

ÖT KONTINENS

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti
Tanszék közleményei*

N°2015/2.



**Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST
2018**

ÖT KONTINENS

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék
közleményei
Nº 2015/2.*

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST
2018**

**FIVE CONTINENTS
Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary
History
Nº 2015/2.**

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES**

**BUDAPEST
2018**

Editorial Board

President

BALOGH, András, Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest

Members:

BODNÁR, Erzsébet (Ph.D.), University of Debrecen, *BÚR, Gábor* (Ph.D.), Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *CADILHON, François*, Professor, Michel de Montaigne University, Bordeaux 3, *ÇOLAK, Kamil* (Ph.D.), University of Eskişehir, *FIGEAC, Michel*, Professor, Michel de Montaigne University, Bordeaux 3, *FISCHER, Ferenc*, Professor, University of Pécs, *FRANK, Tibor*, Professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *GULYÁS, László* Professor, University of Szeged, *HOREL, Catherine*, Professor, University of Paris I, Directress of Research, CNRS, Paris, *LACHAISE, Bernard*, Professor, Michel de Montaigne University, Bordeaux 3, *LEANCA, Gabriel* (Ph.D.), University of Iasi, *MAJOROS, István* (editor in chief), Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *MARUZSA, Zoltán* (Ph.D.), Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *NAGY, László, J.*, Professor Emeritus, University of Szeged, *PIMENTEL, Maria do Rosário*, Professor, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, *RATHKOLB, Oliver*, Professor, University of Vienna, *Élisabeth du RÉAU*, Professor Emeritus, University of Paris III - Sorbonne Nouvelle, *RIBEIROA, Maria Manuela de Bastos Tavares* Professor, University of Coimbra, *SZÁVAI, Ferenc*, Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest and University of Kaposvár, *SZÉKELY, Gábor*, Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *TÓTH, Andrej* (Ph.D.), University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, University of Economics, Prague, *USLU, Ateş* (Ph.D.), Istanbul University.

This volume is edited by István Majoros

ÖT KONTINENS

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék
közleményei*

Nº 2015/2.

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

BUDAPEST

2018

FIVE CONTINENTS

Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History
N° 2015/2.

EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Humanities

BUDAPEST
2018

© authors, 2018
© editor, 2018

Chief Editor:
István Majoros
imajoros6@gmail.hu

ISSN: 1589-3839
Published twice a year

Publishing House:

Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék,
Department of Modern and Contemporary History
ELTE BTK
1088 Budapest, Múzeum krt. 6-8.
Tel.: +36-1-4855204

www.cceol.com

Printing House: ROBINCO KFT
BUDAPEST

Contents

Czeferner, Dóra Weibliche Identität in Mitteleuropa und Wissenstransfer zwischen den ungarischen, österreichischen und deutschen Frauenorganisationen 1890–1914)	7
Dömök, Csilla Regionalism in today's Europe	31
Földessy, Gábor Warfare, Horror, and the Truth On-screen: The Role of the American Media in the Vietnam War	41
Földessy, Gábor The Development of the Antiwar Movement in the United States: From the Peaceful Protests to the Nationwide Demonstrations	49
Kószeghy, Anna George Orwell and Spike Milligan – Outsiders and Insiders of the British Empire	71
M. Madarász, Anita Magyarország brit szemszögből, 1945–1955	83
Pácha, Martin Losing the „Universal” Mihály Horváth and František Palacký	103
Schrek, Katalin Interpretation of Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy's Diplomatic Role and Thematization of His Reports during the Negotiations on the Independent Greek State (1829–1832)	117

Contents

Dóra Czeferner¹

Weibliche Identität in Mitteleuropa und Wissenstransfer zwischen den ungarischen, österreichischen und deutschen Frauenorganisationen 1890–1914



Abstract

It is regarded as an evidence, that historians of the dualistic era study the political, economic and social development of Austria and Hungary parallel with each other. This way, the question may come up: Why do Hungarian (as well as Austrian) women's historians tend to forget about the fact, that women's movements of the two countries should be examined parallel with each other as well? This present paper analyses the relationship between three Austrian and Hungarian bourgeois-liberal and feminist organizations before the outbreak of the First World War: in Austrian relation, it focuses on the Allgemeiner Österreichischer Frauenverein (General Austrian Women's Association, founded in Vienna in 1892). With regard to Hungary, it concentrates on two separate but co-operating groups: the Nótisztviselők Országos Egyesülete (National Association of Female Clerks, established in Budapest in 1896) and the Feministák Egyesülete (Hungarian Feminists' Association, founded in Budapest in 1904). Apart from direct and indirect contacts of the organizations, the issue is placed in a larger context: it shows how the models borrowed from the German women's movements were adapted to the Austrian and the Hungarian organizations.

Keywords: Austria-Hungary; feminist organizations; Rosika Schwimmer; Auguste Fickert; International Woman Suffrage Alliance;

„Der häusliche Apfelstrudel, so hiess es, genüge der Frau nicht mehr, sie verlangen nach dem Strudel des öffentlichen Lebens.”² – Die Erinnerungen von einer unbekanntem Schriftstellerin (oder vielleicht Käthe Braun-Präger, 1888, Wien–1967, Wien) an Auguste Fickert³, Leiterin der österreichischen linksgerichteten bürgerlichen Frauenbewegung, illustrieren die Situation und die Bedürfnisse um die Jahrhundertwende lebenden Frauen sehr plastisch. Susan Zimmermann, namhafte Forscherin der zeitgenössischen Frauenorganisationen, behauptet, dass nicht nur die Industrialisierung und die Revolutionen (die Französische Revolution, die Epoche des Vormärz usw.), sondern auch die Erschaf-

¹ Czeferner, Dóra, PhD student, University of Pécs, czefernerd@gmail.com; Die Forschung wurde von dem ungarischen ÚNKP-17-3-IV Neue Nationale Vorzüglichkeit Programm gefördert.

² Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Musiksammlung, Nachlass Fickert. F34 Fickert. 361–365. (in weiterem: ÖNB M)

³ Angaben zu ihrer Biographie s. später.

fung der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit eine bedeutende Rolle in der Entwicklung der zeitgenössischen Frauenbewegung(en) spielten.⁴ An dieser Stelle muss betont werden, dass dies sowohl für die internationalen Organisationen als auch an die wachsenden nationalen und lokalen Frauenvereine gilt.

Trotz der rasanten gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Veränderungen blieb die Lage der Frauen während der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts relativ statisch. Der Kampf um die Gleichberechtigung des „*schwachen Geschlechtes*“ in den mitteleuropäischen Staaten – die man keineswegs als Massenphänomen bezeichnen kann – beschleunigte sich zusammen mit anderen verschiedenen Reformbewegungen in den letzten Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrhunderts.

Die wichtigsten Zielsetzungen dieser Bestrebungen waren meines Erachtens nach folgende: das Problem der Demokratie bzw. der Ausdehnung des Wahlrechts, die soziale Frage, die Begründung der Wohlfahrtsstaaten des 20. Jahrhunderts⁵ und die Frauenfrage. In diesem Beitrag geht es nur um die Frauenfrage bzw. die Rolle und die Tätigkeit der bürgerlichen feministischen Frauenorganisationen in nationalen und transnationalen Kontext.

Es muss auch betont werden, dass diese Organisationen keinesfalls in einem „*luftleeren Räumen*“ existierten. Neben den bürgerlichen feministischen Vereinen kämpften um die Gleichberechtigung der Frauen auch die sozialdemokratischen bzw. proletarischen sowie die christlich-sozialistischen Frauenorganisationen. Obwohl die Zielsetzungen der drei Tendenzen oft ähnlich waren, ihre Mittel um ihre Ziele zu realisieren waren ziemlich unterschiedlich. In diesem Beitrag werde ich mich ausschließlich mit den bürgerlichen feministischen Tendenzen beschäftigen, auf die weiteren zwei Richtungen werde ich nur ansatzweise hinweisen.

Relevanz des Themas und Forschungsstand in Ungarn

Die Tatsache, dass nicht nur Männer, sondern auch Frauen eine bedeutende Rolle in der Gestaltung der Welt spielten, ist seit den 1970-er Jahren nicht nur von der Mehrheit der amerikanischen und westeuropäischen Sozialwissenschaftler erkannt worden.⁶ Auch ungarische Forscher haben diesbezüglich den Anschluss an die Welttendenzen gefunden. Unter den Wissenschaftlern, die sich in Ungarn mit diesem Thema beschäftig(t)en – außerhalb der Thematisierung des institutionellen Rahmens der Frau-

⁴ ZIMMERMANN (2003): 119–147.

⁵ Für den Ausbau der Wohlfahrtsstaaten s. SACHBE (1993): 136–159. ZIMMERMANN (2011).

⁶ Obwohl die Wirkungen der Annales-Schule ganz kraftvoll in Ungarn waren, wurden die frauengeschichtlichen Forschungen nur mit einer relativ großen Phasenverzögerung – in den 1970-er Jahren – begonnen. PETŐ (2006): 514–532. S. 514.

enerziehung und der politischen Partizipation des „schwachen“ Geschlechtes – wurde ab Anfang der 2000-er Jahren die Untersuchung der Tätigkeit der „Brot verdienenden“ Frauen ein immer mehr populäres Forschungsthema.⁷ Den weiblichen Rollen und in einen weiteren Sinn der weiblichen Identität wurde weniger Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet. Es ist jeweils wichtig zu betonen, dass die beiden Begriffe keineswegs identisch sind. Die Rollen einer Frau beschreibt nämlich Bereiche des Lebens, in denen die Frau als Akteur auftritt, so z. B. als Ehefrau, Hausfrau oder Mutter. Die modernen Rollen der Frauen sind natürlicherweise unvorstellbar ohne ihre aktive Tätigkeit in der öffentlichen Sphäre der Gesellschaft (z.B. Arbeit, gesellschaftliche Aktivität usw.). So weist der Begriff Rolle in erster Linie auf Tätigkeitsbereiche hin, die von Frauen wahrgenommen werden.⁸ Identität hat dagegen eine eher abstrakte Definition. Kollektive weibliche Identität soll als das integrierte Teil der weiblichen Seele definiert sein, die die Frauen durch ihre persönlichen Lebenserfahrungen in sich als Frau entwickeln.⁹ Rolle und Identität haben jedoch miteinander zu tun, indem die Rollen der Frau doch ihre Identität prägen. Bei der Analyse der Entwicklung der Frauenorganisationen kommt beiden eine hohe Relevanz zu.

Sowohl die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung als auch die Erforschung der Gründung, Tätigkeit und Funktionsfähigkeit der Frauenorganisationen während des Dualismus wurden besonders in Ungarn, aber teilweise auch in Österreich und Deutschland vernachlässigt.¹⁰ Die in Ungarn publizier-

⁷ Über die weibliche Arbeitstätigkeit während des Dualismus wurden in Ungarn nur einige Beiträge und manche Buchkapitel publiziert z. B. BURUCS (1993): 15–19.; CZEFERER (2014): 49–151.; CZEFERNER (2018): 40–65.; KÉRI (2008). Ferner: NAGY Beáta: *Nők keresőtevékenysége Budapesten a 20. század első felében*. IN: HADAS Miklós (Hrsg.), *Férfiuralom. Írások nőkről, férfiakról, feminizmusról*. Budapest, 1994. 155–175. NAGY Mariann: *Nők a magyar gazdaságban a dualizmus korában*. IN: GYÁNI Gábor; SÉLLEI Nóra (Hrsg.), *Nők a modernizálódó magyar társadalomban*. Debrecen 2006. 205–223. Unter den ausländischen Forscherinnen müssen wir Susan Zimmermann hervorheben, die sowohl über den (trans)nationalen Charakter der österreich-ungarischen Frauenbewegungen, als auch den Arbeiterinnenschutz und die sozialpolitischen Entwicklungstendenzen mehrere Beiträge und Bücher veröffentlichte. ZIMMERMANN (2003): 119–147. ZIMMERMANN (2006): 119–167.

⁸ KERESZTY (2009): 77–88.

⁹ Über die gemeinsame Identität und Selbstrepräsentation der Frauen s. KORTSCH (2016): 1–23, 141–185. CURTI (1998).

¹⁰ Neben anderen ungarischen Forschern haben meine Betreuerin, Judit Szapor, Susan Zimmermann, Anna Loutfi und Fanni Borbíró in einigen Werken dargelegt, dass man in Ungarn über eine echte methodische Erschließung der Frauengeschichte nicht sprechen kann. Es wurden auch wenige Monographien über die weiblichen Rollen publiziert. (Z.B. ZIMMERMANN (1999) Vg.: KAARI (1987)). Die vier Bände über die frauengeschichtliche Aspekte der Geschichte seit der Antiquität bis dem 20. Jahrhundert herausgegeben von Georges Duby in Frankreich: DUBY (1991–1992); COTT (2004): 1–20.; SZAPOR (2007): 129–145.; BORBÍRÓ (2014). Zum

ten Bücher behandeln die weibliche Arbeit und die Rolle von Frauenorganisationen während der Zwischenkriegszeit und in den Jahrzehnten des Sozialismus außerordentlich detailliert und fachspezifisch.¹¹ Das bedeutet – neben den anderen Mangelhaftigkeiten – dass die Geschichte jener Periode der Frauenbewegungen fast völlig unerschlossen blieb, in der die mitteleuropäischen Frauen massenweise für ihre politischen, gesellschaftlichen und ökonomischen Rechte auftraten. Von den drei in dem Titel benannten Ländern ist die Situation in Ungarn am ungünstigsten, wo dieses Thema noch ein echtes Forschungsdesiderat bedeutet.¹² Ohne die Kenntnisse dieser sozialgeschichtlich wichtigen Phase sind nicht nur die späteren Entwicklungstendenzen schwer zu verstehen und zu interpretieren, sondern auch ist die Erschließung der transnationalen Frauennetzwerke in den mitteleuropäischen Frauenbewegungen unvorstellbar.

Es ist nämlich offensichtlich, dass man unter den drei Ländern viele ähnliche Aspekte entdecken kann. In erster Linie werde ich hier demonstrieren, dass unter den österreichisch-ungarischen und deutschen Frauenorganisationen – um mit einem modernen Begriff auszudrücken – ein bedeutender Wissenstransfer stattfand.

Mit den in westeuropäischen Ländern – und auch in Deutschland – wohl bekannten Methoden der Diskursanalyse und der semantischen Untersuchung unterschiedlicher Frauen- und feministischer Zeitschriften, Korrespondenzen der Organisationen werde ich illustrieren, dass Struktur und Aktivität der österreichisch-ungarischen Frauenorganisationen auf Adaption von Modellen basierten und auf diese Weise ein erprobtes und breitgefächertes Identitätsmanagement bewerkstelligten.¹³

Traditionelle und moderne Tendenzen der mitteleuropäischen Frauenbewegungen

Es ist zweifellos, dass das 19. Jahrhundert mit der industriellen Revolution und zahlreichen Unterrichtsgesetzen zu bedeutenden Änderungen im Leben der Frauen führte. Der Zweck dieser Beitrag ist keinesfalls

österreichischen und deutschen Forschungsstand s. CATLING (2000); HACKER (1996): 97–106.; APPELT et al. (2013); KLINGENSTEIN (1997); Ferner: PALATSCHKEK Sylvia: *Kinder, Kirche, Küche*. IN: François ÉTIENNE (Hrsg.), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*. 2001.: 2. 419–433.

¹¹ Z.B.: Werke von Katalin Koncz und Magda Aranyossi, die in einer kraftvollen sozialistischen Gesinnung geschrieben worden waren. Neulich s. die Beiträge von Andrea Pető!

¹² Nach der Meinung von Judit Acsády sind die Mehrzahl der ungarischen Frauenrechtlerinnen und feministischen Denker völlig vergessen, weil ihre Werke nur einmal und nur in niedrigen Auflagen publiziert wurden. ACSÁDY (2004): 190–205.

¹³ Es ist wichtig zu betonen, dass bei dieser Analyse meistens auf die Werke von Teun. A. van DIJK und Allan BELL. S. DIJK, TEUN A. van: *News as Discourse*. Hillsdale, 1988. BELL, ALLAN: *The Language of News Media*. Blackwell, 1991.

diese Veränderungen aufzuzählen, aber es ist wichtig zu erwähnen, dass die Modernisierung in den unterschiedlichen Regionen zu ungleichen Zeitpunkten erfolgte.¹⁴ Betreffend der verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Organisationen und naturgemäß der Frauenvereine ist es bemerkenswert, dass die Entwicklung dieser Gruppen durch die sozialen, wirtschaftlichen und technischen (s. z.B. pressegeschichtliche Aspekte) Innovationen positiv beeinflusst wurde. Aber wie es schon gesagt wurde, in diesem Beitrag geht es nicht um diese Veränderungen, sondern über das Wachstum der Frauenorganisationen und die transnationalen Tendenzen (und Relationen) der Frauenbewegung. In dieser Hinsicht kann man riesige Differenzen auch unter den mitteleuropäischen Staaten beobachten. Während sich die ersten modernen deutschen und österreichischen Frauenorganisationen – die für die gleichen politischen und bürgerlichen Rechte für die Frauen kämpften – schon im Jahre 1848 konstituierten, funktionierten in Ungarn bis in die 1860-er Jahre hauptsächlich karitative Frauenvereine.¹⁵ In dieser Hinsicht diente Deutschland als Muster für die Staaten der Doppelmonarchie. Den Frauenvereinen, die auf den Wurzeln dieser ersten Gruppen organisiert wurden, gelang es gegen die Jahrhundertwende die vielfach negative Attitüde der (Mitglieds) Frauen zu verändern, und eine kollektive Identität unter den Frauenrechtlerinnen und ihre Mitfrauen zu erschaffen.

Nach der Einschränkung des Versammlungsrechts und der Ausbreitung der Zensur infolge der Ereignisse im Jahre 1848, entstand die erste bedeutungsvolle und langlebige bürgerliche Frauenorganisation der deutschen Gebiete vor der deutschen Einheit im Jahre 1865. Der Allgemeine Deutsche Frauenverein (ADF) wurde aus dem Leipziger Frauenbildungsverein heraus nach der ersten Frauenkonferenz zwischen 16–18. Oktober gegründet. Nach Luise Otto Peters (Gründungsmitglied des ADF)¹⁶ „*müssen Frauen ihre Sache selbst führen, sonst sind sie vornherein verloren*“.¹⁷ Der ersten Paragraph des Statuts des ADF fasste die folgenden

¹⁴ MÜHLBACHER et al. (2007): 8.; SIMONTON (2002): 1–3.

¹⁵ Die Gründe der Phasenverschiebung in Ungarn werde ich später in diesem Beitrag aufführen. (WEILAND (1983): 18.) Die Forscher heben die nationalen Charakterzüge der ungarischen Frauenbewegung bis 1867 hervor. (SZAPOR (2007): 129–145.) Z.B. Aus den zeitgenössischen Quellen stellt sich heraus, dass Männer den Frauen in der Spracherneuerung am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts wichtige Rollen widmeten. Nach Péter Bárány (1790). SCHWIMMER Rózsa (Hrsg.): *A magyar nőmozgalom régi dokumentumai*. Budapest, 1907. 16.

¹⁶ Louise Otto Peters (1819, Meißen–1895, Leipzig), Schriftstellerin, Publizistin, mit Auguste Schmidt zusammen, sie ist Mitbegründerin der deutschen bürgerlichen Frauenbewegung. Nach der Gründung des ADFs publizierten sie die *Neuen Bahnen* als Vereinsorgan, die bis 1933 erschien. Pseudonym: Otto Stern. Wichtigste Werke: *Das Recht der Frauen auf Erwerb. Blicke auf das Frauenleben der Gegenwart* (1866), *Frauenleben im deutschen Reich* (1876). BRUNOLD–KNOP (2016).

¹⁷ SCHRAUT (2013), WEILAND (1983): 15.

Zielsetzungen zusammen: „*Der allgemeine deutsche Frauenverein hat die Aufgabe, für die erhöhte Bildung des weiblichen Geschlechts und die Befreiung der weiblichen Arbeit von allen ihrer Entfaltung entgegenstehenden Hindernissen mit vereinten Kräften zu wirken.*“¹⁸

In den deutschen Gebieten wurde die Frauenbewegung um die Jahrhundertwende eine richtige Massenbewegung. In Österreich sehen wir ähnliche Tendenzen, obwohl das Vereinsgesetz – was 1867 eingeführt und nur 1918 aufgehoben wurde – die Organisierung einigermaßen behinderte. Dieses Gesetz besagte, dass „*Ausländer, Frauenpersonen und Minderjährige nicht als Mitglieder politischer Vereine geführt werden durften*“. Wegen dieses Gesetzes durften die österreichischen Frauen keine Vereine mit politischen Zielsetzungen organisieren, und auch die Publikation von Vereinszeitschriften war problematisch.¹⁹ Die Wurzeln der österreichischen bürgerlichen und Arbeiterinnenbewegung sind auch auf die Ereignisse des Jahres 1848 zurückführbar. Nach der Demonstration der Arbeiterinnen gegen die 25 prozentigen Lohnsenkungen wurde der Erster Wiener Demokratische Frauenverein von Karoline von Perin (1808, Wien–1888, Neu Isenburg,) gegründet.²⁰ Wenn man aber die konkreten Zielsetzungen des Vereines überblickt, scheinen diese Ziele ziemlich vage gewesen zu sein: „*§ 2 Die Aufgabe des Vereins ist eine dreifache: Eine politische, eine soziale und eine humane: a) eine politische, um sich durch Lektüre und belehrende Vorträge über das Wohl des Vaterlandes aufzuklären, das demokratische Prinzip in allen weiblichen Kreisen zu verbreiten, die Freiheitsliebe schon bei dem Beginne der Erziehung in der Kinderbrust anzufachen und zugleich das deutsche Element zu kräftigen; b) eine soziale, um die Gleichberechtigung der Frauen anzustreben durch Gründung öffentlicher Volksschulen und höherer Bildungsanstalten, den weiblichen Unterricht umzugestalten [...]; c) eine humane, um den tiefgefühlten Dank der Frauen Wiens für die Segnungen der Freiheit durch sorgsame Verpflegung aller Opfer der Revolution auszusprechen.*“²¹ Die Stichwörter dieser Zielbestimmung sind folgende: Wohl, Freiheit, Gleichberechtigung und demokratisch. Es ist wichtig, dass die Gründer ihre Zwecke zusammen mit Männern erreichen wollten: ihr Statut bekräftigte, dass sie Männer als unterstützende Mitglieder akzeptieren.²² Dies kann einerseits als

¹⁸ Statuten des Allgemeinen Deutschen Frauenvereins. Leipzig, 17. Oktober 1865. Der Verein existierte bis 1933.

¹⁹ ILLUSTRIERTE (1901): 140. Gerade deswegen waren karitative Organisationen oft die Tarnorganisationen für politische Vereine, und als Herausgeber der Vereinszeitschriften wählten die Leiterinnen der Organisationen Privatpersonen aus. Die Herausgeberin des *Neuen Frauenlebens* war z. B. Auguste Fickert.

²⁰ HAUCH (1999): 75–96.

²¹ Markiert von der Autorin. Statut der Ersten Wiener Demokratischer Frauenverein. Wien, 28 August 1848.

²² Ebenda.

progressiv bewertet werden, andererseits muss man voraussetzen, dass die Mitgliedsfrauen auf die (finanzielle) Unterstützung der Männer hingewiesen waren.²³ Die Situation war ähnlich bei dem deutschen Verein, wie der zweite Paragraph des Statuts es ausführte: „Männer, die sich für die Zwecke des Vereins interessieren und dies bestätigen können, werden als Ehrenmitglieder mit beratender Stimme aufgenommen, ebenso solche Frauen im Auslande, die für die Frauensache im rühmlicher Weise tätig waren.“²⁴

Obwohl der erste österreichische Verein nur für zwei Monaten existierte, begann eine bedeutsame Entwicklung, die während den folgenden Jahrzehnten Hand in Hand mit den deutschen Tendenzen voranging. Unter den zahlreichen Organisationen möchte ich jetzt nur den Allgemeinen Österreichischen Frauenverein (AÖFV, 1893, Wien) erwähnen. Die Gründe, warum ich mich gerade mit dieser Organisation beschäftige sind folgende: erstens war dieser Verein die erste und später wichtigste bürgerliche feministische Organisation in Wien und in Österreich, der – ähnlich den untersuchten zwei ungarischen Vereinen – für die gesellschaftlichen (z.B. Unterricht) und wirtschaftlichen (z.B. Berufsleben) Rechte der Frauen kämpfte.²⁵ (Die politische Gleichberechtigung der Frauen wurde in dem Statut nicht erwähnt, weil das österreichische Vereinsgesetz die politische Organisation der Frauen völlig verbot.) Weiterhin pflegte der Verein relativ enge Kontakte mit den internationalen Frauenorganisationen. Die erste Vorsteherin des Vereines – Auguste Fickert²⁶ hielt die Berufssituation der Lehrerinnen besonders wichtig, weil sie selbst auch Volksschullehrerin war.²⁷

Angesichts der Eigenartigkeiten der Frauenbewegungen in den drei Ländern ist es offenbar, dass in Ungarn eine Phasenverschiebung von mehreren Jahrzehnten sichtbar ist. Die Grundlagen der gesellschaftlichen (Selbst)Organisationen wurden erst nach dem Ausgleich von 1867

²³ Wirkende Mitglieder zahlen im ersten Monate 30 kr., für die Folge 20 kr. C. M. monatlich, unterstützende Mitglieder monatlich 20 kr. C. M. Statut der Ersten Wiener Demokratischer Frauenverein.

²⁴ Statut des ADFs, 1–3.

²⁵ LANGE-BÄUMER (1901): 180.

²⁶ Auguste Fickert (1855, Wien–1910, Maria Enzersdorf), Volksschullehrerin, Sozialreformerin, Leiterin der linken Flügel der österreichischen Frauenbewegung, Gründerin des AÖFVs, Herausgeberin der *Dokumenten der Frauen* (1899–1902, mit Marie Lang und Rosa Mayreder) und des *Neuen Frauenlebens* (1902–1918). Ihr letztes Werk war – nach nordeuropäischen und deutschen Modellen – die Errichtung eines Einküchenhauses in Wien, die unter dem Namen „Heimhof“ erst im Jahre 1911 geöffnet wurde. SCHMÖLZER (2009): 100–125.; KENDLER (1990).

²⁷ Tätigkeitsbericht des AÖFV. Allgemeiner Österreichischer Frauenverein. Wien 1910. Das Organisationstalent von Fickert wurde hochgepriesen unter anderen von Käthe Braun-Prager in einem Artikel, der nach der Einweihung des Denkmals Auguste Fickerts in Wien publiziert wurde. BRAUN-PRÄGER ÖNB Sammlung von Handschriften und Alten Drucken. Cod. ser. N.: 27844. 1927.

erschaffen, die auf die Industrialisierung und die Formierung der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zurückführbar sind. In der Geschichte der ungarischen Frauenbewegung betrachten wir das Jahr 1896 als einen wichtigen Wendepunkt.²⁸ Dieser Zeitpunkt markiert den Beginn der ersten Organisationen, die nicht mehr rein karitativ waren, und die sich nicht nur auf den Schutz von Frauen konzentrierten, die einem gleichen Berufskreis angehörten.²⁹ In diesem Jahr nahm seine Tätigkeit der Nőtisztviselők Országos Egyesülete [Landesverein der Stadtbeamtinnen].

Der Feministák Egyesülete [Verein der Feministinnen] organisierte sich ein paar Jahre später, im Dezember 1904. Die Vorgeschichte für die Gründung wurde von der in Berlin, im Sommer 1904 organisierte Frauentag bestimmt. Während dieser Veranstaltung wurde nicht nur das Statut der International Woman Suffrage Alliance (IWSA, die andere einflussreiche internationale Frauenorganisation neben dem International Council of Women, ICW) angenommen, sondern auch die Erweiterung dieser Organisation diskutiert.³⁰ Aletta Jacobs, wer in der niederländischen Frauenbewegung eine leitende Rolle spielte und mit Róza Schwimmer (oder Rosika Schwimmer) befreundet war, regte an, dass sie und ihre Mitfrauen in Ungarn eine neue feministische Verein als integrierte Mitgliedsorganisation der IWSA gründen sollten.³¹ Róza Schwimmer³² hatte im Rahmen des Landesvereines der Staatbeamtinnen eine führende Position inne, aber zusammen mit Vilma Glückliche³³ wurde sie über die Wichtigkeit der Gründung einer neuen mehr spezifischen Organisation überzeugt.³⁴

²⁸ Die Periodisierung der ungarischen Frauenbewegung wurde von RózaSchwimmer fertiggemacht.

²⁹ S. die Mária Dorothea Egyesület [Marie-Dorothea-Verein], die im Jahre 1885 – neben anderen – von Janka Zirzen (1824, Jászberény–1904, Budapest) für den Interessenschutz der Lehrerinnen gegründet wurde. ZIMMERMANN (1999): 22–25.

³⁰ S. ZIMMERMANN (2005): 87–117.; ZIMMERMANN (1997): 272–307.

³¹ Für die Beziehung von Schwimmer und Jacobs s. BOSCH–KOOSTERMAN (1990): 43–135.

³² Róza Schwimmer (1877, Budapest–1948, New York), ungarische Feministin und Pazifistin. Sie stammte aus einer ungarisch–jüdischen Familie, ab Anfang der 1900-er Jahre wurde sie professionelle Journalistin, die nicht nur in ungarischen, sondern auch in mehreren ausländischen Zeitschriften Artikel und Berichte veröffentlichte z. B. *Neues Frauenleben* (bis 1908), *Neue Freie Presse* (Wien), *Illustrierte Frauen Rundschau* (Leipzig).

³³ Glückliche Vilma (1872, Vágújhely/ Neustadt an der Waag–1927, Wien), obere Mädchenschullehrerin in Fiume, ab 1896 die erste ungarische Universitätsstudentin an der philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Budapest. Gründungsmitglied und für lange Zeit geschäftsführende Leiterin des Vereines der Feministinnen. Im Rahmen der internationalen Frauenfriedensliga war sie nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in der Schweiz tätig. Wegen einer Krankheit 1925 kehrte sie nach Ungarn zurück. KEMÉNY (1927); DE HAAN et al. (2006): 163.

³⁴ ZIMMERMANN (1997): 272–307.

An diesem Punkt dürfen wir nicht vergessen, dass die Mitgliedschaft dieser zwei Vereine in mehreren Hinsichten ähnlich war, was nach der Untersuchung der Namen in den Mitgliederlisten offensichtlich ist.³⁵ Desweiteren waren die Zielsetzungen der Beamtinnen und der Feministinnen ähnlich – bürgerliche, wirtschaftliche und politische Gleichberechtigung der Frauen –, was auch durch ihre gemeinsam veröffentlichten offiziellen Zeitschriften demonstriert wurde.

Nämlich publizierten die zwei Vereine *A Nő és a Társadalom* (*Die Frau und die Gesellschaft*, 1907–1913), und *A Nő – Feminista Folyóirat* (*Die Frau – Feministische Zeitschrift*, 1914–1928) bis Ende 1914 zusammen, was eine sehr enge Kooperation unter den Vereinsmitgliedern bedeutete. Im Rahmen der oben erwähnten Tatsachen ist es gar nicht merkwürdig, dass mehrere Führungsmitglieder in beiden Vereinen aktiv waren. Unter den Vereinsmitgliedern waren in erster Linie Schwimmer und Glücklich auch in internationalen Dimensionen der Frauenbewegung aktiv. Sie nahmen an allen wichtigen Kongressen der IWSA teil, 1914 ging Schwimmer als Korrespondentin verschiedener europäischer Zeitschriften und für die IWSA nach London. Während und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wirkten die beiden Frauen als bedeutende Figuren der Frauenfriedensbewegung (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom) zusammen mit den österreichischen und deutschen Frauen.³⁶

Verfolgung der österreichischen–deutschen Modelle in der ungarischen feministischen Frauenbewegung

Auf Grund der primären Quellen kann man eindeutig feststellen, dass die ungarische Frauenbewegung ihren Höhepunkt mit diesen zwei Vereinen zwischen 1904 (nach der internationalen Integration) und 1913 erreichte. Es ist unzweifelhaft, dass sie sich zwischen 1896 und 1914 in allen Aspekten den europäischen (und die Welt)Tendenzen näherten. In einigen Hinsichten erwies sich der Verein der Feministinnen als Vorkämpfer in der Welt. Róza Schwimmer und die anderen ungarischen Delegierten waren nämlich unter den Teilnehmerinnen einen Reihen den Frauenkongressen (z.B. in Kopenhagen im Jahre 1906, wo Schwimmer die Publikation der *Ius Suffragii* (1906–1926) initiierte, und auch in Amsterdam und in Rom).³⁷ Die internationale Einbettung der Feministinnen war außerordentlich streng, besonders in den ungarischen Relationen. Der Verein wurde 1904, gleich nach dessen Gründung, Mitglied des International Council of Women (ICW), nur wenig später als das in Deutschland (1897) und Österreich (1903) erfolgte.³⁸ In

³⁵ Z.B.: FG 4 (1907): 63–69.; FG 5 (1907): 88–93.

³⁶ DE HAAN et al. (2006): 163, 484–488.

³⁷ FG 4 (1907): 4. 68.

³⁸ FG 8 (1907): 97–98.; FRANCK (1965): 7–10.

der IWSA wurde Ungarn früher als Österreich ein vollständiges Mitglied (1906). Die oben erwähnten Veranstaltungen (Konferenzen, Kongresse usw.) waren ausgezeichnete Plattformen für die ungarischen Frauen von den westeuropäischen Abgeordneten neuen Strategien zu lernen, um ihren Willen durchzusetzen. Róza Schwimmer würdigte immer die internationalen Frauenkongresse, die in jedem zweiten Jahr veranstaltet wurden, immer in anderen Großstädten, mit der Beteiligung der berühmtesten europäischen und amerikanischen Feministen.³⁹

Das beste Signal der positiven Entwicklung war vielleicht die Zeitschrift *A Nó és a Társadalom* [*Die Frau und die Gesellschaft*]. Der wichtigste Ertrag der Publikation der ersten feministischen Monatszeitung in Ungarn war die Tatsache, dass die inländische Feministinnen nicht mehr nur die ausländische – deutsche, englische und französische – Periodiken folgen konnten, sondern selber einen „heimischer Bericht“ hatten.⁴⁰ Neben den neuesten Informationen über die ungarische und transnationale Frauenbewegung formierte diese Zeitschrift ein gemeinsames Identitätsbewusstsein unter den Lesern, die zugleich Förderer der feministischen Gedanken in der Hauptstadt und auch in den Provinzen waren. Übrigens bedeutete die Publikation der ungarischen Zeitung gar nicht, dass die Feministinnen mit der Beobachtung der ausländischen Ereignisse aufhörten. Über die österreichischen und deutschen Frauenorganisationen berichtete die Redaktion fast immer positiv, und das deutsche Frauenstudium und auch die Behandlung der deutschen Arbeiterinnenfrage waren immer gute Beispiele. Das ungarische Redaktionskollegium berichtet (neben zahlreichen anderen) über verschiedenen Nachrichten aus Deutschland.⁴¹ So diente Deutschland in mehreren Hinsichten (z. B. Tätigkeit und Aktivität in den Vereinen) als ein zu befolgendes Beispiel für Ungarn. Andererseits, wegen des Inhalts und der stilistischen Elemente, die von den Redakteur(innen) und den Autoren benutzt wurden, kann man die Zeitschrift als eine solche Initiative bewerten, die unter den Publizisten und der Leserschaft (bzw. Mitglieder

³⁹ Für die Ergebnisse der Konferenzen 1909 und 1911 s. FG 6 (1909): 89–90.; FG 7 (1911): 107–108. *Neues Frauenleben* 5 (1909): 124–127.; 6 (1911): 160.; 7 (1911): 182–185. (im weiteren: NFL.) . Natürlicherweise konnten alle Vereinsmitglieder an diesen Veranstaltungen teilnehmen, die oft mit Auslandsreisen verbunden waren.

⁴⁰ FG (1907): 1. 1. Die Veröffentlichung einer solchen Zeitschrift tauchte unter den Plänen der Vorstehenden der zwei ungarischen Vereinen, aber die Finanzierung war problematisch. Für die Gründung und Rezeption der Zeitschrift s. CZEERNER (2014); KERESZTY (2011): 290–304.

⁴¹ 1908 agitierten die sozialdemokratische Frauenorganisationen für das Wahlrecht der Frauen. Auch im Jahre 1908 konnten die Abonnenten über eine Frau lesen, die in Berlin den Führerschein für Luftschiff erwarb. Sie referierten auch über den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt der Frauen: die Zeitschrift bringt 1910 die Nachricht, dass eine Zoologin (eine geborene Gräfin) zur ordentlichen Professorin der Universität Bonn ernannt wurde FG 1 (1908): 10.; FG 1 (1908): 11.; FG 7 (1910): 121.

der feministischen Organisationen) die Formulierung einer imaginären Gemeinschaft bezweckte. Also, das Paradigma, das originell von Benedict Anderson auf die Nationen und Nationalismus entworfen wurde, kann in dieser Hinsicht auf die Frauenbewegungen bezogen werden.⁴² Es ist auch wichtig, dass nicht nur die hauptstädtische, sondern auch die kleineren provinziellen Organisationen eine Menge österreichische und deutsche feministische Zeitschriften abonnierten.⁴³

Die Programme und Projekte der ungarischen Feministinnen (bzw. die ungarische bürgerliche feministische Frauenbewegung, mit denen diesen Beitrag beschäftigt) zeigen auch eine bedeutungsvolle Ähnlichkeit mit den deutschen und österreichischen Modellen. Das sogenannte Heimhof-Projekt von Auguste Fickert war in allen mitteleuropäischen Staaten bekannt. Die Idee von der Beamtinnensektion in Temesvár (Timișoara) über die Konstruktion eines Arbeiterinnenheims kann einerseits auf diesen Plan zurückgeführt werden.⁴⁴ Voraussichtlich waren die ungarischen Vereinsmitglieder mit der Tatsache auch im Klaren, dass das erste Arbeiterinnenheim in den deutschen Gebieten schon im Jahre 1906 in Cottbus eröffnet wurde.⁴⁵

Das deutsche Organisationsleben leistete ein zu beherzigendes Exempel nicht nur für die ungarische, sondern auch für die österreichische Frauenbewegung. Die bürgerlichen Frauen benachrichtigten regelmäßig über die deutsche Situation, und manchmal beklagten sie in dieser Hinsicht die Indifferenz und Apathie der österreichischen Frauen.⁴⁶ Die Ursache für diese Konstellation ist in den langen Traditionen der deutschen Zivilorganisation aufzufinden. Bis zur zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts begannen fast alle Frauenorganisationen ihre Zeitschriften zu publizieren. Nach dem Bericht des *Illustrierten Konversations-Lexikons der Frauen*, die im Jahre 1900 in Berlin herausgegeben wurde, wurden in den deutschen Gebieten insgesamt 70 und in Österreich-Ungarn 11 Frauen- und feministische Zeitschriften veröffentlicht.⁴⁷

⁴² Für die weiteren Einzelheiten s. ANDERSON (1991).

⁴³ Es ist nachzuweisen, dass die Suborganisation der Beamtinnen ab 1909 nicht nur das *Neue Frauenleben* und die *Frauenbewegung* abonnierte, sondern auch das Blatt Mitteilung der Vereinigung arbeitender Frauen und die Zeitschrift für weibliche Handlungspflegerinnen. FG 2 (1909): 23.

⁴⁴ NFL 1 (1908): 15–16. Tätigkeitsbericht 1910.; FG 7 (1911): 120.

⁴⁵ Weiland, Geschichte der Frauenemanzipation, 16.

⁴⁶ Nach einem Bericht sollten die Österreicherinnen an den deutschen Frauen Beispiel nehmen, weil sie viel erfolgreicher für ihre Gleichberechtigung kämpften, als die Frauen in Österreich. NFL 5. (1910): 154. Der AÖFV berichtete auch über den Tod der ausgezeichneten deutschen Politikerin, Gewerkschafterin und Journalistin, Emma Ihrer (1857, Glatz–1911, Berlin). NFL 3 (1911): 70.

