroszból származtatják, s összetett szónak tekintik, melynek első tagja a *polle*, mezőt jelent, s az ehhez járuló *tze* vagy *kszi* ragnak köszönhetően a szót *mezei* vagy *térföldi* lakosnak lehet fordítani, de csak abban az esetben, ha a polovici szót tájnyelvi jellegűnek tekintjük. A legtöbb szlavista, így Kniezsa István és Melich János nyelvészek is a szláv eredetű palóc szót a *plavci, polovci* származékának tartják, s ez *fakót, fakósárgát, szőkét* jelent. Ez az értelmezés azonban nyilván nem lehet

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[34] BELITZKY János: *Nógrád megye története 896-1849,* Nógrád megyei Tanács Végrehajtó Bizottsága, Salgótarján, én. (1973), 51. BAKÓ Ferenc: *A palóc néprajzi csoport eredete, etnikai összetevői,* IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 68–69. BÍRÓ Friderika: *Göcsej,* Gondolat, Budapest, 1988. 285–288.

[35] SZABÓ Károly: *A történelem szavakba merevült múlt,* Madách Imre Városi Könyvtár, Balassagyarmat, 2000. 17.

embertani vonatkozású, mivel a kunok nem szőkék. A fakó, szőke jelentés ezért lovakra, sátrakra, ruházatra, és még sok másra is vonatkozhat. Úgy tűnik, a szőke szín kérdése sem egyszerű, ahogy más sem palóc ügyben, mert Kovács Szilvia egy orosz régészre hivatkozva írja, hogy a kunok szőkék voltak.[36]

A jelentésmagyarázatok sora ezzel nem ér véget. Kovács Béla szerint a *palóc* a lengyel *polovac* igéből is származhat, amelynek *vadászni* a jelentése, s ez a szepesi, sárosi lengyelektől eredhet. Többen, így Jerney is a *rabló* jelentés mellett állnak ki. Van azonban olyan vélemény is, amely szerint a név finnugor, s *keveréke*t jelent.[37]

Belitzky János véleménye szerint a *palóc* szó szamojéd eredetű, ami aztán tájszóvá vált. Szerinte a szónak van egy *„zagyva, zavaros, hebegő-habogó"* jelentése, és van egy hadrendi is, amely szerint a palócok a palotaispán fegyveres hadnépe voltak. Bartha László viszont nem fogadja el a szamojéd eredetet, mert szerinte szamojéd eredetű magyar szóból nem lehetett tájnév. S még hozzáteszi: *„...a palóc kérdés a részadatok hiányában ma még megoldatlan".*[38] Pintér Sándor a palócokról szóló könyv szerzője is a szó szláv eredetét hangsúlyozza, és szerinte *síkon-gyepen lakó* népet jelent.[39]

A palóc szót *paraszt* értelemben is használták a 19. században, s ez még a 20. században is megmaradt. Manga közli azt a történetet, hogy egy salgótarjáni legény szerint csak a magasabb állású emberek használják a palóc szót *paraszt* értelemben: *„Ezek csak olyan palócok, vagyis parasztok."* A palóc szó gúnynév, elmarasztaló jelentéséhez Manga idézi Benkóczy Emil történetét egy egri lányról, aki azért szakított udvarlójával, mert a társai szerint palóc, mivel felsőtárkányi születésű volt.[40]

Szabó Zoltán kiemeli, hogy a palócok a 19. századig sohasem nevezik magukat palócnak, se dalaikban, se meséikben. Az elnevezés kívülről jön. *„Még ma is sok tekintetben úri huncutságot, kiismerhetetlen,*

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[36] KOVÁCS Szilvia: *A hunok története a mongol hódításig* (doktori értekezés), Szeged, 2012. 34–35. Rasovskij, D.A. régészre hivatkozik, aki a kínai Kang mu évkönyv alapján, s antropológiai érvekkel is alátámasztva véli úgy, hogy a kunok szőkék voltak.

[37] MANGA: 11. BAKÓ Ferenc: *A palóc néprajzi csoport eredete, etnikai összetevői*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989). 58. BARABÁS Jenő: *A palóc eredet kérdése*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 120. BARABÁS, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 120–121.

[38] MANGA: 28. Bartha véleménye a Palócföld 1969/1-es számában jelent meg, s itt válaszolt Belitzky János tanulmányára, amely ugyancsak a Palócföldben jelent meg 1968-ban.

[39] SELMECZI KOVÁCS Attila: *A palócok kutatása a kezdetektől napjainkig, különös tekintettel Reguly Antal tevékenységére.* IN: KAPROS–LENGYEL–LIMBACHER: 281.

[40] MANGA: 21. PALÁDI-KOVÁCS Attila: *A Palócföld kiterjedése*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 156. Manga idézett története megtalálható SZABÓ Zoltán: *Cifra nyomorúság* című könyvében is: 33.

gyanús és talán veszedelmes praktikát éreznek abban, hogy a nadrágos ember el akarja különíteni őket ezzel a névvel a többi paraszttól." – írja Szabó, s még hozzáteszi: *„ezzel a névvel sosem a palócok büszkélkedtek, nem maguk a parasztok, hanem azok, akik soraikból az intelligenciába kerültek fel és jónak látták a palóc eredet dícséretét, mert ezzel burkoltan saját eredetüket és úri, palóc személyüket dícsérték".* Szabó azt is hozzáteszi, hogy a palóc azért nem nevezi magát palócnak, mert kicsinyesnek tartja ezt a szót és csúfnévnek.[41]

Nem tudjuk, mikor kapta az elmarasztaló jelentést a palóc szó. Kniezsa szerint *„a palóc név csak igen későn és mint gúnynév bukkan fel".*[42] Ez a késő a 17. századot jelenti, amikor az alföldi mezővárosok irataiban találkozunk ezzel az elnevezéssel. Paládi-Kovács Attila úgy véli, ez nem véletlen, mivel a palócok lejártak az alföldi vásárokra, és sokan le is települtek ebben a térségben.[43] Kérdés persze, hogy korábban miért nem tesznek említést a források róluk, hiszen feltehetően nem a 17. században kezdték látogatni az alföldi, vagy más tájegységek vásárait. Talán az oszmán megszállás miatti rossz közbiztonság lehet az oka? Az oszmánok azonban a 17. században is itt voltak. Ráadásul oszmánok, magyarok egyaránt készítettek legalább adóösszeírásokat, de a palóc szó, a Palóc családnév sem a hatvani szandzsák 1550-es vagy a budai szandzsák 1559-es adóösszeírásában nem fordul elő.[44] S a magyar összeírásokban sem, legalábbis a szakirodalom nem szól erről.

Egy helyen találkoztam a palóc szó használatával az 1853-as úrbéri pátens alapján végrehajtott jobbágyfelszabadítás kapcsán, pontosabban a tagosítás, a jobbágy és a földesúr közti birtokelkülönítéssel összefüggésben. A Gazdasági Lapok füleki levelezője a tagosítás miatti elégedetlenségről ír: *„Palócaink nagy ellenszenvvel viseltetnek mindenféle újítás ellen. Különben is másfajta tagosítást vártak ők. Erős hitük lévén, hogy a határt azonnal fel fogják osztani, személyi válogatás nélkül, a lakosok között egyformán."*[45] Ez persze lehet újságírói fogás, hogy a Nógrádban élőket palócnak nevezi, de egyáltalán nem jelenti azt, hogy a megyében mindenki palóc volt.

A szakirodalom nem foglalkozik azzal, hogy a palóc szó miért gúnynévként jelenik meg, legalábbis én nem találkoztam ezzel. Egy gúnynév, csúfnév, ragadványnév azonban bárhol, bármikor és könnyen létrejöhet, megszülethet. Gyerekkoromból emlékszem, hogy szülőfalum egyik lakóját *Paríz* néven ismerte mindenki. Azért kapta ezt a

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[41] SZABÓ: 32–33.
[42] BARABÁS Jenő: *A palóc eredet kérdése*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 122.
[43] PALÁDI-KOVÁCS Attila: *A Palócföld kiterjedése*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 155.
[44] BARABÁS Jenő: *A palóc eredet kérdése*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 125.
[45] SZABÓ Béla – HORVÁTH István: *Nógrád megye története 1849-1919*, 2. kötet, Nógrád Megyei Tanács Végrehajtó Bizottsága, Salgótarján, én. (1969), 40. Az idézet a Gazdasági Lapok 1857. 2. számából való.

melléknevet, mert nagyon szerette ezt a felvágottat. A *parízer*, más néven *párizsi* az ötvenes években a legolcsóbb felvágott volt a lecsókolbásszal együtt, ezért a falusi ember, így az én szüleim is ezt vásárolták. Ezt engedhettük meg magunknak. Visszatérve az említett személyre: egy alkalommal egy nem falubeli kereste meg, hogy segítségét kérje. *Kedves Paríz úr …* – szólította meg, de nem folytathatta, mert amit kapott, azt nem tette zsebre. Paríz úr ugyanis nagyon haragudott e megszólítás miatt, mivel gúnynak, gúnyolódásnak tartotta, miként a palócok is az itt élő szlávoktól kapott elnevezést. Ezért a falubeliek csak a háta mögött használták ezt a ragadványnevet. Nyilván Paríz úr és az idegen között tisztázódott a félreértés. Gúnynév, ragadványnév használata azonban nemcsak a tradicionális falusi világ jellemzője volt, hanem napjainkban is keletkeznek ilyen nevek. Egykori középiskolai tanáraink közül kettő a nevük kezdőbetűje alapján kapott a diákoktól melléknevet: *Kofe* és *Mofe*. Osztályfőnökünk és orosz tanárunk a makogásai miatt lett *Maki bácsi*, a másik osztályfőnökünk szelíd természetének köszönhette a *Mimóza* nevet. Egy középiskolai kollégám a *Gatya* nevet kapta a tanulóktól lötyögő, bő nadrágjai miatt. Feltehetően a palóc név is hasonlóan született. Az itt élő szlávok nevezték el a jövevényeket polovecnek, hiszen az orosz évkönyvek is ezt az elnevezést használták, s ebből a nyelv átalakulása, változásai miatt alakult ki a *palóc* szó. Ez persze egyáltalán nem jelenti azt, hogy ez a népesség kun lett volna. Az orosz évkönyvek ugyanis mindenkit polovecnek neveztek, akik a kunokhoz kapcsolódtak. Ezért nehéz egy nép etnikai azonosítása, mivel azonos népek különböző nevek alatt jelenhettek meg, ahogy ezt a magyarok esetében is megfigyelhetjük (türk, onogur, ugor, vengr, baskir, avar, stb). Másrészt azonos nevek alatt különböző népek rejtőzhetnek.[46] Feltehetően ezt látjuk a kunok, a polovecek, így a palócok esetében is.

