

# **ÖT KONTINENS**

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti  
Tanszék közleményei*

**N°2014/1.**



**Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem  
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST  
2016**



**ÖT KONTINENS**

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék  
közleményei  
Nº 2014/1.*

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM  
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST  
2016**

**FIVE CONTINENTS  
Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary  
History  
Nº 2014/1.**

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY  
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES**

**BUDAPEST  
2016**

## ***Editorial Board***

### **President**

*BALOGH, András*, Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University,  
Budapest

### ***Members:***

*BODNÁR, Erzsébet* (Ph.D.), University of Debrecen, *BÚR, Gábor* (Ph.D.), Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *CADILHON, François*, Professor, Michel de Montaigne University Bordeaux 3, *ÇOLAK, Kamil* (Ph.D.), University of Eskişehir, *FIGEAC, Michel*, Professor, Michel de Montaigne University Bordeaux 3, *FISCHER, Ferenc*, Professor, University of Pécs, *FRANK, Tibor*, Professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *GULYÁS, László* Professor, University of Szeged, *HOREL, Catherine*, Professor, University of Paris I, Directress of Research, CNRS, Paris, *LACHAISE, Bernard*, Professor, Michel de Montaigne University Bordeaux 3, *LEANCA, Gabriel* (Ph.D.), University of Iasi, *MAJOROS, István* (editor in chief), Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *MARUZSA, Zoltán* (Ph.D.), Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *NAGY, László, J.*, Professor Emeritus, University of Szeged, *PIMENTEL, Maria do Rosário*, Professor, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, *RATHKOLB, Oliver*, Professor, University of Vienna, *Élisabeth du RÉAU*, Professor Emeritus, University of Paris III - Sorbonne Nouvelle, *RIBEIROA, Maria Manuela de Bastos Tavares* Professor, University of Coimbra, *SZÁVAI, Ferenc*, Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest and University of Kaposvár, *SZÉKELY, Gábor*, Professor Emeritus, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *TÓTH, Andrej* (Ph.D.), University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, University of Economics, Prague, *USLU, Ateş* (Ph.D.), Istanbul University.

***This volume is edited by István Majoros***

## **ÖT KONTINENS**

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék  
közleményei*

**Nº 2014/1.**

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM  
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST**

**2016**

**FIVE CONTINENTS**

*Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History*  
N° 2014/1.

EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY  
Faculty of Humanities

BUDAPEST  
2016

© authors, 2016  
© editor, 2016

*Chief Editor:*  
István Majoros  
[majorosi49@t-online.hu](mailto:majorosi49@t-online.hu)

ISSN: 1589-3839  
*Published twice a year*

*Publishing House:*

Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék,  
Department of Modern and Contemporary History  
ELTE BTK  
1088 Budapest, Múzeum krt. 6-8.  
Tel.:+36-1-4855204

<http://tortenelemszak.elte.hu/index.php/ot-kontinens>

**Printing House:** ROBINCO KFT  
BUDAPEST

## **Contents**

<b>Wanner, Michal</b> Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky's Campaign to Central Asia and India in 1714-1717	9
<b>Papp, Imre</b> Conjoncture agraire à l'époque de Napoléon III	33
<b>Világi, Dávid</b> Integration versus segregation Two examples of resolving the 'native question'	47
<b>Szalánczi, József Krisztián</b> „Antártida Argentina”. Argentine interests and activities in the south polar region before the Antarctic Treaty (1820–1959)	67
<b>Szabó-Zsoldos, Gábor</b> Boer Communities and the British Colonial Policy, 1846-1881. Differences between the Boer Republics from the Aspect of the British Colonial Policy	83
<b>Czeferner, Dóra</b> From Construction Workers to Tram Conductors. Female Labour in Hungary during the Great War	101
<b>Enyedi, Zsuzsa</b> A francia külpolitika változása 1934-1936 között	127
<b>Byrappa, Ramachandra</b> The Troubling Interval 1945-1950 The dark and dusty years of the 20 <sup>th</sup> century Indian history (Part One)	141
<b>Sylburska, Aleksandra</b> Hungarian Communists' Struggle with the Catholic Church in the reports of Polish Diplomatic Post in Budapest (1946–1948)	161
<b>Földessy, Gábor</b> U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War: The Failure of Containment in the case of the Vietnam War	179
<b>M. Szebeni Géza</b> Tojástánc avagy Kádár és II. János Pál	199

<b>Földessy, Gábor</b>	
The Vietnam War and the Johnson Administration: The 1964 Presidential Election, the Escalation of the War, and the Consequences	229
<b>Pichonnier, Christopher</b>	
La Hongrie face au projet mitterrandien de confédération européenne	241
<b>Book review</b>	261
<b>Szalánczi, József Krisztián</b>	
Fischer, Ferenc: <i>The „war after the War” 1919–1933. Evasion of the Versailles Treaty. The naval, aerial and military activity of the Weimar Republic in the countries of Ibero-America</i>	263
<b>Authors</b>	269



ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék tudományos közleményei, N° 2014/1.  
ELTE, BUDAPEST, 2016.

ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék tudományos közleményei, N° 2014/1.  
ELTE, BUDAPEST, 2016.

**Michal Wanner**

***Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky's Campaign to Central Asia and India in 1714-1717***

**Abstract**

The study deals with one branch of the Russian policy of the Peter I period, heading towards establishing contacts with India via Central Asia. Author describes in introduction the Russian attempts to establish trade and diplomatic relations with India in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Subsequently, he analyses the information and errors, relied on by the Russian policy in this area, their gradual disproving by various expeditions organized both from the Siberian centers, both from Astrakhan. The greatest attention is paid to campaigns of Alexandr Bekovich Cherkassky in Central Asia 1714-1717. Based on a detailed study of sources, he attempts to evaluate the significance of these expeditions both for growing of geographic knowledge of the area as well as assessment of the possibilities of Russian expansion to Central Asia and India. The conclusion is devoted to the analysis of the causes of the tragic end of Cherkassky campaign to Khiva in 1716-1717.

*Keywords:* Alexandr Bekovich Cherkassky's Campaign in Central Asia in 1714-1718, Russian Expansion, Central Asia, the period of Peter I, Russian Indian Policy, Geographical Discovery of Caspian Sea.

The study deals with one branch of the Russian policy over the Peter I period, heading towards establishing contacts with India, so catching the western-European dominance in that region up. The author pursues the aim to gradually map and appraise single components of Peter I's effort in this direction. It is a follow-up to the published works devoted to the development of the Indian trading community in Astrakhan,<sup>1</sup> and attempt by Peter to penetrate the East-Indian trade by gaining co-operation with Madagascar pirates<sup>2</sup>.

The story of the first campaign to India in history is linked to the expansion of Russia to Central Asia. Out of all attempts at independent penetration to India and establishing business contacts, this was the most ambitious, the most liberal and the most complex

---

<sup>1</sup> WANNER M., *Indian Trading Community in Astrakhan in Context of Russian-Indian Relationship (1636-1725)*, West Bohemian Historical Review, Pilsen-Hamburg, 1/2012, 115-131; Ibid., *Development of Indian Trading Community in Astrakhan in Context of Russian-Indian Relationship (1725-1800)*, West Bohemian Historical Review, Pilsen-Hamburg, 1/2013, 34-51

<sup>2</sup> WANNER M., *The Madagascar Pirates in the Strategic Plans of Swedish and Russian Diplomacy 1680-1730*, Prague PHIR, Prague-Vienna, 2008, 73-94

one. For that reason the catastrophic failure has led to long-term consequences, and has been kept in the Russian history as a permanent memento. A low number of historical studies<sup>3</sup> covering this theme is the reflection of aversion to this topic in the Russian society, as well as deficiency in sources, or a number of obscurities in the interpretation of single actors' behaviour. On the other hand, most of the key sources were published as early as in the tsarist Russia<sup>4</sup>, others in the Soviet era<sup>5</sup>. The study is based on investigation into the mentioned sources, tries to critically compare them, and to set Bekovich's expedition to the overall context of the Indian and Caspian policy.

### ***Russia's Indian Policy up to 1713***

The effort to establish direct business contacts with India was one of the constants in the Russian foreign policy over the entire early modern period. Russia was kept well informed about the development in India through the news coming from Persia and Bukhara, mediated by Indian trading communities in Russia, mostly the one in south-Russian Astrakhan. However, it appears fairly logical that just mere information was hardly sufficient to satisfy the tsarist government. Taking its cue from Portuguese and other west-European traders, it tried to establish direct diplomatic and trade relations with India. Therefore, four deputations in total were sent to India in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The first of them was led by Nikita Syroyegin in 1646; the leaders of the second one in 1651 were Rodion Pushnikov and Ivan Derevyensky. Neither of those missions

---

<sup>3</sup> The campaign is widely mentioned in the syntheses of Peter's foreign policy, Russian-Central Asian trade and diplomatic relations, but only two independent studies were devoted to it so far: OMAROV O. Yu., *Otvazhny issledovatel' Kaspiyskogo morya*, Makhachkala 1965. VILINBAKHOV V. B., *Aleksandr Cherkassky – Spodvizhnik Petra I.*, Nal'chik 1966. Important studies have also been devoted to Cherkassky expeditions from the point of view of geographical discoveries (viz note. N<sup>o</sup> 93).

<sup>4</sup> Zapiski Bebera, *Russky arkhiv*, 1872, N<sup>o</sup> 7-8. 1334-1457; *Dyelo, 1714-1718 godov, ob' otpravlenii leyb'-gardii preobrazhenskogo polka kapitan'poruchika knyazya Alexandra Bekovicha Cherkasskago, na Kaspiyskoe more i v' Khivu*, IN: BYCHKOV A. F. (ed.), *Materialy Voenno-uchenogo arkhiva Glavnogo shtaba*, St. Peterburg, vol. I, 1871, 197-202. BEZGIN I. G., *Knyazya Bekovicha-Cherkasskogo ekspedicia v Khivu i posol'stva flota poruchika Kozhina u Murzy Tevkeleva v Indiu k Velikomu Mogolu (1714-1717 g.)*, *Bibliograficheskaya monografiya*, St. Peterburg, 1891, 239 p.

<sup>5</sup> OVCHINIKOV R. B., SIDOROV M. A. (eds. ), *Russko-indiyskie otnoshenia v XVIII v.*, *Sbornik dokumentov*, Moskva, 1965, 33-52.

succeeded, since envoys had been forced to go back in the middle of their journey.<sup>6</sup> The third delegation led by a Bukharian merchant Muhammad Jusuf Kasimov arrived in Kabul, controlled by the Great Mughals those times, in 1676. However, Emperor Aurangzeb did not admit that Russian mission. He had just a general idea about Russia and its importance, what is more he had been fully occupied with a rebellion in Delhi.<sup>7</sup>

The course of events in the sphere of diplomatic relations, not successful until those times, went on in a bit more systematic manner during the reign of Peter I, when another pillar of foreign relations, the Caspian policy, part of which became also Indian policy, was being built besides the traditional Baltic and Black Sea ones. Peter had been particularly interested in Oriental antiques and rarities. Samples of mostly coins and letterings collected by his order would become the core of the Asian Museum later on. What was also laid during the era of his reign were foundations of Russian Orientalism. On the other hand, his dismissive attitude towards envoys from weaker Asian countries was extraordinarily demonstrated by exposing his non-Russian vassals and Asian serfs at his court to the public ridicule and bizarre ceremonies.<sup>8</sup>

A number of steps to establish constant trade and diplomatic contacts were taken in the late 17<sup>th</sup> and the early 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. The instructions to single expeditions show that the prime aim was to establish business relationships. The most significant out of those expeditions was Semyon Martynovich Malen'kov's one (also Malen'koy) in 1695. He undertook a journey to Isfahan in Persia, and in January 1698 he went abroad a ship in Bandar-Abbas harbour to sail to Surat in India. Between 1698 and 1701 he was staying on the Indian subcontinent. He met Emperor Aurangzeb while he was leading the Army of the Mughal Empire against the Maratha people on Dakshin. Malen'kov received Aurangzeb's *ferman* allowing him duty-free trade in all towns in the Mughal Empire. In 1701, Malen'kov bought a number of goods and set out on journey back, once again across Persia. However, on the way he died in the town of Shamakhi (Schemakha) in Azerbaijan in 1702. Nevertheless, his mates delivered the goods to Moscow, together with two unused

---

<sup>6</sup> May 26, 1651- at the latest May 15, 1667, delegation to India of the merchants R. Pushnikov and I. Derevyensky, in: LAVRENKOVA T. D., OVCHINIKOV R. V., SHUMILOV V. N. (eds. ), *Russko-indiyskie otnoshenia v XVII v., Sbornik dokumentov*, Moskva, 1958, Doc. N° 49-55, 99-123.

<sup>7</sup> NEPOMJASHCHY N. N., *Russkaya India*, Moskva, 2010, 64-65.

<sup>8</sup> KEMP P. M., *Bharat-Rus, An Introduction to Indo-Russian contacts and travels from medieval times to the October revolution*, Delhi, 1958, 62.

letters of recommendation for the Khan of Khiva and Balkh (the expedition did not go through Central Asia)<sup>9</sup> and precious notes about India at the turn of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Also Aurangzeb's *ferman* arrived in Russia, but it would be found impossible to translate it in the *Posolsky Prikaz*. Malen'kov's journey demonstrated to Peter I the possibility to establish the trade with India by land.<sup>10</sup>

After the naval battle of Hangö in July-August 1714 it became evident that the victory in the Northern War had been definitely inclined towards the Russian part. Tsar Peter had already broken through his longed-for window to Europe, and appeared in the Baltic region. However, the treasury was empty; there were just a few sources of income for the state. It was necessary to fill that window to Europe with trading contents. The traditional goods, which Russia could offer to the west - corn, hemp and wax, had not brought in a handsome profit. Therefore, it was necessary to search for other sources of gains to finance war. The thing that best documents Peter's considerations on matters of business relationships with India are talks of 4 December 1714 with a Hannover resident staying in Petersburg, Friedrich-Christian Baber, about how profitable for Russia would be trade with India, and during which he pointed out Astrakhan as the central point of trade with India and Persia. Those times, Peter I had been already thinking about digging a canal connecting the Volga River with the Black Sea, so with the Mediterranean Sea, despite exercising certain restraint resulting from the slow progress on the canal Volga-Don construction works, which had begun in 1707.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, the events of the year 1713 brought about the change of the dominant orientation of Russian policy on India. First of all, it was a Turkmen magnate, Hodja Nefes's initiative, whose motivation remains not quite evident. Provided with different sorts of goods, Nefes arrived at Tyub-Karagan wharf on Mangyshlak (also Mangghyslaq) Peninsula in 1713. He confided to the locals that he had a certain important task regarding the Russian state, and asked them to take him to Astrakhan. He met there one member of the Indian community, who was called Prince Mikhail Zamanov (also Samonov or Samanov). He was of Persian origin from Gilan, and

---

<sup>9</sup> May 7, 1695 – April 30, 1716, Travel to India of P. Malen'kov, *Russko-indiyskie otnosheniya v XVII v.*, Doc. N° 251-260, 356-377, 391-393.

<sup>10</sup> ULANICKY W. A., *Snosheniya Rosii s Sredneyu Aziyeyu i Indiyeyu v XVI-XVII v.*, IN: *Chteniya v Imperatorskom obshchestvye istorii i drevnostey rossiyskikh pri Moskovskom univerzitete* 1888, 56.

<sup>11</sup> *Zapiski Bebera, Russky arkhiv*, 1341.

would leave for Russia later on where he would convert to Christianity. Nefes told him about a river in the Bukhara Khanate where it was possible to pan gold. Basing on that information, Zamanov organised a joint journey to Moscow, where he introduced Nefes to His Tsar Majesty, Peter I. Whereas Zamanov left Moscow and went back to Astrakhan, Hodja Nefes stayed there.<sup>12</sup>

Peter had come together with the monarch of Khiva, Khan ShakhNiyaz, as early as a few years before, in 1700. That monarch's power position was rather unstable, so he needed his northern neighbour to help him suppress some Turkmen tribes. In 1700, in accord with a feudal tradition, he offered Peter to become his vassal. That agreement would be never reached as the Khan would die. However, in 1709, Peter answered to request alike put in by the Khan's successor Aran-Mamet saying „*we've agreed on providing Khan and all his territorial possession with protection to eternal subordination.*”<sup>13</sup>

This step would significantly affect Russian thoughts in the future, and during the period of Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky's campaign to India, which is the subject of this study, might have helped perceive insufficiently political realities in Central Asia. However, instantly after 1709, Peter I fully engaged with affairs of the Northern War put his mind out of that question. Only later on he formed his opinion that control over the Khanate of Khiva lying off the Russian southern border, and bordering on India, according to what he thought, would allow him to open a way to India by land. In addition to that, the Khan of Khiva as a Russian vassal could protect Russian caravans heading with goods to India. At a time, Hodja Nefes communicated to him that the Amu-Darya River flowing through the Khanate of Khiva and Bukhara was abundant in golden sand. He also told him that the large river had once flown into the Caspian Sea, and that it had been possible to arrive in gold-yielding towns of India alone by that river. However, having worries about the chance of that favourable water way Russians would jump at, the local Turkmen monarchs decided to divert the Amu-Darya towards the Aral Sea, therefore would dam the old riverbed with a dyke. Supposedly, to take this dam to piece was not that complicated, so the water would flow into the Caspian Sea once again. Nefes swore that his compatriots were ready to help Russians cross dry sands and steppes. His news would fall on fertile ground.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> OMAROV O. Yu., *Otvazhny issledovatel*, 25-26.

<sup>13</sup> Quoted by *Istoriya Uzbekoj SSSR*, vol. I, part III, Tashkent, 1955, 440.

<sup>14</sup> ŁUKAWSKI Z., *Dzieje Azji Środkowej*, Kraków, 1996, 197-198.

At that period, at the end of 1713, the Governor General of Siberia, Prince Matvey Petrovich Gagarin, told Peter that the so-called „sand gold” could be found on the Syr-Darya River around the town of Yerket. He supposed that the town, also called Erket or Irket, was situated in Siberia. Actually, it was obviously the town of Yarkand lying on the same-named river in today's Xinjiang.<sup>15</sup>

What was considerably more valuable for Peter than the testimony about gold was information on the possibility to reach India by water across the Caspian Sea. Many of the west-European sources also indicated that the Amu-Darya River had lately flown into the Caspian Sea. Peter became interested in the chance to get the river back to its original bed. The Tsar had been creating visions according to which the system of canals could make it possible to lengthen the link with the Baltic region, so he would gain the key to the main and the most profitable trade route running between the west and east, and he would become a middle man in trade between India and Europe.<sup>16</sup>

Variety of plans had been hatched, despite unfavourable financial situation of Russia. A project to develop the trade between India and China was designed from Fedor Stepanovich Saltykov's pen no later but in 1714. The plan forms Chapter XXV and XXVI in the document „*The Statement of the State Profits*”. That project suggested that the Tsar should build supporting points, and first of all an extensive development of navigation by European and Siberian rivers and adjacent seas in the area from the Northern Dvina River mouth to the Amur River mouth. The author assumed that „*then East-Indian vessels could be sent for merchants from Your state, which will bring a handsome profit and the state wealth*”. The plan also called for following the caravan trade between southern Russia and India.<sup>17</sup>

Another direction of advance was Siberia. The expedition of Ivan Dmitrievich Bukhgol'ts in 1714-1717 followed the one of Tobol'sk aristocrat F. Trushnikov. In 1713, he undertook a journey to explore Central Asia from the north. He went through East Turkestan to Kuku-nor Lake (Qinghai), to the upper Huang-he River, across Kalgan, and came back to Tobol'sk in 1716. This expedition yielded a

---

<sup>15</sup> GROSSUL-TOLSTOY P., *Dela russkogo oruzhiya i politiki v Sredney Azii (po povodu voyny Rosii s Chivoyu)*, Odessa, 1871, 3-5. KNYAZHECKAYA E. A., *Istoriya odnoy geograficheskoy oshibki petrovskogo vremeni*, IN: *Puteshestviya i geograficheskiye otkrytiya v XV-XIX vv.*, Moskva-Leningrad, 1965, 57-67. Included are reproductions of sketches of M. P. Gagarin and P. Chicharov showing the position Erketi-Yarkend.

<sup>16</sup> LEBEDEV D. M., YESAKOV V. A., *Russkiye geograficheskiye otkrytiya i issledovaniya s drevnikh vremen do 1917 goda*, Moskva, 1971, 153, 155-156.

<sup>17</sup> *Russko-indiyskie otnoshenia v XVIII v.*, Doc. N° 7, 33-36, link 34.



number of finds about the Khanate of Bukhara and the Dzungar Khanate. However, it did not confirm gold occurrences in Yarkend. The Bukhgoł's expedition, not very well organized one, was moving ahead across Siberia, from Tobol'sk by the Irtysh River to Yamyshevsk Saline Lake (also Zaysan Lake) in today's Kazakhstan, where they would build a fort. However, during the next period they came into conflicts with Dzungarians, were forced to bring the fort to a halt in 1716, and to retreat to Tobol'sk. They would never reach Yarkend they were expected to seize. The outcome of that expedition was just incomplete information about the region, Lake Zaysan, and the position of the town of Yerket (Yarkend).<sup>18</sup>

Another direction the Tsar focused his exploration effort on was Persia. In his order of 7 July 1715 he instructed the envoy from Russia to Isphahan, Artemy Petrovich Volynsky, to explore trade routes from Persia to India, possibilities for linking the Russian trade to those routes, and the conditions of the local trade and trends of Indian market. His task was to find out „*rivers that flow into the Caspian Sea, towns that are possible to reach by these rivers from that sea, whether there is such a river running from India that would flow into that sea.*”<sup>19</sup>

The third, central focus of Russia, was on Central Asia. In 1714, the Tsar admitted in Petersburg the envoy from Khiva, Ashur Beg, and bearing the title of Russian feudal lord he entrusted him with a journey to India. The Khivan protested, and demanded from Russia the pledged protection for his lord against attacks from wild Turkmen tribes. Ashur Beg would not obey the Tsar's order; nevertheless, the negotiation led the Tsar to believe that Russian military expedition would not encounter any stronger opposition. Therefore, in May 1714, the Tsar decided to launch a military expedition to Central Asia. The one that became a leader was the commander of the guard Preobrazhensky Regiment, a native of the Caucasus, Muslim by origin, Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky, since Peter thought that Muslim origin would help Cherkassky find common ground with the Khan of Khiva.<sup>20</sup>

Prince Bekovich Cherkassky was born in Little Kabarda in the Caucasus; the date of his birth remains unrevealed. The first reference to him dates back to 1688, when after a fire in the town of Terki, the former commander, Voivode Borisovich Matyanov, was

---

<sup>18</sup> LUKAWSKI Z., *Historia Syberii*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, 1981, 121.

<sup>19</sup> *Rusko-indiyskie otnoshenia v XVIII v.*, Doc. N° 8, 36.

<sup>20</sup> DRUHE D. N., *Russo-Indian Relations 1466-1917*, New York – Washington – Hollywood, 1970, 47-48.

instructed to put Afanasy Borisovich Kozlov in command. That record written while taking that command and property over reveals that Devlet-Girei-Murza, Bekovich's original name, was held hostage in Terki between 1688 and 1689.<sup>21</sup> He is believed to be secretly kidnapped by Russians from his family in the period of the first Caucasian conflicts. His kidnappers did not know the boy's name, what they only knew was that his father had been *bek*, that means prince, therefore called him Bekovich. Nevertheless, he himself derived his origin from the chief prince – *valiy* of Great Kabarda, Kaz Psheapshok (died 1615). Prince Bekmurza Djambulatov, Kaza Psheapshok's grandson had six sons: Tatarkhan, Shevlokh, Devlet-Girei, Batok, Kaysin and El'murza. They were called Bekmurzins after their father, and also Bekovichs. Bekmurz's children were called Bekovichs in Russian documents.<sup>22</sup>

Prince Alexander was raised in the house of Peter I's tutor, Prince Boris Alexeyevich Golitsyn's, together with his sons. Noted in the diary of I.G. Korb, a secretary of the delegation from Emperor Leopold I to Peter I that was on a visit there between 1698 and 1699, is one entry from 1698 relating to a formal dinner hosted by B. A. Golitsyn, where Austrian guests were served by Golitsyn's sons „*who were joined by a young Cherkessian prince, only recently secretly kidnapped from his parents, Cherkessian princes, a Tatar who has been baptized.*” Unlike the Golitsyns, whose faces showed modesty according to the envoy, „*the Cherkess's face wore broad-minded and strict expression betraying natural soldier.*”<sup>23</sup>

In 1699, Prince Peter II - Murzich Cherkassky's widow, Princess Anna Vasilyevna, maiden name Nagaya, presented young Prince Alexander with her vast landed estates in Romanovsky domain (uyezd). Prince Alexander, like many other boyars' adolescent sons, left abroad in 1701 to study navigation and ship-building.<sup>24</sup>

When he returned to Russia he entered the service in the Preobrazhensky Regiment.<sup>25</sup> In 1711, he was sent to his homeland

---

<sup>21</sup> *Akty istoricheskiye, sobrannyye i izdannyye istoricheskoy komissiei 1676-1700*, St. Peterburg, 1842, 314-315.

<sup>22</sup> *Cherkassky, Alexandr Bekovich*, Russky biografichesky slovar' A. A. Polovcova, St. Peterburg, 1896-1918, vol. 22, 1914, 177-183, link 177.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted *ibidem*, 177.

<sup>24</sup> List of persons sent to learning in Italy and the Netherlands in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries compiled by Prince Ivan Borisovich KURAKIN – PLATONOV F. P., B. I. KURAKIN i A. P. Prozorsky (1697-1720), *Doklady Akademii nauk SSSR* 1929, 236.

<sup>25</sup> ANDRYEYEV A. A., *K voprosu o rannem periode biografii Aleksandra Bekovicha Cherkasskogo*, IN: *Arkhheologiya i etnologiya Severnogo Kavkaza*. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov k 75-letiyu Ismaila Magomedovicha Chechenova,

with a letter from the Tsar to princes – *beks* of Kabardia to make them take part with Russia. Russia's aim was to gain allies against the Kuban Khanate that had been carrying out systematic raids on the south of Russia. Bekovich soon informed the Tsar that after reading his letter, Cherkessian *beks* had indicated their willingness to swear an oath to the ruler of all Kabardians. Alexander had found his mother and both brothers in his homeland, and asserted influence over the local feudal lords through their mediation. No later than in May 1714, Cherkassky suggested facing the Ottoman influence in the region by erecting a Russian fort, gaining control over the mountain nations, establishing trade contacts and entering into a treaty of alliance in case of war with Persia.<sup>26</sup>

On the Tsar's order of 2 June 1714 Bekovich was sent to explore the stream of the Amu-Darya, a size of the dam, possibilities for diverting the river to its original bed, to map the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, and to get a fort for 200-300 men built at the site where the river had originally flown to the Caspian Sea. Another aim was to force the Khan of Khiva to become a serf, and to be loyal to the Russian Tsar, as well as persuade him to send his people down the Syr-Darya River (also called the Seykhun those times) to the above mentioned small town Erketi to prospect for deposits of gold.<sup>27</sup>

The Governor of Kazan, Saltykov, and the Voivode of Astrakhan, Chirikov, were given an instruction from the Tsar to provide Bekovich with „*one thousand five hundred soldiers, five thousand roubles for all costs, and to instantly satisfy every requirement of Prince Cherkassky.*” Embarking on that expedition with Bekovich was also Hodja Nefes, with whom Cherkassky had been discussing for long hours, and the Turkmen had been answering in detail all questions. One member of that expedition was a mining master Blyuger, whose task was to explore deposits of silver in the Caucasus. The expedition finally consisted of 1,650 infantrymen, 33 artillerymen, 19 cannons, and 100 sailors. The total costs amounted to exorbitant sum: 30,638 roubles.<sup>28</sup> That troop was considered to be sufficient, despite the fact that the Russians had estimated the forces of the Army of Khiva at

---

Nal'chik 2013, vol. 2, 132-138.

<sup>26</sup> *Materialy Voyenno-uchenogo arkhiva Glavnogo shtaba*, St. Peterburg, vol. I, 1871, Doc. N° I and II, 197-202.

<sup>27</sup> *Zapiski Bebera*, Russky arkhiv, 1872, N° 7-8, 1387-1389.

<sup>28</sup> *Materialy Voyenno-uchenogo arkhiva*, Doc. N° III, IV, V and VI, 202-209. Details of an economic character are described in the document Listing created from the columns of dispatching the Guard Captain of Mr. Prince Cherkassky on the Caspian Sea since the beginning of his journey in May 1714 to 10<sup>th</sup> May 1717, *Ibidem*, 401-506.

200 thousand men, which had been the number of Khan's male serfs. They saw their superiority over Khiva in deficiency of its artillery, as „calibre and range of fire” of those few seized cannons “are nowhere near as great as Russian ones”.<sup>29</sup>

### ***Bekovich Cherkassky's First Expedition***

Devoting himself to the expedition, Bekovich spent all the summer and nearly all the autumn in Kazan and Astrakhan in 1714. He met Turkmens there, who affirmed that the Amu-Darya was „not a smallish river running from the mountains of India, winding its way through the countries of Bukhara and Khiva, and flowing into a lake called the Aral Sea, which lies at a distance of a 14-day march from the Caspian Sea.”<sup>30</sup> On 7 November 1714, the expedition of approximately 1,500 soldiers, including a hundred Yaik (Ural) Cossacks, set off on two schooners and 27 *strugs*<sup>31</sup> to Gur'yev (today's Atyrau). However, a storm had blown in, during which six *strugs* disappeared, therefore the expedition would be forced to sail back to Astrakhan. Bekovitch devoted the winter time to build 20 new, modern and faster vessels.

What occurred in January 1715 was one event that would soon have adverse impact on Bekovich's second expedition. Thirty thousand Kuban Tatars under the command of Khan Bakht-Girei approached Astrakhan to destroy stations and villages of the local Kalmyks. They killed three thousand of them, and moved away with captives and loot. Bekovich Cherkassky organised the expedition to help Kalmyks, however Kuban commander presented the Governor of Astrakhan an instruction written by the Tsar, allowing to „attack Kalmyks wherever they meet them.” This incident would affect the Kalmyks' position, mostly Kalmyk Khan Ayuka's reluctance to join the Russian expedition, and later on his willingness to defect to the side of Khivans.<sup>32</sup>

On 25 April 1715, the expedition set sail from Astrakhan and easily reached Gur'yev. Bekovich was visited by Turkmen nomads there with whom he had a long and detailed talk about the Amu-Darya old bed. The nomads affirmed the information they had acquired from

---

<sup>29</sup> *Zapiski Bebera*, Russky arkhiv, 1872, N° 6, 1084 a 1168.

<sup>30</sup> Quoted by SOKOLOV A. P., *Opisi Kaspiyskogo morya s nachala ose'mnadcatogo veka po nastoyashcheye vremya*, in: *Zapiski Hidrograf. depart. Morsk. Min-va*<sup>4</sup>, N° 10, St. Peterburg 1852, 3.

<sup>31</sup> Strug or struga – Russian sailboat or rowboat with a flat bottom used in the 16th to 18th centuries. Served for transporting people and goods.

<sup>32</sup> VILINBAKHOV V. B., *Alexandr Cherkassky*, 28-29.

Hodja Nefes adding that it would be necessary to dig a canal 20 *verstas*<sup>33</sup> in length to the Red Waters Bay to get the river to its original bed.

Another voyage during which the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea to the Bay of Astrabad (Gorgan) was described brought about a discovery of a lagoon lake called Kara-bogaz-gol. The expedition arrived at the Bay of Tyub-Karagan on Mangyshlak Peninsula. The main forces of the expedition set off along the sea shore to the Red Waters (at Balkhan or Krasnovodsk Bay) locality. A smallish troop led by aristocrats Fedorov and Zvansky was sent to explore the Amu-Darya old bed, and to verify the testimony they had been presented by the nomads. Hodja Nefes left together with explorers. They travelled ten days from Tyub-Karagan along deserted caravan paths to finally arrive at the Kara-agach River. Behind the river a grand mound came in their view that was one and a quarter of *arshin* (0.9m) in height<sup>34</sup>, three *sazhens* (6.39m) in width<sup>35</sup>, and five *verstas* (5.3km) in length. Running about two *verstas* (2.2km) off the mound was the Amu-Darya<sup>36</sup>, stretching towards the Caspian Sea was a long dry valley, which according to Nefes's witness had once been the old river bed (Aktam-Uzboy).<sup>37</sup>

Due to the proof the explorers brought back to the camp at the Red Waters Bekovich would finally become convinced that the original assumption had not been erroneous. On 4 August 1715, Prince wrote to Tsar Peter an account of his discoveries saying: „I arrived to a site called Aktam, where the Amu-Darya had flown into the Caspian Sea. Now there is no water there or close vicinity either, since the river is dammed for several reasons in the section Kharakoe, in a four-day-ride distance of Khiva. From the dam the river must run to a lake called the Aral Sea.”<sup>38</sup>

It was also clear that an expedition into the interior had to be far better organised. Therefore, on 7 October 1715, Bekovich ordered to load vessels, and the complete expedition party came back to Astrakhan. First, the Prince immediately left for Moscow, next for

---

<sup>33</sup> 1 versta = 1,06 km

<sup>34</sup> 1 arshin = 0.71 m

<sup>35</sup> 1 sazhenh = 2,13 m

<sup>36</sup> December 15, 1717 Testimony of Astrakhan Nikolai Fedorov made in the office of Senat relating to the dam on the river Darya, *Materialy Voyenno-uchenogo arkhiva*, Doc. N° XCVI, 387-390.

<sup>37</sup> Testimony of Hodja Nefes, Tatar Altyn Useynov and Yaik Cossacks Fyodor Yemel'yanov and Mikhail Byelotyelkin made in Kazan Fortress on 11<sup>th</sup> October 1717, *Ibidem*, Doc. N° LXXXVI, 327-328 (Testimony of Hodja Nefes).

<sup>38</sup> Quoted by SOKOLOV A. P., *Opisi Kaspiyskogo morya*, 5.

Petersburg and the Baltic region to inform the Tsar of the expedition outcome; he showed him the first map of the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, which has not been preserved until the day.<sup>39</sup>

### ***Preparations for the Second Expedition***

Tsar Peter had been staying in Mitau (Mitava, today's Jelgava) those times, where he personally commanded the army fighting against Swedes. Regardless of being engaged in those affairs, he delayed other matters to hear Bekovich, and entrusted him with particular tasks regarding the eastern march. Peter's aims were clearly defined in the order to Cherkassky issued on 14 February 1716:

*„(I. 40) ... 7. Likewise to equipped him with ships, put merchants on board and sent them down the Amu-Darya to India, to sail as far as ships can sail, to go to India from there while paying attention to rivers and lakes, to describe water and land routes, mostly that water one running to India by that or other rivers, next to go back to India by the same way, provided he would hear about a better route to the Caspian Sea, he would go back by that one, and would describe it.”*

Further on, Bekovich was supposed „to visit the Khan of Khiva as well as the Khan of Bukhara, to bring them to serfdom otherwise to friendship provided it would not be possible.” The order (*ukaz*) stated that „for the sake of all these matters it is necessary to assign him four thousand men, vessels, and all he needs, documents for both khans, and merchants to khans and Mughals” and „and pick Lieutenant Kozhin out of naval officers, to sent him and five or more navigators, who will be used for both journeys, the former as merchants others in *Erketi*”. Lieutenant Kozhin was supposed to spy on all information on spices or other goods. He had two younger merchants at hand for that task.<sup>40</sup>

Prince Bekovich Cherkassky was given more detailed instructions in the Tsar's *ukaz* of 13 May 1716. Peter pointed out that it was imperative to use peaceful means to make Khiva and Bukhara take the Russian part. The local magnates both in Khiva and Bukhara had often organised conspiracy, or deposed their khans from their thrones. Peter was ready to ensure khans protection, provide them with Russian

---

<sup>39</sup> The Senate orders to the captain-lieutenant Cherkassky from January and February 1716 about the need to travel to St. Petersburg, messages of Kazan governor P. P. Saltykov to the Senate from September 1714, February and April 1715, IN: *Materialy Voenno-uchenogo arkhiva*, Doc. N° VII, VIII, IX, X, 210-212.

<sup>40</sup> *Russko-indiyskie otnoshenia v XVIII v.*, Doc. N° 9, 37.

guard to protect them in exchange for their loyalty and acting „*with intention of our interests*”. Peter would say that khans and the noblest magnates had to be given generous presents on his behalf.

Bekovich was supposed to investigate possibility for diverting the Amu-Darya to its original bed, and to estimate „*how many people they needed for that mission*”. He was also supposed to build „*a fort for a thousand people*” by the old river mouth to the Caspian Sea as a base for another expansion to Central Asia. As soon as the dam had been ruined and they returned to the closer vicinity of that fortress, to build another fort, whose purpose would be to discourage khans’ desire to re-gain the control over the situation.<sup>41</sup>

Peter devoted particular attention to exploring a water route to India. It was essential to clarify the possibility to reach that country by sailing the Amu-Darya. If so, it would be necessary to describe the complete route in detail, and to explore other routes, perhaps more suitable ones. On that account, a group of “merchants” under the command of Lieutenant Kozhin, a navigator and cartographer, was incorporated into that expedition.<sup>42</sup> The Tsar had assigned Bekovich the rank of Captain of the Guard.<sup>43</sup>

On 14 February 1716 in Libau (Libava, today’s Liepāja), Peter I also issued a special *ukaz* for Lieutenant A. N. Kozhin. He entrusted him with the following task:

*„Go as a merchant until Captain Lieutenant Prince Cherkassky Alexander Bekovich release him, down the Amu-Darya (or other rivers that flow into it) as far as possible to India, to find out a water route to India.*

*At the moment it will not be possible to go by water, continue to India by land, and to secretly gain information there. To go back by the same way, unless he finds another, better water route, then to return and describe everything everywhere they go, either by water or by land, and draw a map.*

*To find out more about the sorts of goods of Indian provenance, firstly spices or else.*

*To see and describe other things that are not written here, and*

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 21, pp. 46-47; The previous life of Lieutenant Alexander Ivanovich Kozhin (he also featured as Nikita Kozhin) is not known too much. He was graduated in 1711 in the school of navigation in astronomy class. He became one of the first Russian cartographers. In 1715 he created the description and map of the Gulf of Finland that was published. *Ocherk russkoy morskoy istorii*, St. Peterburg, vol. I, 1875, 365.

<sup>42</sup> *Russko-indiyskie otnoshenia v XVIII v.*, Doc. N° 13, 40-41.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 26, 50.

*which might relate to the state interest.*"<sup>44</sup>

On 31 March, the Tsar additionally entrusted Kozhin with: „*When you are at Mughal's in East India, buy as many various big birds as you like, first of all ostriches, cassowaries, and other ones, also varied smaller ones, and animals of different species, also small ones, and handling them with caution bring them back.*"<sup>45</sup> Kozhin was given 5,000 roubles to purchase them, and 1,000 roubles for transport costs.<sup>46</sup>

No later but that day, Chancellor Prince Gavril Ivanovich Golovkin informed the Senate and the Secretary of the *Posolsky Prikaz* Peter Vasilyevich Kurbatov of the Cherkassky's expedition, and entrusted him with creating letter of recommendation, stating correct titles of the Khan of Khiva and the Khan of Bukhara, and finding out the title of the Great Mughal.<sup>47</sup> In March, an Indian, Radgeram Sidorov from the Astrakhan Indian community was called as adviser to explain the titles used in the Mughal Empire<sup>48</sup>, since it was not possible to easily find out the title of the Indian emperor (it had been found out, besides other things, that the document Malen'kov had been given from the Mughal Emperor had got lost<sup>49</sup>). What proves that the question regarding the titles was considered to be weighty and was not played down is the fact that Cherkassky himself urgently asked competent authorities for issuing the documents of safe conduct as early as on 23 April and 8 May.<sup>50</sup> On 18 May, a special list of Russian tsars addressed to padishahs of India<sup>51</sup>, added with used salutations and titles was put together, but the documents themselves would be only delivered to Cherkassky by the letter of 14 June 1716<sup>52</sup>.

As early as on 17 March 1716, the Tsar wrote a letter to the Khan of Bukhara to inform him of sending „*a merchant Alexander Ivanov, Kozhin's son, to India across the Bukhara country,*" and asked him to let that envoy freely pass the Bukhara territory, and for help if needed.<sup>53</sup> Written on 18 May was also Peter I's letter to the Shah of Persia containing information about A. I. Kozhin's journey across

---

<sup>44</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 10, 37-38.

<sup>45</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 18, 45.

<sup>46</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 26, 50.

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 11, 39 and Doc. N° 12, 40.

<sup>48</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 14, 41 and Doc. N° 15, 42.

<sup>49</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 17, 42.

<sup>50</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 14, 41 and Doc. N° 15, 42.

<sup>51</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 22, 47.

<sup>52</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 25, 50.

<sup>53</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 19, 45 and 46 and Doc. N° 20, 46.



Persia to India<sup>54</sup>, as well as a special request for admitting Kozhin addressed to „*the Shah of India*”. Besides of phrases in language of the code, it also included a request „*to allow him to sell goods sent along with him in the state of Your Majesty, and to freely buy the local goods without paying duty on them.*”<sup>55</sup>

### ***Bekovich Cherkassky's Second Expedition***

In the second half of September in 1716, the second expedition set off towards the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. Now, it was a complete army consisting of 70 vessels carrying about 4,000 people, besides others, three infantry regiments and two regiments of Cossacks (1,500 Yaik, and 500 Grebensk [Terek] Cossacks), a company of captured Swedish dragoons, and 500 Tatars. Undertaking the expedition were also artillerymen, engineers and architects, as well as merchants, clerks, translators, doctors or members of other professions. The expedition-related costs amounted to 220,000 roubles those times, amazingly, at the time when the tsarist treasury was nearly empty. This shows again the importance Peter I attached to the idea of opening „*the window to India*”.<sup>56</sup>

On 9 October, the ships dropped their anchors at the well-known Tyub-Karagan Bay where they met with Hodja Nefes and his smallish escort. Bekovich stationed there Colonel Khrushchev's Penzensky Infantry Regiment and command him to erect a fort, which would be called St. Peter's Fort. Bekovich acted so at his own will. No such an item had been included in Peter's instructions. The reason might be seen in relationship between Bekovich and Kozhin, who was acting quite independently, so the tension between them was growing. Kozhin would keep proving that „*the site is not convenient for building a town, as there is neither land and forest nor fresh water but sand*”<sup>57</sup> Water in wells was salty and rotten, so Kozhin had worries that diseases would occur at a garrison. Bekovich held his own in saying that an old route to Khiva was leading just from there.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 23, 48.

<sup>55</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° 24, 49.

<sup>56</sup> The gradual formation of expedition, shipbuilding, its equipment and weaponry are described in detailed orders of the Senate from 15<sup>th</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> March and 9<sup>th</sup> April to 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1716, IN: *Materialy Voyenno-uchenogo arkhiva*, Doc. N° XVII-XXXV, XXXIX-LVIII, LXV-LXVIII, 226-248, 258-279, 285-290.

<sup>57</sup> November 18 , 1717 Testimony of Lieutenant of the Fleet Kozhin made before the Senate, on the March of Prince Cherkassky to Khiva on 18<sup>th</sup> November 1717, Ibidem, Doc. N° XC, 374-379, quotation 375.

<sup>58</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXVIII, 361-362.

The Prince sent to Khiva heralds with letters and gifts along that way. Nobleman Ivan Voronin left for Khan Shirgazi (also Shergazi) to assure him of a peaceful character of the delegation. Another aristocrat, Alexey Svyatov was supposed to make a Khan's relative, influential magnate Columbay, take his part. At the same time, another delegation led by an aristocrat Davydov was heading to the Khan of Bukhara. However, Davydov went to Bukhara across Persia. Bekovich ordered Kozhin to take him by sea to the town of Astrabad (today's Gorgan).<sup>59</sup>

In the meantime, the main forces of the expedition had been advancing about 200km by land to the south, where they founded a small fort (today's Alexandrovsk) off Bekhtemir-Liman Bay (later on re-named Alexander-Bay to pay tribute to Bekovich), and stationed some of the companies of the Krutoyarsk regiment, further on to the Red Waters, where a fort, which would be occupied by the Azov Regiment, was built on the Balkhan Bay shore, on the site of a future town of Krasnovodsk.<sup>60</sup>

Kozhin and Davydov, who had failed in reaching Bukhara, arrived there on 10 November. Both of them reported that the Persian authorities had not let the delegation go across their territories due to the local rebellion. Bekovich did not believe Davydov, and secretly sent Mikhail Zamanov to Astrabad to analyse the true situation.<sup>61</sup>

Those times Kozhin was busy with frantic activities. He had explored the site and did a few topographic surveys. He believed that no old river bed existed, even „*There is no river flowing into the Caspian Sea close to that site.*”<sup>62</sup> According to him a fort was not worth building there, since there was not enough fresh water, pasture for animals, and the like, there. Nevertheless, Bekovich did not trust in Kozhin's foresight. He was convinced of his own power. Late that year he left for Astrakhan to finalize essential preparations for the crucial stage of the march. Owing to ice that had covered the Caspian Sea he had to go back by land. He also took Kozhin with him, apparently to keep him under his surveillance. Also Zamanov, who had been staying for a while in Astrabad, arrived in Astrakhan in February 1717. He reported that Persian authorities had had no intention to create any barriers against Davydov. Supposedly, it had been only Kozhin's intrigues that discouraged a hesitating herald from the journey to Bukhara. The thing that occurred next was an in-

---

<sup>59</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° XC, 375.

<sup>60</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXVI, 329-330 (Testimony of Hodja Nefes).

<sup>61</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° XC, 376.

<sup>62</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° XC, 376.

depth conversation between Bekovich and Kozhin. Leading the expedition, Bekovich exacted obeying all his commands with no delay. The talk, however, resulted in Kozhin's departure for Petersburg aiming to persuade Tsar Peter and Menshikov about the meaningfulness of the expedition withdrawal.<sup>63</sup> At the same time, Cherkassky's testimony about their conflicts was heading to Petersburg beginning with words *Lieutenant Kozhin did not act like a human being but a beast.*<sup>64</sup>

Bekovich was most likely to grasp the sheer complexity of his mission. Kozhin's „merchants” had gained disturbing information according to which nobody believed there that Russians had come in peace. Khiva and Bukhara hostile to each other had agreed on fighting against foreigners together, and were preparing military operations. Kozhin mostly based on a letter written by the Kalmyk Khan Ayuka, where he had written that „*the local Bukharians, Kazakhs, Karalpaks and Khivans are preparing together, and want to go by fighting against service people /that is Cherkassky's forces/*”.<sup>65</sup>

In Astrakhan, he was delivered information from his heralds he had sent to Khiva, according to which Voronin had not been admitted well. Shirgazikhan had been travelling those times, and the Russian herald had been virtually held prisoner. It was only by virtue of Columbay, who had been given presents from Svyaty, that Voronin was treated with indulgence. When Shirgazikhan returned in March 1717, he admitted the heralds, listened to them, however, would not come to end clearly apparent war preparations in Khiva. As Voronin stated: „*They are scared, those in Khiva, and they think we want to seize Khiva using a trick; therefore, they do not admit us.*”<sup>66</sup>

Russians' hope for getting the Khan onside had died, but Bekovich assumed that Shirgazikhan would change his mind as soon as he had seen the magnitude and power of the Russian troops. Therefore, he amassed reinforcement in Astrakhan joined by Tatar, Armenian, Khivan, Bukharian and Russian merchants. In the meantime, there had been decrease in number of members of the basic contingent. As Kozhin had anticipated, diseases stroke in new forts. Over 500 people

---

<sup>63</sup> Information of Kazan vice-governor Kudryatov on a separate journey of Lieutenant Kozhin to St. Petersburg issued after 7<sup>th</sup> May 1717, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXI, 293-294.

<sup>64</sup> 1717, Notes of Prince Cherkassky sent to Vasily Nikitich Zlotov, Ibidem, Doc. XCII, 380-381, quotation 380.

<sup>65</sup> March 5, 1717, Letter of Kalmyk Khan Ayuka to Lieutenant Kozhin that Bokharians, Karakalpaks, Kazakhs, Khivans are preparing attack on Russians, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXX, 292-293, quotation 292.

<sup>66</sup> Ibidem, 302.

died in Tyub-Karagan in May 1717.<sup>67</sup> Bekovich hoped he would reinforce his troop with Turkmens suffering privation under khans of Khiva, but allied Turkmen tribes did not display their willingness.<sup>68</sup> Only Kalmyks kept providing Russians with valuable information.<sup>69</sup> In the late spring, Bekovich was left with 2,200 people able to march, mostly Yaik and Grebensk Cossacks.<sup>70</sup>

Those forces set off across the steppe towards Gur'yev, where their camp would be attacked by Karakalpak tribes. They captured 60 Cossacks, and looted part of their draught animals. Cherkassky arrived there by sea in June, and brought there his two brothers and personal guard consisting of 20 Kabardians. Taking part in the expedition was his wife Marfa Borisovna (maiden name Golitsyn) and their three children. A storm blew in while ships were sailing to Gur'yev. Some of the troops saved themselves on the shore, so went on to Gur'yev by land, unfortunately the ship carrying Bekovich's family got wrecked in the Volga mouth below Astrakhan, and his wife and two daughters died. Only his younger son and a domestic servant saved their lives.<sup>71</sup>

Bekovich feeling miserable sent about a one-hundred troop as reinforcement to the fort in Tyub-Karagan in June, and was advancing himself along the Red Waters towards Khiva. He avoided a usual caravan route; instead the troops followed a winding way along the Emba River instead.<sup>72</sup> The journey was nowise easy since „provisions and many horses were lost on the way ... because of a long journey and lack of feed many horses died”.<sup>73</sup>

By Peter's order Bekovich received on the way he was supposed to send merchants to Persia and India, next to China and Bukhara. He appointed Murza Tevkelev to lead the expedition, but he would be driven to Astrabad due to the storm on the Caspian Sea, where he

---

<sup>67</sup> June 25, 1717, Astrakhan Commander in Chief Chirikov on numbers of dead soldiers in Tyub-Karagan and Letter of Kozhin of July 13, 1717 on a similar situation in the Red Waters, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXVIII, 301 and Doc. N° LXXXIX, 301-302.

<sup>68</sup> May 1717, Letter of Astrakhan Commander in Chief Chirikov to Lieutenant Kozhin, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXIV, 298.

<sup>69</sup> May 16, 1717, Letter of Khan Ayuka on gathering of 2,000 soldiers and their dragging the Red Waters, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXIII, 297.

<sup>70</sup> October 7, 1717, Testimony of Cossack Tatar Urazmet Akhmetev on campaign of Bekovich Cherkassky to Khiva, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXIII, 314-323, link 314-315.

<sup>71</sup> Notes of General-Lieutenant Shubert and Department Commander Colonel Folton- de Barason on journeys of Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky to the Eastern shore of the Caspian Sea and on his journey overland to Khiva, National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archives, f. 1087, d. 612, ll. 9-16.

<sup>72</sup> *Materialy Voyenno-uchenogo arkhiva*, Doc. N° LXXXIII, 315-316.

<sup>73</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXVI, 352 (Testimony of Fyodor Jemel'janov).

would be thrown into a jail. He would not be set free until Bekovich Cherkassky's death by Artemy Petrovich Volynsky, a Russian envoy to Persia's intervention.<sup>74</sup>

The army approached Aral Lake, next went a long way along its shore. When they reached a well called Chil'dan, the rest of the Turkmen guides ran away, thus the troops were advancing along caravan paths from one well to another. In August 1717, the expedition reached the Amu-Darya, so was at a distance of 100 to 150km from Khiva. Trying not to bring the matter into military confrontation, Cherkassky sent a one-hundred-men troop of Cossacks under Koreytov's (also Kireytov) command to deliver a letter to the Khan of Khiva explaining once again the peaceful purpose of the delegation. Heralds from Koreytov arrived at a camp situated on the Akkul River (the Amu-Darya tributary) to tell him the letter had been delivered, and the great Khan's herald was heading towards him. While meeting with that herald Bekovich assured him they were coming in peace. The herald went back to the Khan. The Russian troops were advancing until the troops of Khiva blocked their way by Aybugir Lake (today's Sudochoye Lake).<sup>75</sup>

The Russian troops were deployed along the lake exploiting it as a natural barrier, and surrounded themselves with a war wagon wall. They had been resisting attacks all day long. As the evening was progressing, Khivans retreated, but would strike again next day. The Russians dug a deep trench during the night, and surrounded three sides of their camp with a mound. The thing that had great importance was seven Russian cannons, as the troops of Khiva had none. Likewise the Russian troops had been better drilled. Despite superiority in number of attackers (16 to 24 thousand at a guess) Khivans suffered huge losses, whereas Russians only lost ten men.<sup>76</sup>

On that account, Shirgazikhan initiated talks. His herald Hodja Ishim declared that the Russian camp had been attacked by Khivans without the Khan's knowledge, which he deeply regretted. Bekovich sent his herald, a Tatar Altyn Useynov, to the Khan to assure him that „Cherkassky has been sent out by His Tsarist Majesty's herald not by the troops.” Useynov returned together with Hodja Ishim, who informed Cherkassky that the Khan had arranged a session with his relatives and would send an answer in the morning.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> OMAROV O. Yu., *Otvazhny issledovatel'*, 47-48.

<sup>75</sup> *Materialy Voyenno-uchenogo arkhiva*, Doc. N° LXXXVI, 332-333 (Testimony of Hodja Nefes), 353 (Testimony of Fyodor Yemel'yanov).

<sup>76</sup> *Ibidem*, Doc. N° LXXXIII, 314-323, link 316-317.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibidem*, Doc. N° LXXXVI, 363.

The Khivans launched another attack in the morning but would be repelled again. However, betting on the previous account, Bekovich, believed that it was possible to negotiate in a peaceful way. He sent his emissaries who would demand explanation for the Khivan perfidious action. Shirgazikhan was now very helpful. He ordered the troops away the lake, and issued the command to punish culprits „one man to be pierced his nostril, another one his ear.” Paying his tribute to Bekovich, he sent Columbay and Hodja Nazar with other magnates who would demonstrate they were ready to accept substantial concessions.<sup>78</sup>

The following day, on 22 August, Bekovich was invited to the Khan to talk face-to face. He went there with his two brothers and brought along „Prince Mikhail Zamanov and other commanders, 250 dragoons, 200 Yaik Cossacks, 50 Grebensk Cossacks; 500 people in total”, as well as presents, silver, sable pelts, and sugar. Frank Frankenberg and Grigori Pal'chikov had been given command of the rest of the troops.<sup>79</sup>

Despite expressing dissatisfaction with building Russian forts on the shores of the Caspian Sea during the talks, Shirgazikhan declared he accepted all conditions of the Russian Tsar. Then he invited Bekovich to visit Khiva. Khivans and Russians set out on a journey, however, on the way in a camp by a small river called Porsugan, in the distance of a two-day journey from Khiva, the Khan invited Bekovich to his tent and told him „he would not have enough food to keep them just in one town, Khiva, therefore it would be necessary to accommodate them in five other ones.”<sup>80</sup>

The course of events that occurred afterwards remains unclear; in general, there are several versions and sub-versions, as the only facts we know about those occurrences are based on additional testimony of nomads or surviving Russians, Tatars and Turkmens, who, however, did not belong to the circle of the supreme commanders, therefore had not been involved in the key decisions. Their testimony mostly includes speculation and mediated information.

According to some of them, Bekovich had got caught in that obvious trap, and with a light heart commanded his soldiers to obey the order. Although Major Frankenberg had been extremely reluctant to obey that mediated order, and had demanded to be given it by the supreme commander in person, he finally surrendered. Khivans had been waiting until the Russian troops separated and set out on the

---

<sup>78</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXVI, 336-337, quotation 337 (Testimony of Hodja Nefes).

<sup>79</sup> Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXIII, quotation and link 317.

<sup>80</sup> Ibidem, 319.

journey then attacked them from reserve. Most soldiers were killed, the rest of them were taken captured. Bekovich, Zamanov and other commanders were beheaded before the Khan's very eyes. Also Palchikov, Frankenberg, Zamanov, Zvansky and Ekonomov were executed, others were taken captives.<sup>81</sup>

According to another version Bekovich was taken prisoner and forced under threat to issue command to separate the united troops. The order was carried out, the troops slaughtered. Bekovich, still alive, was stripped off the skin, which would be treated with conservation resin. Zamanov was treated alike. Afterwards the heads of Russian princes were carried on sticks along streets of Khiva, next sent to the Khan of Bukhara.<sup>82</sup>

Other version of the story says Bekovich was beheaded in the town of Porso situated close to the Porsugan River.<sup>83</sup> By hearsay, Cherkassky sacrificed his troops for the sake of saving his life, and would comfortably spend the rest of his life at the Khan of Chiva's.<sup>84</sup>

All mentioned versions are not verisimilar, and cannot be supported with expedition members' eyewitness testimony that would fully accord with the time. They form traditional spectrum of opinions corresponding to different *a priori* attitudes of information mediators from effort to excuse the hero failure to a traditional theory of conspiracy.

Sirgazikhan boasted about his victory, but Bukharians did not accept the offered present in the form of Bekovich's chopped-off head. Finally, more careful attitude would prevail even in Khiva. The upcoming public execution of 40 Russian officers was halted, and some of the captives, including both brothers of Cherkassky, would be allowed to go back to Russia.<sup>85</sup> The first more ample testimony to the catastrophic end of the expedition was presented in the Kazan Fortress already in October 1717 by those who had made their escape by various ways.<sup>86</sup>

Turkmen nomads, who had behaved friendly towards Russians

---

<sup>81</sup> Ibidem, 319-320; Doc. N° LXXXVI, 340-341.

<sup>82</sup> NEPOMYASHCHY N. N., *Russkaya India*, 103.

<sup>83</sup> OMAROV O. Yu., *Otvazhny issledovatel'*, 56.

<sup>84</sup> Cherkassky, *Alexandr Bekovich*, *Russky biografichesky slovar'* A. A. Polovcova, 183.

<sup>85</sup> December 30, 1717, Report of the Kazan governor Peter Samuelovich Saltykov on liberation of Russian prisoners and assaults on Russian fortress, *Materialy Voyenno-uchenogo arkhiva*, Doc. N° XCVIII, 391-394.

<sup>86</sup> October 11, 1717, Order of the Senate on authorization of the Commissioner Grigori Netesov in Kazan to interrogations of survivors, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXIV, 323; Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXVI, 350-351 (Testimony of Altan Useynov).

soldiers, were now displaying growing aggression.<sup>87</sup> The Russian forts suddenly fell into the conditions of a real siege. They got neither reinforcement nor help. It was worthless holding them in a waste land.<sup>88</sup> Therefore, the garrison of the fort by the Red Waters sailed away on remaining ships to Astrakhan in October 1717. While they were on their way a heavy storm blew in. Some of their ships sank others were washed away by the stream to the mouth of the Kura River. They spent winter there, and in the spring of the year 1718 they could go back to Astrakhan. The garrison of the fort in Tyub-Karagan Bay wintered on the site. They faced attacks by Turkmens, but in the spring of the year 1718 they went back to Russia as well.<sup>89</sup>

As regards Kozhin, he had been imprisoned in Petersburg, and brought to trial. Kozhin accused Cherkassky of betrayal. Apparently, Peter I had felt sympathy for Bekovich, however, after receiving the account of the terrible end of the expedition, the situation changed and Kozhin would be granted pardon.<sup>90</sup>

Rumours about the Khiva expedition failure had spread around Russia. A saying "Defeated like Bekovich" became synonymous with failure, and would be included in dictionaries of idioms. Peter I bitterly regretted the failure of the Khiva march. He did not abandon his plans, but had no resources to organise another expedition. He sent an Italian in the Russia's service, the Secretary of the *Posolsky Prikaz* Committee on Eastern Matters, Florio Beneveni, to Bukhara in 1718. He managed to establish friendly relationships in Bukhara, map the local markets, and came back to Russia via Khiva, where he had not been given a hearty welcome. But he would arrive to Russia only in 1725, after Peter I's death.<sup>91</sup>

The thing that dramatically affected the failure of the expedition was Cherkassky's naivety that had made it possible to lure his troops into a trap. The role which Cherkassky's weakened mental condition caused by the loss of most of his family occupied in that decision remains just a subject of speculation. The failure, however, had been

---

<sup>87</sup> December 7, 1717, Report of the Kazan governor P. P. Saltykov to the Senate on the state of Tyub-karagan fortress, Krasnovodsk Fortress and Fortress of St. Peter, Ibidem, Doc. N° XCIII, 383-386.

<sup>88</sup> October 15, 1717, Letter of the Kazan governor P. P. Saltykov to the Senate, asking whether it makes sense to keep the crew in the newly established strongholds, if confirmed reports on death of Bekovich Cherkassky, Ibidem, Doc. N° LXXXVII, 359-360.

<sup>89</sup> OMAROV O. Yu., *Otvazhny issledovatel'*, 57.

<sup>90</sup> NEPOMYASHCHY N. N., *Russkaya India*, 104.

<sup>91</sup> BENEVENI F., *Poslannik Petra I na Vostoke: posol'stvo Florio Beneveni v Persiyu i Bukharu v 1718-1725 godakh*, Moskva, 1986, 156 p.



pre-destined by a great deal of other factors, such as ill-considered construction of forts on unsuitable sites bound by huge military forces or soldiers' exposure to diseases, which decimated most of the expedition, and the like.

The basic aim of the expedition, that is the establishment of business relationships with India, was not accomplished, since it had been based on insufficient knowledge of the region geography, and the basic incorrect assumptions regarding the possibilities of transport by the Amu-Darya. One problem also lay in the military and conquering character of the expedition that had been easy to identify a mile off. Even though the key motivation of that mission was trade, the whole undertaking possessed a trait of feudal expansion based on, besides others, a vision of enforcing rights of Russian feudal lord over his vassals. However, this vision did not correspond to the true situation in Central Asia. Howsoever it had been expensive and extensive venture, the Russian troops facing the superior number of Khivans were just in a slight chance of winning. Their technological superiority over far more numerous army of Khiva was not that overwhelming to play a key role. Chance of long-term sustainable success and permanent presence in the region was slender due to enormous distance from the Russian centres and generally hostile character bringing logistic problems. What supports importance of these factors is the course of events after otherwise formally successful Russo-Persian wars Peter had waged in 1722-1723. Russia's huge territorial gains in the Caspian region had to be given back to Persia nine years later.<sup>92</sup>

Therefore, among the principal assets of that expedition are geographical discoveries and making maps of the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. Information provided by Cherkassky and mainly Kozhin made it possible for von Berden and Samoylov to draw a manuscript map known as „*General Flat Picture of the Caspian Sea*” as early as in 1717. Peter I charged a respected scientist from Paris Guillaume Delisle with its further processing, and would himself add it with oral notes. The map was printed with cartographic description in French in Amsterdam in 1720. That was just the one that would allow Peter I to enter the French Academy of Science.<sup>93</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> KURUKIN I. V., *Persidsky pokhod Petra Velikogo: Nizovoy korpus na beregach Kaspiya (1722-1735)*, Moskva, 2010, 384 p.

<sup>93</sup> Details on the genesis of the map in studies BERG L. C., *Pervye russkie karty Kaspiyskogo morya*, Izvestiya AN SSSR, seriya geografiya i geofizika, 1940, N° 2, 160-165. KNYAZHECKAYA E. A., *Sud'ba odnoy kartiny (o geografe A. Bekoviche-Cherkasskom)*, Moskva, 1964, 29-32. FEDCHINA V. N., *Kak sozdavalas' karta Sredney Azii*, Moskva, 1967, 48-52. LEBEDEV D., YESAKOV

Russia embarked on the real expansion to Central Asia only over 156 years later by the Khivan campaign in 1873. When the Governor-General of Turkestan region, Kaufman, gave Major-General Golovachev order to launch repressive raid on the tribes that had been refusing Russian serfdom, the Russian public understood the command as revenge for Bekovich.<sup>94</sup>

---

V. A., *Russkie geograficheskie otkrytia*, 157-164.

<sup>94</sup> SHIROKORAD A. B., *Rossia - Anglia: neizvestnaya vojna 1857-1907*, Moskva, 2002, 145.

**Imre Papp**

## ***Conjoncture agraire à l'époque de Napoléon III***<sup>1</sup>

### **Abstract**

The author presents the economic development of the period of Napoleon III. He focuses on the agriculture and he presents the changes of this branch of the French economy. First of all we know the situation of the French rural population. We know the development of the railway during the Second Empire. And the author presents the changes in the economy and in the agriculture in detail, backed up by statistics.

*Keywords:* agriculture, Second Empire, Napoleon III, modern consumption, railway, customs policy, rural population.

Il n'est pas nécessaire que la frontière des périodes de conjoncture et de récession économiques coïncident avec celle des régimes politiques. Néanmoins, le régime de Napoléon III recouvre une période conjoncturelle dans l'économie. Bien que le progrès basé sur le renouvellement technique se soit accéléré déjà pendant la Monarchie de Juillet, son apogée ne sera atteint que durant le Second Empire.<sup>2</sup> L'essor dans l'agriculture commence au début des années 1850 et dure jusqu'au milieu des années 1870. Les ouvrages spécialisés parlent souvent, en exagérant un peu le phénomène, de „l'âge d'or de la campagne” à propos de ces deux décennies.<sup>3</sup>

L'industrialisation moderne créa de nouvelles conditions pour l'agriculture, et elle devait s'y adapter. Pendant le Second Empire s'opère un changement dans la nature de l'économie française. Auparavant, le caractère de cette économie était déterminée par l'agriculture. Pour les années 1860 le principal régulateur de l'économie seront l'industrie et le secteur tertiaire.<sup>4</sup> La population active non-agraire, la population urbaine et l'augmentation des revenus ont également contribué à l'élargissement de l'offre, et la

---

<sup>1</sup> Traduit par Dr. MAROSVÁRI Mária.

<sup>2</sup> BARJOT, Dominique: *Histoire économique de la France au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Paris, 1995. 36.

<sup>3</sup> LENHOF, Jean-Louis: *La France (années 1830-1870)*, dans BARJOT, Dominique, dir. par, *Les sociétés rurales face à la modernisation. Évolutions sociales et politiques en Europe des années 1830 à la fin des années 1920, Étude comparée de la France, de l'Allemagne, de l'Espagne et de l'Italie*, Paris, 2005. 50.

<sup>4</sup> BARJOT (1995): 38.

réponse du secteur agricole à ce phénomène ne pouvait être que la croissance de la production.<sup>5</sup>

L'un des produits les plus importants de l'industrialisation moderne fut le chemin de fer révolutionnant le trafic. L'économie française prit son temps pour développer son réseau. En 1850, il n'y avait que 1.931 kilomètres de voie ferrée. La construction s'accéléra pendant la période de Napoléon III, lorsque l'État, à partir de l'année 1851 a offert des concessions pour une période de 99 ans aux compagnies. Les grandes lignes ont été construites.<sup>6</sup> C'est le chemin de fer qui réussit à réaliser le transport massif des marchandises et de la population. Les rails ont soudé les branches de „l'hexagone français”. Tandis que dans les années 1840 le chemin de fer n'assura que 7% du trafic des marchandises, dans les années 1870 cette proportion atteint 50%. Le réseau du chemin de fer créa un marché national unique tout en ouvrant les régions isolées et autarciques devant une économie de marché. Grâce aux tarifs de transport bon marché il réussit à établir une concurrence au niveau national (plus tard au niveau international) à l'intérieur du monde des consommateurs. Quant au prix du blé, l'un des produits les plus importants de l'économie traditionnelle, la différence de prix selon les régions pouvait atteindre 70%. Cet écart a baissé autour de 30% dans les années 1870. L'équilibre des prix mit fin à la situation privilégiée des régions qui se trouvaient à proximité des grands marchés de consommation. Par conséquent, l'agriculture était dans l'obligation de se consacrer à une production la plus appropriée suivant les régions.<sup>7</sup>

L'un des plus grands problèmes de l'économie traditionnelle consistait dans la faible capacité, la lenteur et le coût élevé du transport terrestre. A l'époque de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>, la durée du trajet entre Paris et Calais (300 kilomètres environ) était de 40 heures en chariot, dans les années 1830, après la constitution du réseau routier, ce même trajet demandait 26 heures. Par le chemin de fer, dans les années 1850, la durée s'est réduite à 6 heures 40 minutes. La rapidité du transport a rendu possible dans les villes la consommation massive des produits périssables (lait, primeur, viande). Par exemple, avant l'avènement du chemin de fer, la consommation du lait était le privilège d'une couche sociale

---

<sup>5</sup> TOUTAIN, Jean-Claude: *La population de la France de 1700 à 1959*, dans Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A., N° 133 - janvier 1963. VII-VIII.

<sup>6</sup> TOUTAIN (1963): VII-VIII.

<sup>7</sup> GAVIGNAUD, Geneviève, *Les campagnes en France au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle (1780-1914)*, Paris, 1990. 80.

restreinte dans les grandes villes.<sup>8</sup> Un mulet pouvait transporter 170 kilos de marchandises par jour à une distance de 30 kilomètres. Un chariot de bonne qualité avec deux chevaux a réussi à transporter, au maximum, 15 q à une distance de 35 kilomètres. Dans les années 1830, les diligences mettaient 24 heures pour faire 200 kilomètres. La vitesse moyenne des omnibus, dans les années 1860 était autour de 45 kilomètre/heure.<sup>9</sup>

Le grand stimulateur, plus efficace même que la diminution dans le temps du transport, fut la baisse du tarif. Au début du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, une tonne-kilomètre sur la route coûtait 50 centimes, ce tarif était de 30 centimes dans les années 1830. En 1870, par voie de chemin de fer une tonne-kilomètre coûtait une centime. Pour un voyageur-kilomètre en diligence, dans les années 1830, il fallait payer de 11 à 16 centimes, tandis qu'en chemin de fer, en 1870 seulement 5 centimes.<sup>10</sup>

La fonction la plus élémentaire de la production agricole consiste à satisfaire les besoins de la population en denrée alimentaire. Si l'on prend en considération uniquement l'accroissement de la population, le défi n'est pas considérable. A partir du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, la croissance de la population ralentit: en 1851, le nombre de la population est de 35,7 millions de personnes, en 1861 de 37,4 (avec le rattachement de Nice et de Savoie qui correspond à une population de 668 mille personnes), et en 1872 de 36,1 millions (compte tenu de la perte d'une population de 1,5 millions de personnes suite à l'annexion de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine).<sup>11</sup> La proportion entre la population rurale et urbaine change également lentement, mais c'est la première période où la diminution de la population rurale peut être exprimée en chiffres absolus, pas seulement de manière proportionnelle. Les proportions entre populations rurale et urbaine sont les suivantes: en 1851 74,5 : 25,5, en 1872 68,9 : 31,1. En chiffres absolus, entre 1851 et 1872, la population rurale a diminué de 26,6 millions à 24,9 millions de personnes, c'est-à-dire de 1,7 millions d'habitants (6,6%). Par contre, la population urbaine a augmenté de 9,1 millions de personnes à 11,2 millions, c'est-à-dire de 2,1 millions de personnes (22,8%). Par rapport à l'Angleterre, à la Belgique et à l'Allemagne la population

---

<sup>8</sup> ROWLEY, Anthony: *Évolution économique de la France du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle à 1914*, Paris, 1982. 214.

<sup>9</sup> GAVIGNAUD (1990): 66-67.

<sup>10</sup> CARON, François: *Histoire économique de la France, XIX<sup>e</sup> - XX<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Paris, 1981. 74.

<sup>11</sup> TOUTAIN (1963): 19.

urbaine française a augmenté d'une manière plus lente et proportionnellement sa part était plus basse dans la population totale du pays.<sup>12</sup>

Le changement social est mieux représenté par la croissance d'une population active, ayant accès à un revenu régulier (population avec emploi régulier). En 1845, le nombre de cette population active était de 13,5 millions de personnes dont 7 millions travaillaient dans l'agriculture. Le retournement s'est effectué en 1872, date après laquelle le nombre de la population active dans l'industrie et dans le secteur tertiaire a dépassé celui de l'agriculture : le nombre total de la population active est de 14,7 millions dont 7,5 millions sont employés dans l'industrie ou dans le secteur tertiaire (50,7%).<sup>13</sup>

La croissance de la population urbaine et celle de la population active dans l'industrie et le secteur tertiaire était alimenté par l'exode rural. L'exode rural massif a commencé dans les années 1830 pour atteindre son apogée dans les années 1860. Entre 1830-1840, 40 mille personnes quittaient la campagne annuellement, entre 1851-1872, ce nombre était de 71 mille. En premier lieu, c'étaient les ouvriers journaliers qui tournaient le dos à l'agriculture. Malgré ce phénomène, la campagne française restait „surpeuplée” par rapport à la terre disponible. Les plus nombreux étaient les petits propriétaires.<sup>14</sup>

Dans les années 1870, on pouvait constater une pénurie en ouvriers journaliers dans plusieurs provinces. La ville s'est prolétarisée, tandis qu'à la campagne se déroulait une sorte de „déploration”. A l'intérieur de la population active agricole la proportion des domestiques et des journaliers a diminué tandis que celle des propriétaires a augmenté. En 1851, la proportion des domestiques et des journaliers à l'intérieur de la population agricole était de 39%, en 1881 de 33%. La diminution n'était pas uniquement conséquence de l'exode rural, mais découlait du fait qu'une part de cette population est devenue petit propriétaire, accroché à la terre et, contribuant à accélérer le parcellement des propriétés.<sup>15</sup>

La croissance de la population urbaine et l'augmentation de la population active ont contribué, par l'intermédiaire des besoins, à

---

<sup>12</sup> TOUTAIN (1963): 54-55.

<sup>13</sup> PINCHEMEL, Philippe: *Structures sociales et dépopulation rurales dans les campagnes picardes de 1836 à 1936*, Paris, 1957. 221-222.

<sup>14</sup> DÉSSERT, Gabriel: *Prospérité de l'agriculture*, dans DUBY, Georges et WALLON, Armand, sous la direction de, *Histoire de la France rurale*. t. 3, *Apogée et crise de la civilisation paysanne, 1789-1919*, Paris, 1976. 222-223.

<sup>15</sup> LENHOF (2005): 69.

dynamiser la production agricole. L'élargissement des besoins était beaucoup plus considérable que la croissance de la population urbaine et celle de la population active. Ce dynamisme fut dopé du côté des revenus. Quant à la population agricole, son autoconsommation dans le domaine des produits agricoles n'était que partielle et elle diminuait en fonction d'une production spécialisée. Le revenu réel des personnes vivant de l'agriculture n'a augmenté que de 10% dans la première moitié du siècle, par contre, pendant le Second Empire cette augmentation était de 25%. Le revenu réel de la population vivant de l'industrie et du secteur tertiaire n'a augmenté que de 2-3% par décennie entre 1830-1850. On peut constater une augmentation considérable à partir des années 1850: une hausse du revenu réel de 6,7% en 1860 par rapport à l'année 1851, et une hausse de 9,5% en 1870 par rapport à 1861.<sup>16</sup> Le coût des denrées alimentaires calculé par personne d'après des moyennes des décennies successives a augmenté de 80% entre les années 1845-1854 et celles 1865-1874 : de 167 francs à 295 francs. Cette hausse prend en considération l'augmentation des prix aussi, autrement dit, la somme destinée à l'achat des provisions n'augmentait pas si considérablement.<sup>17</sup>

La consommation, et par conséquent à travers elle la production agricole, a été de plus en plus déterminée par les grandes villes et les régions industrielles naissantes, puisque les revenus se concentraient là-bas. Pendant le Second Empire débute le changement à partir d'une consommation traditionnelle vers un nouveau type de consommation moderne. Jusque-là, la population consommait des produits, mangeait des denrées dont la production en grande quantité était assurée à proximité. Dans le système moderne de consommation, c'est la production qui, dans la majorité des cas, s'adapte aux besoins des consommateurs.<sup>18</sup>

En premier lieu, c'était les différents types de blé qui assuraient les calories nécessaires à la subsistance humaine. Pour produire des calories d'une même quantité, mais d'origine animale, on avait besoin, compte tenu du niveau de la culture agricole de l'époque, d'un territoire cinq fois plus grand qu'auparavant. Ainsi, dans l'alimentation populaire, même dans les années 1860, 60% de

---

<sup>16</sup> CARON (1981): 92.