⁴⁷ Bittermann-Wille Christina; Hofmann-Weinberger Helga, Von der Zeitschrift Dokumente der Frauen zur Dokumentation von Frauenzeitschriften. 2000. (<http://www.demokratiezentrum.org>; (25. Januar 2014.) Daniela Weiland betont,

Der ADF hatte beispielsweise 1865 (im Jahre der Gründung) nur 34 Mitglieder. Aber der Mitgliedszahl verdoppelte sich schnell während des ersten Jahres und nach fünf Jahren zählte es bereits etwa 10 000 Mitglieder. Das offizielle Organ des Vereines (Die *Neuen Bahnen*; Leipzig, 1866–1919) wurde bis 1908 von 49 Mitgliedsvereinen und von insgesamt zirka 19 000 Mitgliedern verfolgt.⁴⁸

Dieser Umfang des Lesekreises der österreichischen und ungarischen bürgerlichen feministischen Zeitschriften dürfte diese Zahlen nur annähern. Das war wahrscheinlich die direkte Folge der Tatsache, dass die Lesekultur und die soziale Organisationskultur in den österreichisch-ungarischen Gebieten nicht so kraftvoll waren. Die ersten österreichischen feministischen Zeitschriften – die sich nicht um den Haushalt und die Mode handelten, und die schon für längere Zeiten überlebten – wurden ab den 1870-er Jahren publiziert. Ungarn war sogar in einem größeren Rückstand: die erste Frauenzeitschrift – die auch deutschen Beispiele folgte – wurde in Budapest ab 1871 veröffentlicht.⁴⁹ Auf das erste feministische Periodikum – *Die Frau und die Gesellschaft* – mussten den Interessenten noch mehr als 30 Jahre warten.

Selbstverständlich ist es kompliziert die Nummer der Abonnenten in allen drei Ländern festzustellen, weil die Herausgeber(innen) die Dokumente über die Subskriptionen nie veröffentlichten.⁵⁰ Nach der Vermutung von Eva Klingenstein wurde das *Neue Frauenleben* von ungefähr 1000 Lesern in Wien und in den Provinzen abonniert. Sie betont, dass es im Rahmen des AÖFVs ein ständiges Problem bedeutete, dass die Zeitschrift auch nicht von den Vereinsmitgliedern verfolgt wurde. Aber es ist auch sehr wichtig, dass es der Herausgeberin (Auguste Fickert) zu erreichen gelang, dass das *Neue Frauenleben* nach 1902 in allen Wiener Cafés, Konditoreien und Frauenklubs erreichbar wurde. Das bedeutete naturgemäß, dass die Zahl der Abonnenten fast nie mit der Zahl der Leser(innen) identisch war und die Anzahl der potentialen Leserinnen viel mehr als 1000 sein konnte.⁵¹ Der Abonnementpreis der Zeitschrift war jährlich 4 Kronen.⁵²

dass von dieser relativen hohen Zahl nur einige deutsche Zeitschriften als maßgeblich angesehen werden können. Weiland, *Geschichte der Frauenemanzipation*, 103.

⁴⁸ Nave-Herz Rosemarie, *Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung in Deutschland*. Hannover 1997. 12., Weiland, *Geschichte der Frauenemanzipation* 15.

⁴⁹ KOSÁRY–NÉMETH (1985).

⁵⁰ Über diese Praxis in dem Journalismus s. BIGGS–BURKE (2004): 187–191. Für die detaillierte Kalkulation der Zahl der Abonnenten S. CZEERNER Dóra: „*Kávéházakban, klubokban, olvasókörökben kérjük A Nő és a Társadalom lapot*” – *Egy periodika a nők egyenjogúságáért*. *Médiakutató* 2 2014. 49–63. Und zum Vergleich dieser Daten mit den Daten des österreichischen *Neuen Frauenlebens* s. CZEERNER: *A női munka interpretációja* 49–151.

⁵¹ KLINGENSTEIN (1997): 87–94.; CZEERNER (2014): 49–151.

⁵² Der jährliche Lohn z.B. einer Referendarin im Jahre 1912 zwischen 800–1200

Auf die Anzahl der Abonnenten der *Frau und die Gesellschaft* können wir auf Grund der jährlichen Tätigkeitsberichte der zwei Vereine folgern, wo nicht nur die einbezahlte Mitgliederbeiträge, sondern auch die Einnahme der Zeitschrift tabellarisch dargestellt wurden. Nach meiner Kalkulation wurde die Zeitschrift im Jahre 1907 für 2100 Abonnenten gesendet.⁵³ Die Abonnentenzahl in den deutschen Gebieten publizierten feministischen Zeitschriften war wesentlich höher, als die Mitgliederzahl der Vereine, die oft mehr zehntausend betrug. Wie es in dem Nachlass Auguste Fickerts sichtbar ist, wurden mehrere deutsche (nicht nur feministischen, sondern sozialdemokratischen) Zeitschriften bei der AÖFV abonniert z.B. *Die Frau*, das *Frauenleben*, *Die Gleichheit* und das *Zentralblatt des Bundes Deutscher Frauenvereine*.⁵⁴ Wir müssen das auch berücksichtigen, dass die Verbreitung *Der Frau und der Gesellschaft* ganz beschränkt war. Andererseits erwiesen sich auch die Abonnements sehr teuer insbesondere für die Arbeiterklasse. Aber die Zeitschrift wurde – ähnlich der *Neuen Frauenleben* – von mehreren Bibliotheken, Leserkreisen und Cafés bestellt, nicht nur in Budapest, sondern auch in den Provinzen. Wegen der obenerwähnten Faktoren können wir leider das nicht präzise feststellen, wie viele Leuten den Nachrichten der Feministen folgten, weil die Herausgeber und die Druckerei die Register über die Abonnements sehr vertraulich behandelten.

Auch unter den Programmen der mitteleuropäischen feministischen Organisationen kann man eine Menge Parallele finden, sowohl bei den größeren hauptstädtischen als auch bei den provinziellen Vereinen. Die Ideen der verschiedenen Industriekurse, Arbeitsbazaren und Stellenvermittlungsbüros kamen aus Deutschland und aus Österreich nach Ungarn. Es ist in mehreren Artikeln in *Der Frau und der Gesellschaft* betont, dass die Ideen der verschiedenen Projekte von diesen zwei Ländern kämen.⁵⁵ Dieses Projekt der Feministinnen und Beamtinnen war

Kronen (in den Provinzen etwa zwischen 800–1200 K, in Wien zwischen 1000–1200 K). Wenn wir mit durchschnittlich 1000 Kronen kalkulieren, beträgt der monatliche Lohn etwa 83 K. (Jetzt rechne ich mit dem Quartiergeld nicht, es wurde in meisten Fällen auf der Unterkunft ausgegeben.) Solange kostete Einzelhefte des *Neues Frauenlebens* 1912 40 Heller, die jährliche Abonnementpreis war 4 K. Wenn man alle 12 Exemplare pro Jahr besorgte, kostete das 8 K, so können wir behaupten, dass die Anzahl der Abonnenten war nicht in erster Linie wegen des Preises der Zeitschrift relativ niedrig, sondern wegen der Interessellosigkeit.

⁵³ CZEFERNER (2013): 42–45.

⁵⁴ Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, Nachlass Auguste Fickert. 77996C, 77991B. (in weiterem: WR)

⁵⁵ S. Tätigkeitsberichte der Verein der Feministinnen und des Landesvereines der Beamtinnen zwischen 1907 und 1913! Z.B.: FG 2 (1907): 29. FG 4 (1907): 64–70. FG 5 (1907): 81–83, 88–93. FG 4 (1908): 69–73. FG 5 (1908): 88–94. FG 2 (1909): 32–35. FG 8 (1910): 140. FG 5 (1909): 80–85. FG 6 (1909): 81–85. FG 5 (1910): 81–84. FG 6 (1911): 100–103. FG 7 (1911): 121–123. FG 5 (1912): 94–98. FG 5 (1913): 100–104.

insbesondere in den Jahren des Ersten Weltkriegs wichtig: den zwei oben benannten ungarischen Organisationen gelang es schon im Jahre 1914 mehr als 5000 Arbeitsstelle mit bedürftigen Frauen aufzufüllen.⁵⁶ Anhand dieses Falls ist es wichtig, dass sich in Ungarn nach 1914 keine solche Praxis herausbildete, im Unterschied zum Nationalen Frauendienst in Deutschland. Diese Arbeitsvermittlung war eine Initiative der zwei unter die Lupe genommenen Vereine, die zusammen mit dem Magistrat von Budapest geleistet wurde.⁵⁷ Die Anzahl der zu Frauen übermittelten Arbeitsstellen ist natürlich wegen des Kriegsdienstes der Männer so hoch. Zu einem solchen Arbeitsnachweis verfügen wir in österreichischer Relation über keine Angaben, aber es ist auch ein gemeinsamer Charakterzug, dass sowohl die österreichischen als auch die ungarischen Feministinnen mit den sozialdemokratischen Parteien – trotz scharfer Gegensätze vor dem Krieg – zu kooperieren begannen.⁵⁸ Andererseits sollte die Rechtshilfeeinrichtung der Österreicherinnen ein Beispiel für den ungarischen Gyakorlati Tanácsadó [Praktischer Berater] maßgebend sein.⁵⁹ Ab 1895 operierten zwei Rechtsschutzbüros, die Frauen jedes Standes kostenlose Rechtsauskünfte lieferten. Das eine funktionierte in Dresden, und das andere in Wien, in der Wohnung von Auguste Fickert und half im Jahre 1906 bei mehr als 1100 Fällen.⁶⁰ Zwischen der deutschen (in erster Linie in Halle gegründeten Organisation) und den Wiener Rechtsschutzvereinen waren die Kontakten sehr eng. Auguste Fickert besuchte mehrere mit Frauenrechtsschutz verbundene Veranstaltungen in Halle und sendete mehrere Artikel für das Vereinsblatt.⁶¹

Auf Grund der oben erwähnten Tatsachen, können wir festsetzen, dass unter den bürgerlichen Frauenorganisationen in den mitteleuropäischen Staaten vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg ein bedeutender Wissenstransfer durchgeführt wurde. Es ist sichtbar, dass in diesem Transfer die gemeinsame Identität eine wichtige Rolle spielte. Trotz der Differenzen in dem wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsstand waren die Probleme der Frauen natürlicherweise ähnlich: sie kämpften für ihre Gleichberechtigung in allen Gebieten des Lebens, und sie waren im Klaren, dass sie zusammen für ihre Rechte effektiver auftreten können. Gerade deswegen war die Erkenntnis von Róza Schwimmer für die ungarische Bewegung die al-

⁵⁶ *Die Frau*. 5 (1915): 82. (im Weiteren: DF).; CZEERNER (2018): 40–65.

⁵⁷ In diesem Fall ist es offensichtlich, dass die Vereine keinen finanziellen Gewinn aus dieser Tätigkeit erzielten.

⁵⁸ HAUCH (1999): 221–245.; DF 12 (1918): 276.

⁵⁹ Über den Anfang ihre Tätigkeit S. FG 4 (1907): 63. FG 8 (1907): 141.

⁶⁰ Tätigkeitsbericht 1910., BADER-ZAAR (1999): 365–383. Die Statistiken der ungarischen Institutionen waren ähnlich während der Kriegszeiten. S. DF 17 (1914): 2. DR 18 (1914): 206. DF 19 (1914): 214. DF 1 (1915): 12. DF 2 (1915): 25. DF 3 (1915): 40. DF 4 (1915): 65. DF 7 (1915): 112. DF 8 (1915): 123. DF 10 (1915): 164. DF 11 (1915): 178. DF 1 (1916): 14. DF 2 (1916): 33. DF 5 (1916): 78.

⁶¹ WR Nachlass Fickert. Konvolut von Zeitungsausschnitten. 88152 L.

lerichtigste: sie wusste eigentlich, dass der positive Einfluss aus den westlichen Staaten unerlässlich ist. Gerade deswegen versuchte sie mit mehreren weltberühmten Feministinnen enge Kontakte auszubauen.⁶² Ihre Anstrengungen wurden 1913 mit Erfolg gekrönt, als der Verein der Feministinnen dem International Women Suffrage Alliance (IWSA) beitrug.⁶³

„Mit dem Ausdruck des Bedauerns u. vorzügl. Hochachtung...“⁶⁴ – Korrespondenzen, Vorträge, Artikel

Die bisher genannten Aspekte sind als indirekte Verbindungspunkte zu begreifen und im Folgenden möchte ich einige Beispiele direkter Kontakte unter den Mitgliedern der Frauenorganisationen – insbesondere in internationaler Relation – bringen.⁶⁵

Nicht nur die Korrespondenzen der Feministinnen, sondern auch die Artikel in ihren Zeitschriften und auch die Protokolle der Generalversammlungen und die Vereinsnachrichten verraten wertvolle Informationen über die Netzwerke, die sich in internationaler Relation vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg unter den Vereinen herausbildeten.⁶⁶ Es ist bedauerlich, dass die Sozialwissenschaftler diese Quellen aufgrund dieses Belanges noch nicht beachteten. Erstens finde ich es wichtig, dass die Mitglieder der oben erwähnten Vereine regelmäßig in den Zeitschriften von ausländischen Frauenvereinen publizierten. Außerdem nahmen sie gern und oft an den unterschiedlichen Veranstaltungen (Vorlesungen, Vorträge, Diskussionsabende usw.) der „Schwesternvereine“ teil,⁶⁷ und gerade deswegen standen sie in fortlaufender Korrespondenz miteinander.⁶⁸ Die literarische Kolumne und die

⁶² HAAN et al. (2006): 484–489.

⁶³ SZAPOR (2011): 245–261.

⁶⁴ Die erste Zeile des Briefes von Gabriele Reuter (1859, Alexandria–1941, Weimar) berühmte deutsche Schriftstellerin) Auguste Fickert. Nachlass Fickert. ÖNB M F.34. Fickert 365. 18. Januar 1902.

⁶⁵ Die Rahmen diesem Beitrag machen es nicht möglich eine detaillierte Analyse alle die früher erschlossenen Quellen zu übermitteln. Die komplexe Analyse der Korrespondenzen und der untersuchten Zeitschriften bilden die das Rückgrat meiner Dissertationsarbeit.

⁶⁶ In diesem Gebiet wäre es auch nützlich, die Mitgliedsliste des ADFs zu kontrollieren, weil das Statut auch über ausländische Mitgliedern sprach. Außerdem erwähnen Gertrud Bäumer und Helene Lange in ihrem Bund über der deutschen Frauenbewegung, dass der Verein in Verbindung mit österreichischen Frauenorganisationen stand. LANGE (1901): 52.

⁶⁷ S. z. B. die Dokumente über die Beurlaubung von Auguste Fickert wegen verschiedener internationaler Kongresse und Konferenzen, die mehrmals von der Wiener Schulbehörde abgelehnt wurden. WR Nachlass Fickert I.N. 71183/2, 7, 9.

⁶⁸ Der Rekonstruktion der Teilnehmerlisten dienen die Vereinsnachrichten von den österreichischen und ungarischen Zeitschriften als ausgezeichnete Quellen: S. Vereinsnachrichten in beiden Zeitschriften (z.B: FG 4 (1910): 62–65., NFL 11 (1912):

Rezensionen sind auch wichtig, insbesondere in dem ungarischen Fall, wo die Mehrheit der neu angekommenen Bücher aus den deutschen Gebieten stammten.⁶⁹ Die Korrespondenzen der ungarischen Vereinsmitglieder arbeitete ich noch nicht auf, aber es ist schon nachzuweisen, dass Róza Schwimmer und Vilma Glücklich mit den österreichischen und deutschen Organisationen intensiven Kontakt aufhielten. Schwimmer schickte insgesamt vier Artikel (und höchstwahrscheinlich mehrere Berichte anonym) für die Zeitschrift von Auguste Fickert, in denen sie die ungarische Bewegung meistens in eine vorteilhafte Beleuchtung stellte.⁷⁰ Andererseits haben die Feministen einen langen Bericht über die Beschlüsse der ersten deutschen Konferenz, die die Interessen von den Arbeiterinnen schützen wollte.⁷¹ Weiterhin veröffentlichten – neben anderen – Lily Baitz Meran (deutsche Bildkünstlerin) und Ella Berger (Vizevorsitzende der Organisation der deutschen Frauen, die im Buchhandel arbeiteten) Artikel in *Der Frau und der Gesellschaft*, während Lily Braun, (1865, Halberstadt–1916, Berlin)⁷² führende Figur der deutschen sozialdemokratischen Frauenbewegung und Maria Lischnewska (deutsche Lehrerin und radikale Aktivist der Frauenbewegung, die eine viel zitierte Publizistin in österreichischen-ungarischen Zeitschriften war) schon im Jahre 1907 in Budapest Vorträge hielten.⁷³ Hans Dorn, der Professor der Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität in München hielt Vorträge in Ungarn und publizierte auch im *Neuen Frauenleben*.⁷⁴ Vilma Glücklich wurde während der Kriegszeiten auch nach Wien eingeladen um einen dicht besuchten Vortrag über die Stellenvermittlung von den Feministinnen und Beamtinnen zu halten.⁷⁵

295-297. S. in Österreichischer Relation z.B. die Korrespondenz von Auguste Fickert und Rosa Mayreder. (S. ÖNB M F.34. Fickert 365, Nachlass Mayreder. ÖNB H Cod. Ser. No. 24566).

⁶⁹ Es kommt auch oft vor, dass die Bücher, die aus den angelsächsischen Staaten kamen, deutsche Übersetzungen waren. z.B. S. FG 5 (1907): 85.

⁷⁰ Zum Artikel über den Vortrag von Maria Montefiore in Budapest und für die Frauenärzte s. NFL 9 (1907): 14. Schwimmer benachrichtigte den österreichischen Verein auch über die neue Angestellte der Universitätsbibliothek in Budapest, aber sie schrieb auch über ein gesetzwidriges Verfahren, nämlich dass die Lehrerinnen nach ihren Eheschließungen nicht mehr unterrichten durften. NFL 6 (1908): 162–163.

⁷¹ FG 5 (1907): 81–83.

⁷² Brinkler-Gabler; Ludwig, Wöffen, Lexikon der Schriftstellerinnen, 42–43.

⁷³ MOTTER (2011). WERNER (1999): 206. Es ist wichtig, dass das *Handbuch der Frauenbewegung*, die von Helene Lange und Gertrud Bäumer in Deutschland im Jahre 1901 publiziert wurde, über die ungarische Frauenbewegung als bedeutungslos berichtete. LANGE-BÄUMER (1901): 187–188. Schließlich sagte Lily Braun ihren Budapester Vortrag ab wegen ihrer Krankheit.

⁷⁴ PERSONALSTAND 1925/1926. München 1925. 8., FG 11 (1908): 184. Für die Artikel die von seinem Vortrag in *Der Frau und der Gesellschaft* veröffentlicht wurde S. FG 1 (1909): 15. NFL 4 (1912): 97–101. NFL 5 (1912): 121–128.

⁷⁵ DF 19 (1914): 214.

Als Herausgeberin des *Neuen Frauenlebens* war die Aufgabe von Auguste Fickert ähnlich der Arbeit von Róza Schwimmer. Sie musste die potenziellen Autoren und Publizisten auswählen, die in der Zeitschrift Artikeln mitteilten. Sie war auch verantwortlich für die Vereinsveranstaltungen z.B. für die Vorträge, die normalerweise von berühmten Frauenrechtlerinnen gehalten wurden. Die Korrespondenzen und die anderen Quellen beweisen es eindeutig, dass diese Organisationsaufgaben gar nicht problemlos und einfach waren. Nach der Gründung der Zeitschrift stellte es sich für Fickert heraus, dass es um neue Autoren und Publizisten zu ersuchen gar nicht einfach ist. Unter den weltberühmten Persönlichkeiten der Frauenbewegung – mit denen sie übrigens freundliche Briefe wechselte – wurde ihr Ersuchen 1902 nicht nur von der ersten in Deutschland promovierten Juristin, Anita Augspurg, die sich als prominente Figur der bürgerlich-feministischen Frauenbewegung der Jahrhundertwende um die Erneuerung des deutschen Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches engagierte (1857, Verden–1943, Zürich)⁷⁶ und der oben erwähnten Gabriela Reuter, sondern auch von der weltberühmten Nobel-Trägerin und Schriftstellerin Bertha von Suttner (1843, Prag–1914, Wien) zurückgewiesen.⁷⁷ Reuter lehnte 1902 Fickert noch einmal ab: „*die freundliche Aufforderung*“ konnte sie wegen anderen Verpflichtungen leider „*nicht mit einem ja beantworten*“.⁷⁸ Lily Braun sagte nicht nur die Aufforderung des österreichischen, sondern auch des ungarischen Vereins in den Jahren 1906 und 1907 ab.⁷⁹

Dass muss auch betont werden, dass beide Frauenrechtlerinnen auch eine Menge positive Rückmeldungen bekamen: 1891 – vor der Gründung des AÖFVs – wurde Fickert von Suttner zu einer Frauenversammlung eingeladen.⁸⁰ Ein paar Jahre später war sie in ständiger Korrespondenz mit dem deutschen Schriftsteller, Bühnenautor und Übersetzer Ludwig Fulda (1862, Frankfurt am Main–1939, Berlin) die während ihres Aufenthaltes in Wien einen Vortrag in dem Verein hielt.⁸¹ In Un-

⁷⁶ Sie hat sich auf Zeitnot beruft: „*Meine Zeit erlaubt mir leider nicht, zu meinen vielen alten noch neuen Verpflichtungen zu übernehmen, weshalb ich Ihnen Wünsche nach m. Mitarbeit am Neuen Frauenleben zum. Bedauern nicht entsprechen kann.*“ (18. Januar 1902.) ÖNB M F.34. 365.

⁷⁷ BRINKLER–GABLER 1986. 302–304.

⁷⁸ (9. Dezember 1902. ÖNB M F.34. 365.) Im ersten Brief hat sie auch ihre Überlastung ausgedrückt: „*Durch eine Fülle begonnener Arbeiten [...] ist es mir leider unmöglich, für ihre begonnene Zeitschrift in der nächsten Zeit etwas von Beiträgen zu liefern.*“ 18. Januar 1902. ÖNB M F.34. 365.

⁷⁹ 16. August 1906. (ÖNB M F.34. Fickert 365.) Auf dem ungarischen Fall musste die ihren Vortrag wegen einer Krankheit absagen. FG 4. (1907): 63.

⁸⁰ ÖNB M F.34. Fickert 365.

⁸¹ Sie mussten nicht nur das Thema des Vortrages, sondern auch den Zeitpunkt abstimmen, weil der deutsche Dramatiker nur vier Tagen in der Kaiserstadt verbrachte. ÖNB M F. 34. Fickert 365.

Czeferner Dóra: *Weibliche Identität in Mitteleuropa und Wissenstransfer zwischen den ungarischen, österreichischen und deutschen Frauenorganisationen 1890–1914*

garn kamen auch deutsche Referenten ganz oft vorbei: Neben Lily Braun und Hans Dorn konnte Schwimmer z.B. Maria Lischnewska, die sich mehr mit der Fabrikarbeit der Frauen beschäftigte, und die wohlbekannteste deutsche Modeschöpferin und prominente Figur der Reformkleidbewegung Hedwig Buschmann aus Berlin zu Gast haben, die auch die provinziellen Organisationen besichtigten.⁸²

Der Höhepunkt – Frauenkongress in Budapest im Jahre 1913

Der Höhepunkt der ungarischen bürgerlichen feministischen Bewegung wurde von dem Budapester internationalen Frauenkongress im Jahre 1913 geliefert. Über den Ort entschieden die Delegierten, die an dem Frauenkongress in Stockholm zwei Jahre früher teilnahmen.⁸³ Über die Vorbereitungen müssen wir kurz hervorheben, dass der Kostenvoranschlag der Konferenz und der anschließenden Programme insgesamt 110 000 Kronen war.⁸⁴ Meiner Ansicht nach ist diese Angabe die beste, die den Entwicklungsstand und die Stärke der ungarischen Frauenbewegung vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg illustrieren kann.⁸⁵ Es muss als ein riesiges Wachstum angesehen werden, besonders wenn man auf die Tatsache Rücksicht nimmt, dass die ungarische Frauenbewegung von den deutschsprachigen Büchern – die an der Jahrhundertwende über die europäischen Organisationen publizierten wurden – fast nicht registriert wurden.⁸⁶



Zwischen den 15. und 20. Juni kamen auch die prominenten deutschen und österreichischen Persönlichkeiten der Frauenbewegung nach Budapest. Aber bevor sie nach Budapest abfuhren, hielten sie sich – mit Ausnahme von Carrie Chapman Catt – eine kurze Zeit in Wien auf.⁸⁷ Neben Anita Augspurg besuchten die Konferenz Lida Gustava Heymann (1868, Hamburg–1943, Zürich; Vorstandsmitglied des Vereins Fortschrittlicher Frauenvereine) und Helene Stöcker (1869, Wuppertal–1943, New York;

⁸² FG 1 (1912): 18.

⁸³ FG 7 (1911): 107.

⁸⁴ Diese informellen „Freizeitaktivitäten“ (Ausflüge in die Provinzen, Soireen) sollten ebenso wichtig wie die formalen Tagungen behandelt werden, weil sie für die Delegierten Möglichkeit für tiefere Konversationen boten.

⁸⁵ Vor 1913 hatten Berlin, London, Amsterdam und Stockholm solche Frauenkonferenzen organisiert. LANGE-BÄUMER (1901): 151.

⁸⁶ Ebenda. 179–180., ILLUSTRIRTES 1900. 59, 140, 224, 240.

⁸⁷ WITTMANN (1950): 117.

Gründerin des Bundes für Mutterschutz).⁸⁸ Aus Wien kamen – natürlich neben anderen Delegierten – Henriette Herzfelder (1865, Brünn–1927, Wien; Redakteurin des offiziellen Organs des Bundes Österreichischer Frauenvereine, das von der oben erwähnten Marianne Hainisch geführt wurde) und Maria Schwarz (1852, Wien–1920, Wien; Volksschullehrerin, und Vizepräsidentin des Vereines der Lehrerinnen und Erzieherinnen in Österreich, enge Kollegin von Auguste Fickert).⁸⁹

Die Pressestimmen über das „*Frauenparlament*“ waren weltweit fast eindeutig positiv. Die Zeitungen betonten, dass sie Delegierten während der Debatten von bester parlamentarischer Schulung zeugten, und sie beleuchteten die Tatsache, dass die Frauenrechtlerinnen von dem früher geprägten Witzblattklischee weit entfernt seien.⁹⁰

Wie es auf den Bildern sichtbar ist, die während des Kongresses angefertigt wurden, diente die Woche, die die insgesamt 1200 Gäste – unter denen die weltberühmten Feministinnen, wie Carrie Chapman Catt (1859, Ripon, USA–1947, New Rochelle, USA), die Präsidentin der IWSA – in Budapest verbrachten, als eine vorzügliche Gelegenheit für die Vertiefung der Netzwerkverbindungen in den Rahmen der Frauenorganisationen.⁹¹ Es bedeutet, dass dieser Kongress ein direkter Treffpunkt des Wissenstransfers war, wo alle Mitglieder der provinziellen, hauptstädtischen und internationalen Frauenbewegung die ideologische Gemeinschaft unter dem weiblichen Geschlecht fühlen konnten.⁹²



Fazit

Neben den oben aufgezählten, eindeutig positiven Entwicklungstendenzen blieb die ungarische Bewegung in vielen Hinsichten im Rückstand, besonders im Vergleich zu der deutschen Organisation. Wegen der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Differenzen zwischen den zwei Ländern waren die Traditionen der Zivilorganisationen in den deutschsprachigen Ländern ausgeprägter, die im Fall der Frauenbewegung zu einem kräftigen gesellschaftlichen Identitätsbewusstsein führte.

⁸⁸ BRINKLER–GABLER (1986): 298–299.

⁸⁹ Foto: Lida Gustava Heymann und Dr. Anita Augspurg als Mitglieder der deutschen Delegation an der Budapester Frauenkongress.

⁹⁰ *Zeitschrift für Frauenstimmrecht*. 4 (1913).

⁹¹ Für die Bilder aus dem Nachlass von Róra Schwimmer s. Rosika Schwimmer Papers. 1890–1983. Schwimmer–Lloyd Collection. (New York Digital Library.)

⁹² Foto: Internationale Delegierte der Frauenkongress während einer Schifffahrt.

Gerade deswegen – und auch wegen der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung – kann es beobachtet werden, dass die deutschen und auch die österreichischen Frauenorganisationen spezialisierter waren. Aufgrund dieser Faktoren kann man beobachten, dass die Frauenorganisationen in den verschiedenen Ländern nicht immer auf die gleichen Aspekte konzentrierten, obwohl ihre Zielsetzungen ähnlich waren. Die finanzielle Situation der deutschen Vereine war selbstverständlich wesentlich günstiger, als in Österreich und in Ungarn. Der Allgemeine Deutsche Frauenverein z. B. konnte sich erlauben mehrtägige jährliche Vereinstagungen zu organisieren. In Österreich und Ungarn blieben diese Versammlungen sehr einfach: meistens eine paar-stündige Sitzung mit einem Empfang oder einem Konzert. Es ist keinesfalls eine Überraschung, dass diese Programme nicht so dicht besucht waren, als die großzügigen Programme der deutschen Organisationen. Das sollte auch betont werden, dass in Ungarn die Frauenbewegung sehr stark von einzelnen Personen (wie Róza Schwimmer und Vilma Glücklich) abhängig war, was auch auf kulturelle und spezielle ungarische organisationsgeschichtliche Eigenartigkeiten zurückzuführen ist. Vor 1918 waren die oben erwähnten Frauen die wichtigsten Persönlichkeiten in der bürgerlich-feministischen Frauenbewegung in Ungarn, die nicht nur die Zielsetzungen, sondern auch die Aufgaben und der Charakter der Vereine in bedeutenden Maße prägten.⁹³ Es muss auch betont sein, dass hauptsächlich in Ungarn, die Charakterzüge der behandelten Vereinen von jüdischen mittelständischen Frauen dominiert wurden.

Die Methoden von Auguste Fickert – die keine jüdischen Frauen in dem AÖF sehen wollte – waren sogar autokratisch, sie setzte sich in den meisten Debatten durch, die den AÖF betrafen. Von ihren Mitfrauen wurde Fickert oft als „*Führerin*“ bezeichnet. Trotz dieser Tatsachen waren die Vorsitzenden mit den jährlichen Ergebnissen der österreichischen und ungarischen Vereine unzufrieden, in den meisten Fällen wegen der passiven Haltung der Mitglieder. Mehrere von diesen Frauen nahmen an dem Vereinsleben nicht teil, und der Einzahlung der Mitgliedsbeiträge war auch regelmäßig problematisch.

Der Erste Weltkrieg beeinflusste die ungarische – und natürlich auch die gesamte mitteleuropäische – Frauenorganisationen negativ. Die internationalen Organisationen konnten ihre Aufgabe nicht vollständig erfüllen und die Pflege der Beziehungen wurde nicht nur mit den westeuropäischen und amerikanischen Staaten erschwert, sondern auch in den Ländern der Mittelmächte. Die rechtlichen Veränderungen beeinflussten nicht nur die Publikation der Zeitschriften (Kriegszensur), sondern auch die Rahmen der Organisation der früher veranstalteten (in-

⁹³ Ähnlich wie Marika Gárdos in der sozialdemokratische oder Margit Slachta in der Christlicher Sozialist Partei zwischen den zwei Kriegen.

ter)nationalen Frauenkongressen. Das gemeinsame Identitätsbewusstsein kam jedoch nicht abhanden, es verkörperte sich während der Jahre des Krieges in der internationalen Friedensbewegung und blieb auch nach 1918 intensiv. Andererseits begann die bürgerlichen feministischen Frauenorganisationen in Ungarn während der 1920-er Jahren verkümmert, und die Rahmen der Frauenbewegung wurden ganz anders.

Literaturverzeichnis

Primärquellen

BRAUN-PRAGER, Käthe: *Auguste Fickert*. Nachlass Käthe Braun-Prager. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Sammlung von Handschriften und alten Drucken (ÖNB HAN). Cod. ser.: 27844. 1927.

A Nő és a Társadalom. [Die Frau und die Gesellschaft, FG]. Bp., 1907–1913.

A Nő. Feminista Folyóirat. [Die Frau. Feministische Zeitschrift, N.] Bp., 1917–1917.

Nachlass Fickert. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Musiksammlung (ÖNB M). F.34. Fickert 365. 18. Januar 1902.; Wienbibliothek im Rathaus, 77996C, 77991B.

Illustriertes Konversation – Lexikon der Frau. Erlangen, 1900.

KEMÉNY Gábor: *Glücklich Vilma és a magyar feminista mozgalom*. Korunk, (1927): 12. (<http://korunk.org/?q=node/4471>; 16. 06. 2016.)

LANGE, Helene-BÄUMER, Gertrud (Hrsg.): *Handbuch der Frauenbewegung*. Band 1. Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung in den Kulturländern. Berlin, 1901.

Neues Frauenleben (NFL). Wien, 1902–1918.

Personenstand der Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München. Winter-Halbjahr. 1925/1926. München, 1925.

Rosika Schwimmer Papers. 1890–1983. Schwimmer-Lloyd Collection. (New York Digital Library.)

Statuten des Allgemeinen Deutschen Frauenvereins. Leipzig, 17. Oktober 1865.

Statuten des ersten Wiener demokratischen Frauenvereins. Wien, 28 August 1848.

SCHWIMMER Rózsa (Hrsg.): *A magyar nőmozgalom régi dokumentumai*. [Die alten Dokumenten der ungarischen Frauenbewegung.] Bp., 1907.

Tájékoztató a Feministák Egyesületének céljairól és munkatervéről. [Bescheid über die Zielsetzungen und die Arbeitsplan des Vereins der Feministen.] Bp., 1905.

Tätigkeitsbericht des Allgemeinen Österreichischen Frauenvereines. Allgemeiner Österreichischer Frauenverein. Wien, 1910.

Zeitschrift für Frauenstimmrecht. Wien, 1911–1918.

Bibliographie

ACSÁDY, Judit: 'The Women of the 20th Century': the Feminist Vision and its Reception in the Hungarian Press 1904–1914. IN: HEILMANN, Ann-BEETHAN, Margaret (Hrsg.): *New Woman Hybridities. Femininity, feminism and international consumer culture, 1880–1930*. New York, 2004. 190–205.

ANDERSON, Benedict: *Elképzelte közösségek* [Imaginäre Gemeinschaften]. Budapest, 2006.

ANDERSON, Benedict: *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, 1991.

ARIADNE. Frauen in Bewegung. Diskurse und Dokumente der österreichischen historischen Frauenbewegung. Persönlichkeiten. (<http://www.onb.ac.at/ariadne/vfb/index.htm>; 15. 06. 2016)

Czeferner Dóra: *Weibliche Identität in Mitteleuropa und Wissenstransfer zwischen den ungarischen, österreichischen und deutschen Frauenorganisationen 1890–1914*

BADER–ZAAR, Brigitte: *Geschichte und Recht*. Wien, 1999.

BIGGS, Asa–BURKE, Peter: *A média társadalomtörténete. Gutenbergtől az Internetig*. Budapest, 2004.

BITTERMANN-WILLE, Christina–HOFMANN-WEINBERGER, Helga: *Von der Zeitschrift Dokumente der Frauen zur Dokumentation von Frauenzeitschriften*. 2000. (http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/fileadmin/media/pdf/bittermann_hofmann.pdf; 25. Januar 2014)

BORBÍRÓ Fanni: „A nő szüli ugyan a férfiút de a férfi alkotja a törvényt.” *A nők helyzete és a nőkérdés a 19. századi Magyarországon*. [Das Kind wird von der Frau gebären, aber die Gesetze werden von den Männern erschafft. Frauenrolle und Frauenfrage in Ungarn im 19. Jahrhundert.] Árkádia. (http://www.arkadia.pte.hu/magyar/cikkek/borbiro_nokhelyzete; 18. September 2014)

BOSCH, Mineke–KOOSTERMAN, Annamaria (eds.): *Politics and Friendship. Letters from the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, 1902–1942*. Ohio, 1990.

BRINKLER-GABLER, Gisela–LUDWIG, Karola–WÖFFEN, Angela (Hrsg.): *Lexikon deutschsprachigen Schriftstellerinnen 1800–19145*. München, 1986.

BRUNOLD-KNOP, Stefanie: Louise OTTO-PETERS – *Die Biografie einer bedeutenden Frauenrechtlerin*. Geschichte-Lernen.net. (<http://www.geschichtelernen.net/louise-otto-peters-biografie/>; 15. 06. 2016.)

BURUCS, Kornélia: *Nők az egyesületekben*. [Frauen in den Vereinen.] *História*. 2 (1993): 15–19.

CATLING, Jo: *The History of Women's Writing in Germany, Austria and Switzerland*. Cambridge, 2000.

CURTI, Lidia: *Female Stories, Female Bodies: Narrative, Identity and Representation*. New York, 1998.

CZEFERNER Dóra: *A Nő és a Társadalom, valamint a Neues Frauenleben női munkavállalásról közvetített nézetei a 20. század elején*. [Ansichten ind der Frau und der Gesellschaft und dem Neuen Frauenleben über die weibliche Erwerbsarbeit am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts.] Diplomarbeit, Manuskript, 2013.

CZEFERNER Dóra: *A női munka interpretációja és diskurzusa az osztrák-magyar feminista sajtóban*. [Interpretation und Diskurs der Frauenerwerbstätigkeit in der österreichisch-ungarischen feministischen Presse.] IN: ZACHAR, Péter Krisztián (Hrsg.): *Diplomácia, emancipáció és egyházpolitika*. [Publikationen der Stiftung Modern Minerva. Diplomatie, Emanzipation und Kirchenpolitik.] Modern Minerva Könyvek 7. Budapest, 2014. 49–151.

CZEFERNER Dóra: „Háborús nyereszkezők“ vagy a körülmények áldozatai? IN: KATONA, Csaba: *Minden egész eltörött. A Nagy Háború emlékei...* Tempevölgy Könyvek, Balatonfüred, 2018.

CZEFERNER Dóra: „Kávéházakban, klubokban, olvasóköri körökben kérjük A Nő és a Társadalom lapot” – *Egy periodika a nők egyenjogúságáért*. [„In Cafés, Klubs und Leserkreisen bitten wir um Der Frau und der Gesellschaft.“ – Ein Periodikum für die Gleichberechtigung der Frauen. Médiakutató. 2 (2014): 49–63.

COTT, Nancy (Hrsg.): *History of Women in the United States*. München, 2004. 1–20.

DUBY, Georges (Hrsg.): *Histoire des femmes en Occident*. 1–5. Paris, 1991–1992.

FRANCK, Wilma: *60 Jahre Bund Österreichischer Frauenvereine*. Wien, 1965.

DE HAAN, Francisca–DASKALOVA, Krasimira–LOUTFI, Anna (Hrsg.): *A Biographical Dictionary of Women's Movements and Feminisms. Central, Eastern and South Europe, 19th and 20th Centuries*. Budapest–New York, 2006.

HACKER, Hanna: *Wer gewinnt? Wer verliert? Wer tritt aus dem Schatten? Machtkämpfe und Beziehungsstrukturen nach dem Tod der „großen Feministin“* Auguste Fickert (1910) *L'homme. Tausendeinen Geschichten aus Österreich*. 7 (1996): 97–106.