Szinte minden palócokkal foglalkozó munka megemlíti azokat a forrásokat, ahol a palóc név előfordul a 17. században. Mindjárt hozzáteszem, ezekből a forrásokból még nem derül ki, hogy gúnynévként használják. Szerintem inkább egyszerű ténatközlésről van szó. A palóc név először 1656-ban jelenik meg írásban Nagykőrös városának számadáskönyvében. *„Tíz pár gyöngyházas késeket vettem palóczoktúl.”* – írja a város nótáriusa. Kecskemét 1663-ban *„Felföldi Palócz”* állatkereskedőket említ, egy 1683-as debreceni feljegyzés pedig ezt írja: *„a vásárra jött palóczokat kísérő tokaji katonákból kettőt elfogtak … az palóczok közzül is egy embert két lovával”*. A késárusok feltehetően Rimaszombatról érkeztek Nagykőrösre, Debrecenbe pedig

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[46] RÓNA-TAS András: *A honfoglaláskori magyarság*. Akadémiai székfoglaló, 1991. június 10. Szerkesztő: TOLNAI Márton. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1993. 5. Ez a magyarok esetében szintén megfigyelhető, mivel a türk birodalom kialakulásával mindenki, aki része volt a birodalomnak, a *türk* nevet kapta.

Gömörből, Borsodból.[47] Ezután gyakrabban találkozunk a palóc névvel, s a 18. század végén már az irodalomban is előfordul.

Ráth Mátyás[48] evangélikus lelkész, nyelvész, a *„szóejtés"* miatt említi a palócokat 1780-ban.[49] Gvadányi József (1725-1801)[50] egyik szatirikus versét[51] *Istenmezei palótz* álnéven adta ki 1790-ben. Főhőse, a Heves megyei Istenmezejéről Budára érkező palóc atyafi faragatlan tréfáival szórakoztatja a főrendeket. *„Az istenmezei palóc a grófok iránt tanúsított buzgó szolgálatkészségével, önkéntes bohóc és potyaleső szerepében nem éppen rokonszenves személy; mégis mint talpraesett népi hős kerekedik alkalmi gazdái fölé"* – írja róla Lukácsy Sándor.[52] S bár nem tartja költőnek, csak verselőnek, a maga korában Gvadányi népszerű, ismert író volt. Petőfi Sándor verset is írt róla *A régi jó Gvadányi* címmel, s ez egyértelműen pozitív kicsengésű. *„....mulatok a kegyelmed könyvével, /Könyvének igaz magyar beszédjével"* – írta róla.

A *palóc* név Gaál György[53] egyik munkájában is szerepel: *A tudós palótz avagy Furkáts Tamásnak Mónosbélbe lakó sógor urához irt levelei.* Ez a munka 1803–1804-ben jelent meg Pesten.[54] A szerző

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[47] KÓSA László – FILEP Antal: 25–26. PALÁDI-KOVÁCS Attila: *A Palócföld kiterjedése*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 138.

[48] Általában *h* nélkül írják a nevét, mivel a családi Ráth nevet a magyarosabb Rátra változtatta. Rát Mátyás, (1749–1810) győri, iparos-kereskedő családból származott. A pozsonyi evangélikus líceumban végzett. Németországi útja során a göttingeni egyetemet is látogatta, Schlözer tanítványa volt. Rát a szerkesztője az első magyar nyelvű lapnak, az 1780. január elsején Pozsonyban megjelent Magyar Hírmondónak. Sokat tett a magyar nyelvért, a magyar művelődésért.

[49] MANGA: 5–6.

[50] Egy tizenegy gyermekes olasz származású család legidősebb tagja. Bölcsészetet tanul a nagyszombati egyetemen, majd katonai pályára lép. Részt vesz a hétéves háborúban. Vezérőrnagyként helyezik nyugállományba. Sokszor megfordult a Szatmár megyei Nagypeleskén (ma Románia), Becsky György birtokán, s itt írta műveinek nagy részét. Szakolca földesura.

[51] A munka címe: *A mostan folyó ország gyűlésnek satyrico criticé való leírása, a melyet egy Isten mezején lakó palócznak szinlése alatt írta azon buzgó szívvel biró hazafi, a kinek pennájából folyt ki a falusi nótáriusnak Budára való utazása; ezen munkáját is négy sorú versekben hazájának eleibe terjesztette* 1790. eszt. bak havának 25. napján. Lipsiában (Pozsony), 1791.

[52] *A magyar irodalom története kezdetektől 1975-ig.* III. köt. *A magyar irodalom története 1772-től 1849-ig.* szerk.: PÁNDI Pál, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1984. (utánnyomás). PC CD-ROM, Arcanum, 105–112.

[53] Gaal György, vagy Gaál György (1783–1855. Író, műfordító, könyvtáros. Dugonics András tanítványa, Eszterházy Miklós herceg könyvtárnoka Bécsben. Sokat tett a magyar irodalomért. Németre fordította több magyar író, köztük Kisfaludy Károly munkáját. Népszerűsítette a magyar irodalmat Németországban. Nevéhez fűződik az első magyar népmesegyűjtemény kiadása, igaz, ez németül jelent meg 1822-ben.

[54] FÜLÖP Lajos: *A palóc nyelvjáráskutatás kezdetei* (A Tudományos Gyűjteménytől a Magyar Nyelvőrig), Egyetemi fonetikai füzetek 3. ELTE BTK, Fonetikai Tanszék, Budapest, 1990. 48.

hősének, az együgyű, mégis szeretetre méltó palócnak, Furkáts Tamásnak kacagtató kalandjait mutatja be Pest-Budán. Ez a munkája hat füzetben jelent meg. A palóc elnevezést a szerző a *pancser* szinonimájaként használja.[55] Szilágyi Márton szerint nem véletlen, hogy Gaál hőse egy palóc, s ebben a választásban nem a palóc dialektus játszott szerepet, hanem az, hogy ez a nyelvjárás az ősi magyar nyelvet őrizte meg. S ez az ősiség *„a természetes értelem képviselőjévé, a magyar városi élet ellenpontjává is éppen ezt az etnikumot avatta, még ha magában a levelekben ennek az őstörténeti eredetkoncepciónak nincs is túlságosan sok nyoma".[56]*

Meg kell még említenem, hogy az 1830-as évektől a Pest-Budán megtelepülő színtársulatok gyakran felhasználták a palócot komikus, népi figurák megjelenítésére. Gaál József[57] *Szerelem és Champagnei* című vígjátékának (1838) két figurája, Fa Jankó és Butyi Balázs palóc inasként szerepel. 1834-től játszották előbb Budán, majd másutt is Johann Nestroy[58] *Lumpácius vagabundus* című bohózatát, s míg az eredeti változatban az asztalos, a szabó és a csizmadia bécsi dialektusban beszélt, addig a magyar változatban a részeges *Lábszíj* palóc nyelvjárásban szólalt meg.[59]

Az említett irodalmi alkotásokban a palóc együgyű, mulatságos, bohóckodó népi hős, akin jót nevet az olvasó. A kor irodalma azonban ilyen típusú hősöket mutatott be, s nem csak a palóc jelenik meg ebben a szerepben. Szabó Zoltán azonban azt írja, hogy a 18. század végén, a 19. század elején *„a palócokat inkább gúnyolták, mint ismerték".* Ezért ha valaki szatírát akart írni, szívesen bújt a palóc bőrébe, ahogy Gvadányi is tette, s a palócot, ezt a furcsa beszédű, együgyűnek tartott népet, mint álruhát használta fel arra, hogy szapulja az országgyűlést, a nemeseket:

[55] SZEPESI Attila: *Furkáts Tamás avagy a palóc Gulliver pest-budai utazása*, Magyar Szemle, Új folyam IX. 11-12. szám, 2001. http://www.magyarszemle.hu /cikk/20001101_furkats_tamas_avagy_a_paloc_gulliver_pest-budai_utazasa

[56] SZILÁGYI Márton: *Utószó*, IN: GAÁL György, SZEMETHY Imre, BANGA Ferenc: *A tudós palóc, avagy Furkáts Tamásnak a Mónosbélbe lakó sógor-urához írt levelei*. I–II. ELTE Historia Litteraria Képes Próza Tár, 1999. 150–151.