<sup>17</sup> TOUTAIN, Jean-Claude: *Consommation alimentaire en France de 1789 à 1964*, dans *Économies et sociétés* (Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A.), t. V, N° 11, novembre 1971. 2023.

<sup>18</sup> MONTANARI, Massimo: *Éhség és bőség, A táplálkozás európai kultúrtörténete*, Ford. KÖVENDI Katalin, Budapest, 1996. 173.

calories nécessaires étaient assurées par les céréales. F. Braudel a dénommé les Français „*mangeurs de pain*”.<sup>19</sup> C'est à partir du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle que la consommation du pain blanc commence à faire reculer celle d'autres types de pain. Pourtant, on peut constater une hausse plus importante dans la consommation d'autres produits que dans celle du pain.

**La consommation annuelle des produits alimentaires par personne ((d'après des moyennes des 10 ans)<sup>20</sup>**

	céréales (kg)	pain (kg)	pomme de terre (kg)	viande (kg)	autres produits (kg)	vin (litre)
<b>1845-54</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>12,2</b>	<b>134</b>
<b>1855-64</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>13,5</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>1865-74</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>13,7</b>	<b>162</b>
<b>croissance</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>135%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>21%</b>

Proportionnellement, l'augmentation de la consommation était la plus importante dans le domaine de la viande, puisque celle de pommes de terre a chuté de manière extrême, dû à mildiou de la pomme de terre à la fin des années 1840. Entre 1835-44, sa consommation annuelle moyenne était de 81 kilogrammes, autrement dit, la croissance véritable était 13%.

Jusqu'au milieu du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle, une des maladies durables de la campagne française était le parcellement des champs et la proportion très élevée des petits lots et des petites propriétés. La catégorisation des propriétés dans les statistiques françaises est différente par rapport à ce qui se fait chez nous: on parle d'un petit lot au-dessous de 1 hectare, d'une petite propriété entre 1-10 hectares, d'une propriété moyenne entre 10-40 hectares et d'une grande propriété au-dessus de 40 hectares. A peu près 76% des propriétés ne dépassaient pas 10 hectares et cela correspondait à 24% du territoire. La proportion des propriétés moyennes était de 20 % qui correspondait à 30% du territoire. Tandis que la grande propriété ne couvrait que 4% du total, mais elle correspondait à 46% du territoire.<sup>21</sup> Les propriétés dépassant effectivement 100 hectares étaient peu nombreuses, 40 mille au total qui correspondait à 25% du territoire agricole.

La capacité de subsistance ou celle de réalisation de profit

<sup>19</sup> BRAUDEL, Fernand: *Franciaország identitása*, t. II, *Az emberek és a dolgok*, Ford. MIHANCSIK Zsófia, Budapest, 2004. 270.

<sup>20</sup> TOUTAIN (1971): 1918 et 1922.

<sup>21</sup> LENHOF (2005): 73.



dépendaient largement du type d'exploitation. L'unité économique de base était l'exploitation, la ferme agricole. Le parcellement des propriétés déterminait plus ou moins la répartition des exploitations, mais les deux ne coïncidaient pas totalement. D'une manière générale, il y avait plus d'exploitations que de propriétés, puisque la plupart des moyennes et grandes propriétés n'étaient pas exploitées par les propriétaires eux-mêmes, elles étaient confiées après les avoir départagées en plusieurs unités, aux fermiers. Les exploitations étaient encore plus fragmentées que les propriétés. Dans les années 1860, environ 85% des exploitations ne dépassaient pas 10 hectares.<sup>22</sup>

Derrière ce morcellement se trouvait le phénomène de la surpopulation de la campagne française. Dans le cas des petits lots et des petites propriétés, ils ne disposaient pas de terrains suffisants pour assurer leur survie. La croissance de la population agricole n'était pas proportionnée à l'élargissement du terrain exploitable et à la croissance du gain. Cette situation est appelée par Jules Michelet, dans les années 1840 „*faim de terre*”.<sup>23</sup>

Comme la possibilité de l'acquisition des terres était limitée, le revenu qui manquait à la subsistance pouvait être assuré par diverses manières, ou bien par des activités extérieures (travaux journaliers, artisanat) ou bien par l'intensification de l'exploitation de la ferme (agrandissement de la valeur de la production par unité). Un facteur favorable à l'intensification dans les exploitations des petits lots et des petites propriétés résidait dans le fait que le main d'oeuvre familial était à leur disposition et que ce type d'investissement ne coûtait rien. Le fermier des petites exploitations continuait de produire pour la subsistance même dans le cas où son revenu ne compensait pas la valeur du travail investi. Par contre, cette „*flexibilité*” de l'économie des parcelles contribuait à maintenir „*l'attachement à la terre*” de la population. Si la terre assurait la subsistance, le producteur ne partait pas.<sup>24</sup> Quant à l'approvisionnement en capitaux par unité d'exploitation en France (et en général en Europe occidentale) il n'y avait pas de différence si considérable entre petites et grandes exploitations, au détriment des petites, comme en Hongrie. Ce qui manquait dans une petite

---

<sup>22</sup> GOUJON, Pierre: *Le temps des révolutions inachevées*, dans HOUSSEL, Jean-Pierre, dir. par, *Histoire des paysans français du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle à nos jours*, Paris, 1976. 290-291.

<sup>23</sup> LAURENT, Robert: *Les cadres de la production agricole: propriété et modes d'exploitation*, dans BRAUDEL, Fernand et LABROUSSE, Ernest, dirigée par, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, t. III, *L'avènement de l'ère industrielle* (1789 - année 1880), Paris, 1976. 633-634.

<sup>24</sup> AUGÉ-LARIBÉ, Michel: *L'évolution de la France agricole*, Paris, 1912. 170.

exploitation, c'était le total des capitaux: celle-là n'a pas réussi à produire la somme nécessaire au renouvellement de son activité économique, tandis que la grande exploitation avait les moyens de concentration et de regroupement.<sup>25</sup>

Dans ces conditions, la croissance de la production agricole correspondait globalement aux besoins. C'était une période de croissance pendant laquelle, durant un quart de siècle, les prix élevés des produits agricoles étaient durables, surtout par rapport aux années 1820-40. On appelait cette période „*l'âge d'or de la campagne*”, tout particulièrement à cause du bon comportement des produits agricoles. C'était le secteur agraire qui tirait profit du changement survenu dans la structure des prix de l'économie entière: tandis que les prix des produits industriels stagnaient entre 1850-1860, ceux des produits agricoles augmentaient de 0,4-0,9% de moyenne annuelle.<sup>26</sup>

Les prix des produits agricoles les plus importants, ceux des céréales, entre 1865-74, étaient de 20% plus élevés en moyenne de dix ans que durant la période entre 1845-54. Le prix de pommes de terre, entre le milieu des années 1840 et 1850 augmentait de 63%, puis il stagnait. Cette augmentation brusque s'explique par une production extrêmement faible de pommes de terre à la fin des années 1840. Le prix du vin présentait plus de caprice encore, puisqu'il réagissait sensiblement à tout changement en quantité ou en qualité également, survenu dans la production. Dans les années 1850, la production a diminué à cause de l'oidium, par conséquent les prix ont considérablement augmenté aux marchés de vin de l'époque : dans les années 1845-54, un hectolitre de vin coûtait 11,56 francs en moyenne, tandis que dans les années 1855-64 cette même quantité coûtait 29,18 francs, autrement dit, l'augmentation était de 152%. Ce niveau de prix élevé restait durable grâce au bon comportement du vin. Les prix des viandes ont également augmenté et, de manière plus importante que ceux des céréales. Entre 1845-54, un kilo de viande coûtait 0,89 francs, par contre, entre 1864-75 il coûtait 1,54 francs (augmentation de 73%). Dans les années 1840, on pouvait acheter pour le prix d'un quintal de blé 31 kilos de viande, à la fin des années 1860, 19 kilos. Le marché a donc surévalué la viande et c'était le cas pour le lait également. Le prix du lait, du beurre et du fromage a augmenté de 50%.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> LAURENT (1976): 669-670.

<sup>26</sup> LENHOF (2005): 61-62.

<sup>27</sup> TOUTAIN, Jean-Claude: *Le produit de l'agriculture française de 1700 à 1958*, t. II, *La croissance du produit de l'agriculture entre 1700 et 1958*, dans Cahiers de

L'agrandissement de la production résultait de l'élargissement des territoires agricoles, de la croissance des investissements (main-d'oeuvre, nouveauté technique, fumage) et de l'augmentation des rendements. Au milieu du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle, les moyens pour agrandir les terrains à exploiter étaient limités. Les réserves en territoire étaient jusque-là absorbées par la production. Il ne restait que des terrains en friche dont l'exploitation par les techniques des siècles précédents et à cause du manque des capitaux présentaient un obstacle trop grand pour la société. Surtout à l'ouest, au sud-ouest et au centre de la France se trouvaient des territoires dont la transformation en terre labourable, en pré, en paturage ou en bois devenait possible.<sup>28</sup>

La transformation des paysages ne pouvait être possible que par l'établissement d'un réseau routier et des chemins de fer et elle a pu être accéléré par la participation active de l'état. Napoléon ne disposait pas d'une politique agraire élaborée, il ne pouvait ignorer pourtant que la plupart de ses électeurs vivaient à la campagne. Comme président tout autant comme empereur, il soutenait, de manière quasi spectaculaire, le drainage des marais, la transformation des prairies incultes et la plantation des forêts. A partir des années 1850, une série de lois servait à inciter les changements. Parmi les travaux, le plus important était le drainage des Landes du sud-ouest et le commencement de son boisement. L'empereur lui-même a acheté une propriété de 900 mille hectares là-bas où il a fait planter une pépinière. Pendant deux décennies, on a fait le drainage de 300 mille hectares de terre et y ont planté des pins maritimes.<sup>29</sup>

Dans la région de la Sologne, à proximité de la ville d'Orléans, et dans les Dombes au nord-est de Lyon, on a également entamé des travaux pareils. La Sologne a eu droit à une attention particulière, étant donné que Napoléon possédait des terres là-bas également. C'est aussi pendant le Second Empire qu'on rend fertiles les champs de bruyère de Bretagne et qu'on commence à transformer le delta du Rhône (Camargue) pour l'adapter à la culture agricole. Ces deux décennies représentaient la dernière grande période du défrichage en France.<sup>30</sup>

---

I.I.S.E.A., N° 115 juillet 1961. 188-192.

<sup>28</sup> SPECKLIN, Robert: *Grandes travaux et tâches quotidiennes*, dans *Histoire de la France rurale*, t. III, 194-196.

<sup>29</sup> DANSETTE, Adrien: *Naissance de la France moderne, Le Second Empire*, Paris, 1976. 301-302.

<sup>30</sup> DU PLESSIS DE GRENÉDAN, Joachim: *Géographie agricole de la France et du monde*, Paris, 1903. 47-56.

En 1852, 47 millions 460 mille hectares de terres étaient cultivés sur les 53 millions d'hectares. En 1873, les terres cultivées représentaient 47 millions 460 mille hectares, c'est-à-dire une augmentation de 485 mille hectares, 1%.<sup>31</sup> Cet agrandissement n'était pas suffisant pour une croissance importante de la production. Ce qui était plus déterminant, c'était le redéploiement intérieur en faveur des terres arables et des vignes. Au début des années 1860, l'étendue des terres labourables a atteint sa plus grande dimension avec 26 millions 200 mille hectares qui correspondait à 56% de terres exploitées. La culture des vignes occupait, de tout temps, une place privilégiée dans l'agriculture française: après la culture des champs et l'élevage, elle arrivait en troisième position. En 1849, il y avait 2 millions 193 mille hectares de vignes, en 1873, 2 millions 583 mille hectares d'exploitations dans la culture de vignes, atteignant ainsi sa plus grande dimension.<sup>32</sup>

La croissance de la production a été rendue possible par l'agrandissement des surfaces ensemencées. Elles se sont élargies plus considérablement que l'étendue des terres arables, et ce processus représente la diminution des terres en jachère ainsi que le gain d'espace de l'alternance des cultures. Par contre, le processus était lent: en 1852, 22% des terres labourables étaient en jachère, en 1873, cette proportion était de 18,7%. L'étendue des terres en friche a diminué de 14,7% en deux décennies. La surface ensemencée des céréales atteint son étendue la plus importante dans les années 1860, puis survient une lente diminution. Elles sera remplacée par la plantation des espèces fourragères. Leur étendue, étant donné qu'elle repart d'un niveau bas, augmente plus rapidement que celle d'autres cultures: entre 1852 et 1873, on constate une augmentation de 47%, traduisant ainsi les besoins grandissants de l'élevage.<sup>33</sup>

La diminution des terres en jachère fut accompagnée par un lent renouvellement des moyens techniques. Selon les statistiques de l'année 1862, seulement 25% des charrues étaient des charrues en fer ou moitié en fer. Cette proportion est de 27% dans l'année 1873.<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> *Statistique agricole de la France, Résultats généraux de l'enquête décennale de 1892*, Publiée par le ministre de l'agriculture, t. I, 242.

<sup>32</sup> *Statistique de la France, Agriculture, Résultats généraux de l'enquête décennale de 1862*, Publiée par le ministre de l'agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics, t. II, Strasbourg, 1868. 125-127. *Statistique internationale de l'agriculture, 1873*, Rédigée et publiée par le Service de la Statistique Générale de France. Nancy, 1876. 19.

<sup>33</sup> *Statistique agricole de 1852, Statistique de la France*, deuxième série, publiée par le ministre de l'agriculture, du commerce et des travaux publics, t. II, Paris, 1860. 405-407. *Statistique internationale de l'agriculture, 1873*. 18-19.

<sup>34</sup> *Statistique de la France, Agriculture, 1862*, t. I, CXXVI-CXXXIX, *Statistique*

En 1862, il n'y avait que 10 mille semoirs en ligne tirés par cheval. Parmi les instruments de moisson, le changement le plus important était la propagation du faux au détriment de la faucille. On est à la première période de la mécanisation de la moisson. La moissonneuse tirée par cheval et la faucheuse sont également connues, mais en 1862, seulement 9 mille sont utilisées respectivement de chacune. C'est dans le domaine du battage qu'on constate les changements les plus radicaux: en 1852, 50 mille batteuses sont en fonction, tandis qu'en 1873, 130 mille, et parmi elles, 7 mille à vapeur. Une batteuse, avec un personnel de 5-6 individus, effectue le travail fait par 30-40 personnes sans machine.<sup>35</sup>

Le résultat de l'alternance des cultures, qu'on ne pouvait introduire que parallèlement avec un fumage régulier, la culture du sol améliorée et l'investissement grandissant en main-d'oeuvre aboutissaient à une croissance des rendements. D'une part, les espèces à rendement bas ont été suppléées par des espèces à haut rendement: le blé représentait plus d'importance par rapport aux autres céréales. Les espèces fourragères étaient privilégiées au détriment de l'orge et l'avoine. D'autre part, le rendement de telle ou telle espèce calculé par rapport à une unité de terrain, a augmenté. Compte tenu de grands écarts des rendements, il est préférable de les analyser d'après des moyennes étalées sur dix ans. Ainsi, on peut constater que le rendement moyen des céréales dans les années 1840 était 8,44 quintals/hectare, tandis que cette proportion dans les années 1860, était de 10,58 quintals/hectare. Donc, les rendements ont augmenté de 25%, avec des écarts régionaux très considérables. Parmi les céréales le plus important, le blé, dans les années 1850, dans le Bassin Parisien et dans les régions du nord du pays, avait un rendement de 13-16 quintals/hectare. Par contre, dans la plupart des régions situées au sud de la Loire, ce rendement était entre 8-10 quintales/hectare.<sup>36</sup>

Les rendements de céréales anglais, hollandais et belge étaient de 40-50% plus élevés par rapport à celui de France. Il n'y avait que le rendement de deux espèces de plantes cultivées où la France ne présentait pas de retard par rapport à ses voisins de l'Europe occidentale et d'autres pays européens. Quant aux rendements des cultures de vignes, elle avait incontestablement la première position en Europe. La betterave donnait, dans les années 1860-70, 300 quintals par hectare, tout comme en Angleterre ou en Belgique. En Europe du Nord, on ne cultivait plus de vignes depuis longtemps, et

---

*internationale de l'agriculture*, 1873. 12.

<sup>35</sup> *Statistique internationale de l'agriculture*, 1873. 12.

<sup>36</sup> *Statistique agricole de 1852*, t. II, 400.

l'agriculture des pays méditerranéens étaient moins développée que celle de la France. Si l'on prend la moyenne des rendements des années 1851-1860, elle était de 16,6 hl/h, celle des années 1861-70, 25hl/h, ce qui correspond à une augmentation de 50%. Les rendements élevés dans les régions viticoles de Languedoc ont contribué à inciter d'autres régions aussi de les atteindre, les plantations languedociennes composaient des espèces avec un rendement de 30-40hl/h. C'étaient les rendements suisse et allemand, dans les années 1860, avec une moyenne de 20hl/h qui étaient proches des rendements français.<sup>37</sup>

Le cheptel des animaux de diverses espèces et d'utilisation a augmenté en nombre pendant ces deux décennies, mais cette croissance était modeste, de 4%, en prenant en considération le nombre des animaux. Cette croissance a été accompagnée par un changement dans la structure de l'élevage et de la composition du cheptel. La croissance est survenue grâce à celle du nombre de cheval, de vache et de porc. Le cheptel des moutons, après avoir atteint un record dans les années 1850, a diminué: en 1852 le nombre des moutons était de 33 millions, tandis qu'en 1862 seulement 29 millions. Avec le rétrécissement des jachères et des terres a exploitation commune, les moyens de l'élevage des moutons ont considérablement diminué. Ce qui renforçait cette tendance, c'était la diminution du prix de la laine avec l'apparition de l'importation australienne.<sup>38</sup>

La croissance lente du cheptel en nombre n'exprime pas le progrès effectif de l'élevage. Ce qui révèle sa productivité c'est le changement dans les espèces d'animaux à élever et l'augmentation des rendements en viande et en lait. C'est l'époque où se répandent des espèces de mouton, de porc et de vache qui donnent plus de laine, de viande et de lait. Le rendement annuel moyen de lait était au début des années 1850 environ 900 litres par an, ce qui, à la fin des années 1860 dépassait 1.000 litres. En 1852, un boeuf de boucherie a donné 253 kg de viande, en 1873, 300 kilos, on peut donc enregistrer une augmentation de rendement de 18%. Le rendement de viande dans le cas du cheptel du porc était de 10%.<sup>39</sup>

En convertissant les rendements en valeur de production (la valeur des produits exprimée en monnaie d'après des prix constants)

---

<sup>37</sup> *Statistique agricole annuelle*, 1912, Ministère de l'agriculture, Paris, 1914. 60-63.

<sup>38</sup> SÉE, Henri: *Histoire économique de la France*, t. II. *Les temps modernes (1789-1914)*, Paris, 1951. 317-318.

<sup>39</sup> LAVERGNE, Léonce de: *Économie rurale de la France depuis 1789*, Paris, 1866. 39-40, TOUTAIN (1961): t. I, 155.

on a l'indice de la productivité.

Cet indice est réel dans le cas où on prend en considération le prix du produit final (le produit qui arrive à la table du consommateur ou au marché), que l'on calcule d'après la valeur de la production totale. Un tiers des produits agricoles annuels est réutilisé dans l'agriculture elle-même, dans le processus de la production. Par conséquent, on doit enlever de la valeur de la production totale celle des grains, de la paille, du fumier et de l'alimentation des animaux (blé, fourrage, lait etc...).<sup>40</sup> Le produit final ainsi calculé, projeté à un hectare dans les moyennes des années 1845-1854 était de 160 francs, tandis que dans les années 1865-74 de 197 francs. Donc, la productivité a augmenté de 23%.<sup>41</sup>

Si l'on exprime les changements quantitatifs d'après des indices naturels (mesure de poids et de capacité), on doit constater que la contribution des divers secteurs était différente. Quant à la production des céréales, entre 1845-54 et entre 1865-74 elle a augmenté seulement de 9%, par contre, à l'intérieur de celle-ci, la production de blé a augmenté de 19,5% et celle de l'avoine de 17%. Ce qui veut dire que la production des autres céréales a diminué ou a stagné durant cette période. Quant à la croissance de la production de vin, elle a dépassé même celle des céréales : dans la moyenne des années 1865-74, la production a augmenté de 26% par rapport à celle des années 1845-54. Pour cette même période, la production de betterave a triplé, celle des pommes de terre a augmenté de 61%. La production du fourrage de pleins champs a augmenté de 65% et la ration par animal de 46%. Les Français pouvaient manger de 32% de plus de viande produite en France et consommer de 17% de plus de lait. Par contre la production de laine et de cocon a diminué.<sup>42</sup>

L'augmentation de la production peut être mesurée d'après le produit final également. La croissance selon des indices naturels et le changement structurel de la production ne peuvent être comparés qu'à l'intérieur de tel ou tel secteur (p.ex production des céréales). Il est donc impossible de mesurer la relation entre des secteurs de nature différente (p.ex culture végétale et élevage). Le produit final agricole a augmenté de plus de 24% entre 1845-54 et 1865-74. Proportionnellement, la production des céréales a diminué lentement à partir des années 1860, mais encore au début des années 1870, elle représentait 40% de la valeur de la production végétale. L'augmentation la plus dynamique quant à la valeur de la production était à enregistrer dans le domaine de la production des

---

<sup>40</sup> LAVERGNE (1866): 476.

<sup>41</sup> TOUTAIN (1961): t. II, 91, 128 et 207-208.

<sup>42</sup> TOUTAIN (1961): t. II, 6-8, et 13-16.

légumes et des fruits. A l'intérieur de l'élevage c'était la valeur de la viande qui augmentait de manière la plus importante: au début des années 1850 elle représentait 46%, au début des années 1870, 50%. Les proportions entre les deux grands secteurs, culture végétale et élevage, ont à peine changé en faveur de l'élevage. Entre 1845-54, 66,1% du produit final était représenté par la culture végétale, entre 1865-74, 65,8%. La diminution se voit renforcée pendant la crise des céréales à la fin du siècle.<sup>43</sup>

L'agriculture française, grâce à son rythme de croissance, pouvait assurer les besoins de consommation, mais l'importation est devenue nécessaire en quantité considérable, de deux produits : de céréales et de viande. Dans les années 1860, 3-5% de la consommation des céréales et 4-8% de celle de viande étaient assurés par l'importation. Parmi les matières premières, dans les années 1860, l'industrie textile avait besoin de deux fois plus de laine que la production intérieure pouvait mettre à sa disposition. L'exportation s'est effectuée uniquement pour le vin, pendant le Second Empire cette exportation annuelle était en moyenne 2-3 millions d'hectolitres. Les importations en produits agricoles ont toujours été plus grandes que les exportations, et la proportion des importations a également augmenté. Pour la moyenne des années 1847-56, 5% de la valeur du produit final agricole était représenté par l'exportation et, 9,7% par l'importation. Pour la moyenne des années 1857-66, 9,3% du produit final est représenté par l'exportation et, 15,1 par l'importation.<sup>44</sup>

La politique douanière de l'état a également contribué à l'essor du commerce extérieur des produits agricoles. Jusqu'aux années 1840 une politique douanière protectionniste était en vigueur. La grande pénurie des denrées alimentaires des années 1846-47 avait comme effet la diminution des douanes à l'importation. Le protectionnisme est resté de règle, mais en appliquant des tarifs douaniers bas. Napoléon III a abandonné ce régime à partir des années 1860, lorsqu'il a signé des contrats de libre échange avec la plupart des pays européens. En 1861, les douanes à l'importation ont pratiquement disparu. Jusqu'à l'époque de la crise des céréales c'était une période de libre échange.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> TOUTAIN (1961): t. II, 126-129.

<sup>44</sup> LEVY-LEBOYER, Maurice et BOURGUIGNON, François: *L'économie française au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Analyse macro-économique, Paris, 1985. 45.

<sup>45</sup> GAVIGNAUD (1990): 81.



**Dávid Világi**

***Integration versus segregation  
Two examples of resolving the ‘native question’***

**Abstract**

Through the centuries of European expansion and colonization one of the most re-emerging issue – faced by the colonial administrations – was the ‘*native question*’. While the methods of settling the problem were numerous in theory, in practice relocation proved to be a most straightforward resort without reference to geographical, political, legal or economical conditions. In this article this process is traceable through two distinct instances from the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

*Keywords:* 19<sup>th</sup> century, North America, Natal, segregation policy, Indian Removal Act

**D**uring the course of the European expansion, all of the coloniser nations faced a significant question: what to do with the natives? Many answers were given to this question during the period of the colonisation from assimilation to genocide. As a general rule, drastic solutions were typical in the early period. Later on - primarily driven by the influence of the thinkers of Enlightenment - the coloniser nations tried to use more humane methods, but of course there were always exceptions.

The two examples submitted are similar in many aspects. Since the simplest and cheapest solution was the occupation of native territories where the natives were either expelled or relocated. This points to the fact that it was an ultimate dénouement. It was widely applied and other methods were tried only on the pressure of the circumstances.

***Native policy in Natal***

This script could be followed up in South Africa, where during plenty of wars the British Empire expanded its borders to northern direction. It is enough to mention here the sequence of the Xhosa wars.<sup>1</sup>

However expelling the natives had its own limits, mainly when the unoccupied areas ran out. Natal is a good example for this, where in the 1840<sup>s</sup> a settling process took place. The end of this process was a statute

---

<sup>1</sup> Between 1779 and 1879 there were nine Xhosa wars altogether. During this period the border continually moved to the northern direction, until in 1879 a whole Xhosa inhabited territory got under British authority.

on 23 June 1849,<sup>2</sup> which regulated the jurisdiction between natives.<sup>3</sup>

In 1840 the Boers invaded Natal, and the Volksraad was formed in Pietermaritzburg. The Volksraad immediately negotiated with the issue represented by the local Africans. At first the Boers expected that the Africans will run away from the invaded territories, but usually the reaction of the Africans was totally different. They stuck to their accustomed environment and even if they lost some of their territories, they tried to stay.<sup>4</sup>

Settling the situation in Natal was more and more necessary because of the migration from Zulu territories. The new Zulu king, Mpande sought after the consolidation of his authority. Although he was widely known as the most peaceful member of the dynasty (within Zulu standards, he was rated as a particularly soft ruler), his ascension to the throne was interlocked with a bloody massacre. Mpande was convinced that his only surviving half-brother Gqugqu, who was spared by the former Zulu ruler Dingane, wants to kill him. Therefore he ordered Gqugqu's killing in 1843.

With his action, he initiated another wave of migration in the direction of Natal because a number of people surmised that Gqugqu's death was only the beginning of further massacres. Therefore many of them wanted to settle down in a safe distance from the Zulu borders. The leader of this group was Mpande's aunt, Mawa.

It was a large scale migration, the south-eastern areas of Zululand were almost completely abandoned. Meanwhile the number of native inhabitants in Natal significantly expanded to the point that the Boer, and later on, the British administration were forced to act and handle the escalating situation.<sup>5</sup>

The Volksraad worked up a suggestion in 1841 in which they planned to relocate the whole African population. For this purpose, one massive reservation was appointed between the Mtamvuna and

---

<sup>2</sup> Of course the whole process did not end up here. The last remarkable regulation of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was published in 1891.

<sup>3</sup> This solution, which was pushed by Theophilus Shepstone, was not the only conception. The original plan by Henry Cloete was meant to introduce the British legal system. There was an attempt to apply this conception in 1845, however, in a short time it turned out that the instant introduction of the European legal system would be impossible. So in the end Shepstone's indirect ruling conception was triumphant.

<sup>4</sup> RICH, Paul, *Segregation and the Cape liberal tradition*. IN: *Collected Seminar Papers on The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries*. Vol. 10. University of London, London, 1981. 31.

<sup>5</sup> The source of the expanding native population in Natal was not only the people from Zululand, but from other areas also began a homecoming of those clans, which were formerly expelled. These clans saw in British presence the guarantee of stability.

Mzimvubu Rivers.<sup>6</sup> The council preferred voluntary relocation, but they made an authorization to apply force if it became necessary.<sup>7</sup> However the implementation was delayed in the next years and in May of 1843, the territory was occupied by the British forces.

In November 1843, the Boer Volksraad renewed the plan of relocation, but British Special Commissioner Henry Cloete stood for another conception. He worked out his own suggestion in which instead of a big reservation out of Natal, he envisioned a few smaller locations inside the borders of Natal.

His suggestion contained three major cornerstones. Firstly, he recommended creating at least six locations. Secondly, he considered it very important to establish mission headquarters in the new locations. Thirdly, he found it necessary to assign a governmental officer who would be entrusted with the task of supervising the African inhabitants.<sup>8</sup>

The Cape government supported his ideas as they immediately appointed an agent to intermedicate between the government and the Africans. The new post was occupied in 1846 by Theophilus Shepstone.<sup>9</sup> He had similar ideas as Cloete. He thought, that as long as the thinking of the Africans shows such great differences from the European standards, it would be better for both them and the settlers to live in separation. In his opinion, the segregated locations could provide places where the Africans could learn the European ways and customs in their own pace without any external interference.<sup>10</sup>

The elaboration was executed by a whole team. In 1846, the government created an independent Locations Commission to examine the state of the Africans. During this examination, the commission decided that it would be subservient to station local magistrates or superintendents in all the planned locations.

---

<sup>6</sup> The idea of segregating settlers and Africans was not predestined. But during the interactions between the two groups, as an answer for the local governmental and economical environment, almost everywhere was practiced.

POPKE, Jeffrey, *Managing colonial alterity: narratives of race, space and labor in Durban, 1870-1920*. *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 29. N° 2. 2003. 249. (POPKE (2003)). GUY, Jeff, *Theophilus Shepstone and the Forging of Natal: African Autonomy and Settler Colonialism in the Making of Traditional Authority*. University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg, 2013. 42. (GUY (2013)).

<sup>7</sup> IVEY, Jacob Mckinnon, *The White Chief of Natal: Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the British Native Policy in Mid-Nineteenth Century Natal*. University of Central Florida, Orlando, 2008. 17-18. (IVEY (2008))

<sup>8</sup> GUY (2013), 52-53. IVEY (2008), 20-23.

<sup>9</sup> GUY, Jeff, *Creating Customary Law*. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2008. 3.

<sup>10</sup> IVEY (2008), 3.

Additionally, they also found it very useful to create local police forces under the control of European officers.

Local commissioners would have had multiple tasks. Of course their main task would have been to supervise the Africans, but moreover they would have made the local statistics and census, just as they would have occupied a key position in the local judiciary system. Later on they were adjudicating the minor crime and civil cases. Their work was supported by a board formed by local chiefs. During the suit, when it was possible, the unwritten African law was adopted.<sup>11</sup>

The commission found it extremely important to set up mission stations and schools for the Africans. The main goal of maintaining schools would have been to transmit practical agricultural knowledge to the African youth.<sup>12</sup> The estates of the locations were regarded as state property, the Africans only had the right to crop the fields.<sup>13</sup>

Without governmental permission, trade was prohibited with those Africans who lived in the locations. For receiving such a permission, the merchant was obligated to submit an itemized list about the wares.<sup>14</sup>

The number of the locations was eventually determined at ten. There were 1.168.000 acres<sup>15</sup> of land detached for this purpose and the relocation concerned roughly 100.000 Africans.<sup>16</sup> The locations were settled in a way that none of them affected the farmlands of British or Boer inhabitants. However, the borders of the locations were not traced out in a detailed way. As a general rule they followed a principle: the frontier ran along where the farms of the settlers came to an end. In many cases these farmlands belonged to generations of African families who did not leave their ancient lands. If the new settler owners did not occupy their lands, these families did not experience any disturbances.<sup>17</sup> With the relatively high location number, they tried to avoid the hostility between rival clans.

---

<sup>11</sup> GUY (2013), 111.

<sup>12</sup> MCCLENDON, Thomas, *Who Put the Mission in Civilizing Mission? Reconsiderations of Shepstone's Early Career*. North Eastern Workshop on Southern Africa, 2002. 19. (MCCLENDON (2002.)

<sup>13</sup> IVEY (2008), 27-29.

<sup>14</sup> IVEY (2008), 30.

<sup>15</sup> Approximately 4730 km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> The number of the locations at the 1880s reached forty. CELE, Nokuthula, *Mpondos or Natalians? The Boer-British Struggle for Control and Manipulation of Boundaries in Natal, South Africa in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*. IN: *Global Encounters European Identities*. Ed. HARRIS, Mary Noelle, Plus-Pisa University Press, Pisa, 2010. 46.

<sup>17</sup> This was the situation in such cases, when the new owner was a land speculator. GUY, JEFF, *The Remarkable Mr. Peppercorne: (or Adam Smith in Msinga)*. Durban, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2011. 8. (GUY 2011.)

During the process the clans were deliberately mixed up to prevent any incidental uproar.

Creating multiple locations was not only done for the purpose of separating Africans and European settlers, they also fulfilled strategic considerations; namely many of the locations were placed in a way that they functioned as buffer zones between settlers and hostile clans on the borders of Natal.<sup>18</sup> In these locations - after Shepstone's concept – the native unwritten law was in force with a few modifications. For example murder could not be redeemed with cattle and the old superstitious customs were abolished.<sup>19</sup>

In practice only the establishment of mission stations was subsidized by the government. Each of the stations received a 200 hectare fields for personal purposes and another 2.400-3.600 hectares in the vicinity for those African families who planned to settle down near the stations after converting to Christianity.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover an African militia was created under the supervision of five European officers. At first it consisted of one hundred men, but later on this number was doubled. However, that militia was disbanded in 1851 due to financial issues and no other similar organization was set up until 1874.<sup>21</sup>

With lacking sufficient financial resources, only one possibility proved to be realistic, namely to carry on with the indirect ruling system.<sup>22</sup> Thank to this mish-mash of achievements, the whole framework proved to be very unstable. The locations could not maintain the whole African population, hence more and more natives tried to find a job on settler farms or on governmental fields.<sup>23</sup>

During the relocation process, the British forces rarely used violence. In the 1840<sup>s</sup> only two major cases are known. In 1847, they used force against Fodo, the chief of the Dumesa, and in 1849 they confronted the

---

<sup>18</sup> MCCLENDON (2002), 18.

<sup>19</sup> A full document about the regulation concept of Shepstone was published by George von Welfling Eybers. *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History 1795-1910*. Ed. EYBERS, George von Welfling, George Routledge & Sons, London, 1918. 235-238.

<sup>20</sup> IRELAND, William: *Historical Sketch of the Zulu Mission in South Africa*. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Boston, 1864. 13.

<sup>21</sup> MAHONEY, Michael, *How the British Stayed in Power in Early Colonial Natal*. Durban, University of Natal, 2001. 21-23.

<sup>22</sup> Officially until 1848 the same rules were applied for settlers and Africans. In practice for the Africans these changes meant nothing. They lived exactly the same way as before. In theory they accepted the British rule, but their settlements were so isolated, that de facto they have not experienced any difference. MCCLENDON (2002), 15.

<sup>23</sup> MCCLENDON (2002), 20.

Hlubi refugees under the leadership of Langalibalele.<sup>24</sup>

In 1850 the government appointed local magistrates for the first time.<sup>25</sup> The magistrates supervised the clans, made reports for the government, collected the taxes and mediated the orders of the government.<sup>26</sup> At an early stage they did not receive any detailed instructions and they did not have any independent budget. In most cases they had very little notion about governmental intentions until Theophilus Shepstone wrote them an instruction. In this document he defined the idea of an indirect ruling system. The task of the magistrates was to control the power of the chiefs instead of honeycombing it. Accordingly, if any hostility occurred, they were obliged to find a solution using the chiefs and their influence instead of direct intervention. In practice, magistrates were used as an alternate court by the Africans. In cases when they were unsatisfied with the judgment of the chief, they made a petition to the magistrate. The settlers were motivated by rather different reasons. They hoped for worker recruitment and the return of stolen cattle from the magistrates.<sup>27</sup>

Between 1849 and 1852, a significant number of settlers arrived to Natal. The newcomers blamed the location system for the insufficient labour market.<sup>28</sup> In the meantime the locations could not maintain the growing African population, so in time many Africans left their appointed locations and tried to settle down in other places. By the 1870<sup>s</sup> more than a half of the African population lived on fields which did not belong to them.<sup>29</sup> As a result, the original segregation system was totally broken because of the massive migration by the 1880<sup>s</sup>.<sup>30</sup>

Surveying the contemporary press articles and books, it is clear what was the settler's opinion about the increasing African migration.

---

<sup>24</sup> MORRIS, Donald R., *The Washing of the Spears: The Rise and Fall of the Zulu Nation*. Da Capo Press, Cambridge, 1998. 165. 171. 173-174. BRYANT, Alfred T., *Olden Times in Zululand and Natal*. C. Struik Publisher, Capetown, 1965<sup>R</sup> (1929). 679. THOMPSON, Leonard, *Co-operation and Conflict: The Zulu Kingdom and Natal*. The Oxford History of South Africa Vol. 1. Ed. WILSON, Monica - THOMPSON, Leonard. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969. 374-376. WALKER, Eric A., *The Formation of New States 1835-1856*. IN: *The Cambridge History of the British Empire* Vol. VIII. Ed. WALKER, Eric A. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963. 359.

<sup>25</sup> IVEY (2008), 38.

<sup>26</sup> IVEY (2008), 47-48.

<sup>27</sup> GUY (2011), 8.

<sup>28</sup> Actually the real issue was caused by the low wages. MCCLENDON (2002), 14. GUY (2011), 24.

<sup>29</sup> GUY, Jeff, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom*. 3. edition. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 1994. 43. (GUY (1994).

<sup>30</sup> POPKE (2003), 251.

For example in 1886, one of the articles in the *Natal Mercury* contained the following phrasing: '*the social pest ... spreading like an epidemic ... undermining all sense of security*'.<sup>31</sup>

In this period the Africans were treated in the cities as visitors or passersby. One main method was implemented for the controlling of the migration wave after 1873. The local clerks tried to control the migration and security by only allowing entrance to Africans who were employed in the cities.

The underdevelopment of the locations was extensively examined by Norman Etherington. He diagnosed three main causes in the background of the failure for any developmental and industrialization attempts in the locations. Firstly, the cooperative mentality of the Africans hindered the individual initiatives. Secondly, they did not have adequate organizing experience. And thirdly, they could not accumulate proper capital.<sup>32</sup> Of course besides the negative observations there are some positive ones as well. For example, in this period the African parents learned to appreciate the significance of the school system. At least this was the impression of the Inspector of Native Education, Fred B. Fynney in 1885.<sup>33</sup>

The missionary maintained schools, which were created to discipline the African youth, were superior in number as well as in quality when compared to the schools maintained by the government. The mission schools were upheld mainly by American missionaries. Since they were able to guarantee the continuous teacher reinforcements, the standard of their education was consistently high.

The other side of the coin was that the mission schools provided only elementary knowledge. The secondary schools were created for settler pupils and they rarely admitted African students. The situation was even worse after 1903, because the Natalian government reduced the annual financial support in several steps from 1 pound 2 shillings 8 pennies to 13 shillings 3 pennies per capita between 1893 and 1903.<sup>34</sup>

In summary, it could be argued that the location system, which today is named after Shepstone, was not created as a singular act, but

---

<sup>31</sup> Quoted by Jeffrey Popke. POPKE (2003), 258.

<sup>32</sup> ETHERINGTON, Norman, *African Economic Experiments*. IN: *Enterprise and Exploitation in a Victorian Colony: Aspects of the Economic and Social History of Colonial Natal*. Ed. GUEST, Bill – SELLERS, John, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1985. 270.

<sup>33</sup> His statement is quoted by Duncan Du Bois. DU BOIS, Duncan: *Natal south coast region: a review of African interaction with colonization*. 2014. 1. and 12. (DU BOIS (2014).

<sup>34</sup> DU BOIS (2014), 11-12.

in many steps building on many local, regional and state changes, not to mention ideological influence.<sup>35</sup>

In the opinion of Norman Etherington, there was never any coherent and reasoned conception. The so-called Shepstone-system could be summarized as the complex bunch of ad hoc reactions given for the different situations which occurred over the decades.<sup>36</sup>

At the same time it could be argued that the location system was one of the most important and most lasting establishments in the history of the colony and later on it was introduced in all British governed colonies of the Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>37</sup>

Segregation made it possible to separate the Africans from European settlers on political, legal and territorial bases at the lowest cost. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this method fully supplanted the alternative solution of assimilation.

On the downside, the system ossified over the years and it could not adapt to the altering circumstances. It artificially conserved the archaic customs and conditions of the Africans. Furthermore, these circumstances directly lead to more drastic forms and methods of segregation politics during the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### ***Native policy in the United States***

The settlers in North America faced similar problems. From the beginning of the United States history, clarification and regulation of the status of the natives had been a continuous issue.<sup>38</sup> There were two political groups, the gradualists and the supporters of relocation. The former party presumed that through teaching and developing the natives, they could acquire enough knowledge to get integrated into the society. Members of the other party believed that although the natives could be civilised, there is not enough time to do this due to the white settlers' greed for land, so they recommended the relocation of the natives to the western bank of the Mississippi River.<sup>39</sup>

It is a common opinion that the main supporter of the latter fraction was President Andrew Jackson and the policy of relocation

---

<sup>35</sup> MCCLENDON (2002), 2.

<sup>36</sup> GUY (1994), 42.

<sup>37</sup> IVEY (2008), 1.

<sup>38</sup> Obviously the problem has a longer history, but this study has no intention to depict the period of British ruling.

<sup>39</sup> WEEKS, Philip, *Farewell, My Nation – The American Indian and the United States in the Nineteenth Century*. Harlan Davidson Inc., Wheeling, 2001<sup>2</sup> (1990). 29-31. (WEEKS (2001).



was his *'invention'*. In fact, the roots of this political idea had originated much earlier, at around the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>40</sup>

In the early period, the government tried to regulate and restrict the relations between natives and settlers. This effort primarily served the interests of the natives. Throughout this period, the so called *'Trade and Intercourse Acts'* was in force. From these acts the most important was an act acknowledged on 30 March 1802, which was substantially influenced by the previous trade acts.<sup>41</sup> Until 1834 the act went through only minor modifications.<sup>42</sup>

The act defined the exact borders between the United States and the native tribes. The trespassers were punished either with a fee or with imprisonment. If a settler stole something from a native, he had to pay twice the worth of the stolen goods. If the culprit did not have the money for the fee, then the government paid to the aggrieved party. If the aggrieved party took revenge, there was no compensation liability. Settling down on a native territory without permission could lead to expulsion even with the assistance of the army. Killing a tribesman was equal to death sentence.

Trading was only legal with governmental permission, in case of misuse, the permission was ambulatory. Trading with land was an exclusive right of the government commissioners. If a tribesman committed a crime on a settler's territory, the evidences were supposed to be passed to the commissioner and only he had the right to negotiate with the tribe. Revenge was culpable.<sup>43</sup>

If all these rules could be enforced in practice, then presumably the natives would have had much less harm. But in the everyday routine these principles were never applied consistently.

In 1803, during Thomas Jefferson's presidency, the Louisiana Purchase came into force. This treaty contained such terms which later eased the implementation of the relocation policy. In article 15,

---

<sup>40</sup> This fact was stated by contemporary politicians. For example in the memorials of Charles Eaton Haynes it is underlined that President Jefferson and President Monroe were instrumental in the development of the relocation policy. In Jefferson's case, Haynes mentioned a negotiation with the Cherokees in 1809, where he urged the relocation of the natives. In Monroe's case, Haynes quoted a message to Congress in 1825, which also dealt with the question of relocation. *The Makings of America: The United States and the World* Vol. I. Ed. MILLER, James - MALLORY, Sylvia, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1993. 307-308.

<sup>41</sup> This previous trade acts arose in 1790, 1796 and 1799.

<sup>42</sup> *Documents of United States Indian Policy*. Ed. PRUCHA, Francis P. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1975. 17. (PRUCHA (1975).

<sup>43</sup> PRUCHA (1975), 17-21.

which was ratified by the Congress in 1804, Jefferson promised lands from the newly gained territories for the tribes living on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River if they were willing to transfer to the western bank.<sup>44</sup>

The commissioners dealing with the natives were instructed to convince the tribes to discuss the relocation conditions with the government. In his instructions, Jefferson distinguished between the tribes. He urged primarily to deal with hunter tribes, because these tribes needed significantly more land to secure their food supplies than the tribes dealing with agriculture. To secure their living stocks, hunter tribes needed almost 2.000 acres of land per capita, whereas settler families required only a few acres per capita.<sup>45</sup> In this early period of the relocation policy, the government tried to convince the natives instead of using violence.

The efforts had some results. Members of the Cherokee tribe wandered to the West firstly only to hunt, but later they settled down. This promising process was stopped by the Second War of American Independence.<sup>46</sup>

The evolving cotton plantation seduced many settlers in the 1810<sup>s</sup> and they outnumbered the natives soon enough, generating more and more tension. Oftentimes slaves were seeking refuge from the natives, because the living conditions were better than on the settler's plantations. Runaway slaves and poor natives formed robber bands and they endangered the safety of the roads.<sup>47</sup> The problems were more and more acute because of the differences between the native and settler law and order. The states also aspired to extend their jurisdiction on native territories.

During the presidency of Monroe, the question of dealing with the status of the natives turned up again. The main opinions – just like during Jefferson's presidency – focused on two alternatives. The tribes must either migrate to the West or switch to cultivation. Monroe wrote in a letter to Andrew Jackson in October 1817, that the

---

<sup>44</sup> BORSÁNYI László, *Hontalanok a hazájukban: az első amerikaiak történelme az Egyesült Államok történetében (XVII-XIX. század)*. Helikon Kiadó, Budapest, 2001. 68. (BORSÁNYI (2001)).

<sup>45</sup> WHAPLES, Robert, *Were Andrew Jackson's Policies "Good for the Economy"?* *The Independent Review* Vol. 18. N° 4. 2014. 547. (WHAPLES (2014)).

<sup>46</sup> PRUCHA, Francis P., *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians* Vol. I. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1984. 183-184. (PRUCHA (1984)).

<sup>47</sup> USNER, Daniel H. Jr., *American Indians on the Cotton Frontier*. IN: *Major Problems in American Indian History – Documents and Essays*. Ed. HURTADO, Albert L. - IVERSON, Peter, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1994. 190-191.

hunting tribes need much more land to maintain their welfare than the ‘civilised’ tribes. This is the same idea as Jefferson’s.

This letter initiated that the main problem was still the settlers’ demand for soil. Most of the politicians of the period thought the problem would have been solved if the government could have distributed all of the tribal lands east from the Mississippi River between the settlers. Thus the government instructed the agents dealing with the natives to work out new treaties with the tribes, but just like before the war, they were not allowed to use violent methods.<sup>48</sup> However, this patient policy changed drastically because of external circumstances.

This twist was induced by the tensions between the State of Georgia and the Cherokees – ironically enough, the conflict was caused by gradualist ambitions. These natives had effectively adopted the settler’s achievements so they were able to interpret the objects of the settlers and they could estimate the real value of their territories. Therefore they were very hostile towards the idea of voluntarily migrating to the West.<sup>49</sup> Moreover they were fully aware of the fact that the western bank of the Mississippi River was inhabited by other tribes, who would not welcome their arrival. Finally, they presumed that it would be only a temporary solution, because in the course of time the swarm of settlers will invade the western territories too.<sup>50</sup>

The root of the discordance between the Cherokees and the State of Georgia was a treaty created on 24 April 1802. In this agreement the state gave up its claims over the western territories, but in exchange got the promise that as soon as the circumstances were suitable, they could take over the native fields which were inside the borders of the state. On several occasions, the Cherokees and the governor of Georgia requested the federal government to settle the disputed question: the

---

<sup>48</sup> President Monroe essentially shared the viewpoint of the gradualists. This is well supported by the Civilisation Fund Act, which was ratified after his initiative on 3 March 1819. According to the law the government founded 10.000 dollars worth annuity, which served the purpose of training ‘*capable persons of good moral character*’. This person’s task was to teach the natives the knowledge of writing, reading, calculating and cultivating. WEEKS (2001), 36. PRUCHA (1975), 33.

<sup>49</sup> In his account to President Monroe the Secretary of War, John Caldwell Calhoun refers to this fact. ‘*It cannot be doubted,*’ he wrote ‘*that much of the difficulty of acquiring additional cessions from the Cherokee nation, and other southern tribes, results from their growing civilisation and knowledge, by which they have learned to place a higher value upon their lands than more rude and savage tribes.*’ WEEKS (2001), 39-40.

<sup>50</sup> TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de, *Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of De la démocratie en Amérique*. Vol. 2. Ed. NOLLA, Eduardo, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 2010. 543. (TOCQUEVILLE (2010).

natives because of the threatening attitude of Georgia and the state in order to get the conditions of the treaty fulfilled.

In this situation Monroe envisioned a great western native territory with a governmental system and without any threat from the settlers. In this territory the tribes could have chosen the proper pace of their 'civilisation' progress. This conception was espoused by the Indian Affairs Committee.

Senator Thomas Hart Benton on 1 February 1825 suggested to endow the president with the right to work out treaties with the tribes living on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River to migrate to the western bank. The conception promised a guarantee that the government would defend their new, western territories from settlers and would help to create their own governmental system. For this purpose, Senator Benton earmarked a 125.000 dollars foundation. The suggestion was accepted by the Senate but members of the House of Representatives voted against it.

In the meantime the Cherokees followed their own way. On 26 July 1827 they passed their own constitution, which was based on the United States Constitution. In this document they declared the establishment of their own, independent, sovereign state. The constitution enabled the integration of the different Cherokee groups. The document was in many aspects modern, although wherever it was possible, they tried to preserve the ancient tribal traditions.<sup>51</sup>

This measure necessarily resulted in a counter-move by the settlers of Georgia. The state expanded its supremacy and jurisdiction over the Cherokee territories.<sup>52</sup> From that time on the settlers were allowed to move into the native territories. They purchased the lands dirt-cheap or took them using violence. Furthermore, they created such a sharp competition on the market that the native farmers would go broke sooner or later. The state obligated the native inhabitants to pay taxes and the men were enrolled in the local militia – the greed of the settlers finally coupled with the oppression of the state.<sup>53</sup>

In the next years other states followed the example of Georgia and extended their jurisdiction and authority. The new regulations and adjudications together with the steady attitude of the governors lead to

---

<sup>51</sup> YOUNG, Mary, *Pagans, Converts, and Blacksliders, All: A Secular View of the Metaphysics of Indian-White Relations*. IN: *The American Indian and the Problem of History*. Ed. MARTIN, Calvin. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987. 80-81. (YOUNG (1987)).

<sup>52</sup> BORSÁNYI (2001), 80-81.

<sup>53</sup> ROGIN, Michael Paul, *Fathers and Children – Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian*. Vintage Books, New York, 1976. 212-213. (ROGIN (1976)).

the impression that their only intention was to banish the natives.<sup>54</sup>

The situation was so serious that the Indian Affairs Committee could not find any other loophole, but the policy of relocation. At this juncture Andrew Jackson was elected as the 7<sup>th</sup> president of the United States in 1828.

His experiences led him to the point of view that traditional native policy had limited efficiency and on many occasions the contracts were not observed. He wrote a report to President Monroe in 1817 wherein he pleaded the method of negotiating with the natives. In his opinion, the natives were also living on the territory of the United States, therefore they did not have complete independence and this pointed to the fact, that the Senate had an equal right to govern them as it had governing the settlers living on the territories. He thought, that the natives only have the right to possess the lands, but not to own them.<sup>55</sup>

Jackson preserved these ideas as a president. His firm belief was that the natives cannot live in the states as independent tribes – they should either migrate to the West or observe the law of their states.<sup>56</sup>

After the State of Georgia arbitrarily extended its jurisdiction, the Cherokees sent protesting deputations either to the Senate or the president. Nevertheless they did not get remedy, although their arguments suited the European standards. They did not refer to their tribal virtue or ancestral spirits but they emphasised their rights.<sup>57</sup>

This kind of reasoning appeared in a petition to the Congress dated on 19 November 1829. *The land on which we stand we have received as an inheritance from our fathers, who possessed it from time immemorial, as a gift from our common Father in Heaven. They bequeathed it to us as their children, and we have sacredly kept it, as containing the remains of our beloved men. This right of inheritance we have never ceded nor ever forfeited. Permit us to ask what better right can the people have to a country than the right of inheritance and immemorial peaceable possession? We know it is said of late by the State of Georgia and by the Executive of the United States, that we have forfeited this right; but we think this is said gratuitously. At what*

---

<sup>54</sup> TOCQUEVILLE (2010), 540-541.

<sup>55</sup> PRUCHA (1984), 191-192.

<sup>56</sup> Jackson's understanding was a sort of junction between the standpoint of the gradualists and the opinion of the relocation supporters. He had no doubt that the natives could be civilised and be integrated into the white society in the long run. On the other hand he was aware of the increasing greed for cultivatable lands of the settlers. Whereupon he thought, the gradualist program was functional but only on the western banks of the Mississippi River, far away from the settlers. WEEKS (2001), 41-42.

<sup>57</sup> YOUNG (1987), 80-81.

*time have we made the forfeit? What great crime have we committed, whereby we must forever be divested of our country and rights? Was it when we were hostile to the United States, and took part with the King of Great Britain, during the struggle for independence? If so, why was not this forfeiture declared in the first treaty of peace between the United States and our beloved men?*<sup>58</sup>

The report prepared by John Bell<sup>59</sup> on 24 February 1830 makes it obvious that this kind of reasoning did not have any effect. *‘The fundamental principle that the Indians had no right by virtue of their ancient possession either of will or sovereignty, has never been abandoned either expressly or by implication.’*<sup>60</sup>

The Cherokees’ other typical reasoning stands for the gradualist attitude of mind. A good example for this was written by Elias Boudinot on 13 March 1828 in the *Cherokee Phoenix*. He put down, that lately the main opinion about the native question suggested that the tribes could not be civilised while continuously getting harassed by the settlers. After that he – following the train of thought by Jefferson – asks a question: if the tribes leave the civilised environment for a savage one, how could it be expected, that they will get civilised?<sup>61</sup>

On 8 December 1829, President Jackson in his first message to the Congress reviewed his opinion about the dangerous situation. In his introduction he summarised the issue. Some of the natives – living in the southern region – have recently made an independent self-government on the territory of the State of Georgia and the State of Alabama. The states mentioned above, reacting to the violation of their sovereignty, extended the validity of their laws on areas inhabited by natives, whereon the natives have turned to the government of the United States.

In his opinion the government in this case did not have any legal right to act against the states, because the constitution unequivocally prohibited creating a new state on a territory of an existing state.

After that – in his message – Jackson suggested to establish a territory on the western bank of the Mississippi River for the native tribes. On this territory they would be allowed to settle down freely and there they would be able to acquire the fundamental knowledge

---

<sup>58</sup> TOCQUEVILLE (2010), 545-546.

<sup>59</sup> John Bell was a representative of the State of Tennessee between 1827 and 1841 in the Congress. In the years mentioned above he was a member of the House Committee on Indian Affairs.

<sup>60</sup> TOCQUEVILLE (2010), 547.

<sup>61</sup> *Major Problems in American Indian History – Documents and Essays*. Ed. HURTADO, Albert L. - IVERSON, Peter, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1994. 210. (HURTADO-IVERSON (1994).

of the European civilisation without any pressure.<sup>62</sup>

In case the natives were willing to accept this conception, he made up several promises to attract them for choosing the relocation. He warranted autonomy on the new territory for the tribes. Furthermore, he guaranteed that the government would never get involved in internal matters, only in case of tensions among the tribes or dispute about the borders. Like his predecessors, Jackson pointed out, the relocation would be organised voluntarily.<sup>63</sup>

As a result of Jackson's conception, two draft bills were prepared. Finally the Congress passed the one framed up by the Senate. Before reviewing the contents of the act, it is worth to examine the reasons that lead to the victory of the relocation policy supporters.

The most important reason was of course the settlers' greed for cultivable fields. It had a huge impact on the southern areas especially, where the cotton plantations needed broad areas. The effect of the economic boom after the Second War of American Independence has just escalated the need for soil. Moreover, the plantations used extensive agricultural methods instead of intensive ones. The greed for new territories was intensified in 1828 because the settlers found gold on Cherokee territories in that year.<sup>64</sup>

The conflict, escalating between the natives and the states – as mentioned before – also had a significant consequence. The federal government was not ready to confront the states, especially using force. Therefore the easier way was to relocate the tribes.<sup>65</sup>

Humanitarian reasons can be mentioned as well. In the early 1830s, it turned out that while the idea of the gradualist's method was appropriate, in practice it could only be carried out partially. The process of integrating the natives into the white society proved to be much longer than it was previously presumed. Furthermore, together with the useful achievements destructive phenomena also streamed into the native territories, for example the consumption of spirits.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> PRUCHA (1984), 194.

<sup>63</sup> HURTADO-IVERSON (1994), 209. CAVE, Alfred A., *Abuse of Power: Andrew Jackson and the Indian Removal Act of 1830*. *The Historian* Vol. 65. N° 6. 2003. 1332. (CAVE (2003).

<sup>64</sup> ROGIN (1976), 219.

<sup>65</sup> This consideration is mentioned by Tocqueville. The federal government did not want to fight with the states endangering the integrity of the Union. They rather undertook the task to relocate the tribes on the account of the federal budget. TOCQUEVILLE (2010), 542.

<sup>66</sup> MARTIN, Calvin, *Ethnohistory: A Better Way to Write Indian History*, IN: *Major Problems in American Indian History – Documents and Essays*. Ed. HURTADO, Albert

Under these circumstances, a number of politicians bona fide professed that civilising the tribes can only be successful if it is not accelerated by external factors and it is happening while being separated from the white society in a controlled manner so that the negative effects can be prevented.

This attitude is well represented by Thomas Loraine McKenney who, as the head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs created in 1824, wrote very trusting reports about the propagation of civilisation among the natives and about the establishment of new schools in the beginning. By 1827 however, when he made a trip to native territories, he recognised that the positive examples were *'like green spots in the desert'*.

About the northern tribes he wrote straight from the shoulder with the following words. *'They catch fish – and plant patches of corn; dance, paint, hunt, fight, get drunk when they can get liquor and often starve'*. After that experience the previously zealous gradualist, McKenney changed his mind and thought that the only chance for natives would be the instant relocation.<sup>67</sup>

Eventually the Indian Removal Act was passed in 1830. The Senate passed it on 24 April with a 28:19 ratio, the House of Representatives passed it on 26 May with a 102:97 ratio and President Jackson signed it on 28 May. The act empowered the president to mark out areas west of the Mississippi River and to truck these areas with the eastern tribes for their lands. The act gave a permanent guarantee that the government is willing to protect them on their new lands. It also guaranteed that the relocation would be organised on federal expense and the government would warrant the natives' supplies for a year, until they could become self-sufficient. For this purpose the Congress passed 500.000 dollars.<sup>68</sup>

In the new situation, it was crucial to work up the frames of the intercourse with natives. The Secretary of War, Lewis Cass formulated his standpoint in 1831. In his opinion the natives should be guaranteed that their new lands would be secured from entering settlers and they would not be perturbed anymore. The government should prohibit the trade with spirits. To prevent the hostility between the tribes it is necessary to station sufficient military forces on the border. The government should support all those natives who are willing to establish a ranch with seeds and domestic animals. The tribes' traditions and customs must be preserved as much as possible. For the education of

---

L. - IVERSON, Peter, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1994. 27.

<sup>67</sup> WEEKS (2001), 35. PRUCHA (1984), 198-199.

<sup>68</sup> CAVE (2003), 1333. PRUCHA (1984), 206.



the natives the government should assign suitable specialists.<sup>69</sup>

By 1830, when the Indian Removal Act was passed, many of the Cherokees already moved to the West. Initially at the end of the 1810<sup>s</sup> they settled down in the Territory of Arkansas, later on in 1828 they gave up these territories as well and moved to the western bank of the Mississippi River. Accordingly, over 6.000 Cherokees lived in the West by 1836. In his letter on 18 April 1829, the Secretary of War, John Henry Eaton urged the others to follow the example above. He mentioned in his letter that the natives deluded themselves with false hopes, if they thought they could hold their lands in the future. At the same time he pointed out, that if they would migrate to the West, they would never be insulted by the settlers ever again.<sup>70</sup>

Those who stayed on their ancient lands stoutly insisted on their territories. Even though they were warned, that if they would stay, they must obey the laws of the settlers. For Jackson this attitude did not make any sense. He was sure that the relocation is for the good of the natives.<sup>71</sup>

Over the 1830<sup>s</sup> the situation of the natives got worse step by step. The settlers impatiently and more and more violently intruded upon them and the federal government did not give effect to any counter-measures, so in time many of them were amenable to leave their territories. The leader of this party was Major Ridge, whereas the intransigent party was led by John Ross.

The former party hoped to convince Ross to follow their wish and sign a new treaty. Their attempts were futile in 1833 and again in 1835. Ross considered this point of view unacceptable. He judged assimilation was more reasonable than leaving their homelands.

At the end of the year 1835, it seemed possible that Ross was ready to negotiate with the government. He planned a trip to Washington. Indian Commissioner John Freeman Schermerhorn took advantage of this opportunity and achieved that the removal agreement got signed by several members of the Ridge party in New Echota. Since Ross could not work out another more suitable agreement, the remaining members of the Ridge Party also signed the Treaty of New Echota. The State of Georgia also threatened them with violence if they did not agree to sign the treaty.

In Ross' opinion this tractable attitude was a dead end. He thought that if they were not able to achieve any success in Georgia, then they would not be able to defend their rights in the future either. On the

---

<sup>69</sup> PRUCHA (1984), 271.

<sup>70</sup> TOCQUEVILLE (2010), 544.

<sup>71</sup> YOUNG (1987), 80-81.

other hand, the Ridge party hoped to buy a few peaceful and quiescent years for the tribe.<sup>72</sup>

The government was ready to accept the treaty, although it was signed only by the minority of the tribe. The government alluded that those who were not present at the signing lost their right to the deliverance. After a fierce discussion about the legality of this treatment, the Senate passed the treaty by a single vote in May 1836.<sup>73</sup>

Under the terms of the agreement, the Cherokees gave up their territories and received new lands in the West in exchange and 5.000.000 dollars as compensation. For the transference they had two years from the ratification. The small group of people who signed the agreement left the eastern tribal territories without any difficulties.<sup>74</sup>

Those Cherokees who hanged back tried to stand up against the decision. In the end, Ross was disposed to make a new agreement with even-handed terms but the government had no intention for negotiations. The deadline for fulfilling the terms of the agreement was in May 1838. Since the rest of the natives did not leave the affected territories, the government ordered General Winfield Scott to execute the terms of the agreement. The Cherokee leaders came to an agreement with Scott and they promised to organise the relocation themselves. The great 'exodus' started off in October; approximately 13.000 Cherokees were forced to leave their old homes behind. The severe winter caused remarkable casualties. Over the wanderings, roughly one fourth of the Cherokees died because of the harsh circumstances.<sup>75</sup> Hiding the difficulties, Jackson described the removal policy as a great success in his 'Farewell Address' of 4 March 1837. *'This unhappy race – the original dwellers in our land – are now placed in a situation where we may well hope that they will share in the blessings of civilisation and be saved from that degradation and destruction to which they were rapidly hastening while they remained in the States...'*<sup>76</sup>

Generally speaking the prognostications made by Jackson's antipodes proved unjust. The relocation did not result in the vanishing of the tribal structures. On the new lands the tribes continued to put the previously acquired settler developments into practice. Of course this does not mean that the relocation policy

---

<sup>72</sup> YOUNG, Mary, *The Cherokee Nation: Mirror of the Republic*. IN: *Major Problems in American Indian History – Documents and Essays*. Ed. HURTADO, Albert L. - IVERSON, Peter. D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1994. 232.

<sup>73</sup> BORSÁNYI (2001), 84-85.

<sup>74</sup> BOYER, Paul S. et al., *The Enduring Vision – A History of the American People* Vol I. D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, 1990. 282.

<sup>75</sup> PRUCHA (1984), 234-241.

<sup>76</sup> PRUCHA (1984), 242. WEEKS (2001), 50.

subverted integrating the natives into the society. On the contrary, it only served the purpose of segregation.<sup>77</sup>

In the 1840<sup>s</sup> and 1850<sup>s</sup>, the relocated tribes lived in peace and prosperity and they achieved a significant development; this statement could be best demonstrated with the example of the tribal school system.

This school system had three main pillars. Firstly, the natives tried to establish work-schools. In these institutes the students learned not only theory and English language but they obtained agricultural and domestic knowledge as well. Secondly, the schools were mixed schools so they tried to educate not only the boys, but the girls as well. Finally they urged the establishment of schools on native territories. By this they hoped that all of the natives could acquire a basic knowledge.

Usually the educational program was a shared project between the tribes and the federal government. The two parties put up the money together. The school systems operated by the natives were so well-functional that in this period their systems were better, than the educational institutes in the States of Arkansas and Missouri.<sup>78</sup> In these years the reports about the tribes were generally very positive and trusting. Only in a few occasions could have been found moderate opinions – yet even these less positive reports never questioned the development, they only highlighted the tardiness of the progress.

These achievements partly legitimated the justness of the presidential policy accomplished by Jackson. The situation later – principally after the Civil War – has drastically changed. Of course this was not the supporters of relocations' fault. In the 1830<sup>s</sup> it was not obvious what the second-half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century will bring.<sup>79</sup>

It is certainly true, that the removal policy was not the only solution for the native question but it would be unjust, to consider President Jackson's conception was wrong and unsuccessful as a whole. The core idea took the interest of the natives into account and offered real solutions but the execution was far from flawless. Neither the relocation nor the subsequent happenings were perfectly organised and often the best intentions could not achieve any

---

<sup>77</sup> FIXICO, Donald, *Federal and State Policies and American Indians*. IN: *A Companion to American Indian History*. Ed. DELORIA, Philip J. – SALISBURY, Neal, Blackwell, Malden, 2002.

<sup>78</sup> PRUCHA (1984), 287-290.

<sup>79</sup> The problems could be caught from the late 1840<sup>s</sup>, correlating with the discovery of gold in the West (Oregon, California). At this time the native territories were not in real danger, the gold miners only transited their lands, but they caused a lot of trouble with epidemics and trading spirits being the most notable damages. WEEKS (2001), 63, 68, 71.

development because of certain officer's interest or malpractice.<sup>80</sup>

Moreover almost nobody expected that this solution would prove so ephemeral and in a few years the natives will suffer from problems similar to the ones before the removal.<sup>81</sup> Of course clairvoyant writers could be found, who previously foreboded the future prospects.

For example Tocqueville thought that by the time the settlers will reach the Pacific Ocean, all of the natives will be exterminated. In context with that harsh assignation, he quoted a statement by Lewis Cass. *‘Judging of the future by the past, we cannot err in anticipating a progressive diminution of their numbers, and their eventual extinction, unless our border should become stationary, and they be removed beyond it, or unless some radical change should take place in the principles of our intercourse with them, which it is easier to hope for than to expect.’*<sup>82</sup>

Maybe in not so drastic measures but these worries came true from the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: a few years after the settlers reached the new native borders and caused subsequent hostilities.

### **Conclusion**

Two examples, two continents, two situations, but in terms of methodology they had very similar results. Dealing with the natives was a crucial issue during the colonization period. There were different conceptions and suggestions, but at the end in the name of cheapness and amenity, segregation proved to be an ultimate solution.

Handling the differences in culture and way of life would have been a very long process and although this process could have been accelerated by the presence of European groups, the settlers' intolerant and greedy attitude did not make the peaceful social integration and assimilation possible.

This is why the original inhabitants were expelled from their original territories step by step – as a result, the ambitious plans for assimilation either totally failed or significantly slowed down.

---

<sup>80</sup> WHAPLES (2014), 553. CAVE (2003), 1338.

<sup>81</sup> A good parallel example can be found from this period by the Mormons. They suffered from permanent persecution because they allowed bigamy in their church. In 1846, with the leading of Brigham Young, they left the United States and established Salt Lake City while seeking new territories. The Mormons hoped that they could live without any vexation from other settlers for a couple of decades but the United States in a few years extended its borders as far as Salt Lake City, correlating with the California Gold Rush.

<sup>82</sup> TOCQUEVILLE (2010), 529.

**József Krisztián Szalánczi**

**„Antártida Argentina”  
*Argentine interests and activities in the south polar region  
before the Antarctic Treaty (1820–1959)***

**Abstract**

Argentina – as one of the closest country to the White Continent – always paid great attention to the south polar issues, since the Republic declared its independence from Spain in 1816. The irreconcilable dispute, which began in 1833 between Argentina and Great Britain about the sovereignty rights over the Falkland Islands is the starting point of the international debates in the far South Atlantic region, but the overlapping claims of the above-named countries in Antarctica – inclusive also Chile – is a lesser-known segment of this topic. As an introduction, an attempt to present the Argentine Antarctic policy will be followed from the second decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, in particular with regard to the Argentine activities, which led to the official announcement of the Argentine territorial claim under the name *Antártida Argentina* (Argentine Antarctica) in 1942/1943.

*Keywords:* Antarctica, territorial claims, Argentina, Great Britain, Antarctic Treaty, Falkland Islands, sovereignty rights.

**N**owadays the main questions about the ice-covered southern continent are first of all the large scale of environmental and economic challenges such as the global warming, the status of the ozone layer, the immeasurable amount of raw materials in the depths of the Antarctic mainland, the oil reserves in the continental shelf of the surrounding waters – and last but not least the huge amount of fresh water, which is located in the form of ice in the region. Nevertheless, the multiple political issues about Antarctica – which date back in a wider sense to the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century – never played a leading role in the mainstream world politics. Seemingly, there is no reason to be inquisitive about this topic while the Antarctic Treaty – which was signed in Washington in 1959 and entered into force in 1961 – put the whole area south of 60° South Latitude under international control. This agreement permits the scientific research but strictly prohibits the military activities in the south polar region in particular with regard to nuclear weapon tests.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> The Antarctic Treaty. National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAAC) A10728 DOCUMENT 28. Article I; III; V–VI.

Officially, all of the signatories observe the principles of the Antarctic Treaty but beside the scientific observations, the national research stations emphasize also the physical presence of the concerned powers in Antarctica.<sup>2</sup> In the light of the former events and experiences about the „*conquest*” of the White Continent, it is not so surprising. Seven countries had announced official territorial claims in Antarctica in the first half of the 20th century.<sup>3</sup> Because of the Antarctic Treaty, at this moment these pretensions are in frozen, but not in invalid status.<sup>4</sup> The above-named agreement appeased the former disputes about the sovereignty rights in Antarctica but didn't solve the problem in its entirety. The territorial claims are in not current status – but only during the period while the Antarctic Treaty is in force.<sup>5</sup> As an introduction, an attempt to present the Argentine Antarctic policy will be followed from the second decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to 1959. The Argentine ambitions and activities reveal the origins and also the lesser-known contexts of the most irreconcilable territorial disputes in the region – first of all between the Argentine Republic and Great Britain.

---

<sup>2</sup> The original 12 signatories of the Antarctic Treaty were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America.) Nowadays the Antarctic Treaty System – which includes the original treaty and also the supplementary agreements such as for example the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty which entered into force in 1998 – comprises 53 member states. Ibid; CSATLÓS, E.: *Az Antarktisz nemzetközi jogi helyzete a XXI. században* Miskolci Jogi Szemle, 2012/1. 54.; Official website of the Antarctic Treaty System. [Http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats\\_parties.aspx?lang=e](http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e). Visited: 06.22.2016.

<sup>3</sup> The United Kingdom (1908), New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina (1942/43).

<sup>4</sup> The Antarctic Treaty does not take stand definitely on territorial claims. Article IV of the Agreement prohibits any new claim and also the enlargement of an existing claim, but it doesn't repeal the pretensions which had officially announced in the pre-treaty era. NAAC A10728, DOCUMENT 28. Article IV. The above-named seven countries which proclaimed their claims before 1959 were also the original signatories of the agreement. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union also reserved their rights to assert claims in the future. It was obvious that the treaty can't be effective without the ratifications of the most concerned states and especially the two superpowers in the Cold War period, such as the USA and the USSR. Because of the political situation the most satisfying solution was to put the existing claims to a so-called „*frozen*” status while the Antarctic Treaty is in force.

<sup>5</sup> We need to mention, that the hypothetical cancellation of the Antarctic Treaty in the future would not only renew the former claims in the area, but it would lead to the announcement of several new pretensions, because the United States, China, the Russian Federation, Japan, Brazil, India and the Republic of South Africa are also very concerned in this question.

Because of its geographical location, Argentina always paid great attention to the South Atlantic (and later to the Antarctic) matters since the Republic declared its independence from Spain on July 9, 1816. After the collapse of the Spanish Empire in South America, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata<sup>6</sup> expanded its sovereignty to the Falkland Islands (*Malvinas* in Spanish) which are situated some 500 miles northeast from the Cape Horn and exercised its authority over the archipelago between 1820 and 1831/1833. Buenos Aires inherited its rights about the islands from the legal principle *uti possideitis* and also on the basis of old contracts from the colonial age. On purpose to avoid the conflicts between the newly founded states in South America, the borderlines were delimited after the independence war generally along the boundaries of the former Spanish viceroalties in the area.<sup>7</sup> Before 1810 the above-named islands were officially the dependencies of the Spanish Empire. In this interpretation, because of the *uti possidetis* the sovereignty rights over the Falkland Islands demised to the United Provinces.<sup>8</sup> From the point of view of Argentina, the *uti possidetis* and the Spanish „*historical heritage*” are the most important keywords in the South Atlantic and also in Antarctic issues from nowadays. But despite all of these claims, Buenos Aires lost the Falkland Islands because of a conflict which evolved between the Argentine governor of the *Malvinas*, Louis Vernet and the United States of America. In 1831, Vernet confiscated some North American fishing boats because of the violation of the exclusive Argentine fishery rights around the

---

<sup>6</sup> Or: United Provinces of South America. The predecessor of the Argentine state after the independence war against the Spanish which comprised generally the former territories of the Spanish Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata with Buenos Aires as its capital. The denomination changed to Argentina officially in 1853. SZILÁGYI Á.: *Változatok a függetlenségre: Argentína, Paraguay, Brazília, Uruguay*, IN: ANDERLE Ádám (ed.): *Latin-Amerika: a függetlenség útjai*. University of Szeged, 2012. 81.

<sup>7</sup> The meaning of the legal principle *uti possidetis* in English: „as you possess”.

<sup>8</sup> This time it is not possible to introduce the history of the Falkland Islands in its entirety, but – as an important component of the topic – we need to emphasize the following: although the islands were discovered belike by Spanish sailors in the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century (probably under Magellan’s expedition between 1519–1522), the British state that the archipelago was sighted first by their navigators such as Captain John Davies and Richard Hawkins at the end of the 1500s. MAÑANA LAINO, D.: *Harc a Falkland- (Malvin-) szigetekért 1982*. Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Budapest, 1985. 7–8. In the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, French and British settlers also visited the former uninhabited islands for a while – so much so that after a military expedition the Spaniards expelled the British colonists from the Faklands in 1770 –, but before 1810 the Spanish rule was generally indisputable over the islands. Ibid. 9–10.

islands.<sup>9</sup> It was not a wise decision because Andrew Jackson, President of the United States called out the sloop-of war USS Lexington to avenge Vernet’s insolence. The captain of the ship, Silas Duncan attacked Vernet’s headquarters with fierce cannon fire in Puerto de la Soledad<sup>10</sup>, seized the settlement, expelled the colonists, captured and arrested the governor himself and charged him with piracy. Before the Lexington set sail, Duncan „*declared the islands free of all governments, 31 December [in 1831 – Sz. K.]*”.<sup>11</sup> The British swiftly realized the situation that the territory is partially unowned. Officially in order to repair their derelict fort at Port Egmont on the West Falkland Island, they returned back, hoisted the Union Jack in Puerto de la Soledad and declared the British sovereignty over the islands on 2 January 1833.<sup>12</sup> From that time, except the weeks of the Falkland War in 1982 while the troops of General Leopoldo Galtieri, leader of the Argentine military junta invaded the territory, the Falkland Islands are *de facto* under British rule – although Buenos Aires never recognized the occupation. After the valorization of the South Atlantic and Antarctic regions from economic and strategic aspects, the loss of the *Malvinas* became for Argentina not only a moral but also a serious political question which affected very adversely the positions of the country in the area. The significance of the underpopulated Falkland Islands was never the territory itself, but the geographical location of the archipelago such as the gate of Antarctica. For that very reason the sovereignty questions over the territory are in the centre of the insoluble British and Argentine disputes in the region.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> HEADLAND, R.: *Chronological List of Antarctic Expeditions and Related Historical Events*. Cambridge University Press, Irthlingborough, 1989. (HEADLAND 1989) 139. Beside the Falkland Islands, Buenos Aires also tried to monopolize the fishery rights in the area of *Tierra del Fuego*, southernmost part of South America. Simultaneously with Vernet’s official appointment as governor in 1829, Buenos Aires issued a decree which announced the Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas and also some small uninhabited islands in the vicinity of the Cape Horn. Of course, Great Britain protested officially against this Argentine action. Ibid. 135–136.