HAUCH, Gabriella: *Das „Geschlecht der Revolution“ im tollen Jahr 1848/49*. IN:

- FRÖHLICH, Helgard (Hrsg.): *1848 im europäischen Kontext*. Wien, 1999. 75–96.
- KAARI, Utrio: *Evas Töchter – Die weibliche Seite der Geschichte*. Zürich, 1987.
- KENDLER, Helmut: *Die Sozialisierung des Haushaltes von Fouriers Plänen bis zum Wiener „Heimhof“*. Wien, 1990.
- KERESZTY Orsolya: *Egy folyóirat a művelődésért: A Nő és a Társadalom indulása és működésének első évei (1907–1910)*. [Eine Zeitschrift für die Frauenunterricht: Gründung. *Die Frau und Die Gesellschaft* und die erste Jahren ihrer Betätigung zwischen 1907–1910.] IN: KOZMA Tamás–PERJÉES István (Hrsg.): *Új Kutatások a Neveléstudományokban*. Budapest 2011. 290–304.
- KEINPOINTHER, Manfred: *Gender: Eine Frage des Stils?* Bemerkungen zu geschlechtsspezifischen diskursiven Strategien. IN: APPELT, Erna–GATT, Sabine–JAROSCH, MARION–KÖGLER Nina: *Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven der Geschlechterforschung*. Innsbrucker Gender Lectures. Innsbruck, 2013.
- KLINGENSTEIN, Eva: *Die Frau mit Eigenschaften. Literatur und Geschlecht in der Wiener Frauenpresse*. Wien, 1997.
- KORTSCH Bayles, Christine: *Dress Culture in the Late Victorian Women's Fiction: Literacy, Textiles, and Activism*. New York, 2016.
- KOSÁRY Domokos–NÉMETH, G. Béla (Hrsg.): *A magyar sajtó története. 1867–1892*. [Die Geschichte der ungarischen Presse.] Budapest, 1985.
- KOZÁRI Mónika: *Ki volt Veres Pál? (Családi indíttatás és háttér a XIX. században közszerepet vállaló nők esetében)*. Forrás, 11 (2015) 39–51.
- MOTTER, Barbara: *Lili Baitz. Biographische Datenbank und Lexikon Österreichischer Frauen*. Wien, 2011. (http://www.univie.ac.at/biografieA/daten/text/bio/Baitz_Lilli.htm; o8. 01. 2012.)
- MÜHLBACHER, Kurt–MAISSEN, Thomas: *Geschichte der Universität Wien im Überblick. Frauenstudium an der Universität Wien*. In: Berger, Elisabeth (Hrsg.): *Die Frauenstudium an der Universität Wien – im Zeichen des Liberalismus*. Wien, 2007.
- NAVE-HERZ, Rosemarie: *Die Geschichte der Frauenbewegung in Deutschland*. Hannover, 1997.
- PETŐ Andrea: *Társadalmi nemek és a nők története*. [Die Geschichte der Geschlechtern und Frauen.] IN: BÓDY Zsombor–Ö. KOVÁCS József (Hrsg.): *Bevezetés a társadalomtörténetbe*. [Einführung zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte.] Budapest, 2006. 514–532.
- RUPP, Leila G: *Constructing Internationalism. The Case of Transnational Women's Organisations*. IN: OFFERN, Karen (Ed.): *Globalising Feminismus 1789–1945*. London–New York, 2010. 139–151.
- SACHSSE, Christoph: *Social Mothers: The Bourgeois Woman's Movement and German Welfare-State Formation. 1890–1929*. IN: KOVEN, Seth–MICHEL, Sonya (eds.): *Mothers of a New World. Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States*. Routledge, New York–London, 1993.
- SCHMÖLZER, Hilde: *Frauenliebe. Berühmte Weibliche Liebespaare der Geschichte*. Wien, 2009.
- SCHRAUT, Sylvia: *Bürgerinnen im Kaiserreich. Biographie eines Lebensstils*. Stuttgart, 2013.
- SIMONTON, Deborah: *Women in European Culture and Society. Gender, Skill and Identity from 1700*. London, 2002.
- SZAPOR Judit: *A magánszférából a politikai közéletbe: a női politizálás története a kezdetektől 1945-ig*. [Von der Privatsphäre nach das politische öffentliches Leben: die Geschichte das weibliche Politisieren von den Anfänge bis 1945.] IN: PALASIK Mária (Hrsg.): *A nő és a politikum. A nők politikai szerepvállalása Magyarországon*. [Die Frau und die Politik. Politische Rollenverpflichtung von Frauen in Ungarn.] Budapest, 2007. 129–145.

Czeferner Dóra: *Weibliche Identität in Mitteleuropa und Wissenstransfer zwischen den ungarischen, österreichischen und deutschen Frauenorganisationen 1890–1914*

SZAPOR Judit: *Who Represents Hungarian Women? The Liberal Bourgeois Women's Rights Movement and the Rise of Right-Wing Women's Movement in the Aftermath of WW1*. IN: Sharpe, Ingrid–STIBBE, Matthew (Hrsg.): *Aftermath of War. Women's Movements and Female Activists, 1918–1923*. Leiden, 2011. 245–261.

WEILAND, Daniela: *Geschichte der Frauenemanzipation in Deutschland und Österreich*. Düsseldorf, 1983.

WERNER, Adrian: *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens*. IN: SAUR, Klaus G. (Hrsg.): *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens*. Berlin, 1999.

WITTMANN, Maria Imma: *Die österreichische Frauenstimmrechtsbewegung im Spiegel der Frauenzeitschriften*. (Mit einer einleitenden Darstellung der allgemeinen österreichischen Wahlbewegung von 1893–1906, im Spiegel der Presse.) Wien, 1950.

ZIMMERMANN, Susan: *Die bessere Hälfte? Frauenbewegungen und Frauenbestrebungen im Ungarn der Habsburgermonarchie*. Wien, 1999.

ZIMMERMANN, Susan: *Divide, Provide, and Rule. An Integrative History of Poverty Policy, Social Policy, and Social Reform in Hungary under the Habsburg Monarchy*. Budapest–New York, 2011.

ZIMMERMANN, Susan: *Jenseits von Ost und West. Entwicklungswege zentral-osteuropäischer Frauenbewegungen in transnationalen Kontext*. IN: PECHRIGGL, Alice–BIDWELL-STEINER, Marlen (Hrsg.): *Geschlecht, Gesellschaft. Gender Studies zwischen Ost und West*. Wien, 2003. 119–147.

ZIMMERMANN, Susan: *Recht, Nation und Internationalismus. Kooperationen und Konflikte der Habsburger Monarchie im Spannungsfeld internationaler Organisation und Politik*. IN: HEINDL, Waltraud–KIRÁL Edit–MILLNER, Alexandra: *Frauenbilder, feministische Praxis und nationales Bewusstsein in Österreich–Ungarn*. Tübingen–Basel, 2006. 119–167.

ZIMMERMANN, Susan: *The Challenge of Multinational Empire for the International Women's Movement. The Habsburg Monarchy and the Development of Feminist Inter/National Politics*. *Journal of Women's History*, (2005): 2. 87–117.

ZIMMERMANN, Susan: *Wie sie Feministinnen wurden? Wege in die Frauenbewegung im Zentraleuropa der Jahrhundertwende*. *L'Homme*. (1997): 2. 272–307.

Dömök Csilla¹

Regionalism in today's Europe

Abstract



Regions and regionalism are rather flourishing in Europe. But what do regionalism and the expression „*Europe of regions*” exactly mean? There are three approaches to the question: 1.) the concept of cross-border interregionality between the Member States of the European Union; 2.) the effort to make regions the basic building blocks of European integration instead of states; and 3.) the objective to introduce a three-tier structure to the European Union which would extend the already existing tiers of the European Union and the Member States with a third one, the territorial units within nation-states. The first approach (interregional cooperation) has long been adopted; the second approach (the vision of Europe made up of regions instead of states) is rather utopian. The third one is subject to fierce debates: a three-tier European Union with European, nation-state and regional levels.

Keywords: region; regionalism; supranational; integration; principle of subsidiarity;

Although the form, motives and causes of movements promoting regionalism may vary greatly², their purpose is the same for autonomous, federalist and separatist movements alike: to relativise the existing central nation-state. Thus, advancing European integration has become a natural ally for them as – from their perspective – it meant the disfunctionality of traditional nation-states. A supranational and therefore multinational and multicultural community promises much more room for development than a classic nation-state.

Nevertheless, regionalism and European integration could only converge effectively at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, following the „*Europe of regions*” concept. As European integration mainly delivered on the hopes relating to the concept of Europe after World War II, it has achieved its goal in the eye of many Europeans and new steps of integration have become necessary. Many are afraid of the European Union becoming a behemoth super-state which would devour democratic constitutional nation-states together with their achievements.³ The regionalisation of the integration process, however,

¹ Historian, PhD, University of Pécs, csilladomok@yahoo.de

² Dirk GERDES: *Regionalismus als soziale Bewegung*, Frankfurt/New York, 1985; Wolfgang LIPP: *Industriegesellschaft und Regionalkultur*, Köln, 198.; Hans-Georg WEHLING: *Regionen und Regionalismus in Westeuropa*, Stuttgart, 1987.

³ Manfred BRUNNER: *Kartenhaus Europa? Abkehr vom Zentralismus-*

promises to remedy this situation. In line with the principles of federalism and subsidiarity, regionality should create new legitimacy and promote acceptance toward the European Union.

But what do regionalism and the expression „*Europe of regions*” exactly mean? There are three approaches to the question⁴: first, the concept of cross-border interregionality between the Member States of the European Union; second, the effort to make regions the basic building blocks of European integration instead of states; and finally, the objective to introduce a three-tier structure to the European Union which would extend the already existing tiers of the European Union and the Member States with a third one, the territorial units within nation-states. The first approach (interregional cooperation) is conventional and has long been adopted; the second approach (the vision of Europe made up of regions instead of states) is rather utopian. The third one is subject to fierce debates: a three-tier European Union with European, nation-state and regional levels.

First, we have to clarify the meaning of regions and territorial units in a European context, which represent the third tier. The Community Charter for Regionalisation, adopted by the European Parliament in 1988, defines ‘region’ as follows: *„For the purposes of this Charter the word region shall be taken to mean a territory which constitutes, from a geographical point of view, a clear-cut entity or a similar grouping of territories where there is continuity and whose population possesses certain shared features and wishes to safeguard the resulting specific identity and to develop it with the object of stimulating cultural, social and economic progress. ‘Shares features’ shall be taken to mean language, culture, historical tradition and interests related to the economy and transport. It is not necessary that all of these elements be present in every case.”*⁵

A geographically „clear-cut entity”, a „similar grouping of territories”, a population with „certain shared features” in terms of language, culture and historical traditions – it is obvious that such vaguely described areas cannot provide a solid foundation for determining the third tier of the European Union. Such a European Union probably exists only in regional studies and at the level of hopes and intentions, but definitely not in terms of powers of action or from a legal perspective.

Neuanfang durch Vielfalt, München, 1984.

⁴ Rudolf HRBEK: *Die deutschen Länder vor den Herausforderungen der EG-Integration*, IN: Bernhard VOGEL/Günther H. OETTINGER: *Föderalismus in der Bewährung*, Köln, 1992. 9–33. 19f.

⁵ European Parliament Resolution on Community regional policy and the role of the regions; *Gemeinschaftscharta der Regionalisierung*, In print: Joachim BAUER : *Europa der Regionen. Aktuelle Dokumente zur Rolle und Zukunft der deutschen Länder im europäischen Integrationsprozeß*, Berlin, 1991. 23–20. 33.

The „*regions*” defined by the European Commission as target areas for its regional policy are also of little use here.⁶ These are nothing more than statistical quantities which disregard the competence of individual territorial units in legislation, public administration and legal practice, their institutional structure and their role in the decision making process of the unitary state. If we nevertheless have a look at the shared characteristics of the regions’ powers of action, we find that „*region as a statistical label*” refers to quite different realities in Europe.

This means that the foundations of regions, which can be considered for defining the third European tier, is highly heterogeneous. The spectrum ranges from the dependent administrative units of unitary Member States (such as in Ireland) to the federated states of Germany which have constitutional and budgetary autonomy and have powers to express opinion at federal level. Consequently, there is disparity not only in the potential political interest in using the third tier of European structures but also in the resources required by Member States to carry out this process.

Antecedents of European integration

The advance of German states were primarily due to the changes in importance resulting from the federal system of Germany. Integration necessarily entails the waiver of German sovereign rights for the European Community. Based on its integration competence of Germany (Article 24(1) of the Basic Law), the federation may transfer certain rights to European organisations, including its own rights and that of the states, without the approval of the Federal Council. This way, several state-level legislative competences have been transferred to European level since the establishment of the European Community.⁷

In addition to the transfer of sovereign rights expressly listed in the treaties, the competences of the German states have been „*clandestinely*” undermined. Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, which gives the Council the power to act if any action by the Community is necessary to achieve a Community aim in cases where the Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, made it possible to create a „*self-service system of competences*” for the European Community. Besides

⁶ For the EU’s funding delivery mechanisms, the European Commission uses the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) which defines three levels: NUTS I: 66, NUTS II: 174, NUTS III: 829 regions. Cf. Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: *Die Regionen in den 90er Jahren*, 4. periodischer Bericht über die sozio-ökonomische Lage und Entwicklung der Regionen der Gemeinschaft, 1991.

⁷ Thomas REMMERS: *Europäische Gemeinschaften und Kompetenzverluste der deutschen Länder*, Frankfurt am Main, 1992. Tobias BUSCH: *Bundesländer im Grundgesetz im Spannungsfeld der europäischen Integration*, Pflaffenweiler, 1990.

the area of economy, the extension of competences reached all the areas of domestic policy which had been considered the „holiest” parts of the states: self-government, public and higher education, police and media. This made it clear for the states that their political essence is at stake.

The transfer of the legislative competence of the federation to the Community shifted the centre of gravity to the detriment of the federated states. The states were deprived of their right to intervene in federal legislation in the form of protest and veto. „*Participatory federalism*”, on which the federated states could rely in the past decades by replacing parts of their original legislative rights to matters delegated to the federation in turn of the veto right of the Federal Council, became futile in this sense.

Furthermore, the Community also intervened into a central element of state powers: public administration. The thoroughness with which the Council and the Commission adopt provisions and determine directions, has become legendary in the meantime. They restrict the states' room for manoeuvre in applying the federal law provided by the German federal constitution. Examples of the perfectionistic regulation of details are part of the „*Euro-folklore*” ranging from the guidelines for preparing a change of government to the regulation of agricultural vehicles and the labelling of tobacco products.

Instrumental in this process was the fact that European integration had been stricken by a kind of “provincial insensitivity” from the beginning. The legal order of the Community is based on international legal treaties which confer it on the states as contracting parties to regulate the transfer of sovereign rights within the state. Accordingly, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht, Community law only recognised Member States at European level, but not provinces or regions. From the perspective of the Treaty, regions were considered as „*no man's land*”. So only the representatives of the states had the right to participate in exercising the transferred powers in the Community's organisations, while regions could not even enjoy a partial compensation for the powers taken from them.

Initially, state governments received intervention rights through the Federal Council instead of state parliaments, so it was not the Federal Parliament but the Federal Government which exercises euro-political powers. This led to a legitimacy deficit of political decisions affecting Europe which could not even be compensated by the European Parliament.

In view of imbalances within the federation, the problem of federated states is not surprising; they can fall victim of European integration which may finally result in their degradation to a kind of „*union of higher administrative units*” within the „*administrative province*” of the federation.⁸ It is also unsurprising that the federated states adopted a

⁸ Hans-Heinrich RUPP: *Maastricht - eine neue Verfassung?* Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, 1993. 211–213. 213.

dual defensive strategy. On the one hand, they aimed to strictly control of any further transfer of sovereign rights, on the other hand, following the logic of participatory federalism, they aimed to intervene in the exercise of the powers that were already lost. This dual defensive strategy, by nature, manifested in two different levels at the same time: within the federation and within Europe.⁹

The control of transfer of sovereign powers within the federation means closing the door through which the transfer occurs (i.e. the application of Article 24(1) of the Basic Law). This is achieved either by withdrawing the exclusive state-level competences of the federation's integration power, or by making all or certain competences conditional on the approval of the Federal Council. Within the federation intervention right means that the federated states have a decisive role within the federation in expressing opinions on European matters in the preparation of the decisions of the competent European organisations.

At European level, the defensive strategy of the federated states mean the effort to eliminate the „*provincial insensitivity*” and direct the attention to the subnational level of federated states and regions: on the one hand, by enshrining the principle of subsidiarity in Community law, and, on the other hand, by connecting federated states and other supranational entities directly to the process of the expression of political intent of Europe through delegating representatives to the Council and an extraordinary regional chamber. This is precisely the „*Europe of regions*” programme.

This defensive strategy of German federated states dates back to the 1980s and initially it could only produce partial results. The real breakthrough was achieved with the Treaty of Maastricht and the resulting changes in the Basic Law.

The Treaty of Maastricht and the new Europe article of the Basic Law

The Treaty of Maastricht and the new Europe article of the Basic Law strongly correlated both historically and substantially. They put the euro-political role of the federated states to new legal foundations. What was the benefit of the Treaty of Maastricht and the new Europe article?¹⁰

The Treaty of Maastricht can be measured against the specific negotiating goals defined by the federated states in advance. The prime ministers' conference in June 1990 decided on four fundamental claims¹¹:

⁹ Jochen HUHNS/Peter-Christian WITT: *Föderalismus in Deutschland*, Baden-Baden, 1992. 217–238.

¹⁰ Franz H. U. BORKENHAGEN: *Vom kooperativen Föderalismus zum „Europa der Regionen”*, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 1992. B 42. 36–44.

¹¹ Joachim BAUER: *Régiók Európája (Europe of Regions)*, Berlin, 1991. 41–97.

the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the treaties of the Community; the creation of a regional council; the opening of the ministerial council for the representatives of the federated states and regions; and the right of complaint of federated states and regions.

The first three claims were included in the EU Treaty, though the exact wordings differed from the relevant proposals and concepts of the federated states. The right of complaint of federated states, however, was not included in the Treaty. The Federal Government did not accept this claim due to constitutional considerations, so this item was not put on the agenda of negotiations at all.

(a) The principle of subsidiarity was first defined as a general principle of community law. The goals of the EU, and therefore the general goals of the Treaty, had to be achieved in line with the principle of subsidiarity. This is based on the definition in Article 3b which stipulates as follows:

„1. The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.

2. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.

3. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”

Comparing paragraphs 1 and 3 of the subsidiarity Article, their significance is beyond dispute. Paragraph 1 shall be understood as the restriction of competences; the activity of the Community is made conditional on the principle of restricted individual authorisation. Paragraph 3 bounds the Community to the principle of relativity. Paragraph 2, however, sparks fierce debates¹². It says that the Community may only take action if and in so far as the objectives cannot be „sufficiently achieved” by the Member States and if they can be „better achieved” by the Community. This wording is a compromise which combines two concepts. While the wording „cannot be sufficiently achieved” sets a clear limit for community competences, the „better achieved” provides more ground to use those competences. The federated states thus miss the „clear rejection of European centralist processes”¹³ from this compromise wording.

¹² Torsten STEIN: *Subsidiarität als Rechtsprinzip?* Detlef MERTEN: *Die Subsidiarität Europas*, 2nd ed. Berlin, 1994. 23–40. Detlef MERTEN: *Subsidiarität als Verfassungsprinzip*, in: *ibid.* 77–96.

¹³ Rudolf HRBEK: *Der Ertrag der “Verfassungsdebatte” von Maastricht: Ein*

(b) The composition of the Council of Ministers in the Treaty (EC Treaty, Article 146(1)) was extended with the participation of ministers at federative state and regional level. So far, all Council members had to belong to the central governments of the Member States. From now on, only the „*ministerial*” status is relevant, irrespective of whether the representative is from the central, federated state or regional government. This makes it possible to enforce regional interests more strongly and effectively in the Community. These claims, by the way, were pushed through by the Belgian delegation rather than the German one. The application of this provision is left to regulation within the Member State.

(c) The EC Treaty (Article 198a) also foresees the establishment of a „*Committee of the Regions*”. This committee only has a consultative role and comprises the 189 members of regional and local bodies, including 24 German members. According to the Treaty, the committee has to consult in a number of matters, including supporting objectives in general education, cultural life, health, and certain aspects of networks outside Europe and of regional policy. The Committee of the Regions may also express its position in any European issue.

A similarly important provision is enshrined in Article 23 which reinforces the positions of federated states under community law vis-à-vis their positions within the Member State. In connection with the implementing laws and a governmental agreement between the federation and the federated states it regulates three relevant areas: the transfer of sovereign rights to the European Union, the participation of federated states in decision-making affecting European policy within the Member State, and external representation vis-à-vis the European Union¹⁴.

Criticism voiced against the new Europe article, concerning the excessive increase of powers of federated states, primarily presented three arguments:

(1) The Europe article is an „*illegitimate*” child of the Treaty of Maastricht. Many ventured so far as to talk about „*blackmailing constellations*” and „*shopping frenzy*” where federated states reached for everything in their sight¹⁵. This criticism is opposed by the fact that powers to participate in constitutionally planned decisions are meant to be used. Junctions (so-called ‘junktims’) and planned packages also form part of normal everyday political transactions.

Erfolg für den Föderalismus und die deutschen Länder, IN: Jürgen F. BAUR: *Europarecht – Energierecht Wirtschaftsrecht (Festschrift für Bodo Börner)*, Köln, 1992. 125–149. 138.

¹⁴ Ruppert SCHOLZ: *Grundgesetz und europäische Einigung*, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 45, 1992. 2593–2601.

¹⁵ Wolfgang PHILIPP: *Ein dreistufiger Bundesstaat*, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik, 1972. 433–438. 436.

(2) Setting the condition that the transfer of sovereign rights should be approved by the constitutional majority of the Federal Council acts against integration and makes Germany „unsuitable toward Europe”. As opposed to this argument, the federated states have so far fully supported the European integration process and ultimately transferred new competences to the Community under the Treaty of Maastricht. On the other hand, if it is true that the transfer of further sovereign rights triggers the amendment of the constitution, it is consistent to use in this field as well the procedures generally planned for the amendment of the constitution.

(3) The participation of the federated states in the process of expressing the political intent of Europe weakens Germany's powers of action in integration policy. This approach is based on the assumption that tying the German negotiation positions to the coercive mandate provided by the Federal Council ruins the chances of successful negotiations.

The principle of subsidiarity in practice

Ironically, the principle of subsidiarity, which was first introduced to community law on the initiative of the federated states, can be indirectly advantageous to the federated states as in the form given to it in the Treaty it can only exert its impact in the Member States of the Community rather than in transnational entities. As a prerequisite for such an indirect effect, the principle of subsidiarity should create a clear allocation of competences between the Community and the Member States – which is quite dubious.

As opposed to national constitutions, the EC Treaty does not require the definition and allocation of competences, but normally obligates the organisations of the Community to make certain integration policy objectives which must be achieved by appropriate „measures”. The principle of functional allocation of tasks usually overarching sectors is not violated by requiring the principle of subsidiarity to be met. The formula that the Community may only take action if the objectives enshrined in the Treaty cannot be „sufficiently” achieved by the Member States and can be „better” achieved by the Community, does not provide a clear set of criteria for refusing the regulatory claims of the Community. „It leaves the decision on the issue of competences to the subjective consideration of organisations and decision-makers, to which the natural interest of the systematic and restrictive application of the principle cannot be subordinated *ab ovo*.”¹⁶

¹⁶ Werner WEIDENFELD: *Europa '96. Reformprogramm für die Europäische Union*, Gütersloh, 1994. 17.

Summary

„*A state is both too big and too small*”¹⁷ Today there is an increasing need to strengthen the supranational political level, i.e. to create regions. The situation of nation-states is not an easy one: they must be constantly on the alert because of the effects of the globalisation and the alienation of the constituent parts of the state. One of the answers given to this challenge was the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU, which reacted to the economic pressure of the global market, and the inclusion of the above-mentioned principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty of Maastricht. The reasons why regionalism has gained strength can be summarised as follows: economic reasons, easier way of addressing certain economic challenges, and the emergence of the so-called „*cooperative-communicative state ideal*”. Another reason is the reduction of euro-bureaucracy, the shortening of the decision-making chain, which can counterbalance economic and political integration. The emergence of „*euromethodism*”, that is, cooperation along the borderlines, and the traditional forms of belonging together and the sense of identity are also important factors. It is evident for all stakeholders that in order to exploit the full potential of regionalism all its components (such as economic cohesion, geographical characteristics, cultural identity and territorial mobility) have to be present at the same time in the given area. If any of the components is missing, the region as a territorial unit itself becomes questionable.

¹⁷ Peter WAGSTAFF: *Regions, Nations, Identities*. IN: *Regionalism in the European Union*, Portland, 1999. 116.

Dömök Csilla: *Regionalism in today's Europe*

Gábor Földessy¹



***Warfare, Horror, and the Truth On-screen:
The Role of the American Media in the
Vietnam War***

Abstract

The American media played an essential role during the Vietnam War. Not only did the television show the antiwar demonstrations across the U.S., but reporters also informed the American public and the politicians about the happenings in Vietnam. Although the media mostly supported the war, as President Johnson escalated the military conflict in 1965, journalists began to oppose the American involvement in Vietnam. In addition, the media also shaped public opinion about the war. One of the major journalists, Walter Cronkite's report was a decisive moment in the Vietnam War as he, contradicting the statements of the American political and military leaders, revealed that the United States was unlikely to win the war in Vietnam. Afterward, more and more Americans turned against the war. This paper aims at examining the role of the American media in the Vietnam War and the effects of the media on public opinion.

Keywords: the Tet Offensive; the American media; Vietnam War; credibility gap; Walter Cronkite; television; public opinion; Gen. William Westmoreland;

Besides the antiwar protests in the United States that made the American political leaders end the war in Vietnam, the American media also played an essential role throughout the entire military conflict.² Television and the newspapers showed the antiwar demonstrations across the U.S., as well as the military actions and the horrors of the war in Vietnam.³ What is more, the media also shaped public opinion about the military conflict,⁴ and thus, apart from the demonstrations, it also determined the outcome of the war – especially Walter Cronkite's report on the Tet offensive.⁵ The purpose of this essay is to examine the role of the American media in the Vietnam War, to study the attitude of the media about the war, as well as to show the impact of the media's portrayal of the Tet offensive on public opinion.

¹ MA student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, foldessy.gabor@yahoo.com

² Roger BARR: *The Vietnam War*, Lucent Books Inc. San Diego, 1991. Print. 63.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Maurice ISSERMAN and John S. BOWMAN: *Vietnam War*, Facts On File Inc. New York, 2003. Kindle edition. 107.

⁵ William HOSH (ed.): *The Korean War and the Vietnam War: People, Politics, and Power*, Britannica Educational Publishing, New York, 2010. 188.

Television played a crucial role in the Vietnam War.⁶ In the 1960s, television – that was invented in the 1940s – „became the major news source for the country.”⁷ Concerning the role of the television in the 1960s, author Roger Barr makes the assertion that

„[e]very night, Americans sat down in their living rooms and saw the radical changes that were occurring across the country on their television sets. [...] Television cameras went anywhere and everywhere in America. Within hours of a major event, Americans saw pictures of it in their living rooms.”⁸

Moreover, the media also showed the „antiwar protests in the United States.”⁹ However, concerning the reliability of the media, historian David L. Anderson points out that

„[b]ecause the cameras frequently focused on picturesque and unkempt members of the crowd, many viewers got a distorted impression that all protestors were bums or so-called hippies. Television and the other media reported on the war in less than perfect ways.”¹⁰

In addition, the Vietnam War was the first military conflict in U.S. history that Americans saw on television each day.¹¹ Concerning the portrayal of the cruelties in Vietnam, Anderson makes the assertion that

„[t]his technology had not been available in previous wars, and it could at times project dramatic images, such as the execution of a Vietcong suspect on a Saigon street in 1968 or the chaotic helicopter evacuation of the U.S. embassy in 1975.”¹²

All in all, the antiwar demonstrations and especially the terror in Vietnam that Americans watched on TV each day changed people’s mind about the war: many times, the majority of people „had trouble reconciling what they saw on television.”¹³

The Attitude of the Media and Public Opinion

The attitude of the media about Vietnam changed during the war.¹⁴ Throughout „most of the 1960s,” the media more or less supported U.S.

⁶ BARR (1991): 53.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid. 50-53.

⁹ David. L. ANDERSON: *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002. Print. 141.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ BARR (1991): 63.

¹⁴ Bruce O. SOLHEIM: *The Vietnam War Era: A Personal Journey*. Praeger Publishers Westport, CT, 2006. Print. 117.

military intervention in Vietnam.¹⁵ Historian and war veteran Bruce O. Solheim makes the assertion that

„[b]y 1967, there were nearly 1,000 reporters in Vietnam. Reporters were typical of their generation. They believed that the United States needed to stop Communist aggression. We held a sacred mission to do so. Most reporters went to Vietnam believing that the United States was right in being there. The Tonkin Gulf incident that led to the Tonkin Gulf resolution was reported uncritically. Reporters in Vietnam lived alongside the soldiers, under similar conditions. Although there was no censorship, they felt pressure to report what was helpful to the U.S. military and the South Vietnamese government.”¹⁶

One of the journalists, Neil Sheehan who worked for *The New York Times*, told after a visit in Southeast Asia that

„[t]he resident correspondents in Vietnam were [...] questioning detail, not substance, [...]. We thought it our duty to help win the war by reporting the truth of what was happening in order both to inform the public and to put the facts before those in power so that they could make correct decisions.”¹⁷

As the above quotation reveals, journalists like Sheehan made every attempt to let the Americans know about the happenings in Vietnam, and they also let the American politicians know about the happenings in Southeast Asia thus *„they could make correct decisions”* to try to win the war. In addition, as historians Maurice Isserman and John S. Bowman point out, *„Sheehan, [...] and others had not yet “questioned the justice and good sense of U.S. intervention”*” in Vietnam.¹⁸

On the other hand, as President Johnson escalated the war in 1965 (despite the fact that he had promised not to do so), some reporters started to question America’s goal of containing the spread of communism in Vietnam.¹⁹ As soon as the escalation began, the media passed judgment on U.S. military actions in Vietnam.²⁰ Some correspondents were more censorious than others like the freelance reporter, I.F. Stone who remarked concerning Johnson’s escalation *„that “every government is run by liars and nothing they say should be believed”*.²¹ While some reporters criticized the president, others drew the attention of the public to the cruelties of the war such as the

¹⁵ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 106.

¹⁶ SOLHEIM (2006): 117.

¹⁷ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 106.

¹⁸ Ibid. 106.

¹⁹ Ibid. 107.

²⁰ SOLHEIM (2006): 117.

²¹ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 106.

murdering of ordinary citizens in Vietnam.²² After a visit in Southeast Asia, a journalist for *The New York Times*, Harrison Salisbury wrote in December 1966 that „United States planes are dropping an enormous weight of explosives on purely civilian targets.”²³ Isserman and Bowman point out that before Salisbury’s report, „no newspapers had questioned the administration’s claims that civilian targets in North Vietnam were strictly off limits to American bombers.”²⁴ In addition, in December 1966, an American journalist was also „critical of the U.S. bombing campaign in North Vietnam” while others „criticized the United States’ use of defoliants and bombing in South Vietnam.”²⁵

The media also influenced „public opinion” about the Vietnam War.²⁶ Isserman and Bowman point out that in general, „[t]elevision played a major role in shaping public perceptions of the war.”²⁷ The two historians also make the assertion that

„Vietnam was, as has often been noted, America’s first televised war. Almost every day during the war, combat footage shot only a few hours earlier appeared on the television screen at 6:30 P.M. in living rooms across America. [...] Television reporting tended to focus on dramatic footage of combat, not on complicated questions of Vietnamese politics and history. Yet sometimes the images that appeared on the screen led viewers to wonder about the official justifications for the war.”²⁸

However, some historians also claim that before 1968, the media did not influence the Americans to such a large extent.²⁹ For instance, Solheim argues that „[f]rom 1965 to 1967, TV coverage did not have as much impact on public opinion as some people think” because, as he writes,

„[n]ot that many people watched the evening news on a regular basis
[...] People saw what they wanted to see in the coverage, and the TV news confirmed, but did not change minds
[...] Most TV coverage did not show the worst of the death and destruction.”³⁰

²² Ibid, 107.

²³ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 107.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ SOLHEIM (2006): 118. For instance, „[i]n 1967, a reporter named Martha Gelhorn could not get her articles printed in U.S. newspapers” therefore „[s]he had them printed outside of the United States and was promptly asked to leave Vietnam.” SOLHEIM (2006): 118.

²⁶ Ibid. 119.

²⁷ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 107.

²⁸ Ibid. 107.

²⁹ SOLHEIM (2006):119.

³⁰ Ibid. 119.

Nevertheless, Solheim also maintains that „[b]y late 1967, support and opposition to the war were about even and had shifted over time [...], Johnson then became a victim of the credibility gap,³¹ his leadership was in question, and his approval rating slipped to a dismal 38 percent.”³²

The Tet Offensive and the „Credibility Gap”

During the Vietnam War, reporters also played a crucial role in influencing „the American public.”³³ One of the major figures was the foreign correspondent of *The New York Times*, David Halberstam whose „reporting on Vietnam initially supported U.S. involvement,” but after 1965, he expressed his „disillusionment with the war.”³⁴ Moreover, Walter Cronkite who was an „anchorman of the CBS Evening News” also shaped public opinion by corresponding „the most traumatic and triumphant moments of American life in the 1960s.”³⁵ Concerning Cronkite, historian William Hosh points out that „[t]he influence of Cronkite’s reporting is perhaps best illustrated by his commentary on the Vietnam War,” especially on the Tet offensive³⁶ (see also the Figure above³⁷).



Although the escalation seemed to be successful in the beginning, the Tet offensive in 1968 changed the outcome of the war.³⁸ As General William Westmoreland traveled back to the United States from the battlefield in November 1967, he was convinced that the American troops were highly likely to win the war.³⁹ In the fall of 1967, Westmoreland gave the following statement to the press:

„I have never been more encouraged in the four years that I have been in Vietnam. We are making real progress. [...] the “phaseout” of U.S. involvement in Vietnam could begin within two years. [...] the

³¹ The term „credibility gap” will be defined in more detail below, in the next subsection.

³² SOLHEIM (2006): 119.

³³ HOSH (2010): 188.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid. 189.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The Figure depicts „Walter Cronkite and a CBS camera crew [using] a jeep for a dolly while interviewing a commanding officer during the Battle of Hue City, February 20, 1968.” Source: ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 126.

³⁸ Ibid. 117.

³⁹ Ibid. 117.

*“light at the end of the tunnel” in Vietnam had now become visible. Victory, [...] “lies within our grasp”.*⁴⁰

However, the unexpected attacks of the communists between January and April 1968 refuted Westmoreland’s earlier statement.⁴¹ From January 30 to April 1968, the communists attacked the South Vietnamese and the American troops several times that resulted in the deaths of numerous Americans⁴² (see also the Figure⁴³ on the right).



The Tet offensive was an unsuccessful military action for both sides.⁴⁴ Isserman and Bowman point out that *„[a]fter the war it was revealed that the North Vietnamese military leaders themselves regarded the Tet Offensive as something of a military failure”* and *„the Americans were not the victors of Tet”* either.⁴⁵ Moreover, the number of casualties during the Tet offensive was also high in the case of both sides.⁴⁶ The two historians also point out that

*„[m]ore than 1,100 Americans were killed in the first two weeks of Tet, along with several thousand South Vietnamese. The United States claimed that more than 30,000 Communists were killed in the same period. General Westmoreland argued that Tet was a military disaster for the Communists. [...] Their casualties were much higher than those of the Americans and South Vietnamese.”*⁴⁷

In addition, after the Tet offensive, the communists attacked the American troops again in May – historians usually define the incident as *„mini-Tet”* – that resulted in the deaths of more than 2,500 Americans.⁴⁸

Walter Cronkite’s report on the Tet offensive was a crucial factor for the failure of the United States’ military involvement in Vietnam.⁴⁹ Concerning President Johnson, in 1965 the media began to use the

⁴⁰ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 117.

⁴¹ Ibid. 117.

⁴² Ibid. 117–119.

⁴³ The Figure shows Saigon as *„black smoke rises from fires set during the attacks of the Tet Offensive in 1968.”* Source: Maurice ISSERMAN, and John S. BOWMAN (eds.): *Vietnam War. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2003. Kindle. 124.*

⁴⁴ Ibid. 125.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 125.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 123–124.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 123–124.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 125.

⁴⁹ Marilyn B. YOUNG, John FITZGERALD, and A. Tom GRUNFELD: *The Vietnam War: A History in Documents.* Oxford University Press, New York, 2002. Kindle edition. 86.

expression „*credibility gap*” to portray the „*discrepancies between what*” journalists „*observed and what they were told*.”⁵⁰ On February 27, 1968, „*Cronkite’s report on the Tet offensive*” revealed the truth about the outcome of the military operations in Vietnam, as Cronkite announced among others that

*„[t]o say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion. [...] in the next few months we must test the enemy’s intentions, in case this is indeed his last big gasp before negotiations. But it is increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to defend democracy, and did the best they could.”*⁵¹

Concerning Cronkite’s announcement above and the „*credibility gap*,” historian Marilyn B. Young points out that

*„[m]ost of the press accepted President Johnson’s explanations of U.S. policy, [...]. In this context, Cronkite’s support for a negotiated end to the war hurt Johnson deeply. Cronkite’s reporting did change the balance; it was the first time in American history a war had been declared over by an anchorman.”*⁵²

What is more, Young also adds that after Cronkite’s statement, „*Johnson [...] told his press secretary, George Christian, that it was a turning point, that if he had lost Walter Cronkite he had lost Mr. Average Citizen,*” and this actually „*solidified his decision not to run again.*”⁵³

Cronkite’s report on the Tet offensive also played a main role in turning more people against the war.⁵⁴ Isserman and Bowman make the assertion that

*„[w]hen news leaked out in early March that General Westmoreland was requesting an additional 206,000 troops be sent to Vietnam, it added to the fears of Americans that the war was becoming a quagmire. Westmoreland was now so distrusted by the American public that the administration arranged to have him “kicked upstairs,” appointing him army chief of staff in June 1968, to be replaced by his deputy, Gen. Creighton Abram.”*⁵⁵

Moreover, after the Tet offensive, politicians also began to criticize the government for deceiving the public, for instance, Senator Eugene McCarthy who remarked that „*the Administration’s reports of progress*

⁵⁰ ANDERSON (2002): 140.

⁵¹ qtd. in YOUNG, FITZGERALD, and GRUNFELD (2002): 87.

⁵² Ibid. 86.

⁵³ Ibid. 86.

⁵⁴ ANDERSON (2002): 140.

⁵⁵ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 125–126.

[in Vietnam] are the products of their own self-deception."⁵⁶ Thus, as a result of the credibility gap and the negative portrayal of the war in the media, „[b]y late March only 26 percent of the American public approved Johnson's handling of the war."⁵⁷ In addition, Anderson also points out that „[s]ome American political and military leaders came to believe that negative and distorted coverage by antiwar journalists eroded public support for the American war effort and contributed to U.S. defeat."⁵⁸ However, Anderson also highlights that „[a]s the war continued through 1968 and beyond, polls showed the American people increasingly turning against U.S. involvement because of the ever-growing number of American casualties," as well.⁵⁹

Conclusion

As I presented in this paper, in the 1960s, television played an essential role in showing the antiwar demonstrations in America and the horrors of the war in Vietnam.⁶⁰ Although in the 1960s, the media generally supported the war in Vietnam, as President Johnson escalated the war, more and more journalists turned against U.S. involvement in Vietnam.⁶¹ In addition, reporters also influenced the attitude of the public about the military conflict.⁶² The most significant of them was Walter Cronkite whose report on the Tet offensive revealed that the USA was not likely to win the war.⁶³ Thus, the „*credibility gap*” eventually brought Lyndon Johnson's presidency to an end and also turned the American public against the war: actually, both factors contributed to the United States' inability to win the war in Vietnam.⁶⁴

⁵⁶ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 126. However, there were also politicians like Secretary of State Dean Rusk who blamed the media for portraying the horrors in Vietnam because it turned the public against the war. ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 120–121.

⁵⁷ Ibid. 126–127.

⁵⁸ ANDERSON (2002): 140.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 140.

⁶⁰ BARR (1991): 53.