[57] Gaál József vagy Gaal József (1811 – 1866). Költő, író. Tagja a tudományos akadémiának és a Kisfaludy Társaságnak. Szatmáron és Budán végezte középiskoláit, Pesten bölcsészetet és jogot tanult. Első nagy sikerét *A peleskei nótárius* című bohózata hozta meg (1838). Írt regényeket (*Szirmay Ilona*), elbeszélést (*Szerelem és barátság*). A *Haramiacsók* című novellájának hőse Zöld Marci, a festői Hortobágyon. Felfedezi az Alföld szépségét. Néhány további műve: *Rontó Pál élete és viszontagságai, A franczia forradalom története, A fösvény kétszer fizet, Mátyás király Boroszlóban.*

[58] Johann Nepomuk Nestroy (1801 – 1862), osztrák-német író, drámaíró, színész, operaénekes. Színészként játszott Brünnben, Grazban, Bécsben, Pesten és Pozsonyban. Sikeres színműveket, bohózatokat írt, több mint nyolcvan darabot. Kortársai osztrák Aristophanesnek nevezték.

[59] KERÉNYI Ferenc: *Lisznyai Kálmán és a palóc „kelmeiség"*, Nógrád megyei múzeumok évkönyve, Nógrád megyei Múzeumok Igazgatósága, 1976. 283.

„Együtt az ország, de semmit se tészen. Isznak esznek, hogyha szakács vagyon készen, a Hecz és Theátrum tőllök hasznot vészen"- idézi Szabó Gvadányit.[60]

A 19. században aztán nemcsak *„divatba jöttek"* a palócok, hanem divatban is maradtak. A már említett Horvát István megvédte őket, és szerinte a palóc nyelv legrégibb dokumentuma a Halotti Beszéd.[61] Szabó azonban Horvátot ultraromantikusnak tartja. Horvát szerint ugyanis a palócok Arméniában laktak, s mivel Noé bárkája itt, az Ararat hegyen kötött ki, Horvát ebből azt következteti, hogy a híres hajó a Palócföldön ért partot. Horvát arról is meg volt győződve, hogy maga Ádám is palócul beszélt.[62] E *„védelem"* ellenére a palóc, mint gúnynév, és mint elmarasztaló jelentésű szó, a 19. században is megmaradt, annak ellenére, hogy Mikszáth Kálmán bevitte a köztudatba a palóc nevet, és pozitív értelemben. Az előbbi helyzetet jól mutatják a milleneumi vármegyei monográfiákkal kapcsolatos már említett példák. Talán az első világháború után oldódott a helyzet. Manga legalábbis ezt írja Malonyai Dezső 1922-es kiadványával kapcsolatban. A szerkesztő és munkatársai úgy vélték, hogy a palóc szó már elvesztette csúfolódó jelentését.[63]

A 19. század közepén, második felében még Mikszáth előtt többen is népszerűsítették a palóc nevet. 1848 májusában a losonci Jeszenszky Dániel ügyvéd jelentette meg *Palócdal* című versét Vahot Imre *Életképek* nevű lapjában. Brujmann Sámuel, miskolci pap, Hirtelen Barna álnéven a *Nemzetőr*ben közölte *Palócz-toborzó*ját. Mindkét vers palóc dialektusban íródott. A korszak legismertebb költője azonban a Nógrád vármegyei Herencsényben született Lisznyai Damó Kálmán[64]

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[60] SZABÓ: 30–33.

[61] Horvát Istvánnak az említett megjegyzése a Tudományos Gyűjtemény IX. kötetében jelent meg 1829-ben (26. oldal). FÜLÖP: 48.

[62] SZABÓ: 31.

[63] MANGA: 21.

[64] Lisznyai Damó Kálmán (1823-1863), költő. Losoncon végezte a középiskolát, ahol már jelentkezett verseivel. Tanára, Homokay Pál segítette kibontakozni a tehetségét. Felsőbb tanulmányokat Pozsonyban és Eperjesen végzett. Rendszeresen ír, versei megjelennek divatlapban, évkönyvekben s az Athéneumban is. A közönség szívesen olvassa ezeket, különösen a balladáit, és Lisznyai népszerű lett. Megismerkedik Petőfivel, s bemutatja őt író ismerőseinek. Csak érdekességként említem, hogy Petőfi pályája elején Lisznyai verseihez hasonlókat akart írni, s olyan népszerű akart lenni, mint ekkor már neves költőtársa. Közben ügyvédi oklevelet szerez, s nógrádmegyei aljegyző, táblabíró, törvényszéki hivatalnok lett. 1848 májusában egy küldöttséggel Kolozsvárra ment az unió ügyében, s az itt megnyílt országgyűlésen mondta el palóc kiejtéssel híressé vált mondatát: *„mi vagyunk a puszták sasssai, ti vagytok a bérczek sasssai"*. Részt vesz a szabadságharcban, először közhuszár, végül őrnagyi rangot szerez. Világos után közlegényként egy gyalogezredbe osztják be, s két évet tölt Itáliában. Az ötvenes években kiadott két kötete nagyon népszerű volt, a kritikák ellenére is. E költeményeiben azonban megjelenik a modorosság. A magyar költészet másodvonalában tarják számon

volt, aki 1851-ben jelentette meg *Palócz dalok* című 95 verset tartalmazó kötetét. 1858-ban pedig az *Új palócz dalok* című könyve jelent meg. A korabeli kritika, Gyulai Pál, Erdélyi János, Kemény Zsigmond, Salamon Ferenc, keményen bírálta Lisznyai költészetét. Arany János pedig a *Lisznyai Kálmánnak* című versében ugyancsak súlyos bírálatot fogalmazott meg rímekbe szedve. „*Szent iszony/ S rémület/ A fület/ Fogja el,/Míg figyel/E dalra;*" – mármint Lisznyai versére, írja Arany.[65] Ennek ellenére a *Palócz dalok* hatezer példányban fogyott el, ami ebben a korban nagy példányszám volt.[66]

Hol élnek a palócok?

„*Nógrád magyarsága a köztudatban palócz néven ismeretes.*" – írja Farkas Pál balassagyarmati főgimnáziumi tanár.[67] De hol élnek a palócok? Földrajzilag meghúzhatók-e a határai ennek a népességnek? „*...palóczok laknak az Ipoly mentén Pincztől Őrhalomig, továbbá a Karancs, Medves, Mátra és Cserhát vidékén, de már a balassagyarmati járás alsó és a sziráki járás felső részének, valamint az egész nógrádi járásnak magyar népe nem azonosítható teljesen a tulajdonképpeni palóczsággal«*"– olvashatjuk Farkasnál. Az igazi palócok szerinte a Gömörrel és Hevessel szomszédos karancsvidéken találhatók, de vannak palócok a cserhátvidékén is. E két terület között a különbség szerinte csupán néhány szó és nyelvalak. Farkas azt is hozzáteszi, hogy a néprajz és a nyelvtudomány palócnak nevezi „*egész Nógrád magyarságát*", egyesek azonban „*különbséget tesznek magyar és palócz faluk között*". E különbségtétel oka szerinte az, hogy a közvélemény, az élclapoknak és az íróknak köszönhetően, a palócot furfangos csodabogárnak tekinti, aki „*folyton körmönfont hunczutságokat produkál, érthetetlenül kiforgatott vaskos népies mondások kíséretében*". Ez alapján mindenki más és más falut jelöl igazi palócnak, jóllehet valamennyi egyforma.[68] Farkas szerint 150 községben

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Lisznyait. 1857-ben ódát ír Ferenc Józsefhez. S jelzi, hogy a királyhűség a magyar néplélek sajátja. Arany János viszont *A walesi bárdok* című balladával „*köszönti*" Ferenc Józsefet. „*Lisznyai a tékozló költők és emberek típusából való*" – írja róla Kerényi Ferenc. Hozzáteszi, hogy házassága, betegsége sem tartotta *vissza* „*önpusztító, alkoholista életmódjától*". Betegsége idején Liszt Ferenc is meglátogatta. 1863-ban a Császár fürdőben halt meg. KERÉNYI: 296.

[65] Egy versszak Lisznyaitól, hogy érthető legyen Arany reagálása: „*Szín, szín, szín/ cin, cin, cin/Intyim pinty/ Lityim binty/ Dümmögés, mümmögés*". Nem csoda, ha Arany „*dümmögött, mümmögött*".

[66] KERÉNYI: 288. CSÁKY Károly: *Irodalmi kapcsolatok* I. Lilium Aurum, Dunaszerdahely, 2004. 136.

[67] FARKAS Pál: *Nógrád vármegye népe.* IN: BOROVSZKY Samu (szerk.): *Magyarország vármegyéi és városai. Nógrád vármegye,* Budapest, 1911. 137.

[68] FARKAS: 138–141.

élnek palócok, s létszámuk 150 ezer.[69] Azt persze nem tudjuk meg, hogy mi alapján választotta ki ezeket a falvakat. Talán a férfiak és a nők viselete lehetett ez a szempont? Amikor ugyanis bemutatja az említett divatot, felsorolja azokat a falvakat is, amelyekre ez jellemző.

A legszebb cifra *"féketö"* a ludányi menyecskék fején látható. Ennek a szépségét még Pefőfi Sándor is megcsodálta, s az *Úti jegyzeteiben* olvashatjuk: *"Ha megházasodom, onnan hozatok fejkötőt a feleségem számára.* Az érsekvadkertiek viszont kontydeszkás főkötőt hordtak, s aztán Farkas még felsorol több tucat falut, ahol ehhez hasonló a viselet.[70] Osztályozza a palócokat aszerint is, hogy a nők milyen lábbelit viselnek, s ez esetben számokat is közöl. Harminchat csizmás települést ír le, köztük van például Balassagyarmat, Dejtár, Hollókő, Rimócz vagy Patvarc. Cipős faluból nyolcvanöt települést sorol fel, köztük van Borsosberény, Diósjenő, Erdőtarcsa, Mátraverebély, Tolmács. És vannak olyan falvak is, ahol cipő és csizma vegyesen szerepel a női viseletben. Ebből a változatból negyvenet sorol fel a szerző (pl. Csesztve, Ipolytarnócz, Magyarnándor, stb.). Ez a megkülönböztetés azért fontos, mert a cipős falvak jelentik az új divatot, míg a csizmás falvak ragaszkodtak a régimódi viselethez.[71] Nem biztos persze, hogy a nők lábbeli viselete volt az a szempont, amely alapján meghatározta a palóc falvakat, mert ha ezeket összeadjuk, 161-et kapunk.[72]

A földrajzi határok is bizonytalanok, jóllehet Farkas Nógrádot palócnak nevezi a köztudat alapján. A részletekből aztán kiderül, hogy ez nem egészen így van. Ezt Kósa László is megerősíti, mert szerinte még ma sem lehet pontosan körülhatárolni a palócok területét. Éppen ezért Paládi-Kovács Attila úgy véli, a *Palócföld* elnevezés félrevezető és pontatlan, mivel ilyen táj, ilyen közigazgatási egység *"sohasem létezett".*[73] Az elnevezés azonban mind a mai napig használatban van. De nézzük meg, ki, hová helyezi a palócokat.

