

# ÖT KONTINENS

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék  
közleményei*

Nº2012/2.



**Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem  
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST  
2013**



**ÖT KONTINENS**

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék  
közleményei  
N° 2012/2.*

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM  
Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST  
2013**

**FIVE CONTINENTS  
Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary  
History  
N° 2012/2.**

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY  
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES**

**BUDAPEST  
2013**

## ***Editorial Board***

### **President**

*BALOGH, András*, professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

### ***Members:***

*BODNÁR, Erzsébet* (Ph.D.), University of Debrecen, *BÚR, Gábor* (Ph.D.), Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *CADILHON, François*, professor, Michel de Montaigne University of Bordeaux 3, *ÇOLAK, Kamil* (Ph.D.), University of Eskişehir, *FIGEAC, Michel*, professor, Michel de Montaigne University of Bordeaux 3, *FISCHER, Ferenc*, professor, University of Pécs, *FRANK, Tibor*, professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *GULYÁS, László* (Ph.D.), University of Szeged, *HOREL, Catherine*, professor, University of Paris I, directress of research, CNRS, Paris, *LACHAISE, Bernard*, professor, Michel de Montaigne University of Bordeaux 3, *LEANCA, Gabriel* (Ph.D.), University of Iasi, *MAJOROS, István* (editor in chief), professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *MARUZSA, Zoltán* (Ph.D.), Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *NAGY, László, J.*, professor, University of Szeged, *PIMENTEL, Maria do Rosário*, professor, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, *RATHKOLB, Oliver*, professor, University of Vienna, *Élisabeth du RÉAU*, professor, University of Paris III - Sorbonne Nouvelle, *RIBEIROA, Maria Manuela de Bastos Tavares* professor, University of Coimbra, *SZÁVAI, Ferenc*, professor, Corvinus University of Budapest and University of Kaposvár, *SZÉKELY, Gábor*, professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, *TÓTH, Andrej* (Ph.D.), Silesian University in Opava, University of Economics in Prague, *USLU, Ateş* (Ph.D.), Istanbul Aydin University.

***Edited by István Majoros***  
***Contributing Editor: Anita Madarász***

# **ÖT KONTINENS**

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék  
közleményei*

N° 2012/2.

**EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM**  
**Bölcsészettudományi Kar**

**BUDAPEST**

**2013**

**FIVE CONTINENTS**

*Bulletins of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History*  
Nº 2012/2.

EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY  
Faculty of Humanities

BUDAPEST  
2013

© authors, 2013  
© editors, 2013

*Chief Editor:*  
István Majoros  
[majorosi49@t-online.hu](mailto:majorosi49@t-online.hu)

ISSN: 1589-3839  
*Published twice a year*

*Publishing House:*

Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék,  
Department of Modern and Contemporary History  
ELTE BTK  
1088 Budapest, Múzeum krt. 6-8.  
Tel.:+36-1-4855204

<http://tortenelemszak.elte.hu/index.php/ot-kontinens>  
<http://www.cceol.com/>

**Printing House:** ROBINCO KFT  
BUDAPEST

## Contents

<b>Foreword</b>	7
<b><i>A Hungarian emigrant periodical in Vienna</i></b>	9
<b>Kókai, Károly</b> Magyar Híradó	11
<b><i>Studies in French</i></b>	45
<b>Bouneau, Christophe</b> Circulations et échanges d'énergie électrique en Europe depuis 1945 : un levier méconnu de la construction européenne	47
<b>Garadnai, Zoltán</b> La visite de János Péter à Paris (11-12 janvier, 1965)	59
<b>Pichonnier, Christopher D.</b> 1989, année charnière du renouveau des relations franco-hongroises	73
<b><i>Studies on Latin-America</i></b>	89
<b>Fischer, Ferenc</b> La dimensión „vertical” para eludir el Tratado de Versalles: el papel de las expediciones meteorológicas marítimas de los alemanes por el Atlántico Sur (1924-1927) en el establecimiento de las líneas aéreas según el itinerario Alemania-América del Sur...	91
<b>Deák, Máté</b> Apreciación de los espacios aéreos de América del Norte y del Sur, desde el punto de vista de la geopolítica británica (1919–1939)	117
<b>Szalánczi, József Krisztián</b> International Relations of the German Antarctic Expedition 1938/39. Sovereignty dispute between Germany and Norway in the „Polar Desert”	131
<b>Gonçalves, Leandro Pereira</b> Plínio Salgado and integralism: Franco-Luso-Italian Relations	143
<b><i>History of the Mathematics Education in Hungary</i></b>	161
<b>Huszár, Kristóf</b> Creating a Culture of Problem Solving: The Hungarian Approach to Mathematics Education	163
<b><i>European Questions, 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries</i></b>	195
<b>Réfi, Attila</b> The Croatian-Slavonic Grenz (Border) Hussars' Role in the Campaigns 1793-94 against the Revolutionary France or the history of the cavalry for the Wurmser Freikorps	197
<b>Ghenghea, Mircea-Cristian</b> The Romanians and the Empire of 70 Million Germans. Debates and Reactions in the Romanian United Principalities' Press (1860-1861)	213