<sup>10</sup> Puerto de la Soledad was a former French settlement (Port Louis) on the East Falkland Island, which was renamed by the Spanish and later became the residence of the Argentine governor. Ibid. 72.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 139.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 140. Although Silas Duncan expelled the Argentine colonists in 1831, the settlement in Puerto de la Soledad was not absolutely deserted. The British commander, Captain Onslow found there „*the remnants of Louis Vernet’s garrison, who...withdrew under duress to Buenos Aires and British occupation was resumed.*” Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Of course the Falkland Islands are situated in the South Atlantic region and not in the polar zone. But in this regard, there is an inseparable connection between this archipelago and Antarctica.



Although we cannot speak about elaborated Antarctic policy on the part of Argentina in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the country also tried to investigate the economic possibilities in the region. British and Australian archival sources refer to the journey of Captain Carlos Timblón from Buenos Aires to the South Shetland Islands in 1819–1820 as the first classic commercial entertainment in the far South Atlantic area, very close to the Antarctic mainland.<sup>14</sup> Beside this it should be noted that in 1844 an „*administrative post in Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego established by the Government of Buenos Aires.*”<sup>15</sup> This step was an important one in the race for the conquest of Patagonia between Argentina and Chile and made it clear that Argentina also claims *Tierra del Fuego* which region is situated on its southernmost edge – in the vicinity of Cape Horn – the closest to the Antarctic mainland.<sup>16</sup> The boundary disputes between the two South American countries were settled by the so-called Boundary Treaty of 1881 (*Tratado de Límites de 1881*) which was signed in Buenos Aires. Although the main questions revolved around the delimitation of borders in Tierra del Fuego and also about the status of the Strait of Magellan, „*both states have considered its extension to Antarctic regions*”<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> During the expedition Timblón collected 14.600 fur seal skin. Territorial Claims in the Antarctic by Research Department, Foreign Office, May 1st, 1945. Secret. NAAC A4311, 365/8. 143. The South Shetland Islands (62°S; 58°W) are situated some 80 miles north from, the Antarctic Peninsula. Ibid. 43.

<sup>15</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 159. Ushuaia is situated on the shore of the Beagle Channel and nowadays the city is the capital of the Argentine Province *Tierra del Fuego*. On the basis of a decree from 1957 Ushuaia is also the administrative centre of the so-called Argentine Antarctica (*Antártida Argentina*) which comprises beside the Argentine Antarctic territories – of course only in the point of view of the Argentine Republic – the Falkland Islands, the South Georgia and also the South Sandwich Islands. MORRIS, M.: *Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile and Antarctica*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 1990. 45.

<sup>16</sup> Before the organization of the Argentine administrative post in Ushuaia, Chile also established a fort on the Brunswick Peninsula (which is the southernmost part of the mainland in *Tierra del Fuego*) in 1843 to demonstrate its sovereignty claims about the territory and especially the Strait of Magellan. PERRY, R.: *Argentine and Chile: The Struggle for Patagonia 1843–1881*. The Americas, 1980/3. 349.

<sup>17</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 204. The treaty guaranteed the neutrality of the Strait of Magellan. Patagonia and the eastern territories of Tierra del Fuego became parts of the Argentine Republic. Chile obtained the western side of the area, which situated close to the Pacific Ocean. Boundary Disputes: Argentina and Chile. *Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1938: The American Republics*. Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1956. (UWDC 1938/5.) 212. NAAC A4311, 365/8. 177. Later disputes evolved about the sovereignty over three small island such as Nueva, Lennox and Picton in the vicinity of Cape Horn, which led almost to a military conflict between Argentina

In the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Argentina began to prepare to exploit the possibilities in the polar zone, but it was not easy to create a well-founded claim on the basis of the international law to prove the right of the Republic to possess Antarctic territories. The main problem was that there were not former Argentine discoveries in the region and the country also didn't take part in the great wave of the national research expeditions which started at the very end of the 1800s,<sup>18</sup> although the members of the Swedish South Polar Expedition were rescued from the Snow Hill Island (64°S; 57°W, very close to the Antarctic Peninsula) in 1903 with the help of Julian Irizar, captain of the Argentine naval vessel *Uruguay*.<sup>19</sup> Because of the above-mentioned reasons, along the same lines with the Falkland Islands, Buenos Aires tried to support its claims with old treaties from the age of the Spanish rule in South America and also with the legal principle *uti possidetis*. Beside them the Republic also referred to its geographical closeness to the Antarctic mainland and tried to emphasize its physical presence in the area first of all with whaling enterprises<sup>20</sup> and from 1904 with the maintenance of a permanent meteorological station on Laurie Island (60°S; 44°W) which is the part of the South Orkney Islands some 400 miles northeast from the Antarctic Peninsula.<sup>21</sup> Contrary to the British attitude which always preferred to recognize first of all the geographical discoveries in territorial disputes, we can clearly observe that the essence of the Argentine Antarctic policy – which is analogous to the Chilean claims – based very strongly on the Spanish historical heritage. This sharp contrast between the British and Argentine aspects also led to confrontations in Antarctic issues.

---

and Chile not long before the outbreak of the Falkland War in 1982.

<sup>18</sup> Between 1897 and 1914, Belgian, British, German, Swedish, Scottish, French, Norwegian, Japanese and also a common Australian – New Zealand research expeditions visited the White Continent in order to explore the coasts and later the interior of Antarctica – or try to reach the geographic South Pole. RIFFENBURGH, B.: *Encyclopedia of the Antarctic I–II*. Routledge, New York, 2007. (RIFFENBURGH 2007) 1111–1112.

<sup>19</sup> NAAC A4311, 365/8. 147; HEADLAND (1989): 231. The leader of the Swedish expedition was the famous geologist and geographer, Otto Nordenskjöld.

<sup>20</sup> At the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, whaling was the most important economic activity and also the generator of the geographical discoveries and territorial disputes in the Antarctic region. Because of the industrial whaling, cetacean stocks became very thin in the northern hemisphere and whaling companies began to search new areas in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to find numerous whale populations in the far southern waters. STOKKE, S. – VIDAS, D.: *Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge – New York – Melbourne, 1996. 385.

<sup>21</sup> NAAC A4311, 365/8. 147.

The first reference about the validity of the Argentine claims about Antarctic territories was the famous papal bull *Inter caetera* which was issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493 – and still more the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, which divided the influence zones between Spain and Portugal in the western hemisphere, drawing the line of demarcation from the North Pole to the South Pole.<sup>22</sup> Strictly theoretically, western parts of the Antarctic mainland which situated south of the Strait of Magellan became Spanish possessions on the basis of the agreement – although in this period the White Continent was an undiscovered area.<sup>23</sup> In the interpretation of Buenos Aires, the successor of the Spanish rights is the Argentine state because of the Vice Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. But we need to mention that the relevance of the Treaty of Tordesillas became more and more questionable after the beginning of the British, French and Dutch colonization, because these countries never recognized the exclusive Spanish and Portuguese rights in the New World.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, in the 20th century the theory of the Spanish heritage was an insufficient reference to enforce territorial claims in polar questions, thus Argentina tried to enhance its historical right also with whaling and scientific activities. After the arrival of the above-mentioned Irizar relief expedition to Buenos Aires, the *Compañía Argentina de Pesca*, a pioneer Argentine–Norwegian fishing company was formed with Argentine capital in 1904 under the lead of a Norwegian whaling manager, Carl Anton Larsen.<sup>25</sup> The company eftsoon organized an expedition which established „*the first Antarctic whaling station on South Georgia, at Grytviken, 16 November 1904 [and – SZ. K.] made biological [and also meteorological – Sz. K.] observations and collections...This event was the beginning of the modern whaling industry and permanent occupation of the island.*”<sup>26</sup> In order to convey coal and other supplies, the Argentine naval vessel *Guardia Nacional* (which was chartered by the *Compañía Argentina de Pesca*) also visited the

---

<sup>22</sup> The line of demarcation ran along about 2200 kilometres (370 leagues) west from the Cape Verde Islands. Spain claimed the western part of the zone while the eastern part became a Portuguese possession.

<sup>23</sup> HAYTON, R.: *The „American Antarctic”*. *The American Journal of International Law*, 1956/3. 585–587.

<sup>24</sup> Of course Santiago – as the successor of the Captaincy-General of Chile – also referred to the old Spanish treaties and grants about territorial issues in Antarctica. (Ibid. 585.)

<sup>25</sup> HEADLAND, R.: *The Island of South Georgia*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. 110. HEADLAND (1989): 231.

<sup>26</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 233.

island in 1905. Beside the whaling activities, Buenos Aires decided to send out yearly expeditions to the South Orkneys to relieve the meteorological station on Laurie Island, which was officially under the control of the Argentine Meteorological Office (*Oficina Meteorológica Argentina*) from the beginning of 1904.<sup>27</sup> In the following decades, Argentine vessels systematically visited the *Orcadas*<sup>28</sup> to maintain the station and of course to emphasize the physical presence of the Republic in the area.

While Buenos Aires tried to enhance its polar positions, Edward VII, King of Great Britain proclaimed a so-called Letters Patent in 1908, which contained, that „*the groups of islands known as South Georgia, South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, and the Sandwich Islands and the territory known as Graham’s Land, situated in the South Atlantic Ocean to the south of the fiftieth parallel of south latitude and lying between the twentieth and the eightieth degrees of west longitude, are part of our Dominions and it is expedient that provision should be made for their governments as Dependencies of Our Colony of the Falkland Islands.*”<sup>29</sup> The British announcement – the first official sovereignty claim, which contained an Antarctic mainland territory, such as the Graham Land in the Antarctic Peninsula – was a severe blow for the Argentine ambitions and also escalated the conflict about the Falkland Islands. Great Britain began to build up its exclusive polar empire without compromise – first of all in order to control the whaling in the region –, annexed the whole area between 20–80°W to the 50°S to and placed it under the administration of the governor of the Falkland Islands.<sup>30</sup> The British state that there was no official Argentine protest against the declaration: „*Following the issue of Letters patent on July 21<sup>st</sup> 1908...the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed a wish, on November 13<sup>th</sup> 1908, to be informed of the terms of the «declaration» made by His Majesty’s Government in the previous July. As the reference was presumably to the Letters Patent, a copy of the Falkland Islands Gazette containing that instrument was sent to His Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires for communication to the*

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. 229. 234. The meteorological station was built by the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition in 1903, but the Argentine government took over the maintenance of the building on 22 February 1904. Ibid. 229.

<sup>28</sup> Or: Islas Orcadas del Sur. The Spanish name of the South Orkney Islands.

<sup>29</sup> Antarctic Control I – to Imperial Conference 1921. Pt. I. NAAC A981, ANT 4 PART 1. S. C. 499/1. Falkland Islands. (Dependencies.) Letters Patent. Dated 21<sup>st</sup> July, 1908. 1.

<sup>30</sup> Officially the British Sector was formed under the name Falkland Island Dependencies.

*Argentine Government, who acknowledged the receipt of this communication on March 18<sup>th</sup> 1909, without comment.*<sup>31</sup>

The lack of any Argentine (or Chilean) protest is very implausible, because theoretically the northern boundary of the British sector (50°S) „sliced off” the southern parts of Patagonia and grossly harmed the territorial integrity of the Argentine Republic and Chile. Contrary to the above-mentioned citation, the Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Shipping (*Norges handels og Sjøfartstidende*) which was well-informed in polar questions, refers back to the remonstrance in 1933 and says that the two South American countries „protested against this [against the British declaration in 1908 – Sz. K.] with the result that Great Britain by Letters Patent dated 28<sup>th</sup> March 1917 altered the boundary of the so-called Falkland sector in such a way that it no longer included Argentine and Chilean territories...”<sup>32</sup> Of course, the British expansion was very unpleasant for all countries – first of all Norway and France – which explored territories in the area before the establishment of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, but absolutely unacceptable for Argentina.<sup>33</sup> Despite the British annexation, Argentine called out its yearly expeditions to the Laurie Island without break to emphasize its sovereignty rights over the South Orkney Islands. The British Admiralty formerly investigated the question in 1907 in order to disprove the legal base of any possible Argentine claim and „pointed out that no Spaniards had ever explored or discovered anything in that region; that the land in question [the South Orkney Islands – Sz. K.] was far outside any territorial limits to which the Argentine Government could lay claim; and further, that the South Orkneys had been formally taken by British subjects long before the Argentine Government had ships to visit the locality.”<sup>34</sup> The

---

<sup>31</sup> NAAC A4311, 365/8. 55.

<sup>32</sup> Norwegian Claims Part 3. NAAC A981, ANTI 51 PART 3. Annex B. Extract from the Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Shipping. Oslo, Thursday, December 21, 1933. Norway and the British Claims for Antarctic Sectors. 3. Otherwise the British didn't plan to annex South American territories and they really altered the northern boundary of the Falkland Islands Dependencies in 1917 in the area between 50–80°W to 58°S instead of the incorrect 50°S. NAAC A981, ANT 4 PART 1. S. C. 499/1. Falkland Islands. (Dependencies.) Letters Patent. Dated 28th March 1917.

<sup>33</sup> Norwegian Claims Part 3. NAAC A981, ANTI 51 PART 3. Annex B. 3.

<sup>34</sup> NAAC A4311, 365/8. 54. The South Orkney Islands „were discovered by the sealer George Powell and Nathaniel Palmer on 6 December 1821 while searching for fur seals. Finding very few seals of any kind, Palmer appears to have shown little interest in the islands as Powell claimed possession for Great Britain...” MILLS, W.: *Exploring Polar Frontiers*. ABC Clío, Santa Barbara (California), 2003. It was important that Powell was a British subject, but Palmer is an American citizen.

Admiralty also referred back to the Treaty of Tordesillas and concluded that „*its validity as an argument in support of a claim to territory could not be admitted by His Majesty's Government, the meridian of partition between the Spanish and Portuguese possession would place the South Orkneys under Portuguese and not Spanish rule.*”<sup>35</sup>

At the same time as the third important participant in these conflicts, Chile also tried to increase its influence in the Antarctic region. Santiago issued a whaling license about the South Shetland Islands – which were the main target of the Chilean Antarctic policy – and founded the Magallanes Whaling Company (*Sociedad Ballenera de Magallanes*) in 1906.<sup>36</sup> Two years later, members of this company established a station with storehouses for stock of coal on Deception Island (62°S; 60°W).<sup>37</sup> The South Shetlands also became part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies in 1908 but despite Argentina, Chile was much less confrontational with regard to Great Britain. Of course Santiago upheld its claims about Antarctica and never recognized the British sector, but carefully avoided all islands (first of all the South Orkneys) which were under dispute between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

While Chile was slightly inactive in polar issues in the interwar period, Great Britain and Argentina continued their duel in the far South Atlantic region. Buenos Aires focused its efforts to the South Orkney Islands and after the establishment of a radio station on Laurie Island in 1925, the Argentine government announced its official claim about the territory which was extended also to the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in 1927.<sup>38</sup> Of course, both of the above-named islands were also British pretensions, thus the conflict escalated to a higher level between the two countries. Moreover, the *Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales*, „the Argentine state oil company, began to prospect for oil in southern Argentina and Tierra del Fuego”<sup>39</sup> in 1937. The presumable existence of offshore oil fields in the continental shelf of the Southern Ocean presaged an increase in the significance of the Antarctic region at the end of the 1930s, but the outbreak of the Second World War pushed forward also the military

---

<sup>35</sup> NAAC A4311, 365/8. 54.

<sup>36</sup> PINOCHET DE LA BARRA, Ó: *Chilean Sovereignty in Antarctica*. Editorial del Pacífico S. A., Santiago de Chile, 1955. (PINOCHET DE LA BARRA 1955) 36–38.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. 38. Deception Island is situated some 100 miles north from the Antarctic Peninsula and belongs to the South Shetland Islands.

<sup>38</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 274.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. 299.

aspects in the area beside the political and economic debates.

After 1939, Argentine and Chile realized, that Great Britain's influence in the South Atlantic region temporarily weakened because of its serious war efforts and both of them tried to maximize their possibilities in this situation. Chile took the opportunity first and after careful investigations, Santiago announced its official claim in a presidential decree on 6 November 1940 to the area between 58–90°W, south of the 60°S to the South Pole.<sup>40</sup> The Chilean Antarctic Territory (*Territorio Chileno Antártico*) contained the South Shetland Islands and also the Antarctic Peninsula. Of course Argentina also prepared to annex Antarctic mainland territories and during his naval expedition to the South Shetland Islands, Alberto J. Oddera, captain of the *Primero de Mayo* declared the foundation of Argentine Antarctica (*Antártida Argentina*) on Deception Island on 8 February 1942.<sup>41</sup> Oddera was permitted by the Argentine government to carry out this action, but Buenos Aires officially informed London about the announcement only on 15 February 1943.<sup>42</sup> Despite the Chilean claim which clearly avoided the South Orkney Islands and first of all concentrated on the Pacific side of the Antarctic Peninsula, Argentina annexed the territory between 25–68°W, south of the 60°S which contained beside the Antarctic Peninsula both the South Orkneys and South Shetlands.<sup>43</sup>

Because of Oddera's action the Royal Navy called out an armed merchant cruiser, HMS *Carnarvon Castle* to solve the dangerous situation, which threatened with the loss of British control over the far South Atlantic territories. Seemingly, this part of the World Ocean was very far from the main naval confrontation zones and trade routes, but the Admiralty suspected that German (or Japanese) submarines and commerce raiders try to use the area for their operations.<sup>44</sup> On January 1943 „a [British – Sz. K] party landed at

---

<sup>40</sup> PINOCHET DE LA BARRA (1955): 53. Julio Escudero, Professor of the Chilean University and expert in international law was entrusted by the Chilean government in 1939 to investigate the question of the legal basis of the pretension. Santiago decided to claim the sector between 53–90°W after the proposals of Escudero. Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 306.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> The British fear about the German raiders was not unfounded. After a successful raid, captain of the German auxiliary cruiser *Pinguin*, Ernst-Felix Krüder captured the whole Norwegian whaling fleet (two factory ships, a supply ship and eleven whale-catchers) in the Antarctic waters (59°S; 02°30'W) in January 1941 and he tried to do the same with the British whaling ships which also operated in the area. But because of the prospective arrival of a British warship, at the end Krüder decided to retreat and the *Pinguin* left the South Atlantic district. After his action the

*Deception Island, obliterated all traces of the Argentine visit in 1942...hoisted the Union Jack and left a record of the ship visit.*<sup>45</sup> But not so long after – while Buenos Aires notified officially the British government about the Argentine territorial claim – the *Primero de Mayo* returned back to Deception Island under the command Captain Silvano Harriague, who removed the British emblems and replaced the Argentine flag. Two Chilean naval officers also took part in the expedition, but henceforth the co-operation between the two South American countries against the British was not successful.<sup>46</sup> „*The Argentines erased the British marks at Deception Island with the cognisance of the Chileans, but endeavoured to keep secret from the latter the fact that, on the eve of departure, they also restored the Argentine marks.*”<sup>47</sup> Both Argentina and Chile agreed that Great Britain is an intruder in the „American” segment of Antarctica – but because of the „*great rivalry and distrust between them*”<sup>48</sup> they never formed a real alliance against the United Kingdom. Although Harriague’s expedition was a secret mission, the British obtained the informations about the action and gave a resolute answer to the challenge. The Royal Navy organized a partially military manoeuvre under the name *Operation Tabarin* and called out the *HMS Scoresby* and the steamship *Fitzroy* to the Deception Island. They established a permanent meteorological station on the island, removed the Argentine emblems again and built an another station in Port Lockroy (64°S; 63°W) which is situated on the Antarctic Peninsula.<sup>49</sup> The expedition – which also carried out a comprehensive scientific program during the winter 1944 – continued into the next year (*Operation Tabarin II*) and beside the erection of two small huts in the area, „*a new*

---

„*Southern Ocean pelagic whaling was ceased until the end of the war.*” HEADLAND (1989): 303. Irrespectively from the Antarctic disputes, British merchant cruiser *HMS Bermuda Queen* destroyed the above-mentioned „*oil fuel installations and coal stocks on Deception Island to deny their use to enemy raiders*” in 1941. Ibid. There was about 7.000 tons of fuel oil in the abandoned station, which was out of use since 1932. Deception Island, South Shetland Islands: possible use by German raiders and Japanese submarines; Anglo–Argentine disputes over sovereignty of Antarctic regions. The National Archives, London (TNA) ADM 116/4662. Secret. M/N.I.D.01660/39 on the outside of the envelope as well as in the text. 20<sup>th</sup> December 39.

<sup>45</sup> NAAC A4311, 365/8. 65.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. 65-66.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 66. Of course the replacement of the Argentine emblems was unacceptable for the Chileans because they also claimed the South Shetland Islands.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 308.



*meteorological station [was – Sz. K.] established at Hope Bay [63°S; 56°W, Antarctic Peninsula – Sz. K.]”<sup>50</sup> These operations were organized in order to make the British sovereignty clear over the questionable regions and also to emphasize the physical presence of the British Empire in the Antarctic region. And beside them the above-mentioned observation points (which worked also as radio stations) were installed in order to locate the German raiders or submarines in Antarctic waters.<sup>51</sup>*

Argentina didn't risk an armed conflict with Great Britain at the very end of the Second World War. But despite the unsuccessful attempts during the war to increase its influence in the polar region, Buenos Aires upheld its claims about Antarctica so much so that extended its pretension to 74°W (instead of the former 68°W) in 1947.<sup>52</sup> Before the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, the conflict revolved first of all the around the Deception Island and the Antarctic peninsula. *„The United Kingdom invited Argentine and Chilean Governments to submit the dispute about Antarctic sovereignty to the International court of Justice, 17 December [1947 – Sz. K.]...”<sup>53</sup>* but both countries rejected the offer. The most serious confrontation happened at Hope Bay in 1952 while members of the Argentine meteorological station Esperanza *„opened fire with machine guns over a Falklands Islands Dependencies Survey Party”<sup>54</sup>* As we mentioned above, the Antarctic Treaty didn't solve the problem, but partially reduced the intensity of the conflict about the overlapping claims of the three countries. But the antagonism – which increased still more after the Falkland War in 1982 – between Argentina and Great Britain is so deep that a peaceful solution and a truthful arrangement is practically unimaginable in this question.

---

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> RIFFENBURGH (2007): 124.

<sup>52</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 315.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. 338. After this action, Sir Geoffrey Miles Clifford, Governor of the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies personally visited the stations to investigate the circumstances of the attack in 1952. Ibid.

## Bibliography

### Archival Sources

#### ***National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAAC)***

The Antarctic Treaty – Includes delegates' signatures. Doc. 28. December 1, 1959. NAAC, A10728, DOCUMENT 28

Territorial Claims in the Antarctic by Research Department, Foreign Office, May 1st, 1945. Secret. NAAC A4311, 365/8

Antarctic Control I – to Imperial Conference 1921. Pt. I. NAAC A981, ANT 4 PART 1.

S. C. 499/1. Falkland Islands. (Dependencies.) Letters Patent. Dated 21st July, 1908.

S. C. 499/1. Falkland Islands. (Dependencies.) Letters Patent. Dated 28th March 1917.

Norwegian Claims Part 3. NAAC A981, ANTI 51 PART 3.

Annex B. Extract from the Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Shipping. Oslo, Thursday, December 21, 1933. Norway and the British Claims for Antarctic Sectors.

#### ***The National Archives, London (TNA)***

Deception Island, South Shetland Islands: possible use by German raiders and Japanese submarines; Anglo–Argentine disputes over sovereignty of Antarctic regions. TNA ADM 116/4662.

M/N.I.D.01660/39 on the outside of the envelope as well as in the text. 20th December 39. Secret.

#### ***University of Wisconsin Digital Collections (UWDC)***

Boundary Disputes: Argentina and Chile. *Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1938: The American Republics*. 5. sz. Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1956. 210–217.

## References

CSATLÓS, E: *Az Antarktisz nemzetközi jogi helyzete a XXI. században*. Miskolci Jogi Szemle, 2012/1. 47–69.

HAYTON, R.: *The „American Antarctic”. The American Journal of International Law*, 1956/3. 583–610.

HEADLAND, R.: *Chronological List of Antarctic Expeditions and Related Historical Events*. Cambridge University Press, Irthlingborough, 1989.

HEADLAND, R.: *The Island of South Georgia*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984

ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történelmi Tanszék tudományos közleményei, N° 2014/1.  
ELTE, BUDAPEST, 2016.

- MAÑANA LAINO, Daniel: *Harc a Falkland- (Malvin-) szigetekért 1982*. Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Budapest, 1985.
- MILLS, W.: *Exploring Polar Frontiers*. ABC Clio, Santa Barbara (California), 2003.
- MORRIS, M.: *Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile and Antarctica*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 1990.
- PERRY, Richard O.: *Argentine and Chile: The Struggle for Patagonia 1843–1881*. The Americas, 1980/3. 347–363.
- PINOCHET DE LA BARRA, Ó: *Chilean Sovereignty in Antarctica*. Editorial del Pacífico S. A., Santiago de Chile, 1955.
- RIFFENBURGH, Beau: *Encyclopedia of the Antarctic I–II*. Routledge, New York, 2007.
- STOKKE, Olav S. – VIDAS, Davor: *Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System*. Cambridge – New York – Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- SZILÁGYI, Ágnes Judit: *Változatok a függetlenségre: Argentína, Paraguay, Brazília, Uruguay*. IN: ANDERLE Ádám (szerk.): *Latin-Amerika: a függetlenség útjai*. Szegedi Tudományegyetem, Szeged, 2012. 77–85.

### Websites

- [Http://www.ats.aq](http://www.ats.aq). The official website of the Antarctic Treaty System. (Visited: 06.22.2016.)
- [Http://www.dna.gov.ar](http://www.dna.gov.ar). The official website of the *Dirección Nacional del Antártico – Instituto Antártico Argentino* (National Direction of the Antarctic – Argentine Antarctic Institute)

József Krisztián Szalánczi: „*Antártida Argentina*”. Argentine interests and activities in the south polar region before the Antarctic Treaty (1820–1959)

**Gábor Szabó-Zsoldos**

***Boer Communities and the British Colonial Policy, 1846-1881.  
Differences between the Boer Republics from the Aspect of  
the British Colonial Policy<sup>1</sup>***

**Abstract**

The political, economic and above all ethnical heterogeneity had crucial impact on the history of Southern Africa. Although vital tensions existed between the three main ethnical blocks (Africans, Boers, British), essential conflicts emerged between the subgroups. Especially the relation of the different Boer communities and republics (Orange Free State, South African Republic) was hectic. Despite the fact that Boers had same origin, spoke the same language, shared common traditions and followed similar religious views, in the field of politics and denominational issues, serious differences rose chiefly between the Orange Free State and the South African Republic. This diversity among the Boers influenced Great Britain's South African colonial policy as well as the Colonial Office attempted to take advantage of the said circumstances.

*Keywords:* Boer republics, Orange Free State, South African Republic, Sir George Grey, 3<sup>rd</sup> Earl Grey, 4<sup>th</sup> Earl Of Carnarvon, Colonial Office, constitution, Volksraad, Cape Colony

**S**outhern Africa witnessed crucial changes during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century which is among the most important periods in the history of the subcontinent. Key events, for instance the emergence of the Boer republics, or the mineral revolution (discovery of the enormous diamond fields in Griqualand West and the gold layers in the Transvaal), then the South African war (1899–1902) inevitably shaped the face of the subcontinent. South Africa during almost the entire 19<sup>th</sup> century was from cultural, ethnical, economic and above all political aspects divided. The territory of the subcontinent was controlled mainly by three political groups: Great Britain, Boer settler communities and numerous African polities. Relation between these political/ethnical groups as well as the high degree of diversity and the conflicts it resulted had the most essential impact on the history of Southern Africa. Moreover, the importance of Great Britain's colonial policy (as the fourth factor in that order), which was elaborated mainly in the Colonial Office, London but it was executed in the colonies by British

---

<sup>1</sup> The research was supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities, Human Capacities Grant Management Office and financed by the National Talent Program NTP-EFÖ-P-15 grant.

colonial officers (men on the spot), is inevitable as well.

Further distinctions can be easily carried out within the borders of the said columns. For instance the British colonies (Cape Colony, Natal, British Kaffraria, Griqualand West) differed from each other in the field of their political/governmental status, structure of economy etc. The situation was the same in case of the Boers and the independent and semi-independent African communities. Concerning the Boers, the Great Trek was the first borderline which disunited the Dutch speaking part of the European society of Southern Africa. About ten thousand of Boers (the trekkers, trekboers or Voortrekkers) left Cape Colony between 1836–1854 in order to find a new country independent from the British control.<sup>2</sup> Although, that meant a serious migration and a great challenge for the leaders of the British colonial policy, the bulk of the Dutch speaking society of Southern Africa remained in Cape Colony, in Western Cape exactly. The annexation of the Voortrekkers' territories (Republic of Natalia, Orange River Sovereignty) was the first British response for the Great Trek. Natal became a British colony, but the mother country abandoned the Sovereignty and guaranteed the independence of the Voortrekker communities beyond the Vaal River by the Sand River Convention (1852)<sup>3</sup> and the Orange Free State by the Bloemfontein Convention (1854).<sup>4</sup> Although it seems that these facts, namely the annexation determined evidently the Anglo-Boer political relations, but the relationship between Great Britain and the Boer communities in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century can't be described as a fierce hostility.

One of the main characteristic elements of the British colonial policy was the intention to unite the divided subcontinent under the union jack and form these fragments into a modern, unified, self-governing, whites, but particularly British-dominated South African dominion which would be loyal to the mother country. Great Britain attempted to realize that scheme three times between 1850–1881. Although, all of these plans failed, in my opinion, this factor was one of those which inevitably influenced the Anglo-Boer relations. The attitude of the Boers towards the British conceptions was not evidently and always critical and negative.

---

<sup>2</sup> HAMILTON, Carolyn – MBENGA, Bernard K. – ROSS, Robert (eds.): *The Cambridge History of South Africa I. From Early Times to 1885*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. 287. 314–318.

<sup>3</sup> The Sand River Convention, NA (The National Archives) CO 879/18 N° 237.

<sup>4</sup> The Bloemfontein Convention, in EYBERS, G. W. (ed.): *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History, 1795–1910*, George Routledge & Sons, London, 1918. 281–285.

Hypothesis of the present article is that the hostility is far not the only factor by which the Anglo-Boer relations can be characterized. From that point of view the British colonial policy attempted to exploit the differences and conflicts between the South African Republic and the Orange Free State and obstacle the union of the Dutch speaking communities of South Africa because it would jeopardize the British interests in the subcontinent. The Boer communities were far from being homogenous and unified. The Boers were divided not just in the field of politics and economy, but from cultural and some ways religious aspects (liberal – conservative Calvinists) as well. Furthermore, Great Britain's South African colonial policy can be characterized as the relation of tendencies and changes. These trends shaped the Anglo-Boer relations, moreover the relationship of the said two groups affected the direction of the British colonial policy, thus the tendencies as well.

Present article focuses on the characteristic, direction and changes of the Anglo-Boer relations with a special emphasis on the political and cultural aspects regarding four decades of the second half of the nineteenth century. The examined period is marked by the milestones of the British unification policy, strategy. The first plan for the united subcontinent was elaborated in 1850 by Earl Grey who was Secretary of State for War and the Colonies (1846–1852) under the premiership of John Russell. 1881 was the year of the downfall of the first official British attempt made for the unification. The present article aims to offer answers for the following issues: What were the main differences between the Boer communities (then republics)? How did the Great Britain colonial policy influence the relationship between the said Boer republics? How did the Boer republics treat the presence of Great Britain: as a „careful” mother country or a dangerous great power?

Regarding the historiography of the topic it is necessary to highlight a trend. The historians during the last few decades turned their attention from the classic imperial history to the impact of the mineral revolution (discovery of the diamond and gold fields) on the social and political relations and improvement of the South Africa. If one compare the books of Cornelis de Kiewiet (written in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) like the *The Imperial Factor in South Africa. A Study in Politics and Economics*<sup>5</sup> or *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-1872*<sup>6</sup> with the recent studies and

---

<sup>5</sup> DE KIEWIET, C. W.: *The Imperial Factor in South Africa. A Study in Politics and Economics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1937.

<sup>6</sup> DE KIEWIET, C. W.: *British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics*,

materials of Norman A Etherington such as *Labour Supply and the Genesis of South African Confederation in the 1870s*<sup>7</sup> the difference is easy to note. *The Cambridge History of South Africa I-II*<sup>8</sup> published in 2010 and 2011 belong to the later approach. Most of the monographies and articles tend to emphasize the importance of one factor (mineral revolution or strategic importance of the Cape of Good Hope) over the others. Opposite to them, one can argue that all of the elements, the complexity of the reasons and factors could have impact on the British colonial policy.

The examined sources can be divided into different categories, for instance there are official, non-official documents (such as the constitutions of the Boer republics – it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the official documents collected by G. W. Eybers), parliamentary papers, the Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, contemporary press and pamphlets. Furthermore it is important to highlight the correspondence between the leaders of the Colonial office and the men on the spot the British Governors, Lieutenant-Governors and High Commissioners in Southern Africa.

The main element of the core hypothesis of the research is that Great Britain's South African colonial policy during the second half of the nineteenth century can be described through the relations of different tendencies and changes. One can ask that what kind of tendencies could exist. At the present state of the research few of these historical processes have been already identified. At first according to the hypothesis Great Britain's South African colonial policy was enormously influenced by several phobias. One can find that quite odd or strange especially regarding that Great Britain was the super and world power of the second half of the nineteenth century, but by examining the official correspondence and despatches of the leaders of the Colonial Office different fears and phobias can be easily found. The anxieties similar to the tendencies can be traced back to three factors. The first was the fact that the Africans overwhelmed the Europeans in numbers. Moreover, the settler population of Southern Africa was heterogeneous and the Boers outnumbered the English speaking communities. At last but not at least, the strategic importance of the Cape of Good Hope inevitable influenced the direction of the British colonial policy. For

---

1848–1872. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1929.

<sup>7</sup> ETHERINGTON, Norman A.: *Labour Supply and the Genesis of South African Confederation in the 1870s*. The Journal of African History 20. N° 2. (1970), 235–253.

<sup>8</sup> HAMILTON – MBENGA – ROSS: *op. cit.*



Britain the most problematic of them was the native alert. Namely the British officials were afraid of the probable unity of native tribes and they believed that a general anti-British and anti-European native revolt and war would mean the end of the British and European presence in Southern Africa.<sup>9</sup> This was the most characteristic and crucial one among the listed elements. Besides of the native confederation the Colonial Office feared from the unity of the Boers as well, namely that the different so called Dutch speaking communities would unite in one Boer state and that could be a real threat for the British colonies. Furthermore especially some officials of the Colonial Office found possible some kind of Americanization of South Africa and the British Colonies. Moreover there were fears which derived from internal factors, such as Russo-phobia. For instance in case of the wars with the Xhosas and the Zulus, the Colonial Office found the Russian intervention possible. The Russian invasion chiefly during the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) was considered as a real possibility by the leaders of the British Colonial policy.<sup>10</sup> Carnarvon, who paid much attention to these threats, was afraid of that the Russians would take advantage of the tension between the Africans and the British. Thus he kept alarming and attempted to convince Prime Minister Disraeli about the necessity of improving the defence of Cape Colony and Simon's Bay.<sup>11</sup> He believed that the control over the Cape of Good Hope was the cornerstone of the architect of the British Empire and its defence system. The loss of that territory would result the demolish Britain's status in Southern Africa as the paramount power in the region, but would cause the end of Great Britain's position in the world politics as well.<sup>12</sup>

Furthermore, especially from the 1880s, during the years of the scramble for Africa, the British colonial political elite were afraid of the colonial plans of other European powers like Germany.<sup>13</sup> At last but not at least the bulk of the British Governments in the examined period treated the South African colonial politics mainly from one

---

<sup>9</sup> Sir George Grey to Sir George Grey. Bart., 30 Dec. 1854. In HCPP 1854–1855 [1969], 36. 39. Hansard, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ser., CCXXXIII, col. 1647–1648. Carnarvon in Lords, 23 Apr. 1877.

<sup>10</sup> Sir Bertle Frere to Lord Carnarvon, 11 Jun. 1877. NA PRO 30/6/33, 167.

<sup>11</sup> GOODFELLOW, C. F.: *Great Britain and South African Confederation, 1870–1881*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1966. 137–138.

<sup>12</sup> Hansard, 3<sup>rd</sup> Ser., CCXCIII, col. 1538. Carnarvon in Lords, 13 Nov. 1884. CLARKE, Sir George Sydenham (ed.): *The Defence of the Empire*, John Murray, London, 1897. 114. 119.

<sup>13</sup> Notes on Travels, South Africa & Australia, 1887–8. Carnarvon Papers, BL Add. 60809, 11–12.

aspect: money. Namely they, especially the liberals, like William Ewart Gladstone attempted to reduce as low as possible the colonial expenditures.<sup>14</sup>

These fears especially the first and the second one (native- and Boer-phobia) can be traced back to fact that Southern Africa during the entire long nineteenth century was ethnically, economically, culturally, socially and above all politically divided. The European population was highly outnumbered by the natives and among the Europeans the Dutch and not the British element dominated. Thus although Britain was the paramount power in that region, the position of the British, especially from ethnical aspects was far from being solid.

What did the British colonial policy do in order to neutralize these sources of problems? According to my research two main strategies were implemented by the Colonial Office (and these belong to another level of tendencies):

### ***1, Reluctance and Abandonment***

The abandonment of the territories controlled by the British was preferred mainly by some of the economic minded politicians who could not find profitable and even justifiable the maintenance of the British colonial administration in Southern Africa. They argued that the high costs of the maintenance of the British troops in South Africa should not be such a heavy burden on the shoulders of the British taxpayers. From their point of view the population of Cape Colony was mature and prosperous enough to take over the financing of the mentioned military expenditures. Furthermore, according to their opinion, Cape should organize the defence of its own borders. The voice of these critics just became more harsh in Britain during the second half of the 1860s, when year by year Cape got closer to the attain the self-governing status. Some of these politicians would reduce the imperial presence only for the naval base in Simon's Bay through Britain could control the Cape of Good Hope which was extremely crucial from an imperial point of view regardless for the fact the British Government was liberal or conservative.<sup>15</sup> Three

---

<sup>14</sup> GALBRAITH, John S.: *Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier 1834-1854*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1978. 5.

<sup>15</sup> The history of the idea of the abandonment can be easily traced back to the first decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Even just four years after the Congress of Vienna, where the British ownership of Cape Colony was confirmed, critical opinions already appeared in the Imperial Parliament. On 10<sup>th</sup> June 1819 a Scottish radical representative, Joseph Hume according to the issue of the „*Colonial Establishments*”

significant milestones, peaks of the tendency of the abandonment can be defined. In a chronological order to the first one belong the Sand River Convention (1852) and the Bloemfontein Convention (1854), by which Great Britain abandoned the annexation of the Orange River Sovereignty as well as declared the entire freedom and independence of the „*emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River*”<sup>16</sup>, which became the Transvaal, and the „*Orange River Territory*”<sup>17</sup>, which became Orange Free State, from Great Britain. The late 1860s, when the Colonial Office made serious attempts to reduce the South African imperial responsibilities meant the second important milestone. The third one was the Pretoria Convention (1881)<sup>18</sup>, in which Great Britain after four years of British rule restored the almost entire independence of the Transvaal.

## **2, South African Unity**

To the second belong the schemes and plans for the South African unity. The British intended three times between 1846 and 1881 to unite the British colonies and the Boer communities, later republics in a unified South African state (confederation or union) which would be loyal to Britain. In line with the British conceptions this would solve several acute problems, such as the native and the Boer questions. The first plan was elaborated during the Secretaryship of State the 3<sup>rd</sup> Earl Grey, the second one belong to Sir George Grey who

---

proposed the reduction of the imperial military expenditures in case of „*the newly acquired colonies of Ceylon, the Mauritius, the Cape of Good Hope, Malta*” (Hansard, XL, col. 1077. Hume in Commons, 10 Jun. 1819.). Three and four years later Hume attempted again to draw the representatives’ attention to this question again: „*In a time like this, every shilling that could be saved ought to be saved. Why should individuals in this country be called on to pay for the garrisons of Canada or the Cape of Good Hope, any more than for the troops employed in Jamaica?*” (Hansard, XIV, col. 1127. Hume in Commons, 6 Mar. 1826.) He was supported by another radical MP, Sir Robert Wilson. Sir Robert with reference to his former visit in Cape, suggested to the honourable members of the parliament that Britain should „*levy sufficient in the colony, for the maintenance of the garrison, [...], without calling for a shilling from the mother country*”, just as the former possessors of Cape, the Dutch had done before. (Hansard, XIV, col. 1127. Wilson in Commons, 6 Mar. 1826.) The primary elements of the later rhetoric and arguments in favour of the reducing the imperial responsibilities were akin to the opinion of Hume and Wilson.

<sup>16</sup> Sand River Convention, in George von Welfling Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History 1795-1910*, London, 1918. 358.

<sup>17</sup> Bloemfontein Convention, in *ibid.*, 282.

<sup>18</sup> Convention for the Settlement of the Transvaal Territory (Pretoria Convention), 1881. HCPP [C. 2998], 3.

was Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner between 1854–1861 and the last one in that order was the plan of Lord Carnarvon (1877–1881).

Earl Grey created three federal schemes in order to deal with difficulties occurred in Southern Africa. In a chronological order, the first one proposed to merge the African communities of the Lake Ngami into a confederation. The African confederation would stop the trek of the Boers, moreover the scheme according to Earl Grey's argument, through the free trade and the missionaries would be the best mean of civilizing the Africans.<sup>19</sup> Two of the plans aimed to unite Cape Colony, Natal, British Kaffraria and the Boer settler communities located between the Oranje and the Vaal rivers.<sup>20</sup> These plans were never realized, mainly because Earl Grey could not gather enough supporters among the leaders of the colonial policy.

The second milestone was the Governorship of Sir George Grey (1854–1859, 1860–1861). Grey as Governor of Cape Colony worked out several plans for the sake of solving acute and actual problems of the subcontinent. Grey's conception focused on the federal union of Cape Colony, Natal, British Kaffraria and Orange Free State. The whole scheme was induced in the summer of 1858 by the political elite of the said Boer state which was threatened by the probable invasion of the Africans.<sup>21</sup> That inspired and encouraged Grey in the attempts he made for convincing Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1858–1859) about the inevitable implementation of the plan. Although initially the plan met with the ideas and conception of Bulwer-Lytton, the Governor started to negotiate with the Government of the Orange Free State and did not wait for the confirmation and instructions of the Imperial Government, which caused the fall of his scheme. Nevertheless, Sir George Grey's activity is reviewed and examined in a later part of the present article.

Opposite to Earl Grey and Sir George Grey, Henry Howard Molineux, the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon had a chance to realize his own grand design about the unification of the divided subcontinent. As Secretary of State for the Colonies (1874–1878) Carnarvon turned his scheme to the main direction of the British colonial policy regarding to Southern Africa. At the centre of the scheme stood the unification of the South African Republic and the territories stood

---

<sup>19</sup> Earl Grey to Sir H. G. Smith, 12 Nov. 1850. In HCPP [1360], 94.

<sup>20</sup> WARD, John: *The Third Earl Grey and Federalism, 1846–1852*. The Australian Journal of Politics and History 3. N° 1. (1957), 28–29.

<sup>21</sup> Sir G. Grey to Lord Stanley, 5 Jul. 1858. In HCPP 1860 (216), 1.

under British control (Cape Colony, Natal, Griqualand West). The Colonial office took serious steps to create the South African Union. The most significant moment in that process was the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877.<sup>22</sup> In that case the resistance of Cape Colony as the most developed British colony and the resurrection of the Boers in the Transvaal resulted the end of Carnarvon's system.

Regarding the limits of the present article there is no space to review all the said tendencies, phobias, thus two issues were chosen which are worth to show in their details. The first is concerned with the differences between the Boer republics especially from political aspects. Besides the mentioned tendencies the leaders of the British colonial policy attempted to treat the listed threats in other ways as well. For instance they reflected for the differences and conflicts between the different Boer communities – and this is explained through the colonial administration of Sir George Grey in South Africa.

### ***Differences between the Boer Republics***

It is not so difficult to see and treat the Dutch speaking part of the European population of South Africa as homogeneous and united community. Some books and mainly British historians tended to share this belief and suggested that the three groups, the Bantus, Boers and Britons as homogeneous blocks which are mainly isolated from each other.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore the relationship between these groups was characterized by conflicts. That happened with the Anglo-Boer relations as well. From that aspect it is worth to highlight that while the Anglo-Boer conflicts were always emphasized, the Boer-Boer clashes were in many ways neglected.

One can say that the relationship between the Boer settler communities located from Capetown to Zoutpansberg must be cordial because these groups belonged together from many aspects. They had a same origin, family relations bounded together the trek-Boers and those who stayed in Cape Colony after the Great Trek. The Boer people spoke the same language and had same religious views, namely they followed the principles of Calvinism. Moreover the legal system (Dutch-Roman law – Rooms-Hollands recht) and the political structure of the Boer republics showed a high level of similarity. So the former approaches emphasized these connections. Although it is

---

<sup>22</sup> SCHREUDER, D. M.: *The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877–1895*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009. 13.

<sup>23</sup> MACMILLAN, William M.: *Bantu, Boer, and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Problem*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963.

not so difficult to find the said similarities, but in case of a non-superficial examination the differences appear as well and after that the most of the listed elements can be easily refuted. For instance although the trekkers left relatives in Cape Colony after the Great Trek, in the field of politics it meant a real advantage only for a very few times. Despite the fact that the written language of the Boers, especially in official matters was Dutch, during the second half of the nineteenth century the language spoken by the descendants of the voortrekkers started to alter from the Cape Dutch. In case of religion that's true that all of the Boers were Calvinist, but there were two sources of conflicts which were caused by religious matters: in the field of churches, and the conservative and liberal approaches of Calvinism.

Both of these bunches of problems caused not only religious but political conflicts as well. There are several examples for these issues. The voortrekkers lived beyond the Vaal river desired to have an own church which would be independent from the Cape Synod, but the inhabitants of Lijdenburg wanted else. They kept the connection with the Cape Synod alive. Because of the denominational conflict the Court of the Transvaal accused and found guilty eight members of the Volksraad from Lijdenburg for violation of the constitution. Following this the representatives for Lijdenburg left the Volksraad. This led in 1856 to the secession of the said eastern province which became the Lijdenburg Republic with own and independent government and Volksraad.<sup>24</sup> It took four years for the political leaders of the Transvaal to restore through tough negotiations the territorial integrity of the South African Republic. The document which set the framework of the reunification was assigned on 24<sup>th</sup> November 1894 aimed to settle the problematic issues between the republics, with a special emphasis on the denominational conflicts: „*The Dutch Reformed Congregation at Lijdenburg shall never be forced to assimilate its form of church government to that of any other congregation.*”<sup>25</sup>

The election and the campaign of 1871 in the South African Republic offer the best example for the influence of the difference between the conservative and liberal interpretations of the Calvinism. Transvaal could not have had more different two presidential candidates. Commandant General Paul Kruger was an excellent marksman and military leader but he was uneducated and learned

---

<sup>24</sup> The political elite seated in Pretoria grasped the opportunity and the Volksraad of the Transvaal accepted a new constitution which came into force in 1858.

<sup>25</sup> Resouliton of the Volksraad, Sep. 1858, in EYBERS: 425.

reading from the Bible. According some narratives Kruger believed till the end of his life that the Earth is flat. Opposite to him, the other presidential candidate, Thomas François Burgers was a highly educated Calvinist minister who graduated at the University of Utrecht in Netherlands. During the theological studies he became familiar with the liberal and modern religious views of Professor Cornelis Willem Opzoomer. Opzoomer was rationalist and denied the literally truce of the Bible. Thus Burgers after the election as a president supported the liberal wing of the Calvinists opposite to the conservative Nederduitsch-Hervormde Kerk. Kruger was in a totally different standpoint. He was extremely conservative and belonged to the dopper wing of the Transvaaler Calvinists. He found Burger's views absolutely unacceptable and dangerous for the future of the Transvaal. As he said to the freshly elected Burgers: „*Your Honor, I have done my best to prevent your election, principally, because of your religious views, which appear to me to be mistaken. But as you have now been elected by the majority, I submit as a good republican to this vote of the people, trusting that you are a more earnest believer than I thought, in which case I congratulate you with all my heart.*”<sup>26</sup> According to the quoted lines the political opposition criticized heavily Burgers' liberal point of view.<sup>27</sup>

That kind of difference between the qualities and background of the political leaders of the Boers, especially their education occurred in case of comparison of the political elite of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic as well. While the politicians, presidents of the Free State were more educated (studied in Cape Colony or even in Europe, like Sir Johannes Henricus Brand), the Transvaalers were mostly (except Burgers) farmers.

Both of these states gathered their freedom from the British by conventions. The Transvaal became free in 1852 by the Sand River Convention, the Orange Free State two years later in 1854 by the Bloemfontein Convention. While in the Free State the centralization of the state and the elaboration of the political system of the country went quite smooth and quick, in the Transvaal the government in Pretoria had to make enormous efforts to save the territorial integrity of the South African Republic and hold together the provinces. This resulted an acute problem in the Transvaal, a long lasting conflict between the central power, the government and the local, provincial

---

<sup>26</sup> KRUGER, Paul: *The Memoirs of Paul Kruger*, The Century Co., New York, 1902. 73.

<sup>27</sup> ENGELBRECHT, S. P.: *Thomas François Burgers*, H.A.U.M. v/h J. DUSSEU & Co., Cape Town, 1946.

or regional political elite. Thus while the Constitution of the Orange Free State came into force only three weeks after the signal of the Bloemfontein Convention, the Grondwet of the South African Republic was established in 1858 four years after assent of the Sand River Convention. These differences can be identified in the constitutions of the said Boer states as well. That is why it is important to compare the constitutions because these texts reflect well the state, position, aims and conditions of the Boer republics.

### ***Constitutions***

Although both the Transvaalers and the politicians of the Free State took few important principles from the Constitution of the United States of America<sup>28</sup>, several differences can be found between the constitutions, grondwets of the Boer states. Not only the structure and the language of the two constitutions but their content differ from each other. The Grondwet of the Transvaal is much longer and more narrative (for example it includes the presidential and the electoral oaths) than the Constitution of the Orange Free State. The language of the constitution of the South African Republic is more democratic, it operates many times with the form: „*The people desire to*” or „*They shall*”, while the Grondwet of the Orange Free State operates with short sentences and its language more official. I find important to highlight one element, namely the religious provisions of the two constitutions.

The Constitution of the Orange Free State has only one religious provision, the Article XXIV.: „*The Dutch Reformed Church [De Nederduitsch Gereformeerde Kerk] shall be promoted and supported by the Volksraad.*”<sup>29</sup> Opposite to it, the Grondwet of the South African Republic is totally different. The Constitution of the South African Republic refers for different kind of denominational matters fifteen times. For instance the document has a chapter *About the Protection and Defence of Church and State*.<sup>30</sup> According to the Grondwet only the members of the Dutch Reformed Church could bear any kind of office, could be the members of the Volksraad, President or a Veldcornet. Moreover, only the state church, the Dutch Reformed Church was accepted, and the presence of other Christian congregations was not permitted in the Transvaal: „*They [the people] prefer to allow no Roman Catholic Churches among them, nor any*

---

<sup>28</sup> GOODFELLOW: 8.

<sup>29</sup> Constitution of the Orange Free State, in EYBERS: 291.

<sup>30</sup> The Grondwet of the South African Republic, in EYBERS: 366.



*other Protestant Churches than those in which the same tenets of the Christian belief are taught, as contained in the Heidelberg Catechism.*"<sup>31</sup> That motive refers to the denominational conflicts of the Transvaal, such as the secession of Lijdenburg and the activity of European missionaries in the region.

What could be the reason of these differences between these texts? First of all it is necessary and worth to approach the whole issue from one aspect, namely that the constitutions always reflect for the given, actual political and some ways the cultural state of a nation, a country. Opposite to the Orange Free State, the South African Republic in 1858 was less organized and less centralized country than the Free State. The government seated in Pretoria had slight influence in some of the provinces, especially in the 1850s and the 1860s. This kind of limited jurisdiction, the separatism which was popular in few provinces and which was connected to a congregational tension could induce the authors and elaborators of the grondwet to make such strict limitations concerning the religion and terms of office. The central political elite of the Transvaal desired to bind the provinces to the government and save the integrity of the republic.

Apart from the denominational issues and the term of office, there are other differences between the grondwets of the said Boer states. In the Transvaal all the burghers<sup>32</sup> reached the age 21 possessed the right to vote, while in case of the Orange Free State he burgers above age 18 shall be entitled to possess the franchise.

Furthermore, the Grondwet of the South African Republic has serious regulations among the first provisions regarding the limit of the size of the immovable properties, farms: „*The lands or farms*

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 366.

<sup>32</sup> Only whites had the right to possess the burghership in both of the republics. In case of the Orange Free State the constitution dealt with that issue:

„*The Burghers of the Orange Free State shall be:*

1. *All white persons born in the State;*

2. *All white persons who have resided in the State for one year and have immovable property registered in their names to the value of at least 2000 Rds.*” (In Constitution of the Orange Free State, in EYBERS: 286.) In case of the Transvaal the Resolution of the Volksraad of 18<sup>th</sup> June 1855 defined that “*no strangers, who come to reside in this country and who were not to born in Africa, shall enjoy the franchise as a burgher of the Republic or be recognised as entitled to fill any public office in the State, without having first purchased their rights of burghership, which rights of burghership shall have to be bought for two hundred Cape Rix-dollars (Rds. 200). And no person who is not recognised as a burgher shall have the right to possess immovable property.*” Through te quoted Resolution, the Volksraad excluded all the coloured people from the burghership: „*[...] they may never be given or granted rights of burghership.*” (In Resolution of the Volksraad, 18 Jun. 1855, in EYBERS: 362.)

*situated within this territory which have not yet been given out are declared to be the property of State, but are none the less obtainable as heretofore by the public. No farm inspected for that purpose shall be larger than 3000 morgen. And no one shall be entitled to apply for or to obtain lands until he has reached the age of sixteen.*"<sup>33</sup> A great land hunger emerged in the Transvaal because of the traditional inheritance and economic system<sup>34</sup> stood at the background of the strict control over the properties and farms. Such a provision cannot be found in the Constitution of the Orange Free State.

### **Sir George Grey**

One can ask that what the British colonial administration did with this situation. The British followed the events took place in the Boer republics and they were interested in the Boer-Boer relations and the British colonial policy reflected for the given situation and many times took advantage of the difference between the Boer communities.

The way how the British colonial policy treated the Boers changed several times. In the late 1840s and the early 1850s the Colonial Office as well as the Governor of Cape Colony, Sir Harry Smith found unacceptable the Great Trek and made numerous attempts to follow the trekkers and keep them under British control. First of all the British were afraid of that the trek would result wars with the Africans which inevitably would have bad impact on the colonies and the British-African relations. Furthermore, Earl Grey was convinced that the Boers could cause unpredictable damage for the Africans and even exterminate them. Thus, the effective defence against the trek of the Boers seemed to be one of the most advantageous point of the scheme he created for the confederation of the Africans around the Lake Ngami: *„I am persuaded that this is the only policy by which there is any prospect of accomplishing that object, and that the spreading of the Boers over the continent, and their oppression and extermination of the native races, can never be successfully contended against by endeavouring to follow them from the Cape as far as they may think fit to go, and to extend British authority over these vast regions.*"<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> The Grondwet of the South African Republic, in EYBERS: 364.

<sup>34</sup> According to the Boer traditions, a young man entering to adult age were expected to get married and move to his own farm.

<sup>35</sup> (Earl Grey to Sir H. G. Smith, 12 Nov. 1850. In HCPP [1360], 93.) Sir Harry Smith shared same views with Earl Grey about the Boers: *„These Boers being those*

Opposite to Earl Grey, Sir George Grey and Carnarvon attempted to create a partnership and have a cordial relation with the Boers. The main reason was that they believed in that only the confederation of the Boers and the British could prevent Southern Africa from the probable outbreak of a great war between the Europeans and the Africans.

The governorship of Sir George Grey (1854-1861) offers the best example through the whole issue can be proved and explained. Sir George Grey was from many aspects the first modern governor in Southern Africa. He was deeply interested in the culture, traditions, folklore and everyday life of those who lived under his governance. Sir George Grey was the first among the British governors in this region who learned the Xhosa language.<sup>36</sup> Grey travelled a lot and visited many times the African communities and attempted to keep a personal contact with some of the chiefs, like Sandilli.<sup>37</sup> The other main characteristic of Grey's colonial policy that he elaborated grandiose schemes which were designed to solve the acute and actual problems of South Africa, like the relations between the Europeans and the natives or the conflicts between the British and the Boers or the separatism of Eastern Cape.

One of these plans aimed the unification of British colonies (Cape Colony, Natal, and British Kaffraria) and the Orange Free State. The colonies and the Boer republic would form a federal union with common federal government and legislation, but the independence of the local governmental and other institutions, like the Volksraad would be preserved.

As he saw the Boers: *„Although these European countries lying behind our Colonies are treated as separate nations, their inhabitants bear the same family names as the inhabitants of this Colony, and maintain with them ties of the closest intimacy and relationship. They speak, generally, the same language, not English, but Dutch. They are, for the most part, of the same religion, belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church. They have the same laws, the Roman Dutch. They have the same sympathies, the same prejudices, the same habits, and*

---

*who have fled from the pale of civilization, and are the most violent, are so much in the habit of moving from place to place that the expedition would cost them little trouble, and they are so determinedly averse to British rule, that they will gladly avail themselves of any opportunity of removing further from the country under Her Majesty's sovereignty. They are turbulent and restless people, and cannot fail to be the enemies of civilization in the interior, especially if its approach from the side of the colony.”* (In In Sir H. G. Smith to Earl Grey, 12 Jul. 1850. In HCPP [1360], 29.)

<sup>36</sup> Sir George Grey to Sir George Grey. Bart., 14 Feb. 1855. In HCPP 1854-55 [1969], 53.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

*frequently the same feelings, regarding the native races, although marked and rapid changes in public opinion, in relation to this subject, are taking place, as also in reference to the increasing use of English language and the adoption of English customs.”<sup>38</sup>*

Although he speaks about European countries in the quoted lines, the Orange Free State had a key role in Sir George Grey plans. One can ask why and why not the South African Republic? First of all, the leaders and the Volksraad of the Boer republic took the first step when they expressed their desire to join Cape Colony in the late spring of 1858. The reason was that the political elite of the Free State feared from the attack of Moshesh and the Sothos. They believed that the Free State would not survive a war with the Sothos and this case only under the protecting wings of a union with Cape Colony could mean a real defence. The language of the said letter which was in some aspects flattering proves this attitude: *„It is, therefore, our earnest opinion, that unless this country called Orange Free State is allied in federal union with our parent Colony, it never will enjoy the blessings of peace and prosperity.”<sup>39</sup>* It is worth to note that the petitioners called Cape as a parent Colony.

Then Sir George Grey’s choice could be influenced by geographical, geopolitical considerations. Without the Orange Free State the successful unification of Cape, British Kaffraria and Natal was impractical.

Opposite to the Free State the administration and the civil service were less improved in the Transvaal. The South African Republic had to face with serious domestic problems such as the separatist movement. In comparison with the Free State the Transvaal seemed to Grey a less organized country whose borders was not fixed – these factors made for him the country not ripe enough for being part of the planned union. Anyway he did not exclude the possibility of taking the South African Republic to the federal unity – Grey only did not find it practical in that situation.

Grey showed sympathy towards the Free State not in the field of political theory but in the practice as well. He paid visits in the Orange Free State several times. Furthermore, when Prince Albert, son of Queen Victoria travelled to South Africa (the first member of the royal family who ever visited the region) Grey who organized the whole journey accompanied the Prince. Moreover Grey founded a college in the capitol of the Free State, the Bloemfontein College whose name was later altered for Grey College. The Grey College

---

<sup>38</sup> Sir George Grey to Sir E. B. Lytton, 19 Nov. 1858. In HCPP 1860 (216), 6.

<sup>39</sup> Sir G. Grey to Lord Stanley, 5 Jul. 1858. In HCPP 1860 (216), 1.

still exists.<sup>40</sup> So this sympathy was mutual.

There were symbolical elements of Sir George Grey's efforts to bring the colonies emotionally closer to the mother country and the Boers to the British. One of the most significant moments of that rapprochement was the said visit of Prince Alfred in Southern Africa. Grey and Prince Alfred paid visit in all the British colonies of the region and in Orange Free State as well. According to Grey's biographer, William Lee Rees, after a hunting nearby the borders of the Transvaal, Sir George Grey and the Prince found a Boer hut where they were „gladly welcomed”: *„They were hospitably entertained by the occupant of the little dwelling, an old woman, who cooked some exceedingly greasy pancakes for them. The Prince's appetite was not at all spoiled by the fact that the appointments of the table were rather more primitive than at Buckingham Palace. In the absence of spoons and forks, he rolled up his pancake and ate it from his fingers with intense relish, telling Sir George it was 'the most delicious pancake' he had ever tasted. His companion, less hungry, and accustomed to much longer fasting, was quietly amused at such high appreciation of the greasy compound. When, on leaving, the Governor told the kind hostess who her guest was, the old woman was almost overcome with the thought that she had been entertaining 'the son of the Queen'.*<sup>41</sup>

Moreover, the Boers of the Orange Free State in case of tough conflicts with the Africans or even with the South African Republic tended to find shelter under the protecting wings of Great Britain. The relationship between the republics was extremely strained in 1857, when Marthinus Wessel Pretorius, the President of the South African Republic (1857–1860, 1864–1866, 1866–1871) went to Bloemfontein in order to realize his political purpose: unification of the Boer republics under his presidency. First of all he claimed the Orange Free State on the ground that it had been granted for his father, Andries Pretorius, by Queen Victoria. Although it was totally unfounded, other elements of Pretorius' strategy warned seriously Jacobus Nicolaas Boshof, the President of the Orange Free State (1855–1859). Namely, Pretorius promised that he would negotiate with Moshesh, chief of the Sothos and forced him to restore the cattle stolen from the Free State Boers.<sup>42</sup> Boshof and his staff were worried about the possibility that Pretorius supported by the border

---

<sup>40</sup> REES, William Lee: *The Life and Times of Sir George Grey, K.C.B. II.*, Hutchinson & Co. London, 1892. 338–340.

<sup>41</sup> REES: 318.

<sup>42</sup> DE KIEWIET: *British Colonial Policy*, 108.

malcontents and Moshesh would have the power to overthrow the Government in Bloemfontein and eliminate the independence of the Free State. In order to preserve the separateness of his country Boshof turned to the British for help. He reminded Sir George Grey for the fact that the Governor had emphasized the common interests of the Free State and Cape Colony. Boshof's stratagem worked, he had supporters even in the Transvaal as well. Lijdenburgh and Zoutpansberg aimed to have more autonomy and decrease the power of Pretoria, thus these provinces assisted Boshof. Although Pretorius rode with a commando to the Free State and Boshof was ready to fight, on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1857 the treaty of peace was signed and Pretorius left the Free State.<sup>43</sup>

Although Grey's scheme about the federal union of the British Colonies and the Free State was never realized because the Colonial Office did not support it, the relationship between the British and the Boer Republic stayed cordial especially under the long presidency of Johannes Brand (1864–1888) who was knighted in 1882 and became Sir Johannes Brand. Facts like the birthday of Queen Victoria was celebrated in the Free State prove this positive and friendly relationship.<sup>44</sup> The British Colonial policy in many cases saw a partner in the Free State which influenced the relations between the Boer republics. Because of the qualities of the political elite of the Orange Free State, the said geographical matters as well as satisfying state of the domestic relations had impact on the British intentions towards the said Boer republic. Apart from these there could be another political factor: By preferring the Free State the British interfered to the Boer-Boer relations (implemented the Roman divide et impera principle) and obstacle the union of the Boer republics which was among the phobias of Great Britain's South African colonial policy.

---

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 109.

<sup>44</sup> DE KIEWIET: *The Imperial Factor*, 93.

**Dóra Czeferner**

***From Construction Workers to Tram Conductors.  
Female Labour in Hungary during the Great War***

**Abstract**

Before the outbreak of the First World War, the majority of the Austro-Hungarian public opinion firmly believed, that women were incapable of filling in certain fields of works. According to them, females were irresponsible and they could not concentrate for a longer period of time to serious tasks. This was the reason for the fact that until 1914 the members of the „weaker gender” could not even think about gaining equal rights with their male counterparts in the field of labour.

The declaration of war and the mobilization of the Central Powers’ troops completely redrew the picture. Women living within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy did not salute to the war. Neither did the leading bourgeois feminists associations of the two countries, who had been making constant efforts for several years to promote the political, economic and social rights of females. However, they did not inhibit the war preparations, but tried to solve the more and more serious problems in the home front.

*Keywords:* First World War, Hungary, Bourgeois Feminist Associations, Female Labour.

*I*s it possible that I am not completely dull and foolish, not so unreasonable, and not entirely incapable of doing anything beneficial? Is it sure that there are other life choices than marriage in front of me?<sup>1</sup> From the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a long time had to pass until Hungarian women dared to formulate these questions.<sup>2</sup> After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, a

---

<sup>1</sup> *A Nő. Feminista Folyóirat.* (The Woman. Feminist Journal) 1916, 5, 71. (Official organ of the Hungarian Feminists’ Association and the National Association of Female Clerks between 1914 and 1918. It was published in Budapest. Henceforth: TW.

<sup>2</sup> Among the Hungarian theoretical literature in connection with this subject matter see: Gábor GYÁNI, *A fővárosi munkaerő foglalkoztatottságának szerkezetváltozása 1880–1941 között* (Structural Alternations of the Rate of Employment in the Capital City between 1880 and 1941), BFL, Budapest, 1979, 165–188. Katalin KÉRI, *Női munkavállalás* (Women’s Wage Earning Activity), IN: Katalin KÉRI: *Hölgyek napernyővel. Nők a dualizmus-kori Magyarországon. 1867–1914.* (Ladies with Parasols. Women in Hungary during the Dualistic Era), Pro Pannonia Könyvek, Pécs, 2008, 124–145. Katalin KONCZ, *Nők a munka világában* (Women in the World of Labour), Kossuth, Budapest, 1982. Katalin KONCZ, *Nők és férfiak – hiedelmek, tények* (Women and Men – Beliefs and Facts), Kossuth, Budapest, 1985. Beáta NAGY, *Nők a kávések és a kávéházi alkalmazottak között* (Women among the Proprietors of Cafés and among the Employees of Cafés), Budapesti Negyed. Budapest, a kávéváros (Budapest Quarter) 4, 1996, 12–13.

dynamic economic and social evolution begun, which especially accelerated between 1900 and 1914 but in terms of the traditional female roles as well as in terms of the subordinated situation of women only minor alternations can be observed for several decades.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the world of labour remained fundamentally a men's world until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Wage earning activity of the weaker gender became gradually common from the 1880s.<sup>4</sup> The reason for this is twofold: due to the demographic alternations, which evolved during the 1850s and accelerated from the 1890s, a significant surplus of women emerged to the centenary. The lack of enough prospective husbands resulted that marriage was not a possible 'solution' for every single member of the weaker gender.<sup>5</sup> Naturally, those who did not start a family had to work for a living. For them, the continuously expanding industrial and tertiary sectors provided an opportunity, but we cannot forget about certain intellectual and academic professions which opened during the years preceding the First World War.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> KONCZ, *Nők*, 1982, 39. Although, it is essential to emphasize that this situation, namely that lives of women changed very slowly characterised not only Hungary but the more developed Western European countries, too. Kaari UTRIO, *Evas Töchter – Die weibliche Seite der Geschichte*, Rasch und Röhring, Hamburg–Zürich, 1987. Gisela BOCK, *Frauen in der Europäischen Geschichte. Vom Mittelalter bis zum Gegenwart*, Beck, München, 2000, 142.

<sup>4</sup> Because of the divergent developmental tendencies, a phase delay can be observed in this respect between Hungary and the western countries. While the industrial revolution started in Western Europe as early as in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the large-scale industrialization in Hungary begun only during the 1870s. Mariann NAGY: *A nők a magyar gazdaságban a dualizmus korában* (Women in the Hungarian Economy during the Dualism), IN: Gábor GYÁNI - Beáta NAGY (szerk.): *A nők a modernizálódó magyar társadalomban* (Women in the modernizing Hungarian Society), Debrecen, 2006, 205-222.

<sup>5</sup> The fact that more and more women were not able to find husbands is often detailed in the press organs of the feminist associations. For these articles see: *A Nő és a Társadalom* (The Woman and the Society). Official organ of the Hungarian Feminists' Association and the National Association of Female Clerks between 1907 and 1913. It was published in Budapest. Henceforth: WS, 1, 1909, 9–11.: In this article the author argues for the importance of girls' proper education. She claims that it is not sure that with a successful marriage women will be able to enjoy the financial support of their husbands. This topic remained extremely popular after the outbreak of the war as well. The reason for this is naturally the fact that with the death of thousands of young man „marriage prospects of women have deeply descended”. TW 6, 1916, 88. Tamás FARAGÓ, *Bevezetés a történeti demográfiába* (Introduction to the Historical Demography), Corvinus, Budapest, 2011, 12–13.

<sup>6</sup> Gábor GYÁNI and György KÖVÉR, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a reformkortól a második világháborúig* (The Social History of Hungary from the Reform Era until the Second World War), Osiris, Budapest, 2006, 77–78. This process can be followed with the observation of the female press of the Dualistic Era



The ratio of female workers in the three different branches of economy proved to be about 30% in Hungary at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century which in general was equivalent with the Western European proportions. According to the statistics and to the census of 1910, the ratio of wage earning women (above seven years) in Budapest was 38,5%, while in the provinces it remained lower, altogether 24,1%.<sup>7</sup> The social estimation of these working girls proved to be rather negative before the outbreak of the Great War. The majority of the Hungarian public opinion firmly believed that the only duty of women is to become „*the angels of the house*” as the Anglo-Saxon literary tradition specified this ideal. According to this idea, women would have had to be loving wives, mothers and careful housekeepers as well.<sup>8</sup> Abusive series of judgements of male – and sometimes even female – intellectuals, politicians and artists were shared in the columns of the contemporary periodicals about the physical and mental capacities (or disabilities) of women. In 1907, when the majority of the western countries public opinion had already acknowledged that certain rights should have been expanded to the weaker gender, a Hungarian member of the Parliament Károly Kmety still termed well-educated and working women „*cosmopolitan female monsters*”.<sup>9</sup> This kind of discourse informs us and represents properly how women were treated within the frames of the Hungarian society in general as well as in the national jurisdiction and in the legislation.<sup>10</sup>

In the light of the above mentioned facts, it is obvious, that the common knowledge of almost the entire Dualistic Era (from 1867 until 1914) showed a rather rejecting attitude towards every initiative in connection with female emancipation. Consequently, the discourse

---

as well as with the survey of the Hungarian feminist press which emerged during the first decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. (In my opinion, the following periodicals are the most important: *Vasárnapi Újság*. (Sunday Journal), 1854–1921, *Nők munkaköre* (Women’s Field of Work), 1872, *A Nő és a Társadalom*. (The Woman and the Society), 1907–1913, *A Nő. Feminista folyóirat*. (The Woman. Feminist Journal), 1914–1918. These were family journals, female journals as well as papers published by the specific feminist press.

<sup>7</sup> Beáta NAGY, *Nők keresőtevékenysége Budapesten a 20. század első felében* (Wage-earning Activity of Women in Budapest during the First Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century), IN: Miklós HADAS (ed.), *Férfiuralom. Írások nőkről, férfiakról, feminizmusról*, (Male Dominance. Studies about Women, Men, Feminism), Replika Kör, Budapest, 1994, 155–175.

<sup>8</sup> BOCK (2000), 134–135.

<sup>9</sup> WS 2. 1907, 1–2.

<sup>10</sup> This event had a huge press reaction both in the national and in the local papers. For the details see: Katalin KÉRI, *Kmety képviselő úr és a női szörnyetegek. Egy 1907-es parlamenti felszólalás sajtóvisszhangja* (Mr. Kmety and the Female Monsters. Press Reaction of a 1907 Parliamentary Speech), *Iskolakultúra* 3, 1996, 101–103.

related to this subject was characterised by several public debates primarily about the following questions.<sup>11</sup> Can women step out from their traditional spheres of action and leave the household chores for appearing in the public sphere? Why should it be essential to open the doors of secondary schools and universities in front of younger girls?<sup>12</sup> Are females able to do any wage-earning activities outside their homes? What might be the possible outcomes of their presence in the labour market? These proposals indicate us that the Hungarian society remained highly sceptical about the question whether women were capable (or not) of filling in certain jobs. They were considered to be irresponsible and incompetent. Women – either alone or within the frames of females’ associations – had to struggle for a long time for getting a proper education, professions, social security acts etc. Only the declaration of war and the mobilization of the Central Powers Troops during the first days of August of 1914 started to alter this situation.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Historiography, Sources and Aims of the Paper***

The primary aim of this study is to fill in the large gap in the Hungarian historiography connected to the history of female labour

---

<sup>11</sup> Anna FÁBRI, „A szép tiltott táj felé.” *A magyar író nők története a két századforduló között (1796–1905)* („Towards the Nice but Forbidden Sphere” The History of Hungarian Female Authors between the Two Centenaries 1795–1905), Kortárs, Budapest, 1996, 141–143. Katalin N. SZEGVÁRI, *Út a nők egyenjogúságához* (Route towards the Emancipation of Women), Kossuth, Budapest, 1981, 87–92. These issues were discussed not only in the periodical press. Funny and sometimes even offensive caricatures and jokes were published; scientific lectures and series of debates were organized.

<sup>12</sup> Women gained the right to pass the school leaving exam in 1896. The decree of Gyula Wlassics, contemporary minister of public education, about letting women go on to higher education was accepted in the December of 1895. In Austria, women were allowed to study at different faculties of universities from 1896, too, which is a considerable phase delay in comparison with e.g. Switzerland, where women were able to obtain a university degree as early as from 1871. Elisabeth BERGER, *Das Frauenstudium an der Universität Wien im Zeichen des Liberalismus*. Cajeten-Felder Institut, Wien, 2007, 8. Ágnes JOBST, *A női szerepek határátlépésének értelmezése az első magyar orvosnőről szóló narratívákban. Hugonnai Vilma (1847–1922)* (Interpretation of the Crossing of Borders in terms of Female Roles with Special Regard to the Narratives about Vilma Hugonnai, 1847–1922), *Múltunk*, 2, 2008, 19–29.