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[69] MALONYAI Dezső (szerk.): *A magyar nép művészete. V. Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Gömör, Borsod magyar népe. A palócok művészete*, Budapest, 1922. http://mek.oszk.hu/ 01600/01671/html/index.html

[70] FARKAS: 146–147.

[71] FARKAS: 147. A csizma vagy a cipő viselése határozta meg azt is, hogy a nők, vagy ahogy Farkas írja, *"az asszonynép"* milyen ruhát hordott. A csizmához rövid szoknya és pruszlikos ingváll tartozott, a cipőhöz pedig blúz és hosszú szoknya. Vannak olyan falvak, ahol asszonyok, lányok télen-nyáron egyaránt csizmát viseltek a templomban, s vannak ahol az asszonyok és a menyecskék csizmában jártak, a lányok pedig cipőben.

[72] Belitzky János azonban Farkas Pállal kapcsolatban azt jegyzi meg, hogy Nógrád megye 261 községéből 161-et tekintett palócnak (1910-es adat), s nem a 150-es számot kapcsolja hozzá. Ez a szám csak úgy jöhet ki, ha az északnyugati magyar nyelvjárást is palócnak tekintjük. BELITZKY János: *Nógrád megye története 896-1849,* Nógrád megyei Tanács Végrehajtó Bizottsága, Salgótarján, én. (1973), 48.

[73] PALÁDI-KOVÁCS Attila: *A Palócföld kiterjedése*, IN: BAKÓ I. (1989): 137

Horváth Péter,[74] a jászkunok első történetírója 1801-ben megjelent könyvben 6 hevesi falut és 4 borsodit tart palócnak.[75] Pápay Sámuel egri jogakadémiai tanár 1808-ban publikált könyve szerint a *„Palócz Magyarok"* Nógrád, Gömör, Borsod és Heves vármegyék egymással szomszédos vidékein élnek. Ezt *„az ő igen tsudálatos és írás által alig előadható szóejtések"* alapján határozta meg, kiemelve, hogy *„minden magánhangzót mintegy Diftongussal"* ejtik.[76] Szeder Fábián, aki a Tudományos Gyűjtemény I. kötetében 1817-ben megjelent pályázatra küldte be *A Palóczok* című tanulmányát, amely az említett folyóirat VI. kötetében jelent meg 1819-ben, a Pápay Sámuel által felsorolt megyéket jelzi, de értekezésében inkább a *„N. Honthy és a Nógrádi Palóczokról"* szól, mivel ezeket jól ismeri, főleg azokat, akik az Ipoly környékén élnek. Ismereteit annak köszönheti, hogy a Hont vármegyei Csáb községben született 1784-ben.[77] A Tudományos Gyűjtemény 1821-es évfolyamában (XI. kötet) Szeder egy újabb munkát közöl (*A palócokról eredetekre, és Pannóniába való jövetelekre nézve*), s ebben Magda Pál statisztikai adatai alapján kiszámította, hogy az általa megjelölt vármegyékben hány palóc él. Így Hevesben a palócok száma 173.789; Borsodban 111.903; Gömörben 96.874; Nógrádban 86.036; N. (Nagy) Hontban pedig 21.634. Az említett megyékben Szeder szerint a palócok száma 490.237 volt. [78]

A romantika korában divat volt a palócokkal foglalkozni, s így a következő terjedelmes munka Jerney János tollából jelent meg 1855-ben (*A palócz nemzet és Palócz krónika orosz és lengyel évkönyvek nyomán*). Pápayhoz és Szederhez hasonlóan ő is Borsod, Gömör, Heves

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[74] Horváth Péter (1756–1829), Jákóhalmán született, a gimnáziumot Jászapátiban és Egerben végezte. Paptanárnak készült, ezért 1776-ban belépett a kegyesrendi szerzetbe, ahonnan 1781-ben saját kérésére kilépett. Ez után jogi tanulmányokat folytatott s 1783-ban Jászberény vicenótáriusa, másodjegyzője lett. 1804-ben első nótárius, 1805-ben főpénztáros. Közben a jászberényi nemzeti iskolák felügyelője és 1783-tól 1806-ig a jászberényi gimnázium igazgatója. 1807-ben nádori alkapitány. A jászkunok történetét kutatja, a róluk szóló könyve 1801-ben jelenik meg Pesten 1.000 példányban latinul: *Commentatio de initiis, ac maioribus Jazygum et Cumanorum eorumque constitutionibus.* 1823-ban magyarul is megjelenteti könyvét *Értekezés a' kúnoknak, és jászoknak eredetekrül, azoknak régi és mostani állapotjokrúl* címmel. FODOR István Ferenc: *A Jászkunság első történetírója. 150 éve halt meg Horváth Péter*, Honismeret 1979. 1. sz. 142–144.

[75] BELITZKY (1973): 48.

[76] MANGA: 6. PALÁDI-KOVÁCS IN: Bakó I. (1989): 140.

[77] SZEDER Fábián: *A Palóczokról*, Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó, Dunaszerdahely, 2005. 7. hasonmás kiadás. MANGA: 7–8. PALÁDI-KOVÁCS IN: BAKÓ (1989): 140.

[78] SZEDER Fábián: *A Palócokról eredetekre, és Pannóniába való jövetelekre nézve,* Tudományos Gyűjtemény XI. Pest, 1821. Hasonmás kiadás: Lilium Aurum Könyvkiadó, Dunaszerdahely, 2005. 34–36. Szeder Magda Pál adatai alapján közli az említett megyék összlakosságát, s az ott élő különböző népességet. Így pl. Nógrád vármegye összlakossága 163.360 volt. A tótok száma 60.000, a németeké 8.000 s így marad 95.360 magyar. Ezek között a nemesek száma 6.324, a máshonnan odaszakadt magyarok száma 3.000, s így szerinte 86.036 palóc élt a vármegyében.

és Nógrád megyét jelzi a palócok földjének, de az elődei munkáját azzal bővíti, hogy felsorolja a palócok lakta falvak nevét is. Szerinte Borsod megyében 11, Gömörben 4, Hevesben 19, Nógrádban pedig 14 palóc falu van (összesen 48).[79] Arról ő sem ír, hogy milyen megfontolások alapján választotta ki ezeket a településeket. Szedertől eltérően Jerney Hont vármegyét nem nevezte meg.[80] Hunfalvy Pál szerint (*Magyarország ethnográphiája*, 1876.) a mátrai palócok fő fészke a bélháromkúti apátság, Apátfalva (ma Bélapátfalva) volt.[81]

Az 1850-es évek második felében a finnugor nyelvrokonság jeles megalapozója, Reguly Antal (1819-1858)[82] tett komoly néprajzi, antropológiai kutatóutat a palócok földjén. Reguly több alkalommal járt a Felvidéken: először 1838-ban, majd 1853 és 1854-ben volt a palócok között. Ezek azonban rövid utak voltak. Hosszabb időt 1857-ben töltött ezen a vidéken. A kutatást 1857. augusztus 31-én kezdte és október 10-én fejezte be. Kutatásairól mintegy 300 oldalnyi kézirat keletkezett, amely az MTA Kézirattárába került, s másfél évszázadig ismeretlen maradt.[83] Elment a Karancs vidékére, a Fülek környéki falvakba és a Mátra túloldalára az Uppony, Egercsehi, Bánhorvát települések által határolt térségbe.[84] A

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[79] BELITZKY (1973): 48. Malonyai Dezső könyvében Jerneyhez ugyancsak 48 palóc falut jelez, de úgy, hogy Hevesben 18, Nógrádban pedig 15 palóc települést tart palócnak, míg Belitzkynél a hevesi szám 19, a nógrádi 14. Elképzelhető, hogy ez csupán elírás, figyelmetlenség eredménye.

[80] MANGA: 10–11.

[81] MANGA: 11. Jerney tősgyökeres palóc helységnek Borsodban 11, Gömörben 4, Hevesben 18, Nógrádban 15 községet nevez meg. MALONYAI Dezső (szerk.): *A magyar nép művészete. V. Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Gömör, Borsod magyar népe. A palócok művészete*, Budapest, 1922. http://mek.oszk.hu/ 01600/ 01671/html/index.html

[82] Reguly Antal néprajzkutató, nyelvész, antropológus. Járt a lappok, a vogulok és az osztjákok földjén. Megtanulta a fényképezést és ezt használta kutatómunkájában. Jogot Pesten tanult, bölcsészetet Győrben. Tudott németül, megtanult oroszul, svédül, finnül, megismerte a csuvast és a keleti finnugor nyelveket. Az egyetemi könyvtár első őre. A palócok földjén több mint félszáz települést látogatott meg. A megerőltető munka megviselte egészségét, s ez, valamint halála megakadályozta őt abban, hogy gyűjtéseit közzétegye.