<b>Gulyás, László</b>	
State versus Nation. The political thought of Masaryk from „ <i>The Czech Question</i> ” to the „ <i>The problem of small nations...</i> ”	225
<b>African studies</b>	235
<b>Valkoun, Jaroslav</b>	
The British and Egypt in the 1890s	237
<b>Szabó-Zsoldos, Gábor</b>	
The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon and the South African Confederation – With a Special Emphasis on His Motives and the Factors Influenced His South African Conception	255
<b>European studies – 20<sup>th</sup> century</b>	271
<b>Zubor, Zalán</b>	
Operation Nemesis 1920-1923 – The Post-War Fate of the Perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide	273
<b>Pál, Zsombor Szabolcs</b>	
„ <i>This independence gives him force and stability</i> ” – The President’s Waning Powers in the Portugal New State through the Amendments to the 1933 Constitution	305
<b>Madarász, Anita</b>	
„ <i>Atoms for peace?</i> ” - Against the nuclear arms race in Great Britain with Hungarian sources and relations	317
<b>American studies</b>	335
<b>Cserháti, Ferenc</b>	
The History of Dominican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican Immigration to New York	337
<b>Pintz, Katalin</b>	
Assimilation and Acculturation of Armenian Americans	357
<b>Cserháti, Ferenc</b>	
The Role of the United States in the Dispute over the Falkland Islands	375
<b>Studies in Hungarian</b>	397
<b>Bodnár, Erzsébet</b>	
Az orosz diplomácia és a svéd/finn kérdés, 1801-1815	399
<b>Madarász, Anita</b>	
„ <i>Tetteket, ne szavakat!</i> ” – Megjegyzések a brit női választójogi mozgalom történetéhez, 1908-1914	415
<b>Cseh, Dániel</b>	
A japán-amerikaiak internálása: amerikaiak, vagy ellenséges idegenek?	427
<b>Mészáros, Zsolt</b>	
College Othniel: egy „ <i>magyar</i> ” iskola Kongóban	447
<b>Authors</b>	459



## ***Foreword***

Our review is ten years old, because the first volume of ÖT KONTINENS was published in 2003. This number and the next one in 2004 were published in Hungarian. The volume of 2005 was edited in French and the next volumes were published in foreign languages, first of all in English, in French and in German. Every volume contains texts in Hungarian too. From last year the review appears twice a year and you find abstracts and keywords in English to every study. ÖT KONTINENS is the review of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History (Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Humanities, Budapest). We try to publish studies dealing with the history of the five continents from the 18<sup>th</sup> century to the present. And we try to publish the studies of the colleagues from all over the world.

Nowadays it is not easy to find financial support to edit a review. This is true for us, for ÖT KONTINENS too. In spite of this we managed to publish every year the volumes of our review. These volumes are on the site of the Institut of History of our university - <http://tortenelemszak.elte.hu/index.php/ot-kontinens> - and you can find the volumes of the last year on this site too: [www.cceol.com](http://www.cceol.com) . I hope you can read the texts of the present volume on these sites as soon as possible.

Good reading!

Budapest, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2013.

Prof. dr. István Majoros



## ***A Hungarian emigrant periodical in Vienna***

Based on the Archives of the Hungarian State Security Agencies the author, Károly Kókai (University of Vienna) presents a Hungarian emigrant periodical that was published in Vienna (1957 – 1980).



**Károly Kókai**

## ***Magyar Híradó***

### **Abstract**

The emigrant periodical *Magyar Híradó* was published in Vienna between 1957 and 1980. It started as an information brochure for the nearly two hundred thousand refugees in the camps of Austria and became the longest existing migrant magazine at the doorstep of the Iron Curtain. That was the reason why it became a target of the Hungarian State Security Agencies too. Based on reports of the Historical Archives of these agencies it is possible to reconstruct a series of attempts to enlist the editors, most notably György Sebestyén and Gyula Klamár, as agents. A close reading of the documents allows us to understand the dynamics of the Cold War in Hungary and Austria in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

*Keywords:* Emigration, State Security Agencies, Cold War, newspaper, *Magyar Híradó*, György Sebestyén, Gyula Klamár