<sup>13</sup> Norman DAVIES, *Európa Története* (The History of Europe), Osiris, Budapest, 2002, 839–843, 864. Judit SZAPOR, *A magánszférából a politikai közéletbe: a női politizálás története a kezdetektől 1945-ig* (From the Private Sphere to the Public Life: the History of Females’ Engagement in Politics from the Beginnings until 1945.) IN: Mária PALASIK (ed.), *A nő és a politikum. A nők politikai szerepvállalása Magyarországon*. (The Woman and the Politics. Political Engagement of Women in Hungary), Napvilág, Budapest, 2007, 129–145.

as well as to the history of the Hungarian participation in the First World War. Unfortunately, historians and social scientists in our country tend to overlook the fact that women played an essential role during the war on the home fronts. The direct result of this is that several comprehensive and extensive works have been published about the blood-stained battles of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces fighting on the different frontlines, but the self-sacrificing work of the weaker gender has been almost entirely neglected yet.<sup>14</sup> The most important reason for this is undoubtedly the dominance of those topics which are related to politics and diplomacy in the Hungarian historiography over certain branches of social history such as gender history. The other explanation for this is that the study of women's history begun in Hungary relatively late, only at the beginning of the 1980s.<sup>15</sup> And there is one more essential aspect of this subject-matter, namely that among Hungarian scientists, who deal with gender studies, the history of female labour proved to be a less popular subject than e.g. the broadening of the institutional frames of schooling system or the fight for female suffrage. On the problems related to the wage-earning activity of women during the First World War, only some short articles and chapters of books have been published yet.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, there are a few studies published either in English or in German by Hungarian female historians eluding to this subject, however the majority of them concentrates on the consequences of the war and its effect of the national women's movements.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> Without the demand of completeness, some books that have been recently published about the military history of the Great War: Tibor BALLA, *A Nagy Háború osztrák-magyar tábornokai* (Austrian and Hungarian Generals of the Great War), Argumentum, Budapest, 2010. Róbert BARTA, *Az első és a második világháború képes története*. (The Illustrated History of the First and the Second World War), TTK, Debrecen, 2001. Mária ORMOS, *Világháború és forradalmak 1914–1919* (World War and Revolutions 1914–1919), Kossuth, Budapest, 2009.

<sup>15</sup> This is a large phase delay to the western countries where the appearance of the Annales School brought along the popularity of the research of these kinds of topics. Fabrice VIRGIL, *L'histoire des femmes et l'histoire des genres aujourd'hui*, *Revue d'histoire* 3, 2002, 5–14.

<sup>16</sup> E. g. the above-mentioned works of Koncz Katalin, however they were published before the democratic transition in Hungary.

<sup>17</sup> E.g.: Judit ACSÁDY, *Diverse Constructions: Feminist and Conservative Women's Movements and their Contribution of Gender-Relations in Hungary after the First World War*, IN: Ingrid SHARP and Matthew STIBBE (ed.), *Aftermaths of War. Women's Movements and Female Activists, 1918–1923*, Brill, Leiden, 2011, 307–332. Katalin SOÓS, *Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der Frauenbewegung in Ungarn*, IN: Alida Mirella HUELLER and Helmut KONRAD (ed.), *Die Frau in der Arbeiterbewegung 1900–1939*. Europaverlag, Wien, 1980. Judit SZAPOR, *Who*

My primary aim in this study is to introduce one of the most essential aspects of women's field of activity from 1914 until 1918, namely their wage-earning activity. Besides the social estimation of women workers, I discuss the roles of Hungarian women during the four years of war with special attention to the operation and organization of war economy. I also study the – often rather divergent – views about female work. Furthermore, I seek answers to the following questions: how did the ratio of female labourers increased after 1914? Why is it difficult to talk about exact statistical data? How did women workers rush into workplaces in the industrial and in the tertiary sectors? Which intellectual jobs opened for the members of the „weaker gender” during these four years? Additionally, on the bases of case studies, I illustrate the poor working conditions women labourers had to face with. Closely connected to this subject, I consider it inevitable to analyse the role of women's associations, who took an important part in the organization of female workers. I emphasise the activity of two associations in greater details i.e. the *Feministák Egyesülete* (Hungarian Feminists' Association) and that of the *Nőtisztviselők Országos Egyesülete* (National Association of Female Clerks) in Budapest. As a conclusion, I summarize the transformation of the Hungarian labour-market and support my propositions with statistics (where it is possible).

During my research work, I have primarily studied the contemporary periodical press. I completed the content analysis of the official organ of the two above mentioned associations titled *A Nő. Feminista folyóirat* (The Woman. Feminist Journal) between 1914 and 1918.<sup>18</sup> Besides this, I have elaborated certain other journals that shared news on this topic. In addition to this, I have studied the official protocols of the Feminists and Female Clerks as well as other contemporary documents reporting about the activities carried out by the women who were making great efforts to cope with the problems in the home front, while men were fighting.

---

*Represents Hungarian Women? The Liberal Bourgeois Women's Rights Movement and the Rise of Right-Wing Women's Movement*, IN: Ingrid SHARP and Matthew STIBBE (ed.), *Aftermaths of War. Women's Movements and Female Activists, 1918–1923*. Brill, Leiden, 2011.

<sup>18</sup> *The Woman* was the official journal of the Feminists' Association and the National Federation of Female Clerks. It was published in Budapest. In 1914, it appeared in every two weeks. From 1915, it became a monthly periodical. Its editors were Paula Pogány and Mrs. Sándor Teleki. Its editor in chief was Rosika Schwimmer. TW 1, 1914, 1.

### ***Safeguarding of Female Labourers' Interests until 1914***

In order to see the curve of the process connected to the protection of women worker's interests, we have to examine the antecedents very briefly. Before the outbreak of the Great War, the protection of – female as well as male (!) – labourers was based on three main pillars referring basically to three ideological branches. According to their political interests, associations made constant attempts to solve those problems of female workers that affected the whole society. The Christian Socialist School – sealed with the name of Sarolta Geőcze – and the several newly-found organizations related to this (i.e. the *Női Kereskedelmi Alkalmazottak Országos Szövetsége* (National Federation of Female Commercial Employees) and the *Katolikus Nőtisztviselők* (Catholic Female Clerks) intended to fight for the rights of women office workers in a Christian spirituality from the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>19</sup> Under the aegis of the Social Democratic Party, the *Magyarországi Munkásnő Egyesület* (Hungarian Female Labourers' Organization) was established in 1903.<sup>20</sup> One of its defining leader was Mariska Gárdos. In its official organ titled *Nőmunkás* (Woman Worker) the leaders of the organization emphasized that they fight for the interest of labourers belonging to both genders working either in factories or at home.<sup>21</sup> The third branch, with which I intend to deal in greater details in this paper, is the bourgeois feminist line. Within this, I put the main emphasis on the activity of the Hungarian Feminists' Association which operated as the subdivision of the International Council of Women. The association was founded in 1904, partly from the members of the National Federation of Female Clerks (1896) and partly from those women as well as men – living either in Budapest or in the more prosperous regional centres of Hungary – who wanted to intervene for the social, political and economic rights of women.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> Orsolya KERESZTY, *Nők változó társadalmi szerepei a dualizmus kori Magyarországon* (Changing Social Roles of Women in Hungary during the Dualistic Era) IN: Ildikó PSENÁKOVÁ, Ferenc MEZŐ (ed.) and Ildikó VICZAYOVÁ (seds.), *Teória a Prax* II. Nitra, 2009, 77–88.

<sup>20</sup> N. SZEGVÁRI (1981), 95–102.

<sup>21</sup> *Nőmunkás*. (*Women Worker*) 3, 1914, 6. It was the official organ of the Social Democratic Female Labourers. It was published in Budapest since 1903.

<sup>22</sup> According to several research works published on the Hungarian females' associations, it is difficult to examine the social affiliation of the members, as the entire documentation of the associations activity is in most cases inaccessible. Hungarian Feminists' Association, *Tájékoztató a Feministák Egyesületének céljairól és munkatervéről* (Information about the Aims and about the Working Schedule of the Feminists' Association), Márkus Samu Könyvnyomdája, Budapest, 1905, 3–8. Fanni

The two associations stayed in a close connection after 1904 and even during the war: they not only organized common programmes and published their official organs together, but the majority of their members participated in the work of both groups. There was a large overlapping in terms of the leading persons as well, as e.g. Rosika Schwimmer<sup>23</sup> and Vilma Glücklich,<sup>24</sup> two of the most important figures of the Hungarian and international feminist movement before and during the First World War, belonged to the leadership of both associations.

It has to be definitely highlighted that during the history of Hungarian women's movements that these clubs represented a new tendency. Firstly, as it will be clearly visible from the next subpart of the study, it was not charity work that constituted the forefront of their activities.<sup>25</sup> Secondly, besides their national dimensions, these associations had very strong transnational relations all over the world.<sup>26</sup> Due to this factor, scholars dealing with this topic assert that in the course of the history of Hungarian women's emancipation movement, this is the only period – lasting from the 1890s until 1914 or 1918 – when the activities and aims of the Hungarian women's movements were totally synchronous with the western tendencies.<sup>27</sup>

---

BORBÍRÓ, *Budapesti nőegyletek 1862–1904* (Females' Associations in Budapest) IN: Anna FÁBRI and Gábor VÁRKONYI (ed.), *A nők világa. Művelődés- és társadalomtörténeti tanulmányok* (The World of Women. Studies related to Culture and Social History), Argumentum, Budapest, 2007, 185–211.

<sup>23</sup> Rosika Schwimmer (1877–1948): journalist, one of the founding members of the Hungarian Feminists' Association. She had an essential role in the organization of the 1913 Congress of the International Women Suffrage Alliance in Budapest. Famous pacifist who negotiated during the war with Lloyd George and President Wilson several times. She inspired the creation of Women's Peace Party in 1915. She was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947, but she did not receive it. Franciska de HAAN, Krassimira DASKALOVA and Anna LOUTFI, *A Biographical Dictionary of Women's Movements and Feminisms. Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, CEU Press, Budapest, 2006, 484–488.

<sup>24</sup> Vilma Glücklich (1872–1927): teacher in a girls' school in Fiume. She was the first woman who obtained her degree at the University of Budapest. She was the president of the Feminists for several years. After 1918, she immigrated to Switzerland where she worked as the secretary-general for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. HAAN, DASKALOVA and LOUTFI (2006), 162–164.

<sup>25</sup> Fanni Borbíró proves in one of her studies that females' associations before the 1890s focused mainly on charity work. BORBÍRÓ (2007), 185–211.

<sup>26</sup> Rosika Schwimmer recognized that positive effects of the western countries women's movements make a positive impact on the work of the Hungarian associations. As a result of this, she built up very close connection with several foreign activists. HAAN, DASKALOVA and LOUTFI (2006), 484–489.

<sup>27</sup> For the feminist periodization of the Hungarian women's movements, which was prepared by Rosika Schwimmer more than 100 years ago and which is still used

This statement can be justified by the fact that the Seventh International Congress of the International Women Suffrage Alliance was held in Budapest right before the World War in 1913.<sup>28</sup> For this occasion, not only the most famous European figures of the international feminist movement – among others Cicely Corbett and Aletta Jacobs – visited Hungary, but also the Americans such as Carrie Chapman Catt.

### ***The Shifting of the Feminists' Objects in August 1914***

The declaration of war against the countries belonging to the Triple Entente caused fundamental changes in the legal, economic and social circumstances of Hungary.<sup>29</sup> The limitation of the freedom of press as well as the restriction of the freedom of assembly prevented the feminists in practising their previous system of agitation. Public demonstrations and gatherings were immediately banned. Neither petitions nor scolding articles about politicians or male factory managers could have been shared in the columns of the periodical press.

These matters as well as the direct danger of war highly contributed to the shift in the Feminists' objectives. As it is perceptible from the five extraordinary editions<sup>30</sup> of *The Woman* from August until December of 1914, their main aim became the prevention of the collapse of the Hungarian economy as well as „*the protection of the large family of the nation*”.<sup>31</sup> Behind these high-sounding and elevated slogans, we have to observe the changing attitudes of feminist activists. Instead of further struggle for women's right to vote, they noticed that they had a new mission namely to preserve those material and mental values which had been created during the previous decades.<sup>32</sup> One of the most cardinal segments of this duty proved to be the labour exchange for female workers (either

---

in our national historiography see: Rosika SCHWIMMER, *A magyar nőmozgalom régi dokumentumai* (The Old Documents of the Hungarian Women's Movements) Márkus Samu Könyvnyomdája, Budapest, 1907, 1–6. SZAPOR (2007), 129–144.

<sup>28</sup> The preparation works, which lasted more than one year, as well as the timetable and the outcomes of the congress can be followed through the 1912 and 1913 issues of *The Woman and the Society*.

<sup>29</sup> Ignác ROMSICS, *Magyarország története a 20. században* (*The History of Hungary during the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*), Osiris, Budapest, 2005, 101–112.

<sup>30</sup> These issues were relatively short, comprising only few pages. As opposed to this, issues which had been published before had been much longer, approximately about 20 pages.

<sup>31</sup> TW 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 (1914); TW 15 (1914): 1–2.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

originally unemployed or fired due to the war).<sup>33</sup> Besides this, the protection of the already employed women as well as the encouragement of female labourers' trade unionism was integral parts of their work.<sup>34</sup>

Although, before analysing this kind of activity of the associations, it is worth taking a closer look, how the official organ of the two groups interpreted the beginning of the war. In the 13<sup>th</sup> issue of the journal, which was published right after the death of Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie, only two short articles reported on the Assassination of Sarajevo. The first one was rather factual as it announced only the mere deed of the murder even without mentioning the names of the crown prince and princess. The event that led to the outbreak of the war was introduced in two short lines on the front page among many other problems that preoccupied the interests of the feminists.<sup>35</sup> The other article is rather short and compact, too. Its title is *The tragedy of Sophie* who had to die because of her husband. However, compared to the other piece, it is not merely a news, but much more like a piece of writing with an educational purpose for those women who want to succeed through the assistance of their husbands.<sup>36</sup>

I consider it highly interesting that after these two pieces, the editors did not publish a single article about the political events and about the long negotiations that followed the assassinations. Any columns from the next issue dealt with the possible danger of war which is surprising as during the years preceding 1914, the subject-matter of peace movement got a prominent place among the topics of

---

<sup>33</sup> Due to the war, several female clerks were fired. TW 18. 1914, 211. Apart from this, and similarly to the Western European tendencies, mostly the traditional women work sectors suffered from 1914. Naturally, employees from the textile and garment industry were dismissed as the dressmaking industry reduced its capacities. The same situation could have been observed in the Hungarian food processing industry as well as in the confectionary. Patricia BRANCA, *Women in Europa since 1750*, Routledge, New York, 2013, 17–72.

<sup>34</sup> TW 18. 1914, 7.

<sup>35</sup> The information about the murder was published in the permanent column of the paper titled *Life Speaks* under the question *What is happening?* The text of the news sounds as follows: „At the marketplace of Sarajevo, two bullets created history. Due to political reasons, three children became orphans.” After this passage, serious problems were listed in connection with illegal commerce of mother's milk in Hungary („the former larder of Europe”), with the expensiveness of food and also with sad news about sexual harassment which had been committed in Nagyszombat. TW 13. 1914, 257.

<sup>36</sup> The tone of the two articles differs as well, the second one being rather subjective and didactic. Ibid. 258.



the feminists' official organ.<sup>37</sup> Only the August issue, which had already been an extraordinary edition, was devoted to the wartime preparations. This was published on the 5<sup>th</sup> of August when the mobilization of troops had already started, and thousands of men, husbands and fathers had been transported to the frontlines.<sup>38</sup>

### ***Wartime Activity of the Feminists' Association and the National Association of Female Clerks***

In their first extraordinary edition, the editors of the paper asserted that „*they had been hoping until the last minute*” in the preservation of peace but Austria-Hungary entered the war together with the German Empire. From this period, they claimed that the main pillars of the associations' activity were the undertaking of the organization of war economy, the protection of mothers, health care and education.<sup>39</sup> From this declaration of their missions, it is obvious that their activity was based on several – sometimes overlapping – aspects.

First of all, as I have already mentioned, they realized that male workforce had to be replaced with female labourers primarily in the fields of industry and agriculture.<sup>40</sup> The second special circumstance, namely that August was the period of summer vacation at schools, had to be taken into consideration. The other problem (closely connected to this) was that the number of kindergartens and day nurseries was very low.<sup>41</sup> This meant that the institutional day care of small children had to be secured by the associations. They equipped several day-time schools in Budapest and those functioned until the beginning of the school year.<sup>42</sup>

The protection and the financial support of pregnant women also got a high emphasis in the columns of the paper. They were demanding the eight-hour working day and the Sunday bank holiday as well as the vindication of the closing time act which had been

---

<sup>37</sup> For greater details in connection with this see: WS 2, 1907, 11, WS 7, 1907, 122. These articles reported on the peace conference that had been organized in Hague.

<sup>38</sup> For seeking the possible answer of this question, further research work is needed.

<sup>39</sup> WS 19, 1914, 216.

<sup>40</sup> This was extremely important due to the period of harvesting. TW 15. 1914, 2.

<sup>41</sup> In 1908, the number of kindergartens was 3187 in Hungary, but the majority of them were overcrowded. The first day nursery had been established in Kassa only in 1907/1908. TW 16. 1914, 2. KONCZ, *Nők*, (1985), 57.

<sup>42</sup> At this point, the members of the associations expressed their gratefulness to the leaders of the capital city and to the *Pesti Izraelita Nőegylet* (Israelite Women's Association of Budapest) for their financial support. TW 17. 1914, 2.

already legally accepted since 1911.<sup>43</sup> They sent several food vouchers for the people-in-need and offered luncheon invitations for the poor.<sup>44</sup> Obviously, they did not forget about the importance of health care service. This is important because of the fact that they were well aware of the insufficiency of the medical supply in the majority of the smaller Hungarian settlements.<sup>45</sup> Among the warlike conditions they did not miss to call people's attention to the danger of different viruses and bacteria (i.e. the threat of cholera) and to the importance of using certain antiseptic materials during hand wash.<sup>46</sup> They advertised these antiseptic and detergent materials in a lot of issues of *The Woman*.<sup>47</sup> Several types of aids were introduced helping people to buy medicines, new clothes and firewood, which became a cardinal issue especially before winter frosts.<sup>48</sup>

On the bases of these facts, it is obvious that the objectives of the two association were very complex and far-reaching, overlapping several fields. However, the frames of this study does not allow to study all of the above listed aspects. By reason of this, in the next subchapter of the paper I will only analyse in greater detail the operation of the labour-exchange office of the feminists.

### ***Practical Consultancy in Budapest***

Not only the Feminists' Association but also the National Federation of Female Clerks had a several years' experience in the field of labour-exchange on the grounds that they had been operating their own employment agencies since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This can be regarded as the main reason why they

---

<sup>43</sup> The precursor of *The Woman* reported several times about the violation of this legal act. E.g. WS 9. 1913, 157, WS 5. 1913, 92–93, TW 3. 1917, 39, TW 6. 1917, 97.

<sup>44</sup> TW 17. 1914, 3.

<sup>45</sup> They had been dealing with this problem frequently even before the war. Series of articles were published about the insufficient training of midwives and about the lectures which had been held by qualified female doctors about health care. (WS 5 (1908): 80–81. The catastrophic circumstances connected to the infamous „midwife issue” were detailed in the official organ of the *Allgemeiner Österreichischer Frauenverein* (General Austrian Woman's Association) titled *Neues Frauenleben* (New Woman's Life). *New Woman's Life* 2 (1911): 264–270. (henceforth: NWL).

<sup>46</sup> Unfortunately, mainly in the provinces the knowledge of people about hygienic rules was rather incomplete. The feminists were well aware of this fact, and organized several presentations about the importance of proper body care not only in the capital but also in smaller towns. WS 1. 1908, 15.

<sup>47</sup> Advertisements of toothpastes and disinfectants were shared regularly in the paper. TW 10. 1915, 155, TW 1. 1915, 10.

<sup>48</sup> TW 18. 1914, 207.

decided to take action right after the declaration of war and extended their activity. In their clubrooms (Budapest, Mária Valéria Street 12. and Vigadó Place 3.) they welcomed every unemployed person who wanted to find a suitable job each day from 9 a.m. until 7 p.m.<sup>49</sup>

However, it is essential to highlight that they were able to help only for the inhabitants of Budapest, as the frames of the association did not make it available to carry on this work in a country-wide framework. Thus, they warned women living in the provinces several times that they are unable to reply their letters, while they are kept on asking their provincial sub-offices to deal with local job-seekers.<sup>50</sup>

After having been elaborated the sources, it has become recognizable that the basic structure of this office was similar to today's modern head-hunter firms. By reason of this, it is not surprising that its activity was internationally recognised which is proved by the fact that Vilma Glücklich was invited to Vienna as well as to other foreign cities, where she held a presentation about their successful initiative.<sup>51</sup>

It is an indisputable merit of the association that they managed to find paid employments for several thousands of women in the capital even during the first few months of the war in spite of the large chaos that dominated every sector of the economy.<sup>52</sup> At the beginning, they were dealing with labour-exchange for men as well, but after a while

---

<sup>49</sup> TW 15. 1914, 2. TW 16. 1914, 2. The Feminists had a telephone line as well. TW 9. 1914, 178. A few years later, their address changed, when they had to leave for a new clubroom. About this alternation they informed their members as well as their followers through the columns of *The Woman*. TW 4. 1917, 57.

<sup>50</sup> TW 16. (1914, 2.) Naturally, they were well aware of the fact that a large number of provincial women, who would have come to Budapest would cause an even larger chaos. NAGY (1994), 155–175.

<sup>51</sup> TW 19. 1914, 83. The title of her lecture was *Die ungarischen Frauen und der Krieg*. (*The Hungarian Women and the War*). The invitation and the interest of the General Austrian Women's Association were probably not surprising for the Hungarians. Firstly, as Hungarian and Austrian feminists were in close connection with each other which can be proved by several facts (i.e. in exchanging of letters among the leading members of the associations or publishing their pieces of writings in each other's periodicals. (Rosika Schwimmer sent altogether four articles for the Austrian paper sharing news about the achievement of the Hungarian feminist movement. E.g. *NWL* 9 (1907): 14.) Secondly, there is any evidence neither in *The New Woman's Life*, nor in the documentaries of the Viennese association that they would have been dealing with an activity like this.

<sup>52</sup> Even in the first issue, which had been published after the beginning of the war, several job advertisements were shared. TW 15. 1914, 1–2. According to the census of 1910, the population of Budapest was 880.000, which increased to almost 1.000.000 to 1914. It was the 8<sup>th</sup> largest city in Europe.

they had to give up with this activity.<sup>53</sup> Jobs that were allocated to unemployed belonged to two main categories: partly those fields of work dominated that became popular among female labourers during the economic growth of the Dualistic Era (i.e. jobs in canning factories, construction work,<sup>54</sup> domestic labour<sup>55</sup> etc.). Secondly, there were several trades that had been traditionally filled in by male workers and started to effeminate during the four years of war.<sup>56</sup> Among others, the professions of newsboys, photographers, secondary-school teachers as well as road sweepers and tram conductors were feminized during this period.<sup>57</sup> With relation to this subject, we must not forget that *The Woman* shared detailed statistics in almost every issues about the number of those women who gained employment. An 1915 issue of the paper reported about the following: „*In the month of April altogether 416 women had been employed through the associations: 6 saleswomen, 112 factory workers, 16 governesses, 77 domestic servants, 5 day-labourers, 12 waitresses, 2 sales managers, 180 needlewomen, 6 tram conductors.*”<sup>58</sup> Apart from these monthly statistics, annual data were also shared about the activity of the employment agency in the yearly report which had been prepared about the work of the associations.<sup>59</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> This task had been taken over by the State Labour Exchange Office. TW 16. 1914, 2.

<sup>54</sup> One of the leaders of the American trade unionist movement Samuel Gompers wrote an essay about the miserable working conditions of those 2.000 women who worked in the constructional areas of Budapest as hod-carriers right before the outbreak of the war. Samuel GOMPERS, *The Budapest Hod-Carrier and her Fellow-Laborers*, IN: Samuel GOMPERS (ed.), *Labor in Europe and America*, Harper Brothers, New York, 1909, 92–104. Their situation did not change at all during the years of the war.

<sup>55</sup> However, the number of domestic servants had already begun to decrease from the beginning of the 1900s in the western parts of Europe; this field of occupation was still popular in Hungary even during the 1920s. NAGY (1994), 155–175.

<sup>56</sup> About the feminization of certain jobs see Erna APPELT, „*Perfekte Stenotypistin, gebildetes Fräulein aus gutem Haus...*”: zur Geschichte der ersten weiblichen Angestellten Wiens, *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Wissenschaft und Kunst*, 1, 1986, 1–8.

<sup>57</sup> TW 15. 1914, 1–2, TW 17. 1914, 2.

<sup>58</sup> TW 5. 1915, 81.

<sup>59</sup> It is essential to emphasize that the organizations kept records about those women as well who had been registered as job seekers. In September 1914, „*altogether 1566 women were in these lists: 65 nurses, 6 merchants of ladies' wear, 64 saleswomen, 15 ice and wood porters, 7 female photographers, 272 factory workers, 14 nannies, 12 doorkeepers, 321 domestic servants, 16 field workers, 65 governesses, 92 home workers, 31 employees of hotels and spas, 55 newsgirls, 25 road sweepers, 348 needlewomen, 91 women who were prepared to every kind of work.*” TW 17. 1914, 2. In this month, altogether 2383 female labourers found wage-

**Statistics of the Employment Agency about the Number of Female Labourers Who Found Paid Work with the Help of the Two Associations (August, 1914 – March, 1915)<sup>60</sup>**

	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	March	Σ
Nurses	5	61	29	12	1	15	27	10	160
Saleswomen	27	23	15	2	-	-	-	-	67
Jewellers	-	-	-	2	-	2	12	-	16
Construction Workers	48	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	81
Field Workers	418	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	418
Factory Workers	610	120	106	259	235	114	35	34	1513
Nannies	-	-	30	17	-	-	-	-	47
Domestic Servants	1898	840	190	160	101	98	74	93	3454
Embroider Women	-	7	-	-	1	-	-	-	8
Office Workers	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
Commercial Employees	-	-	-	-	17	9	25	30	81
Washerwomen	58	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58
Gardeners	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	28
Coachwoman	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Housepainter	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Day Labourers	626	411	-	-	2	-	-	13	1052
Governesses, Teachers	43	27	51	20	27	35	21	18	242
Furriers	-	-	12	3	-	4	1	2	22
Newsgirls	394	8	7	6	-	-	-	-	415
Agent	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Needlewomen	828	824	1274	921	498	524	383	257	5509
Women of Mixed Occupations	53	28	12	3	-	4	1	2	103
Tram Conductors	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	13	22
Women Preparing Sackcloth	-	34	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
<b>Altogether</b>	<b>5008</b>	<b>2383</b>	<b>1763</b>	<b>1416</b>	<b>882</b>	<b>805</b>	<b>580</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>13337</b>

earning professions. TW 18. 1914, 206.

<sup>60</sup> This table supports my statement about the fact that the demand for female labour was the largest in the field of agriculture (day labourers, field workers) and in the industrial sector (factory workers). Significant ratio of domestic servants worked in the agrarian industry, too. The number of needlewomen is outstanding because of the fact that women, who were not able to find paid work, were employed in great numbers for preparing clothes for soldiers. TW 5. 1915, 82.

**Statistics of the Employment Agency about the Number of Female Labourers Who Found Paid Work with the Help of the Two Associations (February, 1916 – April, 1916)<sup>61</sup>**

	<b>Aggregated Number for the Three Months</b>
<b>Needlewomen</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Domestic Workers</b>	<b>118</b>
<b>Factory Workers</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>Commercial Employees</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Governess, Nannies</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Nurses</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Day Labourers</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Apprentices in the Field of Electrical Engineering</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Laboratory Assistant</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Milliner</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Women of Mixed Occupations</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Altogether</b>	<b>382</b>

One of the most important principles of the Feminists and the Female Clerks was that instead of the distribution of alms, everybody, who is physically able to work, has to find a paid employment. Because of this, they encouraged every job seeker women to join the associations.<sup>62</sup> Their agitation proved to be successful, as the number of the Feminists' members increased over 3000 in Budapest right before the outbreak of the war. In Hungarian respect, this data has to be regarded as outstanding, mainly because some years before (in 1907) the number of members was only about 500. The citizens' interest in the work of the Feminists did not decrease towards the end of the war, as the size of their membership was still around 2900 in Budapest in 1917.<sup>63</sup> Related to the Female

<sup>61</sup> TW 5. 1916, 78. From these tables, it becomes clear that the number of job-seeking women proved to be the highest during the first few months of the war, naturally due to the large-scale mobilization of soldiers. Later, a gradual decrease can be observed in the statistics.

<sup>62</sup> Their well-known slogan was: „We do not want to be the dependants of men on any bases!” TW 1. 1916, 4, TW 19. 1914, 217.

<sup>63</sup> WS 4. 1907, 67, Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL OL), National Archives of Hungary P987/II, fol.27f., Susan ZIMMERMANN, „Frauenbestrebungen und Frauenbewegungen in Ungarn zur Organisationsgeschichte der Jahre 1848 bis 1918 IN: Beáta NAGY and Margit S. SÁRDI (ed.), *Szerep és Alkotás. Női szerepek a társadalomban és az alkotóművészetben* (Role and Creation. Female Roles in the Society and in the Creative Art), Csokonai Kiadó, Debrecen, 2007, 175–205.

Clerks, I need to carry on further research because at the moment I only have the data of 1907. According to this, 1281 ordinary and 323 supporting members enjoyed the protection of the association.<sup>64</sup>

The maintenance of the Practical Consultancy proved to be more difficult among these warlike circumstances than it had been before 1914. To its smooth running, the intensive cooperation of other associations in Budapest was inevitable, which resulted in the fact that after a while a logical and necessary division of labour evolved among them. Along with the Israelite Women's Association of Budapest and with the *Jogvédő Egyesület (Rights Protection Association)*, they collected letters of recommendation and negotiated with the employers. After a while, the National Federation of Female Clerks concentrated on jobs in the field of the tertiary sector, while other professions were mediated by the Feminists. Besides this, each organization made great efforts to protect the rights of those women, who had already found employments.<sup>65</sup>

### ***The Work of the Practical Consultancy in the Provinces***

As I have already noted, associations residing in the capital did not dispose of enough capacity to manage local employment agencies in the provinces. However, both the Feminists and the Female Clerks had several sub-offices in the larger cities of Hungary, these smaller organizations (altogether with 700 members before 1914) did not immediately followed the positive example of their mother associations in terms of the operation of employment centres.<sup>66</sup> They only realized that they have to act after the leaders of the metropolitan organizations had called upon them to equip offices on the bases of the pattern that already functioned in Budapest.<sup>67</sup>

On the evidence of the written documents, these agencies started to operate a few month later. The October issue of *The Woman* shared a piece of news according to which „*local organizations have been carried out the labour-exchanging activity along with the central offices in Budapest.*”<sup>68</sup> At this point, we have to emphasize that among the nine main sub-offices (Arad, Debrecen, Nagyvárad, Nyitra, Pécs, Szabadka, Szeged, Szombathely and Temesvár – indicated on the map below), which had been operated right before

---

<sup>64</sup> WS 5. 1907, 89.

<sup>65</sup> TW 18. 1914, 211.

<sup>66</sup> SZAPOR (2007), 129–144.

<sup>67</sup> TW 16. 1914, 2.

<sup>68</sup> TW 18. 1914, 206.

the outbreak of the war conflict, only few functioned properly from 1914 until 1918. Turning over the pages of the issues of *The Woman* and the documentation of the two associations, it becomes clear that the activity of two sub-organizations were valuable in its essentials. The offices of Szeged and Nagyvárad did not only succeed in adapting the system of the Budapest associations, but they managed to improve this model.<sup>69</sup>

The innovative methods in the Practical Consultancy of Szeged were shown by the data according to which the employment of altogether 19.130 female labourers was assured by the association. Besides this, they were probably successfully fighting for the seven hours closing time and for the Sunday bank holiday in the tertiary sector. In order to protect the physical and mental health of female clerks, they arranged different types of courses that became soon very popular among women.<sup>70</sup> The feminists of Nagyvárad employed a skilled female clerk who handled all errands of the local Practical Consultancy. Thanks to her work, 117 women managed to find paid employment between September and December of 1916.<sup>71</sup> Apart from this, they struggled for the reduction of food prices and made attempts to launch a consumer co-operative. Members of the group dealt with gardening as well which turned out to be a rather successful initiative, as several associations in other cities started to follow it.<sup>72</sup> Apart from these associations, the activity of two other groups is known, namely the managing of employment agency of the organizations of Nyíregyháza as well as Nagybecskerek.<sup>73</sup>

### ***Woman as „war profiteers”? Case Studies***

During the four years' of war, Hungarian woman undoubtedly managed to demonstrate that they were able to do men's jobs. As I have pointed out at the beginning of this study, paid work was not entirely new for women, but its space was highly stepped up since 1914. Unfortunately, exact statistics cannot be shared about the exact

---

<sup>69</sup> TW 1. 1917, 13–14.

<sup>70</sup> TW 6. 1917, 97.

<sup>71</sup> TW 1. 1917, 13.

<sup>72</sup> Unused plots of lands were divided into small (200 m<sup>2</sup>) pieces and were handed over to women for cultivation. In 1916, the feminists of Nagyvárad managed to get seeds cheaply, and they gave altogether 429 gardens to those mothers who had to raise their children without the help of their husbands. TW 8. 1916, 127.

<sup>73</sup> TW 19. 1914, 217. The group of Nagybecskerek was not real feminist association but it was characterized by certain features that described feminist groupings.



expansion of female labour. This is due to the fact that the last national census (within the frames of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) was held in 1910, while the first one after the declaration of peace was carried out in 1920 (within the new borders of Hungary). Thus, it is well-known from the census as well as from an occupational statistics that the number of labouring women in 1910 was 2.242.617 in the Countries of the Hungarian Crown, but during the years of the war we are able to rely only on estimates. According to the calculations of Pál Szende (lawyer and Chancellor of Exchequer between 1918 and 1919), the number of women, who carried on any kinds of wage-earning activities could have been more than 3.000.000, but he anticipated a further increase in the summer of 1916.<sup>74</sup> He also indicated an essential thing (that had been entirely pressed into the background for two years), namely the problem of female suffrage. He stated that the large-scale participation of women in the operation of war economy and in the system of taxation would require their participation in politics as well.<sup>75</sup>

It also became obvious that the ratio of women, who worked independently (not as employees) increased significantly during the first two years of the war. The number of women, who were landholders or rented a plot of land was 260.532. Besides this, altogether 85.569 females worked as craftswomen, 28.391 as shopkeepers or merchants.<sup>76</sup> The public service delivered 10.093 self-employed occupations for women as well. There was one more phenomenon of key importance, namely that the number of female labourers, who enjoyed the protection of any trade unions, finally started to rise. According to the large amount of data, which was collected by Ferenc Mucsi during the 1980s, only 5,2% of wage-earning women was organized in 1911.<sup>77</sup> While there were only 8.314 organized female labourers at the end of 1916, their number increased to 48.811 until 1918, which indicates us that 25% of 215.222

---

<sup>74</sup> He also highlighted that the growth of the number of labouring women is well-proportioned with the increase of the ratio of the burdens of taxation. TW 7. 1916, 102-104.

<sup>75</sup> This issue came up more seriously after the February Revolution in Russia. After this event, editors of *The Woman* shared several series of articles (written either by Hungarian or foreign women) about the extension of suffrage. SZAPOR (2007), 129-144.

<sup>76</sup> TW 7. 1916, 102-104.

<sup>77</sup> The same ratio was 11,5% in Austria and 8,2% in Germany. Ferenc MUCSI, *Weibliche Industriearbeit und sozialistische Frauen-Arbeiterbewegung in Ungarn vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, IN: Alida Mirella HUELLER and Helmut KONRAD (ed.), *Die Frau in der Arbeiterbewegung 1900-1939*. Europaverlag, Wien, 1980, 333-342.

organized workers belonged to the female gender.<sup>78</sup>

As a consequence of the labour shortage that had been created after the mobilization of males, women gained an excellent opportunity to prove that they were able to meet the requirements of the labour market. Apart from the previously-mentioned spheres of activities, they started to work in several other occupations. In the tertiary sector, they were employed as packing workers, glove-manufacturers, chairwomen, knitting women, telephonists, waitresses, caretakers, florists, watchmakers etc.<sup>79</sup> Both associations dealt frequently with the presence of women in the field of the artisan industry. Even before 1914, there had been a loud series of debates on this issue, as the majority of craftsmen tried to exclude female artisans from the market.<sup>80</sup> This situation entirely changed from 1914, and parents were encouraged to choose from the following jobs for their daughters: carpenter, hairdresser, pastry-cook, jeweller, upholsterer, basket maker and cook. Jane Dirnfeld mentioned in one of her lectures that jobs in the field of gardening would also be suitable for women and she assured her audience that wages in this occupations were sufficient for women.<sup>81</sup>

These spheres of activity did not require particular physical exertion from women. But women had to undertake several other occupations, where physical strength had of key importance. The sources report e.g. about helpers of butchers, who were probably carrying large pieces of meat for 10–12 hours a day.<sup>82</sup> At this point, the story of an abuse against a woman has to be mentioned which was fully-documented in the 1916 volume of *The Woman*.<sup>83</sup> The widow of a butcher continued to run the shop of her late husband without employing a sales manager. Therefore, she had been denounced at the local authorities by the owner of a competing shop. The woman was convicted of illegal operation of an enterprise, as

---

<sup>78</sup> N. SZEGVÁRI (1981), 102.) The issue connected to the lack of organization among women workers was not only unique for Hungary, it caused several problems e.g. in France, in England as well as in the United States of America. Theresa Wolfson, an American economist of the 1920s, posed the question in the following way in one of her works: „*Where are the organized women workers?*” Theresa WOLFSON, *Where are the Organized Women Workers?* American Federationist, 6, 1925, 445–453.

<sup>79</sup> TW 1. 1915, 12, TW 2. 1915, 23, TW 10. 1915, 164.

<sup>80</sup> Girls were hardly accepted as apprentices in the workshops of handicraftsmen. WS 5, 1908, 76–77.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> TW 1. 1916, 5.

<sup>83</sup> The sources clearly indicate that similar cases occurred several times during the war.

Hungarian legal acts (that had been accepted before 1914) had pronounced that women were not able to run shops without the assistance of a male sales manager. However, warlike conditions changed this circumstances: soon after the women had lodged an appeal against the other proprietor, she was exempted. The justification of the exemption was the following: only those women had to employ sales managers, who possessed newly-opened shops.<sup>84</sup>

Naturally, factory work had to be done also by female workers. However, it was probably just an exaggeration of the feminists that at this workplaces women had to face with mediaeval conditions, the circumstances were certainly very poor. Wages of women reached only about 50% of the earnings of men and the shifts were very long. In many cases, women had to work for several hours without getting a chance to take a rest. The canteens were badly-equipped as well. Work-safety turned out to be rather primitive, too. As a result of this, accidents happened frequently. In the February of 1917, *The Woman* reported e.g. about a huge accident in a factory of Erzsébetfalva, where certain pyrotechnical materials were produced. According to the article, a fire caused „the terrible death of twenty-four miserable female labourers.” Injuries of other forty women could have been avoided, if the factory had had the proper defensive equipment.<sup>85</sup>

Finally, it is essential to elude to those women, who had a chance to build careers in intellectual, academic and artistic professions. Their number was naturally much lower than that of those women, who worked in the previously-discussed sectors, but their roles were essential. They worked primarily in two areas: in the public health sector and in the sector of education, but we definitely have to mention several other professions, too. The qualification of female doctors and maternity nurses improved considerably. Female teachers got the possibility to educate in secondary schools and boys' schools besides teaching in primary schools which largely contributed to the feminization of this profession.<sup>86</sup> The fact, that the number of women in certain academic occupations had been rising, was welcomed by the editors of *The Woman*, because they firmly stated that this could promote the standards of child care.<sup>87</sup> A female architect was mentioned by her name in a 1917 issue of the paper:

---

<sup>84</sup> TW 2. 1916, 30.

<sup>85</sup> TW 2. 1917, 23.

<sup>86</sup> TW 3. 1917,40.

<sup>87</sup> TW 2. 1916, 31–32. It is important to note that several female intellectuals regularly worked, or sent articles for *The Women*. Dienes Valéria was among them, who was the first female university professor in Hungary.

Ella Kohlbach received her degree at the Humboldt University in Berlin, where she had already started to work.<sup>88</sup>

### ***Problems Emerging Related to the Work Labour-Exchange Activity***

Naturally, several problems arose in the course of the war operation of the Practical Consultancy. Among these troubles, financial issues were the most serious. As the operation of the office cost a fortune, the associations needed a lot of extra money. They realised soon after the outbreak of the war that membership fees would hardly cover the increased expenditures of their activities.<sup>89</sup> Thus, they launched a donation campaign with the following slogan: „*Hard days are the days of generous charity contribution.*”<sup>90</sup> They welcomed donations from everyone, and published the names of those people who sent some money (regardless to the amount). In a 1915 issue, they indicated the name of Mrs. Ignác Glücklich, who sent 8 Crowns, together with the Ministry of War, who transferred as much as 1404.15 Crowns to the associations.<sup>91</sup> For the reservation of the balance of the budget, they organized several cultural programs, like before the Christmas of 1914, when they held a concert at the *Zeneakadémia* (Music Academy).<sup>92</sup>

The roots of the other problem can be found in the structure of the Hungarian (vocational) education. The frames of technical training had already been rather obsolete towards the end of the Dualistic Era, but the state was not able to react suitably and solve this problem. Due to this fact, female associations started to seek possible solutions: even before the war, they launched several language courses for female clerks, where they were able to improve their skills in German, English and French for a reasonable price. After 1914, they supplemented this activity with further courses: they undertook the retraining for those women, who had been employed by the tertiary sector before, but lost their jobs because of the wartime circumstances. Those women, who could not find suitable workplaces, were retrained mainly to needlewomen so that they would be able to produce clothes and

---

<sup>88</sup> TW 15. 1917, 198.

<sup>89</sup> Membership fees for a year cost 5 Crowns. But everybody could by an eternal membership with the payment of 200 Crowns.

<sup>90</sup> TW 16. 1914, 1.

<sup>91</sup> With this sum of money, the budget of the associations increased to 39771.80 Crowns. TW 6. 1915, 96.

<sup>92</sup> TW 19. 1914, 219. *The Woman* kept on raising the following rhetoric question in each December from 1914 until 1918: „*How many wartime Christmases will pass until we can celebrate in peace?*” TW 12. 1915, 105.

underwear for the soldiers for money.<sup>93</sup>

Two more organisational problems has to be mentioned here. Firstly, that the umbrella organization of each Hungarian females' association, namely the *Magyarországi Nőegyesületek Szövetsége* (Federation of the Hungarian Females' Associations) had to face with serious functional problems. According to the editorial office of *The Woman*, its activity was extended only to fund-raising campaigns which did not advanced the work of the other associations at all.<sup>94</sup> Secondly, a serious problem emerged in the field of social work, namely that the activity of the state policies and the work of the local authorities as well as that of the associations was not synchronised.<sup>95</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Members of the weaker gender were frequently indicated as „*war profiteers*” between 1914 and 1918.<sup>96</sup> On the one hand, it is mainly because of the fact that they managed to succeed in many areas which had been previously blocked in front of them by men. The also proved that female adaptability is very high, and finally realised that marriage, maternity and work can be combined. On the other hand, several opportunities opened for them during these four years. Thousands of women left their homes for working either in the field of industry or in agriculture. Lots of women, who lived in the larger towns or cities, were employed by the service sector, while the number of those females, who worked for the local authorities or to different government agencies, increased as well.

During this war, the statement (characterising the previous centuries' wars) according to which „*man fought and women waited*” was not valid any more.<sup>97</sup> The fact that the economy of the home front did not collapse was definitely the merit of the members of the weaker gender. Without their unselfish and helpful work, the war would have undoubtedly caused several casualties on the home front, too. Fortunately, Hungary was hit neither by mass demonstrations nor by hunger marches. The Russian Revolution in March 1917 and the dethronement of the tsar promised the right to vote for Hungarian women as well.

---

<sup>93</sup> TW 16. 1914, 2, TW 18. 1914, 207. *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century) 6. 1915.

<sup>94</sup> This problem had already existed before 1914. TW 1. 1916.

<sup>95</sup> TW 4. 1916, 64.

<sup>96</sup> Evelyne SULLEROT, *Histoire et sociologie du travail féminin*, Gonthier, Paris, 1968, 141–143.

<sup>97</sup> SHARP and STIBBE (2011), 13.

Parallel with this, the attention of organized women's movement noticeably moved „*from gendered aspects of social life towards questions of survival*” and adaptation of new political, economic and social rules, namely to employment, education and social care.<sup>98</sup> Presumably, partly because of the danger of war, and partly due to the common interests all the three wings of the Hungarian women's movement started to cooperate towards the end of the war. Before 1914, feminists and social democrats had been measuring the activity of each other distrustfully and disapprovingly, but two years later the signs of their collaboration had already been visible.<sup>99</sup> As Mrs. Sándor Szegvári explained in a 1918 issue of *The Woman*, „*we intend to establish the social conditions of work. We want to protect the rights of the working woman, the mother and the child. (...) Thus, it is the obligation of every woman, regardless to her political affiliation to encourage the social policy of the feminists.*”<sup>100</sup>

Naturally, we cannot forget about the serious problems that permeated both the everyday lives of female workers both the work of the associations. It could have been probably hard for women to adapt to the new circumstances, especially for those mothers had not been obliged to leave their homes for paid work before the war. Rosika Schwimmer formulated this phenomenon appropriately when she said that „*women suffered from a double burden*” because they had to accommodate their jobs with the household chores and with the duties connected to child rearing.<sup>101</sup> Nevertheless, the following questions were posed towards the end of the war more and more frequently: What will happen with female workers after the war? Will they automatically leave their occupations in order to ensure the employment of their male counterparts? Feminists refused to answer this question, they believed that it would have been solved without any artificial interventions. Generally, it can be stated that many women left their jobs for being housewives again, but the majority of female labourers remained in their employments especially in the tertiary sector.

The specification of the tendencies in the life of the Hungarian women's movement after is not the aim of this paper, but it has to be emphasised that there were several alternations as opposed to the pre-war structures. After the revolution, the bourgeois feminist wing started to lose its strength chiefly because its leaders – among others

---

<sup>98</sup> ACSÁDY (2011), 309–333.

<sup>99</sup> N. SZEGVÁRI (1981), 105.

<sup>100</sup> TW 12. 1918, 276.

<sup>101</sup> TW 5. 1907, 76.

Rosika Schwimmer and Vilma Glüvklich – left the country. Women (with several aggravations) finally gained the right to vote, but the social estimation of working women was still controversial, as the official ideology valued women who met their traditional duties.

### Sources

- A Nő. Feminista folyóirat* (The Woman. Feminist Journal) 1914–1918. (TW)  
*A Nő és a Társadalom.* (The Woman and the Society) 1907–1913. (WS)  
Images from the Schwimmer–Lloyd Collection. Photographs from the Digital Gallery from the New York Public Library. (Schwimmer–Lloyd Collection NYPL)  
*Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century) 1900–1919.  
*Neues Frauenleben.* (New Woman's Life) 1902–1918. (NWL)

### Bibliography

- APPELT, Erna, „Perfekte Stenotypistin, gebildetes Fräulein aus gutem Haus...“: zur Geschichte der ersten weiblichen Angestellten Wiens, *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Wissenschaft und Kunst*, 1, 1986, 7–8.
- BERGER, Elisabeth, *Das Frauenstudium an der Universität Wien im Zeichen des Liberalismus*, Cajeten-Felder Institut, Wien, 2007.
- BOCK, Gisela, *Frauen in der Europäischen Geschichte. Vom Mittelalter bis zum Gegenwart*, Beck, München, 2000.
- BORBÍRÓ, Fanni, *Budapesti nőegyletek 1862–1904* (Females' Associations in Budapest), IN: *A nők világa. Művelődés- és társadalomtörténelmi tanulmányok* (The World of Women. Studies related to Culture and Social History), edited by Anna FÁBRI and Gábor VÁRKONYI, Argumentum, Budapest, 2007. 185–211.
- BRANCA, Patricia. *Women in Europa since 1750*, Routledge, New York, 2013.
- DAVIES, Norman. *Európa Története* (The History of Europe), Osiris, Budapest, 2002.
- FÁBRI, Anna, „A szép tiltott táj felé.” *A magyar íróknak története a két századforduló között (1796–1905)* (Towards the Nice but Forbidden Sphere. The History of Hungarian Female Authors between the Two Centenaries. 1795–1905), Kortárs, Budapest, 1996.
- FARAGÓ, Tamás, *Bevezetés a történelmi demográfiába.* (Introduction to the Historical Demography), Corvinus, Budapest, 2011.
- GOMPERS, Samuel, *The Budapest Hod-Carrier and her Fellow-Laborers*, Budapest, Hungary, August 15, 1909, IN: *Labor in Europe and America*, edited by Samuel GOMPERS, Harper Brothers, New York, 1909. 92–104.
- GYÁNI, Gábor, and KÖVÉR, György, *Magyarország társadalomtörténete a reformkortól a második világháborúig* (The Social History of Hungary from the Reform Era until the Second World War), Osiris, Budapest, 2006.
- HAAN, de Francisca, DASKALOVA, Krassimira, and LOUTFI, Anna, *A Biographical Dictionary of Women's Movements and Feminisms. Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, CEU Press, Budapest, 2006.
- JOBST, Ágnes, *A női szerepek határátlépésének értelmezése az első magyar orvosnőről szóló narratívákban. Hugonnai Vilma (1847–1922)* (Interpretation of the Crossing of Borders in terms of Female Roles with Special Regard to the Narratives about Vilma Hugonnai (1847–1922)), *Múltunk* (Our Past), 2. 2008, 19–29.
- KÉRI Katalin, *Hölgyek napernyővel. Nők a dualizmus-kori Magyarországon. 1867–1914.* (Ladies with Parasols. Women in Hungary during the Dualistic Era), Pro

Pannonia Könyvek, Pécs, 2008, 124–145.

KERESZTY, Orsolya, *Nők változó társadalmi szerepei a dualizmus kori Magyarországon* (Changing Social Roles of Women in Hungary during the Dualistic Era), IN: *Teória a Prax II.* edited by Ildikó PSENÁKOVÁ, Ferenc MEZŐ, and Ildikó VICZAYOVÁ, Nitra, 2009. 77–88.

KONCZ, Katalin, *Nők a munka világában* (*Women in the World of Labour*), Kossuth, Budapest, 1982.

KONCZ, Katalin, *Nők és férfiak – hiedelmek, tények* (*Women and Men – Beliefs and Facts*), Kossuth, Budapest, 1985.

MUCSL, Ferenc, *Weibliche Industriearbeit und sozialistische Frauen-Arbeiterbewegung in Ungarn vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, IN: *Die Frau in der Arbeiterbewegung 1900–1939*, edited by Alida Mirella HUELLER, and Helmut KONRAD, Europaverlag, Wien, 1980. 333–342.

N. SZEGVÁRI, Katalin, *Út a nők egyenjogúságához* (*Route towards the Emancipation of Women*), Kossuth, Budapest, 1981.

NAGY, Beáta, *Nők keresőtevékenysége Budapesten a 20. század első felében* (*Wage-earning Activity of Women in Budapest during the First Half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*), IN: *Férfiuralom. Írások nőkről, férfiokról, feminizmusról.* (Male Dominance. Studies about Women, Men, Feminism) edited by HADAS, Miklós, Replika Kör, Budapest, 1994. 155–175.

NAGY, Mariann: *A nők a magyar gazdaságban a dualizmus korában* (*Women in the Hungarian Economy during the Dualism*), IN: Gábor GYÁNI - Beáta NAGY (szerk.): *A nők a modernizálódó magyar társadalomban* (*Women in the modernizing Hungarian Society*), Debrecen, 2006, 205–222.

ROMSICS, Ignác, *Magyarország története a 20. században* (*The History of Hungary during the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*), Osiris, Budapest, 2005.

SCHWIMMER, Rosika, *A magyar nőmozgalom régi dokumentumai* (*The Old Documents of the Hungarian Women's Movements*), Márkus Samu Könyvnyomdája, Budapest, 1907.

SULLEROT, Evelyne, *Histoire et sociologie du travail féminin*, Gonthier, Paris, 1968.

SZAPOR, Judit, *A magánszférából a politikai közéletbe: a női politizálás története a kezdetektől 1945-ig* (*From the Private Sphere to the Public Life: the History of Females' Engagement in Politics from the Beginnings until 1945*), IN: *A nő és a politikum. A nők politikai szerepvállalása Magyarországon* (*The Woman and the Politics. Political Engagement of Women in Hungary*), edited by PALASIK, Mária, Napvilág, Budapest, 2007. 129–145.

UTRIO, Kaari, *Evas Töchter – Die weibliche Seite der Geschichte*, Rasch und Röhring Verlag, Hamburg–Zürich, 1987.

VIRGILL, Fabrice, *L'histoire des femmes et l'histoire des genres aujourd'hui*, Revue d'histoire, 3. 2002, 5–14.

ZIMMERMANN, Susan, *Frauenbestrebungen und Frauenbewegungen in Ungarn zur Organisationsgeschichte der Jahre 1848 bis 1918*, IN: *Szerep és Alkotás. Női szerepek a társadalomban és az alkotóművészetben* (*Role and Creation. Female Roles in the Society and in the Creative Art*), edited by Beáta NAGY and Mardit S. SÁRDI, Csokonai Kiadó, Debrecen, 2007.

WOLFSON, Theresa, *Where are the Organized Women Workers?* *American Federationist*. 6. 1925, 445–453.



**Enyedi Zsuzsa**

### ***A francia külpolitika változása 1934-1936 között***

#### **Abstract**

Germany's rearmament posed a major threat to France since Hitler had come to power in 1933 and left the Rearmament Conference, therefore the question of security became the main issue in France's foreign policy. The appointment of Louis Barthou to Foreign Minister in 1934 basically changed French diplomacy by attempting to develop the system of alliances as well as to accept a convention on arms limitation involving Germany. However French plans did not always meet with the concepts of British foreign policy. Pierre Laval, Barthou's successor on the post, carried on negotiations with Italy and the Soviet-Union which led to the Franco-Soviet pact in 1935 besides he was still determined to approach Germany and resume arm limitation talks. As a result of the failure of the efforts made in order to prevent rearmament, Hitler announced German conscription which was followed by the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936.

*Keywords:* German rearmament, French foreign policy, collective security, arms limitation negotiations, Franco-Italian talks, Franco-Soviet Pact, reoccupation of the Rhineland

Az 1930-as évek közepétől, így Hitler hatalomra jutását követően Franciaország számára a legnagyobb kihívást Németország újrafegyverkezése jelentette. A Leszerelési Konferencia elhagyása és a további német lépések révén ugyanis egyre nyilvánvalóbbá vált, hogy Berlin katonai erejének növelésére törekszik, amely súlyos veszélyt jelentett Franciaország nagyhatalmi helyzetére és az európai békére nézve. Ennek következtében Párizs külpolitikájában a biztonsági szempontok kerültek előtérbe, a konkrét lépések tekintetében azonban már korántsem volt ekkora egyetértés a francia politikusok között. A félévente cserélődő kormányok és az állandósult belpolitikai válságok csak nehezítették egy egységes és folyamatos külpolitikai irányvonal létrejöttét. Mivel Németország egyre határozottabb lépéseket tett a versailles-i békerendszer felrúgása és nagyhatalmi ambícióinak megvalósítása irányába, a kollektív biztonsági rendszer egyre kisebb mértékben bizonyult alkalmasnak az ország biztonságának garantálására. A francia külpolitika ezért a hagyományos brit és kelet-európai szövetség mellett Olaszországgal és a Szovjetunióval kívánta szorosabbra fűzni kapcsolatait. A kétoldalú tárgyalások folytatása mellett azonban Párizs továbbra is úgy vélekedett, hogy a német fegyverkezés lelassítása csakis egy nagyobb egyezmény keretei között

lehetséges. A francia tervek megvalósítása elé azonban éppen szövetségese, Nagy-Britannia gördített akadályt, így közös álláspont hiányában Németország immáron a versailles-i béke ellen irányuló lépései válasz nélkül maradtak.

### **Barthou külpolitikája**

Az 1934. január 26-án megkötött lengyel-német nyilatkozat után tíz nappal a radikálisok korrupciós ügyei nyomán kirobbant kormányválság elérte tetőpontját. A pattanásig feszült helyzetben alakult meg 1934. február 9-én a nemzeti unió kormánya Gaston Doumergue vezetésével, ami egy időre véget vetett a belpolitikai krízisnek. A külügyminiszteri posztra Louis Barthou került, akinek kinevezése a francia külpolitikában, és így a francia-német kapcsolatok viszonylatában is fordulatot hozott. A németellenes politika képviselőjeként úgy vélekedett, hogy a nemzetközi helyzet számos hasonlóságot mutat az 1914-es helyzettel: a fő veszélyt Franciaországra Németország jelenti, ezért a legfontosabb cél az ország biztonságának garantálása.<sup>1</sup> Barthou már az 1920-as években is kritikusan szemlélte Briand Németország irányába folytatott politikáját, ennek ellenére jó kapcsolatot ápolt a külügyminiszterrel.<sup>2</sup> A Leszerelési Konferencia kudarca pedig csak megerősítette azon nézetében, hogy Franciaország biztonságát a népszövetségi rendszeren keresztül nem lehet elérni. Céljainak megvalósítása érdekében a francia külpolitika azon irányzatához nyúlt vissza, amely elsődlegesen a francia szövetségi rendszerre támaszkodott a kollektív biztonsági rendszerrel szemben.

Franciaország biztonsága szempontjából a legnagyobb veszélyt továbbra is Németország újrafegyverkezése jelentette. Barthou ebben a külpolitikai helyzetben elsősorban a már meglévő kelet-európai szövetségeseire kívánt támaszkodni, akik viszont egyre kevésbé voltak képesek Németország ellensúlyozására. A szövetségi rendszer megerősítésének legfőbb ellenzője legfőbb szövetségese, Nagy-Britannia volt, aki nem nézte jó szemmel Németország ily módon történő elszigetelését.<sup>3</sup> Mivel Párizs továbbra is a francia-brit szövetségben látta az európai béke megőrzésének zálogát, ezért kénytelen volt döntést hoznia a kérdésben. Egy fegyverzetkorlátozásra irányuló egyezmény megalkotásával ugyanis

---

<sup>1</sup> Jean-Baptiste DUROSELLE: *La Décadence 1932-1939*. Paris, 1985, 91.

<sup>2</sup> Piotr WANDYCZ: *The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances 1926-1936*, Princeton, 1988, 336-337.

<sup>3</sup> DUROSELLE (1985): 91.

lehetségesnek tűnt a német újrafegyverkezés megállítása, míg egy önálló külpolitikával a britektől való elidegenedést és Németország korlátlan fegyverkezését kockáztatta a francia vezetés.<sup>4</sup>

### ***A német tervek és az április 17.-i jegyzék***

A Leszerelési Konferencia Németország kivonulását követően is folytatta munkáját, a tárgyalások megszakadásával azonban a francia külpolitika elvesztette korábbi kezdeményező szerepét egy számára is előnyös megállapodás kialakításában a leszerelést illetően. A közvetlen francia-német tárgyalások nem vezettek eredményre 1933-34 telén, a helyzetet pedig csak súlyosbította, hogy március folyamán Hitler egy 300 ezer fős hadsereg létrehozására jelentette be igényét. A bejelentés előzményei 1933 végére nyúltak vissza. Hitler november 24-én közölte François-Poncet berlini nagykövettel, hogy azonnali és jelentős leszerelést kíván a nagyhatalmaktól, és Németország már nem a korábbi MacDonald-féle tervezet által meghatározott 200 ezer főre, hanem 300 ezer főre növelné a német hadsereg méretét. A követeléseit december 18-án is megismételte egy Franciaországnak küldött memorandumban.<sup>5</sup> Január elseji válaszmemorandumában Párizs viszont Németország visszatérését követelte a Népszövetségbe és a Leszerelési Konferenciára, melynek teljesítése esetén Franciaország elfogadja, hogy a német és a francia hadsereget azonos fegyvernemek alkossák, illetve a német és az anyaországi francia hadsereg méretében is megegyezzen. Németország azonban elutasító választ adott a francia javaslatokra. Elfogadhatatlannak vélte azt, hogy a két hadsereg létszámában egyenlőtlenség álljon fenn a francia gyarmati csapatok révén, továbbá elutasította a Népszövetségbe való visszatérésre vonatkozó kérést, fenntartotta azonban követeléseit a német hadsereg létszámára vonatkozóan.

Annak érdekében, hogy a szakítás Franciaország és Németország között elkerülhető legyen, Nagy-Britannia ismét vállalta a közvetítő szerepét. Fellépésével többek között azt kívánta elérni, hogy a németek és a franciák közvetlenül folytassanak tárgyalásokat a német újrafegyverkezés kérdésében.<sup>6</sup> Már korábban, egy 1934. január 29-én kelt memorandumban is a két ország közötti vitás ügyek rendezésére tett kompromisszumos javaslatot, amelyben a haderők helyszíni ellenőrzése helyett egy bizonytalan konzultációs rendszert kívánt

---

<sup>4</sup> WANDY CZ (1988): 337.

<sup>5</sup> Jean-Baptiste DUROSELLE: *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours*. Paris, 1993, 167.

<sup>6</sup> DUROSELLE (1985): 93.

létrehozni.<sup>7</sup> Az angol tervezet a MacDonald tervben meghatározott, illetve a Berlin által követelt létszám között határozta meg a hadsereg méretét az egyenlőség elve alapján. A tervezet elfogadtatása érdekében Eden február 17-én Párizsba, majd négy nappal később Berlinbe látogatott. Hitler azzal a feltétellel volt hajlandó igent mondani az angol javaslatra, ha abba bekerül egy, a német légiereőre vonatkozó kitétel. A helyzet megoldása a továbbiakban Franciaország lépésén múlt. A tervezet elfogadása ugyanis amellet, hogy a német újrafegyverkezést lehetővé tette volna, egy francia-német megegyezést hozott volna létre, ugyanakkor hátrányosan érintethette a francia szövetségi rendszer megerősítésre irányuló kísérleteket. Az elutasító válasz azonban Nagy-Britannia ellenszenvét növelte volna Franciaországgal szemben. A döntést végül elsősorban a belpolitikai erőviszonyok határozták meg. Párizsban Barthou és François-Poncet hajlott az angol javaslat elfogadására, Doumergue, Tardieu és Pétain marsall ellenzésével szemben.<sup>8</sup>

Az április 14.-i belpolitikai tanácskozáson két jegyzék született április 16.-i dátummal keelve. Egyik a Népszövetség francia osztályától származott és egy lehetséges leszerelési egyezmény feltételeit állapította meg. Eszerint egy ellenőrzési rendszer felállítására lenne szükség, amely a Népszövetségben létrehozandó állandó bizottsághoz tartozna. A másik jegyzék szerzője Doumergue volt. Figyelembe véve a március 22-én közzé tett német katonai költségvetési számokat, kijelentette, hogy Németország egyoldalúan nyilvánította ki akaratát az újrafegyverkezés megvalósítására, ezért Franciaország számára az egyetlen megoldást az jelenti, ha önállóan gondoskodik saját biztonságáról.

Április 17-én a Miniszterek Tanácsa egy szöveget fogadott el, amelyet a külügyminisztérium fogalmazott meg. Eszerint Franciaország nem folytathatja a tárgyalásokat Németországgal, hiszen semmibe vette a békeszerződés rendelkezéseit. Doumergue érvelését használva Franciaországnak saját eszközeivel kell szavatolnia biztonságát. A jegyzék felfogása teljesen eltért az eddig követett külpolitikai irányvonalától azáltal, hogy feladta a kollektív biztonság elvét, továbbá negatív hatással volt a brit szövetségre, egy lehetséges törést idézve elő a két ország külkapcsolataiban, hiszen Franciaországnak kellett viselnie a felelősséget a leszerelés kudarcáért. Ezt erősítette meg John Simon, brit külügyminiszter Genfben, kijelentve, hogy a német tervek közel álltak az angol javaslathoz, egyedül a francia magatartás gördített akadályt a

---

<sup>7</sup> DUROSELLE (1985): 94.

<sup>8</sup> Uo. 95.

megegyezés elé.<sup>9</sup> A jegyzék valójában a francia újrafegyverkezés irányába tett utalásokat, 1936-ig azonban ez irányba nem történt előrelépés.<sup>10</sup> MacDonalddal úgy vélte, hogy a francia jegyzéknek valójában akkor lett volna értelme, ha a francia vezetés készen állt volna fegyveres erővel megakadályozni a német újrafegyverkezést.<sup>11</sup>

### ***A keleti paktum terve***

Franciaország az április 17.-i jegyzéket követően diplomáciai ellenoffenzívába kezdett. A francia tervek egyrészt Briand-nak a keleti-Locarnóról alkotott elképzeléshez, másrészt Paul-Boncour-nak azon terveihez nyúltak vissza, mely a kelet-európai országok, illetve Olaszország és a Szovjetunió bevonásával kísérelte megerősíteni a szövetségi rendszert. Barthou azonban tisztában volt külpolitikai lépésének azzal a következményével is, hogy Franciaország az olasz és a szovjet kapcsolatok erősítése révén minden bizonnyal kivívja majd a kisantant államainak ellenszenvét.<sup>12</sup> Ez a tény így némiképp árnyaltabbá tette Barthou diplomáciáját, amelynek célja így nem a keleti szövetségesek irányába történő elköteleződés volt.<sup>13</sup>

A Szovjetunióval és Olaszországgal folytatott közvetlen tárgyalásokkal párhuzamosan a francia külügyminiszter egy multilaterális egyezmény megvalósítására is tett lépéseket, ami Nagy-Britannia támogatásával találkozott. Barthou a tervezett keleti paktumon belül is különleges szerepet szánt a francia-szovjet kapcsolatoknak, ezáltal egy kétoldalú szerződéssel egészítette volna ki az egyezményt. A kölcsönös segítségnyújtás elvén alapuló javaslat a kelet-európai államok mellett Németország számára is lehetővé tette a csatlakozást. A németek bevonása Barthou számára különösen fontossággal bírt, amelyért cserébe az újrafegyverkezés törvényesítését is kilátásba helyezte.<sup>14</sup> Németország azonban nem mondott a felkínált lehetőségre, ahogyan korábban is elutasított minden olyan egyezményt, amely keleti határainak garantálására kötelezte.<sup>15</sup> Noha egy újabb multilaterális egyezményhez való csatlakozás védelmet jelenthetett számára egy külső támadással

---

<sup>9</sup> Uo. 98.

<sup>10</sup> Anthony ADAMTHWAITE: *Grandeur and Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940*, London, 1995.

<sup>11</sup> *Documents diplomatiques français*, DDF I. VI 322.

<sup>12</sup> WANDYDZ (1988): 339.

<sup>13</sup> Nicole JORDAN: *The Popular Front and Central Europe: The Dilemmas of French Impotence, 1918-1940*. Cambridge, 1992, 31.

<sup>14</sup> Uo. 30.

<sup>15</sup> DUROSELLE (1985): 107.

szemben, de egyúttal felfedte volna az újrafegyverkezésre irányuló terveit Franciaország előtt. Az is nyilvánvaló volt a német vezetés számára, hogy a paktum tervének elutasítása a francia-szovjet kapcsolatok további erősödését vonhatja maga után, ebben az esetben azonban Franciaország veszíthet hiteléből a Szovjetunióval ellenséges viszonyban álló kelet-európai országok szemében.<sup>16</sup> Berlin 1934 szeptemberében tehát véglegesen elutasította a paktumhoz való csatlakozást, és remélte, hogy Lengyelország is hasonló lépésre szánja el magát. Varsó számára ugyanis a keleti paktumról folytatott tárgyalások egyúttal azt is jelentették, hogy Franciaország csökkentené korábbi, az 1921-es katonai egyezményben foglalt kötelezettségeit Lengyelország irányába.<sup>17</sup>

A kudarc egyik következményeként Barthou ismét Olaszország és a Szovjetunió irányába fordult. Az 1934 szeptemberében zajló tárgyalások során már az olaszok előtt egy dunai paktum tervét vázolta fel, ezáltal biztosítva Ausztria politikai és gazdasági védelmét. Ezek a kétoldalú megbeszélések valójában hasonló célt szolgáltak azokhoz, amelyek elérésére a francia diplomácia korábban is törekedett a négyhatalmi paktumról folyó tárgyalások alatt: egy közös francia-olasz front létrehozását Németországgal szemben, ami tovább erősítette volna a francia pozíciókat a fegyverzetcsökkentésről zajló tárgyalások során.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Laval diplomáciája***

A Barthou elleni merényletet követően, 1934. október 13-án Pierre Laval foglalta el a külügyminiszteri posztot. A marseilles-i események a francia vezetésben is változást hoztak: az új kormány Pierre-Étienne Flandin irányításával alakult meg. Barthou halálát követően számos külpolitikai kérdés maradt nyitva. A keleti paktum tervének kudarca után is folytatódtak a tárgyalások a Szovjetunióval és Olaszországgal, konkrét megállapodás azonban egyik állammal sem született. A külügyminiszter elleni merénylet következtében Laval külpolitikájának fő célja ezért egy olyan, különböző paktumok és szövetségeken alapuló összetett biztonsági rendszer megteremtése volt, amely képesnek bizonyulhatott egy, Franciaország biztonságát érintő fenyegetés elhárítására.

A személycsere a külügyminisztérium élén a francia-német

---

<sup>16</sup> Gerhard L. WEINBERG: *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936*, Chichago, 1970, 183.

<sup>17</sup> JORDAN (1992): 31.

<sup>18</sup> Uo. 29.

kapcsolatok további alakulására is hatással volt. Laval elődjéhez képest fontosnak tartotta, hogy a német kapcsolatban nagymértékű javulás kezdődjön, ha valódi párbeszédre nem igen látszott lehetőség.<sup>19</sup> A francia-német közeledés így kiemelt szerephez jutott a külügyminisztersége alatt, és elsődleges célja volt, hogy elkerülje a két ország közötti konfrontációt, noha az események további menete erre egyre kisebb mértékben nyújtott lehetőséget.

### ***A Saar-vidék kérdése***

A versailles-i békeszerződés a Saar-vidéket ideiglenesen a Népszövetség irányítása alá helyezte, így annak visszatérése Németországhoz már korábban napirendre került a német vezetésben. A terület visszacsatolásának megakadályozására Franciaországnak egyetlen lehetősége az volt, ha sikerül elérnie egy népszavazás kiírását a kérdésben. Ezt a francia vezetés 1933 folyamán több alkalommal is követelte, Németország azonban következetesen elutasította a kérést. A terület visszacsatolása érdekében Berlin intenzív propagandakampányt folytatott, azt viszont nem sikerült elérnie, hogy a Saar-vidék népszavazás nélkül térjen vissza Németországhoz.<sup>20</sup> A népszavazás kiírásáról 1934 nyarán született döntés, és fél évvel később, 1935. január 13-án tartották meg. A döntést követően a két kormány megegyezett abban, hogy semmilyen befolyást nem gyakorol a választókra.

Barthou a visszacsatolás megakadályozásának érdekében számos, elsősorban pénzügyi erőfeszítést tett. Noha Franciaország számára az elérhető legjobb eset az volt, ha sikerül továbbra is fenntartani a status quo-t és a Saar-vidék nemzetközi státusza fennmaradhat, bár számolnia kellett a visszacsatolás lehetőségével is. Ezért a külügyminiszter 1934. augusztus 31.-i memorandumában meghatározott garanciákat kért a Népszövetségtől arra az esetre, ha a terület visszatérne Németországhoz. November 7-én Köster, párizsi német nagykövet azonban kijelentette, hogy a Saar-vidék visszatérése Németországhoz elsődleges fontosságú. A helyzet rendezésének érdekében így a Népszövetség elfogadta az angol-francia javaslatot, mely egy nemzetközi kontingens felállítására vonatkozott a népszavazás ellenőrzése céljából.

Laval külügyminiszteri kinevezését követően megváltozott Párizs magatartása a kérdésben, így, a Németországgal szembeni konfrontációt elkerülése végett, semmilyen további lépés nem történt

---

<sup>19</sup> WANDY CZ (1988): 371-372.

<sup>20</sup> WEINBERG (1970): 173-174.

a terület státuszának fenntartásának érdekében. A népszavazás nem meglepő módon teljes sikert hozott Németország számára: a lakosság kilencven százaléka a Németországhoz történő csatlakozás mellett voksolt. Ezt követően március 1-jén helyreállt a német szuverenitás a Saar-vidéken. Hitler még a népszavazás napján bejelentette, hogy nincs több területi követelése Franciaországgal szemben. A Saar-vidék kapcsán a továbbiakban is folytatódtak tárgyalások a két állam között, mivel a területen számos francia gazdasági érdekelttség volt, melynek eredményeként született a Saar-vidéki bányák visszavásárlásáról 1935. február 18-án Nápolyban egyezmény.<sup>21</sup> A népszavazás eredménye ennek ellenére nem vezetett a kapcsolatok romlásához, sőt még inkább megerősítette Laval szándékát a két ország között fennálló feszültség csökkentésére.

### ***A stresai front***

A francia-német kapcsolatok javítására irányuló tervek ellenére a leszerelés kérdése továbbra is nagy dilemmát jelentett a francia diplomácia számára. A berlini nagykövet, François-Poncet január folyamán arra megállapításra jutott, hogy Németország teljes energiájával az újrafegyverkezés felé fordul. A német hadsereg létszámát tekintve a francia külügy ugyanakkor nem rendelkezett pontos adatokkal, november végén körülbelül 300 ezer főre becsülte.<sup>22</sup> A berlini nagykövet aggodalma a tavasz folyamán egyre növekedett, miután egyre biztosabb értesüléseket szerzett a kérdésben.

A német újrafegyverkezés által jelentett problémára Franciaország egyelőre nem rendelkezett megoldással, de a leszerelés kérdése napirenden maradt. A francia diplomácia ezért Nagy-Britanniával próbált a kérdésben közös álláspontot kialakítani. A fegyverzetkorlátozást a tervek szerint ezúttal is egy általános egyezmény keretén belül vélték megvalósíthatónak, ezért februárban Flandin és Laval Londonba utazott a tárgyalások lebonyolítása céljából. Laval hajlandó volt engedményeket tenni a fegyverzetkorlátozás terén, ennek cserébe a britek beleegyeztek egy légi paktum támogatásába. Február 4-én François-Poncet és Phipps, brit nagykövet egy dokumentumot adott át Hitlernek, amely a tervezett légi megállapodást irányozta elő. Március elején azonban, a növekvő aggodalmak hatására, Nagy-Britannia egy fehér könyvet tett közzé, amelyben bejelentette a brit hadikiadások növelését, míg a francia kormány ezzel párhuzamosan egy törvénytervezetet nyújtott

---

<sup>21</sup> DUROSELLE (1985): 126-127.

<sup>22</sup> Uo. 128-129.



be, amely a katonai szolgálatot két évre állította vissza.<sup>23</sup>

Az olasz kapcsolatok szorosabbra vonása Laval külpolitikájában is kiemelt szerepet kapott. A német-olasz kapcsolatokban ugyanakkor a korábban fennálló együttműködést egyre hűvösebb viszony váltotta fel. Olaszország továbbra is ellenséges szemmel nézte az osztrák náci párt további erősödését, másrészt Mussolini egyre nagyobb érdeklődést tanúsított az iránt, hogy megvalósítsa kelet-afrikai ambícióit, amelyhez Franciaország támogatása, vagy legalábbis hallgatólagos beleegyezése nélkülözhetetlennek tűnt. Az olasz külpolitika részéről ezért egy erőteljes közeledés indult meg Franciaország irányába, aki szintén hajlandónak mutatkozott az együttműködés felelevenítésére.<sup>24</sup> Laval úgy számított, hogy a Rómával folytatott tárgyalások révén egy olasz-francia front alakulhat ki a leszerelés kérdésében, ami növelhetné az ország mozgásterét a Németországgal folytatott tárgyalásokon.<sup>25</sup> Ezért szorgalmazta, hogy minél hamarabb közös álláspontot alakítsanak ki a fegyverzetkorlátozás kérdésében.