⁶¹ SOLHEIM (2006): 117.

⁶² HOSH (2010): 188.

⁶³ YOUNG, FITZGERALD, and GRUNFELD (2002): 86–87.

⁶⁴ Ibid. 86.

Gábor Földessy¹

***The Development of the Antiwar
Movement in the United States: From the
Peaceful Protests to the Nationwide
Demonstrations***



Abstract

While the United States was involved in a military conflict in Vietnam, a large-scale antiwar movement developed in America. However, the antiwar movement was deeply influenced by the social movements of the 1960s while, at the same time, American society was also in the process of transformation. Thus, these simultaneously emerging factors contributed to a massive and extensive antiwar movement that aimed at ending the war in Vietnam. In addition, the war also divided the American nation into war supporters and war protesters. Eventually, the antiwar movement had an effect on the American politicians, on U.S. legislation, and on America's policymaking as to Vietnam. As a result, the United States was unable to win the war in the Southeast Asian country. The aim of this research paper is to study the development of the antiwar movement in the USA during the Vietnam War and to examine the direct effects of the movement on America's Vietnam policy.

Keywords: Vietnam; antiwar movement; Lyndon B. Johnson; Richard M. Nixon; U.S. society; Martin Luther King; the 1960s; American politics; hawks and doves;

The Vietnam War caused the greatest and the most extensive antiwar movement in the history of the United States.² Sociologist Paul Joseph points out that „*millions of U.S. citizens not only opposed the policies of their government but mobilized themselves in a conscious effort to stop it.*”³ As President Lyndon B. Johnson escalated the war in 1965, the number of demonstrators grew and the peaceful protests turned into a national antiwar movement.⁴ What is more, the antiwar movement that was heavily influenced by the social movements of the 1960s⁵ had an effect on U.S. politics and policymaking as to Vietnam: containment, i.e. the American policy that intended to put a stop to the spread of

¹ MA student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, foldessy.gabor@yahoo.com

² Maurice ISSERMAN and John S. BOWMAN: *Vietnam War*, Facts On File Inc. New York, 2003. Kindle edition. 109.

³ Paul JOSEPH: „*Direct and Indirect Effects of the Movement against the Vietnam War.*” IN: *The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives.* Jayne S. WERNER and Luu Doan HUYNH (eds.). M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1993. Print. 165.

⁴ Roger BARR: *The Vietnam War*, Lucent Books Inc. San Diego, 1991. Print. 57.

⁵ BARR (1991): 54.

communism in the world, eventually failed in the Southeast Asian country.⁶

This research paper seeks to examine the development of the Antiwar Movement in the United States during the Vietnam War and the effects of the Movement on U.S. politics as to Vietnam. Since the examination of the social movements of the 1960s is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to give only a brief overview of the social changes in the 1960s that heavily influenced the Antiwar Movement. In addition, my aim is to exemplify the major events, protests, and participants of the Movement that inevitably determined the failure of the United States' containment policy in Vietnam.

Antecedents and Coincidences: Social Movements, the Counterculture, and the 1960s

The 1960s was the decade of social changes in America.⁷ Young Americans began to rebel against „*the values, traditions, and views of their parents.*”⁸ At the same time, the United States was also involved in a great war in Southeast Asia.⁹ However, as author Roger Barr points out, „*[a]lthough the war was not the direct cause of unhappiness and unrest of the sixties, it touched nearly every other social movement in the country.*”¹⁰ In addition, people's confidence in the government also changed throughout the 1960s.¹¹ At the beginning of the decade, Americans still trusted their political leaders.¹² Historian Andrew Wiest underlines that

*„Americans were certain that their leaders were good, honest men and that the nation as a whole was capable of no wrong. Confident in the future and in their own inherent decency most Americans looked to the new decade as a time of almost unlimited potential.”*¹³

However, the transformation of U.S. society was already underway.¹⁴ As Barr underscores, „*[a]s the decade progressed, many Americans began to question the integrity and honesty of their government and its leaders.*”¹⁵ The motto for young Americans was „*Question everything,*

⁶ JOSEPH (1993): 169.

⁷ BARR (1991): 49.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid. 53.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Andrew WIEST: *Essential Histories: The Vietnam War 1956-1975*. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, England: 2003. Kindle edition. 57.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ BARR (1991): 50.

*demand change, and, if necessary, resort to violence to make it happen.*¹⁶

The counterculture in the United States emerged during the Vietnam War.¹⁷ Wiest points out that „[d]uring the 1960s the massive post-Second World War “baby boom” generation came of age” that „became a catalyst for social change.”¹⁸ The majority of these young Americans „questioned their parents’ music, their economic morals, their beliefs, and their war.”¹⁹ Eventually, „the counterculture became intertwined with the growing antiwar movement as the decade of the 1960s progressed.”²⁰ However, there were Americans who did not play a role in the peace movement, since as Wiest asserts,

„[s]ome young people chose to stand against American policies, including the Vietnam War, and joined groups such as the Students for a Democratic society [...]. Others chose to “turn on and drop out,” becoming hippies who were too busy rejecting society to bother with rejecting society’s war. [...] Most young people, though, affiliated with no particular group in the 1960s and occupied the distant fringes of the counterculture. [They] enjoyed the music of the time and were even part-time protesters but also remained in college and part of the American dream.”²¹

In addition, those who took part in the antiwar demonstrations frequently expressed their objections to „US involvement in the Vietnam War” via music.²² During the 1960s, several songs were written „that spoke directly against US involvement in the Vietnam War.”²³

Minority groups also played an essential role in the social changes of the sixties.²⁴ In the 1950s, more and more people – especially blacks but also several whites – began to oppose the discrimination, degradation, and segregation of black people that eventually led to the emergence of the civil rights movement in the 1960s.²⁵ The social change for black people came little by little:

¹⁶ Ibid. 49.

¹⁷ WIEST (2003): 57.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid. 58.

²² Ibid. 57–58.

²³ Ibid. 57.

²⁴ BARR (1991): 54.

²⁵ Ibid. Roger Barr also points out that „[t]he American Civil War (1861-1865) may have freed blacks from slavery, but white people kept blacks imprisoned in a world of discrimination and bigotry for nearly a century after the war ended. Although the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights formally guaranteed civil rights to every American, blacks remained second-class citizens well into the 1950s.” BARR (1991): 54.

„in 1954 [...] the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed segregation in schools. [...] In 1957, black minister Martin Luther King led a successful boycott against bus lines of Montgomery, Alabama, [...]. In response to all the protests, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964. This act forbade discrimination in the use of most public facilities.”²⁶

What is more, after a long struggle, „a new law helped guarantee blacks their right to vote” in 1965.²⁷

The „Civil Rights Movement” eventually interlaced with the nationwide demonstrations against the Vietnam War.²⁸ Although civil rights activists sought to end racial discrimination in the USA, Martin Luther King, Jr.²⁹ also demanded an „economic and social change” because the majority of African-Americans lived in misery for a long time, „often confined to decaying inner city environments.”³⁰ So, to reassure King and the civil rights activists, as Wiest writes, „President Johnson supported expansion of the American Dream to include African-Americans and made economic and social change, what he called the “Great Society,” the centerpiece of his presidency.”³¹ On the other hand, the costly war „slowed the pace of economic change in the United States,” therefore „[i]n 1967 King began to speak out against the Vietnam War as a waste of American lives and a misuse of American money that could be set aside to help the needy.”³² Hence, as Wiest points out, „by 1967 the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War had crossed paths.”³³

The Divided Nation: Hawks and Doves, and Their Perceptions of the War

The war in Vietnam also „divided America from the time it first became a major issue in 1964.”³⁴ Television and the newspapers „used nicknames for those who were for or against the war.”³⁵ The „warlike hawks” supported U.S. involvement in Vietnam, whilst the „peaceful

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ WIEST (2003): 60.

²⁹ Martin Luther King, Jr. who „emerged as the leader of the Civil Rights Movement” believed in „nonviolent protests to achieve his goals, following the example of Ghandi.” WIEST (2003): 59.

³⁰ Ibid. 60.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ BARR (1991): 53.

³⁵ Ibid.

doves” were against it.³⁶ What is more, both groups were also convinced that „*they were right about Vietnam.*”³⁷

Hawks claimed that the involvement of the United States in the affairs of Vietnam was necessary to put a stop to the communist expansion in Southeast Asia.³⁸ Elliot Abrams, a student at Harvard University who graduated in 1969, argued in an interview that

„*[i]f the United States pulls out and abandons South Vietnam, there will be a Communist government in the South and Laos and Cambodia will fall as well.*”³⁹

Besides the students, „*biographers, philosophers, and literary critics*” were also asked to tell their opinions about the war in Vietnam.⁴⁰ In 1967, the American journalist and author William F. Buckley, Jr. told that

„*I am in favor of it. America’s commitment is to a beleaguered people. It is a commitment originally made by a man who [...] swore, with the backing of the people’s representatives, to defend Southeast Asia against the Communists. That pledge was reaffirmed by his successor [...]. That pledge has been reaffirmed, once again, by Lyndon Johnson. [...] What are we doing in South Vietnam, if not trying to save Southeast Asia from the Communists? [...] That situation is simply this, that we cannot keep South Vietnam free without taking action against North Vietnam.*”⁴¹

As the quotation above demonstrates, during the interview, Buckley referred to President Eisenhower and the communist threat in Southeast Asia, and he also referred to President Kennedy and mentioned President Johnson who promised to continue containment policy in Vietnam. In addition, Buckley also explained that „*taking action against North Vietnam*” was necessary to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.

In stark contrast, doves opposed „*Johnson’s action on both moral and strategic grounds.*”⁴² They argued that the American military intervention in the affairs of Vietnam was immoral since „*[i]nnocent Vietnamese men, women, and children were dying because of Johnson’s action.*”⁴³ Steve Cohen who „*was a part time student*” at Amherst College and a „*full time antiwar activist and peace candidate*

³⁶ Ibid. 55.

³⁷ Ibid. 53.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ qtd. in Myra MACPHERSON: *Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation*. Garden City: N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984. Print. 121.

⁴⁰ Cecil WOOLF and John BAGGULEY (eds.): *Authors Take Sides on Vietnam*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967. Print. 14.

⁴¹ qtd. in WOOLF and BAGGULEY (1967): 26.

⁴² BARR (1991): 53.

⁴³ Ibid.

organizer” in the second half of the 1960s⁴⁴ told in an interview after the war that

„I cared so deeply about Vietnam because I am Jewish and I cannot forget the Holocaust. I couldn't understand the lack of protest. The lesson I derived was; 'If your country is doing something wrong, you've got to try to change it.' I remember a quotation: 'To be silent is to lie.' I tried to live my life by that. Vietnam, of course, was not the equivalent of the Holocaust, but we were killing a helluva lot of people.”⁴⁵

As the above quotation shows, Cohen draws a parallel between World War II and the Vietnam War in terms of casualties. In addition to the immorality of the war, doves were also convinced that the war in Vietnam was strategically needless.⁴⁶ They argued that *„Vietnam and its neighboring countries, poor Third World nations, were not important to the United States”* and *„[i]f Vietnam did fall to communism, [...] it would not be harmful to the security of the United States.”⁴⁷* Moreover, doves also claimed that the war was, actually, *„a civil war between the South Vietnamese government and the Communist-supported Vietcong [...] and the United States should not get involved.”⁴⁸* In 1967, the well-known American novelist, Joseph Heller told in an interview that

„I am against the military intervention of the U.S. in Vietnam. It was a ghastly choice, and thousands die each month because of it. [...] We ought to stop murdering Asians. We ought to stop sending young American boys, against their will, ten thousand miles away to be killed and mutilated in battle against people that do not threaten us and did us no harm. We ought to stop squandering billions of dollars every month [...]. It was Lyndon Johnson's bad fortune to take us into this dreadful national catastrophe; if only he has the good taste to bring us back out!”⁴⁹

As it can be seen in the above quotation, Heller criticized the USA for the high number of casualties and he also blamed President Johnson for *„this dreadful national catastrophe.”* In addition, during the interview, Heller also pointed out that the U.S. government should *„stop squandering billions of dollars every month”* on a needless war.

Although both sides believed *„that they were right about Vietnam,”* the number of war protesters significantly grew by the second half of the 1960s.⁵⁰ Concerning the effects of the Vietnam War on public opinion,

⁴⁴ MACPHERSON (1984): 124.

⁴⁵ qtd. in MACPHERSON (1984): 125.

⁴⁶ BARR (1991): 55.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ qtd. in WOOLF and BAGGULEY (1967): 38.

⁵⁰ BARR (1991): 53.

Roger Barr makes the assertion that

*„[b]etween 1964 and early 1968, the debate over what was right or wrong about U.S. involvement in Vietnam would nearly tear the country apart. It would force the majority of Americans, whose views on Vietnam were fairly neutral at the beginning of the war, to make a decision and take a stand.”*⁵¹

As Johnson escalated the war in 1965 and the number of „casualties increased,” more and more people turned against the military conflict and joined the demonstrators in the streets.⁵²

The Antiwar Movement: From the Peaceful Protests to the Nationwide Demonstrations

The antiwar demonstrations „brought together many different groups, often for different reasons.”⁵³ Among them were, for instance, „Pacifist Groups,” „Religious Groups,” „Civil Rights Groups,” „Disarmament Groups” and „Student/Campus Groups” like the „Students for a Democratic Society (SDS),” and several others.⁵⁴ In addition, the protesters „also included ministers, mothers, traditional pacifists, conscientious objectors, and even some veterans.”⁵⁵ All in all, as authors Nancy Zaroulis and Gerard Sullivan point out, „[a]ll of these groups provided people, organizational support, and money for the movement that was to become the Movement.”⁵⁶

In addition, the number of protesters gradually grew throughout the 1960s until the United States’ military involvement in Vietnam came to an end.⁵⁷ Concerning the statistics, historians Maurice Isserman and John S. Bowman make the assertion that

*„the first known public demonstrations took place in August 1963 in New York and Philadelphia, [...]. Within a few years, 25,000 would seem like a very small number; in April 1967, 300,000 turned out for an antiwar march in New York; in November 1969 a half-million marched in Washington.”*⁵⁸

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Bruce O. SOLHEIM: *The Vietnam War Era: A Personal Journey*. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2006. Print. 120.

⁵³ SOLHEIM (2006), 114.

⁵⁴ Nancy L. ZAROULIS and Gerald SULLIVAN: *Who spoke up?: American Protest against the War in Vietnam, 1963-1975*. Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York: 1985. Print. 9–11.

⁵⁵ David. L. ANDERSON: *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002. Print. 65.

⁵⁶ ZAROULIS and SULLIVAN (1985): 11.

⁵⁷ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 110–111.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

Although the „doves” held numerous demonstrations in various cities of the country, the remainder of this section aims at introducing the most significant events, protests, persons, and groups that pressured the U.S. government to end the war in Vietnam.

The driving force of the antiwar movement was the great number of students.⁵⁹ In the beginning, they „made their antiwar views known with small, peaceful protests.”⁶⁰ In the spring of 1965, a group of „students at Columbia University in New York City sent a message to North Vietnamese leader Ho Shi Minh”⁶¹ in which they wrote that

„[w]e are Americans who are deeply opposed to the U.S. bombing raids against the people of [North Vietnam]. We are doing all that we can to stop these barbarous attacks.”⁶²

Besides the students, in April 1965, the clergy also published a „full-page advertisement in the New York Times” in which they asked President Johnson that „In the name of God STOP IT”.⁶³

Students also organized „teach-in” demonstrations at colleges and universities.⁶⁴ The aim of the teach-ins was to discuss the Vietnam War and its impact on the U.S.⁶⁵ However, Zaroulis and Sullivan also point out that „in the process of learning about what the United States was doing in Vietnam, a good many students, willy-nilly, were turned against the Johnson-Rusk-McNamara-Bundy policies.”⁶⁶ During a „teach-in” in Washington D.C. on April 17, 1965, the president of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Paul Potter told his audience that

„[i]f the people of this country are to end the war in Vietnam, and to change the institutions which create it, then the people of this country must create a massive social movement—and if that can be built around the issue of Vietnam then that is what we must do [...]. The reason the war and the system it represents will be stopped, if it is stopped before it destroys all of us, will be because the movement has become strong enough to exact change in the society.”⁶⁷

As it can be seen in the above quotation, Paul Potter called upon his

⁵⁹ WIEST (2003): 57.

⁶⁰ BARR (1991): 55.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² qtd. in BARR (1991): 55.

⁶³ qtd. in BARR (1991): 55.

⁶⁴ ZAROULIS and SULLIVAN (1985): 37.

⁶⁵ Ibid. When a „teach-in” was organized, all the „classes were [...] cancelled [...] and a day-long analysis of the Vietnam War was [...] held instead.” ZAROULIS and SULLIVAN (1985): 37.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ qtd. in Michael H. HUNT (ed.): *A Vietnam War Reader: A Documentary History from American and Vietnamese Perspectives*. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill: 2010. Kindle edition. 165.

audience to pressure the government collectively to end the war in Vietnam, and he also announced that „*the movement has become strong enough*” to force the government to end the war.

The primary goal of the organizations like the SDS was to hold more impressive antiwar demonstrations.⁶⁸ Moreover, the members of the SDS were also convinced that the Vietnam War endangered Lyndon Johnson’s „*Great Society of America*.”⁶⁹ Therefore, in March 1965, they organized a large-scale antiwar protest in Washington D.C. with the purpose of criticizing America’s military involvement in Vietnam.⁷⁰ In addition, in the fall of 1965, „*two Wisconsin protesters, Frank Emspak and Ray Robinson*” established „*The National Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam*.”⁷¹ Their primary goal was „*to organize simultaneous antiwar protests in forty cities around the United States*.”⁷² All in all, as Roger Barr points out, „*[t]he emergence of a national organization to protest the war indicated that the protest movement was much stronger and more organized than it had been the previous spring*.”⁷³

Besides the „*teach-ins*,” students also organized „*sit-in*” demonstrations at colleges and universities.⁷⁴ The „*sit-in*” demonstrations were „*supported by students, pacifists, civil rights groups, women, religious leaders, and others*.”⁷⁵ „*In the fall of 1965,*” approximately 250 „*students at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor*” organized „*a sit-in demonstration at the Ann Arbor selective service headquarters, where men enlisted or were drafted into the service*.”⁷⁶ What is more, at the university, more than two thousand „*students and teachers sent President Johnson a*” letter in which they required him „*to “bring about a viable peace in Vietnam*”.”⁷⁷

As the number of casualties increased as a result of the escalation, the „*protests became more radical*.”⁷⁸ On November 2, 1965, a man called Norman Morrison went „*to the river entrance to the Pentagon*” – he was approximately „*fifty yards from Defense Secretary McNamara’s office*” – and set his body on fire.⁷⁹ After the incident,

⁶⁸ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 110.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ BARR (1991): 57.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 58.

⁷⁵ SOLHEIM (2006): 113-114.

⁷⁶ BARR (1991): 58. To express their objections to the war, „*demonstrators sat down on the floor until their demands were met or they were arrested and carried away*.” BARR (1991): 58.

⁷⁷ qtd. in BARR (1991): 58.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 56.

⁷⁹ Charles DEBENEDETTI: *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the*

Morrison's widow told about her late husband that

*„Norman Morrison has given his life to express his concern over the great loss of life and human suffering caused by the war in Vietnam. He was protesting the Government's deep military involvement in this war. He felt that all citizens must speak their true convictions about our country's action.”*⁸⁰

What is more, a week later, on November 9, the „*twenty-two-year-old Catholic Worker from upstate New York,*” Roger LaPorte went to the headquarter of the United Nations in New York City and also set his body on fire.⁸¹ In the hospital, before his death he explained that „*I'm a Catholic Worker. I'm against war, all wars. I did this as a religious action.*”⁸²

As the Civil Rights Movement became stronger, African-Americans also joined the demonstrations.⁸³ They primarily „*focused on racial discrimination, segregation, and voting rights.*”⁸⁴ A major leader of the Civil Rights Movement, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. considered „*the Vietnam War as another example of racism and a waste of economic resources that kept the poor down.*”⁸⁵ On April 4, 1967, King told his audience in New York City that

*„it became clear to me that the war was doing far more than devastating the hopes of the poor at home. [...] We were taking the black young men who had been crippled by our society and sending them eight thousand miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in southwest Georgia and East Harlem. So we have been repeatedly faced with the cruel irony of watching Negro and white boys on TV screens as they kill and die together for a nation that has been unable to seat them together in the same schools.”*⁸⁶

The excerpt from King's speech above demonstrates that King criticizes America for not being able to solve racial problems within the country despite the fact that America sends both black and white soldiers to Vietnam to fight „*and die together for*” a common goal.

Martin Luther King also condemned the political leaders of the United States for the war in Southeast Asia.⁸⁷ Concerning King's speeches, historian Bruce O. Solheim makes the assertion that King's „*antiwar*

Vietnam Era. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse UP, 1990. Print. 129.

⁸⁰ qtd. in ZAROULIS and SULLIVAN (1985): 2.

⁸¹ DEBENEDETTI (1990): 130.

⁸² qtd. in DEBENEDETTI (1990): 130.

⁸³ SOLHEIM (2006): 111.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 112.

⁸⁶ qtd. in ANDERSON (2002): 274.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 274–275.

*message was more radical than his ideas on desegregation.*⁸⁸ During a demonstration on April 7, 1967, Dr. King heavily criticized the leaders of his country for the war as he told his audience among others that

*„[a]s I have walked among the desperate, rejected and angry young men I have told them [...] that social change comes most meaningfully through nonviolent action. But they asked—and rightly so—what about Vietnam? They asked if our own nation wasn't using massive doses of violence to solve its problems, to bring about the changes it wanted. Their questions hit home, and I knew that I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today—my own government.”*⁸⁹

As it can be seen in the quotation above, while King emphasized the importance of a „*nonviolent action*,” he declared that America was „*the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today*,” i.e. King announced that the United States was responsible for the cruelty in Vietnam. In addition, concerning King's statement, Isserman and Bowman also underline that „*[f]or King the Vietnam War was more than just an accident; it was a mirror of everything wrong in the United States.*”⁹⁰

Besides King and the civil rights groups, the clergy also objected to the war.⁹¹ The „*two extraordinary figures*” that „*[left] an ineradicable imprint upon the history of the Movement*” were the two priests, Phillip and Daniel Berrigan.⁹² On October 27, 1967, Phillip Berrigan „*entered a Baltimore draft office in the Custom House with three others and methodically poured a mixture of human and duck blood over records filed there.*”⁹³ Shortly after the incident, he sent a letter to one of his friends in which he explained that



*„[t]o stop this war I would give my life tomorrow. I believe in revolution, and I hope to continue a non-violent contribution to it. In my view, we are not going to save this country and mankind without it...the massive suffering of this war and American imperialism around the world will only be confronted by people who are willing to go with suffering as the first move to justice.”*⁹⁴

⁸⁸ SOLHEIM (2006): 111–112.

⁸⁹ qtd. in ANDERSON (2002): 274–275.

⁹⁰ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 111.

⁹¹ BARR (1991): 56.

⁹² ZAROULIS and SULLIVAN (1985): 229.

⁹³ Ibid. 230.

⁹⁴ qtd. in BARR (1991): 56.

What is more, while he was „waiting to be sentenced, Phillip and his brother Daniel planned a second protest.”⁹⁵ On May 17, 1968, together with seven activists, they „broke into a draft board in Catonsville, Maryland, seized draft records, and burned them with [...] homemade napalm”⁹⁶ (see also Figure 1⁹⁷).

During his trial, Daniel „explained” in the courtroom that „I burned some paper because I was trying to say that the burning of children was inhuman and unbearable.”⁹⁸ Although both Daniel and Phillip were incarcerated for some years, as Zaroulis and Sullivan point out, „a significant number of Catholics and others were inspired to follow in the footsteps of the Berrigans.”⁹⁹ Thus, in the subsequent years, antiwar activists destroyed a great number of draft cards in several parts of the country.¹⁰⁰

Toward the end of Johnson’s presidency, peace activists held much more violent demonstrations than before.¹⁰¹ Many times, the situation became so serious that demonstrators „began to carry the red-and-blue flags of the Viet Cong to demonstrations, and a few burned American flags,” as well.¹⁰² Isserman and Bowman also point out that the „[a]ntiwar protesters were sometimes attacked by the police; some protesters fought back; a few actually initiated violence”¹⁰³ (see also Figure 2¹⁰⁴). In addition, the two historians also underline that „Lyndon Johnson was frequently a target of antiwar protesters, who chanted, “Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?””¹⁰⁵



As Nixon became president in November 1968, the number of demonstrations temporarily decreased.¹⁰⁶ In his presidential „campaign,

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 112. The two priests and the seven activists „became known” as „the Catonsville Nine.” BARR (1991): 56.

⁹⁷ Figure 1: „Rev. Phillip F. Berrigan (center) and his brother Rev. Daniel Berrigan (right) are shown throwing matches on the already burning draft records in Baltimore.” Source: BARR, Roger: *The Vietnam War*. Lucent books Inc. San Diego, 1991. Print. 56.

⁹⁸ qtd. in BARR (1991): 56.

⁹⁹ ZAROULIS and SULLIVAN (1985): 235.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 113.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Figure 2 depicts the „Anti-Vietnam War demonstration: Members of the military police keep back protesters during sit-in at the Mall entrance to the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., October 21, 1967.” Source: Isserman, Maurice and John S. Bowman (eds.). *Vietnam War*. New York: Facts On File, Inc., 2003. Kindle. 114.

¹⁰⁵ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 114.

¹⁰⁶ BARR (1991): 70.

Nixon had told Americans he had a peace plan” for ending the war.¹⁰⁷ He managed to satisfy the „doves” as he gradually withdrew troops from Vietnam, and „the number of American casualties” decreased accordingly.¹⁰⁸ However, his peace plan also included the expansion of the war: with the purpose of demolishing „Communist sanctuaries in the neighboring countries,” Nixon ordered the „ground invasion of Cambodia.”¹⁰⁹ On April 30, 1970, the president announced on television that

*„[m]y fellow Americans, we live in an age of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. Even here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. [...] If, when the chips are down, the world’s most powerful nation, the United States of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”*¹¹⁰

As the above quotation shows, while Nixon made the assertion that there was a war „both abroad and at home,” he also explained that the expansion of the war into Cambodia was necessary to prove the ability of the USA to defeat „the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy” that endangered the „free nations and free institutions throughout the world.”

The „invasion of Cambodia” generated the most impressive antiwar demonstrations in America.¹¹¹ On May 4, 1970, „Ohio National Guardsmen shot and killed four students and wounded at least nine others following a weekend of antiwar protests on the campus of Kent State University.”¹¹² The incident angered many people because „[s]ome of the victims were simply onlookers or students walking to class.”¹¹³ Concerning the happening at Kent State University, Barr makes the assertion that

*„[t]o an ever-increasing number of Americans, the deaths at Kent State symbolized what was wrong with U.S. involvement in Vietnam. These deaths were unnecessary and senseless. The tragedy somehow proved that everything protesters had been saying about their government was right.”*¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. 68.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. 70.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. 71.

¹¹⁰ qtd. in HUNT (2010): 107.

¹¹¹ BARR (1991): 71.

¹¹² ANDERSON (2002): 131. On May 2, 1970, „the Kent State University ROTC hall was burned down by an arsonist,” and two days later, the „students confronted Ohio National Guardsmen” who „fired into the crowd” that resulted in the deaths of the four students. SOLHEIM (2006): 115.

¹¹³ ANDERSON (2002): 131.

¹¹⁴ BARR (1991): 73.

Historian David L. Anderson also mentions that the incident „*was one of the worst moments in the history of domestic conflict over the Vietnam War.*”¹¹⁵ In addition, ten days after the incident at Kent State, „*on May 14, police fired on a dormitory at Jackson State University in Mississippi, killing two and injuring twelve*” people.¹¹⁶ The tragedies at Kent State University and at Jackson State University led to further „*demonstrations and student strikes at hundreds of universities.*”¹¹⁷ What is more, after the incidents, numerous „*campuses were closed for the rest of the school year.*”¹¹⁸

The tragedy at Kent State University divided the American public to the greatest extent.¹¹⁹ As they heard about the happening, a number of „*students expressed a mix of anger, alienation, and pessimism.*”¹²⁰ A student at Kent State University, Ron Arbaugh told a reporter of *The New York Times* that

„*[l]ast week, I suppose I didn't have any views pro or con to a great degree [...] Then came Nixon's speech on Cambodia and I thought, well, for crying out loud, I voted for the guy because I wanted to get it over and then he turns around and makes it bigger [...].*”¹²¹

In stark contrast, the „*hawks*” approved of the reaction of the guardsmen at Kent State University.¹²² As historian Michel H. Hunt writes, „*in a nation more deeply divided than ever over the war, some citizens blamed the protesters, not the guardsmen, not the president, and not his policy.*”¹²³ After the incident, a resident of Kent, Ohio made the assertion that

„*[w]hen radical students are allowed to go through a town smashing windows, terrifying the citizens, and are allowed to burn buildings belonging to the taxpayers to the ground, I think it is high time that the Guard be brought in to stop them—and stop them in any way they can. The sooner the students of this country learn that they are not running this country, that they are going to college to learn, not teach, the better.*”¹²⁴

All in all, as Anderson points out concerning the tragedy, „*[t]he extent to which the war had divided American society was obvious.*”¹²⁵

¹¹⁵ ANDERSON (2002): 131.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ BARR (1991): 73.

¹¹⁹ ANDERSON (2002): 131.

¹²⁰ HUNT (2010): 178.

¹²¹ Ibid. 179.

¹²² Ibid. 178.

¹²³ Ibid. 178.

¹²⁴ qtd. in HUNT (2010): 180.

¹²⁵ ANDERSON (2002): 131.

In general, as Isserman and Bowman point out, America „*had never before seen an antiwar movement on the scale or the breadth of the one that grew up in opposition to the Vietnam War.*”¹²⁶ The most severe demonstrations emerged when President Nixon announced the „*full-scale invasion of Cambodia*” in 1970.¹²⁷ However, the number of protests gradually decreased as Nixon announced the withdrawal of American troops and the Congress passed laws that disallowed both Nixon and his successor, President Ford to continue containment policy in Vietnam.¹²⁸

The Consequences: The Antiwar Movement and America’s Vietnam Policy

The extensive antiwar demonstrations across America had direct and inevitable effects on U.S. policymaking as to Vietnam.¹²⁹ As Paul Joseph points out, although the demonstrations did not divert the United States from its „*goal of preserving an anti-Communist government in Saigon, [...] the antiwar movement severely constrained the ability of government decision makers to achieve their goals.*”¹³⁰ As a result, „*the antiwar movement*” eventually led to the failure of containment policy in Vietnam.¹³¹

As Johnson escalated the war in 1965, more and more politicians turned against the American military involvement in Vietnam.¹³² Besides the two members of the Congress, „*Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska*” who had already raised an objection to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,¹³³ Senator J. William Fulbright from Arkansas also turned against the war.¹³⁴ In his speech at Johns Hopkins University in April, 1966, Fulbright drew the attention of his audience to the fact that

„*[g]radually but unmistakably America is showing signs of that arrogance of power which has afflicted, weakened, and in some cases destroyed great nations in the past. In so doing we are not living up to our capacity and promise as civilized example of the world.*”¹³⁵

¹²⁶ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 109.

¹²⁷ SOLHEIM (2006): 124.

¹²⁸ Ibid. 128.

¹²⁹ JOSEPH (1993): 165.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 169.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 108.

¹³³ The Resolution „*had given President Johnson authority to send troops to Vietnam.*” BARR (1991): 74.

¹³⁴ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 108. Despite the fact that Fulbright „*[introduced] the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in Congress in 1964,*” two years later, in 1966 „*he openly opposed administration policy in Vietnam.*” ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 108–109.

¹³⁵ qtd. in Jeffrey P. KIMBALL (ed.): *To Reason Why: The Debate about the*

As historian Jeffrey P. Kimball points out concerning Fulbright's statement, the politician emphasized that „*the „arrogance of power” [...] had inadvertently brought America into Vietnam*” and „*American arrogance was rooted in excessive military and economic power, vaulting pride, and a missionary instinct.*”¹³⁶

Two years later, as a great number of Americans died between January and April 1968 during the attacks of the communists (the event became known as the Tet Offensive),¹³⁷ President Johnson's „*closest advisers*” also began to oppose the military conflict in Vietnam.¹³⁸ After he „*had already privately turned against the war*” earlier, „*Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara*” eventually resigned in January 1968.¹³⁹ Shortly afterwards, McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford also began to oppose the war.¹⁴⁰ Following his resignation, Clifford remarked in an interview that

*„[a]fter a month in the Pentagon, I knew that we were wrong, and I knew that it wasn't really Communist aggression. What we were dealing with was a civil war in Vietnam. And I knew we had an absolute loser on our hands. We weren't ever going to win that war.”*¹⁴¹

In addition, „*a small group of senior advisers*” who are called the „*Wise Men*” also realized that the USA was not likely to beat the North Vietnamese.¹⁴² The „*Wise Men*” warned Johnson that

*„even with reinforcements it might take the United States another five to 10 years to defeat the Communists in Vietnam. [...] The war was unwinnable with the present policies. [...] no additional troops should be sent to Vietnam, the bombing of North Vietnam should be halted, and the United States should move toward a negotiated settlement.”*¹⁴³

Consequently, as Isserman and Bowman point out, „*[a]lthough the antiwar movement had not been able to change Lyndon Johnson's policies directly, it had an effect on the Wise Men, and they in turn pushed Johnson in a new direction.*”¹⁴⁴ In his speech on March 31, 1968, Johnson also „*announced that the Communists' Tet Offensive had been a failure*” and also „*called upon North Vietnamese leaders to join the*

Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War. USA: McGraw-Hill Inc. 1990. Print. 116.

¹³⁶ Ibid. 108.

¹³⁷ BARR (1991): 44-47.

¹³⁸ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 127.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 127.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. 128.

*United States in peace talks.*¹⁴⁵ What is more, the two historians also mention as to Johnson's speech that rather than assert an „*optimistic prediction of a “light at the end of the tunnel” in Vietnam [...] he announced a halt to bombing raids in North Vietnam except for an area north of the DMZ.*”¹⁴⁶

The antiwar demonstrations also contributed to President Johnson's paranoia.¹⁴⁷ Johnson suspected the communists of contributing to the demonstrations that were key factors for the failure of his presidency.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, the president „*ordered the CIA to look into the charges that the antiwar movement was controlled by foreign powers.*”¹⁴⁹ However, as Isserman and Bowman underline,

„*[t]here was no doubt that Hanoi welcomed the spread of antiwar sentiment in the United States, but the CIA reported that “we see no significant evidence that would prove Communist control or direction of the U.S. peace movement or its leaders.”*”¹⁵⁰

All in all, as the two historians also highlight, not only did the antiwar movement ruin „*the presidency of Lyndon Johnson,*” but it also „*[ended] the Democratic Party's long-standing dominance of the White House.*”¹⁵¹

In addition, the objections of politicians to the war also led to the revelation of the Pentagon Papers.¹⁵² The Pentagon Papers that describe the „*history of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam*” from 1945 to 1968 was written among others by Daniel Ellsberg¹⁵³ who sent the documents to *The New York Times* and to *The Washington Post* in 1971.¹⁵⁴ As historians John Prados and Margaret Pratt Porter point out, since „*Ellsberg felt mortified at the way the American public had been misled on Vietnam,*” he decided to disclose the documents.¹⁵⁵ Eventually, the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. „*[T]he demilitarized zone (DMZ) [divided] South and North Vietnam.*” ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 87.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. 114.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ qtd. in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 114.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. 105. Between 1932 and 1964 „*the Democrats won the presidency in six of the eight presidential elections held in those years*” and „*from 1968 through 1988 they lost five out of six presidential elections.*” ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 105.

¹⁵² John PRADOS and Margaret Pratt PORTER (eds.): *Inside the Pentagon Papers*. University Press of Kansas, Kansas City. 2004. Print. 3.

¹⁵³ Daniel Ellsberg was a „*defense analyst who had decided that the war was wrong, and he believed that the information in the Pentagon Papers should be more widely available.*” ANDERSON (2002): 154.

¹⁵⁴ Marilyn B. YOUNG, John FITZGERALD, and A. Tom GRUNFELD: *The Vietnam War: A History in Documents*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2002. Kindle edition. 145.

¹⁵⁵ PRADOS AND PORTER (2004): 3.

revelation of the documents led to a legal dispute at the Supreme Court between the government and *The New York Times*.¹⁵⁶ According to the Court's decision, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* were allowed to publish the Papers.¹⁵⁷ Concerning his decision to reveal the documents, Ellsberg told in an interview that

*„[w]hen I look back at my actions to end the war, I wish I had done in 1964 or 1965 what I did do five years later: go to Congress, tell the truth, with documents. From my first day in the Pentagon—August 4, 1964—I witnessed lies about [...] imaginary torpedoes in the Tonkin Gulf. I became a participant in secret plans to escalate the war as soon as President Johnson won in a landslide by promising voters just the opposite. If I (and others) had done then what I did later, the war could have been averted.”*¹⁵⁸

As it can be seen in the quotation above, Ellsberg confessed that Johnson and the government constantly misled the people about the happenings in the Gulf of Tonkin, and if he had revealed the truth earlier, as he claimed in the interview, „*the war could have been*” prevented.

In the end, in the presidential election of 1968, the majority of people voted for the Republican Richard Nixon.¹⁵⁹ In his election campaign, Nixon announced that „*he had a peace plan that he would unveil after he became president.*”¹⁶⁰ Nixon's goal was to „*achieve what he called an honorable peace in Vietnam.*”¹⁶¹ Thus, with the intention of saving „*U.S. credibility with other countries,*” Nixon worked out a plan that included Vietnamization, i.e. the strengthening of the South Vietnamese army, the expansion of the war into Cambodia in order „*to destroy North Vietnamese supplies and troops*” there, and détente, i.e. the reduction of tensions with the communist Soviet Union and China, and at the same time, he also proclaimed the gradual withdrawal of troops.¹⁶²

However, the expansion of the war into Cambodia turned the members of the Congress against Nixon.¹⁶³ While students held forceful antiwar demonstrations at colleges and universities that led to the tragedies at Kent State University and Jackson State University, the

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. 118–127.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. During the trial at the Supreme Court, „*[t]he majority of the justices found that the government had not shown that printing the Pentagon Papers posed a threat to national security.*” ANDERSON (2002): 154.

¹⁵⁸ qtd. in YOUNG, FITZGERALD, and GRUNFELD (2002): 145.

¹⁵⁹ BARR (1991): 68.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² BARR (1991): 68–79. By means of reducing the number of American casualties in Vietnam, Nixon hoped to maintain the support of the American people. ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 135–136.

¹⁶³ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 136.

„doves” in the U.S. Congress reacted to the expansion of the war by passing a „new legislation that would require withdrawal from Indochina.”¹⁶⁴ On June 24, 1970, „the Senate voted to repeal the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which had given President Johnson authority to send troops to Vietnam.”¹⁶⁵ In addition, shortly afterwards, „the Senate” also „passed a bill prohibiting the use of U.S. troops in Cambodia within six weeks.”¹⁶⁶ Nevertheless, as Barr points out, although the president’s power was limited, „in 1971, Nixon continued his expansion strategy despite the protests of the Congress and the American public.”¹⁶⁷

At last, after the peace treaty was signed on January 27, 1973, the United States was completely unable to help South Vietnam.¹⁶⁸ As soon as the American troops left Vietnam, the South Vietnamese army was unable to defeat the communists.¹⁶⁹ The South Vietnamese president, Thieu asked the United States for help but the „Americans were tired of the war” and „the Congress” also rejected to help.¹⁷⁰ In the summer of 1973, „the U.S. Congress passed the Case Church Amendment that forbade any further U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.”¹⁷¹ Moreover, the USA also significantly reduced the financial help to South Vietnam.¹⁷² In addition, on November 7, 1973, the War Powers Act „that required the president to obtain the support of Congress within ninety days of sending American troops abroad” was also enacted.¹⁷³

Besides, the Watergate Scandal also contributed to Nixon’s inability to help South Vietnam.¹⁷⁴ As Isserman and Bowman mention, „[i]n 1973 and 1974, Nixon was fighting for his political life.”¹⁷⁵ In the summer of 1972, a group of people were „caught burglarizing the national headquarters of the Democratic Party at the Watergate Hotel in Washington, D.C.”¹⁷⁶ Though in the beginning, no link was found between Nixon and the intruders, two reporters from *The Washington Post* eventually discovered that Nixon was aware of the offence.¹⁷⁷ During the „investigations” in 1973, „the media and Congress” found out „that soon after the break-in, Nixon had ordered his staff to cover

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ BARR (1991): 74.