[83] A kéziratra Balassa Iván már 1952-ben felhívta a figyelmet, de nyomtatásban csak 1975-ben jelent meg *Reguly Antal palóc jegyzetei 1857* címmel. Sajtó alá rendezte, jegyzetekkel és mutatókkal ellátta SELMECZI KOVÁCS Attila (*Dolgozatok a Palóckutatás körében,* I. Eger).

[84] Reguly a legtöbb gyűjtést Liptaegrén, Lapujtőn, Persén, Rappon, Fülekpüspökiben, Terbeléden, Fülekpilisen, Fülekkovácsiban, Mulyadkán, Bénán s Kurtányban végezte, s ez utóbbiból még további településekre is eljárt. A Mátra vidékén pedig Egercsehi, Bekölce, Bélapátfalva, Uppony, Bánhorvát, Bánfalva voltak, de járt Járdánházán, Mikófalván, Bekölcén, Szilvásváradon, Nagybarcán és Jánosiban is. SELMECZI KOVÁCS Attila: *A palócok kutatása a kezdetektől napjainkig, különös tekintettel Reguly Antal tevékenységére.* IN: KAPROS–LENGYEL–LIMBACHER: 277–281

palócság központi területei szerinte a Mátra vidéke, Salgótarján környéke, Medvesalja, a Karancs vidéke és az Ipoly menti terület.[85]

Pintér Sándor, a palócságára büszke szécsényi ügyvéd Jerneyhez hasonlóan szintén Nógrád, Gömör, Heves és Borsod vármegyéket nevezi meg a palócok földjének, s Hontot ő sem említi. Felsorolja a palócok lakta falvak nevét az említett vármegyékben, de nem 48 községet, hanem 150-et nevezett meg.[86] Nógrád vármegyében 76 községet tüntet fel, hozzátéve, hogy itt *57.131* palóc él. Gömör vármegyében *19.353* palóc él 29 községben, Heves vármegyében 35 községben *10.060* palóc lakik. Borsod vármegyében viszont csak 10 községben élnek palócok, s a létszámuk *10.960*. A palócok lakta területen három folyót nevez meg: az Ipolyt, a Zagyvát és a Sajót.[87]

Az *Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia Írásban és Képben* című sorozatban[88] Istvánffy Gyula Borsod, Heves, Gömör, Hont, Bars és Nógrád megyéket nevezi meg a palócság lakhelyéül. A palócok szerinte több községben élnek, mint amennyit Pintér Sándor megnevez. Életterük *„a Mátra északi lejtőitől körülbelül a Rima és Sajó völgyéig, s a Bikk-hegységtől nyugatra, az Ipoly folyó lapályáig terjed".*[89] *„Különösen tiszta palóczok lakják Galsától kezdve Kelecsen, Kovácsi, Püspöki, Ragyócz, Bást, Hidegkút, Czered, Zagyva, stb. helységeket."*[90]

A már hivatkozott, Malonyai Dezső által szerkesztett ötkötetes munka palócokról szóló részének nagy részét Gróh István gyűjtötte, s ehhez bejárta az Ipolyságtól Miskolcig, a Hatvantól Rozsnyóig terjedő területet. Szerinte *„palócságunk északi határa a magyar nyelvhatár, keleti határa pedig a Boldva vagy talán a Hernád vize; a határvonal délen a Bükk- és Mátra-hegycsoportnak az Alföld felé eső lejtőjén húzódik és leszögellik szinte Pestig, mert Dunakeszi és Rákospalota palócok. Folyás ellen*

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[85] CSÁKY Károly: *Szülőföldi vallomások*, Madách, 1989. 81.

[86] Nógrád vármegye palóc falvai: Alsó-Ludány, Bárkány, Baglyas, Bárna, Busa, Czered, Csalár, Csákánháza, Csitár, Darócz, Ettes, Endrefalva, Felső-Ludány, Felfalu, Fülek-Kelecseny, Fülek-Püspöki, Galábocs, Halászi, Hidegkút, Hollókő, Homokterenne, Hugyag, Iliny, Jobbágyi, Kazár, Karancs-Ság, Karancs-Keszi, Karancs-Allya, Karancs-Apátfalu, Karancs-Birinke, Kis-Hartyán, Kisterenne, Kis-Gerge, Laputő, Litke, Lipta-Gerge, Lócz, Marczal, Mátra-Verebély, Mátra-Szele, Miksi, Mihály-Gerge, Nemti, Óvár, Ó-Bást, Perse, Pilis, Piliny, Pincz, Pogony, Rárós-Mulyad, Rapp, Ragyolcz, Rimócz, Romhány, Ságújfalu, Salgó-Tarján, Somoskő, Somosújfalu, Sós-Hartyán, Szakal, Szőlős, Tarnócz, Trázs, Tőrincs, Varbó, Varsány, Vecseklő, Verebély, Vizslás, Vilyke, Zagyva, Zagyvaszántó, Zagyva-Lőrinczi, Zellő, Zsély. MANGA: 16.

[87] PINTÉR Sándor: *A Palócokról. Népismertető tanulmány*, Aigner Lajos, Budapest, 1880. 11–14.

[88] Magyarország VI. kötet, Felső-Magyarország II. rész, Budapest, 1900.

[89] MALONYAI Dezső (szerk.): *A magyar nép művészete. V. Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Gömör, Borsod magyar népe. A palócok művészete*, Budapest, 1922. http://mek.oszk.hu/ 01600/01671/html/index.html

[90] Az *Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia Írásban és Képben, Magyarország* VI. kötet, *Felső-Magyarország* II. rész, Budapest, 1900. ISTVÁNFFY Gyula: *A palóczok.*

menvén, a Dunát Verőczénél elhagyja a vonal és Esztergom vármegye északi csücskét átmetszvén, kimegyen a Vágig". Hozzáteszi, hogy Fülek és Losonc között *„valódi, tisztán maradt palócok laknak"*, s azt is, hogy Pétervására és Gyöngyös szintén palóc. A *„legtipikusabb palócság hazája"* szerinte Nagyszécsény és Salgótarján. Megjegyzi azonban: a *„palócok hazáját bajos egész pontosan körvonalaznunk"*, jóllehet egyetlen néppel sem foglalkozott annyit a szakirodalom, mint a palócokkal.[91]

Viski Károly 1938-ban megjelent tanulmányában (*Etnikai csoportok, vidékek*) arról ír, hogy a palócok központi területe a Mátra vidéke, valamint a Börzsöny, Karancs és a Bükk hegység. Megjegyzi azonban, hogy az a törekvés, amely felsorolja a palócok lakta községeket, hogy pontosan körülhatárolja e nép lakóterületét, nos, ez a próbálkozás nem vehető komolyan.[92]

A magyarság antropológiájában (1943) Bartucz Lajos szintén Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Gömör és Borsod vármegyéket említi a palócsággal kapcsolatban. Gunda Béla pedig a Börzsöny, Cserhát, Mátra, s a Bükk hegység vidékére helyezi a palócokat.[93] A Kósa László, Filep Antal szerzőpáros 1975-ben megjelent munkájában (*A magyar nép táji-történeti tagolódása*) fiktív tájfogalomnak nevezi a Palócföldet, s ehhez a már több szerzőnél említett öt vármegyét – Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Borsod, Gömör – kapcsolja, mint a palócság hipotetikus lakóhelyét. Szerintük az említett megyék egységes palóc elnevezése *„tudományosan nem hiteles"*, ugyanis a palócság szűkebb területen él, mint ahogy azt egyes szerzők írják. És úgy vélik, hogy Bélapátfalva környéke tekinthető a palócság eredeti településhelyének.

Paládi-Kovács Attila a *„keleti palóc"* és a *„nyugati palóc"* elnevezést is használja, s a választóvonal a Tarna folyó. Manga János megjegyzi: már Szeder Fábián nyugat felé tolta ki a palóc terület határait, mivel Dejtár, Patak és Hont községeket is palócnak tartotta.[94]

Meg kell még említenem a palócság földrajzi elhelyezkedésével kapcsolatban Balogh Pál[95] hatalmas, több mint ezerszáz oldalas munkáját, amely *A népfajok Magyarországon* címmel jelent meg 1902-ben. A *„palócz felvidék"* szerinte hét vármegyét foglal magába: Esztergom, Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Borsod, Gömör, Abaúj-Torna. A palóc

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[91] MALONYAI Dezső (szerk.): *A magyar nép művészete. V. Hont, Nógrád, Heves, Gömör, Borsod magyar népe. A palócok művészete*, Budapest, 1922. http://mek.oszk.hu/ 01600/01671/html/index.html; MANGA: 20–21.

[92] MANGA: 22.

[93] Uo. 23–24.

[94] Uo. 29–34.