A francia külügyminiszter 1935. január 4. és 8. között tartózkodott Rómában, ahol a tárgyalások során elsősorban gyarmati ügyek merültek fel a fegyverzetkorlátozás kérdése mellett. A találkozó végül eredményesnek bizonyult: a két állam megállapodott abban, hogy bizonyos feltételekkel legalizálják a német újrafegyverkezést, valamint megpróbálják elérni Németország részvételét a tervezett dunai paktumban, amely Ausztria biztonságát garantálná. Ha bármi veszélyezteteti Ausztria függetlenségét és integritását, a két állam konzultál a kérdésben. Egy titkos megállapodás pedig francia-olasz konzultációt írt elő arra az esetre, ha Németország teljes szabadságra törekedne az újrafegyverkezés terén.<sup>26</sup> Emellett Laval szabad kezet adott Olaszországnak Etiópiával kapcsolatos terveinek megvalósításában, a gyarmati kérdésekben tett kijelentései a későbbiekben azonban számos félreértéshez vezettek. Mussolini ugyanis a francia választ úgy értelmezte, hogy a külügyminiszter valóban támogatja az olasz terveket, ezzel szemben Franciaország csak Róma gazdasági terjeszkedéshez adott engedélyt.<sup>27</sup>

A korábbi, Németország újrafegyverkezésével kapcsolatos aggodalmak hamarosan megerősítést nyertek azáltal, hogy március 16-án Hitler bejelentette a hadkötelezettség visszaállítását és ezzel

---

<sup>23</sup> DUROSELLE (1993): 181.

<sup>24</sup> WEINBERG (1970):. 196.

<sup>25</sup> JORDAN (1992): 33.

<sup>26</sup> WEINBERG (1970): 196-197.

<sup>27</sup> DUROSELLE (1985): 133.

egyoldalúan megsértette a versailles-i szerződésben előírt rendelkezéseket. A döntés értelmében két évre emelkedett a katonai szolgálat ideje, a német hadsereg mérete pedig 36 hadosztályra növekedett. A német lépést követően Eden és John Simon külügyminiszter 1935. március 23-án Párizsban találkozott a francia külügyminiszterrel, ahol elfogadták a brit- francia- olasz találkozó tervét egy közös álláspont kialakítása céljából.

Az április 11. és 14. között Stresában megrendezett konferencia célja Németország egyoldalú lépésének elítélése és egy közös front kialakítása volt. A találkozó mégsem hozott áttörést. A három hatalom ugyan elítélte Németország cselekedetét és kifejezte óhaját a tárgyalások folytatására a fegyverzetkorlátozás ügyében, azonban további szankcióról nem született döntés, csak a már februárban a légi paktumról kialakított angol-francia álláspontot tartották fenn. A három résztvevő hatalom valójában mégsem mutatott ilyen egyetértést. Mussolini semleges álláspontra helyezkedett a német újrafegyverkezéssel kapcsolatban, mindenekelőtt Ausztria helyzetét tartva szem előtt. A francia küldöttség ugyanakkor panasz formájában a Népszövetség tanácsa elé kívánta terjeszteni a kérdést, amely azonban Nagy-Britannia elutasításába ütközött. John Simon már a német bejelentést követően, március 25-én Berlinbe látogatott, a fegyverzetkorlátozással kapcsolatos tárgyalások folytatása mellett állt ki nyíltan.<sup>28</sup> Emellett MacDonald miniszterelnökkel egyetértésben kijelentette, hogy Nagy-Britannia semmilyen elköteleződést nem kíván vállalni az ügyben.<sup>29</sup> Ha tehát a három nagyhatalomnak szándékában is állt folytatni a fegyverzetkorlátozásról szóló tárgyalásokat, a további események, így a júniusban aláírt brit-német flottaegyezmény, majd az etióp háború, megakadályozták ezt.

A stresai konferenciának így nem volt komoly hatása sem a francia-német kapcsolatokat, sem a német újrafegyverkezés kérdését tekintve. A német pozíciók ideiglenes meggyengülését követően, 1935 nyarán és őszen a nemzetközi helyzetben bekövetkezett változások azonban egyre inkább Németországnak kedveztek. A brit álláspont, valamint Franciaországnak a Szovjetunióval folytatott tárgyalásai, és végül Olaszország etióp háborúja mind hozzájárult ahhoz, hogy nem történt egységes fellépés a Németország által folytatott újrafegyverkezéssel szemben. A német vezetés így elkerülte azt, ami a legnagyobb veszélyt jelentette volna a hitleri külpolitikára, hogy a három másik európai nagyhatalom között közös megegyezés jöjjön létre a kérdésben. A tárgyalások késleltetésével és lassításával pedig

---

<sup>28</sup> JORDAN (1992): 34.

<sup>29</sup> DUROSELLE (1985): 137.

elterelte a figyelmet a német fegyverkezésről, lehetetlenné téve a megegyezést egy új biztonsági paktum létrehozásában.<sup>30</sup>

1935 márciusát követően így ismét a biztonsági szempontok kerültek előtérbe a francia külpolitikában és a már korábban kiépített szovjet kapcsolatok megerősítése is egyre nagyobb hangsúlyt kapott. Kezdetben Laval Barthou-hoz viszonyítva kevésbé tűnt hajlandónak egy hatékony együttműködés kialakítására a két ország között. A tavaszi események hatására azonban megtörtént az áttérés francia-szovjet kapcsolatokban, amikor is nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy egy többoldalú egyezmény megkötése semmiképpen sem valósítható meg. Laval ekkor kénytelen volt meghajolni a szovjetek akarata előtt, és hozzájárult egy kétoldalú szerződés aláírásához.<sup>31</sup> Két nappal a stresai konferencia előtt, április 9-én történt a bejelentés, hogy Franciaország egy kölcsönös segítségnyújtási szerződést készül aláírni a Szovjetunióval, amelyre május 2-án került sor Párizsban. A szerződés ratifikációja mégis félelemmel töltötte el a külügyminisztert, hiszen ezúttal Németország reakciójával is számolnia kellett. Laval az ősz folyamán ismételten a fegyverzetcsökkentés kérdésében kívánt eredményeket elérni, és ennek érdekében közvetlen tárgyalásokba bocsátkozni Németországgal, amely által elkerülhetőnek vélte a fegyverkezési versenyt.<sup>32</sup>

### ***A Rajna-vidék remilitarizálása***

A Rajna-vidék bal partját a versailles-i békeszerződés demilitarizált övezetté nyilvánította, amelyet a locarnói szerződés is megerősített, ennek értelmében a német hadseregnek a területre történő belépése agresszióknak minősült. A szerződés alapján így megelőzhetőnek látszott egy Franciaország elleni esetleges német támadás, a brit garancia pedig biztosítékot jelentett Németország számára egy esetleges francia támadással szemben. Az egyezmény valójában az egyik legfontosabb garanciát jelentette az európai béke megőrzése szempontjából, a Rajna-vidék esetleges remilitarizálása így a két szerződés felrúgását és egy európai háború kockázatát vonhatta maga után.

A Rajna-vidék kérdése és annak rendezése 1936 elejétől kezdve, a nemzetközi események hatására ismét napirendre került, amelyek közül a francia-szovjet egyezmény létrejöttét kell megemlíteni. Az eseményt követően Németország ugyanis a locarnói szerződés megszegésével vádolta a francia diplomáciát, azzal indokolva, hogy a

---

<sup>30</sup> WEINBERG (1970):. 218-219.

<sup>31</sup> JORDAN (1992): 38.

<sup>32</sup> Uo. 36.

paktum sérti a szerződés rendelkezéseit. Ezt a kormánynak címzett memorandumban hozta Párizs tudomására, kijelentve, hogy a locarnói szerződés egy megnevezési egyezményt is tartalmaz Franciaország és Németország között, tehát a Szovjetunió ellen irányuló német agresszió esetén Franciaországnak is be kellene avatkoznia a konfliktusba. Május 21-én elmondott beszédében Hitler Németország hűségét hangoztatta Locarno szelleméhez, és biztosította a nemzetközi közvéleményt arról, hogy a német politika kiemelt szándéka a szerződés tiszteletben tartása. A demilitarizált övezet felszámolására Hitler 1935 közepén tette meg az előkészületeket, de meg kellett várni a francia-szovjet paktum ratifikációjáról szóló döntést. A képviselőház 1936. február 27-én 353:164 arányban az egyezmény ratifikálása mellett határozott, a döntést pedig március 5-én a szenátus külügyi bizottsága is elfogadta.<sup>33</sup> Az eseményt követően, 1936. március 7-én vonultak be a német csapatok a demilitarizált övezetbe.

Az esemény külpolitikai háttere azonban korántsem volt ilyen egyszerű. A két szövetséges, Nagy-Britannia és Franciaország között ugyanis nem abban nem volt egyetértés, hogy milyen (ellen)lépést tegyen a két kormány a Rajna-vidéket érintő esetleges német katonai akció esetén. A Rajna-vidék Franciaország számára ugyanis kiemelt biztonsági szereppel bírt, és annak státuszában bekövetkező változások közvetlenül érintették, addig Nagy-Britannia számára nem képviselt létfontosságú érdekeket. A francia vezetés már jóval korábban, 1935 tavaszán foglalkozott a Rajna-vidék jövőjével és az azzal kapcsolatos német szándékkal. A francia tervek azonban, amelyek azonnali mozgósítást irányoztak elő a németek erőszakos lépése esetén, nem jutottak meghallgatásra a briteknél. A francia diplomácia újabb javaslata így már csak elővigyázatossági intézkedéseket helyezett kilátásba: abban az esetben, ha Németország bevonul a Rajna-vidékre, a lépés jogosságáról a döntést népszövetségi keretek között kell meghozni. Ha az jogtalanak minősül, a németek lépését katonai válasz követné, mivel a német akció egyértelműen a népszövetségi rendszer egyik alapja, a locarnói szerződés ellen irányul. A katonai erőszak alkalmazása azonban nem volt egyértelmű ebben a helyzetben. A januárban, Albert Sarraut vezetésével megalakult kormány és a külügyminisztérium számára a problémát elsősorban az jelentette, hogy egy nagyobb erejű német akció esetén a francia vezetés kénytelen lenne azonnal megtenni a válaszlépéseket, még a népszövetségi döntés meghozatala előtt. Ennek eredményeként azonban Franciaország

---

<sup>33</sup> DUROSELLE (1993): 192-193.

agresszorként jelenne meg a többi állam, elsősorban pedig Nagy-Britannia szemében. A katonai erőszak alkalmazásának legfontosabb feltétele viszont a brit részvétel lett volna, melyről azonban nem lehetett meggyőzni a londoni vezetést.<sup>34</sup>

Nemcsak a brit-francia megbeszéléseket jellemezte ellentét, de a francia kormány és a katonai vezetés között zajló egyeztetéseket is, ezért február 7-én sor került a találkozóra a kormány és a vezérkari főnökök között. Flandin, mint külügyminiszter határozottan a katonai ellenlépést helyezte kilátásba a német agresszió esetére, de javaslatára csak később kapott választ a hadügyi vezetéstől, Maurin tábornok aláírásával. A válaszjegyzékben azonban a katonai akció helyett csak óvintézkedésekről volt szó, mely a későbbiekben annyival egészült ki, hogy a katonai válaszlépés egyedül Nagy-Britannia teljes egyetértésével valósítható meg. A külügyminisztériumnak ezért nem maradt más lehetősége, mint hogy beleegyezzen a vezérkar döntésébe. A minisztertanács február 27.-i megbeszélésén született döntés arról, hogy a locarnói szerződés nyilvánvaló megsértése esetén a francia kormány a szerződés aláíróival egyetértésben fog cselekedni és lemond minden önálló válaszlépésről. Ezzel a kijelentéssel a vezérkar álláspontja győzedelmeskedett, amelynek háttérében több szempont húzódott meg. Amellett, hogy a francia hadsereg hagyományosan védekező jellegű volt, Gamelin vezérkari főnök felülbecsülte a német haderő nagyságát, ami szerinte ebben az időszakban már meghaladta a francia hadsereg méretét. Információi alapján úgy vélekedett, amelyek viszonylag pontosak voltak, hogy a német hadsereg megközelítőleg 480 ezer főből állhat szemben a 350 ezer főt számláló francia hadsereggel. Egy fontos különbség azonban fennállt a két hadsereg között: a tisztek száma ekkor a német hadseregben még alacsony, csak 13 ezer fő volt. Gamelin a hadsereg méreteinek ismeretében ezért nem merte megkockáztatni a két fél összecsapását.<sup>35</sup>

A Franciaország és Nagy-Britannia között folyó megbeszélések, valamint a francia belpolitikai döntések eredményeként a március 7.-i eseményeket megelőzően a két fél elhatározta, hogy semmilyen komolyabb ellenlépést nem tesz a német akcióval szemben. A döntésből azonban a két legfontosabb francia szövetségest, Lengyelországot és Csehszlovákiát zárták ki, akik azonban fontos résztvevői lehettek volna a Németország elleni fellépésnek. Gamelin megítélése szerint is a lengyel hadsereg beavatkozása Franciaország oldalán felbecsülhetetlen értékű lehetett volna.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>34</sup> WANDY CZ (1988): 432-433.

<sup>35</sup> DUROSELLE (1993): 164-168.

<sup>36</sup> WANDY CZ (1988): 433.

A Rajna-vidék remilitarizálása tehát valójában nem érte váratlanul a két nagyhatalmat. A berlini francia nagykövet részére március 7-én átadott memorandum egyoldalúan felmondta a locarnói szerződést Németország részéről. Végleges döntésre azonban csak másnap, illetve harmadnap került sor Párizsban a minisztertanács ülésén, amely a már február 27-én meghozott határozaton alapult, egyedül Maurin tábornok vélte úgy, hogy az általános mozgósítás az egyedüli lehetőség a helyzet megoldására. Ez azonban nemcsak a már említett okok miatt került elvetésre. Mivel a Laval bukását követően megalakult Sarraut - kormány megbízatása csak április-májusig szólt, ezért a márciusi eseményekre adott választ döntően befolyásolták a választási előkészületek, ennek tükrében egy esetleges katonai akció ötlete szinte örültségnek tűnhetett.<sup>37</sup>

A francia kormány tehát elvetette az egyoldalú katonai akció lehetőségét a Rajna-vidéken, amit a brit kormány álláspontja is megerősített. A brit nagykövet ugyan sajnálatosnak nevezte az eseményt, mégsem tartott kívánatosnak semmilyen lépést azelőtt, hogy az érdekelt kormányok ne konzultálnának a kérdésben.<sup>38</sup> A tárgyalások március 10-től kezdődően zajlottak a locarnói szerződésben részt vevő államok között, ahol is Anthony Eden, brit külügyminiszter álláspontja jutott érvényre. Nagy-Britannia tehát ezúttal is mind a katonai, mind a gazdasági szankciók lehetőségét elvetette, és kizárólag egy megnemtámadási paktumra tett javaslatot. A legfontosabb döntések meghozatalára mégis kilenc nappal később, március 19-én került sor. Ennek értelmében Németországot agresszorral nyilvánították, továbbá arról is határoztak, hogy a brit vezetés Franciaország és Belgium számára garanciát nyújt egy német támadás esetén. A döntés következtében ugyan a locarnói garanciák érvényben maradtak, erről azonban már csakis elviekben volt szó.

---

<sup>37</sup> Raymond POIDEVIN - Jacques BARIÉTY: *Lés Relations franco- allemandes, 1815- 1975*. Paris, 1977, 294.

<sup>38</sup> DUROSELLE (1993): 172.

**Ramachandra Byrappa**

***The Troubling Interval 1945-1950  
The dark and dusty years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Indian  
history (Part One)***

**Abstract**

In the dark and dust-filled night of India's independence, truth was made a beggar and perfidy made its malignant tailor. Silence and disinformation, manipulative use of historic narrative have always been the trademarks of officially sponsored appreciation of Indian history. This is especially true of the period 1945-1950. Five unruly years that transfigured the essence of Indian history for the benefit of those who never held in high esteem loyalty to that land, and its people.

*Keywords* : India, British-India, princely-states, Hinduism, Congress, Gandhi, Bose, Nehru, Vallabhai, Brahmanism

Not long ago one of my attentive Hungarian students said the following: „*There is a lot written and said about 1947 independence and the 1950 proclamation of the republic and the new constitution, but concerning the period in between there is a relative silence! It seems to me that there are too many lapses.*” He might as well have called it a „*troubling silence*” since, as it can be imagined, a lot did happen during and immediately after the precipitated departure of the British. The period is all the more important because much of the history of India since Independence cannot be explained with consistency, without understanding what happened during this period. One can almost think that a lot of historians dealing with the so called „*post-independence*” period have a fundamental problem in defining these few years. We don't know if it was a new beginning or the continuation of the old with a determined ruthlessness.

The urge to pen this study was always impending in the back of my mind because I felt that it was a period of dust-erupted darkness in which truth was twisted and smudged. It always disturbed me to think of the interim period, it was a period in which most of the „*facts*” and the „*truths*” were creatively transformed to suit a well-choreographed plan of operation. It was a period when genuine heroes were portrayed as „*quislings*” or traitors; a period when traitors and collaborators were accoladed as saviours and let loose as almighty nationalists, a time when false saints were turned into demi-gods. It was probably, a period when a great civilisation

suffered its deepest injuries, a period when a proud civilisation was finally brought to its knees. As a citizen of India, like millions of others, I try to accommodate and digest this heritage in silence. But as a historian I still have to come to terms with what happened in this period. If one is uncertain about the fundamentals of a defining period, how is one to build-upon and move-on to the next stage? It is time to make a statement, put forward a perspective on that period which still has no proper name or a face to contemplate.

The job of the historian becomes extremely difficult, since most of the official documents of the time were drafted in view of what we are supposed think of those events. Since 1861, the time the British Crown took over from the East India Company, public documents and pronouncements were „planned” and surely „managed”. In the same manner, the British were also extremely efficient in managing people who „collaborated” with them. So all information coming from those who were close to British power or those nurtured by it also becomes questionable. The idea that we should work with purpose oriented documents should be brushed aside, since these will only yield what their authors wanted them to and not what scientific and authoritative investigation demands. When investigating this interim period a historian is condemned to prudence and vigilance. Priority has to be given to alternative sources, although one is conscious of the fact that these are difficult to collect and that very few are available to the public. One should not hesitate to put forward a modest historical construction from few honest sources, than build edifices based on purpose-built facts.

The narrative of today’s India is punctuated by the withdrawal of the British in 1947 followed by the debate surrounding the Indian Constitution and its proclamation in early 1950. In such, historians have a tendency to deal with this period as „preparatory years” and inconsequential to the larger picture or the sequential of events. Bidyut Chakrabarty, in his *Indian Politics and Society since Independence – Events, Processes and Ideology*, says: „Three major ideological influences seem to have been critical in Indian politics colonialism, nationalism and democracy. The colonial, nationalist and democratic articulation of ‘the political’ remains therefore crucial in comprehending Indian politics even after decolonization. Two points need to be kept in mind. First, although colonialism and nationalism are surely antagonistic to each other there is no doubt that the former provoked circumstances in which nationalism emerged as a powerful ideology to articulate the voices of the colonized. Second, colonialism also led to a slow process of



*democratization by gradually involving people who were favourably disposed towards the alien administration.*<sup>1</sup> Although the author tries to exemplify the complexity of the situation, his semantics and syntax of historiography are not far removed from the norm of the officialised version. A complex situation becomes extremely complex when we mishmash concepts and terms to explain something, when in reality the situation demands honest clarification and not another addition to the existing confusion.

For one thing, just because colonialism provoked nationalism, the resulting nationalism need not become colonialism. If Chakrabarty wants to tell us that the three ideologies coexist in one form or another, then we can give credit to his worthy statement. But how is it logically possible to imagine that there was one consolidated notion of colonisation or nationalism, in a diverse landmass as that of India, especially in the interim period? For all intents and purposes, M. K. Gandhi did not embody Indian nationalism, if he did then there were many who thought contrary to him. The thing to understand about Indian history since the so called Independence is that nationalism and colonialism are not distinct and sequential as Chakrabarty pretends them to be. In reality, in the context of the Indian Subcontinent, both nationalism and colonialism are intertwined or enmeshed into one entity and cannot be separated from one another, they form an organic whole. This is especially true when Gandhi intimately equated Indian nationalism with Hinduism, which in its practical form was nothing other than the political expression of Brahmanism.

When M.K. Gandhi side-stepped into Brahmanism in the name of freedom fighting, he legitimated a silent and salient form of colonialism which was too glad to call itself „*nationalism*”. None can deny the fact that, from times immemorial, Brahmanism was an integral part of every conquest, tyranny, treason and colonial rule. Every time the country was attacked and invaded this category quickly accommodated itself to become the real ruler, the hand in the glove of foreign conquest. Only did the country have a brief respite during the East India Company rule, as was during the early years of Emperor Ashoka, when Brahmanism was temporarily kept at arms distance, to allow for a brief respite in economic recuperation and cultural flowering. But this was rapidly changed by the coup d'état executed by the British Crown during the 1857 uprising and sealed by the 1861 India Act. Along with the East India Company a part of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Bidyut CHAKRABARTY: *Indian Politics and Society since Independence – events, processes and ideology*, Routledge, New York, 2008, 2.

Indian nation was defeated and brutally put down. And as was expected, Brahmanism in the likes of Gandhis and Nehrus prospered everywhere, they worked hand-in-hand and shared the fruits of India's toil. Tight collaboration with a colonial system cannot be equated to nationalism, it does not simply make sense. They were all too keen to imitate their foreign partners and pander to their whims and wants. Not only was Gandhi not nationalism by Western standards, he was not even by Indian standards. His resistance to the reform of the caste-system showed that he was strictly in his brahminess, and this „*caste patriot*” cannot be a symbol of India's nationalism or anything coming out of that soil.

If the gentlemen who grabbed power during the interim period did not have a nationalist ideology, what then did they mobilise as modus operandi? Anyone who has the time to decipher the works of V.P. Menon, part architect and part chronicler of his own deeds and that of the interim period, will soon realise that there was nothing to do with independence or nationalism, and everything related to do with unhindered power or the cravings for it. Nehru was in a process of monopolising power in his hands, against the wishes of everyone.<sup>2</sup> For the historian, what matters is the flow of history and the direction it takes. Anyone with a stern eye fixed on two matrixes, namely that of territorial expansion and the process of centralisation, will notice that since the beginning of the 1800s these two elements were moving in one direction, and with accrued intensity. During the East India Company rule, there was a central authority but its scope was marginal. In terms of territorial ambitions and control, it limited itself to the seaboards and the river valleys. When the British Crown took over in 1861, centralisation gathered pace with remarkable extension of its power and its scope, but by today's proportions it was no way near. And without surprise, the territorial ambitions of Gandhi and associates, and their appetite for power took torrential proportions, with an intensity and brutality not seen since the early 1800s. A period when the Hindu power at that time, the Marathas, rampaged the country, uprooting thousand-year communities and sowing the seeds of irreversible economic disintegration.<sup>3</sup> This trend obliges us to re-evaluate, the contribution of the group led by M.K.

---

<sup>2</sup> V.P. MENON: *The Transfer of Power in India*, Orient Longmans, Calcutta, 1957, 272

<sup>3</sup> As the paramount power in India, mainly dominating the interior India, the brahmin Marathas terrorised the people physically and economically. They used the Pindarees (Rajputs) to decimate and systematically liquidate village heads mainly in the Deccan areas of the country.

Gandhi and his own nature and his way of doing things. Who were these men who came from the north-western rim of India and towards what goals they were working?

Although it is widely written that these men, in the final hours of the British withdrawal, had all had the popular support and were the legitimate for all purposes and ends, the reality is far removed from this. Sweet faced charmers and amiable characters overnight became soured and insecure, especially when it came to dealing with the Indian people, as if, all of a sudden they were finally showing their true colours.

Gandhi himself publicly disavowed himself, his weaknesses and shortcomings. In his *„The story of my experiments with truth”*<sup>4</sup> Gandhi goes into minute detail about his intimate character. In chapter 6 –A Tragedy, reflecting bad acquaintances and friendship he says the following: *„A reformer cannot afford to have close intimacy with him whom he seeks to reform. True friendship is an identity of souls rarely to be found in this world. Only between like natures can friendship be altogether worthy and enduring. Friends react on one another. Hence in friendship there is very little scope for reform. I am of opinion that all exclusive intimacies are to be avoided; for man takes in vice far more readily than virtue.”*<sup>5</sup> After cataloguing a long list of his very grave short-comings, M.K. Gandhi solemnly declares, *„From a strictly ethical point of view, all these occasions must be regarded as moral lapses...”*<sup>6</sup> In both these instances Gandhi has told us everything, although removed from the immediate context of the interim years. His long and intimate relationship / friendship / love / sublimation of British power fits the above described friendship and its consequences; this time not for himself but to a nation already decimated by repression, hunger and disrobed of its inner-most dignity. What is there to tell us that those *„moral lapses”* did not continue until his last days? As historians, and in the

---

<sup>4</sup> M. K. GANDHI: *An autobiography or the story of my experiments with truth*, translated from Gujarati by Mahadev Desai, Gandhi Book Centre, Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal, available online at: <http://www.mkgandhi.org/ebks/gandhiebooks.htm#autobio> (2015-08-30).

<sup>5</sup> M. K. GANDHI: *An autobiography or the story of my experiments with truth*, translated from Gujarati by Mahadev Desai, Gandhi Book Centre, Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal, available online at: <http://www.mkgandhi.org/ebks/gandhiebooks.htm#autobio> (2015-08-30), Chap. 6, page 10.

<sup>6</sup> M. K. GANDHI: *An autobiography or the story of my experiments with truth*, translated from Gujarati by Mahadev Desai, Gandhi Book Centre, Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal, available online at: <http://www.mkgandhi.org/ebks/gandhiebooks.htm#autobio> (2015-08-30), Chap. 7, page 12.

name of rectitude, we have to get used to the habit of not showing so much magnanimity towards Gandhi and his trusted undertakers; their true intentions were masked from the beginning and as was expected everyone failed to notice it.

For the purpose of introducing rationality and sanity into the interpretation of Indian history we have to maintain the purity of concepts so that we can isolate them, and analyse their meaning in a specific context. We cannot use the concept of 'nationalism' to a multitude of ideologies and personalities that can equally be qualified as something else. Simone Panter-Brick for example tries to make sense of M.K. Gandhi's ideology in the following manner: „*The concept of indianity can be used to describe the matrix of British India under direct rule, and of a sizeable Princely India, which was autonomous in internal matters. Indianity equally applies to the India of previous conquerors, with its shifting shapes and frontiers. And although Gandhi admired the indianity of old and was bent of clearing from it the taint of untouchability, among other desirable elements, he politically adhered to India as shaped by British hands.*”<sup>7</sup> The Soviet Union had to reclassify Gandhi several times, as relations between the two countries evolved, and they had no difficulty in doing so.<sup>8</sup> The Mahatma is quoted as saying, *The opinions I have formed and the conclusions I have arrived at are not final. I may change them tomorrow...*<sup>9</sup> And he quite often did change his opinion, regularly changed his affinities and priorities; in all of this it should be clearly stated that India as a nation never took a central place in his actions, he always saw it as an adage to something else. He and not India was always occupying a central position. The colonial media, and allotted news items to foreign media, made sure that everything orbited around Gandhi and not India or its people.

Gandhi's character, methods and his attachments are fundamental to the interim period and beyond because the only legitimacy for the transfer of power to certain people and not others depended upon Gandhi's personal preferences, Gandhi was the gate keeper. The colonial authorities in turn gave a free hand to Gandhi because he leveraged his power over the masses through a political Hinduism. In essence the system was a round a about system of legitimising certain

---

<sup>7</sup> Simone PANTER-BRICK: *Gandhi and Nationalism*, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> Associated Press: *Russians Give Gandhi a New Image*, The Day (news daily), Jan. 26, 1972.

<sup>9</sup> Taya ZINKIN: *Gandhi's Legacy* (syndicated article), Toledo Blade, April2, 1958.

political actors who were hand-picked. There was no evidence at the time that these pretenders for power had enjoyed the popular legitimacy. Outside the urban areas in the North-West India and Delhi, there is little evidence to prove that they had too much political leverage. This was especially true when Bose chose the military option to overthrow the British system of exactions in India in the late 1930s. In any case the method in which they grabbed power, illustrates well that they did not have the whole hearted or even half-hearted consent of the people. In the absence of any reliable legitimacy how were they, as pretenders to paramount political power, able to insert themselves into the power structure is the main question that one has to ask oneself. There is no central ideology or dogma that enticed these Gandhian elite circles to the people on the ground.

No fixed ideology or principles, so what does this leave us with? A group of ruthless men determined to grab power, as soon as the British hands started to tremble in the final months of the Second World War. If their British masters fall, they fall. Something had to be done and should be done quickly and without notice from the Indian people. They knew their weaknesses very well. While Gandhi and followers were conducting expensive experiments in poverty, and succumbing to tactical imprisonments, others were mobilising their forces from village to village, and their pace was gathering. The support for a mass uprising to adjoin an armed invasion of British India by Subhash Chandra Bose was rapidly gaining ground. The Americans, stationed in India were fully aware of this evolution.<sup>10</sup> All the well laid plans could go astray.

Panic reigned in the Congress and its British partnership. What Gandhi and companions did in the very beginning of the interim period, according to their own recognition, has all the ingredients of a coup d'état. By 1943, Subhash Chandra Bose had emerged as the strongest leader in the hearts and minds of the Indian people, compared to the designated freedom fighters of the Gandhi camp. The Forward Bloc, created by Bose after his resignation from the Congress in 1939, was fast growing, with a momentous transfer of popular sovereignty to it.<sup>11</sup> Up to this point the strategy of the colonial authorities and M.K. Gandhi was to shift the nationalist dynamism from Bengal and the eastern flank towards Bombay and the western

---

<sup>10</sup> The Milwaukee Sentinel: *Subose Chandra Bose Now an Ally of the Japs*, Milwaukee, Apr 18, 1944.

<sup>11</sup> Special Correspondant: *India's Part in the War – Congress and Future British Aims, Obstacles to Federation*, The Sydney Morning Herald, Nov 9, 1939.

flank. The scope of this essay does not permit me take the reader into this part of the history of the designated freedom fighters. But the reader should be alerted to the fact that the job of Gandhi and soulmates was to sap the solid nationalist base built up by a group centred in Bengal. At first Gandhi tried to seduce and control two key figures like Tagore and Bose, but that was a tall order, they were true nationalists, in bone and marrow. British fostered „*Indian nationalism*” took the upper hand as the British authorities tried to physically isolate and then eliminate Bose and disciples.

Gandhi and his tight-knit legion of freedom fighters, had one final opportunity to clinch power from the British before it was taken from them by force by the real Indian freedom fighters. It was a period of intense rifts and arguments between Gandhi and Nehru but this was intended to mask the development of an alternative strategy to distance the Bengalis from the corridors of power. Since 1905 the British had developed a strategy to divide Bengal in order to weaken the Bengali power base, but it could not be done effectively. The Bengalis had built their strategy of mobilisation of the rural masses, untouched by Congress urbanite apparatus. The influence of the Bengalis was not restricted to the province alone, it was bridged across from most of South India to all of the North-Eastern provinces, and it was gaining pace.

Gandhi and Nehru masterfully introduce Mohamed Ali Jinnah into the game. Jinnah was extremely successful, too successful to be controlled by Gandhi and very much wants a large slice of the cake than it is palatable to the rest. Nehru sees a clear opportunity to satisfy the British wishes to destroy Bengali identity and fulfil his personal ambition of taking control of a vast country, confronting the Bengalis and the Muslims at the same time would be a difficult task. Nehru decided that both aims could be achieved in one go. Hence onwards, exacerbating the relations with the Muslims becomes an urgent priority for the Congress members. „*Wavell believed that Congress leaders rejected the notion of parity with the Muslim League because they sought to dominate the interim government. ... The Congress response was to complain that the central government was too weak, and that the interim government should function...as a de-facto independent government.*”<sup>12</sup> Wavell, previously a military man and Chief of Staff of the Indian Armed Forces knows that this could cause a bloodbath, he does not trust the Congress and does not want to

---

<sup>12</sup> William F. KURACINA: *The State and Governance in India*, Routledge, New York, 2010, 160.

concentrate power in their corrupt hands.

On the Bengali political wing, Jayaprakash Narayan who was not an ethnic Bengali, clearly sees what is going to happen. *Narayan insisted that a popularly elected constituent assembly should be created to properly represent popular sovereignty. Narayan also warned that the interim government could never function as a free government until the viceroy, the British Army, and all other British officials departed. Narayan also feared that, without full popular sanction, the constituent assembly might make a series of compromises that would produce "neither freedom, nor democracy, nor national unity."*<sup>13</sup> Nehru and comrades do not request elections to constitute a constituent assembly, instead they are more keen to get their hands firmly in control of the levers of power. And due to the fact that during the war India had become a hub to operations stretching from North-Africa to Asia's Pacific Rim, power was extremely concentrated, with powers to almost do as one sees it fit to. The high men of the Congress wanted this power intact, suddenly their complaints about a dictatorial government vanished. Now the only complaints they had were about delays and obstacles that stopped them from making the final grab. Whenever the colonial authorities tried to take a measure to loosen the structure in favour of a wider consultation, the Congress movement rushed to create its own structures to tighten its grip on the power that was seeping out of the British hands, with the strict aim of avoiding others get involved or contest their rising supremacy.

The British authorities were under immense pressure from all corners to create a constituent assembly, in spite of Congress protestations. Once the constituent assembly was put into motion however, Congress worked to create an Executive Committee to oversee the proceedings. Everyone thought that this executive committee was to deal with the everyday affairs of putting the constituent assembly together. No, its function was somewhere else. Once created the Executive Committee then filled it with members it chose, with Nehru at the top; as always was with the Gandhi's approval. Then when in August 1946 when the Congress finally decided to join the interim government, it transformed the Executive Committee into the new Cabinet.<sup>14</sup> It was a master stroke, the British authorities came to believe that the Committee had the backing of all the members of the Constituent Assembly. And as for the Indians,

---

<sup>13</sup> KURACINA (2010): 160.

<sup>14</sup> William F. KURACINA: *The State and Governance in India*, Routledge, New York, 2010, 160-161

everyone thought the Committee to be a temporary structure. But once the Congress supremoes had they hands on the executive levers of power all internal opposition was squashed or brushed aside, without any consideration to ethics or principles of democracy. It was a simple and straightforward crook's grab for power. *'On August 20, Jawaharlal Nehru submitted the Congress list of thirteen nominees for the interim government. Seven Congress members of the interim government were sworn in on September 2, four more were added on September 11.'*<sup>15</sup> During this process the Muslim league members were progressively side-lined with threats from Vallabhai Patel. In an interview Jinnah mentions that Patel threatened to unleash civil war if the League did not heed to Congress demands.<sup>16</sup> In other terms, he would unleash hindu fanatics into urban areas where Muslims lived.

The only people who could interrupt the process of Congress power consolidation were Bose, Jinnah and Jayaprakash Narayan. Bose was isolated and not even in the country and Narayan was either regularly imprisoned in appalling conditions or living a clandestine life, escaping British assassination attempts. Just one man could derail Nehru's plan – Mohamed Ali Jinnah. In the process to keep Jinnah quiet and keep his confidence in place a quick alteration had to be made to the plan. The famous Life Magazine photographer, Margaret Bourke White writes the following in her autobiography: *'With freedom finally on the horizon, Jinnah masterminded the game so adroitly that within months he was to win Pakistan. Jinnah announced what he called Direct Action Day: „We will have,“ he insisted, „either a divided India or a destroyed India.“ On the heels of this announcement, violence broke out in Calcutta. I flew there from Bombay and found a scene that looked like Buchenwald. The streets were literally strewn with dead bodies, an officially estimated six thousand, but I myself saw many more.'*<sup>17</sup> Margaret Bourke White describes the determination of Jinnah and its catastrophic consequences, but she knew little what went on behind the scenes during the period. Like her, we historians, have to stitch-in the missing pieces. Concerning Mohamed Ali Jinnah, historians still have the task of asking a simple question and bringing a substantive reply to it. The legitimate question we have to ask ourselves concerning Jinnah is: Was Jinnah groomed for a specific

---

<sup>15</sup> KURACINA (2010): 161.

<sup>16</sup> Preston GROVER: *India's Future May Hinge on British Mission* (syndicated article), Schenectady Gazette, March 22nd, 1946, p9

<sup>17</sup> Margaret BOURKE-WHITE: *Portrait Of Myself Margaret Bourke White*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1963, 283.



purpose as was Gandhi and Nehru were? If yes by whom and for what purpose? It is in the interest of academic sobriety that these questions be answered. But if as Margaret Bourke White suggests that Jinnah was a tactical master who made timely use of his demands, Nehru and his colleagues would have heeded only if his demands were marginal compared to their designs on the rest of India. Compared to the post-independence period and the effect of the Indo-Pakistan conflict on Nehru's „consolidation” of India, Jinnah surely demanded very little compared to the service he rendered. Jinnah was dealt with and would not hinder the ambitious plans of Gandhi-Nehru tandem. I will develop this idea in a later occasion.

The troubling point and real danger to Nehru's plot was Jayaprakash Narayan, the most emblematic leader who reflected the real aspirations of the people. If there was a leader at that time who knew his people and their aspirations, it was Narayan. He liked to see himself as a social-democrat but in that lay his undoing. Nehru used this opportunity to portray him as a communist and thus an objectionable element in the eyes of the public in the West.<sup>18</sup> Nehru put his fascination for communism temporarily at rest. In his attack, Nehru singled out the *'The Socialist Railwaymen's Federation'*, headed by none other than then Jayaprakash.<sup>19</sup> But once again Margaret Bourke White comes to the rescue of Narayan because she had come into contact with him and met with many left wing intellectuals and activists on the ground. In the same issue of the Milwaukee Journal she says, on the occasion of her book presentation *'Halfway to Freedom'*: „An estimated 80,000 of the subcontinent's 400 million people are members of the Communist party, she said, but the party's influence is small. „Unless the governments make the same mistake that the Chiang government in China made, the Communists are not feared.”<sup>20</sup> As if to protect the reputation of its own sons the Milwaukee Journal then goes on to list the academic credentials of Narayan, achieved in the best of American universities and tells that he had done this through his own effort, unlike Gandhi and Nehru. The paper also makes it clear to its readers that Narayan has no links to the Communist party.<sup>21</sup> Whatever the

---

<sup>18</sup> The Milwaukee Journal: *Nehru Blasts Red sin India- Tells of Sabotage*, March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1949, Milwaukee, 6.

<sup>19</sup> The Milwaukee Journal: *Nehru Blasts Red sin India- Tells of Sabotage*, March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1949, Milwaukee, 6.

<sup>20</sup> The Milwaukee Journal: *Communist Rule for India Doubted*, March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1949, Milwaukee, 6.

<sup>21</sup> The Milwaukee Journal: *Nehru Blasts Red sin India- Tells of Sabotage*, March 1<sup>st</sup>, 1949, Milwaukee, 6.

outside world might think, did not deter Nehru and Vallabhai Patel to resort to police harassment. Their aim was to make sure that Narayan does not organise a challenge from below. It was becoming very clear what kind of state structure the new India was going to embrace. Compromises, personal ambitions and the need to curtail free Indians dictated the process of transition, if one can call it that.

Some however, think that it was the partition which dictated the characteristics of post-independence India. *Post-colonial India was the mode of government that emerged from the chaos of Partition, a state that absorbed much of the superstructure created by the British.*<sup>22</sup> Structurally, most of the historians were expected to fall into this trap. By these kind of statements and conclusions that would like to have us believe that the process of partition suddenly made mild, moderate and ethically immaculate democrats somehow become rapacious colonial predators, ready to kill and appropriate with indiscriminate passion. By looking at the immediate events of the Partition, some historians forget to see the simple truths of the „*medium*” and „*long*” cycles or stretches of Indian history. The Gandhian propaganda of non-violence masks the logical build-up of the transfer of power without structural changes. The Second World War interrupted but did not alter the planned course of events building up towards the imminent withdrawal of British power from India in 1947.

Those historians who are interested in hard facts and not prefabricated propaganda will realise that Gandhi was brought back to India in 1915 to help the British rule without loss of life to their own ranks and leave at will and without moral or financial consequences. Nehru was groomed to rule India because he was acceptable to their post-independence prescription. Otherwise, in essence nothing was to be different, neither the intensity nor depth of suffering of the Indian people. It was not a relief and never meant to be. Just because the international community started to believe in its own interpretation does not mean anything had changed on the ground. Talking of the dinner parties after independence day the New York Times says the following: „*It was a surreal occasion — Britain renouncing and dividing up the jewel of empire with every appearance of satisfaction; India and Pakistan applauding a freedom that would soon be engulfed by bloodshed and war.*”<sup>23</sup> It

---

<sup>22</sup> William F. KURACINA: *The State and Governance in India*, Routledge, New York, 2010, 162.

<sup>23</sup> Ben MACINTYRE: *Exit Strategy*, New York Times, Published: September 2, 2007, online: [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/books/review/Macintyre-t.html?\\_r=3&pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/books/review/Macintyre-t.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all) (2015-08-27).

was just another day in the life of the British Empire. To this surreal picture was added another grand oeuvre of everything being a family affair, where the „independencers” and the „dispensers” of independence brushed shoulders like one big family: „*The warmth shared by India’s new Prime Minister and Lady Mountbatten was obvious. It was equally obvious that Lord Mountbatten minded not at all. In contrast to the erupting turmoil across the subcontinent, the scene between imperial lord and victorious revolutionary that night was one of astonishing civility.*”<sup>24</sup> According to this description, one would think that this was the re-enactment of the coronation of Napoleon I with the beautiful Josephine at his side. Obviously everything was done to show that it was business as usual, seamless and without interruption; a family event to be short.

Alex Von Tunzelmann pushes the blade a few inches deeper by the following statement: „*Thanks to his impressive gift for public relations, the end of Empire was presented as the purpose of Empire – India was as a well-nurtured and fattened chick, raised to fly from the imperial nest while Britain, the indulgent parent, looked on with pride. And so the British were able to celebrate their victory.*”<sup>25</sup> The atmosphere was celebrative and jovial between the new breed of native imperialists and their proud British mentors. In this game of smiles and nods the new enemies were the Indian people and their disruptive manners. The first category of such people who still enjoyed relative independence in the subcontinent was the 40% of its territory which was ruled by the princes and kings who had not submitted their sovereignty but were curtailed by British India. Among these princes some were brutal and practised misappropriation of public goods, showing a relative inaptitude to govern. But an overwhelming majority of them were proud to show that their principedom or kingdom was best governed and most developed. There are scores of anecdotes even by the British officials, showing that these princely states coped better when it came to organising relief to the famine-stricken people, while most of the catastrophe took place in the British governed territories. The King of Mysore, for example, was renowned for building dams, universities and other public institutions that would improve the sort and

---

<sup>24</sup> Alex Von TUNZELMANN: *Indian Summer – The Secret History of the End of an Empire*, Pocket Books, London, cited from Prologue (no page numbers given on the online version).

<sup>25</sup> Alex Von TUNZELMANN: *Indian Summer – The Secret History of the End of an Empire*, Pocket Books, London, cited from Prologue (no page numbers given on the online version).

livelihood of his subjects. These modern monarchs were the obstacles that had urgently to be removed; these were the protective rings of identity and economic subsistence that had to be blasted to make way for Afghan-Mesopotamian clans (the Congress of the time) to take total control of the subcontinent. The flamboyancy of Nehru and his comrades had a colonial tinge to it.

It is not only that the interim Indian state (1945-1950) continues to perpetuate a colonial administration, it openly becomes colonial in its ambition to acquire new territories immediately after the British withdraw from the subcontinent. All this was done in a conception of the new found nationalism. For a historian it is not a question of morality or legitimacy, it is a question of putting the actions of this period (1945-1950) into a historical perspective. When the British do territorial rationalisation in the subcontinent it is called „colonialism” but when it is done with more brutality by the post-British government it is called „territorial –rationalisation”. When kingdoms struggled against East India Company, modern day official Indian history narrative, pours praise upon the period for being anti-British, even when the East India Company was protecting the people against local tyrants. But when Nehru and team take-over almost 40% of today’s Indian territory by blackmail and outright invasion, historians treat it as logical steps taken by a new democratic nation, in its quest to reform and rationalise a very backward society. Except for the territories of the Nawab of Hyderabad, most of the princely states had a markedly higher level of development than the British administered territories. As modern India approached their gates, the princes had much to fear for the future of their people.

The special correspondent of The Sydney Morning Herald writes the following: The Congress Party has never been friendly to them, and recently Pandit Nehru proclaimed that the British paramountcy over the princes must pass to Hindustan (now the Dominion of India) and that the princes who did not enter the Constituent Assembly „will be treated as hostile.”<sup>26</sup> In short, Nehru was declaring war on the Princes and their people. A few months earlier the sentiment was one of betrayal by the British and fear of a new predator. Phillips Talbot of the Chicago Daily News Foreign Service reported the following from New Delhi: *‘Like a flock of frightened chickens various Indian Maharajas and their ministers are scurrying about New Delhi trying to determine their best hopes for*

---

<sup>26</sup> The Sydney Morning Herald: *What Will Happen To The India Of The Princes?*, September 13<sup>th</sup>, 1947, 2.

*survival after the British leave India. ... With perhaps 10 weeks of British protection remaining, the chamber of princes has fallen into confusion following the resignation of the Nawab of Bhopal, a Moslem ruler, as chancellor.*<sup>27</sup> All during the Second World War Britain was massively dependent upon the princely states for a constant flow of army recruits paid for by the loyal rajas, in exchange for the promise from Britain that it will defend their interests and maintain their territorial integrity. Now that the war effort was over, the British, who were stringent monarchists, suddenly changed their mind. It is still not clear if the change of mind was due the change of government in Britain in 1945, or it was part of a larger deal done between the colonial partners and Gandhi's freedom fighters. Whatever the behind the scenes deal, the reality was that of a colonial takeover, without consulting neither the people nor allowing the princes to choose freely the fate of their country.

From the point of a historical treatment, most historians who deal with this period forget to give the right categorization of the actions of the newly independent India. Our inability to understand the last 60 years of India's structural tensions is derived from the ambiguities in qualifying the period. Somehow historians implicated seem to make a convenient confusion between territorial consolidation and colonialism. The same thing cannot be two things, either in both cases it is colonialism or we have to be content with the term „*territorial rationalisation*,” or consolidation. One cannot accuse the East India Company or later the British of colonialism when exactly the same thing, with the same methods was carried out by „*independentised*” British-India. The confusion on how to perceive the period was partly due to an ambiguous power-play by Pandit Nehru himself.

There is, since 1945, a pronounced stress on all kinds of rationalisation that is portrayed as nation-building and the structure of this system was put together during the interval 1945-1950. What has happened since is the need to consolidate the colonial structure on the part of the newly branded Indian state. The interval of 1945-1950 also laid-down a domestic policy and foreign policy equation that continues to be repeated since. What is more interesting with the period is that the foreign policy initiatives taken by the new Prime Minister – Jawaharlal Nehru and the emphasis of these initiatives. Most of the emphasis of India's foreign policy initiative at the beginning was about the non-interference in a country's domestic

---

<sup>27</sup> Phillips TALBOT: *Indian Princes Have Fears* (syndicated article), Toledo Blade, June 7<sup>th</sup>, 1947, Toledo, 4.

affairs. The notion of „*domestic affairs*” in the interim period had a special and sometimes ambiguous connotation to it.

From the outside it very much looked like a newly de-colonised country trying to protect its sovereignty. But in reality it had a practical function – the new India wanted the world to turn a blind eye to the territorial consolidation/colonisation that was taking place within the subcontinent. The charismatic Nehru took to the world stage while his deputy, Vallabhai Patel, was up to his neck in a colonial blitzkrieg in the Deccan and the North-East. They had a hectic agenda - to complete the process of colonisation before deadline of January 1950, by the time which the new constitution was to be adopted. Until the deadline anything could be done, borders could be redrawn and territories extended. After this very important deadline international law and world attention could be an obstacle. The Sydney Morning Herald talking of Nehru’s double standards writes the following on Nehru’s war on the Nagas, where 30 000 Indian soldiers were mobilised for two whole years: „*What was harder for the two Western Powers (Britain and France) to swallow was the fact that Mr. Nehru should have been prosecuting his own “colonial” war in Northern Assam while at the same time castigating Britain and France for their policies in Cyprus and Algeria.*”<sup>28</sup> The interim period (1945-1950) was considered by Nehru and his team of „*nation-builders*” as a window of opportunity where there was a cloud of dust over the legitimacy and legalities of the British heritage in India.

Nehru and his team of „*independencers*” were playing the finely tuned ambiguities that were developed and mastered by the British Raj. There were two territorial categories in British-India, the territories directly administered by the Raj and those areas that were under the supervision of the Raj. This latter category were the princely states which were in control of their proper administration but were regularly inspected by the residents representing the Raj. Was this arrangement administrative or sharing of sovereign control? The ambiguities were deep and cultivated to be that by the British colonials. James Onley, a British historian has this to say on the subject: „*Princely India was ‘informal empire’ (protectorates and protected states or territories under indirect imperial rule), comprised of over 600 ‘native states’ and tribal territories, each with its own ruler or chief overseen by a British resident or agent.*”<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>28</sup> *End of The Naga Rebellion*, The Sydney Morning Herald, September 30 (29), 1957, Sydney.

<sup>29</sup> James ONLEY: *The Raj Reconsidered: British India’s informal Empire and*

And he concludes: „*While this definition does not differentiate between the formal and informal parts of the Indian Empire, the areas of British suzerainty around British India were informal empire all the same.*”<sup>30</sup> What James Onley tries to illustrate is that there was virtually no difference between Princely States and possessions in the Gulf or Sultanate of Yemen. The main reason why the East India Company and later the British Empire wanted to control both categories was to bar them from falling into the hands of Britain’s enemies or unite to cause trouble to its rule. It was for this that the defence and foreign policy of these states was controlled by the British Empire.<sup>31</sup> But administratively speaking the princely states had their own distinctive structures and identities, only the financial soundness was supervised by the British Raj. The main reason for this was that the princes were generous contributors to the imperial ventures of Britain in and outside Asia. They regularly contributed troops to the British missions in Asia and Africa. This would be put in danger if they got into financial difficulties. Balancing the budgets was one of the central agreements that tied them to the British Raj.

Unlike James Onley, Sir Conrad Corfield had a direct contact with what is known as the Princely India, and he has a markedly different opinion to Onley’s dry legalistic appreciation: „*This (a Durbar of Punjab princes in Lahore in 1921) gave me a chance to see the only Indians who at that time had real power. I was struck by their individuality. Dressed for the Durbar they represented the ancient history and culture of India. Their independent attitude was a pleasant contrast to the subservience of many who served the Raj. Was I right in thinking that the real India existed in their territories rather than the Provinces of British India? My instinct said I was.*”<sup>32</sup>

---

spheres of influence in Asia and Africa, *Asian Affairs*, vol. XL, no. I, March 2009, page 44 (also found at: [http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iaais/downloads/Onley\\_Raj\\_Reconsidered.pdf](http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iaais/downloads/Onley_Raj_Reconsidered.pdf) (2015-08-27)).

<sup>30</sup> James ONLEY: *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj – Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, please see section 4. *The Residency System and Britain’s Indian Empire*.

<sup>31</sup> James ONLEY: *The Raj Reconsidered: British India’s Informal Empire and Spheres of Influence in Asia and Africa*, *Asian Affairs*, vol. XL, no. I, March 2009, page 53 (also found at: [http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iaais/downloads/Onley\\_Raj\\_Reconsidered.pdf](http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iaais/downloads/Onley_Raj_Reconsidered.pdf) (2015-08-27)).

<sup>32</sup> Sir Conrad Corfield quoted in, *The Journal of Asian Studies* / Volume 35 / Issue 04 / August 1976, 704-704, also available online at: <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6930392> 2015-08-27. The book by Corfield: Sir Conrad CORFIELD, *The Princely India I Knew: From Reading to Mountbatten*, Indo British Historical Society, Madras, 1975, 15-16.

What Corfield is hinting at is that these princely states were forced, conjured or cajoled into an arrangement of non-hindrance to the British interests but they were never subjugated like the provinces directly ruled by the British Raj. The people who lived in the princely states generally knew who their ruler was and closely identified their future with that of their ruler.

Travelling through the country in the interim years, the Hungarian born Tibor Mende explains how the princes had kept much higher standards and how the people in these princely states escaped the cruelty of famine and poverty. Mende writes: „*From the point of view of industry, Mysore is the most advanced among all the states. From the point of view of public education, Travancore, Cochin, Mysore and Baroda possess a degree of instruction superior that of British India. For example, in Travancore, in the South, education started to be organised in 1801, some 65 years before it was done (on the same level) in England. In the same state the level of education is four times higher than the rest of India.*”<sup>33</sup> By any standards, the princely states did not need the development the newly independent India was offering. What legitimacy did Nehru have therefore to invade and annex many hundreds of princely states and kingdoms? There could be no acceptable answer, except for that India after British India, was structurally one and the same, if not even worse in its logic of unending colonial consolidation. This had nothing to do with good government and democratic rationalisation, and everything to do with an indiscriminate land grab with catastrophic consequences to the people.

What is more interesting, is that while slicing and dicing of Punjab and Bengal was agreed without the slightest consultation and approval of the people concerned, a gift to Jinnah and his very cooperative Muslim League, at the same moment and in the same indiscriminate manner countries were quietly being annexed to the British heritage. It is greatly insufficient to consider the new acquisitions to be weakly or too small to survive on their own. The kingdoms of Travancore, Mysore and the state of Nizam covered most of South India (the Deccan plateau) sometimes bigger than some medium sized countries like Spain or Italy. Apart from the desperation of the state of Nizam, none of these states expressed their animosity or enmity towards British India and there was no reason to consider that they would change their position overnight,

---

<sup>33</sup> Tibor MENDE: *L'Inde devant l'orage* (translation into French by Jeanne N. MATHIEU), Club des Éditeurs, Paris, 1950, 88 (The author of this current essay tried to make a fair retranslation from the French text to English).



after the British packed and went back home to their remote island. The princely states were not a danger and there was no need to mince them with the hunger and poverty stricken territories of the new India.

The germs of Nehru's rule, which brought so much unacknowledged economic mismanagement, starvation, disease and death, had their roots in the interim period. Those few forgotten years were the defining years to what befell the people of the subcontinent. Personalities from North-West India like Gandhi and Nehru, and many others were hand-picked by the British to accomplish specific missions, like loyal sons of the British Empire. The Second World War and the sudden collapse of the British power in the Far-East seriously diverted their plans and quick adjustments had to be made in the years 1942-1945, to cope with all eventualities. This rectification, due to international strategic compromises and accommodations to personal ambitions, dictated the interim period of 1945-1950. These years in turn dictated the future of the Indian Subcontinent and its people.

Ramachandra Byrappa : *The Troubling Interval 1945-1950 The dark and dusty years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Indian history (Part One).*

**Aleksandra Sylburska**

***Hungarian Communists' Struggle with the Catholic Church in the reports of Polish Diplomatic Post in Budapest (1946–1948)***

**Abstract**

The issue of Catholic Church was one of the most important for communists taking control over all aspects of political, economic and social life in Soviet Bloc. It was a major problem in Poland and Hungary. The struggle with Catholic Church was initiated first in Hungary and it was the reason why Polish communists decided to observe that problem carefully to use Hungarian experience in their own country. It was possible due to the activity of Polish diplomatic post in Budapest which was reporting the most important elements of that struggle. The conclusions were essential not only for the government in Warsaw, but also for Polish diplomats. One of their goals was to control Polish diaspora in Hungary which was devoted to Catholic Church. The analysis of reports enables not only to learn about diplomat's interpretation of the situation, but also their „*auto-censorship*” lack of objectivity.

*Keywords:* Polish diplomacy, Catholic Church, Polish-Hungarian relations, Polish diaspora, diplomatic post, Mindszenty's trial, communist repression

**A**fter the World War II Poland and Hungary, as many countries of Central-Eastern Europe, were left behind the Iron Curtain in the sphere of Soviet influence. Since 1944, when the Red Army appeared on the territory of both countries, their situation was prejudged. It affected not only the domestic policy of both countries, but also their diplomacy and mutual relations. Polish-Hungarian tradition of one-thousand-year friendship was neglected by Soviet plans of reorganization of Central-Eastern European relations.

In spite of an intensive cooperation between Poland and Hungary in the interwar period<sup>1</sup> and good relations during the World War II (it is important to remember about the support given to Polish refugees in Hungary<sup>2</sup>) contacts between both countries after 1945 were

---

<sup>1</sup> This cooperation resulted in incorporation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia by Hungary in March 1939. Read more: M. KOŹMIŃSKI, *Polska i Węgry przed II wojną światową (październik 1938–wrzesień 1939). Z dziejów dyplomacji i irrydenty*, Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław, 1970.

<sup>2</sup> Read more about Hungarian support for Polish refugees in the World War II: J. ANTALL, *Les réfugiés polonais en Hongrie pendant la guerre*, Athenaeum, Budapest, 1946. BUDZIŃSKI F., *Szkoły polskie nad Balatonem w okresie II wojny*

established late. There are a few reasons of such situation. First of all, the political status of both countries after the war was quite different. Poland was the ally of Anglo-Saxon powers and Soviet Union which won the war. Hungary was known as „*the last ally of Hitler*” and it was obvious that the country will be severely punished for that. What is more, Moscow decided to form a „*Slavic Front*” consisting of Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, whose main goal was to protect the Central-Eastern Europe from the German invasion in the future (Soviet Union was also afraid of the possibility to make use of German territory for potential Anglo-Saxon offence), what delayed the regulation of Polish-Hungarian relations. It is also important to remember that in the early postwar period both countries had different political priorities. Polish communists had to legalize their governance (in Great Britain the Government in Exile still existed). What is more, Poland had to secure its entitlement to administrate the post-German territory (so-called Recovered Territories). The sovereignty of Hungary, as a defeated country, was reduced because of the Allied Control Commission’s activity. Its main goal was to sign the peace treaty.

Because of all these factors Poland and Hungary established diplomatic relations just on 28<sup>th</sup> December 1945<sup>3</sup>. Although Hungary was not the most important political partner for Poland, it was essential to establish a diplomatic post in Budapest due to the matter of Polish refugees' repatriation. It was proposed to exchange diplomatic representants for the first time in January 1946<sup>4</sup>. The first Polish chargé d'affaires Piotr Szymański<sup>5</sup> arrived to Budapest on 6<sup>th</sup> July 1946<sup>6</sup>.

---

*światowej*, Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, Warszawa, 1988. I. LAGZI, *Uchodźcy polscy na Węgrzech w latach drugiej wojny światowej*, Wydawnictwo Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa, 1980. G. ŁUBCZYK, K. ŁUBCZYK, *Pamięć. Polscy uchodźcy na Węgrzech 1939–1946*, Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, Warszawa 2009. E. RÁCZ, *Uchodźcy polscy na Węgrzech w czasie wojny*, Athaneum, Budapest, 1946. A. TOKARSKI, *W gościnie u bratanków (zarys dziejów uchodźców polskich na Węgrzech w czasie II wojny światowej 1939–1945)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 1998.

<sup>3</sup> Poland had already established diplomatic relations with 31 countries, i. a. all countries in the Soviet Bloc: E. PAŁYGA, *Dyplomacja Polski Ludowej 1944–1984 (kierunki-treści-mechanizmy)*, Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, Warszawa 1986. 333–337.

<sup>4</sup> *Historia dyplomacji polskiej, t. VI, 1944/1945–1989*, ed. W. MATERSKI, W. Michowicz, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2010. 176.

<sup>5</sup> Piotr Szymański was chargé d'affaires in Budapest in 1946–1947.

<sup>6</sup> Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych [AMSZ], Departament Polityczny [DP], 6/26/392, Szymański's report, August 5<sup>th</sup> 1946. 3.

There were four main groups of Polish diplomats' duties. First of all, they were obliged to realise Polish policy towards the Hungarian government. It meant that they had to take part in development of Polish-Hungarian relations, for instance to investigate the conditions of future political, economical and cultural agreements. The second duty was the realisation of Polish propaganda – it was particularly crucial in the postwar period because of Polish diplomatic efforts to gain an international acceptance to administrate the Recovered Territories. The third goal of diplomats was to organise and control the life of Polish diaspora in Hungary. There were two main areas of diplomats' activity: they had to support the Polish refugees and subordinate those living in Hungary to communist regime. Finally they were obliged to regular reporting on the political, economical, social and cultural life in Hungary.

Diplomats' reports contained varied information. In the postwar period diplomats focused mainly on political struggle in Hungary. Hungarian Communist Party, led by Mátyás Rákosi, implemented so-called „*salami tactics*”<sup>7</sup>. This term was typical for all countries of People's Democrations and it meant the struggle with opposition by gradual and systematic accusation as well as elimination of right-wing groups of their opponents, in particular the Independent Smallholders' Party. However, the other parties were not the only obstacle to communists' plan to gain full power in Hungary. Another serious opponent who could not be underestimated was the Catholic Church and its charismatic leader, cardinal József Mindszenty.

The issue of Catholic Church in Hungary was significant for Polish government because of the fact that the institution played also a great part in Polish social life. Both countries were in majority catholic (in Poland more than 90% of population admitted to that confession, in

---

<sup>7</sup> This term was used for the first time by Mátyás Rákosi during his lecture in the Higher Party School 29<sup>th</sup> February 1952: J. KOCHANOWSKI, *Węgry. Od ugody do ugody 1967–1990*, Trio, Warszawa 1997. 115. More about „*salami tactics*” in Hungary: P. KENEZ, *Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets. The Establishment of the Communist Regime in Hungary, 1944–1948*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006. B. KOVRING, *Communism in Hungary. From Kun to Kádár*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1979; J. K. HOENSCH, *A History of Modern Hungary 1867–1994*, Longmann, Nowy Jork 1995; S. BALOGH, S. JAKAB, *The History of Hungary After the Second World War 1944–1980*, Corvina, Budapest, 1986; L. BORHI, *Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union*, Central European University Press, Budapest-New York 2004; Gy. GYARMATI, *A Rákosi-korszak. Rendszerváltó fordulatok évtizede Magyarországon, 1945–1956*, ÁBTL-Rubicon, Budapest, 2013; Á. PÜNKÖSTI, *Rákosi a hataloméért 1945–1948*, Európa, Budapest, 1992; S. BALOGH, *Parlamentti és párt harcok Magyarországon 1945–1947*, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1975.

Hungary around 70%) and the influence of the Church was evident for communists. The catholic faith stood in opposition to marxism and its further Lenin's and Stalin's interpretation and could not be tolerated by new government because of its conservative character. The communists aimed at creation of new type of human, who would be obedient to Stalin's words and they were aware of the fact that if they did not eliminate the influence of Catholic Church it would be impossible to implement.

Despite all similarities, there were also some differences between the situation of Catholic Church in both countries in the postwar period. First of all, the repressions in Hungary started much earlier than in Poland. The beginning of persecution in Hungary was in 1945, in Poland not until 1947 – and it was much more ruthless in Hungarian case. It could be surprising if we considered the fact, that political situation of communists in Hungary seemed to be more difficult than in Poland. As a consequence of Stalin's experiment – holding free and fair elections – the Independent Smallholders Party became, at least in theory, the most influential party in coalition government. In spite of that fact the Catholic Church in Hungary was in much more disadvantageous situation than in Poland.

The explanation of that phenomenon is related to the difference in the role the Church played in both countries. Its significance was out of question, but there were different origins of its strong position. In Hungary the Catholic Church was an influential landowner and controlled largely the educational system. What is important, its influence was present also in political life: according to law, the primate was the second the most important person in country just after the king (or in the interwar period – after the regent Miklós Horthy). The land reform in 1945 and educational reform in 1948 undermined considerably the privileged position of the institution.

The situation described above was possible also because of the fact, that the support of society for that institution was not as significant as it was in Polish case. The Catholic Church in Hungary, despite being the religion of majority of the population, was not as respected as in Poland. Church was often associated with the Habsburg family, the symbol of Hungarian dependence for centuries. Of course this argument should not be overemphasized, but could be taken under consideration. Certainly Hungarian communists knew that resistance of society would be much easier to break than it could be in Poland.

The Catholic Church in Poland, in contrary to Hungary, was considered to be a symbol of freedom and resistance. It always

supported Polish independence aspirations during the partition times and the World War II. It was also very often a shelter for resistance movement in the early postwar period. Its impact on society was more significant than it was in Hungary, although it did not play such a considerable role in economic and political life of the country. Certainly Polish communists were aware of that fact and had to delay the use of more drastic ways of struggle with the Church<sup>8</sup>. The proof was the cooperation between Polish diplomatic post and Polish Catholics at the beginning. Polish priest Erazm Malczyk together with nuns participated in diplomats' activity toward Polish diaspora in Hungary, i.e. they were the members of Polish School Committee<sup>9</sup>. Polish diplomats took also part in church services, e.g. on the occasion of anniversary of PKWN (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, the first Polish communist government established by Soviets) Manifest on July 22<sup>nd</sup><sup>10</sup>.

Despite the differences between the situation in Poland and Hungary, Polish communists obliged the diplomatic post in Budapest to study attentively the way the Hungarian Communist Party tried to discredit the Catholic Church.

It is also important to underline that the issue of Hungarian Catholic Church was crucial for Polish diplomatic post because of one more reason. As it was mentioned before, Polish diplomats were obliged to control Polish diaspora in Hungary. One of the biggest obstacles was the fact that Poles living in Hungary were devout Catholics<sup>11</sup>. For this reason Polish diplomats reported the results of the struggle between communists and Church authorities because it influenced the attitude towards Polish diaspora.

The main goal of the article is not a detailed description of subsequent stages of that conflict because it is already well known in historiography<sup>12</sup>. The goal is to present: a) the way the Polish

---

<sup>8</sup> T. WOLBRECHT, *Z dziejów Kościoła katolickiego na Węgrzech i w Polsce w latach 1945–1956*, [w:] *Odmiany i oblicza komunizmu. Węgrzy, Polacy i inni*, ed. M. KOŹMIŃSKI, Trio, Warszawa, 2007, 95–98; P. KENEZ (2006), 164; L. LÁSZLÓ, *Church and State in Hungary 1919–1945*, METEM, Budapest, 2004, 159–165.

<sup>9</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/27/410, The protocol of organisational meeting of Polish School Comitee, May 3<sup>th</sup> 1947, 13–14

<sup>10</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/390, Szymański to Olszewski, August 7<sup>th</sup> 1946, p. 1; AMSZ, BK, 20/15/182, Kościński's report, October 12<sup>th</sup> 1948, 137–138

<sup>11</sup> AMSZ, BK, 20/5/20, Romanowicz's report, February 27<sup>th</sup> 1951, 3.

<sup>12</sup> The struggle between communists and Catholic Church owns a numerous bibliography, my recommendation: D. LÁSZLÓ, *A magyar katolikus Egyház 1945-től napjainkig*, [w:] *A katolikus Egyház Magyarországon*, ed. Á. SOMORJAI, I. ZOMBORI, Magyar Katolikus Püspöki Egyháztörténelmi Bizottsága, Budapest, 1991;

diplomats described the conflict, b) the effectiveness of Polish diplomats in gathering reliable and useful information about the conflict, c) Polish diplomats' action towards Polish Catholics in Hungary dependent on the situation of Hungarian Catholic Church.

In September 1946 Piotr Szymański described for the first time the role of clergy in postwar Hungary. According to Polish chargé d'affaires Hungarian society was resistant to communist propaganda and still supported the Catholic Church. Its trust and faith was abused by clergy for the struggle with new governance. Catholic priests' sermons – as well as calvinists' – were the mean to strengthen Hungarian nation's aversion, or even hate, to democracy and Soviet Union. The character of the preaching was of course „nationalist and fascist”. Undeniably the leader of that „reactionary” movement was cardinal József Mindszenty.

Not only the sermons were used by priests to fight with new political order. To achieve their goal clergy preached their ideas in catholic organisations, mainly among young people and students. Communists, being aware of the significance of the Church influence on society, decided to act drastically. In July 1946 the Minister of Interior Affairs László Rajk closed down all catholic organisations. The pretext was the manslaughter of two Soviet soldiers committed by a member of one of catholic organisations.

Piotr Szymański was also sure that clergy were planning to found a party and the only reason why it had not happened yet was the unstable geopolitical situation of Hungary and existence of Allied Control Commission. The leader of that party would be cardinal Mindszenty<sup>13</sup>.

Polish diplomats paid attention to the way the Hungarian press related to the matter of Church. In 1946 the image of clergy was negative, but even the leftist journalists had to admit that Mindszenty was one of the most influential people in country. Wherever he appeared, he was accompanied by the support of society<sup>14</sup>. Hungarian journalists not only studied the situation in country, but also the relations between state and Church abroad<sup>15</sup>.

---

T. WOLBRECHT, *op. cit.*; M. BOÉR, *Cardinal Mindszenty and the Implacable War of Communism Against Religion and Spirit*, London, 1949.

<sup>13</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/394, Szymański to Olszewski, 10<sup>th</sup> September 1946, 23–24.

<sup>14</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/400, Press report no. 4, August 4<sup>th</sup> 1946, 55.

<sup>15</sup> An example was an article in „Új Szó” in November 1946, which informed about the weapons of Polish resistance movement WiN („Wolność i Niezawisłość”) found in church: AMSZ, DP, 6/26/400, Press report no. 9, November 1946, 153.



According to the description submitted to the political report of the post in December 1946, written by press attaché Tadeusz Fangrat, cardinal József Mindszenty was the most influential and charismatic representative of Hungarian „*reaction*”. Catholics in the whole country knew his opinions on political situation very well because Mindszenty wrote several pastoral letters which were read during church services (although, according to diplomat, some parsons, afraid of potential repressions, refused to read them). Because of his activity the leftist press started to attack him severely, what is more, some demonstrations, when the primate was abused, took place in the meantime. Due to that unfavorable situation, Mindszenty decided to leave Budapest and move to Esztergom. In Polish diplomat's opinion it was also a result of prime minister Ferenc Nagy's behaviour who had asked him to cease any political activity. Although he stopped writing anti-communist pastoral letters for the short time, certainly he did not change his attitude to the new government. According to the diplomat's analysis he was supported by Anglo-Saxon powers who wanted to make use of him to expand their influence in Hungary and South-Eastern Europe<sup>16</sup>.

At the end of 1946 Tadeusz Fangrat had even a conversation with Mindszenty, which was a chance to learn more about political opinion of controversial cardinal. According to Mindszenty his aim was to defend Hungarian nation from „*communist and Jewish terror*”<sup>17</sup> not supporting the „*reaction*”. No one was able to stop him because in his opinion his activity was respected by 80% of Hungarians. The only party, which should have been supported, was Independent Smallholders Party (although in other conditions he would not have tolerated it), because the whole nation's effort should have been focused on struggle with communism. According to him, the behaviour of Smallholders' leaders was the effect of geopolitical situation of Hungary and their leftist opinions were imposed by communists. He was not afraid to state that socialists and communists „*executed the command*” of Soviet Union<sup>18</sup>.

Fangrat took advantage of that meeting and asked Mindszenty about his attitude to postwar Poland. In cardinal's opinion Poland destroyed one-thousand-year traditional Polish-Hungarian friendship

---

<sup>16</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/393, The Cardinal József Mindszenty, 39–40.

<sup>17</sup> It is worth remembering that cardinal Mindszenty, just like the rest of Hungarian Catholic Church authorities, was perceived as an antisemite: P. KENEZ (2006), 166.

<sup>18</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/393, Political program of József Mindszenty December 1946, 41–42.

because of its behaviour during the peace conference in Paris in 1946<sup>19</sup>. However, he did not blame the nation for the behaviour of Polish delegation. In his opinion the government was not respected by society and its decision was imposed by Moscow. Due to his opinion about Polish nation, he was not surprised that termination of concordat by Warsaw did not influence the attitude of worshippers to Church<sup>20</sup>.

Undoubtedly József Mindszenty was an implacable enemy of communism. He believed that considering the lack of royal family and regent Miklós Horthy, the primate was the head of state. Cardinal Mindszenty is even nowadays perceived as a controversial character. He was an unusually courageous person who always clearly expressed his opinion. Being aware of the fact that his behaviour was risky and it might have resulted in repression, he persisted and continued his activity. He is often compared to Polish primate Stanisław Wyszyński, but Mindszenty lacked his political sense. Wyszyński knew how to cooperate with communists to save as much freedom for Catholics as it was possible. Mindszenty could not accept any kind of cooperation with new authorities.

Such an attitude could be admired and respected, despite the fact, that lack of pragmatism prevented Mindszenty from being a reliable leader of anticommunist movement. However, it was not the only controversy related to the primate. He wanted not only to fight with the new political power, but he also strove for restitution of previous political, economic and social order. In the postwar period just few opponents of communism would agree to reconstitute the kingdom or the semifeudal system which existed in Hungary in the interwar period<sup>21</sup>.

Despite repressions and escalation of fierce political battle in 1947, which were the result of implementation of „*salami tactics*”, Catholic Church authorities did not decide to change its attitude to the new order. What is also important, the society supported them in their

---

<sup>19</sup> Poland demanded 20 million dollars of compensation from Hungary, stating, it is an equivalent of Polish refugees' property who were interned in Hungary during the World War II. Hungarians, expecting strict conditions of peace treaty, were disappointed that even Poland „betrayed” them. Their bitterness was even stronger because they were sure that Poland would remember about the support of Hungarian nation towards Polish refugees and would be a defender of Hungarian rights on the peace conference: T. KOPYŚ, *Stosunki polsko-węgierskie w latach 1945–1970*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków, 2015, 38–41.

<sup>20</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/393, Political program of József Mindszenty, December 1946, 42–43.

<sup>21</sup> P. KENEZ (2006) 171–175.

activity which was a signal for observers what is the opinion of ordinary Hungarians. On August 20<sup>th</sup> 1947 during the Saint Stephen Day, the most important day combining the historical and religious elements of Hungarian identity, the procession attracted 400 thousand people in Budapest! According to new Polish press attaché Zbigniew Udziela Hungarian clergy were aware of their power. The procession was not the only example of Hungarians' piety, they participated numerously in church services<sup>22</sup>. During the meeting with the prior of Pauline order in Hungary Michał Zembrzuski, Udziela noted that according to monk, Hungarians were very piety and they would do anything what Mindszenty would demand from them. What is more, Zembrzuski stated that there were a lot of leftist politics among catholics who attended church services and received the sacraments<sup>23</sup>. The Catholic clergy, in contrary to Protestants, were not going to change their implacable attitude<sup>24</sup>, what was proved in the letter of Church authorities to prime minister Lajos Dinnyés published in catholic newspaper „*Új Ember*” on November 9<sup>th</sup> 1947. They protested against discriminating Catholics and making them join communist party if they wanted to be employed in state administration<sup>25</sup>. They also condemned the repressions towards people who did not agree to spy and inform the security services about the situation in catholic community<sup>26</sup>.

In 1947 Polish diplomats in their reports were informing mainly about the political struggle between communists and their opponents. It started to change in 1948 due to the communists' triumph. When the political opposition was „*incapacitated*”, Mátyás Rákosi and his comrades could concentrate on the struggle with Catholic Church. The change on the political scene was also a signal for Polish diplomats – it was the time to change the narration, especially that the analogical situation took place in Poland. „*Neutralization*” of political opponents enabled communists to

---

<sup>22</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/406, Udziela's note, August 20<sup>th</sup> 1947, 51; AMSZ, Telegrams [T], Fiderkiewicz's telegram to Olszewski, August 21<sup>st</sup> 1947, 9.

<sup>23</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/26/406, Udziela's note, August 21<sup>st</sup> 1947, 66.

<sup>24</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/27/408, Fiderkiewicz to Olszewski, December 1<sup>st</sup> 1947, 416.

<sup>25</sup> It was related to the affair of so-called „*list B*”. László Rajk decided to rid the state administration of „*reactionary elements*” which in fact was a mean to discriminate employees supporting Independent Smallholders Party. Due to that decision 60 thousands people lost their job: P. KENEZ (2006), 131.