¹⁶⁶ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 136.

¹⁶⁷ BARR (1991): 74.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. 85.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. 84.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. 85.

¹⁷¹ SOLHEIM (2006): 128.

¹⁷² BARR (1991): 85.

¹⁷³ SOLHEIM (2006): 128.

¹⁷⁴ BARR (1991): 86.

¹⁷⁵ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 146.

¹⁷⁶ BARR (1991): 86.

¹⁷⁷ ANDERSON (2002): 174.

up the event.”¹⁷⁸ Thus, Nixon was likely to be „impeached, or removed from office and tried by the Senate for illegally using his presidential powers to obstruct the Watergate investigation.”¹⁷⁹ However, as Barr highlights, „[r]ather than face impeachment, Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, the only president in U.S. history to resign.”¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, Isserman and Bowman also point out that due to the scandal, „Nixon had less time and less power to do anything on behalf of his ally, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.”¹⁸¹

Despite the fact that the USA was not involved in the war when Gerald Ford became president in 1974,¹⁸² he intended to support Thieu but the War Powers Act prevented him from helping South Vietnam.¹⁸³ In January 1975, not only did President Ford ask the U.S. Congress to defend South Vietnam,¹⁸⁴ but he also pointed out that if the communists occupied South Vietnam, then „[t]he results would be an alien world in which the costs for our survival would dwarf anything we have ever known.”¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, as historian Christopher Jespersen underlines, „Thieu’s regime collapsed in April 1975 because Congress refused to appropriate the military assistance sought by the Nixon and Ford administrations.”¹⁸⁶

All in all, by the time the peace treaty was signed, the people across the USA recognized that they had suffered the consequences of containing the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.¹⁸⁷ Bruce O. Solheim also points out that

„[w]hether they were hawks or doves, by 1973 most Americans believed that the cost had been too great, and the greatest cost had been American lives. They came to the realization that no more Americans should die for Vietnam.”¹⁸⁸

In general, as Solheim writes, „[f]unding had been cut off by

¹⁷⁸ BARR (1991): 86.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 147. As historian David L. Anderson points out, Nixon and Kissinger maintained „that Watergate made it impossible for the United States to provide effective assistance to South Vietnam after 1973,” but „[t]his contention is debatable [...] because Congress and the public had rejected continuing U.S. defense of [South Vietnam] long before the Watergate scandal ended with Nixon’s resignation.” ANDERSON (2002): 175.

¹⁸² Christopher T. JESPERSEN: „Kissinger, Ford, and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam.” *Pacific Historical Review*, 71, 3 (2002), 439-473. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/phr.2002.71.3.439> 446.

¹⁸³ Ibid. 440.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. 447.

¹⁸⁵ qtd. in JESPERSEN (2002): 450.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. 440.

¹⁸⁷ SOLHEIM (2006): 128.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

*Congress and the American people were done with Vietnam.*¹⁸⁹

Summary and Conclusion

As I presented in this paper, the 1960s in America was the decade of social changes that was brought about by a new generation of Americans who distrusted the government and rebelled against traditional social values.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, the minority groups were also influenced by the social changes, so the Civil Rights Movement that intended to bring racial intolerance to an end eventually interlaced with the protests against U.S. involvement in Vietnam.¹⁹¹ In addition, the Vietnam War also divided U.S. society into war supporters and war protesters, i.e. into „*hawks*” and „*doves*” who constantly disagreed with each other on the war in Vietnam.¹⁹² Hawks maintained that the war was necessary to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.¹⁹³ On the other hand, doves opposed the military conflict in Vietnam since, as they argued, it was unnecessary and morally wrong, and it led to the deaths of numerous Vietnamese citizens and American soldiers.¹⁹⁴ Eventually, the antiwar demonstrators, i.e. the doves had much more effect on America’s Vietnam policy than the hawks.¹⁹⁵

The Antiwar Movement that sought to pressure the U.S. government to end the war in Vietnam was created and shaped by a vast number of people across America.¹⁹⁶ Though the driving force of the Movement was the great number of students, the African-Americans and the clergy (and several others) also played a crucial role in the demonstrations.¹⁹⁷ While the majority of people objected to the war especially because of its cruelty and the high number of casualties, African-Americans also concentrated on racial issues and an „*economic*” improvement.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, as Barr highlights, „*[a]s Johnson’s escalation of U.S. involvement in the war continued, protests against the war escalated as well.*”¹⁹⁹

Thus, the peaceful protests like the advertisements in the newspapers, the „*teach-ins*,” and the „*sit-ins*” eventually transformed into a nationwide and violent Antiwar Movement that included the riots

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. 129.

¹⁹⁰ WIEST (2003): 57.

¹⁹¹ Ibid. 60.

¹⁹² BARR (1991): 53.

¹⁹³ MACPHERSON (1984): 122.

¹⁹⁴ BARR (1991): 55.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 53–57.

¹⁹⁶ ZAROULIS and SULLIVAN (1985): 11.

¹⁹⁷ SOLHEIM (2006): 114.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. 111–112.

¹⁹⁹ BARR (1991): 57.

in the streets and also suicides.²⁰⁰ The Movement peaked in 1970 as President Nixon expanded the war into Cambodia.²⁰¹ However, the president's military decision eventually resulted in tragic confrontations at Kent State University and at Jackson State University between the students and the authorities.²⁰² What is more, the tragedy at Kent State University also revealed how deep was „*the gap*” in U.S. society between the war supporter „*hawks*” and the war protester „*doves*.”²⁰³

In the long run, on account of the Antiwar Movement, numerous politicians including Johnson's „*Wise Men*” turned against U.S. involvement in Vietnam.²⁰⁴ What is more, Johnson also suspected that the communists contributed to the antiwar demonstrations but the authorities did not confirm the president's fears.²⁰⁵ After Johnson's withdrawal from the presidency in 1968, his successor, Nixon announced both his peace strategy and the gradual withdrawal of troops.²⁰⁶ However, his decision to invade Cambodia turned the members of the Congress against the war, so they passed laws that prevented Nixon from helping South Vietnam.²⁰⁷ In addition, in the summer of 1973, after the peace treaty was signed, the Congress passed further laws that forbade Nixon and his successor, Ford to give assistance to South Vietnam.²⁰⁸ However, by this time, the entire American nation was also completely tired of the war.²⁰⁹

All in all, as this research paper wished to demonstrate, the Antiwar Movement automatically and inevitably influenced U.S. legislation and policymaking as to Vietnam: as a result, the United States' military involvement in Vietnam that aimed at containing the spread of communism in the Southeast Asian country eventually came to an end without victory.²¹⁰

²⁰⁰ DEBENEDETTI (1990): 129–130.

²⁰¹ BARR (1991): 72.

²⁰² ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 110–111.

²⁰³ ANDERSON (2002): 131.

²⁰⁴ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 127–128.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 114.

²⁰⁶ BARR (1991): 68.

²⁰⁷ ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003): 136.

²⁰⁸ SOLHEIM (2006): 128.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ JOSEPH (1993): 169.

Anna Kószeghy¹



***George Orwell and Spike Milligan –
Outsiders and Insiders of the British
Empire***

Abstract

What if the founding father of British radio comedy and the famous broadcaster and author of dystopian social criticism were brought together within one analysis? An aspect rarely considered when looking into the oeuvre of Spike Milligan is the sharp criticism of colonial rule present in his war memoirs. In a letter to his friend and fellow-humourist-to-be, Harry Secombe, there is a short, intriguing part that can be dated circa early 1943 which bears the designation: „*S. S: Arcadia, Near Aden*” and constitutes the first part of a series of five letters, all reminiscences about the North African coast. More often discussed and widely known is George Orwell’s depiction of colonialism. A most thought-provoking exemplar of it being ‘Marrakech’, an essay first published in a collection entitled *New Writing* (1939). The correspondence and the short essay possess similar characteristics, so much so that their comparison seems to be a fertile ground for analysis. In my paper, I will venture to indicate that a colonial sensitivity similar in origin yet different in expression lies in the two writings whose authors happened to be both insider-born and outsider-bred subjects of the British Empire.

Keywords: colonialism; colonial sensitivity; George Orwell; Spike Milligan; Marrakech; Aden; outsider; insider; audience; narrator; WWII; British Empire; British; Britishness;

What if the founding father of British radio comedy and the famous broadcaster and author of dystopian social criticism were brought together within one analysis? An aspect rarely considered when looking into the oeuvre of Spike Milligan² is the sharp criticism of colonial rule present in his war memoirs. In a letter to his friend and fellow-humourist-to-be, Harry Secombe, there is a short, intriguing part that can be dated circa early 1943³ which bears the designation: „*S. S: Arcadia, Near Aden*”⁴ and constitutes the first part of a series of five

¹ Translator, Budapest – anna.koszeghy@gmail.com

² Also known in his biographies as „*Spike Milligna, the well-known typing error*”.

³ The thrills of dating the letter will be addressed later.

⁴ The letters themselves will hereafter be referred to as *Aden*. Spike MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 53–59.

letters, all reminiscences about the North African coast. More often discussed and widely known is George Orwell's depiction of colonialism. A most thought-provoking exemplar of it being 'Marrakech', an essay first published in a collection entitled *New Writing* (1939). The correspondence and the short essay possess similar characteristics, so much so that their comparison seems to be a fertile ground for analysis. In my paper, I will venture to indicate that a colonial sensitivity similar in origin yet different in expression lies in the two writings whose authors happened to be both insider-born and outsider-bred subjects of the British Empire.

The roots of the two authors

They were born in British India: Terence Alan Milligan in Ahmednagar (1918), Eric Arthur Blair in Motihari (1903) and had the education of sons of officers of the Empire. Orwell's father worked in the Opium Department of the Indian Civil Service, while Milligan's was a bombardier of the British Royal Artillery posted to Poona in 1911. Thanks to this, Spike spent his childhood there and in Rangoon, capital of British Burma. „*It was a beautiful childhood, I loved the gentle people*”⁵, he recalls.

First of all, let me bring forth some proof for an even more intricate connection between the two literary men than what their attitudes would initially suggest:

I remember how the visitors used to come, and one in particular, Sergeant Blair. He used to come out on the bus every week or so, and would sit on our verandah. Father was a bit of an authority on roads and laws and customs by now and this Blair used to come quite often. He used to arrive on the bus from the town, and come walking up to our bungalow. 'Hello, Milli,' he'd call. 'Are you there, Milli?' I remember he always wore bush shirts, and he had very thin legs. I was always excited when he came and used to sit as close as I could listening to them talking, not wanting to be sent away. [...] He used to

⁵ Roger LEWIS: 'Murder by Potato Peeler – How Spike Milligan Tried to Knock off Peter Sellers', on Spike Milligan, *Milligan's Meaning of Life by Spike Milligan – An Autobiography of Sorts* (ed. Norma FARNES), Penguin, 2012. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/books/article-2046123/MURDER-BY-POTATO-PEELER-How-Spike-Milligan-tried-knock-Peter-Sellers-MILLIGANS-MEANING-OF-LIFE-BY-SPIKE-MILLIGAN-EDITED-BY-NORMA-FARNES.html> Accessed: 15 January 2018

*bring a big book of papers and, I think, his writings. My father would try to answer his questions and they talked about the police, and the army and India. I longed to join in, but knew I couldn't.*⁶

Quoted from Milligan's first ever biography, this paragraph sheds light on the fact that a certain Sergeant Blair had often been a guest at the Milligan residence, and perhaps more relevantly to our topic, the young Spike was mesmerised by Blair's writings, his views on India and opinions on authority. This latter intertwine is especially noteworthy as Blair served as police officer with the Indian Imperial Police in Burma from 1922–1927, and it is just as important to take note of the fact that he had resigned from this profession. As for the timeline, Spike's family left India in 1933, which meant that Spike was at the ripe age of fifteen years old (at most) when being instilled by Orwellisms. Interestingly, the book Sergeant Blair had been working on at the time turned out to be *Burmese Days* and brought him acknowledgement as well as the penname George Orwell.

The first half of the poem, *India, India!* Milligan composed later, in maturity (though, according to his biographer Pauline Scudamore, „he never matured”⁷) sheds light on a British colonialist upbringing where insider and outsider viewpoints are present and merged:

India! India!

*As a boy
I watched India through fresh Empirical eyes.
Inside my young khaki head
I grew not knowing any other world.
My father was a great warrior
My mother was beautiful
and never washed dishes,
other people did that,
I was only 4, I remember
they cleaned my shoes,
made my bed.
'Ither ow'
'Kom Kurrow...'⁸*

Its careful wording would suggest untainted opinion, „fresh” eyes of a

⁶ Pauline SCUDAMORE: *Spike Milligan – A Biography*. Grafton Books, London, 1985. 55.

⁷ Pauline SCUDAMORE: *Spike Milligan – A Biography*. Grafton Books, London, 1985. 30.

⁸ Pauline SCUDAMORE: *Spike Milligan – A Biography*. Grafton Books, London, 1985. 30.

British person born in India. But this is false naivety. Despite the poem's childishness, he already has a „*khaki head*”, so any evidence he sees is perforce „*Empirical*”, however empirical. Thus, he is already an outsider.

Backgrounds of the essays

Following on from this line of similarity in thought, their immediate motive is also key: 'Marrakech' was composed during the spring of 1939 after Orwell journeyed south in the winter of 1938 for half a year, a pensive period of rest and recuperation, and started his novel *Coming Up for Air*. This essay became a sample for writing the novel. Milligan clarified his North African involvement in his diary some thirty years later: „*I could never have afforded all this travel on my own. It had to be the hard way...*”⁹

Akin to *Aden*, 'Marrakech' consists of a series of disjointed passages, loosely related and highly personal experiences of the author wandering through the mystical Orient. Following Edward Said's theses in *Orientalism* as well as in *Culture and Imperialism*, British representations of colonial spaces and cultures are defined by a rhetoric of power, both physical and moral.¹⁰ I would argue that yet another parallel can be found in the two pieces: their writers act both as (insider) narrator and (outsider) audience. Strangely, insider-outsider positions are merged and intertwined in the colonial space, which creates hybridity, hybrid identity and hybrid positions.¹¹

More precisely, Orwell had been a chief social forecaster and broadcaster of interwar Morocco, whereas Milligan joined the British Army at the outbreak of the Second World War on the North African and Italian fronts, and found work in radio comedy afterwards as performer and script writer.¹² Those turbulent years, remembering Winston Churchill's words, he modestly referred to as „*hyper-activity on the beaches*”¹³. This insider-outsider presence can be found all throughout, not only as privileged subjects but also as distanced observers: Orwell resided in the outskirts of the city, whilst Milligan penned the drafts of his letters from aboard a ship. They both mapped out scenes of subjectly compliance, failure of the establishment, manifestations of extreme poverty and the plight of work.

⁹ Roger LEWIS: 'Murder by Potato Peeler', 2.

¹⁰ Edward SAID: *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books, New York, 1978. Edward SAID: *Culture and Imperialism*. Vintage Books, New York, 1994.

¹¹ On hybridity, see further: Homi K. BHABHA: *The Location of Culture*. Routledge, London, New York, 1994.

¹² http://www.bigredbook.info/spike_milligan_1.html Accessed: 15 January 2018.

¹³ Roger LEWIS: 'Murder by Potato Peeler', 2.

Welcome to the scene

Milligan had definitely developed an acute sense of poetic perception and awareness in humanity while serving in Aden and its environs as signaller of the 56th Heavy Regiment of the Royal Artillery, D Battery.¹⁴ As for the earlier suggested difficulty of dating his letter, it was definitely included in his first volume of poems, stories and drawings, *A Dustbin of Milligan* in the chapter *Letters to Harry Secombe* published in 1961. According to another letter written in 1977 to a certain Mr Stephen Gard, found in *The Spike Milligan Letters*, Milligan dispels the myth he could have included Secombe in his war memoirs earlier than the fourth volume: „*Then you are worried because as yet I have not mentioned my meeting with Secombe and later Sellers. I met Secombe in Italy, which will be in vol 4 [...] I'm sorry, I can't put back the clock to meet Secombe in 1941, to alleviate your disappointment.*”¹⁵ It is recorded that his Regiment embarked for North Africa in January 1943. The five letters are dated April, and in April 1944, they had already been in Europe. The same timeline is followed by Mártonfi in *Portrayals of the British Army in the Second World War in Post-War Humour Shows*.¹⁶ Thus, it seems very likely that his letters, among them *Aden* were drafted to his friend in the spring of 1943.

An illustrative first example of such awareness in humanity comes in the aftermath of their setting off – and although humanity is a much debated concept, by it, I understand solidarity, the recognition of basic human dignity, and an equality of rights of humans of any colour, nation or gender: „*Harry and I got up early to enjoy the sight of Africa at first light. We saw it bathed in a translucent, pre-dawn, purple aura.*”¹⁷ With the same spirit, natural phenomena merged with colours appear poetically in *Aden's* part I: „*Around us is the Red Sea, a festering green sheet of unskimmed molten brass*”¹⁸ and part II: „*the pendants of constellation Castor, Pollux, Andromeda all glitter in the velvet darkness, like old oily chips on boiled haddock.*”¹⁹ However with the latter, an undoubtedly poetic picture turns into grim reality. The closing lines of his correspondence nicely frame his letters, highlighting social injustice out on the decks: „*What a beautiful morning it's been out on deck. And it was*

¹⁴ Roger LEWIS: *'Murder by Potato Peeler'*, 2.

¹⁵ *The Spike Milligan Letters* (ed. Norma FARNES) Penguin Books, Suffolk, 1979. 141.

¹⁶ Anna MÁRTONFI: *Portrayals of the British Army in the Second World War in Post-War Humour Shows – Analysis of the Goon Show and Monty Python's Flying Circus – Through the Lenses of War*, MA thesis, 2008. I would like to thank Anna Mártonfi for her expert help in reconstructing the timeline.

¹⁷ Pauline SCUDAMORE: *Spike Milligan – A Biography*. Grafton Books, London, 1985. 124.

¹⁸ Spike MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*, Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 55.

¹⁹ Spike MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 57.

a beautiful morning on the bridge as well. [...] Only on the third class tourist class passengers' deck was it a sultry overcast dull morning, but then if you do things on the cheap you must expect these things."²⁰ All in all, before we would imagine that everything went smoothly within the territory of the Empire, we are confronted with its failures.

Audience and narrator

This attitude leads us to how they play the role of audience and narrator. It demands courage to write about sensitive subjects such as colonialism (especially as *subjects* of the British Empire). And although criticism of the establishment is obvious in both writings, it remains challenging to reconcile humanistic thoughts with the crude colonial scene. As a shield, Milligan uses bouleversement. Orwell, probably in the same spirit, uses detachment for a similar purpose. Whenever he gives descriptions, he does not forget to emphasise that he is „*merely pointing to a fact*”²¹ or facts. Of course, these facts are his facts – subjective detachments – and inasmuch as they are subjective, the subjectively described situation clamours for some liberation to be offered – which is not there, Orwell merely draws attention to phenomena. Thereby, his style provokes a disturbing feeling, a feeling of unrest. Perhaps this is why some critics²² are not entirely convinced he succeeds in retaining humanistic values. Orwell is standing out as a benevolent outsider in what seems to be an abandoned landscape, which is why his critics state that at least on a symbolic level, he does not allow the humanity of humans to unfold or even „*denies the natives the right to be human*”²³. Yet, I would argue that by doing what he does, by letting writing be as it is, he causes the reader to react with indignation and manages to focus on the problem without a magnifying glass. The often-mentioned invisibility of human beings is made visible when Orwell draws attention to their invisibility, stating: „*[w]hen you walk through a town like this [...] it is always difficult to believe that you are walking among human beings.*”²⁴

The establishment

Following on from these points of view, observers, among them,

²⁰ MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 59.

²¹ 'Marrakech' in George Orwell, *Such Such Were the Joys*, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1953. 124.

²² <https://writingthemaghreb.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/orwell%E2%80%99s-marrakech-desolate-spaces-dehumanised-subjects/> Accessed: 15 January 2018

²³ <https://writingthemaghreb.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/orwell%E2%80%99s-marrakech-desolate-spaces-dehumanised-subjects> Accessed: 15 January 2018

²⁴ 'Marrakech' in George Orwell, *Such Such Were the Joys*, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1953. 121.

Edward Said, reckoned that „*keeping the Orient selectively organized and disorganized, positions the West as the privileged observer that objectifies and governs Orientals for their own benefit*”.²⁵ Indeed, Orwell was looking at aspects of native life in an interwar Marrakech that was populated by a Muslim majority, a Jewish minority and a small group of Europeans at the time, the authority of whom was served by Senegalese soldiers when writing that „*I tore off a piece and he [an Arab navvy] stowed it gratefully in some secret place under his rags. This man is an employee of the Municipality.*” First of all, he clearly attributes responsibility of or at least connection to the extant rule, the imperial apparatus. Moreover, he renders visible the fact that even though these people do work and are part of the legal system, it is futile and insufficient on their part in the struggle for a living. Second, being a correspondent at the time was somewhat akin to acting as a human rights activist now: dangerous and divisive. What he did by drawing attention is magnifying the shortcomings of the Empire he was a part of.

Aden, depicted here on a contemporary hand-coloured photograph²⁶, was captured by the British in January 1839 and remained an important British port until 1967, first run by the East India Company and then as a colony. It is worthy to remember that Milligan’s letter was published in 1961 when Aden had still been part of the



British Empire. He illustrates the city with nonsensical phlegm mingled with disrespect: „*At last I was to step on a part of the British Empire! Last time I was in Aden in 1933 it was just a dirty hot coaling station. Today it is just a dirty hot coaling station.*”²⁷ His critique of the British Empire is not restricted to Britain, his remarks shake the pillars of the British establishment at its very foundations. He snaps at British rule by first stating its existence, then its misery, praising the institution by its weaknesses while alluding to the failures of its canonised figures

²⁵ Edward SAID: *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books, New York, 1978. 228. 251.

²⁶ As part of the exhibition ‘*Buildings That Fill My Eye: Architectural Heritage of Yemen*’. The postcards were principally aimed at British servicemen and passing steamship passengers. They show the almost brutal functionality of a modern port with piles of coal beside the piers and lighters bringing passengers ashore from the steamships anchored in the bay. Heavy military presence is implicit in the predominance of barracks and telecommunications infrastructure, showing the harbour and municipal buildings. Source: <https://blog.britishmuseum.org/postcards-from-aden/> Accessed 15 January 2018.

²⁷ MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 55.

(Admiral Nelson's fall), shameful elements (disorganisation), all the while repeating the keyword British to associate it with tarnished reputation:

I got a lot of wonderful snaps of [...] British soldiers on guard outside the British barracks [...]. I shook hands with a friendly Arab... I still have my right hand to prove it! Nevertheless, everywhere are signs of organized British rule... all those happy fights in the café. [...] Those happy greetings that hang from every window: 'Tommy go home'. [...] From the Yemen hills beyond came happy sounds of rifle fire.²⁸

He presents the British Empire at its worst, and alluding to a drowning Englishman, he debunks another old myth relating to Britishness: „It's homely fun like this that makes us the great seafaring people we are.”

To continue, following a heated evening of flamenco, he felt the urge to spring up and do the Palais Glide: „Who said we British didn't have it in us?”²⁹ But he did it naked. Strangely, this British dance could only be made visible to foreign eyes with the socially unacceptable act of nudity. Only nudity could stir up the still waters that were British values conveyed by the slow, conventional moves of the dance.

The plight of work

Another instance when both Orwell and Milligan render visible what they deem invisible at first is related to an already mentioned aspect of colonialism: the plight of work and its rewards. Said suggested that „the non-European known to Europeans is precisely what Orwell says about him. He is either a figure of fun, or an atom in a vast collectivity”³⁰ The invisibility of working humans presented as a mass-phenomenon, in Orwell's no-comment style broadcast is as follows: „All people who work with their hands are partly invisible, and the more important the work they do, the less visible they are. [...] But what is strange about these people is their invisibility. [...] though they had registered themselves on my eyeballs I cannot truly say that I had seen them.”³¹ Milligan's report of a botched-up situation is somewhat different when travellers are forced to work: „All passengers [are] in the

²⁸ MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 55.

²⁹ MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 58.

³⁰ Edward SAID: *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books, New York, 1978. 252.

³¹ 'Marrakech' in George Orwell, *Such Such Were the Joys*, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1953. 124.

sea helping push the ship off sandbank"³². This would seem a work done out of pure necessity until the punchline reveals an additional information, one that shocks us merely because of its agents and because we are used to observing the colonial scene as Orwell depicts it. „*Unless the Orient was seen for what it was, its power – military, material, spiritual – would sooner or later overwhelm Europe. The great colonial empires, great systems of systematic repression, existed to fend off the feared eventuality [of a rebellion]. Colonial subjects, as George Orwell saw them in Marrakech in 1939, must not be seen except as a kind of continental emanation, African, Asian, Oriental.*”³³ It becomes clear that the outsiders, the travellers are not doing their originally assigned higher tasks but a lowly one usually attributed to colonial subjects. By the time we imagine a common plight in which passengers and the crew are drawn together by one cause (pushing the ship off sandbank) we are to face the truth: „*[a]ll the crew stand at the rails shouting encouragement.*”³⁴

Spivak warns that „*[t]he clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other.*”³⁵

By making the invisible visible and contrasting the fate of working humans and working animals, Orwell further contradicts any indirect accusations of Said or Said's followers that „*writing is an act of denial of the Other, of erasure of the multiple possibilities of existence in favour of one unified and monolithic discourse*”.³⁶ Orwell sheds light on the different reactions to the treatment of humans and animals, respectively:

*I suppose I had not been five minutes on Moroccan soil before I noticed the overloading of the donkeys and was infuriated by it. There is no question that the donkeys are damnably treated. After a dozen years of devoted work it suddenly drops dead, whereupon its master tips it into the ditch and the village dogs have torn its guts out before it is cold. This kind of thing makes one's blood boil, whereas – on the whole – the plight of the human beings does not. I am not commenting, merely pointing to a fact. People with brown skins are next door to invisible.*³⁷

³² MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 54.

³³ Edward SAID: *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books, New York, 1978. 251.

³⁴ MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 54.

³⁵ Gayatri Chakravorty SPIVAK: 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' IN: Patrick WILLIAMS and Laura CHRISMAN (ed.): *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory. A Reader*. Columbia University Press, 1994. 66–111.

³⁶ <https://writingthemaghreb.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/orwell%E2%80%99s-marrakech-desolate-spaces-dehumanised-subjects/> Accessed: 15 January 2018

³⁷ 'Marrakech' in George Orwell, *Such Such Were the Joys*, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1953. 124.

I would argue that these observations depict how much territory each living creature could occupy in a land that was defined by colonial terms. That is: colonial space. Their deaths are also similar: for deceased humans there is „[n]o gravestone, no name, no identifying mark of any kind. The burying-ground is merely a huge waste of hummocky earth, like a derelict building-lot.”³⁸

A disturbingly similar scene is recounted in relation to the plight of workers by both the essay and the letter. The wealthier outsider steps in the midst of poor colonised subjects and is encircled at the sight of his possessions. „Instantly, from the dark holes all round, there was a frenzied rush of Jews, many of them old grandfathers with flowing grey beards, all clamouring for a cigarette. [...] None of these people, I suppose, works less than twelve hours a day, and every one of them looks on a cigarette as a more or less impossible luxury.”³⁹ Their contribution to the labour is duly noted, it is not left invisible. Yet, the writer remains an outsider and keeps silent about the role of the French colonial establishment. In turn, descending the gangplank in Aden, Milligan notices: „We hit the Arab caravan halting places. Everywhere there were miserable wretches moaning: ‘Buckshees!’”⁴⁰ Any reader would be quick to draw parallels with the Orwellian description until reading on: „they were all the tourist passengers off the ship”.⁴¹ Milligan likes to refer to people as „all the” as if they were one universal entity. All in all, the moment humans are finally shown miserable, they are recognised and acknowledged. And they are perhaps recognised because, surprisingly, they do not belong to the colonised group.

I would like to end my analysis on a note given by the second and final stanza of Milligan’s *India, India!*, depicting, naming, thus making visible the moral stance of „other people”, in contrast with those wearing the khaki uniforms of the British Empire.

...Yet, in time I found them gentler
than the khaki people.
They smiled in their poverty
After dark, when the khaki people
were drunk in the mess
I could hear Minema and
her family praying in their godown.

³⁸ ‘Marrakech’ in George Orwell, *Such Such Were the Joys*, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1953. 121.

³⁹ ‘Marrakech’ in George Orwell, *Such Such Were the Joys*, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1953. 122.

⁴⁰ MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 55.

⁴¹ MILLIGAN: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961. 55.

*In the bazaar the khaki men
are brawling.
No wonder they asked us to leave.*⁴²

Conclusion

To summarise, this analysis ventured to bring together two pieces of writing that are different in form – a sociological essay and a correspondence – yet very similar in their subtle criticism of the colonial establishment. They did not wish to write fiction or glorify colonial rule. Orwell managed to unveil hitherto unseen aspects of this criticism by non-commenting on subjects that would otherwise crave for a comment. Thereby, I argued, he evoked indignation and made the invisible visible, whilst Milligan captured the readers' attention by turning the state of affairs upside down, via the employment of war-forged, sarcastic humour. Finally, discussing the topics of the establishment and the plight of work, I aimed to show that Orwell and Milligan took on the role of both audience and narrator, born as insiders in British India but remaining outsiders during their observation of local colonial subjects.

Bibliography,

- BHABHA, Homi K.: *The Location of Culture*. Routledge, London, New York, 1994.
LEWIS, Roger: 'Murder by Potato Peeler – How Spike Milligan Tried to Knock off Peter Sellers', on Spike Milligan, *Milligan's Meaning of Life by Spike Milligan – An Autobiography of Sorts* (ed. Norma Farnes), Penguin, London, 2012.
MÁRTONFI, Anna: *Portrayals of the British Army in the Second World War in Post-War Humour Shows – Analysis of the Goon Show and Monty Python's Flying Circus – Through the Lenses of War*, MA thesis, 2008.
MILLIGAN, Spike: *A Dustbin of Milligan*. Dennis Dobson, London, 1961.
MILLIGAN, Spike: *The Spike Milligan Letters* (ed. Norma Farnes) Penguin Books, Suffolk, 1979.
ORWELL, George: *Such Such Were the Joys*, Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1953.
SAID, Edward: *Culture and Imperialism*. Vintage Books, New York, 1994.
SAID, Edward: *Orientalism*. Pantheon Books, New York, 1978.
SCUDAMORE, Pauline, *Spike Milligan – A Biography*. Grafton Books, London, 1985.
SPIVAK, Gayatri Chakravorty: 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' IN: Patrick WILLIAMS and Laura CHRISMAN (ed.): *Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory. A Reader*. Columbia University Press, 1994.

⁴² Pauline SCUDAMORE: *Spike Milligan – A Biography*. Grafton Books, London, 1985. 30.

Internet sources

The British Museum, 21 July, 2017 <https://blog.britishmuseum.org/postcards-from-aden/>

Big Red Book: Spike Milligan http://www.bigredbook.info/spike_milligan_1.html

Writing the Maghreb, Orwell's Marrakech: Desolate Spaces, Dehumanised Subjects,
11 July 2011 <https://writingthemaghreb.wordpress.com/2011/07/11/orwell%E2%80%99s-marrakech-desolate-spaces-dehumanised-subjects/>

(Accessed: 15 January 2018)

M. Madarász Anita¹

Magyarország brit szemszögből, 1945–1955

Abstract

After World War II, the formation of British-Soviet relations defined and shaped the attitude of the United Kingdom to Central and Eastern European countries. After the Second World War, the question of attitude towards Hungary became increasingly problematic and complicated: relations between the United Kingdom and Hungary yielded a positive or negative balance. The intensity of the British-Hungarian relationship was influenced by several negative factors. The British were not able to sweep under the carpet the fact that Hungary belonged to the Soviet sphere of interests, and we could not examine and interpret the British and Hungarian relations without excluding Soviet interests. This paper does not attempt to present the common history of these years of the two countries: it only briefly outlines what the significance of the Soviet sphere of interest meant, what was the position of the British leadership on the Hungarian government. What were the international and domestic political events that made the relationship between the two countries more and more disturbed and what were the 1950s moments that started to bring foreign policy events into a more positive direction.

Keywords: Hungary; the United Kingdom; Soviet sphere of interest, viewpoint of British leadership about Hungary; strained relations; Philip J. Noel-Baker; Clement Attlee; István Bede; Sir Geoffrey Wallinger;



Magyarország megítélése egy új helyzetben²

„Nem tudom, mi többet tehetnék.”³

(Ernest Bevin)

„Magyarország kapcsolatai Angliával a Moszkvában aláírt fegyverszüneti egyezmény értelmében a Szövetséges Ellenőrző Bizottság tagjaként működő angol katonai és ennek mellérendelt politikai misszió Debrecenbe történt megérkezésével kezdődtek meg.”⁴ A második világ-

¹ Történész, PhD, Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottságának Hivatala, Budapest, anita.madarasz87@gmail.com

² A tanulmány csupán bizonyos, a szerző által kiemelt eseményeket, jelentéseket mutatja be, nem törekszik arra, hogy részletesen, mindenre kiterjedően megvizsgálja a brit-magyar kapcsolatok 1945–1956 közötti történetét.

³ EGEDY Gergely: *Nagy-Britannia és Magyarország, 1945–1948*, Grotius, - <http://www.grotius.hu/publ/displ.asp?id=EARHLE> – 2015. 08. 10. 6.

⁴ Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL) MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. Magyarország és Nagy-Britannia kapcsolatai 1945-ben. 1.

háborút követően a brit–szovjet viszony alakulása határozta meg, illetve formálta az Egyesült Királyság hozzáállását a közép- és keleti-európai országokhoz. A második világháborút követően a Magyarországhoz való viszonyulás kérdése egyre problémásabbá, bonyolultabbá vált: az Egyesült Királyság és Magyarország közötti kapcsolatok hol pozitív, hol negatív irányú mérleget produkáltak. A brit–magyar reláció intenzitását több negatív tényező befolyásolta. 1945 után a két eltérő beállítottságú, politikai berendezkedésű és a világháborúban ellentétes oldalon hadat viselő ország nem volt olyan helyzetben, hogy intenzív kapcsolatokat ápoljon egymással. Az 1945 utáni időszak, a kialakult bipoláris világrend mind Magyarország, mind az Egyesült Királyság számára komoly változásokat és próbatételeket eredményezett: az egyik oldal szovjet érdekszférába került, melynek köszönhetően önállóságát béklyóba kötötték, s a kitérés lehetőségek minimálisak voltak a geopolitikai elhelyezkedés miatt. A problémához természetesen hozzátartozott az is, hogy a Szövetséges Ellenőrző Bizottságon belül a Magyarországot érintő kérdésekben a szovjetek szinte kizárólagos beleszólási joggal rendelkeztek. A magyar vezetés ilyen szempontból egy újabb *kényszerpályán* találta magát.⁵ S nem lévén önálló külpolitika, nehéz volt bármilyen kapcsolatot létesíteni egy nyugati demokratikus berendezkedésű országgal. A másik oldal ugyan győztesen került ki a második világháborúból, ám veszteségei komoly válságot idéztek elő mind belpolitikáját, mind külpolitikáját tekintve. A második világégés végére nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy az európai hatalmak szerepe jelentős mértékben csökkent az USA és a Szovjetunió térnyerésének köszönhetően: a brit politika világban gyakorolt befolyása és súlya jelentős mértékben redukálódott, ami egyben azt is jelentette, hogy a brit vezetésnek át kellett gondolnia addigi orientációját...⁶

A szovjet érdekszférába való tartozás tényét a britek sem tudták a szőnyeg alá söpörni és nem is lehet a brit–magyar kapcsolatokat a szovjet érdekeket kizárva vizsgálni és értelmezni. Az 1945 és 1956 közötti időszak brit–magyar kapcsolatának történetét számos kiváló munkában feldolgozták. Jelen tanulmány nem is tesz kísérletet arra, hogy pontról pontra bemutassa a két ország ezen éveinek közös történetét, csupán röviden felvázolja, hogy mit jelentett a szovjet érdekszférába tartozás, milyen álláspontot képviselt a brit vezetés a magyar kormánnyal kapcsolatban, melyek voltak azok a nemzetközi és belpolitikai események, melyek egyre jobban elmérgesítették a két ország közötti kapcsolatot, és hogy

⁵ Magyarországról és az 1940-es évekbeli kényszerpályáról lásd: ZEIDLER Miklós: *Mozgástér a kényszerpályán. A magyar külpolitika „választásai” a két háború között*. IN: ROMSICS Ignác (szerk.). *Mítoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar történelemről*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 162–205.

⁶ Erről lásd bővebben: M. MADARÁSZ Anita: *Az Egyesült Királyság szerepe Európa talpra állításában, 1945-1955*. *Öt Kontinens, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék Közleményei*. N° 2014/2. ELTE BTK, 2017. 45–64.

melyek voltak azok az 1950-es évekbeli momentumok, melyek pozitívabb irányba kezdték sodorni a külpolitikai eseményeket.

A magyar kormány és a brit álláspont

„Nem tartják kissé szokatlannak, hogy egy vesztes ország számára kérnek támogatást egy győztesel szemben?”
(Philip Noel-Baker)⁷

A Foreign Office-ban már 1945 folyamán arról beszéltek, hogy a Szovjetunió megkaparintotta Közép-és Kelet-Európát és semmi áron nem hajlandó kiadni ezen országokat a kezéből. Az Egyesült Királyság külpolitikai vezetése számára közben az is világossá vált, hogy semmit sem tehetnek annak érdekében, hogy megállítsák, illetve visszaszorítsák a szovjetek gazdasági és politikai hatalmát az említett térségben. Ennek részben már a korábbiakban megfogalmazott problémák szolgáltak magyarázatul: az Egyesült Királyság hatalma és ereje ehhez már kevés volt. Emiatt Bede István londoni magyar követ szavaival élve, „*lehetőleg minden olyan lépéstől igyekszik magát távol tartani, amely számára akár egyik, akár másik vonatkozásban [ti. külpolitika és gazdaság] új kötelezettségvállalást, új súrlódási felület lehetőségét jelenthetné*”.⁸ A mások a geopolitikai elhelyezkedésben rejlett: a Szovjetunió túl közel volt ehhez a területhez, így különösebb gond nélkül tudta alakítani és befolyása alá vonni a térség államait, az Egyesült Királyság pedig túlságosan messze volt ahhoz, hogy érdemben bármit is cselekedhessen.⁹ Nézzük meg távolabbról a kérdést: Közép- és Kelet-Európát – ahogyan azt Egedy Gergely is megfogalmazta – az angolszász vezetés geopolitikai szemszögből értékelte és súlyozta. Sem az USA, sem pedig az Egyesült Királyság nem tartotta volna szerencsésnek, ha a szovjetek egyfajta „*ugródeszkaként*” használják a térség országait a további terjeszkedés érdekében. E mellett azonban azt is látni kell, hogy a régió egyetlen országa sem volt annyira fontos, hogy érte komolyabb konfrontációt vállaltak volna a Szovjetunióval szemben.¹⁰

⁷ BALOGH Sándor: *Magyarország külpolitikája 1945–1950*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1988. 201.

⁸ MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. 45/pol.-1946. A magyar kormányférfiak látogatásának mérlege. 1946. június 28.