[95] Újságíró, statisztikus, 1854-ben született és 1933-ban halt meg. Dolgozott a Pesti Hírlapnál és a Budapesti Hírlapnál is. A miniszterelnökség sajtóosztályának a munkatársa 1903-tól és a húszas években. A nemzetiségi demográfiai kutatások úttörője. Neki köszönhető, hogy a bazilikát Szent Istvánról és nem Szent Lipótról nevezték el.

elnevezést használja e hét megyében élő magyar lakosságra. Így nem tesz különbséget palóc és nem palóc települések között. Csak azt jegyzi meg, hogy ebben a hét megyében *„kemény fajta magyar nép lakik …, amely vidékenkint a palócz tájszólás változatai szerint beszél"*. Kiemeli, hogy a palócoknak szilárd ellenálló ereje és asszimiláló képessége van a tótokkal és a svábokkal szemben.[96]

Szabó Zoltán szerint az Ipolytól a Hegyaljáig terjedő terület a palócok vidéke. *„… a tulajdonképpeni palócföld is ott kezdődik el, ahol a hegyek"* – írja. Megyékben kifejezve ez Nógrád-Hontot, Hevest, Borsod-Gömört és Abaújt jelenti. Az első világháború előtt ez a terület közvetítő volt az ország alsó és felső része között, és út az ország belseje felé. Trianon azonban megszüntette ezt az áthidaló szerepet, s az említett táj egy szerény Felvidékké vált, ahol *„Tátra híján fölfedezte a Mátrát meg a Bükköt"*. A palócok számát illetően Magda Pál, Szedernél már idézett statisztikus adatait használja, aki a borsodi, gömöri, hevesi, nógrádi palócok számát kivonásos alapon számította ki, *„mondván, hogy az, aki nem zsidó, nem görög, nem német, nem tót, nem bevándorolt és nem nemes, az »Palócz«"* Így a számuk: 490.237.[97] A palócság szerepe az volt, hogy útját állja a szlovákság leszivárgásának, s az, hogy elmagyarosítsa, elpalócosítsa azokat, akiket befogadott maga közé. *„Míg másutt magyar falvak románosodtak, itt szlovák falvak palócosodtak el, a nyelvi határt híven és biztosan őrizte a palócság"* – írja Szabó. Hozzáteszi azonban azt is, hogy az iskola a tájszólást, a kor a néprajzi különlegességeket irtja, ezért a palócság a közeli jövőben már nem különböztethető meg külső jegyekben más tájak népességétől. Ezért saját könyve sem igazán a palócokról szól, hanem a *„a Cserhát, a Mátra és a Bükk lakosságáról"*.[98] Meg kell jegyeznem, hogy Jerney János erre már 1851-ben felhívta a figyelmet. Kiemeli, hogy az idegenek, a tudatlanok a palócok szójárását gúny tárgyává teszik. *„Lelkészeik és iskolai tanítóik pedig hasonló elfogultságból az írói nyelvhez törekszenek őket szoktatni; minek csak azon sajnos eredménye lehet, miszerint maholnap végkép kihal a palóczos szójárás anélkül, hogy kellő tudós nyomozások tétettek volna annak különös sajátsága fölött"* – írja.[99]

Bakó Ferenc munkái nemcsak a tájról, hanem, a palócokról is szólnak. Petercsák Tivadar kiemeli, hogy az ő szervező tevékenysége nélkül nem lennének eredmények a palóckutatásban. Gunda Béla pedig ezt írja róla: *„Mikszáth Kálmán tevékenysége mellé oda kell helyezni egy széket Bakó Ferenc részére is. Ő tudományba ötvözte azt, amit a*

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[96] BALOGH Pál: *A népfajok Magyarországon,* M. Kir. Vallás- és Közoktatásügyi Minisztérium, Budapest, 1902. 381. 480.

[97] SZABÓ: 10; 26; 28–29; 38.

[98] Uo. 37–38.

[99] JERNEY János: *Keleti utazása a 'magyarok' őshelyeinek kinyomozása végett 1844 és 1845,* első kötet, Pesten, 1851. 91.

'nagy palóc' az irodalomba és az örökkévalóságba álmodott bele".[100] Ez az ízig-vérig kutató ember a palócság szinte minden területével foglalkozott, így azzal is, hol helyezkedik el a palóc táj. Ez a Felföld déli része, amely magában foglalja az Északi-Kárpátok és a Magyar Középhegység régióját, melynek centruma a Mátra és környéke. Ehhez Bél Mátyás jellemzését teszi hozzá, miszerint *„erdős hegyekben bővelkedő zord vidék ez. A búza nem terem meg, a rozs is csak itt-ott. Lakói magyarok, akik közé kevés szlovák is vegyült. Vallásuk katolikus. Életmódjuk egyszerű, szegényes, nyelvük csiszolatlan, beszédjük szaggatott"*. E központ másik része a Nógrád megyei Karancsalján található. Kiemeli, hogy a palócok első kutatóit a kissé komikus, az irodalmi nyelvtől eltérő tájszólás érdekelte. S bár számos nyelvjárás típust lehet megkülönböztetni a csehszlovákiai Szenc-Senice – a Kassa-Košice és a Cegléd közti háromszögben, közös bennük az *a* és az *á* magánhangzók sajátos kiejtési módja.[101] Személyes emlékként jegyzem meg, hogy amikor gyerekkoromban Törökbálinton nyaraltam, a házigazda lányát zongorázni tanító zenetanár miután megtudta, Nógrád megyéből jöttem, Salgótarján nevét ejtette ki velem, hogy megállapítsa, palóc vagyok vagy sem. Az *a* és az *á* hangok kiejtésére volt kíváncsi. Ez alapján közölte velem, hogy nem vagyok palóc. A kiejtés lenne tehát a meghatározó tényező a palócsághoz való tartozásnak? Attól tartok ez a kérdés nem ilyen egyszerű.

Összegzésképpen megállapítható, hogy Nógrád, Heves, Borsod és Gömör vármegyéket minden, palócokkal foglalkozó szerző megnevezte e nép lakóhelyeként. Többségük Hont vármegyét is hozzáteszi, s van aki Barsot, sőt, Esztergomot és Abaúj-Tornát is. Palócok azonban nemcsak az említett megyékben, hanem az ország más részein, sőt külföldön is éltek, élnek. A palóc migráció azonban már egy másik történet.

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[100] PETERCSÁK Tivadar: *A palóckutatás célkitűzései, megvalósulása és eredményei,* Nógrád megyei Múzeumok évkönyve XXVI. Balassagyarmat – Salgótarján, 2002. 297.

[101] BAKÓ Ferenc: *A palóc néprajzi csoport eredete, etnikai összetevői,* IN: BAKÓ I. (1989). 53–56.

Dömők Csilla[1]

Európai integráció és globalizáció
A szubnacionális mobilizáció

Abstract

Defining the economic, social and political contours of Europe is not an easy task. Even if we have to determine only one of the characteristics, such as welfare state, we need to admit that the concept of the *„European social model"*, – which was created by Jacques Delors in the 1980s and was accepted by the European Council in its *'Nizza 2000'* document – is open to criticism that it rather represents a kind of normative vision instead of a solid reality. Socio-scientific literature often refers to the wealth of variation of the European welfare states, economic institutions and democracy as well. A kind of clear and implicit identity of the European model can only be delineated if Europe is contrasted with the non-European regions, such as East Asia is contrasted with the less developed South Asia or with North America. Moreover, the (Western) European history of the second half of the 20th century was determined considerably by the United States and its military, political, intellectual, economic and aesthetic hegemony. What makes social actors interconnected is the global – and not European – scale impacts and relations (such as public transport, global markets, the Internet). It is difficult to understand the so-called *„Europeanism"* only through the common history of the European societies.

Keywords: European integration; globalisation; subnational mobilisation; subsidiarity; regionalism; identity;

A régiók szerepét az egységesülő Európában több divatos elmélet próbálta és próbálja leírni. A *„Régiók Európája"* – mint láttuk – alapvető definíciós problémákat vet fel: mely régiók Európájáról van szó? A német tartományok által a kilencvenes évek elején kidolgozott *„Háromszintű Európa"* – koncepció - amely látszólag az EU továbbfejlődésének ideáltipikus, a három (európai, nevezeti, regionális) szint egyenrangúságán alapuló, föderalista szemléletű forgatókönyve valójában azt a célt szolgálta, hogy más szubnacionális szereplőket is mozgósítva visszaszerezzék, és alkotmányos garanciákkal kompenzálják a veszteségeiket. Az újabb megközelítések az EU jelenlegi karakterét a korábban jelzett megszorítások figyelembevételével alkotó többszintű kormányzás rendszerében próbálják elhelyezni a szubnacionális szinteket.

A tagállamok általában több (régiók és provinciák Belgiumban, tartományok és járások Németországban, régiók és megyék Franciaországban, Autonóm Közösségek és provinciák

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Spanyolországban) vagy egyszintű (tartományok Hollandiában, járások Dániában, kerületek Portugáliában, megyék Angliában és Írországban) stb. területi önkormányzati struktúrával rendelkeznek[2]. Nyilvánvaló, hogy a politikai tartalmú vagy önkormányzati képviseleti elv alapján szerveződő régiók a föderális, regionalizált, vagy decentralizált országokban inkább kompatibilisebbek a NUTS egységeivel, könnyebben tudnak eleget tenni a Strukturális Alapok alapelveiből (szubszidiaritás, partnerség, koncentráció, addícionalitás, koherencia, rugalmasság, fenntarthatóság, egyenlő esélyek) fakadó elvárásoknak. Ez esetben (a NUTS szintjén) a létező közigazgatási struktúra – az adott országtól függően NUTS I, NUTS II, NUTS III regionális bontásban – változtatás nélkül alkalmazható. Az unitárius országokban, vagy ahol a területi decentralizáció még nem vált jellemzővé, a területfejlesztés intézményrendszere általában elkülönül az általános közigazgatástól. Hogy ezen országokban is teljes legyen a háromszintű NUTS regionális struktúra, a hiányzó szinteket az eggyel lejjebb lévő szint megfelelő számú egységének összevonásával építik fel, azaz tervezési-statisztikai (tehát nem közigazgatási) régiókat hoznak létre. A politikai közbeszédben, a médiában és, bár csökkenő mértékben, a szakirodalomban időnként eluralkodó fogalmi zavart az okozza, hogy kétségtelenül van igény a régiók standardjának megfogalmazására. Az európai értelemben vett régiófogalom és a régiók jogaival összefüggő kérdések átfogó tisztázása szempontjából az elmúlt időszakban két jelentős dokumentum látott napvilágot, amelyek egyelőre jogi kötőerő nélkül tükrözik a régiók elvárásait és az EU, konkrétan a Bizottság törekvéseit.