<sup>26</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/27/408, The letter of Mindszenty to Dinnyés, „*Új Ember*” in November 9<sup>th</sup> 1947, 154; AMSZ, T, Fiderkiewicz's telegram to Olszewski and Grosz, November 11<sup>th</sup> 1947, 52.

commit all forces to subjugate clergy. Moreover, that change of priorities was expressed by Hungarian politicians unequivocally. During his visit in Budapest in May 1948 Wiesław Sobierajski<sup>27</sup> met Jenő Heltay, the Head of Political Department in Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His interlocutor admitted that the issue of Catholic Church and primate József Mindszenty had been the most important ones in current politics of the government<sup>28</sup>.

In opinion of Alfred Fiderkiewicz<sup>29</sup>, the successor of Piotr Szymański, at the beginning of 1948 the most significant threat to democracy was cardinal Mindszenty. He was not only an embodiment of „*reactionary system*”, but he was also abused by Anglo-Saxon powers to reconstitute their influence in Hungary<sup>30</sup>. In 1948 it was already a serious accusation. Conflict between Soviet Union and Western Powers was obvious to observers and suspicion of supporting the Anglo-Saxons could be an excuse for repression. Just before the Unification Congress of Hungarian workers parties in June 1948 Fiderkiewicz noted that Hungary had found itself behind the Iron Curtain and had decided to break off relations with Western Europe<sup>31</sup>. Mindszenty was also suspected to enable the reconciliation between government and clergy, although the part of Church authorities changed their attitude to the new political order, what was exposed by Hungarian press. Despite the fact that most of Church authorities were eager to cooperate with communists just to avoid the repressions and discrimination, Mindszenty prohibited even to administer the sacraments to those who supported the theory of dialectical materialism<sup>32</sup>.

Subsequent months were the time of the radicalization of Mindszenty's attitude and deterioration of relations between state and Catholic Church. An important step was the nationalization of Hungarian schools on June 16<sup>th</sup> 1948 (it was mentioned above that hitherto schools had been controlled by Church). That decision was accompanied by the indignation of some catholic members of

---

<sup>27</sup> Sobierajski was the Head of South-Eastern Department in Political Department in Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>28</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/423, Sobierajski-Heltay meeting, May 18<sup>th</sup> 1948, 10.

<sup>29</sup> Alfred Fiderkiewicz was an envoy in Budapest in 1947–1949.

<sup>30</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, Fiderkiewicz to Olszewski, March 8<sup>th</sup> 1948, 22–23.

<sup>31</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, Fangrat to Olszewski, May 3<sup>rd</sup> 1948, 76.

<sup>32</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, Fiderkiewicz to Olszewski, April 7<sup>th</sup> 1948, 37; AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, The attitude of Catholic Church to the state based on articles in Hungarian press, 74–75; AMSZ, Departament I [DI], 7/65/533, Fangrat's telegram to Wierblowski, April 27<sup>th</sup> 1948, 246.

parliament and clergy, but in Fiderkiewicz's opinion it was the victory of government. He was also sure that Mindszenty would not resign and he was not mistaken: cardinal called the priests and nuns, who were teachers, to boycott public schools<sup>33</sup>. Mindszenty claimed that secular education would not be able to raise young patriots. Fiderkiewicz referred to the behaviour of Mindszenty critically when he noted appreciatively the conciliatory attitude of Protestant Churches<sup>34</sup>. The question of the nationalization of schools was an important in Polish diplomats' work. They wrote a special report on that situation in which they drew conclusions, based on information from „*well-informed circles*”, that government did not want to punish Mindszenty. It would have made him a martyr and that was what communists wanted to avoid. They rather wanted to concentrate on those who were supposed to execute his commands<sup>35</sup>.

In the meantime another problem appeared which was related to the situation of Catholic Church and engaged Polish diplomats. The prior of Pauline order Michał Zembrzuski came to the diplomatic post and related about the incident which had already happened. Paulin order had its chapel in grotto hollowed in the Gellert's Hill and it held its services there. The order was known for its Our Lady's services because thousand of worshippers took part in them. On June 12–13<sup>th</sup> 1948 the Unification Congress was organised in Budapest and the delegates were accommodated in the Gellert Hotel which was opposite the grotto. Due to that fact, a policeman came to the prior of the order and told him it would have been too dangerous if such a big crowd would have been in the neighbourhood of the hotel. Zembrzuski asked the policeman to let him use a radio to cancel the service but he refused, being aware of the fact it would have had negative propaganda effects on the government if the Western journalists had learned about it. Not being able to cancel the service,

---

<sup>33</sup> Mindszenty wrote several pastoral letters to worshippers and letters to the Minister of Religion and Education Gyula Ortutay, complaining about nationalisation of schools and warning against that decision. The letters can be found in: J. MINDSZENTY, *Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks: Authorized White Book*, Longman, New York-London-Toronto, 1949. The letters can be also find in Polish diplomats' reports: AMSZ, DP, 6/28/426, Moszczeński's report on the question of Catholic Church, June 9<sup>th</sup> 1948, 145–155.

<sup>34</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, Fiderkiewicz to Olszewski, June 30<sup>th</sup> 1948, 89–99, AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, Fiderkiewicz to Olszewski, September 30<sup>th</sup> 1948, 140; AMSZ, DI, 7/65/533, Fiderkiewicz's telegram to Wierbłowski, June 7<sup>th</sup> 1948, 247.

<sup>35</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/426, Moszczeński's report on the question of Catholic Church, June 9<sup>th</sup> 1948, 141–144.

thousands of people came and police had to intervene, commanding them to leave the grotto and go back home. Fiderkiewicz reported on it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw<sup>36</sup>. He was criticised for passivity because in the opinion of Polish governance the attitude of Zembrzuski was „*directed against the Government of Hungarian People's Democracy*”. According to them, he should have asked about Zembrzuski's attitude to that fact. Fiderkiewicz was obliged to control the behaviour of Polish monk and inform him that such an attitude would not be tolerated<sup>37</sup>.

The lack of political sense, which was mentioned above, was the reason of another crisis in the relations between Church and government. For Hungarians the Day of Saint Stephen was one of the most important days during the whole year. It was always associated with the procession held on streets of Budapest. In 1948 the government decided to organise a „*Day of Bread*” in the same time. It hoped that some people would choose its celebration. It was desired by communists because in former years 200-400 thousands of people participated in processions. That year Mindszenty wanted to give the ceremony more ceremonial character and asked for permission to conduct the procession in the main streets of Pest. The government refused, agreeing for the procession around the Saint Stephen's Basilica only. Mindszenty decided to express his dissatisfaction, not organising a procession at all. In opinion of communists his behaviour was provocative and was evidence of Mindszenty's hostile attitude to the government<sup>38</sup>.

In the last quarter of 1948 Alfred Fiderkiewicz realised that the time had come for the „*final battle*” between Catholic Church and communists. In November he condemned irreconcilable attitude of Mindszenty and noted that the authorities had been gathering information about his anti-state activity. According to the confidential information Mindszenty had been organising the resistance movement with the support of Anglo-Saxon Powers. Communists were supposed to welcome his emigration, but being aware of his character it was obvious he would never leave Hungary. In the opinion of Fiderkiewicz the only possible solution which could be implemented was arrest<sup>39</sup>.

---

<sup>36</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/426, Fiderkiewicz to Modzelewski, June 15<sup>th</sup> 1948, 156–157.

<sup>37</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/426, Wierblowski to Fiderkiewicz, July 9<sup>th</sup> 1948, 159.

<sup>38</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/426, Fiderkiewicz to Wierblowski, August 25<sup>th</sup> 1948, 160–161.

<sup>39</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, Fiderkiewicz to Olszewski, November 15<sup>th</sup> 1948, 200; AMSZ, DI, 7/64/539, Fangrat's telegram to Sobierajski, November 10<sup>th</sup> 1948, 6.

Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested on December 26<sup>th</sup> 1948. Fiderkiewicz reported that just before the arrest even a major part of catholic society had turned away from him. According to the confidential information Church authorities had received the recommendation from Vatican to reach an agreement with the government<sup>40</sup>. Intensive propaganda in press had been a communists' mean to prepare Hungarian catholics for such a radical solution<sup>41</sup>.

The accusation against Mindszenty of being an American spy resulted in the protest of the USA. Hungarian government took advantage of that situation and made American diplomats leave the country. It also initiated the propaganda action whose goal was to inform the society about the threat from the West. That „*threat*” was also an argument to begin the propaganda offensive against the USA and Great Britain as well and Hungarian communists used it to explain their hostile attitude towards Western diplomats<sup>42</sup>. Every aspect of Mindszenty's trial was studied and reported by Polish diplomats carefully<sup>43</sup>.

In opinion of Fiderkiewicz, Hungarians reacted surprisingly calmly. There were two possible explanations of that situation. First of all, the part of society was bored with the behaviour of Mindszenty and did not want to contest the government, as the cardinal had demanded. What is more, they were disappointed with his behaviour during the trial: he seemed to be a weak man who had lost his former self-confidence<sup>44</sup>. The second explanation was less optimistic for communists. Fiderkiewicz accounted that Hungarians as a nation were not used to show emotions. Especially in the postwar period because of the presence of the Red Army they learned to „*suppress feeling*” what

---

<sup>40</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/65/533, Fangrat's telegram to Sobierajski, December 21<sup>st</sup> 1948, 250. Although Vatican recommended to find a solution of the crisis, there were different opinions about what Hungarian bishops should do. One of Vatican authority stated in the conversation with Archbishop of Eger Gyula Czapik that Hungarian bishops should have „*become martyrs*”: G. ADRIÁNYI, *A Vatikán keleti politikája és Magyarország 1939–1978. A Mindszenty-ügy*, Kairosz Kiadó, Budapest, 2004, 14–15.

<sup>41</sup> AMSZ, DP, 6/28/427, Fiderkiewicz to Olszewski, December 27<sup>th</sup> 1948, 219–220.

<sup>42</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/72/591, Fiderkiewicz's report, February 21<sup>st</sup> 1949, 1–2.

<sup>43</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/64/539, The communiqué of the Press Department of Ministry of Interior Affairs in Hungary, December 28<sup>th</sup> 1948, 7–10; AMSZ, DI, 7/64/539, Fiderkiewicz's special report on question of Mindszenty, January 10<sup>th</sup> 1949, 11–13; AMSZ, T, Fiderkiewicz's telegram to Wierbłowski, January 1<sup>st</sup> 1949, 1–2.

<sup>44</sup> However, for the observers it was obvious that the behaviour of Mindszenty was the result of tortures during the interrogation. Due to the physical suffering Mindszenty broke down and was unable to resist any more: M. BOËR (1949), 314.

meant they had not accepted the situation but had been waiting for a good moment to express their hate towards communists. The only evident opponents were Church authorities who refused to appoint a new primate stating that previous still lived and was fulfilling his office. A person who was appointed to replace him „*in the meantime*” (until the moment he would leave the prison) was the bishop of Kalocsa József Grósz<sup>45</sup>. In 1949 and at the beginning of 1950 the Episcopate constantly, but not as ostentatiously as Mindszenty had done, although tended to cooperate with governments on certain conditions, refused to submit to communists<sup>46</sup>.

The „*neutralization*” of cardinal Mindszenty was a major triumph of communists in their struggle with Catholic Church. Of course it was not the end of it because they planned to subordinate the Catholic Church in the same way as they had already done in the case of Protestants. They were also aware of the fact that international public opinion would be interested in the matter of Mindszenty and that it would be discussed in the ONU<sup>47</sup>. However, they knew that the most serious opponent had been beaten and the rest was the question of time<sup>48</sup>. Despite the long time of resistance it turned out they had not been mistaken. The agreement between Church and state signed in August 1950 was much easier to gain in those conditions<sup>49</sup>. In opinion of chargé d'affaires Henryk Minc<sup>50</sup> Hungarian communists

---

<sup>45</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/65/533, Article *Kościół i państwo* in „*Hazánk*” in January 7<sup>th</sup> 1949, 21–22; AMSZ, DI, 7/71/591, Fiderkiewicz's report, February 21<sup>st</sup> 1949, 6–7.

<sup>46</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/71/592, Minc's report, January 31<sup>st</sup> 1950, 12; AMSZ, DI, 7/71/592, Minc's report, April 1<sup>st</sup> 1950, 77–78; AMSZ, DI, 7/71/592, Minc's report, May 31<sup>st</sup> 1950, 150–151.

<sup>47</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/71/591, Fiderkiewicz's report, February 1<sup>st</sup> 1949, 7. According to the communists, the discussion about Mindszenty in the ONU was an example of „*interference in interior affairs of Hungary*”. They even decided that there had been no Hungarian delegates during the trial in front of the International Court of Justice: AMSZ, DI, 7/71/591, Fiderkiewicz's report, April 5<sup>th</sup> 1949, 75; AMSZ, DI, 7/71/592, Minc's report, May 1<sup>st</sup> 1950, 177.

<sup>48</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/71/591, Minc's report, February 10<sup>th</sup> 1950, 352–353.

<sup>49</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/71/593, Minc's report, July 30<sup>th</sup> 1950, 9–11; AMSZ, DI, 7/71/593, Minc's report, August 31<sup>st</sup> 1950, 28; AMSZ, DI, 7/71/593, The agreement between the Episcopate of Catholic Church and Hungarian People's Republic in August 30<sup>st</sup> 1950 in „*Szabad Nép*” (August 31<sup>st</sup> 1950), 29–30; AMSZ, DI, 7/71/593, Minc's report, September 30<sup>th</sup> 1950, 45–47; AMSZ, T, Kościński's telegram to Wierbłowski, August 30<sup>th</sup> 1950, 15.

<sup>50</sup> Henryk Minc was a chargé d'affaires in Budapest in 1949–1951, an envoy 1951–1954.



were inspired by Polish government and its way to gain the analogical agreement in April 1950<sup>51</sup>. The arrest of József Grósz in 1951 did not arouse much emotions, the society and Church authorities seemed to be „*paralyzed*” with the ruthlessness and effectiveness of the communists<sup>52</sup>. The reports of Henryk Minc presented new phenomenon in Hungarian Church: he compared the attitude of „*reactionary*” minority of Church members who supported arrested Grósz and the majority of clergy who joined the movement of „*peace priests*”, submitted to communists<sup>53</sup>. It is worth to remember that mentioned movement was modeled on Polish organisation of „*patriotic priests*”. The Polish diplomatic post participated in exchange of the organisational experience between Poland and Hungary<sup>54</sup>.

The change of Catholic Church position in Hungary and consolidation of communist governance, analogous to the turn of events in Poland, resulted in deterioration of cooperation between Polish diplomats and Polish Church representatives. Despite the engagement of Erazm Malczyk and Polish nuns in work for diaspora, Henryk Minc decided finally to end the cooperation. Erazm Malczyk, being aware of potential repressions, decided to live Hungary and emigrate to Canada. In the meantime Henryk Minc abolished the house of elderly members of Polish diaspora, where Polish nuns had worked. The nuns, deprived of work, had no excuse to stay in Hungary and emigrated to Rome<sup>55</sup>. It was much easier to do so in 1950 because Polish members of clergy lacked any support from Hungarian Catholic Church. As Polish citizens, they had to submit to Polish diplomats' decisions. The lack of Polish clergy did not change the attitude of members of diaspora towards faith, but the diplomats did not have to be afraid that their „*bigotry*” would strengthen.

The reports of Polish diplomats could be a useful material for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it is crucial to remember about differences between the situation in Hungary and Poland which had

---

<sup>51</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/71/592, Minc's report, June 30<sup>th</sup> 1950, 224–225.

<sup>52</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/65/543, Minc to Skrzyszewski, June 8<sup>th</sup> 1951, 101–103; AMSZ, DI, 7/65/543, Minc's report, July 1<sup>st</sup> 1950, 133–135.

<sup>53</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/62/544, Minc's report, August 1<sup>st</sup> 1951, 13–16.

<sup>54</sup> AMSZ, DI, 7/68/566, Fiderkiewicz to Sobierajski, March 2<sup>nd</sup> 1949, 1.

<sup>55</sup> AMSZ, BK, 20/5/70, Kościński's report, February 7<sup>th</sup> 1950, 10; AMSZ, BK, 20/5/70, Kościński's report, September 1<sup>st</sup> 1950, 22; AMSZ, BK, 20/5/20, Romanowicz's report, February 27<sup>th</sup> 1951, 6; *Wierni polskim korzeniom. 45 lat Polskiego Stowarzyszenia Kulturalnego im. Józefa Bema na Węgrzech*, ed. J. KRÓLIKOWSKI, A. NAGY, Polskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalne im. Józefa Bema na Węgrzech, Budapest, 2003, 33.

been mentioned at the beginning. Due to that fact, the struggle with Polish Church was postponed and it was less radical. It was not possible to pacify Polish Catholics as it had been done in Hungary. What weakened the position of Catholics in Hungary, and what did not occur in Poland, was the attitude of Protestants. Due to their submissive behavior, it was easier to attack the Catholics, opposing those two confessions and stating that Catholic Church had been unable to any cooperation.

However, the reports could be used as a warning and information what steps could have negative effect on Poland, e.g. the severity of communists' attitude towards Mindszenty resulted not in his „*neutralization*” but made him even more implacable. It led to the situation that the only solution was brutal arrest and trial which was condemned in the international forum. The reports, although very detailed, had one drawback: the narration and interpretation of the events. It is crucial to underline that they were informed very well about the situation (especially considering the information obtained from „*confidential sources*”), but their interpretation was affected by communist propaganda. Sometimes the diplomats did not try to find or to present the more possible reasons of some situations. It is difficult to judge if they really believed in everything they wrote or if they were aware of the fact that being a diplomat of communist country they were obliged to present the reality in „*required*” way. It should be also underlined that the interpretation was evolving – the more advanced the conflict was, the more unequivocally negative the comments were. The opinion about cardinal Mindszenty was also changing. At the beginning, he was supposed to be just a controversial and reactionary personality. When the communists started to consolidate their power, the diplomats' accusations against Mindszenty became more serious.

The analysis of the conflict was definitely crucial for the policy of diplomats towards Polish diaspora in Hungary. Their activity in that case was strictly coordinated by Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was the reason why their attitude to Polish clergy changed so drastically during that time. The careful study of the situation let them solve the problem of Polish clergy at the appropriate moment. They also avoided the accusation of brutal treatment because they could pretend that the decision of Malczyk's and nuns' emigration was not imposed by them.

Summing up, it is needed to state that the process of solving the problem of Catholic Church in Hungary was much more long-lasting in Hungary than it was in Poland. The way it was

implemented was more drastic. However, despite all differences it is crucial to remember that both countries were realising the same policy, imposed by the Soviet Union. The goal was identical, the Polish and Hungarian communists were obliged by Moscow to gain it in limited period of time and the means were not as significant as the final result.

Aleksandra Sylburska: *Hungarian Communists' Struggle with the Catholic Church in the reports of Polish Diplomatic Post in Budapest (1946–1948)*

**Gábor Földessy**

***U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War: The Failure of Containment in the case of the Vietnam War***

**Abstract**

The primary goal of American foreign policy during the Cold War was to contain the spread of the Soviet Union's communist ideology around the world. By the mid-1960s, the struggle of the two superpowers was concentrated on Vietnam. Through supporting the anti-communist South Vietnamese government, the United States made several attempts to prevent the spread of communism in Vietnam: the USA fought against the North Vietnamese communists who were backed by the Soviet Union and China. However, despite all its efforts, the United States failed in its attempt to contain the spread of communism in Vietnam. The purpose of this research paper is to examine the failure of containment policy in the case of the Vietnam War and the reasons and factors that played a major role in it.

*Keywords:* Cold War, containment, Vietnam War, communism, the domino theory, Lyndon B. Johnson, escalation, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, guerilla warfare

**A**fter World War II, there was a significant change in the world: the old world order, i.e. „[t]he colonial system, where nations maintained control over other countries or territories, was almost completely destroyed by the war.”<sup>1</sup> After World War II, there was a change in the foreign policy of the United States, as well: U.S. political leaders emphasized that „every country should develop economic and strategic policies sympathetic to the interest of the United States,” but the „spread of communism around the world,” including Vietnam, endangered this U.S. policy.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the United States decided to prevent the spread of communism in Vietnam, and thus in Southeast Asia and in the world, but it failed. But what were the reasons and factors that contributed to it? And why was containment both a political and military failure in the case of the Vietnam War? In this essay, I present briefly the antecedents of the Vietnam War and the reasons for the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the essay primarily focuses on the failure of containment in the case of the Vietnam War as well as on the reasons and factors that contributed to it.

---

<sup>1</sup> Roger BARR, *The Vietnam War*, Lucent Books Inc., San Diego, 1991. 9.

<sup>2</sup> BARR (1991), 9.

The main reason for the involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia, and thus in Vietnam too, was President Dwight D. Eisenhower's *domino theory* as well as *containment*, i.e. a policy that aims to stop the spread of communism in the world.<sup>3</sup> Communism is the opposite of capitalism where „*all property and businesses are owned by the government*”.<sup>4</sup> American political leaders thought that the spread of communism endangered U.S. national security and it also hindered American „*economic and strategic policies*”.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, as Roger Barr emphasizes concerning containment, „*[t]he purpose of American foreign policy was dominated by winning the cold war through containing the spread of communism.*”<sup>6</sup> In addition, President Harry S. Truman also proclaimed the Truman Doctrine<sup>7</sup> in 1947, i.e. „*a new American policy*” that „*would support, through military and economic aid, all free peoples resisting communism*”.<sup>8</sup>

The *domino theory* also played a crucial role in the involvement of the USA in Vietnam: the concept that became important in the case of U.S. foreign policy and Vietnam was mentioned by President Eisenhower during a press conference on April 7, 1954, where the president also „*defined the importance of Vietnam in terms of freedom, [...] and the domino theory*”:<sup>9</sup>

„*[f]inally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the „falling domino” principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.*”<sup>10</sup>

As it can be seen in the quotation above, President Eisenhower explains the domino theory in practice, namely, if the first domino

---

<sup>3</sup> BARR (1991), 10.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>7</sup> The Truman Doctrine aimed to prevent the spread of communism in Southeastern Europe, and it was also a successful policy that helped Greece and Turkey to resist communism. BARR (1991), 10.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Terrie EPSTEIN, *Excerpts from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's News Conference of April 7, 1954*, OAH Magazine of History, Vol. 1, N° 1, Organization of American Historians (Apr. 1985), 29. Accessed: December 12, 2014. url: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25162452>

<sup>10</sup> quoted in EPSTEIN (1985), 29.

falls, i.e. the first country in Southeast Asia becomes a communist country, then the other countries follow it immediately one after the other – as the above quotation suggests. In addition, concerning the domino theory and Vietnam, Jeffrey P. Kimball also points out that „*[i]f Vietnam fell into the Soviet or Chinese Communist orbit, then neighboring Laos and Cambodia would too; all of Southeast Asia might fall*”.<sup>11</sup>

After World War II, the Soviet Union crossed its borders because it wanted to spread its communist ideology.<sup>12</sup> But in 1946, the American diplomat in Moscow, George Kennan warned Washington about the plans of the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> In his „*famous Long Telegram of 1946*,” Kennan mentioned among others that

*„[i]n these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. [...] it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points [...].”<sup>14</sup>*

As it can be seen in the excerpt from Kennan’s telegram above, not only did he warn the United States about the Soviet extension, but he also drew the attention of the American political leaders to the fact that the „*Russian expansive tendencies*” must be contained with the purpose of saving the „*free institutions of the western world*” – as it can be seen in the quotation above.

After Kennan’s message, the U.S. focused on Southeast Asia because the „*[c]ommunists were working against the established governments*” there.<sup>15</sup> In Vietnam, the Vietnamese communists were already fighting against the French, but with the purpose of containing the spread of communism there, the USA helped the French.<sup>16</sup> Vietnam was „*an important French colony for nearly a century*,” but the Vietnamese people wanted their own independence

---

<sup>11</sup> Jeffrey P. KIMBALL (ed.), *To Reason Why: The Debate about the Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War*, McGraw-Hill Inc., USA, 1990. 7.

<sup>12</sup> BARR (1991), 10; The Soviet Union „*had become the world’s first Communist nation in 1918*.” BARR (1991), 10.

<sup>13</sup> *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, The History Guide: Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe, April 13, 2012. n.pag. Accessed: January 10, 2015. url: <http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html>

<sup>14</sup> *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, n.pag.

<sup>15</sup> BARR (1991), 10-11.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* 11.

therefore they started to rebel against the French.<sup>17</sup> For a long time, the Vietnamese did not manage to win against the French.<sup>18</sup> But in 1930, when the communist Ho Shi Minh „[became] the key figure in Vietnam’s quest for independence,” together with other communists, he established the Vietminh, which is also known as „a League for the Independence for Vietnam,” with the purpose of „[defeating] the French and the Japanese”.<sup>19</sup>

While Ho Shi Minh fought against the French, Japan invaded Vietnam during World War II and „declared Vietnam independent under Japanese protection.”<sup>20</sup> But after World War II, when Japan was driven out from Vietnam, the communists went on fighting against the French that led to the outbreak of the Vietnamese revolution on August 15, 1945.<sup>21</sup> Since the Vietminh could not beat the French in the southern part of the country, they focused on the northern part of Vietnam where they established a temporary government<sup>22</sup> with the leadership of Ho Shi Minh.<sup>23</sup>

The USA intervened in the affairs of Vietnam when France wanted to control the northern part of the country and the communists resisted that resulted in a war in December 1946.<sup>24</sup> The USA supported the French with the purpose of preventing Vietnam from becoming a communist country.<sup>25</sup> But the fighting went on between the French and the Vietnamese communists who got military aid from China.<sup>26</sup> The Secretary of State during the presidency of Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles remarked in his speech on September 2, 1953 that

*„[c]ommunist China has been and now is training, equipping and supplying the communist forces in Indochina. There is the risk that [...] Red China might send its own Army into Indochina. The Chinese communist regime should realize that such a second aggression could not occur without grave consequences [...].”<sup>27</sup>*

---

<sup>17</sup> BARR (1991), 11.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 13.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 14.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 14.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. 14.

<sup>22</sup> The temporary government was officially called the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. BARR (1991), 14.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. 14-15.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. 15.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. 16.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. 16.

<sup>27</sup> quoted in KIMBALL (1990), 76.



As it can be seen in the quotation above, Dulles drew the attention of U.S. politicians to the fact that not only did China support Indochina, but it was also likely that the communist country „*might send its own Army into Indochina*,” furthermore, Dulles also warned China „*that such a second aggression*” would have „*grave consequences*”– as it can be seen in the quotation above. In my opinion, the last sentence of the quotation above also suggests a threat and thus an American military interference in those affairs with China.

Finally, the Vietminh, who also used „*guerilla tactics*” with the purpose of exhausting the French, managed to rule the northern part of Vietnam by 1952.<sup>28</sup> Since the exhausted French wanted to end the war, they started to negotiate with the communist Vietminh that resulted in a peace conference in Geneva, Switzerland in 1954.<sup>29</sup> The result of the peace conference „*was a cease-fire agreement*” between France and Vietnam, and it also officially cut Vietnam into two countries: into North Vietnam, led by the communist Ho Shi Minh, and into South Vietnam, led by the nationalist Ngo Dinh Diem who was both „*anti-Communist and anti-French*”.<sup>30</sup>

When Diem became the president of South Vietnam, the intention of the United States was still the same concerning containment in Vietnam.<sup>31</sup> Since the USA wanted to prevent South Vietnam from becoming a communist country, it supported Diem’s government „*in exchange for his support of the United States*”.<sup>32</sup> The peace conference in Geneva also „*called for national elections to be held in July 1956*” in South Vietnam.<sup>33</sup> But the USA and Diem „*conspired to thwart the 1956 elections*,” so the Vietminh could not win in South Vietnam.<sup>34</sup> In addition, despite the fact that he remained in power, Diem „*was unable to build a stable government*” and his „*poor rule left the South Vietnamese economy in ruins*,” as well.<sup>35</sup>

Since there were no elections in South Vietnam in 1956, and thus the communists could not win, they realized that the two countries could be united only through a war.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, with the leadership of Ho Shi Minh, the North Vietnamese communists tried to win the

---

<sup>28</sup> BARR (1991), 16.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 17.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 17-18.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. 19.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. 19.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. 18.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. 19.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 19.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. 20.

support of the South Vietnamese people.<sup>37</sup> Meanwhile, Ho Shi Minh's guerilla army was also established in 1960 when „*the Vietminh changed its name to the Vietcong*”.<sup>38</sup> In addition, the Vietcong also turned „*the rural peasants against Diem*” and they „*also used guerilla tactics to terrorize and frustrate the South Vietnamese army*”.<sup>39</sup>

Because of the worsening „*economic, political, and military conditions in South Vietnam*” in the 1960s, the USA decided to send „*more aid and military personnel*” to the country.<sup>40</sup> When Kennedy became the U.S. President in 1961, he increased „*the number of U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam from about 900 to 11,000*”.<sup>41</sup> The plan of the United States was to support and strengthen the South Vietnamese army with the purpose of making it stronger to fight against the communists.<sup>42</sup> Since the Vietcong were very strong in South Vietnam and the American military strategy was not successful, President Kennedy sent more aid to the country because he „*did not want to let South Vietnam to fall to the Communists*”.<sup>43</sup>

The United States made several attempts to contain the spread of communism in Vietnam: beside President Eisenhower, and Kennedy who sent „*U.S. military, financial, and political*” support to the South Vietnamese army,<sup>44</sup> President Johnson also asked the Congress on August 5, 1964 to help South Vietnam:

*„[a]s President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.”*<sup>45</sup>

As it can be seen in quotation above, not only did Johnson ask the Congress to help South Vietnam against the communists, but he also announced that the USA „*will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations,*” i.e. the USA intends to maintain its containment policy in Vietnam – as it can be seen in the quotation above. As a

---

<sup>37</sup> BARR (1991), 20.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 21.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 21.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>45</sup> *President Johnson's Message to Congress. The Tonkin Gulf Incident. (August 5, 1964) American Experience. PBS. March 29, 2005. n.pag. Accessed: January 5, 2015. [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/psources/ps\\_tonkingulf.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/psources/ps_tonkingulf.html)*

result, the U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964 that „*had given President Johnson authority to send troops to Vietnam*”.<sup>46</sup> The Resolution was very important because the USA determined to „*defend South Vietnam against communism*”.<sup>47</sup>

Besides, President Johnson also „*used the authority given to him by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to expand, or escalate, U.S. involvement in Vietnam*”.<sup>48</sup> The president „*[sent] combat soldiers to fight with the South Vietnamese against the [...] Vietcong and the North Vietnamese army*”.<sup>49</sup> By sending American troops to South Vietnam, Johnson wanted to make the South Vietnamese army and government stronger until they can fight on their own against the communists.<sup>50</sup> Concerning Johnson’s policy, Roger Barr mentions that „*[b]y preventing defeat, Johnson believed he was accomplishing his goal of containing communism*”.<sup>51</sup>

In contrast to the efforts of the USA, the communists also made attempts to win the war in Vietnam, for example, on August 2 and 4, 1964, „North Vietnamese patrol boats [...] attacked” the American destroyer ships *Maddox* and the *USS Turner Joy* in the „Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnamese coast.”<sup>52</sup> Despite the fact that „*[n]either ships were damaged,*” the happenings, i.e. „*the idea that the Vietnamese would directly attack U.S. ships,*” made President Johnson angry, therefore he „ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese air bases and oil storage depots.”<sup>53</sup>

Besides, the communist leader, Ho Shi Minh’s guerilla army also made the fighting of the American and South Vietnamese troops more difficult.<sup>54</sup> The communists used a special tactic in the war: they built traps and they could hide themselves in the jungle and in the homes of local people.<sup>55</sup> They could attack the American troops suddenly from different directions from the forest because they knew the jungle very well, thus they managed to baffle U.S. soldiers, and this actually „*[allowed] them to pursue their own tactics*”.<sup>56</sup> In addition, the communists also built traps with bombs that exploded

---

<sup>46</sup> BARR (1991), 74.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 26.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. 27.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 27.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. 27.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. 27.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 25.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. 25.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. 32-33.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. 32.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. 32-33.

immediately when U.S. soldiers stepped on it.<sup>57</sup> As Roger Barr points out, „[s]uch weapons made the Americans even less effective in the unfamiliar jungle, giving the Communists a distinct advantage”.<sup>58</sup>

The communists also ensured their own supplies through the Ho Shi Minh trail.<sup>59</sup> North Vietnam supported the Vietcong in South Vietnam with a huge number of guns, equipment, and armed forces through a path known as the Ho Shi Minh Trail.<sup>60</sup> As it can be seen in the Appendix section of this essay (see on page 18), the map depicts the Ho Shi Minh Trail – it is indicated on the map with the arrows – stretching from North Vietnam through the two neighboring countries: Laos and Cambodia on the west, toward South Vietnam, and the trail entered South Vietnam from the west.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, as the map also shows, the major conflicts between the Vietcong and the South Vietnamese happened primarily at those points where the Ho Shi Minh Trail enters South Vietnam – as it can be seen on the map. In addition, concerning the Ho Shi Minh Trail, Roger Barr points out that „[b]y locating this supply route outside of North and South Vietnam in more neutral territory, the Communists had a better chance of getting their supplies far to the south where they were needed”.<sup>62</sup>

The event that became known as the Tet Offensive was also an effort the communists made against the USA: from January to April 1968, „the Communists attacked the American base [...] near the DMZ”<sup>63</sup> from where the Americans observed the communists „along the DMZ and the Ho Shi Minh Trail in Laos”.<sup>64</sup> During these attacks, the communists demolished „the main ammunition stores, and damaged some aircraft”.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, they also attacked the big South Vietnamese cities, the American embassy in Saigon where they killed several American diplomats, „the South Vietnamese presidential palace [...] and the headquarters of the South Vietnamese army,” as well as „U.S. commander Westmoreland’s compound at the American Airbase” where twenty-three Americans

---

<sup>57</sup> BARR (1991), 33.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. 33.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. 29.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. 29. The trail „was named in honor of North Vietnam’s revolutionary hero,” Ho Shi Minh. BARR (1991), 29.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. 29.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 29.

<sup>63</sup> The DMZ, i.e. the demilitarized zone, was „the neutral area along the border between North and South Vietnam.” BARR (1991), 41.

<sup>64</sup> BARR (1991), 41.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. 41.

were murdered and eighty-five were injured.<sup>66</sup> But despite these severe attacks from the North Vietnamese army and the Vietcong, the U.S. troops fought back and managed to win these battles against the communists.<sup>67</sup>

The U.S. containment policy and military actions in the case of the Vietnam War were shaped and directed primarily by the American presidents as well as by the major political and military leaders like President Eisenhower who talked about the *domino theory* that played a crucial role in shaping „*America's global containment structure*”.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, Eisenhower also „*defined South Vietnam's survival as a major American security interest*”.<sup>69</sup> But actually, as Edward Cuddy points out, „*Eisenhower played a major role, arguably the most crucial role of all presidents, in America's slide down the "slippery slope" into Vietnam*”.<sup>70</sup>

President Kennedy was also crucial political leader in the Vietnam War since he „*was nonetheless determined to continue the struggle in Vietnam*”.<sup>71</sup> In his speech in September 1961, the president mentioned that

„*South Viet-Nam is already under attack – sometimes by a single assassin, sometimes by a band of guerillas, recently by full battalions. The peaceful borders of Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and India have been repeatedly violated. And the peaceful people of Laos are in danger of losing the independence they gained not so long ago.*”<sup>72</sup>

As it can be seen in the quotation above, President Kennedy highlighted the fact that South Vietnam was endangered both because of the spread of communism and because of the attack of the communist army. In the quotation above, Kennedy also pointed out that other countries in Southeast Asia, such as „*Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and India*” are also endangered because of the communism when he said that „*people of Laos are in danger of losing the independence*” – as it can be seen in the quotation above.

In addition, President Kennedy also emphasized the importance

---

<sup>66</sup> BARR (1991), 44-45.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. 46.

<sup>68</sup> Edward CUDDY, *Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War. Or Mr. Eisenhower's?* The Review of Politics, Vol. 65, No. 4, Cambridge University Press (Autumn, 2003), 355. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408716>.

<sup>69</sup> CUDDY (2003), 355.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. 352.

<sup>71</sup> KIMBALL (1990), 35.

<sup>72</sup> quoted in KIMBALL (1990), 35.

of U.S. support in Southeast Asia.<sup>73</sup> In September, 1963, when a reporter asked him about the support that the U.S. sent to South Vietnam, Kennedy told in the interview that

*„[i]f you reduce your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse.”<sup>74</sup>*

As it can be seen in the above quotation, Kennedy highlighted the importance of the support that the USA gave to South Vietnam, namely, as Kennedy mentioned, without the help of the USA, the government of South Vietnam would collapse – as it can be seen in the quotation above.

President Lyndon B. Johnson also shaped U.S. containment policy during the Vietnam War because he started several military operations against the communists like *„a series of covert attacks on North Vietnam,”* as well as *„Operation „Rolling Thunder,”* that was *„the air war against North Vietnam, launched in March 1965.”<sup>75</sup>* As Edward Cuddy says, Johnson also faced the decision *„either abandon South Vietnam to communism or send in American forces to save it.”<sup>76</sup>* But Johnson remarked that

*„[i]f we ran out on Southeast Asia, [...] I could see trouble ahead in every part of the globe”* opening *“the path to World War III.”<sup>77</sup>*

Thus, Johnson decided to send *„huge weapons supplies and 23,000 military advisers”* to South Vietnam.<sup>78</sup> In addition, he also *„launched covert 34-A attacks against North Vietnam”* and *„expanded presidential war – making powers with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.”<sup>79</sup>* On the other hand, he also misled the American public when he, as Roger Barr says, *„kept the details of his actions secret and lied to the very people who had elected him [...] in order to pursue a Vietnam policy that became more and more unpopular.”<sup>80</sup>* But in general, as Cuddy points out, *„[a]mong the presidents who led America to war in Vietnam, no one was so*

---

<sup>73</sup> KIMBALL (1990), 37.

<sup>74</sup> quoted in KIMBALL (1990), 37.

<sup>75</sup> CUDDY (2003), 352.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. 361.

<sup>77</sup> quoted in CUDDY (2003), 362.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid. 365.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. 365.

<sup>80</sup> BARR (1991), 90.

*deeply ensnared by predecessors' policies as Johnson*".<sup>81</sup>

General William Westmoreland also played a crucial role in the Vietnam War because he was „*the military commander in charge of U.S. troops in Vietnam*".<sup>82</sup> He „*commanded U.S. forces in the Vietnam War*” during the presidency of Johnson.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, William Hosh also points out that during the war, Westmoreland „*implemented a strategy of attrition, using overwhelming firepower to try to kill enemy troops at a rate faster than they could be replaced*".<sup>84</sup> Hosh also highlights that despite all his efforts to win the war against the communists in Vietnam, when the United States seemed not to win, „*Westmoreland was recalled to Washington and given the post of army chief of staff*".<sup>85</sup>

President Richard Nixon, along with Henry Kissinger, was also a crucial political leader who „*[aimed] to achieve „peace with honor” in the Vietnam War*".<sup>86</sup> The president gradually withdrew the American soldiers from Vietnam while he also started his „*policy of „Vietnamization*".<sup>87</sup> Furthermore, Nixon's political decisions were not liked by the American public therefore Americans started to demonstrate against the war.<sup>88</sup> Concerning achieving peace, Hosh points out that, with the help of Henry Kissinger, the „*agreement was finally reached in January 1973 and signed in Paris*".<sup>89</sup> In addition, Nixon also „*ended all draft calls in 1972, and in 1973 the draft was abolished in favour of an all-volunteer military*".<sup>90</sup>

As William Hosh points out, Henry Kissinger, „*as an adviser for national security affairs and secretary of state, was a major influence in the shaping of foreign policy from 1969 to 1976 under presidents Nixon and Ford*".<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, Kissinger also „*played a major role in Nixon's Vietnamization policy—the disengagement of U.S. troops from South Vietnam and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces*”,<sup>92</sup> which will be mentioned later in the essay.

Despite the fact that the USA was not involved in the war when

---

<sup>81</sup> CUDDY (2003), 372.

<sup>82</sup> BARR (1991), 38.

<sup>83</sup> William HOSH (ed.), *The Korean War and the Vietnam War: People, Politics, and Power*, Britannica Educational Publishing, New York, 2010, 186.

<sup>84</sup> HOSH (2010), 186.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. 187.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. 176.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. 176.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. 176.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. 177.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. 138.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. 177.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. 178.

Gerald Ford became president in 1974,<sup>93</sup> he also tried to help South Vietnam but the War Powers Act did not allow him to do so.<sup>94</sup> In January 1975, not only did President Ford ask the U.S. Congress for help to defend South Vietnam,<sup>95</sup> but he also pointed out that if the communists occupy South Vietnam, then

„[t]he results would be an alien world in which the costs for our survival would dwarf anything we have ever known.”<sup>96</sup>

But finally, as Christopher Jespersen writes, „Thieu’s regime collapsed in April 1975 because Congress refused to appropriate the military assistance sought by the Nixon and Ford administrations”.<sup>97</sup>

Not only political leaders, but the media and the American public also influenced U.S. containment policy in Vietnam.<sup>98</sup> After a journalist from the *Washington Post* returned from Vietnam, she wrote concerning „Johnson’s war policy” that

„[m]aybe „we shouldn’t have been there in the first place,” [...] But “we were there,” leaving „no choice but to help the South Vietnamese” fight Communist guerillas.”<sup>99</sup>

As the above quotation shows, the American media expressed its dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War. Furthermore, many Americans in general were also disappointed and disillusioned by the war and by its serious consequences like the huge number of casualties.<sup>100</sup> As the Table in the Appendix section of the essay (see on page 19) shows, the most people died in 1968: altogether more than 14,000 Americans, but in 1967 and 1969 nearly 10,000 Americans died in the war each year – as the Table depicts. In addition, many Americans „protested Johnson’s action on both moral and strategic grounds”.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, the fact that „Johnson routinely kept what was going on in Vietnam a secret” and „[e]ach month he sent more troops to Vietnam,” made many Americans angry and disillusioned.<sup>102</sup>

As a result of the serious consequences of the war in the USA,

---

<sup>93</sup> Christopher T. JESPERSEN, *Kissinger, Ford, and Congress: The Very Bitter End in Vietnam*, *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 71, No. 3, University of California Press, (2002). 446. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/phr.2002.71.3.439> .

<sup>94</sup> JESPERSEN (2002). 440.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.* 447.

<sup>96</sup> quoted in JESPERSEN (2002), 450.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* 440.

<sup>98</sup> BARR (1991), 65.

<sup>99</sup> quoted in CUDDY (2003), 362.

<sup>100</sup> BARR (1991): 53.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* 53.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.* 62.



American political leaders like Nixon and Kissinger „*recognized that the war must be ended*”.<sup>103</sup> President Nixon also knew that if the USA withdrew in a way that was not honorable, it „*would destroy U.S. credibility with other countries and damage its world standing*”.<sup>104</sup> Kissinger also emphasized that the United States must not seem to be beaten when it withdraws from Vietnam.<sup>105</sup> Concerning the quick withdrawal from Vietnam, Kissinger pointed out that

„*[h]owever we got into Vietnam, [...] whatever the judgment of our actions, ending the war honorably is essential for the peace of the world. Any other solution may unloose forces that would complicate the prospects of international order.*”<sup>106</sup>

As it can be seen in the quotation above, Kissinger emphasized that it is crucial that the USA withdraw from Vietnam with honor because the „*international order*” and the peace in the whole world can be maintained only in this way – as it can be seen in the quotation above. Therefore, with the purpose of achieving „*an honorable peace*,” Nixon’s peace strategy included three parts: Vietnamization, the expansion of the war, and détente.<sup>107</sup>

In the case of Vietnamization, the USA gave South Vietnam high-quality weapons and ensured the training of the South Vietnamese soldiers.<sup>108</sup> Nixon wanted to make the South Vietnamese army stronger, so they could fight against the communists and defend South Vietnam without American help.<sup>109</sup> In the meantime, Nixon announced the gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam with the purpose of „*[reducing] the number of American casualties*”.<sup>110</sup> The president also talked to the American public on television about his plans:

„*[...] we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war:*

—*I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.*

—*Or we can persist in our search for a just peace, through a*

---

<sup>103</sup> George C. HERRING, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1986, 222.

<sup>104</sup> BARR (1991), 68.

<sup>105</sup> HERRING (1986), 223-224.

<sup>106</sup> quoted in HERRING (1986), 223.

<sup>107</sup> BARR (1991), 68.

<sup>108</sup> HOSH (2010), 132.

<sup>109</sup> BARR (1991), 70.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. 70.

*negotiated settlement if possible or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization [...] I have chosen this second course. [...]. It is a plan which will end the war [...] not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world...I have chosen a plan for peace. [...]*<sup>111</sup>

As it can be seen in the excerpt from Nixon's speech above, the president emphasized that Vietnamization and discussions about peace are much more important than a quick withdrawal because these will lead to a peace in Vietnam as well as in the whole world – as it can be seen in the quotation above.

Beside Vietnamization, Nixon also decided to expand the war.<sup>112</sup> His goal was „to destroy communist sanctuaries in neighboring countries” such as in Cambodia and Laos because they supported the North Vietnamese in the South.<sup>113</sup> Therefore, Nixon „authorized secret bombing raids inside Cambodia to destroy Communist sanctuaries,” but this strategy was not successful because the „bombings did not destroy all the communist troops and supplies in Cambodia”.<sup>114</sup> Then, in 1970, Nixon „authorized a ground invasion of Cambodia,” which meant that „the South Vietnamese troops aided by the American troops [...] crossed the border into Cambodia [...] to completely destroy North Vietnamese supplies and troops”.<sup>115</sup>

In the case of „encouraging detente,” Nixon's goal was to reduce the tensions with the Soviet Union and China.<sup>116</sup> In 1969, the USA talked to the Soviet Union about the limitation on arms while Nixon was also weakening „the trade embargo against China,”<sup>117</sup> and finally „[a]n agreement [...] for both countries was reached in May 1972”.<sup>118</sup> Nixon's intention with detente was „to expand the war into Cambodia and Laos without drawing in the SU or China,” and he also wanted to „encourage the Soviet Union and China to pressure North Vietnam to end the war”.<sup>119</sup>

---

<sup>111</sup> quoted in HOSH (2010), 135.; The speech is known as Nixon's „*The Pursuit of Peace in Vietnam*” speech that was announced on November 3, 1969. HOSH (2010), 135.

<sup>112</sup> BARR (1991), 71.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. 71.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. 71.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. 71-72.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. 76.

<sup>117</sup> This political decision from the USA was important because since 1949, „when the Communists had taken control of” China, the USA „had had no diplomatic or trade relationship with” the country. BARR (1991), 76.

<sup>118</sup> BARR (1991), 76.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. 76.

Despite Nixon's peace strategies, the way toward peace was not easy because „[t]he peace talks” that started „in 1969 had continued without progress”.<sup>120</sup> A year later, in 1970, Nixon sent Henry Kissinger to talk secretly to the North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho about peace but they could not agree for two years.<sup>121</sup> Finally, in 1972, Kissinger and Tho accepted a proposal by October 8<sup>th</sup> that included an armistice in Southeast Asia, the withdrawal of the American „troops within sixty days,” the release of the American prisoners who were caught in the war, as well as a government in South Vietnam led by Thieu.<sup>122</sup> Since the proposal also included that the United States had to leave Vietnam, the South Vietnamese president, Thieu did not accept the proposal because „he needed American support to stay in power”.<sup>123</sup>

But Nixon and Kissinger were determined to achieve peace in Vietnam with honor.<sup>124</sup> Nixon managed to persuade Thieu to accept the proposal – Nixon promised that the United States would help him if „North Vietnam violated the agreement”.<sup>125</sup> In December 1972, Nixon also forced North Vietnam to be loyal to the agreement as he ordered the bombing of North Vietnam.<sup>126</sup> Eventually, „a peace treaty very similar to the October proposal was signed” on January 27, 1973.<sup>127</sup> According to this agreement, the United States had to remove its soldiers from Vietnam within two months, the „U.S. bases were to be dismantled, and the two sides would exchange prisoners of war”.<sup>128</sup> In addition, the peace treaty also included a „cease-fire between North Vietnam and South Vietnam”.<sup>129</sup>

Despite the fact that the peace treaty „ended the United States' longest war,” the fighting continued in Vietnam.<sup>130</sup> Although the South Vietnamese army was much bigger and had better equipments than the army of the communists, South Vietnamese soldiers could not win the fights against the communists because „they were poorly led”.<sup>131</sup> Moreover, since „[p]resident Thieu remained unpopular with

---

<sup>120</sup> BARR (1991), 79.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. 79.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. 80.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. 80.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. 81.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. 81-82.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. 82.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. 82.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid. 82.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. 83.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. 83-84.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. 84.

his people” and the USA did not back him either, „his government began to deteriorate”.<sup>132</sup> In addition, since the communists did not give up their goals as to reuniting the two Vietnams, they attacked some South Vietnamese cities.<sup>133</sup> In a short time, they „took control of twelve provinces and eight million people” in South Vietnam.<sup>134</sup> Actually, as Roger Barr points out, „South Vietnam territories began to collapse like a row of falling dominoes”.<sup>135</sup>

Even though the United States’ army had already left Vietnam, „American diplomats and their families were still stationed at the American embassy in Saigon”.<sup>136</sup> Since „the Communists attacked the city of Saigon” on April 29, 1975, the remaining U.S. citizens and diplomats had to be evacuated from the embassy.<sup>137</sup> On April 30, 1975, „the South Vietnamese government surrendered unconditionally,” and the communists „occupied Saigon without a struggle”.<sup>138</sup> Afterward, „the country was officially united as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with its capital in Hanoi” and „Saigon was renamed Ho Shi Min City”.<sup>139</sup> Concerning the struggle of the communists in Vietnam, Roger Barr points out that „[t]heir long struggle to reunite North and South Vietnam had finally ended with victory”.<sup>140</sup>

The failure in the case of the Vietnam War also changed American foreign policy as the Congress decided to limit the power of the president.<sup>141</sup> Therefore, in 1973, when the war ended for the United States, the Congress „passed three pieces of legislation that reduced the support the United States could give to South Vietnam, and took power away from Nixon”.<sup>142</sup> As a result of the decisions of the Congress, „U.S. bombing in all of Indochina” was entirely forbidden.<sup>143</sup> In addition, the Congress also enacted the War Powers Act on November 7, 1973<sup>144</sup> that actually „prohibited Nixon and all

---

<sup>132</sup> BARR (1991), 84.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. 86.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. 87.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. 87.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid. 87.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. 87-88; Graham Martin, the U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, and his family were the last Americans who left Vietnam on April 30, 1975. BARR (1991), 88.

<sup>138</sup> HOSH (2010), 146.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. 146.

<sup>140</sup> BARR (1991), 88.

<sup>141</sup> IBID. 85.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid. 85.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. 85.

<sup>144</sup> Since the Congress was convinced that „both Johnson and Nixon had abused their presidential powers in running the Vietnam War, [...] they wanted to establish congressional control over the president’s power to wage war.” BARR (1991), 85.

*future presidents from committing U.S. troops overseas for more than sixty days without congressional authority*".<sup>145</sup>

In conclusion, as I presented in this essay, containment policy was the key point in the case of the Vietnam War but the United States did not succeed because it „*had the wrong goals, used the wrong military strategy and employed weapons that proved ineffective in the end*”.<sup>146</sup> Therefore, as Roger Barr says, actually „*the United States had negotiated the Paris Accords primarily to allow it to withdraw from Vietnam without admitting defeat*”.<sup>147</sup> Furthermore, Barr also highlights that „*[p]erhaps most importantly, the United States failed in Vietnam because the war lost support among the American people*”.<sup>148</sup> In addition, the failure of containment in Vietnam also had serious consequences because after the communists won in Vietnam, Cambodia „*was also overthrown by Communists*”.<sup>149</sup>

---

<sup>145</sup> BARR (1991), 69.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. 102.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. 84.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. 102.


<sup>149</sup> Ibid. 102.

## Appendix



The source of this map: BARR, Roger. *The Vietnam War*. Lucent books Inc. San Diego, 1991. Print. 77.

*„US Fatalities In Vietnam War”*



*„US Fatalities In Vietnam War.” Historycentral. Multieducator, Inc. 2012. Accessed: January 4, 2015. url: <http://www.historycentral.com/Vietnam/casulties.html>*

Gábor Földessy: *U.S. Foreign Policy during the Cold War: The Failure of Containment in the case of the Vietnam War*



**M. Szebeni Géza**

### ***Tojástánc avagy Kádár és II. János Pál<sup>1</sup>***

#### **Abstract**

News about the new pope's election was received with reserve in the socialist countries. According to the Soviet leadership John Paul II had an antisoviet and anticommunist stand and the fact that this Personality of the nationalistic Polish catholic church was elected the new pope was going to make serious troubles. Kádár who was not interested in modifying his „church policy” sent very urgently the chairman of the State Office for Churchs' Affairs to the Holy See to probe Vatican's inner circles about their intentions concerning the so called „East policy”. Archbishop Casaroli - one of the banner holder of the „East policy” - reassured his Hungarian counterpart that the „East policy” launched by John XXIII and developed by Paul VI would be continued by John Paul II. What is more after two months of his intronizations John Paul II send Archbishop Poggi to Budapest to declare that the Holy See places trust in the continuation and the improvement of its bilateral relations with the Hungarian state. The Holy See's rediness to further cooperate ment for Kádár that he could continue his well proved „church policy.”

*Keywords:* János Kádár, church policy, John Paul II, Holy See, State Office for Churchs' Affaires

**VI.** Pál, akivel Kádár, előző évi magánkihallgatása során meghatározta a magyar-szentszéki kapcsolatok alapelveit, 1978. augusztus 6-án elhunyt. Az MSZMP Politikai Bizottsága 1978. augusztus 8-i ülésén úgy döntött, hogy VI. Pál pápa temetésén az egyházügyi hivatal elnöke és a római nagykövetség ügyvivője vegyen részt. Ezt a határozatot gyorsan módosították, mivel a lengyelek és az NDK magas szinten akarta képviseltetni magát (az államtanács elnökhelyettese) és így a magyar részvételre az Elnöki Tanács elnökhelyettesét, az egyházügyi hivatal elnökét és a római magyar nagykövetség ügyvivőjét jelölték ki.<sup>2</sup>

Ezt követően a Politikai Bizottság 1978. augusztus 29-én „röpszavazással” döntött I. János Pál megválasztásával kapcsolatos teendőkről. A határozat úgy szólt, hogy Losonczy Pál az ET elnöke táviratban köszöntse a pápát megválasztása alkalmából. Az 1978. szeptember 3-ai koronázási ünnepségeken az Elnöki Tanácsot és a

---

<sup>1</sup> Ez a tanulmány mintegy folytatása a Grotius-ban megjelent és annak tartalomjegyzékében visszakereshető, „A golyószórótól a pápai emlékéremig” c. dolgozatomnak.

<sup>2</sup> Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL) M-KS 288.f.8/556 ö.e.

kormányt az ET elnökhelyettese, az Egyházügyi Hivatal elnöke és a római nagykövet képviselje. A budapesti Bazilikában rendezendő koronázási misén pedig az igazságügyi miniszter, az egyik (nyugat-európai kapcsolatokat felügyelő) miniszterhelyettes és az egyházügyi hivatal elnökhelyettese vegyen részt.<sup>3</sup>

A római nagykövet 1978. augusztus 30-án „*statissime*” (sürgős kézbesítésre) jelzéssel küldött táviratot a lengyel nagykövetség „*Vatikán melletti képviselőjével*” történt ebédjéről. A lengyel diplomata néhány nappal előbb találkozott a vatikáni diplomácia vezetőivel, akik „*nagy jelentőséget tulajdonítottak*” a szocialista országok képviselői jelenlétének VI. Pál temetésén. „*Elkeseredetten*” nyilatkozott Casaroli érsek arról, hogy a szovjetek távol maradtak. A vatikáni diplomaták szerint az új pápa várhatóan nem változtat a vatikáni külpolitikán – ezt a pápa egyébként megerősítette Casarolinak ez utóbbinak adott audienciáján.<sup>4</sup> Ez kedvező hír volt Kádárnak is, mivel azt jelentette, hogy a számára általában is fontos folyamatosság és stabilitás a Vatikánnal fennálló kapcsolatokban is megmarad. A Szentszék szovjetek általi „*negligálása*” nagy gondot nem okozott, mivel Moszkva számára az autokefál orosz pravoszláv egyház nagyságrendekkel fontosabb volt, s csak később, II János Pál idején kellett foglalkoznia a Vatikánnal, egyrészt a litván és ukrán katolikusok, másrészt az egyre súlyosabbá váló lengyel válságperiódus idején.

I. János Pál drámaian rövid uralkodását követően újabb konklávéra került sor, s az előre jelzések szerint az általános kívánság az volt a bíborosi karon belül, hogy ne túl fiatal olasz és jó egészségi állapotban lévő bíboros legyen a pápa. S valóban az előrejelzések szerint valamennyi szóba jöhető bíboros olasz volt.<sup>5</sup> A római nagykövet újabb jelentésében a Lékai bíborossal folytatott beszélgetéséről beszámolva azt írta, hogy a magyar katolikus egyházfő szerint kizárt, hogy nem olasz lesz a pápa, a pápaválasztó bíborosok egységes álláspontja pedig az, hogy az új pápa ne legyen túl idős se túl fiatal, ne másik kontinensről jöjjön, ne csak lelkipásztor, de politikus is legyen és ismerje a kúria belső viszonyait.<sup>6</sup>

Így aztán Karol Wojtyła megválasztása döbbenetet okozott Budapesten is. A krakkói bíboros érseket jól ismerték a magyar „*illetékesek*” és az Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal az új pápa beiktatására vonatkozó, a Politikai Bizottság számára készített előterjesztésében

---

<sup>3</sup> MNL M-KS 288.f.8/556 ö.e.

<sup>4</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán,138. doboz. 005285. 1978.

<sup>5</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán,138. doboz. 005285/2 1978.

<sup>6</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán,138. doboz. 005285/2 1978.

meg is írta, hogy „*Karol Wojtyła (...) eddigi működés során nyíltan antikommunista, szocialista ellenes magatartást tanúsított.*”<sup>7</sup> Csak hangsúlyozta a meglepetés erejét, hogy az új pápa megválasztásának *másnapján* a külügyminisztérium relációért felelős, XI. területi főosztályának vezetője (korábbi római majd párizsi nagykövet) dr. Bényi József<sup>8</sup> azonnal feljegyzést készített a minisztérium felső vezetése számára. A feljegyzés szerint Wojtyła bíborossá szentelése előtt a lengyel egyház mérsékeltebb szárnyához tartozott, és sokan azt remélték, hogy a merev, szembenálló Wyszynski bíboros ellensúlya lesz. Nem így történt, „*szélsőségesen*” antikommunista egyházi vezető képe alakult ki róla. Nagy volt a szerepe abban – így a feljegyzés –, hogy a lengyel és a magyar katolikus egyház „*ma élesen szembekerült egymással*”, mivel lengyel részről úgy látják, hogy a magyar egyház vezetői az egyházi érdekek árulói. Az új pápa jövőbeli tevékenységét illetően a magyar egyházi körök borúlátóak és hasonlóan vélekedik a magyar Egyházügyi Hivatal vezetése is. Aggodalomra az ad okot – emelte ki Bényi József –, hogy Wojtyła esetleg törést hoz a Vatikán keleti politikájában, amely politika „*az elmúlt években megteremtette a párbeszéd lehetőségét és elősegítette számos kényes kérdés kölcsönösen előnyös megoldását*”. Gondolatmenetét Bényi azzal zárta, hogy Wojtyła megválasztása olyan vatikáni körök befolyásának az erősödését mutatja, amely körök mögött „*az enyhülési folyamat visszafordításán munkálkodó politika erők húzódnak meg.*”<sup>9</sup>

A varsói magyar nagykövet is rk.statissime (azonnali kézbesítésre) jelzéssel jelentette Wojtyła megválasztására vonatkozó információit, melyek szerint a lengyel közvélemény zajosan ünnepelt, míg a LEMP KB adminisztrációs osztályának a vezetője (egyebek mellett az állambiztonság politikai felügyeletét is ellátta) által mondottak előre jelezték a későbbi konfliktusokat azzal, hogy az új pápa „*kozmpolita*”, szélsőségesen antikommunista-antiszocialista, nagyon ambiciózus személy. Hasonló hírokat pengetett a varsói szovjet nagykövetség illetékes munkatársa is, aki szerint az új pápa megválasztása sok negatívummal jár, s minden valószínűség szerint kedvezőtlen irányban változik a lengyel-vatikáni viszony és a lengyel kormány és egyház közötti kapcsolat. Számolni lehet azzal – így a szovjet diplomata –, hogy bonyolódik a lengyel belpolitikai helyzet és

---

<sup>7</sup> MNLXIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz. 005285/7. 1978.

<sup>8</sup> A kádárkori magyar diplomácia egyik legtehetségesebb nagykövete. Kiváló nemzetközi jogász volt, sok nyelven tárgyalt s árvagyerekként nevelkedve is fényes pályát futott be. Külügyminiszter helyettesként vonult nyugalomba. E sorok írója több évet dolgozott vele és mestereként emlékszik rá.

<sup>9</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz. 005285/3. 1978

erősödni fognak a szocialista tábor elleni nyugati propagandatámadások és a fellazítási tevékenység.<sup>10</sup> Igen érdekes módon, hasonló amerikai véleményeket jelentett a washingtoni nagykövet azzal, hogy „*a nacionalista lengyel egyház egyik személyiségének pápává választása minden bizonnyal komoly probléma elé állítja majd a szovjet és a lengyel kormányt, de más kelet európai országok kormányait is.*” A jelentés kiemelte, hogy amerikai várakozás szerint az amerikai elnök által indított emberi jogi kampány új töltést kaphat s a Vatikánban új szövetségesre talál.<sup>11</sup>

Kádár és a magyar vezetés közvetlen tájékozási szándékára utalt, hogy az egyházügyi hivatal elnöke 1978. október 21-én a Vatikánban felkereste az új kinevezés előtt álló Casaroli érseket az Egyházi Közügyek Tanácsa leköszönő titkárát (a Vatikán „*keleti politikájának*” egyik kialakítóját), akivel egyébként a korábbi magyar-vatikáni tárgyalások során jó munkakapcsolatot létesített. E nem hivatalos találkozó során Casaroli kétség kívül csökkenteni akarta a II. János Pállal kapcsolatos aggodalmakat, mivel kijelentette, hogy a Szentszék „*keleti politikájában*” nem várható lényeges változás. Ennek okát abban látta, hogy azok az egyház felső vezetők, akik a „*keleti politikát*” formálták, továbbra is a helyükön vannak, és ezt az új pápának is figyelembe kell vennie. A verbális szinten jelentkező, az eddigi vatikáni megnyilvánulásokkal ellentétes nyilatkozatokat javasolta óvatosan kezelni, s nem tanácsolta, hogy „*ezekből messzemenő következtetéseket vonjunk le.*” Az egyházügyi hivatal elnöke jónak látta leszögezni, hogy a magyar egyházpolitikában a jövőben sem lesz változás, mivel a jelenlegi gyakorlat felel meg a magyar társadalom és egyház valódi érdekeinek.<sup>12</sup> Két nappal később még Arruppa jezsuita generálissal is nem hivatalosan találkozott, viszonzva ez utóbbi két évvel előbbi nála tett látogatását. A generális elismerően szólt a jelentés szerint a magyarországi egyházpolitikai viszonyokról, s érdeklődött az új pápáról kialakított magyar álláspont iránt – amire azt a választ kapta, hogy az új pápát „*csak a tevékenység alapján lehet megítélni.*”<sup>13</sup>

Majd befutott a lengyel vezetés részére készített, a varsói magyar nagykövetséghez eljuttatott és általa felterjesztett jelentés is, amelyik szerint a Vatikán és a szocialista országok kapcsolatai terén nehézségekkel kell számolni és ez hatással lesz egyes országokban az

---

<sup>10</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz. 005285/4. 1978.

<sup>11</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz. 005285/27. 1978. V.ö. M. SZEKENI Géza: *Az Egyesült Államok és a Vatikán kapcsolatai*, Külügyi Szemle, 2005. 3-4.sz. 136-152

<sup>12</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz. 005285/10. 1978

<sup>13</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz.005285/13. 1978

állam és az egyház viszonyaira is.<sup>14</sup> A moszkvai nagykövet is jelentett az ottani Állami Egyházügyi Tanácsban folytatott beszélgetéséről. A szovjet vélemény igen óvatos volt, azt mindenesetre szükségesnek látták leszögezni, hogy az új pápa szovjetellenes és antikommunista, jó amerikai kapcsolatai vannak. Tekintettel arra, hogy az új pápának igen alapos ismeretei vannak a szocialista országokról, a Vatikánnal folytatott tárgyalások nehezebbé fognak válni – „*megnehezíti a dolgunkat*”.<sup>15</sup> A római magyar nagykövet 1978. november 13-i dátummal küldött értékelő jelentést a frissen megválasztott pápa tevékenységéről. Leszögezte, hogy az egyház jelentős fordulathoz érkezett II. János Pál pápaságával. Viszonylag széles körű az a vélemény, hogy az új pápa komoly kihívást jelent a szocialista országok számára, és pápasága alatt az egyház kész lesz megmérkőzni a marxizmussal. A nehézségekre elsősorban Lengyelország és a Szovjetunió számíthat, bár eddig nem tett olyan kijelentéseket, melyek a szocialista világ elleni direkt konfrontációs szándékra utalnának. Az emberi jogok tekintetében határozottan szemben áll a szocialista világgal, s e tekintetben vallott felfogása nagyon hasonló Brzezinskyéhez. Bár bizonyos, mind belső, mind külső nyomás tapasztalható a Vatikán keleti politikájának a megváltoztatására II. János Pál eddig tartózkodott attól, hogy bármiféle kötelezettséget vállaljon – így a jelentés.<sup>16</sup>

Néhány hónappal II. János Pál trónra lépését követően a római magyar nagykövet újabb értékelést küldött. E szerint a pápa beszédeiben megvalósulni látszanak azok a negatív előjelek, amikre múltja alapján következtetni lehetett. Megjelentek a bírálatok a szocialista országok ellen az emberi jogok védelmének köntösében azzal, hogy egyes szocialista országokban megtiltják a vallás szabad gyakorlását. Mi több, a „*magyar ügyek*” is napirendre kerültek e bírálatokban azt hangoztatva, hogy VI. Pál képtelen volt megoldani a Mindszenty problémát, ráadásul Wojtyła nem értett egyet leváltásával és Lékai bíboros kinevezésével. A bírálók szerint e lépések a Kádár rendszer iránti gesztusok voltak.<sup>17</sup>

E bírálatok Kádár számára nyilván teljesen érdektelenek voltak. Saját egyházpolitikája helyességét illetően egyebek mellett már csak azért sem támadhattak kételyei, mert II. János Pál, megválasztását követően kevesebb, mint két hónappal Budapestre küldte Luigi Poggi érseket, pápa nunciust és kísérelőjét azzal a céllal, hogy konzultatív

---

<sup>14</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz. 005285/16.1978.

<sup>15</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz.005285/23. 1978.

<sup>16</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 138. doboz. 005285/26. 1978.

<sup>17</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 133. doboz, 00464. 1979.

jellegű megbeszéléseket folytasson a magyar Egyházügyi Hivatal vezetőjével. Poggi a megbeszélések során hivatkozott is annak a jelentőségére, hogy „a pápa a szocialista országok közül elsőnek Magyarországra küldte őket” és visszatérésük után közvetlenül a pápának kell beszámolniuk tárgyalásaik eredményeiről. A vatikáni diplomata átadta a Szentszék köszönetét azért, hogy az elhunyt pápák temetésén és az új pápák beiktatásán a magyar kormányzat magas szinten képviseltette magát. Poggi kijelentette, hogy VI. Pál „testamentumként” hagyta utódaira a magyar-vatikáni kapcsolatok ápolását s hozzáfűzte, hogy II. János Pál ismeri a szocialista országok egyházpolitikai helyzetét és különös érdeklődéssel viseltetik a magyarországi viszonyok iránt. Az új pápa a „kapcsolatok továbbépítése és a konstruktív együttműködés szempontjából jelentősnek és a jövőre nézve is meghatározónak ítélte Kádár János első titkár és VI. Pál pápa találkozósa alkalmával elhangzott megnyilatkozásokat.” Ez utóbbiakra tekintettel a Szentszék bízik abban, hogy az „eddiggi vonalat lehet tovább vinni és talán még jobbra is lehet tenni” – figyelemmel mindarra, ami Kádár János és VI. Pál találkozásán elhangzott.

Poggi érsek ezt követően előadta, hogy időszerű lenne megoldani a váci, székesfehérvári és az esztergomi segédpüspöki kinevezéseket, s felvetett néhány, 1964 óta többször szóba került kérdést: a meglévő szerzetesrendek keretszámának bővítését, új szerzetesrendek felállításának igényét, a templomi és az iskolai hitoktatás kérdését, új templomok és plébániák építésének, a kórházakban és a börtönökben folytatandó lelkipásztori tevékenység lehetőségét, az egyházi sajtótermékek cenzúrájának feloldását.

Az Egyházügyi Hivatal elnöke a magyar álláspontot megfogalmazva a kapcsolatokat illető elhangzottakkal lényegében egyetértett s hozzáfűzte, hogy a magyar nép elégedett a társadalmi rendszerrel és magyar részről a magyar nép érdekeivel összefüggésben „vizsgáljuk az állam és az egyházak viszonyát.” A magyar rendszer nem tökéletes, de a magyar kormány Helsink szellemét már korábban is hirdette és gyakorolta – másokhoz hasonlóan. Az új pápát illetően magyar részről az álláspontot II. János Pál tettei és nem a szavai befolyásolják elsősorban, „Nincsenek előítéleteink, bizakodva várakozunk” – mondta. Mindazonáltal, magyar megítélés szerint a pápa nagy felelősséget vállalna, ha elődeinek az együttműködésre irányuló „vonalvezetését” nem folytatná. Amennyiben a pápa „ideológiai harcra” serkentené a katolikusokat, az kedvezőtlen irányban befolyásolná az állam és egyház viszonyát, és „lelkiismereti konfliktust okozna” az új társadalom építésében aktív szerepet vállaló katolikus

tömegekben.<sup>18</sup> Ez világos beszéd volt, félreérthetlenné tette, hogy a magyar vezetés – Kádár – adott esetben hajlandó felvállalni e „*lelkiismereti konfliktus*” feloldását a rendelkezésére álló eszközökkel – mely utóbbiak mibenlétének kitalálásához nem kellett nagy fantázia. Lékai bíboros egy, a római nagykövettel folytatott beszélgetése során célzott is erre a lehetőségre a pápa akkor még csak tervezett varsói látogatásával kapcsolatban. A magyar egyházfő úgy látta, hogy ez az utazás „*elhamarkodott*”, s esetleges zavaró események közbejöttével sokat árthat a többi szocialista országban lévő egyháznak s a „*megindult folyamatnak*” is.<sup>19</sup>

Az ÁEH elnöke egyébként nem emelt kifogást a három segédpüspök kinevezése ellen, felvetette, hogy nem időszerű-e a veszprémi apostoli kormányzó megyéspüspöki kinevezése? A többi kérdést illetően a magyar fél megerősítette, hogy „*a jelenlegi helyzetet megfelelőnek tartjuk, azon nem indokolt változtatni.*” Ez esetben is magyar részről a leglényegesebb vatikáni kéréseket utasították el. Igaz, hogy a nem hivatalos beszélgetések során – tompítandó az elutasítás élét - az ÁEH elnöke megkérdezte Poggi, miben lehetne Casaroli és Poggi segítségére abban, hogy „*eddig munkájuk eredményei megszilárduljanak?*”. Poggi „*meglepődéssel és hálásan fogadta*” a kezdeményezést, s választ a legközelebbi találkozásra ígért. Végezetül, a vatikáni diplomata kijelentette, hogy a megbeszélések tapasztalatai, „*a látottak és a hallottak megerősítették korábbi értékelésüket, melyről pontosan beszámolnak a pápának.*”<sup>20</sup> Ami egyébként arra utalt, hogy bizonyos csalódottsággal fogadták a magyar elutasítást, és hogy ez a „*korábbi értékelés*” talán mégsem volt annyira kedvező, mint ahogy azt a jelentés készítője sugallta.

A megbeszélések csak megerősíthették a magyar vezetést, Kádárt abbéli meggyőződésében, hogy egyházpolitikai téren nincsenek gondot okozó fejlemények, s ha addig nem is akart a Szentszék részéről felvetett kérdéseket illetően továbblépni, az akkori helyzetben nem is tehetette meg, még ha akarta volna is. II. János Pált lengyel, szovjet, de még csehszlovák részről is kétség kívüli gyanakvás, várakozás fogadta, amit tetézték a szentszéki-amerikai együttműködést anticipáló hírek. A nemzetközi elismertség hullámhegyén vitorlázó Kádár – aki egyébként is irtózott a „*bezzeg*” szereptől – óvakodott attól, hogy a meglehetősen kiélezett kelet-nyugati viszony bonyodalmai közepette olyan engedményeket tegyen

<sup>18</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 133. doboz, 001150. 1979.

<sup>19</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 133. doboz, 00464/7. 1979.

<sup>20</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 138. doboz, 005874/3. 1978.

a Szentszéknek, amilyen engedményekre semmi nem kényszerítette, és amely engedmények révén „kilógott volna a sorból”. Ilyen értelemben valóban a „jól bevált politikát” szándékozott folytatni. Egyébként ezt teljesen világossá tette a római magyar nagykövet Casaroli bíboros államtitkáránál (akkor nevezte ki erre a posztra a pápa) tett látogatása során azzal, hogy a magyar politika stabil, az egyházzal fennálló viszony jó, kielégítő és ezen nem szándékozik változtatni a magyar fél.<sup>21</sup>

A változtatás – ami jelen esetben nem visszalépést, inkább a Vatikán által sürgetett „továblépést” jelentette volna – azért sem volt lehetséges, mivel a pápa tervezett lengyelországi látogatásának nemzetközi visszhangjáról a varsói magyar nagykövet azt jelentette, hogy több forrása megerősítette, hogy a szovjeteket erősen nyugtalanítja a pápa lengyelországi látogatása és annak várható következményei. Moszkva csak most döbönt rá a lengyel vallásosság igazi méreteire, a lengyel egyház tömegbefolyására és tekintélyére – írta a nagykövet. A nagykövet meg nem erősített információi szerint a szomszédos szocialista országok is aggodalommal figyelik az eseményeket, csehszlovák részről lezárják a lengyel-csehszlovák határt és visszatartják a szolgálati utakat is. Hasonló határozat fontolgat a Szovjetunió és az NDK.<sup>22</sup>

Jellemző, hogy II. János Pál lengyelországi látogatásáról készített külügyminisztériumi feljegyzésben szereplő megállapítást, miszerint a vatikáni diplomácia megmutatta, hogy kész és képes az egyes szocialista országok megkülönböztetett kezelésére, miként azt elsősorban „a magyar katolikus egyházhoz, személy szerint Lékai bíboroshoz való viszonyulása, a személye iránt tanúsított megkülönböztetett figyelem mutatja” a miniszter hatalmas kérdőjellel látta el – jelezve, hogy semmiféle „megkülönböztetett” viszonyról nem akar hallani.<sup>23</sup> Annál is kevésbé, mivel a varsói magyar nagykövet II. János Pál lengyelországi látogatásáról szóló távirati értékelésében rámutatott, hogy a pápa nem szólt az enyhülésről, a békéről, a népi Lengyelország eredményeiről és kétértelmű kijelentéseket tett a Szovjetunióról. Ellenben a harcos egyház krisztusi tanait hirdette, s útjának következménye a lengyel nacionalizmus felszítása volt. A szorosban egyeztető szocialista országok varsói nagyköveteinek a jelentésben rögzített véleménye, amit osztott a magyar is: II. János Pál nyíltan törekszik az egyház pozíciójának az erősítésére a szocialista országokban, és

<sup>21</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 133. doboz, 006340. 1979.