⁹ MAGYARICS Tamás: *Nagy-Britannia Közép-Európa politikája 1918-tól napjainkig*. Grotius – <http://www.grotius.hu/publ/displ.asp?id=RHIXRV> – 2015. 07. 25. 36.

¹⁰ EGEDY Gergely: *Nagy-Britannia és Magyarország, 1945–1948*. Grotius, 2009. 1–7. 1. [a továbbiakban: EGEDY (2009)] http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/EARHLE/2009_01_egedy.pdf – 2016. 07. 28.

1945 márciusában a Foreign Office helyettes államtitkára, Sir Orme Sargent készített egy részletes memorandumot, amely abból a feltevésből indult ki, hogy a Duna-medence térsége egyrészt „nem életbevágó fontosságú” az Egyesült Királyság számára, másrészt pedig „védhetetlen” területet képez a szovjetekkel szemben, ezért csupán egyetlen lehetőség maradt: „csendesesen el kell majd fogadni” az új közép- és kelet-európai kormányokat.¹¹ A brit és amerikai vezetés álláspontja a politikai beavatkozás terén eltérő elemeket foglalt magában. A minél árnyaltabb megfogalmazás kedvéért, ebben az esetben pontosan idézzük Egedy Gergely szavait: „A brit és az amerikai megközelítés ugyanakkor, amint azt jó néhány történész joggal hangsúlyozta, több vonatkozásban is különbözött; a superhatalommá vált Egyesült Államok erőteljesebb ellenállást mutatott az orosz terjeszkedéssel szemben, mint az új bipoláris világrendben másodrendű hatalommá süllyedő, s a háborúban alaposan kimerült Nagy-Britannia. A brit külpolitika hagyományaiiba egyébként is jól illeszkedett a kompromisszumokon nyugvó erőegyensúly eszméjének az elfogadása, a befolyási szférák informális kialakítása és tudomásul vétele.”¹² Magyarország 1944 decemberében megválasztott kormányát a brit vezetés nem volt hajlandó elfogadni, mondván, nem feleltek meg az 1945. júliusi potsdami konferencián elfogadott képviseleti és demokratikus feltételeknek. Annak ellenére, hogy hivatalosan nem fogadták el a kormányt, a britek képviseltették magukat az országban politikai és katonai misszió formájában,¹³ bár a Szövetséges Ellenőrző Bizottságon belüli szovjet túlsúly miatt, a szerepük nem volt domináns.

Mindamellet, hogy a diplomáciai kapcsolatok nem tudtak az adott körülmények között meghatározóak lenni, a briteket egy bizonyos szinten mégis foglalkoztatta a magyar kérdés. A második világháború magyarországi borzalmairól például a neves brit lap, a Times diplomáciai levelezője is megemlékezett az 1945. március 15-i számban, *Számosan halnak meg Budapesten nap mint nap* című írásában: „A németek azon döntése, hogy csatlósuk fővárosát erődítményként használják, az emberek tömegei számára borzasztó következményekkel járt. A város gáz nélkül maradt, a vízszolgáltatás csekély és részleges. Kevés élelemhez jut a város, és kevés üzlet nyitott ki újra. Naponta halnak éhen emberek. Holttestek ezrei mindmáig temetetlenül hevernek, a várost aláak-

¹¹ EGEDY Gergely: *Nagy-Britannia története. 1918–1990. A rövid XX. század.* Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 2011. 102.

¹² EGEDY (2009): 2.

¹³ Erről lásd bővebben: FIGDER Éva: *Brit diplomáciai törekvések Magyarországon, 1945-1947.* IN Frank Tibor (szerk.): *Angliától Nagy-Britanniáig. Magyar Kutatók tanulmányai a brit történelemről,* Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2004. 357–372. M. MADARÁSZ Anita: *Barcza – Szent-Györgyi – Gascoigne. Magyar-brit kapcsolatok három diplomata tevékenysége alapján (1941-1946),* IN: Soós Viktor Attila (szerk.): *Súlypontáthelyezés a diplomáciában. A NEB Külügyi Munkacsoportjának Tanulmányai,* I. Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága, Budapest, 2015. 81–127.

násították. A főváros keleti része sokkal nagyobb pusztuláson ment keresztül, mint a nyugati rész. A királyi palotát lerombolták, a brit követiséget is nagy kár érte. Az orosz hatóságok és az Ideiglenes Kormány mindent megtesz, hogy eltakarítsák a romokat, hogy a közművek ismét a lakosság szolgálatába álljanak, de – minthogy Budapest még mindig küzdőtér – a haladás lassú.”¹⁴ A magyar közvélemény komoly reményeket fűzött a britekhez és az amerikaiakhoz, e várakozások azonban sajnos minden alapot nélkülöztek. „Amikor a magyarok a briteknél és az amerikaiaknál próbálták támogatást keresni a szovjet nyomással szemben, csak elutasításra leltek: sem a britek, sem az amerikaiak nem voltak hajlandók sem valódi, sem politikai tőkét költeni egy olyan országban, amelyet már korábban leírtak, mint a szovjet érdekszférába tartozó egyik közép-európai államot.”¹⁵ A háború végét követően az egyik legfontosabb nemzetközi feladat a békekötések lebonyolítása volt – a nagyhatalmak még a potsdami konferencián egyeztek meg abban, hogy a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa készíti elő a békekonferenciát.¹⁶ A britek összességében egyre kisebb befolyással bírtak a közép-európai országokat illetően a békeszerződések¹⁷ megszövegezése terén. Mi több, a brit kormánynak fel kellett adnia a háború alatt megfogalmazott területrendezési terveit, abból az okból kifolyólag, hogy a politikai realitások miatt azok szinte megvalósíthatatlannak bizonyultak. Ennek alapján a magyar, a román és a bolgár területi kérdéseket eleve a Szovjetunió hatáskörében hagyták, mivel Moszkva gyakorolta a tényleges ellenőrzést ezekben az országokban. A békeszerződések mellett a jóvátétel kérdésébe sem tudtak érdemben beleszólni a nyugati hatalmak a Szovjetunió által őrzött térségben. Annyit azonban magyar vonatkozásban sikerült elérni, hogy brit–amerikai nyomásra sikerült lealkudni 300 millióra az eredetileg 400 millió dolláros szovjet kártérítési követelést.¹⁸

1945 májusában ismét előtérbe került a magyar kormány legitimációs kérdése. Amikor Churchillnek és Trumannak azt javasolta Sztálin, hogy Romániát, Bulgáriát és Finnországot azonnal, Magyarországot a közeljövőben ismerjék el, se az Egyesült Királyság, se az USA nem fogadta el ezt a javaslatot. 1945. augusztus 7-én Alvary Frederick Gascoigne politikai misszióvezető találkozott Gyöngyösi János külügyminiszterrel: a beszélgetés során három területet érintettek, a potsdami konferenciát, a brit választásokat és a magyar kormány elismerésének kérdését. Gascoigne

¹⁴ H. HARASZTI Éva: *Anglia és Magyarország párhuzamos története, 1945–1951*. Scolar Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 93.

¹⁵ MAGYARICS: 37–38.

¹⁶ A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsáról lásd bővebben HEGEDÜS Gyula: *Magyar-angol kapcsolatok, 1944–1956*. ELTE BTK, Budapest, 2011. (doktori disszertáció) 43–45. <http://doktori.btk.elte.hu/hist/hegedusgyula/diss.pdf> – 2016. 03. 24.

¹⁷ A magyar békeszerződésre e tanulmány keretei között nem térünk ki részletesen.

¹⁸ MAGYARICS: 40.

kijelentette, hogy a munkáspárti győzelem semmiféle módosításokat nem eredményezett Magyarország megítélésében. Vagyis, a brit kormány demokratikus kormányrendszert kívánna látni a továbbiakban is. Gyöngyösi megkérdezte, hogy mit értenek demokratikus kormányzat alatt? A misszióvezető erre kifejtette, hogy ez alatt a teljes politikai szabadságot, gyülekezési jogot, személy-és vagyonbiztonságot értik – hozzátette, ez a „feltételrendszer” az egész brit közvélemény álláspontját tükrözi. Gascoigne úgy vélte, hogy *„ebben a tekintetben Magyarországon még nincs teljesen tiszta demokrácia. Különösen a politikai rendőrségnek, főleg a fővárosban tapasztalható egyes túlkapásait tette kifogás tárgyává. Itt kell megjegyezni, hogy ez a kifogás nemcsak ekkor hangzott el, hanem több alkalommal és az angol misszió mély sajnálkozással vette tudomásul, hogy ezek a túlkapások nem igen akarnak megszűnni.”*¹⁹ Ugyanezt a véleményt fogalmazta meg nem sokkal később Ernest Bevin külügyminiszter is augusztus 20-án megtartott alsóházi beszédében. E szerint Magyarországon a kormány nem képviseli a nép nagy többségét és *„hogy a legújabb fejlemények szerint az egyik irányú totális rendszert felváltotta egy másik”*. S hogy ez a rendszer nem az, amit az Egyesült Királyságban demokráciának neveznek, így az ilyen kormány nem alkalmas arra, hogy felvegyék vele a diplomáciai kapcsolatokat.²⁰ Ennek ellenére azonban szeptemberben az amerikai kormány nagy meglepetésre elismerte a magyar kormányt.²¹ A britek viszont továbbra is kívártak. Szeptember 15-én Gyöngyösi és Gascoigne ismét találkoztak, mely során a politikai rendőrség szerepe ismét napirendre került: e probléma miatt a misszióvezető nem látott garanciát arra, hogy a közelgő választások tiszta lefolyásúak lesznek.²² John Haire brit munkáspárti képviselő 1945. októberi budapesti látogatása során úgy látta, hogy a magyar politikai helyzet *„bonyolult”* és *„kiélezett”*, rámutatott a gazdasági nehézségekre és *„elismeréssel állapította meg, hogy a magyar politikai élet vezetői realisztikusan és államférfiúi belátással közelítik meg a problémákat.”* Ezzel kapcsolatban azonban hozzátette, ezeket Magyarország egyedül nem képes megoldani, szüksége van az angolszászok és a szovjetek támogatására.²³ Mindezek tükrében az 1945. novemberi választások sem győzték meg teljesen a brit vezetést arról, hogy a megalakuló új magyar kormány teljesen független lesz-e, ennek ellenére rövidesen mégis megtörtént a diplomáciai elismerés. Bede egy 1946. szeptem-

¹⁹ MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. Magyarország és Nagy-Britannia kapcsolatai 1945-ben. 6.

²⁰ Uo.

²¹ EGEDY Gergely: *Nagy-Britannia és Magyarország, 1945-1948*. Grotius – <http://www.grotius.hu/publ/displ.asp?id=EARHLE> – 2015. 08. 10. 3.

²² MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. Magyarország és Nagy-Britannia kapcsolatai 1945-ben. 7.

²³ MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. John Haire angol munkáspárti képviselő budapesti látogatása. 40.827/Be. 1945. október 30.

ber 2-i jelentése pedig már arról értesítette a Külügyminisztériumot, hogy a brit sajtó egyre pozitívabb színben látja Magyarországot, és hogy egyre komolyabb figyelem kíséri a „külpolitikai érdeklődésű” közvélemény részéről. A magyar követ meglátása szerint „ez különösen akkor válik szembetűnővé a dolgok beavatott szemlélője előtt, ha tekintetbe vesszük az Angliában valóban meglévő »vasfüggöny« szemléletet, ami gyakorlatilag abban nyilvánul meg, hogy politikusok, sajtó és közvélemény egyaránt, érdeklődésük határát, a »vasfüggöny« előterében fektették le. Ami azon túl van, általában érdektelen a közvélemény számára, amely Délkelet-Európát, mint kényelmetlenségi zónát tekinti és az ott fekvő országok problémáinak érintésétől lehetőleg húzódozik. [...] Figyelmét inkább csak akkor fordítja ezek felé az országok felé, ha azok valamely konkrét kérdés során többnyire nagyhatalmi backgrounddal, a nagypolitika porondjára sodródnak, mely esetben viszont sajátos problémáik többnyire áldozatul esnek premeditált nagyhatalmi nézőpontoknak.”²⁴ Továbbfolytatva a gondolatmenetet, arra a megállapításra jut, hogy amennyiben csak és kizárólag a magyar helyzetet nézzük, akkor a legtöbb, amit a magyarok elérhetnek az az, hogy a hazánkban jelentkező problémákat a brit sajtó figyelemre méltatja és maximálisan objektívan vizsgálja meg. Ha ezek a feltételek megvalósulnak, akkor Bede szavaival élve „munkánk lassan bár, de egyre eredményesebb lehet”.²⁵

A kormány elismerése, a fokozódó érdeklődés, az egyre pozitívabb irányba mutató együttműködési kezdeményezések (lásd: gazdasági és kulturális kapcsolatok) ellenére, azonban szükséges rámutatni arra, hogy még ekkor is fogalmazódtak meg kemény kritikák Magyarországgal szemben. Erre kiváló példa a magyar kormány képviselőinek 1946. június végi londoni látogatása. A kapcsolatfelvétel célja az volt, hogy a béketárgyalásokat előkészítsék (ennek érdekében pár héttel korábban, 1946. június 8-án a kormányküldöttség Washingtonba utazott). A tárgyalások azonban nem sok jóval kecsegtettek a magyar fél számára. Londonban, Philip J. Noel-Baker külügyminiszter-helyettes június 21-én kijelentette, ne reménykedjenek abban, hogy támogatni fogja a magyar célokat, sőt, megkérdezte: „Nem tartják kissé szokatlanoknak, hogy egy vesztes ország számára kérnek támogatást egy győztes szemben?”²⁶ Clement Attlee miniszterelnök ennél kevésbé szívélyes módon tudatta véleményét a magyar politikai helyzetről a jelenlevőkkel. Hogy érzékeljük szavainak súlyát, a pontosság kedvéért segítségül hívjuk Bede István jelentésének egy részletét: Attlee „a magyar miniszterelnöktől [Nagy Ferenc – kieg. M. M. A.] sokszor hallotta emlegetni a demokráciát. Bár tudatában van

²⁴ MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. 85/pol/1946. Az angol sajtó álláspontja Magyarországgal kapcsolatban. Ch. Buckley cikke a Daily Telegraph-ban. 1946. szeptember 2. 1-2.

²⁵ Uo. 2.

²⁶ BALOGH (1988): 201.

annak, hogy ennek a szónak is, mint sok másnak, a különböző égtájak és a különböző használat folytán értelme részben módosult, mégis szükségesnek tartja kijelenteni, hogy *Őfelsége* kormánya a demokrácia lényeges elemének tekinti, hogy a kormányzatával ellenkező véleményét mindenki félelemtől mentesen vallhassa. Ő tehát, amikor a magyar kormány a határon túl élő magyar kisebbség érdekében emeli fel szavát és kér támogatást [lásd: Erdély, illetve csehszlovákiai magyarok kérdése – kieg. – M. M. A.], le szeretné szögezni, hogy nemcsak a határon túl élő etnikai kisebbségek tarthatnak igényt az emberi jogok teljességére, hanem ugyanilyen jogokban kell részesülnie az államhatáron belül élő azon kisebbségnek is, amelyik az uralkodó kormányzattól eltérő felfogást vall magáénak.”²⁷ Attlee hozzáállására viszont ellenpéldaként hozható fel Szakasits Árpád államminiszternek Christopher Warner államtitkárnál, a délkelet-európai csoport vezetőjénél tett látogatása 1946. november 5-én.²⁸ Ő ugyanis úgy vélte, hogy „Délkelet-Európában Magyarország politikai berendezkedése a legkielégítőbb”.²⁹ Érdeemes azonban még egyszer visszatérni a brit miniszterelnöknél tett látogatásra. A tárgyalás ugyanis a tekintetben is tanulságos volt a magyar delegáció számára, hogy nyilvánvalóvá vált: sem London, sem Washington, sem pedig Moszkva nem fogja támogatni a béketárgyalásokon elérni kívánt magyar célokat. Mindezt tetézte az, hogy az Egyesült Államokban történt diplomáciai látogatás azt is egyértelművé tette, hogy a nyugati hatalmak nem fognak fellépni Közép-és Kelet-Európában a Szovjetunióval szemben. Nagy Ferenc 1976-ban a BBC-nek (British Broadcasting Corporation) adott interjújában e szavakkal emlékezett vissza az amerikai látogatásra: „[James – kieg. M. M. A.] Byrnes amerikai külügyminiszterrel először washingtoni látogatásunk alkalmával, majd a párizsi béketárgyalásokon találkoztam. Mr. Byrnes mindkét alkalommal elárulta, hogy Közép-Kelet-Európában a kezdeményezés kizárólag a Szovjetunió kezében van. Békecéljaink támogatását csak arra azt esetre ígérte, ha azokra nézve maga a Szovjetunió tesz kezdeményező lépéseket.”³⁰ Az Attlee-vel való találkozás még egy érdekességre felhívja a figyelmet. Bede követ 1946. június 28-i jelentésében véleményezte a kormánydelegáció londoni látogatását. Ez alapján fel lehet tenni egy lényeges kérdést: miért fogadta a brit vezetés a magyarokat? A válasz megadá-

²⁷ MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. 41/pol/1946. A magyar kormányférfiak megbeszélései Attlee brit miniszterelnökkel. 1946. június 27.

²⁸ Szakasits Árpád, Kéthly Anna és Horváth Zoltán, a Népszava külpolitikai szerkesztője az 1946. november 8. és 10. között, Bournemouth-ban megtartott nemzetközi szocialista konferencián képviselték a magyarországi szociáldemokrata pártot.

²⁹ MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. 115/pol./1946. Szakasits Árpád miniszterelnökhelyettes angliai látogatása. 1946. november 14. 1–2.

³⁰ PALLAI Péter–SÁRKÖZI Mátyás: *Némi demokráciától a népi demokráciáig. A kommunista hatalomátvétel története Magyarországon a BBC-archívum tükrében (1945-1948)*. Helikon Kiadó, 2008. 67.

sa előtt egy pár mondat erejéig ki kell térni a brit gondolkodásmódra. Bede szerint a jelenlegi helyzet, vagyis a háború és békekötés közötti állapot egy átmeneti időszaknak tekinthető a brit politikában, s ezért a vezetés nem igen szeret bármit is pozitív vagy akár negatív véleménnyel illetni, hiszen az adott kérdésben a brit politika még nem határozta meg állásfoglalását. A magyarok londoni látogatása azonban ezt az állásfoglalást bizonyos szempontból kikényszerítette. „*A brit kormánynak nemcsak arról kellett nyilatkoznia, hogy mit akar tenni, vagy mit nem akar tenni, hanem ami még ennél is kényelmetlenebb, mit képes tenni és mit nem képes tenni az adott helyzetben.*”³¹ Ennek ismeretében tesszük fel még egyszer a kérdést: miért fogadta a brit vezetés a magyarokat? Bede István szerint erre két válasz adható. Egyrészt a brit kormány elejét kívánta venni, hogy szemrehányásokkal illessék akár magyar, akár más részről a tekintetben, hogy „*még azt a minimumot is megtagadta egy nehéz sorssal küszködő kormányzattól, amit a meghallgatás pusztán ténye jelent*”. A másik ok ennél is érdekesebb színben tünteti fel a brit politikusokat: ez a hiúság, „*amely nem tudta volna elviselni, hogy két nagyhatalom fővárosában [értsd: Moszkva, Washington – kieg. M. M. A.] tett látogatás után London a sorozatból kimaradjon, és ez olyként legyen értelmezhető ország-világ előtt, mintha a negligálást az angol világbirodalom tekintélyének csorbulása tenné indokolttá.*”³², a kialakuló új bipoláris világrend színpadán.

Mindezek ismeretében feltehető még egy kérdés: mennyiben volt elérhető és reális elgondolás, hogy az Egyesült Királyság aktív szerepet szánjon magának Magyarország demokratikus helyzetének javításában, formálásában? E tekintetben minden kétséget kizáróan kijelenthetjük, hogy függetlenül attól, hogy a britek miképpen – pozitívan vagy negatívan – vélekedtek a magyar helyzetről a sajtóban, illetve a hivatalos találkozókon, a szigetország tulajdonképpen végignézte a Rákosi-rendszer kiépülését, visszafogottan és olykor meglepően reagált a magyar belpolitikai fejleményekre (lásd például: Kovács Béla letartóztatása és Szovjetunióba hurcolása; Nagy Ferenc miniszterelnök lemondatása). Nem tehetvén mást, a brit vezetés látszólag belenyugodott abba, hogy Magyarország szovjet érdekszférába került. Azért látszólag, mert a politikai színpalak mögött ugyanakkor aggodalmát fejezte ki amiatt, hogy mi lesz a szovjetek következő lépése. Ezért például Maurice Peterson moszkvai brit nagykövetség³³ arra kapott utasítást, hogy Molotovtól kérjen felvilágosítást

³¹ MNL OL XIX J-1-a (Békeelőkészítő Osztály iratai). 72. doboz. 45/pol/1946. A magyar kormányférfiak londoni látogatásának mérlege. 1946. június 28. 2.

³² Uo.

³³ Több országban is ellátott diplomáciai feladatokat, utoljára a Szovjetunióban volt nagykövetség 1946 és 1949 között. Ezt követően nyugdíjba vonult. Életéről és pályafutásáról lásd önéletrajzi munkáját: Maurice PETERSON: *Both sides of the curtain: an autobiography*. Constable, London, 1950.

tást a Magyarországra vonatkozó szovjet elképzelésekről. Az Egyesült Királyság az USA-val ellentétben ugyan a nyílt tiltakozások helyett, inkább a körültekintőbb, csendesebb diplomáciai fogásokat alkalmazta, Petersonnak a magyar ügyekkel kapcsolatos kérdései mégis heves szovjet ellenreakciót váltottak ki, s a briteket azzal vádolták meg, hogy beavatkoznak a magyar belügyekbe. Bevin ezzel kapcsolatban csak annyit mondott: „Nem tudom, mi többet tehetnék.”³⁴

Véges türelem – egy szerződésen kívüli állapot

„A magyar nép a maga módján akarja berendezni életét és az a véleményünk, hogy más népeknek is a maguk eszméi szerint és a maguk módján kell berendezniük az életüket. Külcsönösen tiszteletben kell tartanunk egymás ideológiáját, életberendezését, államberendezését. Csakis ez lehet az alapja az országok között való megértésnek és tartós békének.”³⁵

(Csató István, a Minisztertanács elnöke titkára, 1951)

A szovjet érdekszférába tartozás, a kommunista rendszer fokozatos kiépülése, az 1947-es választási csalások, a magyar szociáldemokraták „eltüntetése” a politikai életből, a Mindszenty-per körülményei³⁶ („Mindszenty letartóztatása után az angol államférfiak egész sor rágalmozó kijelentést tettek, így többek között Herbert Morrison brit »munkáspárti« miniszter, McNeil külügyi államtitkár és Bevin.”)³⁷ finoman szólva sem tettek jót a nyugati országokkal való diplomáciai érintkezéseknek. E mozzanatoknak is köszönhetően a politikai, gazdasági és egyéb társadalmi – kulturális, tudományos – kapcsolataink az Egyesült Királysággal csak nagyon nehezen és lassan indultak el ismét. Gazdasági kapcsolatainkra erősen rányomta a bélyeget a Magyarország-

³⁴ EGEDY Gergely: *Nagy-Britannia és Magyarország, 1945–1948*. Grotius – <http://www.grotius.hu/publ/displ.asp?id=EARHLE> – 2015. 08. 10.

³⁵ MNL OL XIX-J-1-k (Nagy-Britannia) 5. doboz. 36. tétel. 02313.

³⁶ Ezekre az eseményekre, illetve az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződésre és megkötésének körülményeire részletesen nem térünk ki a tanulmányban. Mindszenty József-ről bővebben lásd: BALOGH Margit: *Mindszenty József I-II*. MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, Budapest, 2015.; illetve MINDSZENTY József: *Emlékirataim*. Szerk.: SOÓS Viktor Attila. Helikon Kiadó, Budapest, 2015. Az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződésről lásd: ROMSICS Ignác: *Az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződés*, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2006.; A magyar belpolitikáról többek között lásd bővebben: FEITL István, IZSÁK Lajos, SZÉKELY Gábor (szerk.): *Fordulat a világban és Magyarországon 1947-1949*, Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2000. GYARMATI György: *A Rákosi-korszak. Rendszerváltó fordulatok évtizede Magyarországon, 1945–1956*. ÁBTL-Rubicon, Budapest, 2013. KALMÁR Melinda: *Történelmi galaxisok vonzásában. Magyarország és a szovjetrendszer, 1945-1990*, Osiris, Budapest, 2014.

³⁷ MNL OL XIX-J-1-d. Mindszenty (1945–60) 6. doboz. 408/pol/res. I. Mindszenty-ügy – „Emberi jogok” kérdése. 1.

gon történt államosítások sora, amelyek brit érdekeltségeket is súlyosan érintettek.³⁸ Eröss János³⁹ követségi tanácsos, ideiglenes ügyvivő 1948 szeptemberében találkozott Hector McNeil brit külügyi államtitkárral. A megbeszélésen szóba kerültek a kereskedelmi kapcsolatok és az államosítások problematikája is: „Az első téma, amelyet felvetettem, a magyar–angol kereskedelmi kapcsolatok fejlődésének kérdése volt, miután tudtam, hogy McNeil az angol kormány fődelegátusa a kelet–nyugati kereskedelem kifejlesztését tárgyaló genfi E.C.E. konferencián. Amikor azt mondtam, hogy magyar részről mindent megtesznek az angol–magyar kereskedelem kedvező alakulása érdekében, McNeil kissé szkeptikusan megkérdezte: – Ön azt mondja, hogy »mindent«. De mi van a kompenzációkkal?

Erre én azt feleltem, hogy ez a kérdés a pénzügyi tárgyalások anyagát képezi és nem tudom, hogy miért zavarná meg az angol–magyar kereskedelem alakulását. Erre McNeil sajnálatát fejezte ki afölött, hogy Gallacher kommunista képviselő tegnap az angol alsóházban helyeslőleg idézte a csehszlovák és magyar munkások azon kijelentését, hogy a rabló kapitalistáknak nem adnak kompenzációt az államosított javakért. Szerinte Gallacher ezen kijelentése »általános megrökönyödést« váltott ki az alsóházban. Csodálkoztam, hogy egy magát szocialistának valló politikus ennyire azonosítja magát a tőkés érdekekkel (ilyen fokú nyíltság még angol munkáspárti miniszternél is ritkán észlelhető) és azt feleltem, hogy az államosítás Magyarországon a dolgozók érdekében történt s ezért a magyar tőkések kapnak valami kompenzációt, de természetesen nem régi vagyonuk és követeléseik arányában, hanem szociális szempontból indokolt megélhetési szükségletük szerint. Ami a külföldi részvényesek kártalanítását illeti, erre nézve törvényes províziók vannak és a követelések regisztrálása folyamatban van. Döntésre később kerül majd sor. McNeil erre nem inzisztált tovább és csak annyit mondott, hogy »természetesen mi is tisztában vagyunk azzal, hogy kompenzáció fizetésére csak olyan mértékben és tempóban került sor, amilyen mértékben ezt az Angliába irányuló magyar export fejlődése megengedi«.⁴⁰ Az államosítási botrányok mellett azonban azt is szükséges leszögezni, hogy 1945 és 1949 között az Egyesült Királyság volt (kivételesen a Szovjetunió után) Magyarország második legnagyobb kereskedelmi partnere. A magyar fél mezőgazdasági termékeket exportált, Angliából pedig félkész áruk és különböző gépipari berendezések érkeztek a három évre szóló kereskedelmi megállapodásoknak köszönhetően.

³⁸ Erről lásd bővebben: HEGEDŰS Gyula: *A brit tulajdon államosítása Magyarországon, 1945-1950*, Múltunk (52) 2007/4. 282–306.

³⁹ Eröss János 1948–1949 között töltötte be a követi posztot Londonban.

⁴⁰ MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia, 1945–1964) 4. doboz 14. tétel. 708/pol/res. Érkezett: 1948. szeptember 29. Tárgy: Látogatás Hector McNeil államminiszternél.

Arday Lajos megfogalmazásában, Bevin a gazdasági kapcsolatok felújításáról úgy nyilatkozott, hogy „Magyarországgal feltétlenül meg kell újítani a kereskedelmi kapcsolatokat, mert ez az egyetlen járható út a brit befolyás megőrzésére és erősítésére”.⁴¹

A magyarok Nyugatra történő emigrálásának kérdése szintén komoly észrevételeket vetett fel mindkét oldalon: „Megmondtam, hogy a magyar nép körében keserűen kommentálják azt, hogy elegendő az, hogy valaki magát a mai magyar rezsim ellenségének adja ki és máris angol tartózkodási és munkavállalási engedélyt kaphat, sőt nagy publicitásra tehet szert. [...] Ami pedig a magyar szociáldemokrata emigráció támogatását, vagy akár elismerését illeti, arra nézve csak azt mondhatja, amit már a Bevintől kapott teljes meghatalmazás alapján a cseheknek is és elsősorban Hubert Ripkának⁴² mondott, hogy tui.(tudniillik) a cseh emigránsoknak nem szabad azt remélniük, hogy az angol kormány egy csehszlovák ellenkormánynak »akárcsak az árnyékát is« hajlandó lenne Angliában megtűrni. Az emigránsok kaphatnak munkát Angliában, de ha nem dolgoznak, akkor nem fognak megélni, mert politikai célokra »egy pennyt« sem adnak nekik és arra sem fognak támogatást kapni, hogy publicitáshoz jussanak Angliában.”⁴³ Erőss János szerint mindez teljesen úgy hatott, mintha McNeil ki akarta volna zárni annak a lehetőségnek a feltételezését, hogy az Egyesült Királyságban a magyarok vagy más kelet-európai szocialisták bárminemű politikai támogatást kapnának tevékenységükhöz. „Kedvezőnek mondható, hogy éppen akkor tesz McNeil ilyen kijelentéseket, amikor Bán Antal és Bede István⁴⁴ a magyar szociáldemokrata emigráció szervezeteinek elismerése érdekében tárgyalnak Londonban. Azt hiszem, hogy erre a kijelentésre támaszkodva tiltakozni lehet majd az emigránsok melletti sajtó- és rádiópropaganda, valamint hatósági támogatás ellen és talán el lehet majd érni az emigráns tevékenység zavarását és korlátozását is.”⁴⁵

Sir Geoffrey Wallinger brit követ, miután 1949-ben megérkezett álmáshelyére, Budapestre, igyekezett mindent megtenni annak érdekében, hogy a brit–magyar kapcsolatok pozitív irányba mozduljanak el. Bemutató látogatása alkalmával kertelés nélkül rátért arra, hogy: „mint az angol külügyminisztérium Délkelet-Európai csoportjának volt vezetője, alkalma volt két éven át Magyarországgal is foglalkoznia és azzal a meggyőződéssel jött ide, hogy bár sok téren nézeteltérés áll fenn

⁴¹ ARDAY Lajos: *Az Egyesült Királyság és Magyarország*, Mundus Kiadó, Budapest, 2005. 154.

⁴² Csehszlovák politikus, író (1895–1958).

⁴³ MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia, 1945–1964) 4. doboz 14. tétel. 708/pol/res.

⁴⁴ Londoni magyar rendkívüli követ, 1947–1948 között, miután 1947. szeptember 16-án megtörtént a diplomáciai kapcsolatok felvétele.

⁴⁵ MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia, 1945–1964) 4. doboz 14. tétel. 708/pol/res.

a két ország között, kölcsönös jóakarattal ezeket gazdasági, pénzügyi és esetleg más téren is át lehet hidalni. [...] Minden épeszű embernek, mind Angliában, mind Magyarországon csak az lehet az életcélja, hogy békés építő munkával emelje a népe életszínvonalát. Lehet, hogy a demokrácia működését másképpen ítélik meg a két országban, de nem szabadna szem elől téveszteni azt, hogy végső fokon közös céljaik vannak.”⁴⁶ A két ország kapcsolatát azonban tovább rontotta egy 1949-ben bekövetkezett letartóztatási ügy: szabotázs, kémkedés és embercsempészet vádjával november 18-án az Államvédelmi hatóság letartóztatta a Standard Electric Company brit igazgatóját, Edgar Sanderst és több magyar munkatársát.⁴⁷ Az ügy miatt kölcsönös kiutasításokra került sor. 1950 júniusában, Wallinger brit követtel lezajlott beszélgetés alapján „a magyar kormánynak az az álláspontja, hogy nem lehet normálisnak tekinteni, hogy egy angol kém letartóztatása után az angol kormány ellenséges intézkedéseket foganatosít Magyarország ellen és azután ajánlatot tesz nekünk ezen ellenséges intézkedések visszavonására, amennyiben a letartóztatott kém szabadon bocsátjuk. A magyar kormány nem zárkózik el az elől, hogy Sanderst esetleg kiutasítsa az országból, amint azt az angol kormány kéri, de azt csak abban az esetben hajlandó megtenni, ha az angol kormány részéről tényleg olyan intézkedések történnek, amelyek lehetővé teszik a két ország között jelenleg fennálló vitás kérdések kielégítő rendezését. [...]”⁴⁸ A helyzetet tovább élezte, hogy az 1950 tavaszán bezárták a British Council budapesti irodáját is.⁴⁹ A romló kapcsolatok tényét erősíti Rákosi Mátyás egyik,

⁴⁶ MNL OL XIX-J-1-k (Nagy-Britannia) 5. doboz. 36. tétel. 4089. Wallinger angol követ bemutatkozó látogatása Dobi István miniszterelnöknél.

⁴⁷ A Sanders-üggyel kapcsolatban lásd bővebben: BALOGH Sándor: *Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1950*, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1988. 330–334. PÉCSI Vera: *The Standard Electric Trial*. The Hungarian Quarterly. (62) 162. sz. Summer 2001. 85–98.; SZÖRÉNYI Attila: *A brit–magyar diplomáciai kapcsolatok és a Sanders-ügy, 1949–1953*. Valóság 2006 (49. évf.) 6. sz. 74–92.; illetve SZÖRÉNYI Attila: *Adalékok az angol katonai hírszerzés történetéhez Edgar Sanders ügyének tükrében. 1950. február*, Hadtörténelmi közlemények, 2009. (122. évf.) 3. sz. 731–746. PÁL István: *A rész munkaidős ellenzéki képviselő. Harold Wilson politikai pályafutása 1951-1959*. IN: MAJOROS István, ANTAL Gábor, HÁDA Béla, HEVŐ Péter, MADARÁSZ Anita (szerk.): *Hindu istenek, sziámi tigrisek. Balogh András 70 éves*. ELTE, Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék, Budapest, 2014. 443–458.

⁴⁸ MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia, 1945–1964) 1. doboz 12. tétel 00846.

⁴⁹ A British Council 1945 nyár folyamán kezdte meg ismételt működését Budapesten, melynek élére Robert McNab került. A British Council újbóli aktív szereplése hozzájárult a brit-magyar kulturális kapcsolatok fellendüléséhez. Négy évvel később, 1949 nyarán került sor egyre intenzívebb mértékben a British Council tevékenységének korlátozására a magyar kormány és hatóságok részéről. A Council budapesti kirendeltségének bezárását követően, az egyetlen csatorna a magyar kultúra közvetítésére, a BBC magyar adása volt, melynek működése sem ment zökkenőmentesen a magyar hatóságok folyamatos közbelépésének köszönhetően.

1950-ben elhangzott beszéde is, melyet a brit követség külön kiemelt az 1950. november 2-i jelentésében. *„A beszéd, különösen az a része, amely a külügyekkel foglalkozik, nem kevésbé volt sztálinista módon őszintétlen és követelőző, mint általában, s ez adta a feltehetően mérvadó kifejtését a jelenlegi pártpolitikai vonalvezetésnek olyan ügyekben, mint Korea, az Egyesült Nemzetek és a német újrafegyverkezés, és ez lesz a »Párt Pedagógusok« tankönyve a következő néhány hét vagy hónap folyamán. Éppen ezért [...] érdemes összefoglalni Rákosi úr felszólalásában elhangzottakat ezekről a témákról az alábbiakban: ami a hazai frontot illeti, a beszéd egy meglehetősen szókimondó beismerését tartalmazta azoknak a nehézségeknek, amelyeket a Nyugattal folytatott kereskedelem zsugorodása okozott; nem meggyőzően írta le legutóbbi élelmiszerhiány okait; a legnagyobb képzelőtehetséggel előadott gyalázkodást adta a magyar szociáldemokraták és a brit Munkáspárt ellen, akiket Rákosi a magyar kollégáik árulásra és kémkedésre való felbujtásával vádolt.”*⁵⁰ 1951-ben Wallinger két éves budapesti tartózkodást követően új állomáshelyre került. A magyar miniszterelnöknél, április 12-én tett búcsúlátogatása során szóba került a két ország között fennálló feszültséggel terhelt állapot. Wallinger ezt a helyzetet a szovjet ideológiával magyarázta: *„a nemzetközi feszültség fő oka az az ideológiai merevség, amely a Szovjetunió részéről és általában a Szovjetunió vezetett országokban megnyilvánul. Ha a különböző ideológiák érintkezését megengednék, ha kölcsönös véleménycsere alakulna ki: csökkenne a feszültség.”*⁵¹ Dobi István miniszterelnök ehhez azt fűzte hozzá, hogy 1945-ben, mikor a Munkáspárt került hatalomra az Egyesült Királyságban, a magyarok azon az alapon vártak támogatást és segítséget a britektől, hogy *„a munkások pártjának közel kell állnia minden olyan intézkedéshez, amely a szocializmus felé visz.”* Wallinger ezzel kapcsolatban úgy érvelt, hogy mindkét kormánynak tulajdonképpen ugyanaz a célja – vagyis a szocializmus kiépítése –, de az eszközök és a módszerek, melyeket alkalmaznak, nagyon különbözőek. Dobi ezzel szemben a beszélgetés során végig azt hangsúlyozta, hogy a brit vezetés ezt a célt csak látszólag kívánja megvalósítani, de a gyakorlatban nem a szocializmus rendszere, hanem a kapitalizmus mellett tette le a voksát. A vitára nem sikerült pontot tenni, ugyanakkor a brit–magyar kapcsolatok jobb irányba terelése érdekében búcsúzóul Dobi arra kérte Wallingert, hogy mondja el a brit kormánynak: *„a magyar nép békésen dolgozik, alakítja, építi boldog jövőjét. Mi békét akarunk, s ha hagynak bennünket, békében is fogunk élni, egyre növelve jólétünket, boldogságunkat”*, mondván, ez az üzenet majd előrelendíti a két ország kapcsolatát és csökkenti a nemzetközi feszültséget.⁵² Am a való-

⁵⁰ Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár (PIL). PIL 508.f. 1/106 (99). H 1016/73. No. 259. (1015/136/50). Budapesti brit követség jelentése, 1950. november 2.

⁵¹ MNL OL XIX-J-1-k (Nagy-Britannia) 5. doboz. 36. tétel. 02313.