Az Európai Régiók Gyűlése által Baselben, 1996. december 4-én elfogadott *„Nyilatkozat a regionalizmusról”* című dokumentum radikálisan fogalmaz: régió az a törvényes területi testület, amelyet az állami szint alatt közvetlenül hoznak létre és politikai önkormányzattal van ellátva.[3]

Az EU törekvéseit kifejező, az Európa Tanács által 1997-ben közzétett Regionális Önkormányzatok Európai Chartája ennél mérsékeltebb definíciót használ: az európai régió a központi kormányzati szint alatt működő, közvetlen politikai választás eredményeként létrejött – képviseleti testülettel, saját vagyonnal, bevétellel rendelkező – hatalmi, közigazgatási egység, melynek konkrét feladata és hatásköre a nemzeti alkotmányban, illetve törvényekben meghatározott, valamint

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[2] PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS Ilona: *Regionális politika és közigazgatás*, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest–Pécs, 1999.

[3] SOÓS Edit: *Integráció és regionalizmus Bába és társai,* Szeged, 57–65. 1999. KAISER Tamás: *Az europanizációs folyamat és a területi középszintek,* Veszprémi Egyetemi Kiadó, Veszprém, 2001. 19–21. DÖMŐK Csilla: *Regionalism and the European Charter of Regions*, Köztes – Európa, Szeged, 2018.

megfelelően védett. Ezeknek a koncepcióknak vagy modelleknek az elvárásai és törekvései radikálisabbak, mint a tagállami átlagok. A jelenlegi trendek azt mutatják, hogy a tagállamok nem forgatták fel totálisan területi önkormányzataikat és közigazgatási rendszereiket. Az europanizáció kihívásait – benne a strukturális alapokhoz való alkalmazkodást – intézményeik és területi kapcsolatrendszerük belső tartalmának újraértelmezésével próbálták megoldani[4].

A strukturális és kohéziós politikára vonatkozó szabályozásban meghatározott funkcionális intézmények (Irányító Hatóság, Kifizető Hatóság, Végrehajtó Szervezetek, Monitoring Bizottság) felállítása és működtetése a tagállamok feladata, csakúgy, mint az adott programidőszakra vonatkozó személyi, anyagi, statisztikai és technikai feltételek biztosítása.

Az Európai Bíróság esetjogi aktusai, a közpolitikai transzferek, a legjobban bevált módszerek kölcsönös cseréje, illetve a legújabban szorgalmazott nyílt koordináció fokozatosan europanizálják a tagállami közigazgatást, viszonylagossá téve működésük önállóságát. Ezt támasztják alá azok a törekvések is, amelyek szükségesnek tartják a szubszidiaritás elvének újrafogalmazását [5]. A fogalom belső tartalma azonban változatlanul képlékeny: a regionalizmus hívei a szubnacionális mobilizáció egyik legfőbb eszközének tekintik, Németországban a hatékonyabb politizálás és döntéshozatal lehetőségét látják benne, míg több tagállam – elsősorban Dánia és Nagy-Britannia – számára a szubszidiaritás egyfajta biztosíték, hivatkozási alap a *„brüsszeli centralizációval”* szemben arra nézve, hogy az integrációs folyamat nem jár a nemzeti szuverenitás csorbulásával. Habár mint a hatalommegosztás elve nem azonos a decentralizációval, és jelenleg kizárólag az EU és a tagállamok közötti viszonyban alkalmazzák, a szubszidiaritás kiterjesztő értelmezésével lehetővé válhat egy adott közpolitikának a közösségi vagy nemzeti szint helyett regionális vagy helyi megvalósítása. A Régiók Bizottsága legújabban azt az álláspontot képviseli, hogy a szubszidiaritást, mint általános jogelvet irányelv formájában egységesen ki kell terjeszteni a tagállamokon belüli hatalommegosztásra. Az irányelv jogi tartalma széleskörű döntési mozgásteret biztosít a nemzeti szintnek, amely államszervezeti tradícióinak, politikai kultúrájának, hatalmi erőviszonyainak figyelembevételével átalakítja közigazgatási struktúráját. Annál is inkább, mivel a tervezet szerint a regionális és helyi hatóságokat alkotmányos garanciákkal kell felruházni a szubszidiaritás teljes körű érvényesítése érdekében.

A szubnacionális mobilizáció a kilencvenes évekbeli európai

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[4] KAISER T.:*Az europanizációs folyamat és a területi középszintek,* Veszprémi Egyetemi Kiadó, Veszprém, 2001. 19–23.

[5] SOÓS: 77–79.

belpolitika egyik legszembetűnőbb vonása. A jelenséget két, egymást kölcsönösen erősítő tényező tükrözi leginkább. Egyrészt a Strukturális Alapok 1988-as reformja és a TEU számos rendelkezése, alapelve új lehetőségeket teremtett a régiók számára ahhoz, hogy bekapcsolódjanak az európai politizálásba; másrészt a tagállamokon belül a hatalom területi decentralizációjának irányába ható folyamatok és elméleti viták, valamint a régiók nyitottsága és aktivizmusa a strukturális és kohéziós politika terén egyre markánsabb érdekérvényesítési igényeket fogalmaztak meg. A lehetőségek és igények, a *„Régiók Európája”*, a *„Háromszintű Európa”*–koncepció, valamint az EU többszintű kormányzási rendszerré fejlődése együttesen alkotják a szubnacionális mobilizáció feltételrendszerét. A jelenséget az alábbiakban összegezhetjük: a régiók az államon belüli és a közösségi szintű csatornákon, az intézményes és informális eszközök egyidejű használatával egyre növekvő mértékben válnak résztvevőivé és alakítóivá az EU intézményeinek és döntéshozatali folyamatainak[6].

A többszintű kormányzás koncepciója kezdetben a központi állam és az európai intézmények közötti együttműködésből származó *„spin-off”*–hatásokat helyezte előtérbe, amelyek többé-kevésbé véletlenszerűen megnövelték a régiók belső hatalmi súlyát, vagy egy másik nézőpont alapján a hatalomban lévő kormányzati elitek érdekeiből vezette le a területi szereplők felértékelődésének okait és feltételrendszerét[7]. Mindent összevéve a többszintű kormányzás korai, *„top down”* szemléletében a szubnacionális szintek mint a közösségi és tagállami interakciók passzív vagy esetleges *„melléktermékei”* jelentek meg. Hamarosan nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy a többszintű kormányzás megértéséhez elengedhetetlen a szubnacionális mobilizáció *„bottom up”* – jellegének, a regionális mellett egyéb közpolitikáknak, valamint a tagállami adottságokból következő képességeknek és lehetőségeknek bevonása. Ehhez az elméleti és analitikus kereteket az *„európai belpolitika”* teremtette meg. Az európai belpolitika a német tartományok alapvető fontosságú koncepcionális stratégiája lett az alábbi problémák mentén:

a) az Egységes Európai Okmány ratifikációját követően a szakpolitikák egyre nagyobb hányada került közösségi szintre;

b) ezzel szemben az EK/ EU-val kapcsolatos ügyeket hagyományosan külpolitikai, ennél fogva a központi (szövetségi) kormányzat hatáskörébe tartozó kérdésnek tekintették;

c) így a tartományok (régiók) *„dupla eróziós hatással”* kerültek szembe: a szakpolitikák közösségesítése miatt a kompetenciák a

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[6] BOMBERG, E.–PETERSON, J.: *European Decision-Making: The Role of Sub-National Authorities,* Political Studies, Vol. 46. No 2., 219–235. 1998.

[7] KAISER T.: 101–114. KEATING, M.: *The New Regionalism in Western Europe;* (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar), York, 1998. 14. 36.

tagállami döntéshozatal intézményeitől átkerültek európai szintre, ahol a korábban regionális hatáskörbe tartozó ügyekről a központi (szövetségi) kormányzat képviselői döntöttek.

A német tartományok felfogásában a szakpolitikáknak az egységes belső piac érdekében történő *„közösségesítése"* azt jelentette, hogy az európai szintű politizálást már nem lehet kizárólag a nemzetközi kapcsolatok vagy a nemzetközi jog alapján értelmezett külpolitika feltételrendszerében értelmezni. Olyan *„európai belpolitika"* alakult ki, amely többszintű kormányzás és közpolitikai hálózatok működésével kitágítja a tagállami belpolitika mozgásterét, anélkül, hogy megbontaná a hatalmi és területi munkamegosztás társadalmi konszenzuson nyugvó alkotmányos kereteit. A tartományok célja tehát az volt, amihez belga és osztrák társaik is csatlakoztak, hogy azon európai (közösségi) szintű törvényjavaslatok esetében, amelyek kizárólagos vagy a központi kormányzattal párhuzamos hatásköreiket érintik, belső kompetenciáik arányában módjuk legyen részt venni a döntéshozatalban. A probléma tulajdonképpen abból adódott, hogy az Alapító Szerződések a közösségi döntéshozatal és végrehajtás kizárólagos szereplőjeként és felelőseként a tagállami kormányzatokat nevezik meg, az Egységes Európai Okmány és a TEU tervezetei pedig nem vették figyelembe, hogy az immár közösségi szinteken történő döntéshozatal a központi kormányzati és államigazgatási szervek hatáskörébe von olyan kompetenciákat, amelyek eredetileg a régiókat illették meg.

A belpolitikai erőviszonyok módosulásának lehetősége természetesen nem jelentkezett egyformán az egyes tagállamokban. Míg az unitárius és decentralizált országok ebből a szempontból kevésbé voltak érintettek, a föderális és regionalizált tagállamok régiói viszont jogalkotói, közigazgatási hatásköreik jelentős mértékű csökkenésével számolhattak. A német tartományok már az Egységes Európai Okmány parlamenti ratifikációjának vitájában felvetették, hogy megfelelő alkotmányos garanciák és kompenzációk nélkül a tartományi státus Bonntól és Brüsszeltől függő közigazgatási egységgé redukálódhat. A változás konkrétan abból származik, hogy az europanizáció megváltoztatja a döntéshozatali és költségvetési részesedés arányait a kormányzati és szubnacionális szereplők között. Az előbbiek immár közösségi szintre emelt regionális hatáskörök felett dönthettek, míg az utóbbiak formális képviselet híján nem tudtak érdemi befolyást gyakorolni az eseményekre.