<sup>22</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 133. doboz, 00853/32, 1979.

<sup>23</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 133. doboz. 00853/39, 1979.



lengyelországi látogatása ideológiai károkat okozott.<sup>24</sup>

A római magyar nagykövet is azt jelentette a római szovjet nagykövetség illetékes diplomatájával és követ-tanácsosával folytatott beszélgetéséről, hogy szovjet részről aggasztónak ítélik a pápa lengyelországi utazásának várható következményeit. Tartanak attól, hogy e következmények más szocialista országban is érezhetőek lesznek. A szovjet diplomaták érzékeltették, szovjet részről tartanak attól, hogy II. János Pál konfrontatív politikájának folytatásra fog törekedni és a következő célpont Magyarország lesz. A római szovjet nagykövetség vezető diplomatái „nem örültek” annak, hogy a római lengyel nagykövetség egyértelműen pozitívan értékelte a pápa lengyelországi látogatását.<sup>25</sup> Nem úgy a római magyar nagykövet, aki jelentésében azt írta, hogy a szocialista tábor szempontjából kedvezőtlen hatásokkal kell számolni, mert alkalmat adott a pápa látogatása az ellenzéki mozgalmak buzdítására, az egyházi „követelődzések” erősítésére és bátorítja a vatikáni reakciós köröket arra, hogy a „keleti politika” fő vonalait illetően változásokat igényeljenek.<sup>26</sup>

Az ebben a légkörben kétségtelenül jogosan kielégítőnek minősített magyar-vatikáni viszonyra utalt az is, hogy II. János Pálnak a lengyel vezetés és mások részről aggodalommal várt 1979. júniusi, lengyelországi látogatásán ott lehetett a Lékai László vezette MKPK küldöttség. Az AEH ezzel kapcsolatban leszögezte, hogy a részvétel „*egyházpolitikai érdekeinknek is megfelel*” és a távolmaradás „*indokolatlan támadási felületet*” jelentene.<sup>27</sup> Ami teljes mértékben helyes megállapítás volt.

II. János Pál lengyelországi látogatását követő izgalmak elültével az AEH hosszabb feljegyzést küldött a római magyar nagykövetségen ténykedő, egyházügyekkel foglalkozó diplomatának „*csak a címzett személyes használatára*”. Ami elég különös volt, mivel még a nagykövetet is kizárta az informáltak köréből.<sup>28</sup> A feljegyzés „*néhány*

---

<sup>24</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 133. doboz. 00853/41, 1979.

<sup>25</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 133. doboz. 00853/48, 1979.

<sup>26</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 133. doboz, 00853/52, 1979.

<sup>27</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j Vatikán, 133. doboz. 00853/19, 1979.

<sup>28</sup> Ezt a posztot hagyományosan a BM illetékes csoportfőnökségének kádere (ezek némelyike Moszkvában tanulta évekig a KGB iskolában a helyes „*egyházpolitikát*”) töltötte be, s a személyére szóló tájékoztatás azért arról is árulkodott, hogy még mindig nem volt egyértelmű a nagykövet politikai, egy személyű vezetése. Nem sokkal ez előtt, Bényi József római nagykövetsége idején e tekintetben konfliktusba keveredett a BM rezidenssel, akit figyelmeztetni akarván arra, hogy a nagykövet a szolgálatoknak is politikai főnöke, az előbbinek leküldte névjegyét. A rezidens nem értette meg a gesztus jelentőségét és válaszul a saját névjegyét küldte vissza a nagykövetnek. A rezidentst rövid időn belül soron kívüli berendelték. A hajdani

*magyarországi tapasztalat és következtetés II. János Pál pápa törekvéseinek érvényesüléséről a Vatikán politikájában*” címet viselte s mérleget kívánt felállítani a pápa egy éves tevékenységéről. A feljegyzés készítője úgy látta, hogy a katolikus egyház tevékenységében a szocializmus ellenes erők széles frontot nyitó törekvése mutatkozik meg. Ennek megfelelően II. János Pál trónra lépése nem más, mint „a nemzetközi imperializmus hosszú távú, átfogó és összehangolt stratégiája és taktikája” eredménye. Ilyen módon részét képezi a két világrendszer közötti ideológiai harcnak. A katolikus egyház várhatóan igyekszik megfelelni a saját szándékaival megegyező „imperialista elvárásoknak”.

A keleti politika további sorsát illetően pedig az várható, hogy a „VI. Pál és Casaroli által kimunkált, hosszútávra szóló, kompromisszumokra kész rugalmas politika ötvöződik az egyház számára látványos eredményeket követelő agresszív, türelmetlen erővel.” Várhatóan azok a világnézeti és ideológiai kérdések kapnak nagyobb hangsúly, melyek a szocialista országokban meglévő az állam és az egyház közötti politikai együttműködést és társadalmi összefogást kívánják aláásni. Az ÁEH kiemelte, hogy II. János Pál „*eddig*” nem lépett fel erőszakosan és támadó jelleggel a magyar egyházpolitikai viszonyokkal szemben. A magyar egyházpolitika „*eddig bevált*” érvényesítése mellett számolni kell azzal – így a feljegyzés -, hogy a pápa érvényre kívánja juttatni törekvéseit a MKPK és Lékai bíboros megnyerésén keresztül és igyekszik visszafogni a püspökök és a papok „*pozitív politikai*” tevékenységét. A hosszú távú cél „*szövetségi politikánk*” egészének megtámadása – az ÁEH szerint. „*A pápa személyében képviselt hosszútávra szóló politikai program egyértelmű kihívást jelent a szocializmus erőivel szemben, melynek egyik állomását jelentette a pápa Lengyelországban tett látogatása. E kihívásra felkészültek vagyunk (...)*”.<sup>29</sup>

Az „*éberségi roham*” elmúltával hamarosan sor került Casaroli (ekkor már bíboros államtitkár) budapesti látogatásának előkészítésére, mely látogatásra a Magyar Püspöki Kar meghívása alapján került sor. Casaroli bíboros államtitkár útjára Gellért püspök születésének 1000. évfordulója jubileumi ünnepségei adtak alkalmat. Az előkészületek egyik kulcsmozzanata volt, hogy az ÁEH elnökhelyettese római tárgyalásai során tájékoztatta Poggi érseket arról, hogy Casaroli magyarországi látogatásán „*lehetőséget látunk arra*”, hogy találkozzon Kádár Jánossal és Losonczy Pállal.<sup>30</sup> A

---

külföldi zsargon szerint Bényi József „*hazavágta*” a rezidenst.

<sup>29</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 133. doboz, 00464/9, 1979.

<sup>30</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán 134. doboz. 003773/3. 1980.

magyar-vatikáni viszony ekkori, külügyminisztériumi értékelése szerint „*eddig*” kedvező hatást gyakorolt a kétoldalú kapcsolatokra. A magyar szándék arra irányult, hogy „*hatást gyakoroljunk a Vatikánra, annak intézményeire, szerveire, erősítsük a nyíltabban gondolkodó főpapi körök helyzetét.*” A kapcsolatok eddigi rendszere bevált, a rendezésre váró kérdéseket a magyar fél továbbra is tárgyalásos úton kívánja rendezni és a jövőben is korrekt, partneri viszonyt kíván fenntartani a katolikus egyház központjával. Azonban nincs napirenden a diplomáciai kapcsolatok felvétele.<sup>31</sup> 1980 áprilisában Miklós Imre ÁEH elnök hosszabb feljegyzést küldött Aczél Györgynek a magyar-vatikáni diplomáciai kapcsolatok lehetőségeiről. Az ÁEH elnöke úgy látta, hogy az 1964-ben aláírt részleges megállapodás kielégítően szolgálta a két fél érdekeit, és a Kádárnak VI. Pállal történt találkozásán elhangzottak megerősítették az addig gyakorlatot és kijelölték a követendő irányt is. A diplomáciai kapcsolatokat illetően pedig Miklós kijelentette, hogy a kérdés tanulmányozását követően úgy látja, hogy a rendezésre váró kérdések megoldásának nem a diplomáciai kapcsolatok létesítése az előfeltétele, hanem a kölcsönös jó szándék és bizalom. „*Eközben konstruktív alternatívák alakultak ki kapcsolatainkban, amelyeket kölcsönösen betartunk.*”<sup>32</sup>

A magyar-vatikáni viszony alapvetően pozitív értékeléséhez nyilván hozzájárult az is, hogy II. János Pál a magyarországi katolikusokhoz intézett húsvéti levele nem tartalmazott „*kényes kérdéseket*”, mi több az ÁEH kiemelte a külügyi államtitkárnak küldött átiratában, hogy levélben szereplő „*A hitoktatással kapcsolatos ismertetések és buzdítások semmi újat nem tartalmaznak, azok megegyeznek a magyarországi katolikus egyház eddigi gyakorlatával.*” Nem kevésbé volt jelentős az a megállapítás, miszerint a pápa levele megerősítette mindazt, amit VI. Pál pápa 1977-ben mondott a „*bázisközösségekről*” a MPK ad limina látogatása alkalmával. Sőt, II. János Pál még tovább ment, s arra figyelmeztetett, hogy a püspökkel szemben álló bázisközösségek tevékenysége nem megengedhető.<sup>33</sup> A magyar vezetésnek, a Kádár levél feletti elégedettségét jól mutatta az átirat befejező része, mely arról tájékoztat, hogy a levél semmi, a magyar államra vagy egyházra

<sup>31</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán 134. doboz. 004462. 1980.

<sup>32</sup> MNL ÁEH XIX-A-21-a, M-5-9/1980.

<sup>33</sup> Ezt az álláspontját a MPK 1982 októberében lezajlott ad limina látogatása során is megismételte azzal, hogy törekedni kell arra, hogy a bázisközösségek a helyi egyházi közösségekhez tarozzanak és ez a püspökök feladata is. A bázisközösségeknek a helyi püspökök irányítása alatt kell tevékenykedniük, azt ell kell ismerniük. MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 136. doboz. 005552/2. 1982.

vonatközóan „bántó” részt nem tartalmaz, ezért „nem zárkozunk el attól, hogy II. János Pál levelét a hazai katolikus sajtó teljes terjedelmében a hívek és a közvélemény elé bocsássa.”<sup>34</sup>

Casaroli bíboros államtitkár látogatására 1980. szeptember 27-29 között került sor. Casaroli személyét Kádár elég fontosnak tartotta ahhoz, hogy rábólintson a fogadására tett javaslatra. (Losonczy Pál az Elnöki Tanács elnöke társaságában fogadta Casarolit Kádár, az Elnöki Tanács tagja minőségében az Országházban. Ilyen protokolláris „ravaszágokra” máskor is sor került.) Döntését igazolta, hogy Casaroli bíboros az esztergomi bazilikában tartott szentbeszédében elismerőleg szólt arról, hogy a magyar állam valamennyi egyház számára biztosítja a „zavartalan hitbuzgalmi” tevékenységet. A találkozóon Kádár kijelentette, hogy a VI. Pál pápánál lezajlott magánkihallgatása során elhangzottak és a római látogatását lezáró sajtóértekezletén tett, egyházpolitikájára vonatkozó megállapításai továbbra is érvényesek, s kész az addigi út folytatására. Ugyanakkor Kádár szükségesnek tartotta megjegyezni (a lengyel válságperiódus idején), hogy a magyar viszonyok „sajátosak” és eltérnek a Lengyelországban tapasztaltaktól.

A félreérthetetlen figyelmeztetést követően Kádár kitért az akkor előkészítés alatt álló madridi konferenciára, mely utóbbinak az volt a célja, hogy a helsinki záróokmányban vállalt kötelezettségek teljesítését áttekintse. Az aláírás óta eltelt öt év bebizonyította a moszkvai vezetésnek, hogy a záróokmány aláírásával óriási öngólt lótt, hiszen a harmadik kosár (emberi jogok, emberek és eszmék szabad áramlása, stb.) a szerződészegés miatt ellenük indított folyamatos erkölcsi és politikai támadásokra adott alkalmat. Kádár (aki a harmadik kosár magyar teljesítése tekintetében csak pozitív visszajelzéseket kapott nyugati partnereitől) annak a reményének adott hangot, hogy a Szentszék küldöttsége a madridi konferencián is „konstruktív” magatartást tanúsít majd. Ezek után rátért II. János Pál 1980. szeptember elsejére datált, a záróokmányt aláíró „államférfiakhoz” intézett üzenetére (amit másfél hónappal később hoztak nyilvánosságra). Az üzenet a harmadik kosár kapcsán az egyház végül is jól ismert álláspontját hangoztatta az emberi jogok, az emberi méltóság, a vallás és lelkiismereti szabadság, a gyermekevelés, oktatás, stb. kapcsán. Amely elvárások természetesen igen kényelmetlenek, teljesíthetetlenek voltak Moszkva, illetve szövetségesei számára. Kádár az üzenetben foglaltak elutasítása vagy egyszerű figyelmen kívül hagyása helyett kijelentette,

---

<sup>34</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán 134. doboz. 003619,1980.

hogy „*II. János Pál államfőkhöz intézett üzenete a madridi konferencia előtt figyelemre méltó és tanulmányozásra érdemes*” dokumentum. Ezt persze érthette mindenki úgy, ahogy akarta, mindenesetre a Casaroli látogatásról készült ÁEH jelentésben az szerepel, hogy a Kádárral történt találkozót „*vatikáni részről olyan politikai eseményként értékelték, amely tartalmilag, külsőségeiben és atmoszférájában felülmúlta minden várakozásukat.*” Ami arra utal, hogy a bíboros államtitkár a pápai üzenet harmadik kosárban foglaltakra vonatkozó részére értelmezte a Kádár által mondottakat. Casaroli egyébiránt Kádárnak kijelentette, hogy elégedett a magyar-vatikáni kapcsolatok addigi eredményeivel s vélekedése szerint további előrelépésre van szükség, Madridban is.

A Casaroli látogatást értékelve az ÁEH úgy látta, hogy az mintegy visszaigazolta az egyházzal fenntartott kapcsolatok – Kádár egyházpolitikájának – eredményességét, annál is inkább, mivel a „*reakciós egyházi körök szerint a bíboros államtitkár magyarországi látogatása nem oldotta meg a katolikus egyház alapvető problémáit, végső soron többet segített az államnak, mint az egyháznak*”. Még hozzáfűzte a jelentés készítője, hogy a nyugati hírközlő szervek „*ügyes lépésként*” értékelték a bíboros államtitkár meghívását.<sup>35</sup> Amiben ez utóbbiaknak bizony teljes mértékben igazuk volt.

Az esemény ottani visszhangjáról a római magyar nagykövet hosszabb jelentésben számolt be. Kiemelte, hogy Casaroli útját, a magyar vezetőkkel történt találkozóját a Szentszék részéről a „*keleti politika*” és annak fellendítése motiválta. Ugyanakkor az „*egységes Európa*” gondolatának is az eleme volt a látogatás, amely „*egységes Európa*” megvalósításában a Vatikán „*feltehetően*” különleges szerepet szán Magyarországnak. A nagykövet azoknak a feltételezéseknek is helyt adott, amik szerint ideológiai harc is kialakulhat, s ennek kezelését illetően a Szentszék „*kísérleti terepnek*” tekinti Magyarországot. A nagykövet jelentése szerint Casaroli nagyon kedvezően nyilatkozott a Kádárral történt találkozásáról, ezt komolynak és tartalmasnak minősítette. Pozitívan minősítette azt, hogy Kádár kiemelte VI. Pál pápa szerepét, amit feltételezése szerint Kádár „*a mai pápának küldött indirekt üzenetnek szánt*”.<sup>36</sup> (A feltételezett üzenet nyilván nem volt véletlen, mivel a Szentszék „*külgyminisztere*”, Silvestrini érsek, 1981. november 21-i sajtóbeszélgetésén kijelentette a „*keleti politikát*” illetően, hogy a „*VI. Pál idején a kapcsolatok rendezésében megindult pozitív fejlődési folyamat megtorpant.*” Ez abból adódik, hogy a pápa a szocialista

<sup>35</sup> MNL, MSZMP Agitációs és Propaganda Osztály táj. anyagok 288/f/11/4390. 45.

<sup>36</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán 134. doboz. 004462/1. 1980.

országok esetében is az egyház jelenlétének erősítésére fordítja a figyelmét, mivel olyan befolyással rendelkező katolikus egyházakat akar, mint amilyen a lengyel.<sup>37)</sup>

A nyolcvanas évek elejének rendkívül feszült nemzetközi kapcsolatrendszerében a magyar-szentszéki politikai párbeszéd folyamatosságát mutatta, hogy az olaszországi hivatalos tárgyalásokra Rómába utazó magyar külügyminisztert II. János Pál 1982. december 17-én magánkihallgatáson fogadta. A magánkihallgatás kérésére a külügyminisztérium tett javaslatot, amivel az ÁEH egyetértett. Puja Frigyes magánkihallgatásáról (amit a magyar emlékeztető „*négyszemközt megbeszélés*”-nek titulált) rövid, másfél oldalas emlékeztető készült – vélhetően a tolmács tollából. Elsősorban a béke és a biztonság kérdéseiről esett szó, ami indokolt volt az akkori feszült nemzetközi helyzetben. Puja hangsúlyozta, hogy a párbeszéd ebben a helyzetben még fontosabb. Elismeréssel szólt a magyar-szentszéki viszony eltelt száz év során elért eredményeiről, választa a magyar katolikusok helyzetét. A pápa Puja értékelésével egyetértett, de hozzáfűzte, hogy tovább kellene lépni, utalt a vallásszabadság kérdésre és arra, hogy a katolikus hívőknek egyenlő jogokat és lehetőségeket kellene biztosítani az államapparátusi tisztségek és egyéb közfunkciók betöltésében. Hozzáfűzte, szavatolni kellene, hogy a katolikus családok gyerekei bejussanak az egyetemekre. Puja erre azt válaszolta, hogy az egyetemi felvétel nem hitvallás alapján dől el – ebben igaza volt. II. János Pál saját korábbi gondolatához hozzáfűzte, hogy igaz, az egyháznak kötelességei is vannak az állammal szemben, de ezeknek csak úgy tud maradéktalanul eleget tenni, ha társadalmi síkon elismerik és tiszteletben is tartják.<sup>38</sup>

A pápai magánkihallgatás után a magyar külügyminisztert fogadta Casaroli bíboros államtitkár. Elismerően szóltak a kétoldalú viszony fejleményeiről, Casaroli szerint azonban tovább kellene lépni -, félreérthetetlenül célozva az egyház eddig elutasított kéréseinek teljesítésére, valamint a diplomáciai kapcsolatok kérdésére. Azt remélte, mondta, hogy még megkoronázhatja életében azokat a kapcsolatokat, amiket ő alapozott meg. Sajnálkozva állapította meg, hogy a magyar-vatikáni viszonyra vonatkozó, átfogó megállapodás várat magára. Megkülönböztetetten szólt a Magyarországhoz fűződő kapcsolatokról, majd reményének adott hangot, hogy a magyarokkal fennálló kapcsolatoknak tovagyűrűző hatása lehet a Szovjetunióban

<sup>37</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j,Vatikán 134. doboz, 006850. 1981.

<sup>38</sup> KÜM levéltár. Puja Frigyes látogatása az Olasz Köztársaságban és a Vatikánban. dok. kötet. 005620, 1982. 228-229.

is. Puja válasza erre az volt, hogy a vatikáni-magyar kapcsolatokról a szovjet vezetés tud, „*egyeztetjük álláspontunkat és politikai elképzeléseinket*”.<sup>39</sup> A tények azonban nem ezt mutatták, illetve, ha voltak is a Vatikánra vonatkozó egyeztetések (dokumentált nyomát nem sikerült találni), a magyar kormány egyáltalán nem a szovjetek kívánta konfrontatív politikát vitte.

Az ÁEH – már ugyancsak a pápa újabb lengyelországi látogatása után - arra tett javaslatot, hogy Várkonyi Péter az új, Puját váltó külügyminiszter a madridi európai biztonsági és leszerelési értekezlet záróülésén találkozzon a Vatikán képviselőjével. Mi több, a beszélgetési témavázlatot is megküldték. Eszerint a külügyminiszter juttassa kifejezésre a magyar kormány elismerését a Vatikánnak és személyesen II. János Pál pápának a béke, a leszerelés és az enyhülés érdekében tett pozitív megnyilatkozásáért (ami arra utalt, hogy II. János Pál üzenetének méltatásakor Kádár nem arra gondolt, amire Casaroli, vagyis nem a pápa által az emberi jogokról, az emberi méltóság védelméről mondottakat tartotta tanulmányozásra érdemesnek). A kétoldalú kapcsolatokat a korszak bonyolult és feszültségekkel terhes nemzetközi légkörében is jónak és eredményesnek minősítette az ÁEH.<sup>40</sup>

A pápa lengyelországi (hadiállapot idején) látogatása után a külügyminisztériumban feljegyzés készült a magyar-vatikáni kapcsolatokról, melyek a hivatalos értékelések szerint mintegy „szélárnyékban” voltak. A dokumentum megállapította, hogy a kétoldalú viszony megfelelően alakul, s magyar részről „*a jövőben is készek vagyunk együttműködni mindazokkal, akik az emberiség sorsáért nemcsak aggódnak, hanem tesznek is érte.*” A Vatikánnal fennálló kapcsolatokat ennek a szellemében akarja fejleszteni a magyar fél. E határvonal megvonására, a kapcsolatoknak mintegy az emberiség sorsáért aggodás éteri magasságaiba való emelésére azért volt szükség, mert a KüM szerint érezhetővé vált az a vatikáni törekvés, amelyik Magyarországnak az „*egységes Európa*” vonatkozásában speciális szerepet szán a szocialista országok megosztásának a céljával, amitől nem idegen az ideológiai zavarkeltés szándéka és az arra való törekvés, hogy „*fellendítsék a katolikus egyházi életet Magyarországon*”. A feljegyzés némi önelégültséggel állapította meg, hogy a szilárd belső egyházpolitikai bázisra támaszkodva „*befolyásolhattuk a Vatikánt, hogy állásfoglalásai a hazánkat érintő nemzetközi kérdésekben, a magyar katolikus egyház irányításában számunkra kedvezőbbek legyenek. Az eddigi*

---

<sup>39</sup> Uo. 230-233.

<sup>40</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 124. doboz, 004702, 1983.

*kapcsolatrendszer bevált, korrekt partneri viszonyra törekszünk*”. Ennek ellenére nincs napirenden és nem is lesz napirenden magyar részről a diplomáciai kapcsolatok felvételének az ügye. Nincs olyan kérdés, amelyik negatív hatást gyakorolna a kétoldalú viszonyra.<sup>41</sup>

Ez a megállapítás viszont homlokegyenest szembe ment a moszkvai véleményekkel. A római magyar nagykövet munkatársa információi alapján azt jelentette ugyanis, hogy az ottani szovjet nagykövetség magas beosztású diplomatája az SZKP központi bizottságában történt konzultáció alapján kifejtette, hogy szovjet értékelés szerint II. János Pál egyre inkább amerikai vonalat követ, s a pápa célja nem más, mint az, hogy a kisebb szocialista országokat az ottani katolikus egyházak felhasználásával eltávolítsa a Szovjetuniótól. Nem kivétel Magyarország sem, a pápát igazából irritálja a magyar állam és egyház közötti jó kapcsolat. Ennek megbontása az egyik cél, a másik pedig a lengyel modell átültetése Magyarországra. Ennek a fényében kell értékelni a szovjet párt álláspontja szerint a lengyel egyház magas rangú vezetőinek küszöbön álló magyarországi látogatását is. Ausztriai útja során, „*Mariazellben a pápa nem mondta el Mindszentyt méltató beszédét, de a beszéd kész és bármikor elmondható*” – hangzott el a baljóslatú figyelmeztetés. A Szovjetunió eddig várt a vatikáni elleni bírálatokkal, de most már erősödni fognak a kritikai észrevételek a Vatikán ellen. A *Laborem Exercens...* kezdetű enciklika terjesztését betiltották a Szovjetunióban, mivel az politikai röpirat és akcióprogram a szocialista társadalmakkal szembenálló szakszervezetek létrehozására.<sup>42</sup>

A lényegében kendőzetlen szovjet figyelmeztetés ellenére Poggi érsek „*a Vatikán rendkívüli hatáskörrel felruházott nunciusa*” 1984 áprilisában Magyarországra utazott annak a kétoldalú konzultációs rendszernek a keretében, amelyik évente egy római és egy budapesti találkozó gyakorlatát követte a Szentszék megbízottja és az ÁEH elnöke között. Ez alkalommal Poggit fogadta a minisztertanács elnökhelyettese is, ami kétségtelenül politikai gesztus volt figyelembe véve a Vatikánról adott szovjet értékeléseket. Ráadásul Poggi és kísérője találkozott Lékai bíborossal, a püspöki kar több tagjával és katolikus egyház több vezető személyiségével, látogatást tett a nyíregyházi, győri teológián, a Központi Papnevelő Intézetben és a leányfalusi lelkigyakorlatos házban, ami lényegében azt jelentette, hogy Poggi érsek programját nem korlátozták.

A hivatalos megbeszélések során az ÁEH elnöke tájékoztatást

---

<sup>41</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 124. doboz, 005757, 1983.

<sup>42</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 124. doboz, 005565, 1983.



adott partnerének az MKPK képviselőivel folytatott megbeszéléseiről, a plébániai hitoktatás bevezetéséről, a női szociális betegápoló szerzetesrend felállításának és a világi személyek egyházi alkalmazásának kérdéseiről. Szóba került a Bulányi vezette ellenzéki mozgalom ügye is. Magyar részről elismerően szóltak arról, hogy a Vatikán „*múlt évi tárgyalásainknak megfelelően intézkedett*”, s igényelték, hogy a Szentszék a továbbiakban is tegyen konkrét lépéseket annak érdekében, hogy Bulányi engedelmeskedjen a Hittani Kongregációnak és a Szentszék más illetékes szerveinek. A magyar fél Emlékeztetőt adott át arról, hogy Bulányi vatikáni kihallgatása után visszatérhet a magyar törvényeknek megfelelően Magyarországra, s „*tájékoztató jelleggel*” átadta Pogginak Bulányi egyik levelét, amely mozgalmát és Ruiz piarista generálist kompromittálta.<sup>43</sup> Poggi elmondta, hogy a Bulányi ügy megoldását illetően a magyar kormány és a Szentszék között egyetértés van. A megbeszélésekről készített feljegyzés eredményesnek értékelte a Poggi érsekkel folytatott tárgyalásokat.<sup>44</sup> Bár Poggi érsek még februárban arról beszélt, hogy a pápa Magyarországgal is a vatikáni-lengyel kapcsolatrendszeret képzele el – vagyis állandó képviselő a diplomáciai kapcsolatok előtt -, ha a kapcsolatok szintjének emelése egyszer szóba kerül. Első lépésben egy állandó apostoli delegátus küldése jöhetne szóba.<sup>45</sup> Ez alkalommal a kérdés nem került felvetésre. (Egyébként a kapcsolatok minőségét mutatta, hogy a római nagykövetség „*több mint egy éves szünet után*” 1984 júniusában felkereste Casaroli bíboros államtitkárt, ki a beszélgetésük befejezésekor „*hangsúlyozta, ne várjunk egy évet a következő találkozásunkig. Amennyiben pedig magyar részről bármilyen konkrét elgondolás merül fel arra vonatkozóan, hogy a Vatikán miben segítheti a feszültség csökkentését, bármikor fogad.*”<sup>46</sup>)

A magyar-vatikáni kapcsolatok békés állóvívét váratlan esemény kavarta fel. Az történt ugyanis, hogy a Hittani Kongregáció a későbbi pápa Ratzinger bíboros által jegyzett dokumentumot adott ki 1984. szeptember 3-án, melyben elítélte a Latin-Amerikában komoly hatást gyakorló „*Felszabadítás ideológiáját*” s elutasította a marxista módszer alkalmazását a modern teológiában. Ráadásul a dokumentum „*korunk szégyenének*” nevezte a szocialista országokat.

---

<sup>43</sup> A „*Bulányi-ügy*” ennek a dolgozatnak nem témája. A kérdés kutatását egyébként is nehezíti, hogy a vonatkozó külügyminisztériumi iratok közül jó néhányat több évtizedre titkosítottak.

<sup>44</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 00307, 1984.

<sup>45</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 00644m 1984.

<sup>46</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 003542, 1984.

Bár a dokumentum tanulmány formában megjelent a „30 giorni” című lapban, Ratzinger – állítólag - nem szánta nyilvánosság elé. Ekképpen nem tekinthető a Vatikán hivatalos álláspontjának, ráadásul „ideiglenes jellegű, szigorúan személyes munka”- mondták. Később azonban hivatalos állásfoglalás formájában is megjelent, és óriási vihart kavart.<sup>47</sup>

Egyáltalán nem lehetett kizárni annak a lehetőségét, hogy a magyar-vatikáni kapcsolatokban nemcsak megtorpanás, hanem egyenesen visszaesés következik be. Annál is kevésbé, mivel a római magyar nagykövet által jelentett vélemények szerint a dokumentum kihatással lehet a keleti politikára, mivel a Vatikánban felülkerekedik az az álláspont, hogy a szocialista országok ideológiai-gazdasági válságban vannak, állandó külső nyomással engedményeket lehet tőlük elérni. Nem világos, hogy a durva hangnemet követik-e durva lépések a kisebb szocialista országok irányába? „Tény azonban, hogy a pápa álláspontja gyorsuló ütemben tolódik jobbra, gyakorlatilag ma már minden térségben Reagan szándékaival azonos módon cselekszik”- így a nagykövet.<sup>48</sup> Szovjet értékelés szerint a Vatikán jobboldali körei támadást intéztek Casaroli és az általa képviselt keleti politika ellen.<sup>49</sup>

A Szenszék is valószínűleg úgy látta, hogy Ratzinger bíboros veszélyes vizekre evezett. Poggi érsek a Hittani Kongregáció dokumentumával kapcsolatban fontosnak tartotta elmondani a római magyar nagykövetség illetékes diplomatájának, hogy meggyőződése szerint a pápa csak a dokumentum teológiai koncepcióját hagyta jóvá, nem tájékoztatták előzetesen a szocialista országokat illető kitételekről, amiket a pápa „meglepetéssel” vett tudomásul. Poggi kérte, hogy „ne a nyilatkozatokból, hanem a tényekből” induljon ki Budapest. Az államtitkárság továbbra is kizárólagosan intézi a politikai ügyeket, a keleti politikában nincs változás – fűzte hozzá.<sup>50</sup> Hasonló szellemben nyilatkozott Casaroli bíboros államtitkár a római magyar nagykövettel folytatott rövid beszélgetése során mondván, hogy az ilyen dokumentumokat gyakran azonosítják a pápa álláspontjával, de ebben az esetben a pápa is meglepődött azon, hogy a dokumentum ilyen „heves reagálást” váltott ki. Magyarországgal kapcsolatban pedig kifejtette, hogy nemcsak megőrizni szeretnék a húsz év alatt elért eredményeket, hanem tovább is szeretnék

---

<sup>47</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 003122, 1984.

<sup>48</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141 doboz, 004678, 1984.

<sup>49</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 004598, 1984.

<sup>50</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141, doboz, 004763/1, 1984.

fejleszteni.<sup>51</sup>

Magyar részről ezt tekintették mérvadónak, nem pedig a szovjetek vészjelzéseit. Kádárnak egyáltalán nem állt érdekében a helyzet mesterséges elmérgesítése. Lévé, hogy a rendszer válságjelei ekkor már egyre láthatóbbá váltak más sem hiányzott neki, mint egy újabb belső front nyitása – ezúttal az egyház ellen. Így aztán, az inkriminált dokumentum megjelenése után *tíz nappal* az ÁEH elnöke üzenetet küldött a római magyar nagykövetségen keresztül a Vatikánba azzal, hogy a magyar-vatikáni részleges megállapodás aláírásának a 20. évfordulója, valamint Casaroli 70. születésnapja alkalmából rövid látogatás kíván tenni Rómában. Szeretné átadni ebből az alkalomból *a magyar miniszterelnök Casaroli bíboros államtitkárhoz intézett jókívánságait*, s sor kerülhetne a szokásos kétoldalú konzultációra is. Kérte felhívni a Vatikán illetékesének a figyelmét arra, hogy a megállapodást méltatja a Magyar Nemzet szeptember 20-i számában, és a Vigília és az Új ember kiemelten foglalkozik az évfordulóval.<sup>52</sup>

Az ÁEH elnökének tárgyalásaira végül 1984. november 23-30 között került sor. Casarolival egyetértettek abban, hogy pozitívak a 20 év alatt elért eredmények, a magyar fél kész a folytatásra abban a szellemben, ami Kádár és VI. Pál megbeszélését jellemezte. Az ÁEH elnöke ezt követően az együttműködés zavaró tényezőjeként minősítette a Hittani Kongregáció Ratzinger jegyzte dokumentumát, s megjegyezte, súlyosbítja a helyzetet, hogy a dokumentumzáró szakasz szerint a pápa rendelte el a kiadását. Casaroli „*árnyaltan jelezte*”, hogy a Hittani Kongregáció Útmutatójában megfogalmazott elvekkel nem ért egyet. Mivel nem lehet meg nem történné tenni, inkább arra kell koncentrálni, hogyan lehet a keletkezett feszültséget enyhíteni. Hangsúlyozta, hogy amíg ő hivatalban van, addig VI. Pál szellemében folytatja a tevékenységét.

Agostino Silvestrini érsekkel az Egyházi Közügyek Tanácsának titkárával már „*élénk vita*” alakult ki. Az érsek ugyanis – a jelentés szerint – igyekezett a Ratzinger által adott instrukciókat védeni és tompítani a vita élet azzal, hogy a magyar fél túlságosan kielezi a dokumentum egyes fejezeteit. Az ÁEH elnöke azzal válaszolt, hogy miközben a magyar fél törekszik arra, hogy a vallást se gyalázzák, addig a dokumentum a szocialista eszméket korunk szegényének minősíti és azokat pedig, akik a szocialista társadalmi rendszerekkel együtt működnek, a leigázás cinkosainak nevezi – (vagyis a Kádár rendszerrel együttműködő papok a „*leigázás cinkosai*”). A dokumentum megállapítása, miszerint „*az erőszak erőszakot szül*”

---

<sup>51</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 005016, 1984.

<sup>52</sup> MNL, XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 004763, 1984.

érvényes a dokumentumra is. A meggondolatlanság vagy a megfontoltság diktálta a dokumentum egyes részeit? – tette fel a kérdést az ÁEH elnöke. Elfogadhatatlan a magyar fél szerint, hogy a dokumentum a szocialista országokat teszi felelőssé a nemzetközi viszonyok rosszabbodásáért.

Poggi érsekkel folytatott tárgyalásán kifejtette, hogy a 20 év előttihez képest mennyit javult a helyzet – a magyar állam és a katolikus egyház viszonya - és kár lenne az elért eredményeket veszélyeztetni. Vagyis világosan jelezte, hogy adott esetben a magyar vezetés – Kádár – kész arra, hogy szigorítson egyházpolitikáján. Ez persze blöff volt, mivel egy ilyen szigorításnak nem voltak meg sem a külső sem pedig a belső feltételei. Tárgyaláson kívül említés tett az ÁEH elnöke az Erdélyben élő magyar nemzetiségű, többségében katolikus vallású emberek sorsával kapcsolatos magyar kormányzati gondokról – ami vitán felül új elem volt, mivel ez sem többet sem kevesebbet nem jelentett, mint azt, hogy Miklós Imre „*kivitte az utcára*” a magyar-román viszony addig bizalmasan kezelt problémáját. Ez olyan horderejű lépés volt, hogy teljesen kizárt, Kádár engedélye nélkül került volna rá sor – bár ennek az engedélynek dokumentált nyomát nem sikerült fellelni.

II. János Pál negyed órás magánkihallgatáson fogadta Miklós Imrét (!). Elismerően szólt a pápa az állam és az egyház kapcsolatairól Magyarországon. Kiemelte Kádár személyét és köszönetet mondott az államvezetésnek e kedvező viszony alakulásáért. Miklós kifejtette aggodalmait az elért eredményeket illetően. Rámutatott, hogy az MNK általános politikáját és ezen belül egyházpolitikáját is a szocialista közösségen belül folytatja és kérte, hogy a Vatikán ezeket az összefüggéseket és kölcsönhatásokat az eddiginél jobban vegye figyelembe.<sup>53</sup> A jelentés végén aláhúzta, hogy az a tény, hogy a pápa először fogadott szocialista országbeli egyházügyi hivatali vezetőt objektíve megnehezíti, hogy a szocialista országok egyházügyi hivatalait a nyíltan ellenséges politikai erők az egyház és a vallásüldözés erőszakszerveként tüntessék fel.<sup>54</sup> A magánkihallgatás valódi jelentőségét persze az adta, hogy a II. János Pál által mondottak nyilvánvalóan újfent megerősítették Kádárt abbéli reményében, hogy legalább „*egyházpolitikai fronton*” nem kell újabb kihívással szembenéznie.

---

<sup>53</sup> A tizenöt perces magánkihallgatás azt jelentette, hogy hét és fél perc állt mindkét fél rendelkezésére, ami a tolmácsolásra fordított időt levonva három és fél percet adott a mondandók kifejtésére. Valószínűtlen, hogy Miklós többet beszélhetett a pápánál. Ráadásul a tizenöt percben benne volt a belépés, üdvözlés, elhelyezkedés stb...

<sup>54</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz.005016, 1984.

Mindezen közben a római magyar nagykövet jelentette, hogy ottani csehszlovák, szovjet és lengyel diplomaták szerint a pápa egyre gyorsabban és nyíltabban zárkózik fel a legkonzervatívabb erők mellé.<sup>55</sup> Bár más vélemények is azt hangoztatták, hogy nőtt a konzervatív körök (így a Hittani Kongregáció súlya), a magyar nagykövet kérdésére Silvestrini határozottan cáfolta, hogy változna a Vatikán politikája a szocialista országok irányában.<sup>56</sup> Amit persze érhetett mindenki úgy, ahogy akart – magyar részről meg a kedvező kétoldalú kapcsolatok fenntartását értették ez alatt. Mi több, vagy egy hónappal Miklós Imre vatikáni látogatása előtt a szovjet külügyminisztérium a „*szorosan együttműködő szocialista országok*” valamint Kuba, Laosz, Mongólia és Vietnam moszkvai nagyköveteit arról tájékoztatta, hogy a SZKP KB intézkedési tervet fogadott el a Vatikán ellenséges és felforgató tevékenységének az ellensúlyozására. Ezt a lépést azzal indokolták, hogy a Vatikán az utóbbi időben szokatlanul erős felforgató tevékenységbe kezdett a szocialista országok, a felszabadító- és háborúellenes mozgalmak, és a marxizmus-leninizmus ideológiája ellen. „*A Vatikán erősen aktivizálja a Szovjetunió ellen tevékenységét is*”. Moszkva úgy látta, hogy a Vatikán hangvétele éles és agresszív, célja a szocialista országok és más haladó mozgalmak destabilizálása. Ebben a folyamatban jelentős a szerepe II. János Pál pápának. Szovjet részről célszerűnek tartanák, ha a szocialista országok kommunista pártjai központi bizottsági, illetékes osztályvezető helyettesei a Vatikán elleni propaganda kérdéseiről külön is tárgyalnának.

Néhány hónappal később, 1985 márciusában a római magyar nagykövet olasz és vatikáni forrásból valamint szovjet, lengyel, nyugatnémet és NDK diplomatáktól származó értesüléseit „*A Vatikán kettős arca*” címmel jelentésben foglalta össze. A jelentésnek az a része kelthetett kétségkívül figyelmet, amelyik a kettős arculat érvényesülését a szocialista országok és Magyarország irányában taglalta. A keleti politikát állandó támadások érték korábban is – így a jelentés -, ezek II. János Pál megválasztása óta felerősödtek. A „*keleti politika*” a legtöbb szocialista ország irányában nem képes eredményt felmutatni, s ellenfelei úgy vélekednek, hogy „*harcosabb vonalvezetéssel*” nagyobb sikert lehetne elérni. A pápa ezeket az álláspontokat rokonszenvennel figyeli, mivel úgy véli, hogy a szocialista országokban működő egyházak nem köthetnek túl messze menő kompromisszumokat a kommunista állammal, meg kell őrizni függetlenségüket és fokozódó szerepet kell betölteniük a társadalom

---

<sup>55</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 005420, 1984.

<sup>56</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 141. doboz, 002709/1, 1984.

életében.

Az intranzigens, a status quót megkérdőjelező körök úgy látják azonban, hogy Magyarország szinte az egyetlen, ahol a „keleti politika” kis lépések politikája működik. Ennek okán a pápának itt éri meg legkevésbé, hogy konfrontálódjon, de a támadás elkezdődött. A magyar egyház az állammal szemben elveszítette tartását, belső helyzete – a kritikák szerint – hitélet szempontjából katasztrofális, elkényelmesedett, Az egyház vezetésének hibája, hogy a bázisközösségeket nem sikerült integrálni, holott ezek megújulást hoznak az egyház belső életében. A pápa valószínűleg a magyar egyházat is igyekszik elképzelései felé tolni, de nyílt konfrontációra nem léphet. A pápa támasza a Vatikánon belüli konzervatív irány vezetője Ratzinger, és ez azt jelenti, hogy továbbra is szorgalmazza az egyházak függetlenedési törekvéseit, s újabb engedményekre akarja készíteni a szocialista országokat – zárul a jelentés.<sup>57</sup> A borús megállapításoknak viszont ellentmondott az a tény, hogy a pápa a korhatárt elérő Lékai bíboros lemondólevelét nem fogadta el, illetőleg további két évre számított rá, mint a magyar katolikus egyház vezetőjére, ami mindenképpen kedvező üzenetértékkel bírt Kádár számára, mivel Lékai bíborossal az együttműködése zavartalan volt. Jól mutatta ezt, hogy a bíborost 70. születésnapján a Magyar Népköztársaság Zászlórendjének rubinokkal ékes fokozatával, az egyik legmagasabb állami elismeréssel tüntették ki.

Luigi Poggi 1985. április 19-27 között Magyarországon tartózkodott s ennek keretén belül látogatást tett katolikus egyházi intézményeknél, találkozott a püspöki kar tagjaival. Április 20-án tárgyalta az Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal vezetőjével a szokásos konzultációs rendszer keretén belül. Poggi visszatért a Miklós Imre által az előző évben megfogalmazott „bírálattunkra”. Hangsúlyozta, hogy a kapcsolatok további fejlesztésére törekszenek. Miklós sajnálkozással állapította meg, hogy a Vatikán megnyilatkozásai miatt tovább romlott a helyzet, úgy tűnik, hogy a Vatikán kettős játékot játszik, nem őszinték kapcsolatépítési törekvéseik, s a szocialista országokkal romló, éleződő viszony kedvezőtlen hatással van a kétoldalú kapcsolatokra is. Készek vagyunk az együttműködésre, de csak azon az elvi alapon, amelyikről Kádár és VI. Pál szólt – fűzte hozzá. A tárgyalást követően az ÁEH elnöke arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy a vatikáni delegáció fő célja a kapcsolatok fenntartása és az elért eredmények megvédése volt. Amire egyébként a magyar fél is törekedett. „Komolyabb vitára nem került sor”.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146. doboz, 001966, 1984.

<sup>58</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146. doboz, 002207/1, 1985.

1986-ra a magyar-szentszéki kapcsolatok két fontos személyisége nem volt többé hivatalban. Lékai bíboros meghalt, Poggi érsek pedig a szentszéki nagykövet lett Rómában. Őt a szocialista országokkal vitt kapcsolatok kezelésében Colasuonno érsek váltotta fel. 1986. július 9-én Miklós ÁEH elnök a Lékai bíboros temetésére érkezett Colasuonno érseket fogadta is. Az eseményről készült jelentés szerint Colasuonno megköszönte a találkozás lehetőségét, erről a pápának jelentést fog tenni - mondta. A maga részéről a nyitottságra, párbeszédre törekszik, és kérte, hogy magyarországi tartózkodása kínálta lehetőséggel élve, találkozhatson a magyar püspökökkel. Az ÁEH elnöke válasza az volt, hogy a magyar fél az eddigiekhez hasonlóan kész a kétoldalú viszony gyakorlatának a folytatására a Kádár és VI. Pál által kijelölt úton. Megjegyezte, (nem minden alap nélkül), hogy Colasuonno nem hivatalos látogatásának összekötése a püspökökkel való találkozással közvetlen a temetés után félreértésekre vezethet. Amennyiben a MPK tagjaival találkozni szándékozik, adjon hivatalos jelleget látogatásának s kívánsága teljesítésének nem lesz semmi akadály. Miklós Imre még hozzáfűzte, hogy Lékai bíboros halála nem jelenti egy korszak lezárását, e korszak folytatása a kívánatos.<sup>59</sup>

Az 1986 nyarán a római állomáshelyére kiutazott új magyar nagykövet azt az utasítást kapta, hogy a Casarolinál teendő bemutatkozó látogatása során mondja el: a magyar fél Rómában tartandó kétoldalú tárgyalást javasol novemberre. Megtartása jó jelzése lenne annak, hogy Lékai bíboros halálát követően nem következett be törés a kapcsolatokban. Értékesnek tartja a magyar kormány, hogy a Szentszék az eddig bevált politika vonalat akarja folytatni és nem azonosítja magát azokkal a körökkel, amelyek Lékai halálát egy korszak lezárásaként állítják be, hanem ellenkezőleg, a Szentszék is egy korszak kezdetének tekintené tevékenységét. A kapcsolatokat a jövőben is a Casaroli államtitkár képviselte vonal alapján akarja a magyar fél, ami magában hordozza a további fejlődés lehetőségét és nem kíván változtatni a helyesnek bizonyult úton.<sup>60</sup>

Ebben minden jel szerint egyetértés volt, mivel Lázár György miniszterelnök 1986 végére tervezett olaszországi hivatalos tárgyalásait vatikáni látogatással kívánták összekötni magyar részről és ennek a Szentszék részéről nem látták akadályát. Lázár számára értékelés készült a magyar-vatikáni kapcsolatokról. Eszerint a kibontakozó neokonzervatív, jobbratolódási irányzat beárnyékolja a Vatikán és a szocialista országok kapcsolatait, de gyakorlati síkon továbbra is a Casaroli nevével fémjelzett realista irányvonal érvényesül. II. János Pál

<sup>59</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 004171, 1986.

<sup>60</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 004378/1, 1986.

demonstrálni akarja a vatikáni-magyar kapcsolatok folyamatosságát, ezért tudomásul veszi a kialakult helyzetet. Jelentős politikai eredmények tekintni a magyar fél, hogy a Vatikán hallgatólagosan tudomásul vette a katolikus papok indulását az országgyűlési választásokon, és egyéb jellegű közéleti szerepvállalásukat (vagyis nem tekintti őket a „leigázás cinkosainak”). Az értékelés fontosnak minősítette, hogy a Vatikán elkötelezte magát a MKPK mellett a Bulányi vezette ellenzéki mozgalommal szemben. A Vatikán bizonyos körei azonban kísérletet tesznek arra, hogy szűküljön az együttműködés a magyar állam és az egyház között. A Vatikánnal és a magyar katolikus egyházzal ápoltságban a magyar kormányzat a progresszív és reálpolitika mellett elkötelezett erőkre támaszkodik.<sup>61</sup>

A világjáró II. János Pál lengyelországi utazásait követően kimondva-kimondatlanul napirendre került más szocialista országban történő látogatás kérdése is. A szovjetunióbeli vizitáció lehetőségéről (amit nyilván figyelembe kellett venni egy magyarországi pápalátogatás mérlegelésekor) a moszkvai magyar nagykövet azt jelentette hivatalos források alapján (Egyházügyi Tanács), hogy nem látszik valószínűnek egy ilyen látogatás. Komoly érvek ellene nincsenek, ezért a feladat inkább abban áll, hogy olyan helyzetet teremtsenek, amely eleve kizárja II. János Pál utazásának lehetőségét. Ettől függetlenül nincs egyetértés e téren, különböző szervek foglalkoznak a kérdéssel és mindegyik a saját szempontját latolgatja. Külpolitikai és propaganda szempontból sok szól mellette, de belpolitikai szempontból ellene van, hogy növelné a vallás iránti érdeklődést, s néhány etnikum esetében nem kívánt hatásokkal járna (pl. kazahsztáni németek).<sup>62</sup> Más alkalommal a szovjet forrás ezt kiegészítette azzal, hogy a látogatás ellen szól a feszült nemzetközi helyzet és a pravoszláv egyház ellenállása, ráadásul egy pápa sem járt nemhogy a Szovjetunióban, de még Oroszországban sem. Azt nem zárta ki, hogy Gorbacsov olaszországi látogatása során esetleg találkozna a pápával.<sup>63</sup>

Feltehetően a gorbacsovi vonal érvényesülésének tudható be, hogy az úrfegyverkezés ellen fellépő, a leszerelést támogató pápa megítélése gyorsan változott. A római magyar nagykövet jelentése szerint (Lázár látogatása előtt) a szovjet diplomácia fokozott érdeklődéssel tekint a Vatikánra, „*mint sok millió békét akaró ember szellemi központjára.*” A változásokat jelzi, hogy az ortodox egyház jelen volt Assisiben a pápa által kezdeményezett békeimádkozáson, és az ortodox egyház szándéka, hogy a Vatikánt meghívja a pravoszláv

<sup>61</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 005026, 1986.

<sup>62</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 003390, 1986.

<sup>63</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 003390/1, 1986.



kereszténység ezer éves évfordulójára szervezett ünnepekre 1988-ban, s e meghívásnak eleget tehet a pápa is.<sup>64</sup>

A római magyar nagykövet értékelése a pápa által 1986 októberében végrehajtott „békeoffenzíva” kapcsán bizonyos diszkrepanciáról árulkodik a külügyi értékelés és az ÁEH megítélése között. Ennek oka feltehetően abban rejlik, hogy a Vatikánt illető szovjet vonal sem volt még tisztázott. A nagykövet a Vatikán „békeoffenzíváját” úgy ítélte meg, hogy az a baloldali békemozgalmakkal szemben kínált alternatívát, a béke kérdésében a Vatikán a többi egyház között vezető szerepre tör, erősíteni akarja a katolikus ideológia befolyását a világban. Súlyosabb, és a nagykövetnek a lényegét illető teljes félreértésére utal az a kitétel, miszerint a *„nyugati országok fegyverkezési terveivel szembe a Vatikán csak általános megfogalmazásokat tesz, (...) el akarja terelni a figyelmet ezekről a tervekről, segít a tömegek neutralizálásában.”* Ugyanakkor elképesztő módon azt tartalmazza a nagykövet jelentése, hogy a Vatikán a béke és a kultúra eszközeivel akar kapcsolatba kerülni a szocialista országok tömegeivel s *„az ember középpontba helyezésével keresi a marxista ideológia gyenge pontjait, és a szocialista országokban is gyengíteni akarja a marxizmus befolyását.”* Vagyis az ember a marxista ideológia gyenge pontja. Mindezeket az indokolja, hogy a Vatikán a „harc” súlypontját ideológiai területre helyezi át, miközben a szocialista állammal kiegyensúlyozott viszonyra törekszik.<sup>65</sup>

A Lázár György miniszterelnök pápai magánkihallgatására az ÁEH által készített háttéranyag és beszélgetési tématerv viszont egy sokkal árnyaltabb képet ad a Szentszék tevékenységéről, a magyar-szentszéki kapcsolatokról. Nagyra értékeli II. János Pálnak a béke érdekében, a termonukleáris háború elkerülése érdekében kifejtett erőfeszítéseit. Az emberiség békés jövője megvédésére irányuló mély felelősségérzetről tanúskodó gesztusként értékeli az assisi béke imnapot. Fontos lépének tartaná, ha II. János Pál teljes erkölcsi tekintélyét latba vetné a szovjet-amerikai párbeszéd elmélyítése érdekében. Ettől függetlenül – tükrözve azt az állandó, a virtuális térben elhelyezett „éber” és ortodox vonal valamint a valóságban zajló folyamatokra adandó reális, a saját érdekeknek jobban megfelelő politikai válasz közötti dilemmát - az ÁEH elemzése szerint II. János Pál *„a NATO országok s elsősorban az Egyesül Államok stratégiai célkitűzéseihöz, az imperialista érdekekhez szorosabban kapcsolódó, szilárd belső egységet követelő, eszközeiben számos új vonást*

<sup>64</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 005490, 1986.

<sup>65</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 005256, 1986.

*mutató egyházpolitikai irányvonalat juttatott érvényre.*” Jobbratulódás tapasztalható a Vatikán politikájában, ideológiai támadást indítottak a szocialista országok ellen, ideértve a szocializmus eszméivel és gyakorlatával rokonszenvező papok és hívők ellen. Viszont az MNK és a Vatikán kapcsolatait illetően a magyar gyakorlatot II. János Pál tudomásul vette, figyelemmel a magyar katolikus egyház érdekeire. A magyar fél jelentős politikai eredményként értékeli, hogy a Vatikán elkötelezte magát a MPK támogatása mellett a Bulányi vezette ellenzéki mozgalom ügyében. Ettől függetlenül – így az elemzés – a világegyház vezetése a magyar egyházpolitika ellen irányuló lépéseit hosszú távú stratégiai folyamat keretében képzelel el. A válaszlépés erre a „*keleti politika*” támogatása és a „*rugalmas, kezdeményező*” egyházpolitika.<sup>66</sup>

1986. december 8-13 között került sor az ÁEH elnökének a szokásos tárgyalásaira Rómában. Partnere Colasuonno érsek volt, de találkozott a jezsuita rend generálisával, Etchegaray bíborossal a Iustitia et Pax pápai bizottság elnökével, Poupard bíborossal a Nem hívők titkárságának az elnökével, Zakar Polikárppal a cisztercita rend generálisával és Cheli c. érsekkel a Turizmus és Bevándorlás pápai bizottsága ügyvezető elnökével. Találkozott Casaroli bíboros államtitkárral és fogadta II. János Pál pápa, akiknek átadta Kádár János üdvözlését. Ők ezt viszonzták.

Valamennyi megbeszélést az a szándék jellemezte, hogy a partnerek magasra értékelték a kapcsolatok eddigi eredményeit, a „*jelenlegi irányvonal megőrzésére törekednek*”. A látogatás legfontosabb célja Lécai bíboros utódlásának a kérdése volt. Vatikáni részről Paskai Lászlóra, Szakos székesfehérvári megyéspüspökre és Zakar Polikárpra tettek javaslatot. Ez utóbbival kapcsolatban a magyar álláspont elutasító volt azzal, hogy Zakar külföldi állampolgár. A másik kettő jelölését nem ellenezték magyar részről, de életkor és egészségügyi szempontok miatt Paskai mellett több érv szólt. Ráadásul Paskai a magyar püspöki kar elnöke is volt. Az ÁEH elnöke rövid időn belüli megoldást kért szentszéki partnereitől azzal, hogy a javaslatukat a magyar kormányzat egyetértése esetén az Elnöki Tanács decemberi vagy januári ülés elé terjeszti. A Szentszék erre elállt Zakar Polikárp jelölésétől és első helyre Paskai Lászlót tette.

A megbeszélések kétség kívül új és igen lényeges eleme volt, hogy ezúttal Miklós Imre írásos Emlékeztetőt adott át az erdélyi magyar katolikusok helyzetéről, s kérték a Vatikánt, hogy vizsgálják meg, mit tehetnek az emberi jogok és a vallásszabadság ottani érvényesítése

---

<sup>66</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 146, doboz, 005026, 1986.

érdekében. Erre Colasuonno érsek ígéretet tett, s felvetette, hogy a cisztercita rend még Magyarországon élő tagjainak a helyzetét a jezsuitákéhoz hasonlóan rendezhessék, s a Miasszonyunk Iskolarend kapjon segítséget a rendház és iskola felújításához. Az ÁEH megígérte e kérdés megvizsgálását, de kritikai észrevételekkel (Bulányi ügy) jelezte, hogy a kétoldalú kapcsolatokat csak úgy lehet eredményesen folytatni, ha mindkét fél betartja a korrekt partneri viszony feltételeit.<sup>67</sup> Vagyis, a kapcsolatok „bensőséges” jellegét mutatta, hogy egy, már csak nem is kendőzött alkudozás zajlott a két fél között.

Lázár Györgyöt 1987. februárban magánkihallgatáson fogadta II. János Pál. A magyar miniszterelnök tolmácsolta a magyar vezetők jókívánságait, méltatta a Szentszék nemzetközi tevékenységét, az atomháború veszélyének elhárítása, az enyhülés előmozdítása érdekében kifejtett erőfeszítéseit. Lázár pozitívan értékelte a magyar állam és a katolikus egyház kapcsolatait. Az együttműködés folytatása a Kádár és VI. Pál találkozóján elfogadott elvek alapján kívánatos - mondta. Kölcsönös érdek, hogy Lékai bíboros utódja is a megkezdett úton haladjon tovább. A magyar hívők megtalálták a helyüket a szocializmusban, a lelkiismereti szabadságot biztosítja a magyar kormány, de ugyanilyen fontosságot tulajdonít a nemzeti kisebbségek szabadságjogai biztosításának is (!). A pápa fontosnak tartotta Lázár látogatását, hangsúlyozta az egyetértést a béke fenntartásának a biztosításában, s kijelentette, hogy nem kevésbé fontos, hogy a nemzetek és kisebb közösségek megértsék egymást – amit a magyar miniszterelnök természetesen érthetett úgy, mint II. János Pál kedvező reagálását a fentiekben említett Emlékeztetőben foglaltakra. A továbbiakban a pápa egyetértését fejezte ki az elmúlt negyedszázados gyakorlattal, annak eredményeivel, ő is azt akarja – jelentette ki -, hogy Lékai utódja az „*eddiggi utat folytassa.*” Kérte szívélyes üdvözlétének továbbítását Kádárnak. A pápai magánkihallgatást követően Lázár György Casaroli bíborossal találkozott, aki hasonló szellemben beszélt, a kapcsolatok további fejlődésének lehetőségét hangsúlyozva. A kétoldalú viszony jó szelleme – mondta - hozzájárulás a kelet-nyugati kapcsolatok ápolásához. A melléktárgyaláson Miklós és Colasuonno megállapodott abban, hogy Paskai bíboros kinevezése egyeztetett időpontban kerül bejelentésre.<sup>68</sup>

A római magyar nagykövet évi beszámoló jelentésében „*hangsúlyozottan jó légkör*”-ről szólt a magyar-vatikáni kapcsolatok tekintetében, s arra következtetett, hogy a Vatikán előbb utóbb

<sup>67</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 135. doboz, 00221, 1987.

<sup>68</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Olaszország, 105. doboz, 0054/12, 1987.

megkezdte a pápa magyarországi látogatásának, a diplomáciai kapcsolatok felvételének, újabb szerzetesrendek engedélyezésének szorgalmazását. Azonban hozzáfűzte, hogy a Vatikán a szocialista országok felé kettős vonalat követ. A kormányokkal a kapcsolatok normalitására törekszik, ugyanakkor határozottabban fellép a vallásszabadságért, s úgy látja, hogy van tere és lehetősége az egyház társadalmi szerepének az erősítésére. Fokozódóan igyekszik megakadályozni a világegyházakban erősödő baloldali mozgalmakat. A Vatikánban a konzervatív erők előtérbe kerülése folytatódik.<sup>69</sup> Az ÁEH a nagyköveti beszámolóra küldött értékelésében „*kellő óvatosságot*” ajánlott a Vatikán képviselőivel folytatott kapcsolattartásban, nehogy arra a következtetésre jussanak, hogy a magyar fél a jelenlegi állapotot a diplomáciai kapcsolatok felvételének az irányában akarja megváltoztatni.<sup>70</sup> Ami a kádári gyakorlat szerint természetesen elképzelhetetlen volt addig, amíg mások fel nem vették ezeket a diplomáciai kapcsolatokat.

A következő, a Kádár rendszer széthullásának kellős közepén tartott, immár budapesti konzultáción az ÁEH elnöke ismételt felvetette, hogy a magyar közvéleményt igen foglalkoztatja a romániai magyarok helyzete, az ottani emberi jogok, a nemzetiségek és a vallásszabadság védelme. Érinteni fogja-e a pápa burgenlandi látogatása során a magyar katolikus híveket foglalkoztató kérdéseket? – érdeklődött a magyar fél, ami persze már félreérthetetlenül mutatta, hogy az ekkorra már az MSZMP és vezetése aligha megnyerhető versenyhelyzetbe került az egyre virulensebb ellenzéki erőkkel, és komolyan aggódott amiatt, hogy adott esetben a pápa burgenlandi útján döntő fontosságú gesztusokat tehet az ellenzék felé – a szabad választásokkal a horizonton. Colasuonno megígérte, hogy jelezni fogja a pápának a felvetett kérdéseket.<sup>71</sup> Ezeket egyébként Kada Lajos érsek is tanulmányozta, mint azt jelezte a római nagykövetnek.<sup>72</sup> Bár a vatikáni delegáció igyekezett olyan püspökök kinevezését elérni, akik csak a hitélettel foglalkozzanak, és nem vállalnának szerepet a magyar társadalmi, politikai fejlődésében, „*érzékelhető volt a törekvés, hogy kihasználják nehézségeinket, de ezeket az áttörési kísérleteket sikerült elhárítani*” – a konzultációról

---

<sup>69</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Olaszország, 105. doboz, 003340, 1987.

<sup>70</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Olaszország, 105. doboz, 003340/5, 1987.

<sup>71</sup> Egy későbbi beszélgetés során Colasuonno a római nagykövetnek megjegyezte, hogy a pápa burgenlandi látogatása a pápának egy későbbi, magyarországi látogatásának az előcsarnoka lehetne. MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 102. doboz, 002002/1, 1988.

<sup>72</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 102. doboz, 001677, 1988.

készített jelentés szerint.<sup>73</sup> Ekkorra azonban a magyar vezetés már egyszerűen nem volt abban a helyzetben, hogy „*kezében tartsa a stratégiai kezdeményezést*”, inkább ment az események után, s lépései arra irányultak, hogy mentse, ami menthető. Igen jól mutatta a Szentszék magabiztosságát, hogy a római magyar nagykövet azt jelentette, hogy Silvestrini bíboros és Poggi érsek tiszteletére adott vacsoráján Poggi felemlítette Silvestrini magyarországi látogatásának lehetőségét. Ezt azzal indokolta Poggi érsek, hogy az esemény jó alkalmat adna az 1964-es megállapodás kibővítésére új elemekkel, mint pl. a diplomáciai kapcsolatok vagy a szerzetesrendek visszaállítása, vagy egy budapesti pápa látogatás előkészítése.<sup>74</sup> Ez kétség kívül a kétoldalú kapcsolatok fejlesztésére irányuló szentszéki szándéokra utalt – azzal a perspektívával, hogy e kétoldalú kapcsolatok fejlesztését már egy új magyar vezetéssel fogja megvalósítani.

II. János Pál magyarországi meghívására már Kádár bukása után került sor. Az Állami Egyházügyi Hivatal vezetője hosszabb feljegyzést küldött Grósz miniszterelnök titkárságának vezetőjéhez, mely feljegyzésben arról tájékoztatta, hogy a pápa látogatása kétségkívül a kétoldalú kapcsolatok kiemelkedő eseménye lenne. Ezt a lépést az ésszerű kompromisszumok, a megállapodások betartása, a kölcsönös bizalom tette lehetővé és az, hogy nincsenek olyan rendezetlen kérdések, amelyek kizárnák a pápa meghívásának a lehetőségét. Magának a meghívásnak a gondolatát Paskai bíboros vetette fel Grósznál tett látogatása során 1988. augusztus 12-én azzal, hogy a magyar katolikus egyház és a magyar püspöki kar magyarországi látogatásra „*szerezné*” meghívni II. János Pált.

Grósz ezzel egyetértett, s jelezte, hogy tájékoztatni fogja a minisztertanácsot és az Elnök Tanácsot (a Politikai Bizottságot viszont ezek szerint nem - vagyis a hatalmi centrum ekkorra már a párttól átkerült a kormányzathoz, gorbacsovi mintára) s javasolni fogja, hogy állami részről hivatalosan hívják meg II. János Pált. Ezt az információt Paskai bíboros az 1988. augusztus 20-i, a Szent István bazilika előtt tartott ünnepi misén hozta nyilvánosságra. Szent István halálának a 950. évfordulás ünnepségein a pápa személyes képviselőjében megjelent Colasuonno érseknek adták át a meghívást. Az ÁEH elnöke azzal zárta a feljegyzését, hogy II. János Pál látogatása „*továbblépést jelent a kapcsolatokban, megerősíti az eddig követett politika helyességét.*”<sup>75</sup> Ami természetesen teljes

<sup>73</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 102. doboz, 002002/2, 1988.

<sup>74</sup> MNL XIX-J-1-j, Vatikán, 135. doboz. 00266/1, 1987.

<sup>75</sup> MNL XIX-A-21-a, ÁEH, 79. doboz. M-5-15/1988.

tévedés volt, hiszen ekkor már olyan folyamatok dühögtek a magyar belpolitikában, melyek a pártállam széteséséhez és gyökeresen új minőségű magyar-szentszéki kapcsolatokhoz vezettek. Ezt nagyon jól érzékelték a Vatikánban is, mivel valamivel később a II. János Pál látogatását az 1989-es pártkongresszus, illetve a választások utánra tervezték.

**Gábor Földessy**

***The Vietnam War and the Johnson Administration: The 1964 Presidential Election, the Escalation of the War, and the Consequences***

**Abstract**

The aim of this research paper is to examine the effects of the Vietnam War on the Johnson administration (1963-1968). First, the essay seeks to show briefly the outcome of U.S. military operations in South Vietnam between November 1963 and the summer of 1964, and to exemplify the nature of the Johnson administration as to misinforming the American public. In the second stage, the paper intends to examine the effects of the Vietnam War on the presidential election of 1964 and on President Johnson's political decisions concerning the Gulf of Tonkin Incident that contributed to his victory. In addition, the paper also examines the reasons and factors, namely the escalation of the war in 1965 and its consequences, that eventually brought Lyndon Johnson's presidency to an end.

*Keywords:* Vietnam War, Lyndon Johnson, containment, escalation, presidential election of 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, media, U.S. society, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Great Society.

**A**s John F. Kennedy was shot to death on November 22, 1963, Lyndon Baines Johnson became the next president of the United States.<sup>1</sup> While Johnson decided to continue his predecessor's containment policy in Vietnam, he also sought to win the support of the people for the presidential election in November 1964.<sup>2</sup> However, in order to achieve both of his goals, Johnson misled the Americans.<sup>3</sup> As the people realized that their president deceived them, they turned against Johnson whose presidential career also came to an end.<sup>4</sup> The aim of this research paper is to examine the effects of the Vietnam War on the 1964 presidential election and to reveal the reasons, factors, and circumstances that contributed to the fall of the Johnson administration.

When Johnson became president in November 1963, the U.S. military operations in Vietnam were unsuccessful.<sup>5</sup> Despite the

---

<sup>1</sup> Roger BARR, *The Vietnam War*, Lucent Books Inc. San Diego, 1991. Print. 30.

<sup>2</sup> BARR (1991)? 30.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 65.

<sup>5</sup> Michael H. HUNT (ed.), *A Vietnam War Reader: A Documentary History from American and Vietnamese Perspectives*. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2010. E-Book. 59.

efforts of the United States to prevent South Vietnam from becoming a communist country, the South Vietnamese army seemed to be unable to resist the communists.<sup>6</sup> On December 21, 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent a message to Johnson, in which he drew the attention of the president to the fact that

*[t]he situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2–3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state. [...] The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. [...] We should watch the situation very carefully, running scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement.*<sup>7</sup>

The excerpt from McNamara's message above provides a demonstration as to the continuously deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. What is more, as it can be seen above, McNamara also let Johnson know that South Vietnam is likely to fall unless the USA arranges „for more forceful moves.”

The Johnson administration constantly misinformed the American public as to the outcome of U.S. military operations in Vietnam.<sup>8</sup> Although in his message in December 1963, McNamara secretly notified Johnson about the deteriorating circumstances in Vietnam, the politician informed „the public that great progress was being made in the war.”<sup>9</sup> Moreover, „in February 1964, the United States launched a campaign of covert attacks on North Vietnam” with the purpose of destroying „rail and highway bridges” that was also concealed „from the American public.”<sup>10</sup> In addition, by the summer of 1964, the USA seemed to be beaten „on the ground in South Vietnam,” therefore „American military and political leaders” counseled Johnson to escalate the war.<sup>11</sup> However, since Johnson feared that the expansion of the war would turn the people against him, he decided to put off the military actions „until after the November 1964 U.S. presidential election.”<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Maurice ISSERMAN and John S. BOWMAN, *Vietnam War*, Facts On File Inc. New York, 2003. E-Book. 45.

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in HUNT (2010), 60–61.

<sup>8</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 45.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>12</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 48.



### ***The War in the Political Arena***

In the presidential campaign, Johnson's political opponent was the Republican Barry M. Goldwater.<sup>13</sup> Historian David L. Anderson points out that „[t]he presidential election contest of 1964 between incumbent Democrat Lyndon B. Johnson and Republican Barry M. Goldwater centered on their sharp ideological differences over domestic policy.”<sup>14</sup> Anderson compares the two presidential candidates the following way:

*[t]he ultraconservative Goldwater opposed the social welfare programs that had grown since their inception in the New Deal of the 1930s. He even went so far as to suggest that Social Security be dismantled. Conversely, Johnson's Great Society envisioned moving beyond the New Deal with initiatives such as national health insurance.*<sup>15</sup>

What is more, the two presidential candidates had dissimilar views concerning America's Vietnam policy, as well.<sup>16</sup> Anderson compares the views of the two candidates as to Vietnam as follows:

*[o]n the mounting war in Vietnam, the militaristic Goldwater advocated U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, while Johnson presented himself as the peace candidate who wanted to limit the conflict.*<sup>17</sup>

In addition, in the hope of winning the election in November, Johnson aimed at avoiding „a large war that would divert resources and public attention from his domestic programs.”<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, we should examine the reasons, factors, and circumstances that contributed to Johnson's victory in the 1964 presidential election.

While the United States was involved in a great war in Vietnam, Johnson sought to implement his domestic plans.<sup>19</sup> The president's aim was to eliminate poverty and racial discrimination, as well as to protect the environment – a plan that became known as „*the Great Society of America*.”<sup>20</sup> In his speech at the University of Michigan on

---

<sup>13</sup> David. L. ANDERSON, *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002. Print. 116.

<sup>14</sup> ANDERSON (2002), 116.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 116-117.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 117.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 117.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 44.

<sup>19</sup> BARR (1991), 30.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 30.

May 22, 1964, Johnson announced that

*[f]or in your time we have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society. The Great Society rests on abundance and liberty for all. It demands an end to poverty and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time. [...] Poverty must not be a bar to learning, and learning must offer an escape from poverty. [...] We have the power to shape the civilization that we want. But we need your will, and your labor, and your hearts, if we are to build that kind of society.*<sup>21</sup>

Though Johnson promised all Americans „the opportunity to move [...] upward to the Great Society” that „rests on abundance and liberty for all,” as well as „an end to poverty and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed in our time,” as it will be presented later in this paper, the president’s military and political decisions to contain the spread of communism in Vietnam eventually led to the failure of his „dream of building a Great Society.”<sup>22</sup>

At the same time, however, the president „was under attack from Republican politicians for not doing enough in Vietnam to defeat the Communists.”<sup>23</sup> Johnson aimed at continuing America’s containment policy in Southeast Asia but he also knew that „a major war in Vietnam could only damage his hopes for domestic reform” as well as for the presidency.<sup>24</sup> Historians Maurice Isserman and John S. Bowman describe the dilemma the president faced concerning South Vietnam as follows:

*[d]oing too little in Vietnam would leave Johnson vulnerable to charges from conservatives that he was betraying the Kennedy legacy of resolute cold war leadership by allowing the country to fall to the Communists. Doing too much in Vietnam would leave him equally vulnerable to charges from liberals that he was betraying Kennedy’s legacy of limited commitments in the region, leading the United States into a dangerous, open-ended conflict in Southeast Asia.*<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> „The Great Society, U. Michigan, 1964.” American Experience. PBS. March 29, 2005. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/lbj-michigan/> (Accessed: November 10, 2015).

<sup>22</sup> BARR (1991), 30.

<sup>23</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 52.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 50.

<sup>25</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 55.

Eventually, the happenings in the Gulf of Tonkin in the summer of 1964 helped Johnson solve his dilemma: he showed Republican politicians that he was able to prevent the communist expansion in Vietnam and, at the same time, he also presented himself as a peace candidate who wished to avoid a great war.<sup>26</sup>

Nevertheless, before examining Johnson's political maneuver, it is essential to see the happenings in the Gulf of Tonkin. As it is generally known, on August 2 and 4, 1964, the communists attacked two American ships in the „*Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnamese coast.*”<sup>27</sup> After the attack of „*the Maddox*” on August 2, „*the U.S. Navy ordered another destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, to join the Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin.*”<sup>28</sup> However, the happenings as to the second incident are uncertain: on August 4, the crew of the two ships „*began to pick up radar and sonar readings indicating the presence of enemy ships.*”<sup>29</sup> Concerning the happenings on August 4, historians Maurice Isserman and John S. Bowman point out that

*[a]lthough there were no visual sightings of enemy ships, several sailors claimed to have seen torpedo wakes heading toward the destroyers. Over the next two hours, seamen manning sonar equipment reported 26 torpedoes fired at the Maddox.*<sup>30</sup>

Therefore, with the purpose of defending themselves from the supposed attack, „*[t]he Maddox and the Turner Joy fired 400 shells in the direction they thought the attack was coming from.*”<sup>31</sup>

The supposed incident on August 4 was never confirmed.<sup>32</sup> The American „*Navy pilot James Stockdale flew to the scene of the battle*” with the purpose of destroying the „*enemy ships.*”<sup>33</sup> However, after his return, as he was asked whether he had seen the enemy, he replied that

*[n]ot a one. No boats, no boat wakes, no ricochets off boats, no boat gunfire, no torpedo wakes—nothing but black sea and American firepower. But for goodness' sake, I must be going crazy.*<sup>34</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 55.

<sup>27</sup> BARR (1991), 25.

<sup>28</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 52-53.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 53.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 53.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 53.

<sup>32</sup> ANDERSON (2002), 45.

<sup>33</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 53.

<sup>34</sup> Quoted in Marilyn B. YOUNG, John FITZGERALD, and A. Tom GRUNFELD,

After the supposed attack, the „*the captain of the Maddox, John Herrick,*” also remarked that „*[e]ntire action leaves many doubts. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action.*”<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, historians Maurice Isserman and John S. Bowman argue that probably

*an inexperienced and jittery sonar man aboard the Maddox had mistaken the sound of his own ship’s rudder for onrushing enemy torpedoes, while freak weather conditions led to misinterpretation of radar readings.*<sup>36</sup>

Besides, historian David L. Anderson also makes the assertion that

*[t]he best historical evidence available now suggests that there was no attack on U.S. ships on August 4, but it also shows that the Pentagon did not know with certainty what had occurred and did not willfully misrepresent the situation to the president.*<sup>37</sup>

Although the circumstances concerning the second incident are unclear, historians agree that, in all likelihood, „*there were no North Vietnamese ships in the area that night.*”<sup>38</sup>

Though the communists probably did not attack the two American ships on August 4, Johnson made use of the occasion.<sup>39</sup> After the assumed attack, he „*ordered retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam.*”<sup>40</sup> Shortly after the incident, on August 4, Johnson told the public on television that

*renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. [...] But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations.*<sup>41</sup>

---

*The Vietnam War: A History in Documents.* Oxford University Press, New York, 2002. E-Book. 76.

<sup>35</sup> Quoted in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 53.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 53.

<sup>37</sup> ANDERSON (2002), 45.

<sup>38</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 53.

<sup>39</sup> BARR (1991), 25.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>41</sup> Quoted in YOUNG, FITZGERALD, and GRUNFELD (2002), 73-75.