⁵² Uo.

ságban, a korábban is említett politikai és gazdasági fejleményeknek köszönhetően, a brit–magyar kapcsolatok soha nem látott mértékben kerültek mélypontra. Ez például azt eredményezte, hogy a korábban intenzívnek mondható kereskedelmi forgalom minimálisra csökkent, és „beállt egy szerződésen kívüli állapot, amely 1954-ig tartott”.⁵³

1951. december 21-én keltezték azt a jelentést, amely a néhány nappal korábbi, december 16-i Sztálin-szobor leleplezési ünnepségen történetekkel foglalkozik. Révai József népművelési miniszter, az esemény alkalmából tartott beszédében a szovjet–magyar kapcsolatokról értekezett. A brit jelentés szerint „a beszéd természetesen klasszikus marxista vonalvezetésű volt, azonban különösen világossá tette a magyar kommuniztáknak a nacionalizmushoz és a magyar történelem fő eseményeihez való viszonyulását (most az újraírását).” A két ország ezen időszakban megmutatkozó érintkezését talán jól példázza a beszéd brit értelmezése is: „Révai úr mindvégig talpnyaló hangvételű beszédének a fő témája az volt, hogy a magyar emberek a múlt, jelen és a jövő minden áldását a Szovjetunióknak köszönhetik. »Amit Sztálin népünknek adott, a legtöbb, amit népnek adni lehet: szabadság, függetlenség, hit önmagában, lehetőség arra, hogy alkotóerejét szabadon kifejthesse«⁵⁴; hogy »Sztálin fiai zúzták szét a magyar földesurak és nagytőkések elnyomó államgépezetét«; hogy 1945 óta nem volt polgárháború, hogy a »belső reakció« vereséget szenvedett és hogy Magyarország nem lett »második Görögország, vagy Korea«.⁵⁵ A Sztálin által nyújtott védelem és támogatás tette képessé Magyarországot, hogy legyőzze az imperialisták kísérleteit, hogy fasiszta gyarmattá változtassák az országot, hogy az ő erkölcsi és pénzügyi segítségével új népi demokráciát építsen. Mindezek között a legnagyobb az a segítség, amit a politikai tanításaival nyújtott, amelyek alakították és acélozták a jelenlegi kommunista vezetőket.”⁵⁶ Talán ebből a jelentésrészletből is látszik, hogy a magyar politikai átalakulás következtében 1949 és 1953 között szinte semmilyen kapcsolat nem volt elképzelhető a két ország között, csupán minimális szinten működhetett a kommunikáció. A britek azt azonban pozitívnak vélték, hogy „a Révai úr által mutatott erő és önbizalom mutatása ellenére, úgy tűnt, hogy a Sztálin-szobor magyar természetének a túlhangsúlyozása egy gúnyos megjegyzés által kísértő félelemtől árulkodik, miszerint a kommunista pártnak a magyar földben nincsenek gyökerei

⁵³ ARDAY (2005): 155.

⁵⁴ Szabad Nép, IX. évfolyam. N° 295. 1951. december 18. Cím: „Az a magyar szabadságharc, melyet Sztálin zászlaja alatt vívtunk és vívunk – győzelmes volt és győzelmes marad”. Sztálin elvtárs szobrának felavatási ünnepsége.

⁵⁵ Uo.

⁵⁶ The National Archives of UK (TNA). TNA FO 371 95189. RH 10338/2. Soviet press article on the anniversary of the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty; report and comment on speech by Hungarian Minister of Popular Culture, Revai, explaining the relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union, at the unveiling of Stalin's statue in Budapest.

és teljes vákuumban él, a magyar emberek félelmétől és gyűlöletétől övezve. Úgy tűnik, ugyanez vonatkozik arra a dacos kijelentésre is, miszerint »hányszor jósolták már a reakció levelibékái ez alatt az idő alatt az időváltozást, vagy ahogy ők mondják: a »rezsimváltozást«. De a politikai levelibékáknak, a reakció javasasszonyainak elmúlt az ideje...nem jöhet olyan szélvész, amely kitéphetné az édes anyaföldből gyökereinket.« Révai úr eltért a párt régi »békéről« szóló direktívájától, amely egyszerűen a »800 millió békét akaró ember elsöprő erejét« hangsúlyozta, és egy új militánsabb hangot ütött meg: »De hadd fűzzem ehhez hozzá: most amikor nem vagyunk magunkra hagyva, amikor velünk van Sztálin [...] nem kétséges, hogy a magyar nép egy emberként kelne fel hazája védelmére, ha az imperialistáknak elmenne az eszük és szocialista átalakulásunk vívmányaira rá mernék emelni mocskos kezüket.« A jelentés írója, R. M. A. Hankey kabinettitkár szerint „sok szempontból ez egy hatékony és jól előadott beszéd volt, de a jelenlegi rendszer nem fogja könnyen felszámolni azt a hitet az emberek között, hogy az öt éves terv sebessége és iránya, amelynek a gazdasági szenvedéseik tudhatók be, nem beszélve a kérlelhetetlen osztályharcról, szovjet megrendelésre és Oroszország érdekeit szolgálják. Az eredmény egy legantimarxistább formája a kizsákmányolásnak. Biztos vagyok benne, hogy ez az alapvető pont, amire meg kell próbálnunk rávilágítani a magyar rádióadásaink során. Látni fogják, hogy Révai úr milyen szorgalmasan homályosan fogalmazott a Magyarországnak nyújtott szovjet segítség mértékére és természetére tett utalásaiban.”⁵⁷

1953. december elején Katona János londoni magyar rendkívüli követ Eden külügyminiszternél járt bemutatkozó látogatáson. Az erről szóló jelentés alapján a két ország közötti kapcsolat pozitív irányba fordult. „Eden egyedül fogadott, rajtunk kívül nem volt más jelen. Igen barátságosan üdvözölt és kijelentette, mindenkor rendelkezésemre áll, ha hozzáfordulok. Örült annak, hogy javult a viszony a két ország között és arra törekszik, hogy tovább javuljon nemcsak velünk, de a Szovjetunióval is. Örül a szovjet jegyzéknek és Amerikától is kedvező választ kapott, amiről beszélt délután a parlamentben is. Ő azon van, hogy csökkenjen a nemzetek közötti feszültség. Kijelentettem, én is nagyon örülök, hogy munkámat már egy kellemesebb légkörben kezdhetem meg. Én magam is arra törekszem, hogy a két ország közötti viszony tovább fejlődjön. [...] Gratulált futballcsapatunk nagyszerű győzelméhez és helyeselte a két ország sportkapcsolatainak fejlesztését. Én kijelentettem, hogy örülök a magyar csapat itteni jó szereplésének, de még inkább annak a ténynek, hogy jó sportkapcsolat alakul ki és kívánom, hogy ez más területen is létrejöjjön, így kulturális vonatkozásban is.”⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Uo.

⁵⁸ MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia, 1945–1964) 1. doboz 12. tétel. 002259. Tárgy: Látogatás Eden külügyminiszternél.

Az 1954-es év lesz az az év, amikor ismét szinte a nulláról kezdjük újra kiépíteni a kapcsolatot a britekkel. Szigeti Károly diplomata, az angol–amerikai osztály vezetőjének jelentése alapján 1954-ben a brit–magyar kapcsolat a következőképpen alakult. *„Ebben az évben erősebb irányt vettünk az angol politikai élet – köztük elsősorban a Foreign Office – képviselőivel való kapcsolatok kiépítésére. Ennek érdekében láttam vendégül a Foreign Office több beosztottját Ward külügyi államtitkárral az élen, valamint Heathcoate⁵⁹ jelenlegi földművelésügyi minisztert és Maudling⁶⁰ pénzügyminisztériumi államtitkárt a pénzügyminisztérium és kereskedelemügyi minisztérium több beosztottjával.”*⁶¹ A brit politikai szereplőkkel való szorosabb kapcsolatfelvétel végett, a jövőbeni tervek között szerepelt, hogy a magyar vezetés a baloldali parlamenti képviselőkön (bevanisták – Aneurin Bevan brit munkáspárti politikus neve után, a Munkáspárton belül alakult meg ez a csoportosulás) túlmenően, a „középutasok” és a szélsőjobboldali politikusok irányába is tegyen lépéseket. *„Nincsen jelentősebb kapcsolatunk a konzervatív és liberális képviselők felé. Ez elsősorban abból eredt, hogy ezeknek a képviselőknek a túlnyomó része politikai gyűlöletből nem hajlandó barátokozni velünk. [...] A jövő év első felében továbbfejlesztjük a politikai hivatalok beosztottaival a személyes kapcsolatot. Ezt most már az egyes beosztottak vonalára is átvisszük. Ismét megkezdjük a pénzügyminisztérium és kereskedelemügyi minisztérium beosztottaival a szorosabb és gyakoribb érintkezést, tekintettel a jövő évben meginduló angol–magyar kereskedelmi és pénzügyi tárgyalásokra.”*⁶²

A két ország közötti gazdasági kapcsolatok újraindulása sem volt egyszerű feladat, kezdeti törekvések azonban már tetten érhetőek voltak. Szigeti szerint *„ezen a téren elért eredményeink kisebbek, mint politikai téren. Jó kapcsolatokat szerezünk gyárlátogatásokkal és kereskedőkkel [együtt töltött – kieg. M. M. A.] vacsorákon. Arányi és Szigeti elvtársak sűrűn látogatják a Professional and Business Men's Forum rendezvényeit, ahol több személyt ismernek. Az év folyamán sikerült néhány közgazdással, mint Barou és Bellinger megismerkedni. Egy lépést jelentett előre ezen a vonalon a közelmúltban több gazdasági szakember részére adott vacsorám is. Ezen a téren fokozottabb munkára van szükségünk a jövőben.”*⁶³ Vagyis:

„a) Az eddig megismert haladó és burzsoá közgazdászokkal igyek-

⁵⁹ Derick Heathcoat-Amory (1899–1981): brit konzervatív politikus, Lordok Házának tagja, 1954 és 1958 között földművelésügyi miniszter.

⁶⁰ Reginald Maudling (1917–1979): brit politikus, több funkciót is betöltött, többek között 1952 és 1955 között a kincstár gazdasági titkára volt.

⁶¹ MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia, 1945–1964) 4. doboz 14. tétel. 00498/1955 – A követség kapcsolatai. London, 1954. december 23.

⁶² Uo.

⁶³ Uo.

szünk szorosabb kapcsolatot kiépíteni. Rajtuk keresztül kapcsolatfelvételre törekszünk az Angliában meglehetősen szép számmal élő magyar származású közgazdászokkal.

b) Megfelelő alkalmakkor gyárlátogatásokra megyünk, a kereskedelmi kirendeltség szervezésében. Igyekszünk több londoni gyárat is megtekinteni, mivel az itt szerzett kapcsolatokkal könnyebb a szorosabb viszony kiépítése.

c) A Professional and Business Men's Forum eddig ismert tagjain túl a nagyobb rendezvényeken arra törekszünk, hogy az alkalmanként meghívott befolyásosabb gazdasági szakemberekkel is megismerkedjünk.

d) Eddiginél nagyobb súlyt fektettünk arra, hogy az Economic Representatives in London nevű szervezet által meghívott angol gazdasági és kereskedelmi hivatalnokokkal és vezetőkkel megismerkedjünk. Ez vonatkozik az alkalmanként meghívott üzletemberekre és technikai szakértőkre is. A jövőben úgy Arányi, mint Szigeti elvtársaknak ez is egyik legfontosabb feladatuk lesz.

A gazdasági vonalat azért is vesszük előtérbe, mivel tapasztalataink szerint ezen keresztül könnyebb a politikusok többsége felé is közeledni. Gondolok itt elsősorban a jobboldali beállítottságú politikusokra.”⁶⁴

A kulturális vonal mentén ebben az időben meglehetősen erősek voltak a kapcsolataink, bár a tudományos élet képviselőivel meglehetősen gyengék. Több neves brit személyiséggel is sikerült kiépíteni a megfelelő „hidakat”. A jelentősebb kulturális és tudományos kontakt személyek az alábbi táblázatban olvashatók⁶⁵:

KULTURÁLIS VONAL	TUDOMÁNYOS VONAL
Jessie Street író	Donald Michie biológus
Paul Hogart festőművész	prof. Blackett tudós (Manchester Egyetem)
James Aldridge író	prof. Gordon Childe, a londoni egyetem régészeti intézetének vezetője
Jack Lindsay író	prof. M. Dobb, a Cambridge-i egyetem tudósa
Mona Brand író	prof. Bernal, a londoni egyetem tanára
James Gibb zongoraművész	
Gordon Cruickshank BBC munkatárs	

A kulturális és tudományos kapcsolatok további fejlesztésének előtérben az állt, hogy az eddigi ismeretségeket felhasználják újabb ismeretségi körök szerzésére. Magyar részről olyan szervezeteket és intézményeket kívántak felkutattatni, ahol lehetséges az az említett körökben járatos emberekkel való érintkezés. Ezen kívül kiemelkedő feladattá vált,

⁶⁴ Uo.

⁶⁵ Uo.

hogyan elfogadjuk a különböző brit egyetemek és iskolák meghívásait. A sport kapcsolatok fejlődését megalapozta az 1953-as, híressé vált 6:3-as labdarúgó mérkőzés. A magyar követek és a brit politikai személyiségek közötti beszélgetések alkalmával többször is nosztalgikus módon emlékeztek vissza a két ország meccsére. Látni kell, hogy sem a kultúra, sem a tudomány, sem a sport nem tekinthető elhanyagolható, marginális területnek a diplomácia színterén: meghatározó segítséget nyújtottak abban, hogy Magyarország és az Egyesült Királyság között javuljanak a politikai kapcsolatok. *„Jó személyi kapcsolat alakult ki az angol labdarúgó és atlétikai szövetség vezetőivel. Hasonlóan jó lett a kapcsolat egyes klubok vezetőivel és játékosaival. Példa rá, hogy a sportolók részére rendezett egyik fogadásunkon több mint 200 sportoló és vezető jelent meg. Ez a vonal politikai munka szempontjából is nagy jelentőségű. Erre mutat, hogy a sportolók látogatása alkalmával sikerült személyi kapcsolatot teremteni egyes polgármesterekkel és a kerület képviselőivel. Ez történt a Glasgow-i és a Chelsea-i polgármester esetében Henderson konzervatív képviselő, valamint Carmichael és Cullen munkáspárti képviselők megismerése alkalmával és a velük való kapcsolat kiépítésében.”*⁶⁶

A legfontosabb feladat magyar részről azonban az volt – mint már említettük is, hogy új csatornákat nyissanak a brit politika irányában. Erre Hajdú József főosztályvezető 1955 elején ismételten hangsúlyt fektetett: *„A követség kapcsolatait illetően azonban felkívánjuk hívni a figyelmet arra a hiányosságra, hogy az eddigi kapcsolatok – mind politikai, mind kulturális téren – főleg baloldali körökre korlátozódtak. Fontosnak tartjuk, hogy a jelenlegi tervek alapján igyekezzenek a követség ezen a téren minél jelentősebb fordulatot elérni, s kapcsolatait a liberális és konzervatív politikusokra, az egyes polgári körökre is kiterjeszteni.”*⁶⁷ A kívánt cél elérése az adott körülmények között nem volt egyszerű, s a helyzetet csak tovább nehezítette, hogy az 1956-os év a váltságok, felkelések és forradalmak időszakát hozta magával mind a belpolitikában, mind nemzetközi kontextusban.

*

Mint ahogy az eddigiekből is látható, a brit–magyar kapcsolatok története meglehetősen hullámzó tendenciát mutatott az 1945 utáni időszakban (és már jóval előtte is). A nemzetközi politikában lezajlott hidegháborús erőfeszítések, megnyilatkozások és döntések ugyanúgy hatással voltak a bilaterális kapcsolatokra, mint az, hogy mi történt az érintett országok belügyeiben. Az 1945 utáni időszak mind Magyarország, mind az Egyesült Királyság számára komoly változásokat eredményezett:

⁶⁶ Uo.

⁶⁷ MNL OL XIX-J-1-j (Nagy-Britannia, 1945–1964) 4. doboz 14. tétel. 00498/1955 – A követség kapcsolatai. 1955. február 14.

az egyik oldal szovjet érdekszférába került, melynek köszönhetően önállóságát béklyóba kötötték, s kitörési lehetőségei minimálisak voltak geopolitikai elhelyezkedése miatt. A másik oldal ugyan győztesen került ki a második világháborúból, ám veszteségei komoly gondokat idéztek elő mind belpolitikáját, mind külpolitikáját tekintve. Az Egyesült Királyság nehezen találta meg a helyét az újonnan kialakult helyzetben: a bipoláris világrend okozta nehézségek, a sokszor halogató politika, a döntésképtelenség, az Európa ügyeitől való távolságtartás és a Szovjetunióval való nyílt szembenézésnek az elodázása közvetve a magyarországi szovjet befolyás erősödését is eredményezte. Majd bekövetkezett az a pillanat, amikor a szovjet elnyomás ellen a magyar nép felemelte hangját. 1956-ban a nyugati világ országai, s köztük az Egyesült Királyság is, különös figyelmet fordítottak hazánkra.

Martin Pácha¹



***Losing the „Universal”
Mihály Horváth and František Palacký²***

Abstract

The purpose of the paper is to investigate the historiography of the 19th century Habsburg monarchy based on the example of two prominent historians – Mihály Horváth and František Palacký. The first part is concerned with the fundamental processes, which influenced the historiography of the 19th century, the second part provides a small comparison of the two historians. This study shows how historians partially lost the enlightened call for the „universal” and how they gradually entered the national frame of thinking.

Keywords: nation building process; national narrative; Hungary; enlightenment; historiography; Habsburg Monarchy;

It is often said that 19th century was a century of historicism or golden age of history.³ This era is mostly associated with German states and with Leopold von Ranke.⁴ It is much less investigated what it means elsewhere especially in East-Central Europe is not often clear. In my essay I would like to do a probe into the historiography of 19th century Habsburg Monarchy and find out some aspects of this almost paradigmatic change in historiography.

In the first part, I will explore few elements and clarify some terms that are fundamental for the topic. These are – traditional historiography, the Enlightenment, liberalism, romanticism and nation-building process. In the second part, I will try to do a small comparison between two major historians of this era – Mihály Horváth and František Palacký. I do not suppose that I will discover some universal definition of the 19th century historiography, but I still believe that it is important to challenge established terms like historicism and the

¹ Student, Charles University, Prague, Pacha.Martin@seznam.cz

² I want to thank to Károly Halmos for all his help and his lectures „*Social History of Nineteenth-Century Hungary*“, which was hugely inspirational for this paper. I would also like to thank to Gábor Benedek, Ondřej Vinš and my sister Anna Páchová for consultations.

³ About this problematics: FELDNER, Heiko: *Nová vědeckost v dějepisectví kolem roku 1800*. 11. IN: BERGER, Stefan; FELDNER, Heiko; PASSMORE Kevin (ed.): *Jak se píšou dějiny*. Brno: CDK, 2016. 11–32.

⁴ For example IGGERS, Georg: *Historiography in the twentieth century. From scientific objectivity to the postmodern challenge*, Wesleyan University Press, Hanover, 1997.

method of even a small comparison is very useful to do that. Especially because by comparison we can escape national narratives, paradoxically created by historians in the era of our interest.

Roots and terms

Although many authors proclaimed the 19th century century that of historicism⁵ if we want to know what it means and what is the relationship with historiography, we need to go a little further. In the following text, I am not going to explore the term in its complexity, but I will try to make few points concerning some elements, that in my opinion are inseparably linked with our topic – traditional historiography, the Enlightenment, liberalism, romanticism and nation-building process.

First, if we want to talk about historiography in 19th century, we must explore its roots. Michel Foucault in one of his essays pointed out a big shift in European historiography at the turn of the 17th and 18th century. According to him, the basic narrative structure for many authors became a struggle between two binary opposite elements, in other words a war. That simply means that this new style heavily accented ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences.⁶ But this was not the case all the time. The basic plot of medieval chronicle is genealogical axis of ruling dynasty. Chronicler is narrating about origins of the dynasty, about heroic acts, ancient laws etc. In other words, traditional historic discourse used to defend and strengthen the power of the ruler. „*The great history*” is guarantor of the order and could legitimize often banal everyday life.⁷

Second, during this era, the modern development of historiography has begun. Although there is no universal definition of the Enlightenment, we could say it was a philosophical movement based around the idea of reason. The situation of being human is radically changed. Beginning of human existence was no longer just based on God’s creation, but on Adam’s and Eve’s original sin, where they got understanding and made first steps towards „*freedom*”.⁸ In other words, they became actual human persons in the moment when they entered history. History has its own meaning and inherent value. It is a road towards real freedom or towards real humanity. So, historiography as a

⁵ HROCH, Miroslav: *Hledání souvislostí*, Sociologické nakladatelství (SLON), Praha, 2016. 121.

⁶ FOUCAULT, Michel: „*Society must be defended*”, Picador, New York, 2003. 60.

⁷ ČINÁTL, Kamil: *Dějiny a vyprávění*, Argo, Praha, 2011. 163–164.

⁸ Although individual interpretations differ, we can say that Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and even Johann Gottfried Herder shared a thesis, that human being existed in a certain natural state, which changed due to the original sin to the human state.

subject gained much more prestige, because it no longer meant mere eulogizing stories, but it is principle, which constitutes a human being.⁹

The very idea of science has also changed from the Aristotelian model. This old theory is based on the distinction between searching for individual as opposed to cognition of the universal and abstract. The first one, concerning humans and their acts can be only known in particularity. The second, can be known in fulness and that is called a science.¹⁰ However Aristotelian paradigm has gradually changed in the 18th century. As a result of this, empiricism was on a rise and knowledge from now on should be useful and used in everyday life. Consequences of this epistemological change for the history were first expressed by Giambattista Vico in his *Scienza Nuova* (1725/1744). He made an argument that we should shift our attention from studying nature to studying history, because only God knows his own creation – the natural world. Vico wrote that we could hope for reliable knowledge only in case of studying „*the civil world*” because it is created by men in the same sense that nature is created by God. For this reason, we can think history based on sources as a science and historians as scientists.¹¹

The secularization and thinking about reason as one of the highest values have influenced historiography as well. Guarantor of truth from this point were not just organizations, which claim to the truth was based on God’s revelation, but also institutions which claim was based on the idea of secular science. For writing history, it means, that it should be founded on empirical data and sources not on guessing. It should be reflected from viewpoints of goals and methodology. In principle, every scientific discussion should be open to educated public, which was small but essentially not reclusive. To conclude there were two strong urges: to equip historiography with theoretical thinking and make it available to the public sphere.

Third, we should briefly mention liberalism, which influenced the entire 19th century. Basically, it is a set of ideas based on liberty, equality and individualism without any precise definition, at least in this era. It became a distinct political movement during the Enlightenment, which rejected the prevailing political system based on privileges.¹² Liberalism

⁹ This interpretation is partially inspired by lectures „*Kleió a Sofia. Filozofické myšlení v historiografii českých zemí 19. století*” by Marek Fapšo in academic year 2016/2017 at Faculty of Arts, Charles University.

¹⁰ FELDNER, Heiko: *Nová vědeckost v dějepisectví kolem roku 1800*, p. 14. IN: BERGER, Stefan; FELDNER, Heiko; PASSMORE Kevin (ed.): *Jak se píšou dějiny*, CDK, Brno, 2016. 11–32.

¹¹ FELDNER, Heiko: *Nová vědeckost v dějepisectví kolem roku 1800*, 19. IN: BERGER, Stefan; FELDNER, Heiko; PASSMORE Kevin (ed.): *Jak se píšou dějiny*, CDK, Brno, 2016.

¹² HEYWOOD, Andrew. *Politické ideologie*, Eurolex Bohemia s. r. o., Praha, 2005. 41–51.

is connected with the Enlightenment, which was a problem in the Habsburg Monarchy, because those ideas were almost always enforced by the government and there was no space to create a numerous movement from below. In other words, the inhabitants were only slowly creating a mental framework for accepting liberalism. But on the other hand, there was a certain liberalization of the economy which helped in this process.¹³ But this kind of liberal experience in a massive scale not took shape until the revolution of 1848/1849 and especially in East-Central Europe was often interconnected with national frame of thinking.¹⁴ The important thing concerning historiography, is that liberal philosophy was often used to legitimize political change to representative democracy and the rule of law and many historians acted as politicians in this process.

Fourth, romanticism was artistic, literary, musical and intellectual movement that started in Europe at the end of the 18th century. There is also no clear definition, but for our purposes I just want to mention some major themes concerning „*romantic approach to life*”. There was a strong emphasis on sentiments, on subjectivization of attitudes, social alienation and a feeling of loneliness, which „*stems from a sense of insecurity, from the disrupted harmony of life.*”¹⁵ It was also a reaction to enlightened rationalism, and it is often said that romanticism replaced the Enlightenment as a dominant outlook in the first half of the 19th century.¹⁶ This is oversimplified because romantics authors often drawn inspiration from authors like Herder, who was clearly associated with the Enlightenment. In other words, there was a crisis of identity, which was brought about by changes of forthcoming modernization: „*the loss of religious legitimacy and also therefore the loss of axiomatically formulated principles, the weakening of the old traditional feudal and patriarchal bonds, and from that, the loss of security.*”¹⁷ To conclude, this movement influenced the historiography of the 19th century as well, especially in that way that historians often wrote with emotional flare and they were passionately looking in history for other ways of collective identity, especially a nation.

¹³ VEBER, Václav et al.: *Dějiny Rakouska*, NLN, Praha, 2002. 395–399.

¹⁴ URBAN, Otto: *Český liberalismus v 19. století*, 16. IN: ZNOJ, Milan; HAVRÁNEK, Jan; SEKERA, Martin (ed.): *Český liberalismus*, Torst, Praha, 1995. 15–27.

¹⁵ HROCH, Miroslav: *National romanticism*, 4. IN: KOPEČEK, Michal; TRENCSENYI, Balázs. (ed.): *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770-1945)*, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007. 4–18.

¹⁶ For example IGGERS, Georg G.; WANG, Edward Q.: *A Global History of Modern Historiography*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London; New York, 2013. 70.

¹⁷ HROCH, Miroslav: *National romanticism*, 7. IN: KOPEČEK, Michal; TRENCSENYI, Balázs. (ed.): *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770-1945)*, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007. 4–18.

Finally the fifth, I would like to make some brief notes concerning probably the most influential process in the 19th century – nation-building.¹⁸ I am deliberately avoiding the term “nationalism” because this term as a concept is heavily burdened with so many debates that is losing its explanatory value. Certainly, I am aware that even the term „*nation*” is not without its complication either.¹⁹ Nation as a kind of emotion is a modern phenomenon, it is not an eternal category. It is a socially constructed community in the imagination of the people who perceive themselves as members of that group.²⁰ Also according to Miroslav Hroch’s typology we can distinguish three ideal²¹ phases of nation-building process. Phase A is when a small group of intellectuals make an effort to learn the language, history, traditional culture etc. of non-dominant ethnic group. Phase B is when a new group of activists emerge and try to agitate for the project of fully-fledged nation. And Phase C is when a majority of the population responded to the patriotic call and the full social structure of the nation would usually come into being.²²

There are three typical characteristics of the nation: increased communication intensity inside the group in comparing to outside groups; certain form of „*collective memory*”, the idea of common past and fate; the concept of equality of all members of the nation, at least in theory.²³ In other words we could argue that concept of the nation is influenced by all four already mentioned phenomena – history, traditional historiography, the Enlightenment, liberalism and romanticism.

Mihály Horváth and František Palacký

In this part I shortly introduce the two historians that I chose for the comparison – Mihály Horváth and František Palacký. First, we need to say, that both of them lived in different part of Habsburg Monarchy and from their point of view they were not members of the ruling group. They both engaged in nation-building process at the turning point of the phases B and C, according to Hroch’s typology. The historic difference is that the Bohemia used to be a part of the Holy Roman Empire and

¹⁸ The concept refers to what was expressed in some cases with the phrase ‘*national awakening*’ in the Czech case, and ‘*national independence*’ in the Hungarian one.

¹⁹ For example, the difference between connotation with the term in English and German language environment.

²⁰ ANDERSON, Benedict R.: *Imagined communities*. Verso, London, 1991, 6–7.

²¹ „*Ideal*” in a Weberian sense.

²² HROCH, Miroslav: *Comparative Studies in Modern European History*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2007. 68.

²³ HROCH, Miroslav: *V národním zájmu*, NLN, Praha, 1999. 10–11.

sometimes Czechs, even Palacký, were considered to be Germans,²⁴ which was not the case for the Hungarians. The other main difference between Czech and Hungarian national movement is a different strategy for achieving its goals influenced by actor's mental framework and their geostrategic situation. In Hungarian case, the elite was not afraid to go to open conflict with Habsburgs, in Czech case the elite was trying to apply strategy of small demands and therefore is often called cautious elite.²⁵

Thus, it was only natural that the Hungarians claimed their thousand-year-old historical rights and fought to strengthen the historical nation by emphasizing the legacy of their constitution.²⁶

Mihály Horváth (1809-1878) was born in Szentés, south-eastern Hungary, in a family of seventeen children. His family belonged to the lower nobility and by the time he was born, his father worked as a barber. He finished his secondary education in a Piarists school and started to visit seminary. This choice was probably not motivated by a desire to become a priest, but rather to gain access to higher education and higher social status. In this time, he also showed a great interest in history.²⁷ After finishing his doctorate in theology, he was ordained and started to hold clergy position. Due to his low income, he also worked as a private tutor for wealthy families. His situation somehow improved in 1834 by getting awarded by literary-learned institution called Marczibányi Society for his publication on the civilization of the ancient Hungarians. After publishing many studies including *Az ipar és kereskedelem története Magyarországon a XVI. század elejéig* (The History of Commerce and Industry in Hungary Until the Early Sixteen Century²⁸) he was elected a member of Hungarian Academy in 1842.

Horváth became a major public figure in the reform movement, especially due to his liberal views and to his important position within liberal clergy. In 1848 the revolutionary government nominated him bishop of Csanád and he was the only one among the Catholic high churchmen who followed the Hungarian government to Debrecén. In 1849, he became Minister of Religious Affairs and Education. After the

²⁴ PALACKÝ, František: *Psaní do Frankfurtu*, Národní noviny, 15. 4. 1848. 1.

²⁵ ŠTAIF, Jiří: *Obezřetná elita*, Dokořán, Praha, 2005.

²⁶ HORVÁTH, Mihály: *Huszonöt év Magyarország történelméből (1823-1848)*, volume II, Geneva, 1864. 116. Translated by BAÁR, Monika: *Historians and Nationalism*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010. 260.

²⁷ BAÁR, Monika: *Historians and Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010. 35.

²⁸ Translation to English by: BAÁR, Monika: *The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary: The Case of Mihály Horváth*, 25.

revolution, he was forced to escape to Belgium and later he settled in Geneva, where he abandoned his clerical duties and married his housekeeper. Also he wrote several studies focusing on the Reform Age and history of revolution including *Magyarország függetlenségi harcának története 1848 és 1849-ben* (History of the Hungarian war of independence of 1848-1849). In this work he distanced himself from Kossuth's vision of full independence and started to support the idea of compromise between Austria and Hungary. Due to his serious homesick he wanted to return to Hungary. Finally, he received an amnesty in 1867. He was well accepted by Hungarian scholars and in 1877 he became the president of the Hungarian Historical Society. Horváth's research in this era declined in significance but he remained an important figure in the institutionalization of the historical discipline.²⁹

Mihály Horváth is usually categorized as a typical exponent of European national-liberal school of historiography and with László Szalay (1813-1864) is considered to be a great historian of the 19th century Hungary. His most important work, *Huszonöt év Magyarország történelméből* (Twenty-five years of the history of Hungary) established canonical narrative of the Hungarian „national awakening” and had influence on preserving the cultural memory of „1848 generation” alive.³⁰

Thus, the main content and the basic thrust of the whole history of the Czech-Moravian (...) is constant engagement and struggle between ideas of Slavs, Romans and Germans.³¹

František Palacký (1798-1876) was born in the town called Hodslavice in Moravia, near to the historical borders of Hungary and Silesia, in a family of seven children. His family had a long protestant tradition and his father was a teacher. He studied at Lutheran school in Trenčín and after that, at Lutheran Lyceum in Bratislava³², which was a prominent theological institution. Although he received no formal

²⁹ BAÁR, Monika: *Historians and Nationalism*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010. 39.

³⁰ KOPEČEK, Michal; TRENCSENYI, Balázs. (ed.): *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770-1945)*, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007. 57.

³¹ PALACKÝ, František: *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a na Moravě*. Volume I, Kvasnička a Hampl, Praha, 1939. 10. translated by MP: „Hlavní tedy obsah a základní tah celého dějinstva českomoravského jest, (...) ustavičné stýkání a potýkání se slovanství s římanstvím a němectvím (...).”

³² Bratislava (Pozsony) and Trenčín (Trencsén) were parts of the Kingdom of Hungary.

historical education he became well-read due to his rigorous self-education and ability to learn languages. In 1820 he moved into Vienna where he wrote several papers concerning aesthetics, which gave him a philosophical background for his later historian work. Also in this time, he was already able to network and he acquired many contacts that later helped him very much in his career.³³

In 1823 he moved to Prague where he cooperated with prominent Czech scholars like Josef Dobrovský and Josef Jungmann. He also started to work for Bohemian aristocracy, first as a private tutor, later as an archivist. He especially for Kašpar Šternberk, who enabled him to start publishing museum journal called *Časopis Společnosti vlasteneckého muzea v Čechách*.³⁴ In 1827 he got married to daughter of landowner Jan Měchura, which solved his financial issues. In 1836 he was assigned by Bohemian estates to write history of Bohemia in German (*Geschichte von Böhmen*) and in 1838 he became their official Historiographer. In 1840, he began to publish *Archiv Český*, which is series of sources to Czech history.³⁵ From 1844 he started to translate *Geschichte von Böhmen* (History of Bohemia) to Czech language, but he changed the work significantly and in 1848 he published the first volume of his magnum opus *Dějiny národa českého v Čechách a na Moravě* (History of Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia). The change of his perspective is usually overlooked, but it is apparent just from the title. Palacký changed the conceptualization from the land to the people.³⁶

In 1848 Palacký actively entered politics. He tried to mediate the disputes between Czechs and Germans and promoted an idea of legalism and liberal constitutionalism. After his refusal to join Frankfurt Parliament with argumentation, that he is not a German but Czech, he practically became a leader of Czech national movement. He also tried to promote the concept of Austro-Slavism, which was an idea, that Slavic nations within the Habsburg Monarchy should become a decisive force in the state. He also became a member of the so called Kroměřížský sněm (Kremsier Imperial Diet), where he tried to support federalism. After the defeat of the revolution, he became persona non grata and in 1851 he left politics altogether.

František Palacký in his later years became unquestionable moral figure in Czech society and even his political rivals acknowledged him as „*Otec národa*” (Father of the nation).³⁷ He is also considered as the father of modern Czech historiography and his major work *Dějiny*

³³ ŠTAIF, Jiří: *František Palacký*, Vyšehrad, Praha, 2009. 19–35.

³⁴ Which is the oldest historical scientific journal, still published today under the name *Časopis Národního muzea*.

³⁵ The series was published to 1944 and was renewed in 2000.

³⁶ KOŘALKA, Jiří: *František Palacký*, Argo, Praha, 1998. 256–257.

³⁷ ŠTAIF, Jiří: *František Palacký*, Vyšehrad, Praha, 2009. 235–240.

ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történelmi Tanszék tudományos közleményei, N° 2015/2.
ELTE, BTK, BUDAPEST, 2018.

národa českého v Čechách a na Moravě (History of the Czech nation from „beginning of times” to 1526) still bears some relevance. Even though his work was later criticized especially for factographic reasons, his concept of Czech national narrative remained visible practically to these days.

An attempt to compare

At this point I would like to make my examination of the 19th century historiography by a short comparison. According to Jürgen Kocka there are three main benefits of comparison. Heuristic (identification of new problems), descriptive (clarification of single cases) and analytical (asking and answering causal questions).³⁸ Although all this is true, in my opinion, the main benefit of the following comparison lies in the weakening of the national narrative, which is still very influential in historiography today.

I will focus on a few topics that occupy central space in the narratives of František Palacký and Mihály Horváth. I will not talk about them in any full or rounded way, but instead I will use them as a probe into 19th century historiographic thinking. First, I will look into their interest in origins and early societies, second, I will explore where they saw peak of their histories and third I will try to make some notes concerning their conceptual thinking.

To begin with, if we want to talk about origins of the nation we will see a big difference between Palacký and Horváth. For Palacký the arrival of Slavs into Bohemia is one of the central topics. According to him Slavic chieftain Čech came into the Bohemia and took control over the scattered remnants of the original population.³⁹ In his argumentation is important that Slavs (Čechové) created a state with national unity, where they live almost in an egalitarian society, before and without Germans. Germans, ancestors of Palacký’s German contemporaries, came later as a result of colonization to an already created state. This is crucial for his later argumentation that Czechs have bigger claim for living in Bohemia than Germans. Also the struggle between the idea of Slavs – democracy, peace, freedom and German idea – Christianity, bourgeois law, technology and education is the central plot of Palacký’s narration.⁴⁰ This struggle Palacký did not see a priori negatively, because even when his affection was for the Czech side, he saw dialectic benefits of those interactions. On the other hand, Horváth

³⁸ KOCKA, Jürgen: *Comparison and Beyond*. In: *History and Theory*. Vol 42, No 1. 39–44.

³⁹ Tribe of Boii (Galic origin) and tribe of Marcomanni (Germanic origin).

⁴⁰ PALACKÝ, František: *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a na Moravě*. Volume I, Kvasnička a Hampl, Praha, 1939. 10.

did not attribute too much attention to beginnings of Hungarians but in European context he was an exception in this matter.⁴¹ He just stated that Hungarians originally led a peaceful life of equality, simplicity and independence⁴² and that they arrived into Carpathian Basin as a free society, described as a „national family”.⁴³

The question remains why Horváth did not put almost any importance to the topic, maybe he did not have enough sources, which did not prevent Horváth’s contemporary László Szalay from writing about it, or more probably he did not have the urge to defend Hungarian presence in Carpathian Basin. However, the importance for Palacký is quite clear. He wanted to make a compelling narration for the justification of Czech presence in Bohemia and there was no better way to do it, than on a basis of historical argument.

Second, Horváth’s idea of the peak period of Hungarian history lies in the Reform era: „(That period) became, by the nation’s efforts and struggles, ... the most glorious period, a progress following the principles of liberalism.”⁴⁴ Central to his argument were: the issues of religious freedom, imposing tax on nobility, the extension of civil rights to the people and the reform of the penal code.⁴⁵ Especially the issues of nobility were really important to him. He saw feudalism (imported from West) as opposed to freedom, because it lacks strong middle class.⁴⁶ In other words the nation was formed of the privileged classes only, because other people deprived of their rights cannot constitute a real community, a nation.⁴⁷ According to him nobility was one to blame for its crippling attitude towards national unity and advancement. He argued that nobility had its historical role in defending the country against enemies, but it failed and now there are no reasons for them to be in privileged position.⁴⁸ No need to say, that this topic resonated quite heavily with Horváth’s idea based on the Enlightenment and „plebeian” liberalism.

⁴¹ BAÁR, Monika: *The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary: The Case of Mihály Horváth*, 22. IN: TRENCSENYI, Balázs (ed.): *Nation-Building and Contested Identities*, Regio Books, Budapest, 2001. 21–41.

⁴² Ibid, 23.

⁴³ KOPEČEK, Michal; TRENCSENYI, Balázs. (ed.): *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770-1945)*, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007. 58.

⁴⁴ BAÁR, Monika: *The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary: The Case of Mihály Horváth*, 22.

⁴⁵ BAÁR, Monika: *Historians and Nationalism*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010. 245–246.

⁴⁶ BAÁR, Monika: *The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary: The Case of Mihály Horváth*, 23.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 32.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 33.

For Palacký the most glorious period of Czech history was Hussitism in the 15th century. In his point of view, it was not just the demand for renewed Church, but it was a movement which influenced heavily not only Czech history, but European history as well. It was social and national movement, reaction to feudal and foreign influences.⁴⁹ This discourse based on war was much more convincing than myths of Slavs. According to Michel Foucault „*A history that takes as its starting point the fact of war itself and makes its analysis in terms of war can relate all these things – war, religion, politics, manners, and characters – and can therefore act as a principle that allows us to understand history.*”⁵⁰ This is exactly what Palacký did. Hussitism is for him a cornerstone basically for everything. It is a movement that has predicted not just reformation but social justice and freedom. Palacký’s reader could easily have had the feeling that modern historical processes have reacted on Czech models and not the other way around.⁵¹

Third, I want to briefly mention some conceptual aspects of the Horváth’s and Palacký’s work. Both historians tried to widen historical writings in that way that they included unprivileged classes into the narrative and one could even say, they played a major role. On the other hand I would argue, that major „*figure*” was actually the nation, which should consists of all classes and just the role of aristocracy is more questionable. This is a serious change compared to tradition historiography. Palacký’s and Horváth’s discourses no longer hold the legitimizing function of the old order, they tried to unveil the true nature of current power.⁵² They offered a different history, which „*has to disinter something that has been hidden, and which has been hidden not only because it has been neglected, but because it has been carefully, deliberately, and wickedly misrepresented.*”⁵³ In other worlds Palacký and Horváth tried to undermine contemporary social order and create a new one. This does not mean in any case that they just made some ideological fabrications. They proceed according to contemporary idea of scientific practice and we need to realize that it was generally accepted that correct representation of the past events should serve as an argument for the present.⁵⁴ Also, it is understandable they chose questions and sources that would correlate with their viewpoints, they did not stand outside their studied objects and I would argue that this practice has not change that much even nowadays.