Összegezve: a tagállami kormányzatok befolyásának erősödése a döntéshozatalban, másrészt a közösségi politikák végrehajtása során felmerülő költségterhek egyoldalú áthárítása a hatalom és munkamegosztás aszimmetriáját vetítette elő. Ebben a helyzetben a régiók két alapvető stratégia közül választhattak az europanizáció számukra kedvezőtlen folyamatainak visszafordítása érdekében: a

kooperatív stratégia az adaptációs költségek megosztásán alapul; a központi kormányzat az államon belüli részvételi formákkal és az európai politikák végrehajtási költségeinek bizonyos mértékű átvállalásával kompenzálja a régiókat. A konfrontatív stratégia alkalmazásával viszont az utóbbiak megpróbálják az adaptáció költségeit teljes egészében tagállamaikra hárítani. Ennek eszközeként folytonos alkotmányvitákat provokálva a kompetenciáik alkotmányos körülbástyázására törekszenek, illetve az európai döntéshozatalhoz való hozzáférés érdekében a tagállami kormányzatokat megkerülő, közvetlen csatornákat építenek ki a közösségi intézményekkel. A régiók stratégiaválasztásait alapvetően formális és informális intézményeik alkotmányos pozíciója és intézményi kultúrája befolyásolja[8].

A formális intézmények azokat a stratégiai keretfeltételeket testesítik meg, amelyek a választás lehetőségét kínálják. Ha a régiók nem rendelkeznek a szükséges forrásokkal (jogi felhatalmazás, pénzügyi eszközök, személyi kapacitás), aligha képesek közvetlen csatornákat kiépíteni az európai intézményekkel. Ugyanez másként: ha nincsenek birtokában a kellő szakértelemnek, információnak, nincsenek vétójogaik, a kormányzat sem tartja feltétlenül szükségesnek, hogy *„szétterítse”* a közösségi döntéshozatal részvételi jogosultságait. Az alkalmazott stratégiák segítik, vagy éppen akadályozhatják az europanizációhoz történő intézményi adaptációt. A *„kompenzációt a részvételen keresztül”* megvalósító kooperatív stratégia az adaptációs nyomást olyan flexibilis alkalmazkodóképességgel kezeli, amely stabilizálja a régiók alkotmányos pozícióját.

Mindezek alapján leszögezhetjük, hogy az európai belpolitika többszintű kormányzási rendszere új szempontokkal világítja meg a szubnacionális szintek europanizációs szerepét:

a) feltárja a régiók *„bottom up”* bekapcsolódásának lehetőségeit és korlátait az európai döntéshozatalban, különös tekintettel arra, ha a közösségesített politikák ütköznek belső hatásköreikkel;

b) megkülönböztethetők azok a közpolitikák, ahol a régiók törekvései sikeresnek bizonyultak ott, ahol az európai politizálás a belső kompetenciákat érinti;

c) kimutatható az összefüggés a föderális és regionalizált tagállamok szubnacionális szintjeinek alkotmányos pozíciója, a hatalom területi megosztásának intézményi kultúrája, s a régiók

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[8] KEATING, M.–HOOGHE,L.: *By-Passing the Nation-State? Regions and the EU Polici Process,* IN: RICHARDSON, J.J.: *European Union. Power and Policy Making,* London, 1995. KAISER T. (2000): *A szubnacionális hatóságok és az interregionális együttműködés;* IN: BESZTERI B. – HERVAINÉ SZABÓ Gy. (szerk.): *Regionális és helyi együttműködési stratégiák.* Tudományos Konferencia a Magyar Tudomány Napja keretében, 1999. november 5., Székesfehérvár, 2000. 101-114.

közösségi döntéshozatalban való részvételének indokai, mértéke, hatékonysága között[9].

A többszintű kormányzás tehát lehetővé teszi, hogy a régiók elsősorban tagállamon belüli, formális, alkotmányos vagy törvényben szabályozott csatornákon keresztül kizárólagos vagy párhuzamos hatásköreik arányában részesei legyenek az európai politizálásnak. A mobilizáció ténye és a tényleges befolyás mértéke azonban nem alkot szinonim fogalompárt. Az államszervezeti tradíciók és az alkotmányos különbségek, a formális-jogi tényezők, az informális alkufolyamatokban rejlő lehetőségek kihasználása együttesen alakítják ki azokat a feltételeket, amelyek mellett a szubnacionális szintek érdekérvényesítő képességének különbségei megragadhatók. Az eltéréseket három tényezőre vezethetjük vissza: alkotmányos pozíció; alkalmazkodási képesség; társadalmi beágyazottság és hitelesség Az erős alkotmányjogi felhatalmazással bíró régiók széleskörű belső kompetenciáik révén kétségkívül erősebb befolyást gyakorolhatnak az európai politizálásra, mint a tervezési-statisztikai középszintek. Az alkalmazkodóképességet három további szempont befolyásolhatja:

a) milyen hatékonyságú, formális, a központi állammal kialakított „kormányközi", koordinációs intézményeket és közpolitikai hálózatokat tudnak a régiók nemcsak a föderális vagy regionalizált országokban kiépíteni;

b) mennyire erős az adott szubnacionális elit „európai" elkötelezettsége, legitimációja, kapcsolatteremtési képessége és érdekeltsége;

c) ha régiók képesek szövetségeseket találni országon belül (mint Nyugat-Anglia helyhatóságainak „régiót építő" tömörülése esetén) vagy kívül (interregionális és határmenti együttműködések formájában), a magánszektor képviselőivel (mint az Észak–Nyugati Regionális Gyűlés teszi Angliában), illetve a Bizottsággal (például a Közösségi Kezdeményezések révén), akkor kiegészítő anyagi, szellemi és politikai forrásokhoz juthatnak a tagállami kormányzattal való kapcsolat alakításában. A régiók törekvéseinek sikerességét társadalmi beágyazottságuk is meghatározza, lényeges szerepe van az erős identitású civil társadalomnak az etnikai és nyelvi szolidaritásra alapozott együttműködési és kapcsolatteremtési formáknak, az országos szintű pártrendszer regionális befogadásának, a területi érdekcsoportok helyi erőforrásokat mozgósító képességének. A siker kulcsa a „modernizálódott politikai kultúrá"-ban keresendő. Az alkotmányos felhatalmazás és az érdekérvényesítés formális csatornái döntő, de nem kizárólagos meghatározói a régiók európai

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[9] LOUGHLIN, J. (eds.): *Regional and Local Democracy in the European Union;* Luxemburg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999. 147–166.

szerepvállalásának. Egyre fontosabb szerepet játszik, mint láttuk, akár az alkotmányos felhatalmazás gyengeségéből fakadó hátrányokat ellensúlyozó mértékben az informális alkufolyamatokban és a közpolitikai hálózatokban nyújtott teljesítmény. A közpolitikák terén (itt a strukturális és kohéziós politikát vesszük alapul) a szubnacionális szintek befolyása formális értelemben a politizálás végső, *„döntés utáni"* szakaszában, az elfogadott regionális fejlesztési programok végrehajtása és monitoringja során emelkedik ki, a korai szakaszokban a föderális országok kivételével nincs érdemi (vagy legalábbis garantált) szerepük. Ugyanakkor a régiók befolyást gyakorolhatnak tagállamaik tárgyalási pozícióira már a kezdeti stádiumban is, amennyiben be tudnak jutni a megfelelő közpolitikai hálózatokba. Minél inkább *„technikai"* jellegű az adott kérdés, annál nagyobb a régiók esélye, hogy érdemi befolyást gyakoroljanak a döntéshozatalra. Más esetekben viszont a központi kormányzatok használják fel a régiók érdekeit saját belpolitikai helyzetük erősítésére. A német egyesítést követően a Strukturális Alapokból származó támogatások legnagyobb része a kelet–német országrészbe került. Az újonnan kialakított Landok azonban nem rendelkeztek kellő tapasztalatokkal az Alapok hatékony kezelésére, ezért a szövetségi kormány jelentős befolyást szerzett a támogatásokhoz kapcsolódó közpolitikák terén[10].

Összegzés

A szubnacionális mobilizáció tehát nagyfokú változatosságot mutat a kormányzati rendszerek vertikális szerveződésein belül. Ezzel kapcsolatban viszont nem térhetünk ki annak megválaszolása elől, hogy a szubnacionális mobilizáció és adaptáció mennyiben járul hozzá Európa *„véglegesítéséhez".* Olyan fejlődési pályáról beszélünk, amely akár a funkcionalista paradigma, akár a *„Régiók Európája",* a *„Háromszintű Európa"* vagy a *„többszintű kormányzás"* koncepcióinak részeként végső soron egy alkotmányos alapú föderális Európa kialakulásához vezet, vagy ellenkezőleg, nincs másról szó, mint a neorealista és liberális kormányközi felfogás által vallott *„megtorpanások és újrakezdések"* szubnacionális változatáról. Az utóbbi évtized eseményeinek tükrében e második lehetőség tűnik valószínűbbnek, amennyiben a régiók stratégiája az integráció fejlődését meghatározó kormányközi konferenciák tematikájához igazodik.

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[10] HORVATH Gyula: *Partnerség az Európai Unió regionális politikájában,* Tér és Társadalom, XIV.évf. 1. szám 11–27.