What is more, at the end of his speech, the president also declared that „[w]e still seek no wider war.”<sup>42</sup> Eventually, the Americans believed Johnson and also agreed to the measures Johnson took after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.<sup>43</sup> Concerning Johnson’s political maneuver, historians Maurice Isserman and John S. Bowman point out the following:

*[t]hat is why the Gulf of Tonkin Incident proved to be a political godsend. Four months before the November presidential election, Johnson hit back at the Communists for allegedly attacking U.S. warships—but his retaliation was limited to a one-time air strike. He thus established his political credentials with American voters as both commander in chief and as a „man of peace.” Barry Goldwater had no chance against that potent combination.*<sup>44</sup>

In addition, Johnson also took full advantage of the supposed incident: in order to receive more political and military power, he asked the Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that allowed him „to use armed force in Southeast Asia to protect American personnel and to counter aggression.”<sup>45</sup>

After the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Johnson became much more popular than before.<sup>46</sup> Surveys showed that the majority of people agreed to Johnson’s reaction to the incident.<sup>47</sup> Historians Maurice Isserman and John S. Bowman point out that statistically, „85 percent of the public approved of the raids against North Vietnam” and „Johnson’s personal popularity in the polls skyrocketed.”<sup>48</sup> Moreover, the two historians also make the assertion that Johnson „had proven that he was willing to stand up to the Communists; now he was free to turn around and portray his opponent, Barry Goldwater, as an irresponsible warmonger.”<sup>49</sup> Thus, on November 3, 1964, „Johnson easily defeated Goldwater with 61.1 percent of the popular vote.”<sup>50</sup> However, Isserman and Bowman also underline an important fact, namely, „Johnson, the peace candidate in 1964, was about to approve plans to lead his nation into a much wider war.”<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 54.

<sup>43</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 56.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>45</sup> ANDERSON (2002), 184.

<sup>46</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 56.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>50</sup> ANDERSON (2002), 117.

<sup>51</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 56.

### ***The Escalation and its Effects on the Johnson Administration***

In 1965, Johnson escalated the war.<sup>52</sup> Although „during his reelection campaign in 1964, Johnson warned against increasing American involvement in Vietnam,” in the beginning of 1965, he „reversed this position, ordered bombing in North Vietnam, and sent American troops into battle.”<sup>53</sup> At John Hopkins University in Baltimore, on April 7, 1965, Johnson told his audience that

*[i]n recent months attacks on South Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires. We do this in order to slow down aggression. [...] But we dream of an end to war. And we will try to make it so. For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.*<sup>54</sup>

As it can be seen in the quotation above, although Johnson explained his audience that the escalation was a necessary military decision because the number of „attacks on South Viet-Nam” drastically grew, the president also talked about „an end to war.” In addition, the quotation above also provides a demonstration as to Johnson’s vision of „a world where all are fed and charged with hope” – however, as I will present soon, his vision of wellbeing in America did not come true on account of the escalation.

The escalation of the war was not supported by the public.<sup>55</sup> As the president expanded the war, numerous „Americans who had voted for Johnson felt betrayed by his dishonesty.”<sup>56</sup> The American poet, philosopher, and religious writer, Thomas Merton remarked that

*in the U.S. Presidential election of 1964 along with the majority of voters I took the side of Lyndon Johnson against Barry Goldwater, and my reason for doing so was that I did*

---

<sup>52</sup> BARR (1991), 30.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 30. Johnson also „kept details of the number of troops in Vietnam a secret because he feared his actions would be unpopular with the American people” BARR (1991), 62.

<sup>54</sup> Quoted in HUNT (2010), 69-71.

<sup>55</sup> BARR (1991), 62.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 62.

*not want Goldwater's belligerent policy in Vietnam. However, though Johnson won the election, Goldwater's policy in Vietnam was what we got.*<sup>57</sup>

As the above quotation demonstrates, Merton – who spoke on behalf of numerous Americans – disapproved of the escalation and he also criticized Johnson for misleading the people.

The media also played a crucial role in influencing public opinion about the Johnson administration.<sup>58</sup> Although the government „gave Americans the impression that the war effort was going well,” television and the newspapers „were reporting a much different picture.”<sup>59</sup> Johnson became so unpopular that „[b]y the end of 1965, the media had coined the term „credibility gap” to describe the difference between what Johnson had been telling Americans about the war and what reporters were reporting.”<sup>60</sup> Since television and the newspapers showed the cruelties of the war and revealed that the military actions in Vietnam were ineffective, a great number of Americans who trusted Johnson realized that the president deceived them.<sup>61</sup> Thus, more and more people moved to the streets to demonstrate against the war.<sup>62</sup>

The escalation of the war also thwarted Johnson's „Great Society of America.”<sup>63</sup> Before the president expanded the war, „Congress passed laws that helped pay health care costs for senior citizens, made it easier for black people to vote, helped the unemployed, expanded the food stamp program for the needy, and made it easier for young people to get jobs.”<sup>64</sup> However, as historian Bruce O. Solheim points out, „[t]he war was already turning the economy sour by 1967 as Johnson was forced to raise taxes to pay for the war in Vietnam and his war on poverty.”<sup>65</sup> Table 1 in the Appendix section of this paper (see on page 12) demonstrates that the expenses of the war drastically increased by 1967, namely from 5,812 USD in 1966 to 20,133 USD in 1967 that is far more than a 300% increase. In addition, Table 1 also shows that the expenses of the war remained

---

<sup>57</sup> Cecil WOOLF and John BAGGULEY (eds.), *Authors Take Sides on Vietnam*. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1967. Print. 51.

<sup>58</sup> BARR (1991), 63-64.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, 62-63.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, 63-64.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, 63-64.

<sup>62</sup> YOUNG, FITZGERALD, and GRUNFELD (2002), 84.

<sup>63</sup> BARR (1991), 30.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, 30.

<sup>65</sup> Bruce O. SOLHEIM, *The Vietnam War Era, A Personal Journey*. Praeger Publishers Westport, CT, 2006. Print. 109.

high until 1970. Consequently, as author Roger Barr underlines as to Johnson,

*[a]lthough he insisted that the country could afford both the war and the Great Society programs he wanted, his critics claimed that America could not pay for both „guns” and „butter.”<sup>66</sup>*

All in all, the majority of Americans who sought for the social wellbeing agreed with Martin Luther King, Jr. who remarked during an antiwar demonstration on February 25, 1967 that *„the promises of the Great Society have been shot down on the battlefield of Vietnam.”<sup>67</sup>*

By the spring of 1968, *„Johnson [felt] as though he were fighting two wars, one in Vietnam and one in his own country.”<sup>68</sup>* In March 1968, a survey revealed that *„49 percent, almost half, of the American public viewed the war as „a mistake”<sup>69</sup>* What is more, by 1968, the president himself realized that *„he had destroyed his credibility with his country.”<sup>70</sup>* Johnson also became *„a deeply troubled man, physically exhausted, emotionally drained, frustrated by the lack of success.”<sup>71</sup>* As a result of the antiwar demonstrations across the country, Johnson recognized that *„he had to end the war in Vietnam quickly to satisfy the American people.”<sup>72</sup>* Eventually, on March 31, 1968, the president announced on television that

*[w]e are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations. So, tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to deescalate the conflict. We are reducing—substantially reducing—the present level of hostilities. And we are doing so unilaterally, and at once. [...]  
I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your president.<sup>73</sup>*

Thus, while the president *„was ready to deescalate the conflict,*

---

<sup>66</sup> BARR (1991), 30.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted in SOLHEIM (2006), 107.

<sup>68</sup> BARR (1991), 65.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, 65.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 66.

<sup>71</sup> SOLHEIM (2006), 67.

<sup>72</sup> BARR (1991), 65.

<sup>73</sup> Quoted in HUNT (2010), 97-98.



*effectively paving the way for negotiations,*"<sup>74</sup> as Roger Barr asserts, Johnson „*was willing to step aside and let a new president lead the United States out of the terrible nightmare of the Vietnam War.*"<sup>75</sup>

### ***Summary and Conclusion***

In conclusion, as Johnson became president in November 1963, the American military operations in South Vietnam were ineffective to defeat the communists.<sup>76</sup> In order to achieve victory, the United States needed to expand the war but, because of the forthcoming election in November 1964, President Johnson decided to reschedule the escalation.<sup>77</sup> In addition, while Johnson sought to build up „*the Great Society of America,*” he was also criticized by the Republicans for not being able to contain the spread of communism in Vietnam.<sup>78</sup> Eventually, the supposed incident on August 4, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin helped Johnson, on the one hand, show his determination to contain the spread of communism in Vietnam, and on the other hand, present himself for the upcoming election as a peace candidate.<sup>79</sup>

However, after he won the election, with the political and military power in his hand guaranteed by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, he escalated the war in 1965.<sup>80</sup> Afterward, step by step, Johnson’s plan for „*building a Great Society in America*” fell through a result of the increased costs of the war,<sup>81</sup> and he also „*lost his credibility with the American people by not being honest with them.*”<sup>82</sup> By 1968, Johnson became so unpopular that he aimed at ending the war while he also decided not to run for reelection.<sup>83</sup> All in all, as author Roger Barr mentions concerning Lyndon Johnson: „*[h]e is remembered more as a war president than the creator of the Great Society.*”<sup>84</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> HUNT (2010), 96.

<sup>75</sup> BARR (1991), 66.

<sup>76</sup> ISSERMAN and BOWMAN (2003), 45.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 52.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 55.

<sup>80</sup> BARR (1991), 30.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 62.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 66.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 30.

## APPENDIX

Fiscal Year	Full Cost (millions)
1965	\$ 103
1966	5,812
1967	20,133
1968	26,547
1969	28,805
1970	23,052
1971	14,719
1972	9,261

Full costs are for all forces and include personnel, aircraft, operations, munitions used, and equipment lost in the Southeast Asia conflict.

Source: ANDERSON, David L., *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002. Print. 287.

**Christopher Pichonnier**

***La Hongrie face au projet mitterrandien de confédération européenne<sup>1</sup>***

**Abstract**

At the dawn of major geopolitical transformations in Europe and on the eve of 1990, French President François Mitterrand, well-aware of the shifting political and economic conditions in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the USSR, and worried about the future of the European Economic Community, calls for the creation of a new pan-European structure - The European Confederation - designed to « *associate all states of the continent into a common and permanent organisation for exchanges, peace and security* ». In the weeks following its presentation, the project, in line with the gaullist tradition of a greater Europe « *from the Atlantic to the Urals* », is rather well-received by European political leaders. However, as time goes by, it has to face growing criticism and skepticism from the international community before ultimately being buried after the summer of 1991. Based on the archives of the French presidency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hungarian National archives and the documents from the François Mitterrand Institute in Paris, this article will deliver a brief overview of the background and origins of Mitterrand's European Confederation project before focusing on its reception by Hungarian political leaders and media during the course of the years 1990 and 1991.

*Keywords:* European Confederation, François Mitterrand, Hungary, Post-Yalta Europe, European Economic Community, French foreign policy, Central-Eastern Europe, USSR, József Antall, Miklós Németh, Géza Jeszenszky, Imre Pozsgay.

**A** la veille de la nouvelle année 1990, au cours de la traditionnelle présentation de ses vœux à la Nation, le président de la République française, François Mitterrand, introduit pour la première fois, sous les regards attentifs et étonnés de ses collaborateurs, l'expression de « *confédération européenne* », qu'il définit alors, de manière assez générale, comme « *une organisation commune et permanente d'échanges, de paix et de sécurité* »<sup>2</sup>.

Au sein d'un discours dans lequel la situation politico-économique de

---

<sup>1</sup> Cet article s'intègre dans le cadre d'une thèse en cotutelle portant sur les relations franco-hongroises (1989-2004) sous la direction des Professeurs Bernard Lachaise (Université Michel de Montaigne de Bordeaux ) et István Majoros (Université Eötvös Loránd de Budapest).

<sup>2</sup> Institut François Mitterrand (IFM), Allocution du président de la République, François Mitterrand, à l'occasion de la présentation des ses vœux aux Français pour la nouvelle année, Paris, 31 décembre 1989.

L'Europe centre-orientale semble occuper toutes ses pensées<sup>3</sup>, le président français tente d'esquisser un projet d'avenir pour une Europe en proie à d'importants bouleversements géopolitiques. Traçant un parallèle entre la Révolution française de 1789 – qui fête alors son bicentenaire – et les révolutions de velours en cours à l'est du continent, François Mitterrand se livre à une analyse lucide des défis qui se dressent désormais devant l'Europe de la fin du vingtième siècle :

« *Des questions nouvelles commencent à se poser qui n'auront pas de réponse en un jour, mais elles sont posées : l'avenir des alliances, l'Alliance atlantique et le Pacte de Varsovie, à quel rythme poursuivre le désarmement, sous quelle forme et dans quelles conditions se réunira le peuple allemand, quel type de coopération entre l'Est et l'Ouest, l'intangibilité ou non des frontières existantes, et jusqu'où le réveil des nationalités ?* ».

Le projet de confédération européenne dévoilé lors de cette allocution constitue la tentative personnelle du président français de répondre à plusieurs de ces enjeux et d'apporter une pierre, qu'il juge essentielle, au nouvel édifice européen en construction.

L'idée, développée au cours de l'hiver 1989, mais indubitablement le fruit d'une réflexion plus lointaine, a fait, a posteriori, l'objet de témoignages de la part des proches du chef de l'État<sup>4</sup>, mais également de plusieurs articles d'historiens centrés autour du rôle de la France dans le développement du projet<sup>5</sup>. En revanche, l'accueil réservé au

---

<sup>3</sup> Le président Mitterrand évoque ainsi, dès la seconde phrase de son discours : « *le changement qui s'est produit ces derniers mois dans les pays de l'Est [et qui] dépasse, en importance, tout ce que nous avons connu depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale et s'inscrit, sans aucun doute, parmi les grands événements de l'histoire* ».

<sup>4</sup> A ce propos voir la contribution de l'ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères du président Mitterrand : DUMAS, Roland, « *Un projet mort-né : la Confédération européenne* », Politique étrangère, numéro 3, Paris, 2001, 687-703, et l'article du conseiller diplomatique et porte-parole de la présidence : MUSITELLI, Jean, « *François Mitterrand, architecte de la Grande Europe. Le projet de Confédération Européenne (1990-1991)* », Revue Internationale et stratégique, numéro 82, Paris, 2011, 18-28.

<sup>5</sup> Essentiellement l'oeuvre de Frédéric Bozo dont nous livrons ici pour référence les articles principaux autour de ce thème : BOZO, Frédéric, « *The Failure of a Grand Design : Mitterrand's European Confederation (1989-1991)* », Contemporary European History, numéro 17 (3), 2008, 391-412. BOZO, Frédéric, « *François Mitterrand et la fin de la guerre froide (1981-1991)* », Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps, numéro 101-102, 2011(1), 39-45. D'importants éléments sur le sujet se retrouvent également dans l'ouvrage du même auteur : BOZO, Frédéric, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005. Il faut également citer : BOZO, Frédéric, REY, Marie-Pierre, LUDLOW, N. Piers et NUTI, Leopoldo, (dir.), *Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945-1990*, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 2012 et notamment le chapitre 19 « *Mitterrand's Vision and the End of the Cold War* ».

dessein mitterrandien par ses principaux destinataires – les pays d'Europe centre-orientale (PECO) – n'a guère été l'objet de recherches approfondies. Basé sur un corpus de sources hongroises<sup>6</sup> et françaises<sup>7</sup> cet article se propose de faire la lumière sur la réception de la proposition mitterrandienne par les autorités et les médias hongrois au cours des années 1990 et 1991. Après un bref rappel des origines du projet (construction, contexte), le texte analyse la réaction hongroise lors de la visite officielle du président Mitterrand en Hongrie en janvier 1990, puis se penche sur l'évolution du point de vue magyar vis-à-vis du projet du printemps 1990 à l'été 1991.

### **Penser l'architecture de la nouvelle Europe dans un contexte international complexe : aux origines du projet de confédération européenne**

#### ***Le projet personnel du président Mitterrand.***

La proposition, le 31 décembre 1989, du chef de l'État de créer, au cours des années 1990, « *une confédération européenne au*

---

L'ancien conseiller et porte-parole de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, Andreï Grachev, livre un témoignage sur le sujet dans son article : « *From the Common European Home to European Confederation: François Mitterrand and Mikhail Gorbachev in Search of a Road to a Greater Europe* », dans BOZO, Frédéric, REY, Marie-Pierre, LUDLOW, N. Piers et NUTI, Leopoldo, (dir.), *Europe and the End of the Cold War : A Reappraisal*, Routledge, Londres, 2008. Une vision plus critique du projet est présente dans : RUPNIK, Jacques, « *La France de Mitterrand et les pays de l'Europe du centre-est* », dans COHEN, Samy (dir.), *Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre Froide*, PUF, Paris, 1998, 189-222, mais aussi dans HUTCHINGS, Robert L., *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 1997. Enfin, le thème est également abordé dans l'ouvrage de SCHABERT, Tito, *Wie Weltgeschichte gemacht wird. Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Il s'agit principalement des documents du ministère des Affaires étrangères hongrois regroupés aux archives nationales : Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL-OL) concernant la période 1990-1991 qui se décomposent en trois catégories : les dossiers administratifs (*Adminisztratív ügyiratok*), les dossiers strictement secrets depuis déclassifiés (*Szigorúan titkos ügyiratok*) et les télégrammes diplomatiques des représentations hongroises à l'étranger – le cas échéant de l'ambassade de Hongrie à Paris – (*Rejtjel-táviratok külképviseleteknek*) qui viennent s'ajouter aux articles de presse des principaux journaux hongrois, Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság et Magyar Hírlap.

<sup>7</sup> Archives Nationales (AN) de la présidence Mitterrand (5AG4), documents du centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN) et en particulier les archives de l'ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères français (AMAE), série Europe, sous-série Hongrie (1986-1990) et (1991-1995) et enfin les archives de l'Institut François Mitterrand (IFM).

*vrai sans du terme, qui associera tous les Etats de notre continent* »<sup>8</sup>, prend « *tout le monde de court* »<sup>9</sup>, aussi bien ses plus proches conseillers que les observateurs français et internationaux. François Mitterrand ne s'est en effet ouvert à personne de son intention et c'est de lui-même qu'il a mûri ce concept. Ni son porte-parole, Hubert Védrine, ni son conseiller spécial, Jacques Attali, ni son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Roland Dumas – duquel le président est pourtant très proche – n'ont été mis dans la confidence. Ce dernier le concède d'ailleurs volontiers: « *la surprise était de taille* »<sup>10</sup> et rien ne semblait pouvoir indiquer la gestation de ce projet dans l'esprit du président. Pourtant, rétrospectivement, l'idée peut être ressentie une première fois en amont. Le 22 décembre 1989, François Mitterrand, en visite à Berlin, évoque, sans que personne ne le relève, la possibilité de mettre en place un « *système qui puisse prévaloir pour l'Europe toute entière [en créant] un type de relations organiques qui permettrait d'intégrer tous ces pays chacun à leur manière* »<sup>11</sup>. Si le profil de l'idée est déjà certainement présent dans ces propos il faut néanmoins attendre la présentation des vœux aux Français pour voir apparaître pour la première fois le terme de « *confédération* ».

Les réactions immédiates dans l'entourage du président sont très positives. Hubert Védrine trouve l'idée « *magnifique* »<sup>12</sup> tandis que Roland Dumas se dit « *immédiatement séduit* »<sup>13</sup>. Sur la scène européenne le président de la Commission, Jacques Delors, qualifie le projet de « *génial* »<sup>14</sup> cependant que le chancelier allemand, Helmut Kohl, trouve l'initiative « *très bonne* »<sup>15</sup>.

---

<sup>8</sup> Institut François Mitterrand (IFM), Allocution du Président de la République, François Mitterrand à l'occasion de la présentation des ses vœux aux Français pour la nouvelle année, Paris, 31 décembre 1989.

<sup>9</sup> MUSITELLI, Jean, « *François Mitterrand, architecte de la Grande Europe. Le projet de Confédération Européenne (1990-1991)* », Revue Internationale et stratégique, numéro 82, Paris, 2011, 18-28.

<sup>10</sup> DUMAS, Roland, « *Un projet mort-né : la Confédération européenne* », Politique étrangère, numéro 3, Paris, 2001, 687-703.

<sup>11</sup> IFM, Conférence de presse du Président de la République, François Mitterrand, à l'occasion de sa visite officielle à Berlin, 22 décembre 1989.

<sup>12</sup> FAVIER, Pierre et MARTIN-ROLAND, Michel, *La décennie Mitterrand: Les défis*, tome III, Éditions du seuil, Paris, 1996, 225.

<sup>13</sup> DUMAS, Roland, *Op.cit.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* Jean Musitelli livre néanmoins une version plus modérée de la réaction du dirigeant d'outre-Rhin évoquant « *un accueil prudemment favorable* » dans MUSITELLI, Jean, *Op.cit.*

### ***Entre «enthousiasme et incertitude »: une proposition fruit du contexte géopolitique européen.***

Sans conteste, le projet de confédération germe dans l'esprit du président français en réponse aux intenses et rapides transformations que subit, après près d'un demi siècle de guerre froide, le vieux continent au cours de la décennie 1980.

Dans cette optique il faut distinguer d'une part le contexte général de la déclaration – lié en partie aux changements politiques en URSS– et d'autre part le contexte immédiat du discours pour en comprendre la genèse.

D'un point de vue global, l'arrivée au pouvoir en Union soviétique de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev<sup>16</sup> et la mise en place d'une politique « progressiste » qui l'accompagne – schématiquement les processus de *glasnost* et de *perestroïka* – donnent le coup d'envoi à d'importants changements à l'est de l'Europe et laissent entrevoir l'opportunité d'une amélioration des relations Est-Ouest. François Mitterrand se montre optimiste quant à cette perspective dès octobre 1985 dans une lettre adressée au président américain Ronald Reagan<sup>17</sup> et se remet à imaginer les contours d'une Europe émancipée de Yalta<sup>18</sup> qu'il avait déjà appelé de ses vœux<sup>19</sup>.

Dans le même temps, et sous l'impulsion du duo Kohl-Mitterrand, la signature de l'Acte unique européen, début 1986, favorise l'approfondissement politique de la Communauté Économique Européenne (CEE) dont les relations avec Moscou sont désormais envisagées de manière plus concrète par Mikhaïl Gorbatchev à travers son concept de «*Maison Commune Européenne* »<sup>20</sup>. L'ensemble de ces éléments mis bout à bout fournissent incontestablement à Mitterrand les bases conceptuelles d'un projet qui s'insère par ailleurs fort bien dans la lignée gaulliste « *d'Europe-européenne* »<sup>21</sup> : celle de la fin de la

---

<sup>16</sup> Mikhaïl Gorbatchev est nommé Secrétaire général du Parti communiste de l'URSS le 11 mars 1985.

<sup>17</sup> REY, Marie-Pierre, « *Gorbatchev et la Maison Commune Européenne, une opportunité manquée ?* », Lettre de l'Institut François Mitterrand, numéro 19, Institut François Mitterrand, Paris, 12 mars 2007.

<sup>18</sup> A ce sujet voir notamment : MITTERRAND, François, *Réflexions sur la politique étrangère de la France*, Fayard, Paris, 1986.

<sup>19</sup> « *Tout ce qui permettra de sortir de Yalta sera bon* » avait déclaré le président quelques mois après son élection en mai 1981. IFM, Allocution de Monsieur François Mitterrand, Président de la République, à l'occasion de la présentation de ses vœux, Paris, 31 décembre 1981.

<sup>20</sup> A ce propos voir REY, Marie-Pierre, *Op.cit.*

<sup>21</sup> BOZO, Frédéric, « *The Failure of a Grand Design : Mitterrand's European Confederation (1989-1991)* », Contemporary European History,

logique des blocs, de la diminution progressive de la coercion soviétique à l'est du continent, du retrait graduel des États-Unis, de l'espoir d'une Europe de l'est émancipée et d'une Communauté renforcée avec en son sein une Allemagne réunifiée, en résumé une Europe libérée des divisions héritées de la guerre, une « *Grande Europe* » « *de l'Atlantique à l'Oural* ».

D'un point de vue plus resserré, l'accélération de l'histoire au centre et à l'est du continent au cours de l'année 1989 n'échappe ni à François Mitterrand ni à son entourage<sup>22</sup> et précipite certainement dans l'esprit du président la naissance du projet de confédération. Ainsi, observant que la Hongrie « *vient d'être le théâtre d'un véritable coup d'État réformateur qu'il importe de conforter d'urgence* »<sup>23</sup>, François Mitterrand estime, dès le début de l'année 1989, qu'il faut « *lui proposer un accord politique majeur* »<sup>24</sup>. En réalité l'idée est valable pour l'ensemble de l'Europe du centre-est et a été au cœur du programme de « *relance à l'est* » débuté au cours de l'année 1988.

### ***Tendre la main à « l'Autre Europe »***

L'année 1989 voit, au sein des démocraties populaires, « *le souffle de la contestation et de la liberté [faire] vaciller les régimes communistes, sclérosés et honnis* »<sup>25</sup>. Au cours de l'automne, l'ensemble des républiques de l'est – Roumanie exceptée – connaissent des révolutions de velours et sont, à des degrés divers, sur le chemin du retour à la démocratie. Mais l'évolution est encore loin d'être achevée et la diplomatie française, Mitterrand en tête, entrevoit encore la possibilité d'un arrêt brutal du processus. En Hongrie, Paris craint particulièrement les conséquences d'une crise économique et envisage même d'être confrontée à un « *nouveau 1956* »<sup>26</sup>. L'Etat français considère alors qu'il est d'« *un intérêt essentiel que les mutations à l'Est se passent de façon contrôlée* »<sup>27</sup>.

---

numéro 17 (3), 2008, 391-412.

<sup>22</sup> Roland Dumas explique : « *nous sentions des craquements et nous pensions qu'il fallait soutenir les boutures de liberté qui commençaient à apparaître* », cité dans FAVIER, Pierre et MARTIN-ROLAND, Michel, *La décennie Mitterrand: Les défis*, Tome III, Éditions du seuil, 1996, Paris. 167

<sup>23</sup> Les Magyars viennent en effet d'adopter, quelques semaines auparavant, le principe du multipartisme lors d'une session extraordinaire du parti socialiste ouvrier hongrois (PSOH) ainsi que les grandes lignes d'une nouvelle Constitution.

<sup>24</sup> SCHREIBER, Thomas, *Les actions de la France à l'Est ou les absences de Marianne*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2000. 192-193.

<sup>25</sup> MUSITELLI, Jean, *Op.cit*

<sup>26</sup> Entretien de l'auteur avec Thomas Schreiber, 8 décembre 2011, Paris.

<sup>27</sup> Note d'Hubert Védrine pour le président de la République, 14 décembre



Mais Paris se montre également concernée par la réaction russe face aux transformations. Jean-Louis Bianco, le secrétaire général de l'Élysée, indique, durant une entrevue avec l'ambassadeur hongrois à Paris, Gábor Nagy, que si les changements doivent se poursuivre sans équivoque ils doivent également se passer « *sans heurts* »<sup>28</sup> et « *sans créer de difficultés pour l'Union soviétique* »<sup>29</sup>, condition *sine qua non* au maintien de la paix. Allant dans le même sens, Roland Dumas estime ainsi qu'en dépit des difficultés économiques et politiques dans lesquelles Gorbatchev et Moscou sont enlisés, l'URSS est « *encore loin d'être à genoux* »<sup>30</sup> et que, forte de ses 400 000 soldats déployés en Europe centre-orientale, l'Union soviétique est encore capable de « *mouvements d'éléphants dans un magasin de porcelaine* »<sup>31</sup>. Les questions qui se dressent alors devant François Mitterrand sont donc complexes: comment soutenir les bouleversements en cours au centre et à l'est du continent sans risquer de provoquer Moscou? Comment offrir une aide à des nations qui retrouvent peu à peu leur liberté et souhaitent s'amarrer à l'Europe libre sans pour autant les intégrer dans une CEE en pleine transformation?<sup>32</sup> Face à la nécessité d'offrir une alternative à l'adhésion Mitterrand invente donc « *l'objet confédération* »<sup>33</sup>.

### ***Contrôler l'Allemagne à l'aube de la réunification***

François Mitterrand présente son projet un peu plus de six semaines après la chute de l'un des symboles les plus proéminents de la division de l'Europe – le mur de Berlin –<sup>34</sup> et seulement un mois après que le chancelier Kohl a présenté son plan en dix points pour surmonter la division de l'Allemagne<sup>35</sup>. La réunification allemande

---

1988, archives privées. Cité par BOZO, Frédéric, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005. 106.

<sup>28</sup> « *Felvetés nélkül* » dans le texte original, traduction de l'auteur.

<sup>29</sup> MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-j, carton 35, France, 1989, document 00724/8, Comptes-rendu de discussion de l'ambassadeur Gábor Nagy avec Jean-Louis Bianco, 17 novembre 1989.

<sup>30</sup> DUMAS, Roland, *Op.cit.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Une option qui semble alors totalement exclue dans l'esprit du président français.

<sup>33</sup> MUSITELLI, Jean, *Op.cit.*

<sup>34</sup> Le mur tombe le 6 novembre 1989.

<sup>35</sup> KOHL, Helmut, « *Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europas* », Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, 28 Novembre 1989.

est alors « *d'une actualité brûlante* »<sup>36</sup> et le président français refuse d'être pris au dépourvu par l'accélération des événements. A ce propos, l'historien Frédéric Bozo explique que le projet de confédération peut aussi se concevoir comme un moyen de limiter la prépondérance allemande dans un nouvel Est en reconstruction<sup>37</sup>. En février 1990, François Mitterrand explique ainsi à Helmut Kohl que la confédération européenne pourrait également servir à prévenir les tentatives de regroupement individuel des pays de l'est autour d'un seul centre<sup>38</sup>, « *une avenue dangereuse* » qu'il faut à tous prix éviter<sup>39</sup> : « *Il ne faut pas entrer dans une mauvaise compétition entre nous vis-à-vis de l'Europe de l'Est* » indique le président français au chancelier Kohl lors d'un dîner le 15 février 1990<sup>40</sup>.

### ***Assurer le futur de la CEE***

A Strasbourg, trois semaines avant l'allocution du 31 décembre 1989, la construction européenne a reçu un net coup d'accélérateur. Lors du conseil européen des 8 et 9 décembre 1989, Paris obtient de Berlin la fixation d'une date pour l'entrée en vigueur de la monnaie unique enclenchant ainsi la première étape d'un processus de négociations qui conduit la Communauté à la signature du traité de Maastricht en février 1992. François Mitterrand, tout en étant conscient qu'on ne peut pas « *laisser les pays de l'Est seuls* », ne semble pas imaginer un seul instant la possibilité d'intégrer à court ou moyen terme les PECO dans une Communauté des Douze qui vient de s'engager dans un approfondissement politique et économique. Dans cette optique le projet de confédération semble apparaître aux yeux du chef de l'État tout autant comme une alternative acceptable à l'adhésion pour les PECO que comme un

---

<sup>36</sup> MUSITELLI, Jean, *Op.cit.*

<sup>37</sup> BOZO, Frédéric, « *The Failure of a Grand Design : Mitterrand's European Confederation (1989-1991)* », *Contemporary European History*, numéro 17 (3), 2008, 391-412.

<sup>38</sup> Incontestablement l'Allemagne dans l'esprit du président français.

<sup>39</sup> L'idée semble par ailleurs être en ligne avec la crainte présente au sein de la diplomatie française de la reconstruction d'une *Mittleuropa* sous influence allemande même si sur ce point les déclarations de François Mitterrand ont été changeantes : en juillet 1989, le président français se défend ainsi de nourrir des inquiétudes quant à un tel scénario : « *Une sorte de bascule allemande vers les pays de l'est? Je ne le pense pas. Que l'Allemagne fédérale veuille entretenir de meilleures relations avec l'Union soviétique et les pays qui l'entourent qui s'en étonnera? La géographie et l'histoire l'y poussent* ». IFM, Interview du président de la République française pour le *Nouvel Observateur*, *The Independent*, *El País*, *La Repubblica* et *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 juillet 1989.

<sup>40</sup> ATTALI, Jacques, *Verbatim* (tome III, 1988-1991), Fayard, Paris, 1995. 428.

instrument de protection du « *premier cercle* » européen<sup>41</sup>.

Au final, conscient que « *le scénario de la suite n'était écrit nulle part* »<sup>42</sup>, François Mitterrand propose le projet de confédération européenne pour répondre du mieux possible aux intérêts inextricablement liés de la France, de la Communauté Européenne et du continent tout entier dans un contexte d'intenses transformations géopolitiques.

### **Le projet de confédération européenne au révélateur hongrois (janvier 1990)**

#### ***La visite de François Mitterrand en Hongrie : premiers soutiens officiels et premières réserves privées***

François Mitterrand était resté vague le soir du 31 décembre quant au contenu précis qu'il comptait donner à son projet. Partant d'un constat simple : « *L'Europe, c'est évident, ne sera plus celle que nous connaissons depuis un demi-siècle. Hier, dépendante des deux superpuissances, elle va, comme on rentre chez soi, rentrer dans son histoire et sa géographie* »<sup>43</sup> il avait formulé une proposition assez générale : « *à partir des accords d'Helsinki, je compte voir naître dans les années 90 une confédération européenne au vrai sans du terme, qui associera tous les États de notre continent dans une organisation commune et permanente d'échanges, de paix et de sécurité* »<sup>44</sup> et posé des conditions à sa naissance : « *cela ne sera évidemment possible qu'après l'instauration, dans les pays de l'Est, du pluralisme des partis, d'élections libres, d'un système représentatif et de la liberté d'information* »<sup>45</sup>.

Son déplacement officiel dans la capitale hongroise, les 18 et 19 janvier 1990<sup>46</sup>, lui fournit l'occasion de détailler de vive voix son projet

---

<sup>41</sup> L'expression est de François Mitterrand lui-même : « *il y aurait d'une part un premier cercle avec des institutions fortes et fermes, des disciplines, c'est la Communauté des Douze ; et un deuxième cercle de démarches en commun, d'échanges de toutes sortes, de sécurité garantie entre les Douze et tous les autres qui sont prêts* ». IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à la télévision hongroise, 15 janvier 1990.

<sup>42</sup> MUSITELLI, Jean, *Op.cit*

<sup>43</sup> IFM, Allocution du Président de la République, François Mitterrand, à l'occasion de la présentation des ses vœux aux Français pour la nouvelle année, Paris, 31 décembre 1989.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Un déplacement prévu depuis l'automne 1988 et la transmission d'une invitation officielle lors du passage à Paris de Károly Grósz, alors Secrétaire général du parti communiste ouvrier hongrois.

auprès des dirigeants magyars mais également l'opportunité d'observer leurs réactions, un bon indicateur de la viabilité de sa proposition.

Le Professeur Bernard Lachaise explique, dans un article retraçant en détails le voyage présidentiel<sup>47</sup>, que : « *la question de la confédération n'a pas de place dans les préparatifs* » coté français alors qu'il semble que le thème ait été plutôt bien préparé coté hongrois<sup>48</sup>. Une note de synthèse du 15 janvier 1990<sup>49</sup> conseille aux interlocuteurs magyars du président de l'interroger principalement autour de deux axes : Quel est le but concret du projet à long terme? Et quels avantages la Hongrie et sa région peuvent en retirer?

L'étude des entretiens bilatéraux du président français avec les dirigeants hongrois permet de se forger une idée plus précise de l'orientation que François Mitterrand entend donner à son projet. Lors de sa rencontre avec József Antall, le chef de l'opposition, président du Forum démocrate hongrois<sup>50</sup>, et futur Premier ministre, François Mitterrand explique que : « *le but [du projet] est que tous les États d'Europe se confédèrent et qu'il y ait un certain nombre d'objectifs commun avec un système de contraintes souples* »<sup>51</sup>. A Mátyás Szűrös, le président de la République par intérim, il indique que : « *les pays d'Europe de l'est ont besoin d'établir un contact organique avec l'Europe de l'Ouest, comme nous avec ceux de l'est* » et que dans cette optique la confédération serait le lieu de rencontre idéal<sup>52</sup>. Les propos du dirigeant français reste cependant assez généraux, et le natif de Jarnac le reconnaît volontiers, il ne veut « *rien dicter* »<sup>53</sup> considérant qu'« *il est trop tôt pour figer ce qui en sera le cadre précis* »<sup>54</sup>. Malgré tout, lorsqu'il s'agit des rapports à donner entre la confédération et la Communauté, le président ne fait pas mystère de sa vision: « *La communauté ne peut pas s'élargir*

---

<sup>47</sup> LACHAISE, Bernard, « *Le voyage de François Mitterrand en Hongrie en 1990* », *Öt Kontinens, az Új és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék közleményei* [Cinq Continents, Revue du département d'histoire moderne et contemporaine de l'université ELTE], numéro 2009, ELTE, Budapest, 63-74.

<sup>48</sup> La confédération fait l'objet de plusieurs notes de la part des services du Quai Bem (le ministère des Affaires étrangères hongrois) entre le 2 et le 16 janvier 1990.

<sup>49</sup> Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL-OL), Archives Nationales de Hongrie, Budapest, XIX-J-1-k, carton 40, France, 1990, document 216-3, point de vue hongrois sur la confédération européenne, 15 janvier 1990.

<sup>50</sup> En Hongrois, le Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF)

<sup>51</sup> FAVIER, Pierre et MARTIN-ROLAND, Michel, *Op. cit.* 173.

<sup>52</sup> BOZO, Frédéric, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005. 346.

<sup>53</sup> IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à la télévision hongroise, 15 janvier 1990.

<sup>54</sup> IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à l'agence télégraphique hongroise (MTI) et au journal Népszabadság, 17 janvier 1990.

*indéfiniment à tous les pays* » précise-t-il le 18 janvier à Mátyás Szűrös<sup>55</sup>. Le lendemain, devant le chef du nouveau parti socialiste hongrois<sup>56</sup>, Imre Pozsgay, il confirme : « *La CEE n'est pas une simple zone de commerce mais une zone de construction. L'adhésion n'est pas possible pour tous. La CEE n'a pas intérêt à accueillir en permanence de nouveaux pays (Autriche [sic], Turquie)* »<sup>57</sup>. En conséquence, le président français estime qu'il faut trouver « *de nouvelles formes de collaboration* » et bâtir une sécurité à travers « *un système moins rigoureux que la CEE* »<sup>58</sup>. Le dessein ne peut être plus limpide : la confédération est certes une main tendue vers l'Est, mais c'est aussi essentiellement alors une alternative à la Communauté pour certains pays.

Les propos du président français ne semblent cependant pas froisser les dirigeants hongrois qui apportent un soutien prudent à la proposition au cours de leurs entretiens avec le président Mitterrand. Mátyás Szűrös exprime ainsi la « *sympathie* » de la Hongrie à l'égard du projet dans la mesure où celui-ci tend à soutenir les changements en cours en Europe centre-orientale<sup>59</sup> tandis que le Premier ministre hongrois, Miklós Németh, dit « *apprécier la volonté de stabilité* »<sup>60</sup> contenue dans la proposition, tout particulièrement aux regards des questions des minorités et espère que l'idée « *facilitera le retour à l'Europe* »<sup>61</sup>. Enfin, Imre Pozsgay reconnaît que l'ambition revêt une « *réelle importance* »<sup>62</sup> dans le prolongement des accords d'Helsinki pour la sécurité du continent.

Lors de la conférence de presse commune Mitterrand estime que son idée répond bien à la demande hongroise « *d'institutionnaliser ses rapports avec les organisations européennes* »<sup>63</sup>, un raisonnement

---

<sup>55</sup> Entretien François Mitterrand-Mátyás Szűrös, 18 janvier 1990, cité par BOZO, Frédéric, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005. 346.

<sup>56</sup> Le Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP)

<sup>57</sup> MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-j, carton 26, France, 1990, document 00160/6, compte-rendu de la visite du président Mitterrand, entretien avec Imre Pozsgay, 23 janvier 1990.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-j, carton 26, France, 1990, document 00160/1, thèmes de discussions Mátyás Szűrös- François Mitterrand.

<sup>60</sup> MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-j, carton 26, France, 1990, document 00160/2, thèmes de discussions Miklós Németh-François Mitterrand.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-j, carton 26, France, 1990, document 00160/3, thèmes de discussions Imre Pozsgay- François Mitterrand.

<sup>63</sup> CADN, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), carton 228, « *Bilan de la visite du Président* », télégramme diplomatique, 20 janvier 1990.

« *accepté* » par les autorités hongroises qui, tout en reconnaissant qu'il faudra du temps, indiquent déjà que le rapprochement avec la Communauté deviendra l'un des objectifs de leur politique extérieure<sup>64</sup>.

Au final la Hongrie apporte son soutien politique au projet. Mátyás Szűrös indique que son pays est « *disposé à coopérer dans le progrès de cette idée de confédération européenne* »<sup>65</sup>, faisant ainsi de Budapest la première capitale européenne à prendre officiellement position en faveur de la proposition. Néanmoins, l'ambassadeur français en Hongrie, Pierre Brochand, prend le soin de souligner, dans un télégramme diplomatique en date du 20 janvier 1990, qu'en privé des questions ont été soulevées autour du projet, en particulier concernant le rôle de l'URSS au sein de la confédération mais aussi de l'articulation de la future institution vis-à-vis de la CSCE. En revanche, aucune remarque n'est présente concernant les rapports CEE-confédération, l'adhésion en elle-même n'étant pas encore, à l'époque, l'objectif central de la politique étrangère hongroise.

### ***L'intérêt marqué des médias hongrois.***

Si la réaction de la classe politique hongroise est globalement restée modérée face au projet, les médias locaux, eux, ont accordé une grande importance à l'idée du chef de l'État. Le président français est amplement questionné sur ce sujet le 15 janvier par la télévision hongroise<sup>66</sup> puis de nouveau le 17 par l'agence de presse *Magyar Távirati Iroda* (MTI)<sup>67</sup> et le journal socialiste *Népszabadság*. Interrogé sur les critiques que son projet a déjà commencé à susciter en Europe<sup>68</sup>, François Mitterrand ne semble pas troublé par la remarque et répond : « *On n'avait jamais non plus réuni une Communauté comme celle des Douze [...] donc, l'argument "on n'avait jamais vu" n'est pas un argument suffisant* ». Au cours de ces deux entretiens le président, comme face aux dirigeants hongrois, ne s'avance pas trop sur le contenu précis de son idée : « *le projet mérite discussion* »<sup>69</sup> reconnaît-il devant le journaliste de la télévision hongroise, précisant que « *la mission de*

---

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup> Agence France Presse (AFP), 19 janvier 1990.

<sup>66</sup> L'entretien, enregistré avant le départ de François Mitterrand pour Budapest, est diffusé lors de sa visite quelques jours plus tard.

<sup>67</sup> L'équivalent hongrois de l'Agence France-Presse (AFP).

<sup>68</sup> « *certains critiquent votre idée de confédération disant que c'est un peu idéaliste parce que cela n'a jamais réussi dans l'histoire de cette région de l'Europe* ».

<sup>69</sup> IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à la télévision hongroise, 15 janvier 1990.

*cette confédération sera extrêmement large : elle touche l'économie, la sécurité et unifie les États autour de quelques grands projets »<sup>70</sup> et « aura à se référer aux principes d'Helsinki »<sup>71</sup>.*

Néanmoins, une nouvelle fois, sur la question du lien entre la confédération et la CEE, il apparaît très clair quant à ses intentions, distinguant « *d'une part un premier cercle avec des institutions fortes et fermes, des disciplines, c'est la Communauté des Douze* » et d'autre part « *un deuxième cercle de démarches en commun, d'échanges de toutes sortes, de sécurité garantie entre les Douze et tous les autres qui sont prêts* », <sup>72</sup> c'est à dire la confédération. Le président rappelle que la CEE a un autre projet en cours : « *renforcer ses structures et lui donner un contenu de plus en plus dynamique pouvant aller jusqu'à la décision politique commune* »<sup>73</sup>. Dans ce contexte, il n'imagine pas une adhésion des pays de l'Est à la Communauté, préférant davantage envisager un partenariat privilégié mais en prenant tout de même le soin de préciser qu'il « *ne s'agit pas de substituer à la Communauté des Douze une vague confédération. Il s'agit d'une autre construction complémentaire* »<sup>74</sup>.

La presse hongroise semble globalement séduite par le projet du président. Le journal *Magyar Nemzet* estime que l'idée est « *d'une grande portée* »<sup>75</sup> et répond au « *rêve européen* » de la Hongrie tandis que le quotidien *Magyar Hírlap*, qui décrit le président français comme « *un homme d'État d'une grande force morale* »<sup>76</sup>, souligne la convergence des intérêts franco-hongrois autour de la proposition<sup>77</sup>.

### **Le maintien d'un « préjugé favorable » (1990-1991).**

#### ***Un raccourci vers la CEE malgré tout?***

Lors du déplacement de François Mitterrand en Hongrie, si le « *retour à l'Europe* » est déjà l'un des objectifs affirmés de la diplomatie hongroise, celui-ci ne passe pas encore nécessairement, dans l'esprit des dirigeants magyars, par une adhésion à la Communauté. Interrogé sur le projet mitterrandien lors d'une session de l'assemblée parlementaire du

---

<sup>70</sup> Magyar Nemzet, 18 janvier 1990

<sup>71</sup> IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à l'agence télégraphique hongroise (MTI) et au journal Népszabadság, 17 janvier 1990.

<sup>72</sup> IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à la télévision hongroise, 15 janvier 1990.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> Magyar Nemzet, éditorial du 18 janvier 1990.

<sup>76</sup> Magyar Hírlap, 18 janvier 1990.

<sup>77</sup> Magyar Hírlap, 20 janvier 1990.

Conseil de l'Europe<sup>78</sup> à Strasbourg dix jours après le passage du président français dans son pays, le Premier ministre hongrois, Miklós Németh, estime que : « *l'adhésion de la Hongrie à la Communauté et même l'idée d'une Europe entièrement réunifiée ne sont pas à l'ordre du jour dans un avenir prévisible* »<sup>79</sup> et que « *c'est dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe que la Hongrie entend procéder à des échanges de vues sur ce qui pourrait être 'la maison commune'* »<sup>80</sup>.

Au printemps 1990, après la victoire du parti de József Antall aux élections législatives d'avril, et la nomination de Géza Jeszenszky au poste de ministre des Affaires étrangères, les circonstances changent et l'adhésion à la Communauté devient l'objectif central de la nouvelle diplomatie hongroise. La nouvelle ministre française déléguée aux Affaires européennes, Élisabeth Guigou, reçue début février 1991 à Budapest par son homologue hongrois, se voit clairement indiquer ce changement d'orientation lors d'une longue entrevue: « *[notre] priorité absolue en politique étrangère est dorénavant l'adhésion aussi bien pour des raisons de politique intérieure, d'économie que de sécurité nationale* »<sup>81</sup>. Bruxelles apparaît désormais comme le point d'ancrage évident d'une Hongrie muée par une aspiration viscérale de retour à la normale au sortir d'un demi-siècle d'assimilation abusive de la part des soviétiques. Lucide, et « *sans illusion quant à sa [l'adhésion] proximité* »<sup>82</sup>, la Hongrie reste malgré tout convaincue que dans l'intervalle « *les formes d'associations les plus variées sont bonnes à prendre* »<sup>83</sup>. Dans cette optique la confédération – mais aussi le projet de Banque Européenne pour la Reconstruction et le Développement (BERD) – continuent d'être bien accueillis. Plus encore après qu'Élisabeth

---

<sup>78</sup> Institution pour laquelle la Hongrie a déposé, le 16 novembre 1988, par l'intermédiaire de son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Gyula Horn, une demande d'adhésion. A ce sujet voir : FÜLÖP, Mihály, « *L'adhésion de la Hongrie au conseil de l'Europe* », dans BITSCH, Marie-Thérèse, *Jalons pour une histoire du Conseil de l'Europe, Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg*, Éditions Peter Lang, Berne, 1997, 177-189.

<sup>79</sup> Conseil de l'Europe, Assemblée Parlementaire, Quarante et unième session ordinaire (quatrième partie), 29 janvier-2 février 1990, compte-rendu des débats, tome III, séances 22 à 29, pages 638, Strasbourg, 1990.

<sup>80</sup> A noter ici l'usage préférentiel des termes gorbatchevien de « *maison commune* » de la part du dirigeant hongrois, en lieu et place de l'idée de « *confédération* ».

<sup>81</sup> « *A magyar külpolitika abszolút prioritása az Európához való közeledésünk belpolitikai, gazdasági és nemzetbiztonsági okokból egyaránt* », traduction de l'auteur. MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-j, carton 25, France, 1991, entretiens d'Élisabeth Guigou en Hongrie (7-8 février 1991).

<sup>82</sup> CADN, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), carton 228, télégramme diplomatique, 15 janvier 1990.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*



Guigou a longuement insisté lors de son entretien avec Géza Jeszenszky sur le fait que « *la confédération n'est pas une voie de garage* »<sup>84</sup> mais une « *structure parallèle, un processus vers la Communauté* » prenant le soin d'ajouter que la Hongrie « *aurait sa place dans la CEE* » mais restant néanmoins très vague quant au calendrier : « *un jour* »<sup>85</sup>. Dans ce contexte, et ce jusqu'au début de l'été 1991, la diplomatie hongroise « *continue d'avoir un préjugé favorable* »<sup>86</sup> en direction du projet : au mieux l'institution jouera le rôle d'accélérateur en direction de la Communauté, au pire elle constituera une étape structurante du processus de retour à l'Europe.

Cette confiance affichée dans le projet ne signifie pas que la Hongrie n'a pas eu d'inquiétudes à l'égard du dessein mitterrandien au cours de la période 1990-1991. Quelques jours avant le déplacement à Paris du ministre hongrois des Affaires étrangères, l'ambassadeur Pierre Brochand indique au Quai d'Orsay que des interrogations subsistent coté hongrois « *quant aux modalités de participation des états en voie de reconstitution (URSS, Yougoslavie) dans le projet de confédération* »<sup>87</sup> et que Budapest se montre « *très désireuse de recevoir des informations supplémentaires sur nos intentions* »<sup>88</sup>.

Globalement, sur l'ensemble de la période 1990-1991, il n'est donc jamais inutile au cours des rencontres bilatérales de « *dissiper la crainte que ce nouveau cadre ne soit un substitut à l'élargissement de la Communauté* »<sup>89</sup> même si, ironiquement, « *les Hongrois n'excluent pas eux-mêmes [l'idée] que la confédération joue ce rôle à l'égard des pays moins préparés plus à l'est ou au sud* »<sup>90</sup>, un scénario pour lequel François Mitterrand a entrouvert la porte au cours du printemps 1991.

En visite à Paris au cours du mois de mai 1991 – pour ce qui constitue alors son cinquième déplacement officiel dans la capitale française en moins d'un an – le nouveau Premier ministre hongrois, József Antall, se voit exposer une version un tant soit peu renouvelée de la vision mitterrandienne du futur de la CEE et du rôle de la confédération. Certes, François Mitterrand maintient que

---

<sup>84</sup> MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-j, carton 25, France, 1991, entretiens d'Élisabeth Guigou en Hongrie (7-8 février 1991).

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> AN. 5AG4/CD 274, dossier 6, Visites de responsables politiques hongrois en France, entretiens, audiences. Note de Phillipe Bastelica pour le président, avril 1991.

<sup>87</sup> AMAE, série Europe, sous-série Hongrie (1991-1995), carton 7112, HON 12.4, Visite de Géza Jeszenszky à Paris, Télégramme diplomatique, 25 avril 1991.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> AN. 5AG4/CD 274, dossier 6, Visites de responsables politiques hongrois en France, entretiens, audiences. Note de Phillipe Bastelica pour le président, avril 1991.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

« *la Communauté ne peut pas fonctionner à 30 !* » estimant qu'« *elle a déjà trop de difficultés à résoudre avec ses problèmes internes* »<sup>91</sup> mais il concède qu'elle pourrait fonctionner « *à 15 ou 16* »<sup>92</sup>. Jugeant que « *l'économie, les mœurs, et l'histoire* » rapprochent la Hongrie de la CEE il indique au Premier ministre hongrois qu'il trouverait « *normal* » et « *très bien* » que la Hongrie « *devienne un jour membre de la Communauté* »<sup>93</sup>, une formulation temporellement vague qui avait déjà été employée par Élisabeth Guigou à Budapest. Pourtant, et c'est une première, au cours de cet entretien, François Mitterrand va plus loin et évoque un calendrier d'adhésion: « *D'abord l'Autriche et la Suède, ensuite il y en aura d'autres. Je n'y suis pas hostile, au contraire, mais il faut avoir conscience des délais. Par exemple pas avant 1993. Entre 1993 et 2000 on peut imaginer que l'Autriche, la Suède, la Hongrie et la Tchécoslovaquie vont rejoindre [la Communauté]* »<sup>94</sup>. Considérant « *qu'ensuite cela sera difficile pour la Yougoslavie et l'URSS* », le président français explique que c'est pour cela qu'il a « *imaginé la confédération, pour faire travailler tout le monde ensemble à égalité de dignité. Non pas à la place de la CEE, c'est complémentaire. Il faut partir de ce qui existe et imaginer la fin du siècle et le début du prochain* »<sup>95</sup>. Le contenu de cet échange séduit incontestablement József Antall qui se voit indiquer d'une part que son pays se verra offrir l'opportunité d'adhérer à la CEE à l'horizon de l'an 2000, et d'autre part que sa participation à la confédération ne sera en aucun cas un palliatif à l'intégration communautaire. Il est aisé de comprendre, dans ce contexte, la sympathie que la Hongrie a pu exprimer à l'égard de l'idée de confédération, et ce d'autant plus que Budapest estime en parallèle que le projet a la capacité de devenir un élément clé au sein d'une de ses autres priorités diplomatiques : la protection de ses minorités.

### ***Un moyen privilégié de règlement des questions de minorités ?***

A Budapest, François Mitterrand avait exprimé assez clairement le rôle que pourrait jouer la confédération dans le délicat dossier des minorités. Jugeant que « *les problèmes de nationalité paraissent*

---

<sup>91</sup> AN. 5AG4/CD 274, dossier 6, Visites de responsables politiques hongrois en France, entretiens, audiences. Entretien Mitterrand-Antall, notes de Pierre Morel, 21 mai 1991.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

*plus pressants encore que les problèmes économiques* »<sup>96</sup> il avait estimé que la confédération pouvait devenir un cadre de négociations diplomatiques dans lequel on trouverait des solutions aux pressantes questions ethniques et frontalières afin de : « *permettre le contrôle sinon le règlement de l'éveil des nationalités, les aspirations des minorités et le devenir des alliances militaires* »<sup>97</sup>. En réalité, ce que le président français craignait alors plus que tout c'était le retour à l'Europe émiettée de 1919<sup>98</sup>, la réapparition des violences en lisière de frontières mal dessinées, « *les effusions de sang* »<sup>99</sup> et « *l'effet de contagion* »<sup>100</sup> à toute l'Europe, à cette Europe que la France venait de passer près d'un demi siècle à reconstruire.

Face à ces dangers, Mitterrand avait évoqué la possibilité de créer « *un statut des minorités* »<sup>101</sup> et un « *droit des populations* »<sup>102</sup> et appelé à ne pas fermer les yeux sur les « *minorités lorsqu'elles sont opprimées* »<sup>103</sup>. La Hongrie qui compte alors près de 2,5 millions<sup>104</sup> de « *Magyars d'outre-frontières* »<sup>105</sup> ne peut que réserver un accueil chaleureux à une telle prise de position<sup>106</sup>. Le chef de l'opposition, József Antall, qui a remis au président français, la veille de ces déclarations, un mémorandum sur le statut des minorités hongroises, ravi, adresse une lettre de félicitations au chef de l'État<sup>107</sup>.

Six mois plus tard, c'est cette fois-ci en tant que Premier ministre que József Antall indique à François Mitterrand considérer « *avec de plus en plus d'intérêt l'idée de confédération* », « *surtout avec ce qui*

---

<sup>96</sup> LEGAULT, Albert (dir.), *Les six mois qui ont ébranlé le monde*, Presses de l'Université du Québec, Québec, 1991, 181.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> Il évoque déjà ce danger dans son discours du 31 décembre 1989.

<sup>99</sup> IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à la télévision hongroise, 15 janvier 1990.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> IFM, Conférence de presse de François Mitterrand sur l'ouverture de la Hongrie à l'Europe, le problème des minorités, les relations franco-hongroises et le socialisme démocratique européen, Budapest, 19 janvier 1990.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>104</sup> Environ 1,2 millions de Hongrois vivent en Roumanie, 450 000 dans ce qui constitue encore la Tchécoslovaquie, 300 000 en Yougoslavie et près de 150 000 en Ukraine. A ce sujet voir : BÉHAR, Pierre, « *Minorités hongroises* », *Politique Internationale*, numéro 60, 1993.

<sup>105</sup> Traduction littérale du terme hongrois « *határon túli magyarok* », c'est à dire les minorités hongroises à l'étranger.

<sup>106</sup> Elle sera beaucoup moins appréciée du côté de Bucarest, à ce propos voir notamment LACHAISE, Bernard, *Op.cit.*

<sup>107</sup> RUPNIK, Jacques, « *La France de Mitterrand et les pays de l'Europe du centre-est* », dans COHEN, Samy (dir.), *Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre Froide*, PUF, Paris, 1998, 189-222.

*se passe en Roumanie* »<sup>108</sup>. Le dirigeant hongrois fait alors référence aux violents affrontements inter-ethniques qui ont opposé, dans la ville de Târgu Mureş<sup>109</sup> en Roumanie, au cours du mois de mars 1990, la minorité hongroise de Transylvanie aux Roumains des villages alentours<sup>110</sup>, et qui se sont terminés dans le sang<sup>111</sup>. Dans cette optique József Antall estime que la confédération « *offrirait une claire perspective* » pour le règlement des questions ayant trait aux minorités « *même si on ne peut réaliser la chose tout de suite* »<sup>112</sup>.

**Conclusion : l'échec d'une « idée lancée trop tôt »**<sup>113</sup>.

### ***Un projet qui déplaît à une partie de la communauté internationale***

La Hongrie, malgré les inquiétudes qu'elle a légitimement pu avoir, s'est montrée globalement favorable au projet de confédération au cours de la période 1990-1991. Cette position de sympathie à l'égard de l'idée du président français n'a pas été partagée par tous les acteurs de la communauté internationale. Les États-Unis en particulier, soucieux de préserver leur tutelle sur le vieux continent, voient d'un très mauvais œil le dessein mitterrandien. Au cours de l'hiver 1990 et du printemps 1991 la diplomatie américaine s'emploie donc à saper la confédération « *en soufflant aux dirigeants d'Europe centrale que Mitterrand leur offre une institution au rabais pour retarder leur intégration dans la Communauté* »<sup>114</sup>. Si Budapest a été rassuré, en privé, face à ce scénario, il semble que l'argument porte plus profondément sur les autres pays de la zone<sup>115</sup>.

De son côté, l'Allemagne, qui est naturellement un partenaire essentiel à la mise en œuvre d'un projet d'une telle envergure, commence, elle aussi, à partir du printemps 1991, à exprimer des

---

<sup>108</sup> AN. 5AG4/CD274, dossier 6, compte-rendu de l'entretien François Mitterrand - József Antall, 22 juin 1990.

<sup>109</sup> Marosvásárhely en hongrois.

<sup>110</sup> A ce sujet voir par exemple : SALAT, Levente, ENACHE, Smaranda (dir.), *Romanian-Hungarian Relations and the French-German Reconciliation*, Cluj-Napoca, Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, 2004.

<sup>111</sup> Au moins cinq morts et plus de 200 blessés.

<sup>112</sup> AN. 5AG4/CD274, dossier 6, compte-rendu de l'entretien François Mitterrand - József Antall, 22 juin 1990.

<sup>113</sup> VEDRINE, Hubert, *Les mondes de François Mitterrand, A l'Elysee 1981-1995*, Fayard, Paris, 1996, 448

<sup>114</sup> MUSITELLI, Jean, *Op.cit.*

<sup>115</sup> Pour plus de détails voir : BOZO, Frédéric, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005.

« *réticences feutrées* »<sup>116</sup>, signe que la pression amicale de Washington a probablement fait son effet outre-Rhin mais peut-être également que, sur le fond, Berlin n'apprécie guère les manœuvres françaises dans son arrière-cour d'Europe centrale<sup>117</sup>. Enfin, la CEE qui vient de débiter une phase de consolidation<sup>118</sup> n'est elle-même guère encline à s'engager plus en avant dans cette ambition au long cours.

### ***Le fiasco de Prague***

François Mitterrand avait imaginé le lancement de son projet au cours d'une grande assemblée « *à l'image de 1948* »<sup>119</sup>, réunissant l'ensemble des pays d'Europe, y compris l'URSS, autour d'une même table. Le sommet – qui prend le nom d'Assises – doit se dérouler à Prague du 13 au 15 juin 1991 et réunir près de 150 personnalités issues de la société civile, du monde des affaires, des intellectuels, mais également des scientifiques, hommes politiques, et juristes de tous bords, européens, américains, canadiens et japonais. Mais la veille de l'ouverture le président français jette un froid. Interrogé par Radio France Internationale (RFI) sur la possibilité que la confédération soit le moyen de « *maintenir à la porte* »<sup>120</sup> de la CEE certains pays comme la Pologne ou la Tchécoslovaquie, François Mitterrand se défend tout d'abord : « *Surtout pas, non. Pourquoi ? Je ne décide rien pour les autres* »<sup>121</sup> avant d'admettre, comme il l'avait fait devant József Antall, que l'élargissement permanent de la CEE n'est pas la solution :

*« Je sais que ces pays [d'Europe centrale et orientale] voudraient bien entrer [dans la CEE]. S'ils le peuvent, j'en serai tout de suite d'accord mais ils ne sont pas en mesure de le faire [...] la Suède et l'Autriche sont des pays tout à fait préparés en raison de leur niveau de vie, de la réalité économique à entrer dans l'Europe du Marché commun. Peut-on en dire autant des pays anciennement communistes qui sont dans un état de délabrement*

---

<sup>116</sup> MUSITELLI, *Op.cit.*

<sup>117</sup> Officiellement l'Allemagne estime que la CEE et la CSCE sont probablement des outils suffisants pour accomplir les objectifs du président Mitterrand.

<sup>118</sup> Jean Musitelli estime qu'elle est alors « *au milieu du gué* ».

<sup>119</sup> Référence au congrès de La Haye qui avait rassemblé, du 7 au 10 mai 1948 près de 750 délégués venus de toute l'Europe et donné le coup d'envoi de ce que beaucoup considère comme les premiers moments du fédéralisme européen.

<sup>120</sup> IFM, Interview de François Mitterrand à Radio France Internationale le sur le projet de confédération européenne et la position de la France vis-à-vis de l'adhésion des pays de l'Est à la CEE, 12 juin 1991.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

*tout à fait inquiétant ?[...] Je pense que la Communauté a déjà quelque peine à régler ses problèmes internes à Douze et il y a un danger qui pèse sur elle, c'est que les grands nombres finissent par en changer la nature pour en faire simplement une zone de libre échange »<sup>122</sup>.*

Et c'est lorsqu'il évoque le calendrier que François Mitterrand – sans en avoir semble-t-il conscience – hypothèque les chances de succès de son projet : « *les pays de l'Est et puis quelques autres, qui se sont libérés de la tutelle soviétique [...] et qui ne peuvent pas accéder à la Communauté pour des raisons de fait et non pas parce que je ne le souhaite pas [...] [entreront] dans une phase intermédiaire qui peut durer des dizaines et des dizaines d'années* »<sup>123</sup>. Les propos choquent la majorité des dirigeants des PECO, accréditant le soupçon que la France cherche à différer indéfiniment leur adhésion.

Si au sortir des Assises, et malgré les déclarations malvenues du chef de l'État français, le projet n'est pas encore techniquement abandonné, le changement du contexte international – crise yougoslave, putsch du 15 août à Moscou, désagrégation de l'URSS, élaboration du traité de Maastricht – finit par reléguer le débat sur l'architecture paneuropéenne au second plan.

Lors de la venue de József Antall à Paris, en septembre 1991, à l'occasion de la signature du traité d'entente et d'amitié franco-hongrois<sup>124</sup>, il n'est plus question du projet lors des entretiens bilatéraux. Et si Mitterrand n'abandonne pas l'idée<sup>125</sup>, c'est par d'autres chemins que la Hongrie choisit de se rapprocher de la Communauté au cours des quatorze années suivantes<sup>126</sup>.

---

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>124</sup> AN. 5AG4/CD 274, dossier 6, visites de responsables politiques hongrois en France, entretiens, audiences. Visite de József Antall, 11 septembre 1991.

<sup>125</sup> Lors d'un sommet du Conseil de l'Europe, en octobre 1993, Mitterrand persiste : « *Pendant longtemps, j'ai pensé qu'il faudrait créer une Confédération des États démocratiques d'Europe : je le pense toujours* ». IFM, Allocution de François Mitterrand sur la construction européenne et la nécessité d'une institution rassemblant tous les États démocratiques européens, Conseil de l'Europe, Vienne, 8 octobre 1993.

<sup>126</sup> Un périple long et complexe qui débute en décembre 1991 avec la signature des accords d'associations entre la Hongrie et la CEE.

## ***Book review***





**József Krisztián Szalánczi**

**Fischer, Ferenc: *The „war after the War” 1919–1933. Evasion of the Versailles Treaty. The naval, aerial and military activity of the Weimar Republic in the countries of Ibero-America*, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest – Pécs, 2014. ISBN 978-615-5376-52-8**

Original title (in Hungarian): *A „háború utáni háború” 1919–1933. A versailles-i szerződés kijátszása. A weimari Németország haditengerészeti, légi és katonai aktivitása Ibero-Amerika országaiban*

### **Book Review**

**F**erenc Fisher, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Dean of the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Pécs<sup>1</sup> published his book *The „war after the War”* under the aegis of the Dialóg Campus Kiadó in 2014. The most important topics of Fischer’s field of research are the investigation of the secret German plans and activities in the interwar period which aimed at evading the restrictive terms of the Versailles Treaty. As an expert on the history of the German naval and aerial conceptions and military theories in the era of the Weimar Republic, the author examines the above-mentioned subjects first of all in the unique aspect of the German and Ibero-American relations between 1919 and 1933. In this interpretation, the main title of the book – *The „war after the War”* – alludes to Germany’s background-fighting with covered activities and developments in order to prepare to the next confrontation with her great rivals such as Great Britain and France.

The contents of this 576-page long (without the catalogue of maps) hardbound book based on the results of Fischer’s former researches and academic dissertation,<sup>2</sup> which was defended at the University of Pécs in 2002. The author analyses the German and Ibero-American relations in five great chapters, first of all in the view of the overseas cruises of the German warships such as *Berlin*,

---

<sup>1</sup> Beside the above-named titles, the author is the Director of the Institute of History and the Ibero-American Centre at the University of Pécs and also the leader of the Interdisciplinary Doctoral School.

<sup>2</sup> FISCHER, Ferenc: *„A háború utáni háború.” Az európai hatalmi rivalizálás dél-amerikai dimenziója Németország és Chile haditengerészeti és légi kapcsolatai tükrében (1919–1933)*, Academic dissertation, Pécs, 2002.

*Karlsruhe* and *Emden* in the 1920s and at the beginning of the 1930s, which served to train the cadets of the *Reichsmarine*,<sup>3</sup> to enhance the feeling of togetherness with the populous German origin emigrant communities in the region and also to revive the broken political connections with the germanophile – or at least non-hostile – South American governments and military leaders in Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina and Brasil. Beside the naval contexts, which are the dominant part of the book, Fischer accentuates also the German aerial activities in the area such as the rivalization between France and Germany from the middle of the 1920s for the establishment of the transatlantic flight routes.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the secret co-operations between the general staffs of the German and Chilean armies – with special emphasis on the bilateral visits of Wilhelm Heye, Head of the Army Command (*Heeresleitung*) of the Weimar Republic and Francisco Javier Díaz, General Inspector of the Chilean Army (*Ejército de Chile*) in 1929 – take place in a separate chapter.

Seemingly, the German activities in South America were only isolated attempts to evade the prohibitive paragraphs of the Versailles Treaty – but Fischer introduces this lesser-known segment of the interwar period in a wider context. Although the renunciation of the hated peace treaty and the start of the rearmament was impossible for Germany in the first decade after the Great War, leading German politicians and military experts strongly searched the possibilities to break the international isolation of the country, to create military doctrines and to collect experiences with the help of civilian developments which will be usable also to military goals in the future. The Ibero-American region – in this case inclusive of the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and partially also the Pacific Ocean – was an excellent area to perform these covered activities and manoeuvres. The author emphasizes the German attitude towards the Versailles Treaty: while Germany cannot be a real military power because of the heavy restrictions, try to get the leading positions in research and development. With the clever organisation of the transatlantic flight routes and permanent mail service,<sup>5</sup> the country

---

<sup>3</sup> *Reichsmarine* was the official denomination of the German Navy during the period of the Weimar Republic, before it changed to *Kriegsmarine* under the era of the Nazi Germany in 1935.

<sup>4</sup> Of course the naval and aerial contexts are inseparable in this case. The Germans used well-equipped research vessels as for example the *Meteor* to explore the hydrographic and meteorological features of the Atlantic Ocean in order to prepare to the organization of the transatlantic flights routes.

<sup>5</sup> The Germans solved the problem of the great distance between the coasts of Africa and South America with the help of so-called catapult ships, which were able

achieved a remarkable victory over France and became a great power – so-called *Luftverkehrsgrossmacht* in the German terminology – in the field of civil aviation. The systematic renewal of the German presence in South America – which was very significant before the Great War so much that some of the Ibero-American countries as for example Chile adopted German methods in the organisation of their own armies – began in the era of the Weimar Republic, but it continued undiminished after Hitler's rise to power in 1933. As an outlook, Fischer devotes a separate chapter to introduce the main events and the outgrowth of this topic between 1933–1939, during the rule of the Nazi regime.

In a wider sense, the main questions in the book revolve around the preparation for the so-called 'cruiser war' (*Kreuzerkrieg*) which was the dominant German naval strategy in the interwar period. This conception – which originated from German admirals and naval experts in the 1920s such as Paul Behncke and Erich Raeder – was applied in the first half of the Second World War while units of the *Kriegsmarine's* surface fleet were able to slip through the British blockade and operate on the high seas.<sup>6</sup> The strategy aimed to spread out the commercial war (*Handelskrieg*) to the World Ocean and tried to break the Allies – first of all British – sea supply lines between the colonies and their homeland. While the Royal Navy greatly outnumbered the German fleet, the only possibility to achieve success in a naval war against Great Britain was to commit fast-moving warships and auxiliary cruisers<sup>7</sup> alone or only in very small squadrons, which can attack the enemy merchant ships wherever in the Atlantic, Indian or Pacific Oceans – and also can leave the area before the arrival of any British reinforcements.<sup>8</sup> The main

---

to refill long-range flying boats as for example the hydroplanes of the Dornier aircraft manufacturer company in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and to start them again to their destination. They used these combination of swimming airplane bases and flying boats to organize the first official airmail service between Europe and the New World. After the testing, the first commercial mail flight was performed with the participation of the catapult ship *Westfalen* in 1934.

<sup>6</sup> Erich Raeder was the Chief of the *Marineleitung* – which was the Naval Command of the *Reichsmarine* in the era of the Weimar Republic – from 1928 and he was also the Commander-in-Chief of the *Kriegsmarine's* Naval High Command at the beginning of the Second World War.

<sup>7</sup> Auxiliary cruisers were well-equipped and armed former merchant ships, which operated also in the first half of the Second World War in order to disturb the allied supply lines and destroy or capture enemy merchant ships on the high seas.

<sup>8</sup> Of course another important segment of the *Handelskrieg* was the submarine warfare, but in contrast to Admiral Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder favoured the surface units of the *Kriegsmarine*. Nevertheless the Versailles Treaty strictly prohibited the

conception of the strategy was about dividing the enemy naval forces in the unimaginably large area of the World Ocean. As we mentioned above Fischer introduces first of all the secret German preparations – the covered activities and investigations during the Ibero-American training cruises and another special expeditions – from the first half of the 1920’s and not the cruiser war itself in the Second World War.

One of the main speciality of the volume that the author uses great amount of German references, quotations and maps to reveal the hidden details and contexts of the topic. After his former personal research in Germany, Fischer utilizes the archival sources of the various departments of the German Federal Archives (*Bundesarchiv*) in Freiburg, Bonn, Koblenz and Potsdam and also the documents of the State Archives in München, Stuttgart and Bremen.<sup>9</sup> The quotations – which take places beside the Hungarian translates also in their original language – give insight into the mentality of the German decision-makers and officers about the political situation after the Great War.<sup>10</sup> The author supports his thesis with maps and diagrams – we can find also a separate catalogue of maps at the end of the volume – and refers to top secret, secret and confidential German documents and also to contemporary propaganda materials or advertisements as for example the poster of the *Lufthansa* about the only 2-day long journey from Europe to South America with airplane. These unique contents borrow a very special feeling for the book.

As an improvement of an academic dissertation, the tone of the volume is specifically scientific and not so easily comprehensible in its wider context for an „outsider”. Nevertheless it can be very useful also for a reader who interested in this part of the modern history, but almost obligatory for a historian, who would like to carry out a research about the geopolitical activities of the Weimar Republic. There is only a bit room for improvement that – probably because of small editorial mistakes – we can observe some character mistypes in

---

construction of *U-boats* for Germany. Despite the ambitious German fleet construction program in the late 1930s, a decisive front to front battle against the Royal Navy threatened with heavy military catastrophe.

<sup>9</sup> Because of the structural reorganizations, nowadays some of the referred documents located in different departments of the German Federal Archives, for example in Berlin.

<sup>10</sup> The main title of the book also a quotation from a German pilot, who used this term „*Krieg nach dem Krieg*” („War after the War”) in 1925 about the rivalisation between Germany and France for the organisation of the Ibero-American flight routes. FISCHER, Ferenc: *A „háború utáni háború” 1919–1933. A versailles-i szerződés kijátszása. A weimari Németország haditengerészeti, légi és katonai aktivitása Ibero-Amerika országáiban*. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest – Pécs, 2014. 11.

the text – but in regard to the length of the book it is not so embarrassing. In contrast with this the book cover – where we can see a scanned version of an archive German document under the title „*Geheime Kommandosache*”<sup>11</sup> – alludes very well to the essence of the volume.

As a summary we can take cognizance of the fact that this book based on a very deep and well-founded research. Fischer analyses and introduces the topic in its full context and gives a full-scale overview about the main „frontlines” of this special war, which was fought in the background between Germany and the victorious powers of the Great War after the signing of the Versailles Treaty.

---

<sup>11</sup> It means in English literally „*secret command matter*”, also it is a top secret document in the German terminology.

József Krisztián Szalánczi: *Book Review*

Fischer, Ferenc: *The „war after the War” 1919–1933. Evasion of the Versailles Treaty. The naval, aerial and military activity of the Weimar Republic in the countries of Ibero-America*

***Authors of the volume***

BYRAPPA, Ramachandra, Assistant Professor, Eötvös Loránd University,  
Budapest

CZEFERNER, Dóra, PhD Student, University of Pécs

ENYEDI, Zsuzsanna, PhD Student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

FÖLDESSY, Gábor, PhD Student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

M. SZEBENI, Géza, Historian (PhD), Eötvös Loránd University,  
Budapest; Senior Minister Plenipotentiary

FAPP, Imre Professor, University of Debrecen

PICHONNIER, Christopher, PhD Student, Eötvös Loránd University,  
Budapest

SYLBURSKA, Aleksandra, PhD Student, University of Lodz

SZABÓ-ZSOLDOS, Gábor, Historian (PhD), Déri Múzeum, Debrecen

SZALÁNCZI, József Krisztián, PhD Student, University of Pécs

VILÁGI, Dávid, PhD Student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

WANNER, Michal, Historian (PhD), Department of Archives  
Administration and Records Management, Ministry of the Interior,  
Praha

ÖT KONTINENS, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történelmi Tanszék tudományos közleményei, № 2014/1.  
ELTE, BUDAPEST, 2016.