⁴⁹ BAÁR, Monika: *Historians and Nationalism*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010. 237.

⁵⁰ FOUCAULT, Michel: *“Society must be defended”*, Picador, New York, 2003. 163.

⁵¹ ČINÁTL, Kamil: *Dějiny a vyprávění*. Argo, Praha, 2011. 187.

⁵² Ibid, 164.

⁵³ FOUCAULT, Michel: *“Society must be defended”*, Picador, New York, 2003. 72.

⁵⁴ HORCH, Miroslav: *Národy nejsou dílem náhody*, SLON, Praha, 2009. 168.

To conclude this part, the most innovative and positive aspect of writings of Horváth and Palacký is that they included all sorts of new topics into their histories. But on the other hand we can observe that they strictly closed themselves into the national narratives. Though Palacký seeks some kind of humanity⁵⁵ and shows contribution of Hussits to whole European civilization and Horváth often speaks about freedom and liberalism, they both try to legitimize their own nation. In that sense they both lost the Enlightenment's call for the universal and we can still experience this effects in today's historical writings.

Conclusion

At the beginning of our queries there was a question about 19th century historicism and historiography of the 19th century. Not surprisingly we found that this a complex phenomenon and there is no clear definition. Nevertheless, I think we can make some more general assumption concerning historiography of the 19th century, especially in Bohemia and Hungary.

With Miroslav Hroch we can identify four basic purpose of national history: 1) To strengthen national identity. 2) To create the legitimacy of existence of the nation. 3) To offered sense of security to the individual. 4) To serve as a basis for the formation of national values.⁵⁶

The position of history radically changed during the Enlightenment. We can observe the importance that history got especially in the 19th century in every philosophical system inspired by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.⁵⁷ Not only that, but historiography as a subject, also got more prestige by claiming the same scientific status as natural sciences.

In the 19th century historiography, it is an often-used strong argument, but we cannot say that historians were just ideologists. We need to realize that for historians past development was an organic part of the present and present was an organic part of the past.⁵⁸ For every regime, state or nation at least in modern era is typical an effort to create unique image of the past, which help to justify various social and political decisions.⁵⁹ This follows the legacy of traditional history, but it is amplified in the 19th century because of the disintegration of traditional order and legitimacy based on divine principle. The very idea of nation-building process is based on history, it is timeless community whose justification of existence is derived from preserving the

⁵⁵ Especially in his younger age.

⁵⁶ HORCH, Miroslav: *Národy nejsou dílem náhody*, SLON, Praha, 2009. 177–178.

⁵⁷ For example the works of Ludwig Feuerbach, Moses Hess, Karl Marx.

⁵⁸ HORCH, Miroslav: *Národy nejsou dílem náhody*, SLON, Praha, 2009. 172.

⁵⁹ HAVELKA, Miloš: *Zamyšlení nad legitimizační funkcemi dějin*, Soudobé dějiny 8, 2001, č. 1. 101.

inherited.⁶⁰ In other words many scholars and members of the elite agreed that everything that existed must express and justify the right to exist by means of history.⁶¹ This strength and ubiquity of historical argument can be found even outside the realms of nation-building, for example even Communist manifesto starts with „*all history is history of class struggle*”.

We also observed that the main pseudo-character of the Horváth's and Palacký's narrative was the nation. The readers are not reading about some distant old time, they are reading about themselves, about their present, about their struggles. In other words, historical knowledge helps to constitute subjects of the readers as members of the national community.⁶² This in my opinion is the most accurate characteristic of the national historiography of 19th century.

I would like to end with the notion that national histories or any history for that matter have no meaning by itself, but the meaning is given to them by contemporary historians or by anyone who has the social capital to proclaim it.⁶³ We need to realize that interpretation of any historical object is influenced by the present of the person who is doing the inquiry. In my mind this is actually a good thing, because if we accept the thesis that the act of interpretation of history by itself widens our experience in today's world,⁶⁴ we can study the experience of Horváth and Palacký in 19th century and widen ours in the same process.

Bibliography

- ANDERSON, Benedict R.: *Imagined communities*, Verso, London, 1991.
BAÁR, Monika: *Historians and Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010. 237.
BAÁR, Monika: *The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary: The Case of Mihály Horváth*. IN: TRENCSENYI, Balázs (ed.): *Nation-Building and Contested Identities*, Regio Books, Budapest, 2001.
ČINÁTL, Kamil: *Dějiny a vyprávění*, Argo, Praha, 2011.
FELDNER, Heiko: *Nová vědeckost v dějepisectví kolem roku 1800*, 19. IN: BERGER, Stefan; FELDNER, Heiko; PASSMORE Kevin (ed.): *Jak se píšou dějiny*, CDK, Brno, 2016.
FOUCAULT, Michel: „*Society must be defended*”, Picador, New York, 2003.

⁶⁰ THIESSE, Anne-Marie: *Vytváření národních identit v Evropě 18. až 20. století*, CDK, Brno, 2007. 13.

⁶¹ HROCH, Miroslav: *European Nations*, Verso, London; New York, 2015. 168.

⁶² ČINÁTL, Kamil: *Dějiny a vyprávění*. Argo, Praha, 2011. 167.

⁶³ RANDÁK, Jan: *O národních příbězích*. 147. IN: ŘEPA, Milan (ed.): *19. století v nás*, Historický ústav, Praha, 2008. 139–151.

⁶⁴ GADDIS, John Lewis: *The Landscape of History. How Historians Map the Past*. Oxford, 2002. 10.

- GADDIS, John Lewis: *The Landscape of History. How Historians Map the Past*, Oxford, 2002.
- HAVELKA, Miloš: *Zamyšlení nad legitimizační funkcemi dějin*, *Soudobé dějiny* 8, 2001. n. 1.
- HEYWOOD, Andrew: *Politické ideologie*, Eurolex Bohemia s. r. o., Praha, 2005.
- HORCH, Miroslav: *Národy nejsou dílem náhody*, SLON, Praha, 2009.
- HROCH, Miroslav: *Comparative Studies in Modern European History*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2007.
- HROCH, Miroslav: *European Nations*, Verso, London; New York, 2015.
- HROCH, Miroslav: *Hledání souvislostí*. Sociologickénakladatelství (SLON), Praha, 2016.
- HROCH, Miroslav: *National romanticism*. IN: KOPEČEK, Michal; TRENCSENYI, Balázs. (ed.): *Discourses of Collective Identity in Cenral and Southeast Europe (1770-1945)*, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007. 4–18.
- HROCH, Miroslav: *V národním zájmu*, NLN, Praha, 1999.
- IGGERS, Georg G.; WANG, Edward Q.: *A Global History of Modern Historiography*. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London; New York, 2013.
- IGGERS, Georg: *Historiography in the twentieth century. From scientific objectivity to the postmodern challenge*, Wesleyan University Press, Hanover, 1997.
- KOCKA, Jürgen: *Comparison and Beyond*. In: *History and Theory*. Vol 42, No 1. 39–44.
- KOPEČEK, Michal; TRENCSENYI, Balázs. (ed.): *Discourses of Collective Identity in Cenral and Southeast Europe (1770-1945)*, CEU Press, Budapest, New York, 2007.
- KOŘALKA, Jiří. *František Palacký*, Argo, Praha, 1998.
- PALACKÝ, František: *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a na Moravě*. Volume I, Kvasnička a Hampl, Praha, 1939.
- PALACKÝ, František: *Psaní do Frankfurtu*. *Národní noviny*, 15. 4. 1848.
- RANDÁK, Jan: *O národních příbězích*. IN: ŘEPA, Milan (ed.): *19. století v nás*. Historický ústav, Praha, 2008. 139–151.
- ŠTAIF, Jiří: *František Palacký*, Vyšehrad, Praha, 2009.
- ŠTAIF, Jiří: *Obezřetná elita*, Dokořán, Praha, 2005.
- THIESSE, Anne-Marie: *Vytváření národních identit v Evropě 18. až 20. století*, CDK, Brno: 2007.
- URBAN, Otto: *Český liberalismus v 19. století*. IN: ZNOJ, Milan; HAVRÁNEK, Jan; SEKERA, Martin (ed.): *Český liberalismus*, Torst, Praha, 1995. 15–27.
- VEBER, Václav et al.: *Dějiny Rakouska*, NLN, Praha, 2002.

Katalin Schrek¹



Interpretation of Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy's Diplomatic Role and Thematization of His Reports during the Negotiations on the Independent Greek State (1829–1832)²

Abstract

An interesting segment of the Greek Cause was an idea to create an independent Greek State on the part of the Great Powers. With this object, an international conference was organised between 1830 and 1832. On this conference, a Hungarian diplomat Paul Anton Esterhazy – as a minister plenipotentiary of Austria in London – represented the opinion of the Cabinet in Vienna. During this negotiation process – in favour of Greeks – Esterhazy played a special role. The aim of my study is to make an overview about Esterhazy's diplomatic mission.

Keywords: Eastern Question; Greek Cause; international relations; Austrian diplomacy; English diplomacy; Paul Anton Esterhazy's mission; Conference of London;

The Greek Cause was one of the key issues of the European diplomacy of the 1820's. Between 1821 and 1832, it became a serious dilemma for the participants of the Concert of Europe to find a solution for the international conflict arising as the sign of the decay of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the Greek independence movement of several decades and the social movements associated with it. After almost ten years of military and diplomatic struggle, at the end of the 1820's the issue of the Greek State has stepped into the phase of realization, and an international conference was summoned in London with sessions held between 1830 and 1832, with the purpose of establishing the Independent Greek State. The standpoint of the Cabinet in Vienna at the Conference was represented by the London ambassador to Austria – the Hungarian-born diplomat – Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy. The goal of my paper is to give an overview on this short period of Esterhazy's diplomatic mission and to present the significance of his proceeding during the Conference of London; furthermore to make a thematic

¹ Historian, PhD, University of Debrecen, schrek.katalin@arts.unideb.hu

² Supported through the New National Excellence Program of the Ministry of Human Capacities.

classification of his ambassadorial reports and exploration of the most important issues during the term of the London Conference. Which were the issues and problems he was interested in, and which were the events he sent detailed reports on to Vienna? What were these reports like from stylistic point of view? To what extent were Esterházy's personality, personal opinion and political attitude manifested in these reports?

The investigation of the role of the Austrian ambassador is still a mainly undiscovered part both in the Hungarian and the international literature. In the examination of Esterházy's activity we could use primary sources, which were all relevant from the point of view of the current topic as well. The archive materials can be found at the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna. The collection of *Diplomatie und Außenpolitik vor 1848 – Staatenabteilungen/Außerdeutsche Staaten/Großbritannien* includes valuable documents according to Esterházy's mission.³

Esterházy was a highly qualified and internationally recognized diplomat, with an extensive network of personal relations within the European elite, however, his figure had not been able to take a more prominent place and remained in the periphery of the Hungarian historiography. The historical literature on Esterházy until now mainly focused on his early years, on his relation with Klemens von Metternich and on his role played in the War of Independence between 1848 and 1849, where he functioned as the Foreign minister of the first responsible Hungarian Government.⁴ In performing his duties in this position he could make a good use of his more than four decades of experience in foreign affairs, the period of which is still mainly an undiscovered part of historical research. Nonetheless, Esterházy did not merely fulfil a diplomatic service in Austria, but also represented the interests of the Austrian Monarchy in one of the most influential countries in the ground of the European diplomatic affairs. The function

³ The evaluation of Esterházy's despatches based on the files of the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv. *Diplomatie und Außenpolitik vor 1848. Staatenabteilungen/Außerdeutsche Staaten/ Großbritannien (England) – Diplomatischen Korrespondenz* (further on: HHStA-DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K 185, 186, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196 boxes.

⁴ HAJNAL István: *Egy magyar herceg ifjúkora Napóleon idején. Első közlemény*. Budapesti Szemle. 1927. Vol. 206. No. 597. 264–291.; HAJNAL István: *Egy magyar herceg ifjúkora Napóleon idején*. Budapesti Szemle. 1927. Vol. 206. No. 598. 415–447. HAJNAL István: *Metternich és Esterházy*. Századok. 1927. No. 1–3. RESS Imre: *Der Diplomat Paul III. Anton Esterházy (1786–1866)*. IN: PERSCHY, Johann (Hrsg.): *Die Fürsten Esterházy. Magnaten, Diplomaten, Mäzene*. Eisenstadt, 1995; URBÁN Aladár: *Herceg Esterházy Pál a Batthyány-kormányban*. Aetas. 2009. No. 1. 5–19. URBÁN Aladár: *Herceg Esterházy Pál belépése a Batthyány-kormányba és visszahúzódása a miniszteri tevékenységtől*. Aetas. 2009. No. 1. 161–174.

of the ambassador to London was a serious position of trust, which assumed not only close relations with the political elite of Vienna, but also required the skills of professional and social representation of the country abroad. Prince Esterhazy had excellent knowledge and experience in both fields, which he had by then proved during his former assignments in Dresden and Paris, as well as during the Congress of Vienna. The latter was of capital importance, since it became the turning point in Prince Esterhazy's career in Foreign Affairs.

Before the full description of the topic, I would like to give a short outline on Paul Anton Esterhazy's diplomatic career before the period of his ambassadorial position in London. The Prince started to work in the Austrian Foreign Ministry in 1806, and his first foreign mission was to London, when he was delegated to perform secretarial tasks at the Embassy of Austria in London.⁵ His first assignment was soon followed by another one, with his transfer to Paris.⁶ It was presumably in Paris that he made his first close work contacts with Metternich, who the same year became the Paris Ambassador of the Austrian Empire. Later Esterhazy performed diplomatic service in Dresden – at the Court of the Saxon Principality – then in 1814 he worked with Metternich again, at the Chatillon negotiations, which were meant to prepare the post-war settlement of Europe.⁷ From this point on there was a straight path to the Congress of Vienna, where he probably earned the trust of the British delegation with his performance and personality, and right after the Congress, he received his appointment, which meant for him the Austrian ambassadorial position to London. It is important to note that the Prince Regent made a special request to have Prince Esterhazy in London as the representative of Austria.⁸ In response to the request, Esterhazy the same year received his credentials from the Chancellor, and as a consequence, he performed his ambassadorial service between 1815 and 1842. The duration of his service is also very remarkable: his ambassadorial mission – lasting for 27 years – is the best proof of his correctness and expertise, the properties highlighted by Esterhazy's contemporaries as well.

The exploration of Esterhazy's entire ambassadorial mission can be the objective of a more comprehensive research programme. During the nearly three decades spent in the English capital, the Prince had to mediate in, and manage various international affairs. Since I am concerned with the topic only ten months within the framework of a research programme the time was too short for a complex exploration of the entire period between 1815 and 1842, therefore I have chosen to

⁵ RESS: 200.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid. 202–203.

⁸ *A New Biographical Dictionary (...)*. Vol. I. Part. II. J. Rider, London, 1825. 30.

present Esterhazy's behaviour and political attitude through the examination of a partial problem related to the Eastern Question. At the same time, later on I would like to broaden my research area and to elaborate the entire diplomatic career of Paul Anton Esterhazy. The recent subject is based on the Greek Cause, the international background of which covered a decade by itself (1821–1830). However, the period I have chosen to explore, includes only the last stage of the Greek–Turkish conflict, the years during the Conference of London – held with the purpose to establish the independent Greek State – and its preliminary sessions (1829–1832).

Although the Greek Question appeared on the agenda of European diplomacy starting from 1821, actually the European Great Powers did not want to deal with the matter substantially, since it was considered as the internal affair of the Ottoman Empire. On the Congress of Laibach Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, France and Russia clearly declared their distancing from the case, letting the Porte manage the crisis by themselves.⁹ Significant changes came only due to the interaction and mutual effect of the social, political and economic factors.¹⁰ This process had several aspects: the first one is the so-called philhellenic movement arisen in Europe (mainly in England and France). The second one is the economic interests – this point tied Great Britain and Russia because the assurance of the unobstructed trade on the Mediterranean Sea (and the Black Sea) was a vital point in the policy of London and St Petersburg. Moreover, from the Russian side, the Greek movement made a considerable chance to broaden Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula. In order to avoid this situation Great Britain encouraged the creation of an Anglo–Russian alliance in the favour of Greece. This cooperation expanded with France and a trilateral alliance come into being against the Porte (1827) and brought changes to the power relations in the Balkans. In addition to these factors, the conflicts escalated between St Petersburg and Constantinople in 1828 resulted in a declaration of war between the two countries. Even though the Russo–Turkish war theoretically, on the level of the Russian rhetoric, was independent from the issue of the Greek independence, the events of 1828–1829 in the long run still had an impact on the evolution of the

⁹ ORMOS Mária – MAJOROS István: *Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2003. 42–43. CRAWLEY, C. W.: *The Question of the Greek Independence*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1930. 19.

¹⁰ COUTAU-BÉGARIE, Hervé: *Sea power in the Mediterranean from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century*. IN Hattendorf, John B. (Ed.): *Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean. Past, Present and Future*. Frank Cass, London, 2005. 39–41. HATTENDORF, John B.: *Sea Power as Control. Britain's Defensive Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean (1793–1815)*. IN: *Français et Anglais en Méditerranée de la Révolution française à l'indépendance de la Grèce (1789–1830)*. Service historique de la marine, Toulon, 1992. 203–220.

Greek Cause. The original casus belli of the Russo–Turkish war was a diplomatic conflict between St Petersburg and Constantinople because of the Turkish proceedings in the Danubian Principalities, but the direct root cause of declaration of war against Russia on the side of the Porte was the allied action at Navarino in October 1827. In that way the Russo–Turkish war joined the Greek Cause at this point.¹¹

As part of the short international review of the Greek Question, we would like to cover the directives of the Cabinet of Vienna concerning the case. The Austrian Foreign Affairs lead by Metternich pursued a consistent policy as regards the War of Independence during the 1820's, firmly supporting the Laibach standpoint even when one of their main allies, Russia opposed to the principle of neutrality, advocating for Great Power mediation in order to resolve the ongoing conflict in the East. This strategy of isolation is curious from the viewpoint of Vienna, since it seems to go completely against the Austrian foreign policy of the previous years. For comparison, between 1815 and 1821 Austria took a very active part in the control of the European Affairs: after the Congress of Vienna Austria took major part in resolving the conflicts first in the course of the student movements in the German States, then in the revolutions in South Europe.¹² During the seven years after the Napoleonic Wars there was virtually not one European issue in which Vienna would have remained passive, not even on the level of diplomacy. As opposed to that, in the case of the Eastern Question on the agenda in 1821, namely in the discourses urging the settlement of the Greek–Turkish situation, Austria definitely stepped back and decided not to participate, or just in moderate form.¹³ Until that point, the way of dealing with the Greek Cause could not be revealed in Metternich's foreign policy, the main concept of which after 1815 was focused around the Congress System and the System of the Holy Alliance. The essence of the Austrian conservative foreign policy was formed by the basic principles of the reason for existence of the dynastic power and the aspiration to suppress the enlightened national and revolutionary ideas.

The Chancellor considered the Greek Uprising as an event outside the European matters, which was one of the reasons for Austria's distance from the occurrences.¹⁴ Secondly, in the existing international relations

¹¹ JELAVICH, Barbara: *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 28.

¹² Revolutionary movements evolved in Naples, Piedmont, Spain. To the particular history of the revolutionary wave of the 1820's see: SCHROEDER, Paul: *Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. 606–614.

¹³ JELAVICH, Barbara: *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814–1918*. Rand McMillan & Company, Chicago, 1969. 36. SCHROEDER, Paul: *Metternich Diplomacy at its Zenith, 1820–1823*. University of Texas Press, Austin, 1962. 123–124.

¹⁴ BUCHMANN, Bertrand Michael: *Militär, Diplomatie, Politik. Österreich und*

from the geostrategic point of view Austria focused on the preservation of the Ottoman Empire's integrity, since maintaining the Porte's integrity and authority could prevent the expansion of Russia to the south and its acquiring political influence in the Balkans. The region was important for the Habsburg Monarchy, since starting from the end of the 17th century it became one of the main directions of the potential expansion of the Empire. For this reason from the 1680's Austria more often intervened in the affairs of the region; and during the 18th century it got involved in several wars with the Porte. By the end of the century, when the Western European political scene coming into focus, the Balkan issue became marginal for Austria. Naturally, the Balkan Peninsula remained an integral part of the sphere of interest for the Habsburg Monarchy, but after the rearrangement of the priorities in the foreign policy, the Government of Vienna devoted less attention to the region, pursuing a more reserved policy and staying away from the conflicts in this area. Nevertheless, Austria had an important function at the Balkans, since it played a role of counterbalance against Russia and was the protector of the status quo at the same time. In this task, Great Britain became the main ally of the Cabinet of Vienna.

Thus we can clearly state that despite the fact that the Greek Cause in a sense fitted into the series of the revolutionary movements of the 1820's, which were the main subjects of the Congresses in Troppau, Laibach and in Verona, Metternich's policy still handled the Greek uprising separately from the revolutions in Spain and Italy, considering the Greek Affair as a sub issue of the Eastern Question. Besides, the Austrian attitude applied to the War of Independence was adjusted to the political principles applied towards the Ottoman Empire, and ceased to follow the methods formerly used in the management of European affairs. It must be noted that this difference in judgement can be observed only in the political control of the Greek National Movement by Austria, but not in its evaluation by them.

After the introduction of the main guidelines of the international situation and the Austrian diplomacy it is time to describe the nature of the relationship between Prince Paul Esterhazy and Metternich, with respect to the major common views determining the long-term cooperation of the two statesmen. In the first part of the paper, we have already mentioned that the paths of Esterhazy and Metternich crossed at a very early stage of Esterhazy's diplomatic career. They first met during Metternich's ambassadorship in Paris, and then we could see how Esterhazy helped the Chancellor's work during the last years of the Napoleonic Wars. Metternich and Esterhazy presumably had developed

a good, confidential liaison.¹⁵ Metternich and Esterhazy had essentially a relationship based on trust, the clearest manifestation of which was the fact of Esterhazy's delegation by Chancellor Metternich to one of the most influential and greatest European partners of Austria.

The London Conference on Greece was held with the mutual agreement of the three Great Powers: Great Britain, France and Russia. Austria officially did not take part in the Conference, since the right of the organization and the management of the international conference was owned by the members of the trilateral alliance. Since due to the previously described policy at the Balkans Austria maintained his principles of non-intervention even after an anti-Turkish Great Power cooperation had started to form (1826–1827), it did not join the coalition established by the Treaty of June 6, 1827; and as a consequence missed the official participation at the Conference of London. Therefore, Esterhazy's position and the nature of his actions in connection with the Greek Cause must be defined from this perspective. The first and most important factor is his status: Esterhazy attended the Conference not as a participant, but as an observer, and as such, he did not have the same rights as the representatives of the other three states. He was not authorized either to participate or make decision in specific cases. Nevertheless, he can still be considered as someone who had major role in the formation of the diplomatic events even during the negotiations in London.

The uniqueness of Prince Esterhazy's position can be described with the duality of his participation at the Conference as an outsider and as a mediator, at the same time. This contradiction can be resolved by understanding the true nature of Esterhazy's role in this context, which can rather be regarded informal than formal, and the Prince himself as a constant member of the background consultations throughout the sessions of the Conference of London. It is especially important as regards the British Government, which lead continual consultations with Esterhazy (and through him with the Austrian Government), even during the most active period of the British–French–Russian trilateral cooperation. It was especially true for the Wellington–Aberdeen period between 1828 and 1830. The English diplomacy could rely on Esterhazy's mediation and opinion, since the cooperation with Austria became crucial for the Foreign Office in order to compensate the aspirations of France and Russia. This phenomenon could be more strongly experienced in 1829, the year of the victory of Russia over the Porte, as well as the year when the Cabinet of Paris, in response to the changing situation in the Balkans and the Near East, came forward with a detailed partition plan of the Ottoman Empire. According to the project of the French Prime Minister, Jules de Polignac, Russia would

¹⁵ HAJNAL István: *Metternich és Esterházy*. Századok. 1927. No. 1–3. 22.

obtain control over the Danubian Principalities, and receive Armenian territories; Austria would broaden with some Western Balkan areas as Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Dalmatia together with the Principality of Serbia. France would get Luxemburg and expand her territories to Belgium.¹⁶ Finally, Great Britain would take advantages not in Europe, but in the overseas with Dutch colonies.¹⁷ Under such circumstances, Prime Minister Wellington, and the leader of the British Foreign Office, Lord Aberdeen, took extremely great care to keep the partnership of Austria, sharing common political views on the issue of the Turkish integrity. So during this period Esterhazy's role and position definitely increased in value.

The observations and reports written by Esterhazy in London and forwarded to Vienna between 1829 and 1832 contain useful information on the handling of the Greek Question, and more importantly, on the relations of the three allies during the negotiation process. One of the sorest points was the shaping of the British–Russian relations, notably the difficulties of the period following Russia's victory in the 1828–1829 Russo–Turkish war. The newly strengthened influence of Russia at the Balkans due to the Treaty of Adrianople, as well as the altered Russo–Turkish relations caused a great dilemma for the Wellington Government.¹⁸ The conflicts and clashes between St Petersburg and Constantinople manifested on the scene of diplomacy, which created to a certain extent equal position even during the disputes, with no shift in favour of any of the parties. Due to Russia's military victory in the war and her capacity to defend politically their own interests, Russia gained a significant advantage over the Porte, and the Ottoman Empire was temporarily forced to a subordinate position, which caused many concerns both to the British and to the Austrian leadership in Foreign Affairs.

By the end of the 1820's a new international situation was formed simultaneously with the Greek Cause, leading to a change in the status quo of the Balkans. Esterhazy's London reports from 1829 were mainly grouped around this circumstance¹⁹, and reported about the criticism of

¹⁶ DJUVARA, T. G.: *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie (1281–1913)*. Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1914. 389–390.

¹⁷ SCHROEDER: 658.

¹⁸ No. 29. Prince Esterhazy. Craintes de Lord Aberdeen (...). Londres, le 12 août 1829. IN: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK). K186. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.08–1829.12); No. 42. Prince Esterhazy. (...) entretien avec le Duc de Wellington (...) par le Cabinet du St. James à l'égard des stipulations du traité d'Adrianople et de sur conséquences. Londres, le 2 novembre 1829. IN : Ibid.; No. 46. Prince Esterhazy. Impression fâcheuse produite à St. Pétersbourg par les réflexions du Cabinet Brit(annique): sur le traité d'Adrianople. Londres, le 26 décembre 1829. IN : Ibid.

¹⁹ No. 17. Prince Esterhazy. Opinion du Duc de Wellington sur la campagne Russe

the British Cabinet concerning Russia. In his reports, the Prince repeatedly referred to the details of the Russian military operations, about which he learned from British and other international sources.²⁰ As part of the Russo–Turkish war, he also reported about the blockade of the island of Crete by the Russian Fleet and the British–French responses to that.²¹ The event is of great interest, since through Esterhazy’s records, besides gaining insight to the details of the Russo–Turkish war we can also picture the difficulties of the British–French–Russian trilateral alliance and the aversions of the allies towards one another. The war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia drew the attention of the British and French Government to the risks implied in the ambitions of their common ally in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the concerns due to the expansion in the Balkans were more typical of Great Britain, since Britain did not want to lose their control over the Eastern Mediterranean as well as their economic interests and privileges in the region. Lord Aberdeen’s reaction included in Paul Anton Esterhazy’s report from May 8, 1829, was partially in response to that.²² Based on the Prince’s despatch, the British Foreign Minister demanded for a detailed report on the events from Prince Lieven, the Russian ambassador, expressing his protest against the situation.²³ Although Aberdeen did not question Russia’s right to act in accordance with the Treaty of July 6, he considered Russia’s actions exaggerated, and made a recommendation on the modification of the provisions of the Agreement of 1827, presumably in order to eliminate any similar Great Power actions in the future.²⁴

Esterhazy’s full awareness of the ongoing events was also shown by the fact that the Prince was well-informed about the internal affairs and

en 1829. Londres, le 26 avril 1829. IN: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K185. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.01–1829.07).

²⁰ No. 4. Prince Esterhazy. Entretien avec Lord Aberdeen sur les dernières nouvelles de St. Pétersbourg et de la Constantinople. Londres, le 25 janvier 1829. IN: Ibid.; No. 31. Prince Esterhazy. Entretien avec le Duc de Wellington à la suite de la réception des nouvelles des derniers succès des armées Russes. Londres, le 31 août 1829. IN: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K186. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.08–1829.12).; No. 34. Prince Esterhazy. Opérations militaires russes. Londres, le 11 septembre 1829. IN: Ibid.

²¹ No. 18. Prince Esterhazy. Concernant le blocus de l’île Candie par la flotte Russie. Londres, le 8 mai 1829. IN: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K185. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.01–1829.07). No. 19. Prince Esterhazy. Accuse la réception des dépêches du 30 avril, et transmet un extrait du protocole du 8 mai relatif au blocus de l’île de Candie et à l’extension de l’exercice de l’escadre russe. Londres, le 15 mai 1829. IN: Ibid.

²² No. 18. Prince Esterhazy. Concernant le blocus de l’île Candie par la flotte Russie. Londres, le 8 mai 1829. IN: Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

representation of the other states. He had close relations with the ambassadors of the other European Great Powers to London, and in many cases, he presented detailed reports on the information mediated by the Russian ambassador (K. A. Lieven) to the British Government and the instructions and despatches of the British ambassador at St Petersburg (Lord Heystesbury).²⁵ He had up-to-date information about the reforms were planned by the Russian Government in Moldavia and Wallachia and transmitted detailed summary on the advantages of the possession of the Danube Delta.²⁶

An interesting thematic unit and a part of the former issue in Esterhazy's reports was the question of capability or incapability of the operation of the trilateral alliance. The questions of disagreement between France, Great Britain and Russia concerning the Greek Cause and the future situation of the Ottoman Empire soon became an obstacle for a good cooperation within the alliance. The main problem was caused by the conflicts of interest between the members of the coalition, those existing even before the formation of their alliance, but suspended by the parties in order to resolve the Greek–Turkish conflict. However, the aspirations to acquire political influence in the Balkan region, and moreover, over the Ottoman Empire, soon started to dominate the discourse of the allies. Esterhazy gave regular reports on the diplomatic manifestations of these problems.²⁷

The second bigger thematic unit of Esterhazy's reports was the definition of the English strategy used against Greece. The nature of the support given to the Greek Provisional Government was always a key issue for the Government in London. The amount of the subvention

²⁵ No. 28. Prince Esterhazy. Communication d'une dépêche du Prince Lieven au Cabinet Anglais, sur la correspondance du Diebitsch avec le Grand Vizir. Londres, le 25 juillet 1829. In: *Ibid.*; No. 44. Prince Esterhazy. (...) Contenu des instructions à L. Heystesbury à St Péresbourg. Londres, le 27 novembre 1829. In: *Ibid.*

²⁶ No. 29. Prince Esterhazy. Concernant les reformes (...). Londres, le 12 août 1829. In: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K186. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.08–1829.12). No. 40. Prince Esterhazy. Transmet deux mémoires de relat(ivement) à l'importance de possession des îles sur le Danube. Londres, le 14 octobre 1829. IN : *Ibid.*

²⁷ No. 1. Entretien avec Lord Aberdeen relativement aux armements en course de la partie des Grecs et les complications qui en résultent. Londres, le 8 janvier 1829. In: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K185. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.01–1829.07)., No. 31. Prince Esterhazy. Entretien avec Lord Aberdeen sur la crise actuelle dans les affaires de l'Orient. Londres, le 31 août 1829. In: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K186. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.08–1829.12). Interesting thing that Esterhazy had already reported about the political ambitions of Mohamed Ali (Governor of Egypt) and his plan for creating an independent Arabian State in 1829: No. 40. Prince Esterhazy. Envoi de pièces confidentielles communiqués par Lord Aberdeen relatives à l'émancipation Mehemed Ali, Pasha d'Égypte. Londres, le 12 octobre 1829. IN: *Ibid.*

repeatedly caused dilemmas for the Cabinet of St James, since there were many differences between the notions of the Greek Provisional Government and the British concept of establishing the independent state, especially in territorial issues. The Foreign Office wanted to determine future borders of the autonomous Greek state based on the principle of „*uti possidetis*”.²⁸ The „*uti possidetis*” is a term used in international law, and it implies that a certain territory will be possessed by its present owner.²⁹ Concerning the Greek Cause the position of the British Government was exactly that, namely, the established state would possess the territories acquired during the military conflict against the Porte. To some extent associated with that, in his reports Esterhazy several times mentioned the British aspirations and plans of sustaining the Ottoman Empire³⁰, which was fully in accordance with the Austrian geostrategic interests. In one of his reports, Esterhazy wrote about the conception of Wellington regarding these efforts. The Prince emphasized, that the British Prime Minister is aware to the necessity of a common arrangement of the European Great Powers in this question, and that he is committed to the preservation of the Turkish Empire.³¹ The cooperation of the leading European States appeared in the context of Wellington’s political thinking several times, since he believed that the current situation is equivalent with the waver of the system created in 1814–1815.³²

With regards, the designation of the Greek–Turkish demarcation line some other notions were revealed as well, such as the Russian concept of natural borders. The period of the Boundary Commission negotiations was presumably the most decisive one, when Esterhazy had the chance to support the British Cabinet in the most contentious issue of the discussions on the Greek State. Although Great Britain was in favour of the realization of the sovereign Greek Kingdom, London required the support of the Government of Vienna, since it was not in any sense in their interests to let the newly formed state in the Balkans gain too much

²⁸ FLEMING, D. C.: *John Capodistrias and the Conference of London*. Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1970. 106.

²⁹ PRESCOTT, Victor – TRIGGS, Gilian D.: *International Frontiers and Boundaries. Law, Politics and Geography*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008. 142.; SHARMA, Syria P.: *Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1997. 119–120.

³⁰ For instance: No. 43. Prince Esterhazy. Entretien avec Lord Aberdeen (...) relatif à la conservation de l’Empire Ottoman; la Création d’un État grec (...). Londres, le 13 novembre 1829. In: HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K186. Berichte Neumann, Esterhazy (1829.08–1829.12).

³¹ No. 40. Prince Esterhazy. Conversation avec le Duc de Wellington sur la nécessité de soutenir la Porte. Londres, le 12 octobre 1829. IN: Ibid.

³² No. 40. Prince Esterhazy. Cite les points principaux qui dans la pacification entre la Russie et la Porte (...). Londres, le 12 octobre 1829. IN: Ibid.

territories due to the great support from Russian side from the beginning. The alternative of such over-expansion would imply the possibility of the establishment of a strong Balkan state with strategically excellent location and under Russian protectorate, which at the same time could function as a gateway of the Russian Empire to the Mediterranean area. Esterhazy became a participant of a quite paradoxical situation, when by being a delegate of Austria, outside the trilateral alliance, he virtually supported the British Cabinet in order to help them regain the balance over the Russo–French predominance. The true significance of Paul Esterhazy's participation at the Conference of London was exactly in this context.

In addition, concerning the further results of the Greek Conference Esterhazy's reports helped to understand the degree of significance of the Eastern Question problem related to the European issues as well. In 1830, another revolutionary period started in Europe: riots against the reigning power broke out first in Paris, then in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and later in Poland. Although all the three events have their own specific significance, it was the Belgian Uprising that drew the attention of the leading European Great Powers, since it brought the threat of elimination of the artificially established state, formed in 1815. Therefore, the Great Powers gathered in London with the purpose to find a solution to the Greek Cause, acting in response to the Belgian–Dutch confrontation, had to add to their agenda the issue of the Belgian independence. Therefore, the Conference to handle the Greek Question soon turned to a Conference to deal with the Belgian issue, overshadowing the Eastern problems and pushing them to the background. Esterhazy's reports sent to Vienna clearly reflect this tendency. While Esterhazy's despatches from 1829 and, to smaller extent, from 1830³³ contained rich source material on the negotiations concerning the Greek War of Independence and the position of the Ottoman Empire, starting from the year of 1831 his ambassadorial reports on the Eastern Question spectacularly reduced.³⁴ We should note that it did not happen as a result of a change in Esterhazy's interest, it rather happened due to the developing changes in the international relations. To achieve the Belgian autonomy was regarded as an issue of great interest, since it brought the first significant change in the continental status quo, created by the Congress of Vienna. At the same time, besides Belgium there were other issues deserving attention as well, such as the Spanish internal crisis and the state of affairs of the Portuguese colonies in South America. All these factors lead to a situation when simultaneously with the European issues coming into view, by 1831 the current problem of the Eastern Question was rapidly

³³ HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K 190.

³⁴ HHStA–DA vor 1848/S/AS. Großbritannien – DK.). K 192–196.

settled, and after the completion of the Greek–Turkish border arbitration dispute it practically lost its significance. Esterhazy's ambassadorial reports from that moment mainly focused on the Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese issues, and the topics concerning the Greek Kingdom were displaced from the focus of attention.

During the examination of the short interval of Esterhazy's ambassadorial service in London we came to the following conclusions concerning his role and the content of his reports. While performing his duty of representing the official Austrian foreign policy, as well his ambassadorial service in general, Esterhazy by 1830 found himself in peculiar circumstances: Austria was not invited to the Conference summoned on the issue of establishment of the Greek State, but despite of that Paul Esterhazy had to play an important role during the background negotiations. During the consultations of Great Britain and its allies on the Greek Cause, Esterhazy became the main symbol and representative of Austrian temperance. Acting informally, as a participant outside the Conference, he was still able to enforce the basic factors of the Austrian standpoint represented in the Greek Question. Besides, he was a powerful support for the British Administration as well, who were strongly in need of Esterhazy's assistance, finding him a great external ally in maintaining Britain's capability of enforcing their interests within the British–French–Russian coalition.

One of the main features of his diplomatic reviews and reports is the correctness of the rendered data, as well as his accuracy in presenting the local (British) political relations and responses. Transmitting of the British perspective is decisive part of his despatches, but at the same time, his reports are far from being one-sided. Esterhazy, besides presenting the state of things in England, describes the major factors influencing the British politics in a much broader context, with constant referral to the internal events, and British responses to different international affairs, especially in reference to the Russian Empire. His view is not exclusively centred around the British events; he tried to make an overview about the main political features of the European Great Powers, so he gives us an insight to the driving forces and motives of the French and Russian foreign policy as well. Despite all these benefits, we must note that Esterhazy's reports sent to Vienna are mainly factual and contain little personal opinions or reflections, and they almost entirely lack personal conceptions, commentaries or remarks. The Prince in most of the cases strives to be factual and his reports seem to reflect the attitude of the Cabinet in Vienna. Independent notions or spontaneous attitudes, adjusted in accordance with the situation can rarely be found in his reports. In point of Greece Esterhazy was the representative of moderation and a supporter of the British conceptions, at the same time he contributed to the

compensation of French and Russian ambitions, and to the maintenance of the European balance of power.

In conclusion, it can be stated, that Esterhazy performed a professional and expert ambassadorial representation both in general and as regards the specific period examined by us. In the Greek Cause, he represented the policy of the Cabinet of Vienna, while in his communication and relations with Great Britain he assured the conditions for a stable long-term alliance cooperation. The full discovery of Paul Esterhazy's diplomatic work requires further research, which would be necessary if we want to have a complete and detailed picture about the nearly three decades of Esterhazy's diplomatic mission. Esterhazy's significance can also be described by the fact that as an acknowledged politician taking part in the international political sphere, he was an outstanding figure of the 19th century Hungarian history, therefore a more complex further research of his portrait would certainly fill a gap in the field of historiography.