In der Periode des Kalten Krieges waren die Medien zentraler Platz der Austragung von ideologischen Kämpfen.<sup>1</sup> Das lässt sich an der Entwicklung des neuen Mediums Fernsehen beobachten. Genauso wie das Radio während des Zweiten Weltkrieges und das Internet nach 1989 die bevorzugten Medien wurden, war das nach 1945 das TV. *Magyar Híradó* [Ungarische Nachrichten], eine zwischen 1957 und 1980 in Wien erscheinende ungarischsprachige Zeitschrift, gehörte hingegen zu den Printmedien, zu einem Format also, dessen Etablierung lange zurücklag. Dieser mediengeschichtlichen Tatsache entsprach das Blatt auf kongeniale Weise. Es war weder technisch fortschrittlich, noch formal innovativ oder inhaltlich radikal. Es war geboren, um ein konkretes gesellschaftliches Problem, den Informationsbedarf von Flüchtlingen zu lösen. Wie sich zeigte, konnte es sich über zwanzig Jahre halten, weil es nach der Lösung des Ausgangsproblems weitere Aufgabenbereiche abdeckte, nämlich den Informationsaustausch zwischen West und Ost bzw. Ungarn in Ungarn und in der Emigration, weil es als eine ungarische Zeitung in der direkten Nachbarschaft des Eisernen Vorhanges eine symbolische Funktion hatte, und weil seine Mitarbeiter an seinem Erhalten großes Interesse hatten. *Magyar Híradó* entsprach dabei dem politischen Spektrum der Emigration. Die Partei der Kleinen Landwirte und die der Sozialdemokratie waren die zwei ideologischen Basen, die man

---

<sup>1</sup> Die Arbeit am Forschungsprojekt *Beiträge zur ungarischen Migration in Österreich im 20. Jahrhundert*, dessen Teilergebnis dieser Text ist, wurde finanziell durch die Aktion Österreich Ungarn (Projekt Nummer 82öu1) sowie durch die Unterstützung von Oliver Rathkolb (Universität Wien) und István Majoros (ELTE Budapest) ermöglicht.

geschickt vereinen konnte. Dabei (bzw. daher) positionierte sich *Magyar Híradó* politisch nicht zwischen diesen ideologischen Blöcken, sondern vereinte sie angesichts des gemeinsamen Feindes, des Regimes des in den sowjetischen Block eingegliederten Ungarns.

Natürlich waren in Österreich auch andere ungarische Medien vertreten. So gab es in Wien ein Büro des durch die USA finanzierten *Radio Free Europe*. Es existierten weitere Zeitschriften, so beispielsweise das Emigrantenblatt *Nemzetőr* (Nationalwacht)<sup>2</sup>. Es gab eine Reihe von emigrierten Journalisten, die hier arbeiteten. Und es gab auch Vertreter der offiziellen ungarischen Presse, so der Nachrichtenagentur *MTI* [Magyar Távirati Iroda], einen Korrespondenten von *Népszabadság* (Volksfreiheit) und einen Presseattaché an der ungarischen Botschaft.

Die Zeitschrift der sog. 1956er Migranten, die in Österreich am längsten erschien und die Situation am besten wiedergibt, ist also *Magyar Híradó*. Sie entspricht insofern am besten der Situation, da die Österreicher – also nicht nur die Migranten, sondern auch die Vertreter der aufnehmenden Gesellschaft – sie wollten und da sie sowohl inhaltlich als auch ästhetisch, so etwa mit ihrem Stil, den lokalen Anforderungen entsprach, also wiederum beide Seiten der Migration, d.h. die Migranten und ihre lokale Umgebung wiedergibt. Das war auch mit ein Grund, warum die ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste sich für sie interessierten.

Im Folgenden werden einige Schlüsselereignisse aus der Geschichte der Zeitschrift aufgrund von Akten aus dem Historischen Archiv der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste nacherzählt. Die so gewonnene Sicht ist natürlich eine einseitige und verzerrte, gestaltet durch eine ganze Reihe (oder eher: durch ein System) von Zufällen. Welche Akten dem Historischen Archiv übergeben wurden und demnach welche Akten der Forschungsarbeit zur Verfügung standen, ist das Ergebnis einer Reihe von systematischen Eingriffen und von Zufällen. Zahlreiche Dossiers – etwa die Vorgeschichte der in diesem Aufsatz behandelten Personen betreffend – gingen im Zuge des 1956er Aufstandes bzw. auch im Zuge der Wende von 1989 verloren, nicht mehr aktuelle Dossiers wurden (teilweise aus Platzgründen) vernichtet etc. Zugleich handelt es sich hierbei um etwas, was zeithistorisch besonders interessant ist. Damit kann man die österreichisch-ungarische Geschichte von zweieinhalb Jahrzehnten überblicken.

Die Zeitschrift *Magyar Híradó* ist ungarisch erschienen, die Tätigkeit der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste war grundsätzlich auf Ungarn bezogen. Man interessierte sich für die im Ausland lebenden Landesgenossen und ehemaligen Landesgenossen, insofern deren Tätigkeit für Ungarn eine Bedeutung hatte. Da jedoch diese Tätigkeiten in Österreich passierten, geht es natürlich auch um Österreich. Und zwar um Aspekte der österreichischen Geschichte, die meist übersehen und deren historische Erforschung vernachlässigt wird. Migrationsgeschichte aus dem Blickwinkel des Landes, in das migriert wurde, ist

---

<sup>2</sup> Erschien bis 1963 in Österreich, nachher in der BRD.

nicht allein eine Ergänzung für die Landesgeschichte, sondern rückt die internationalen Aspekte in den Vordergrund, und zwar aus der Perspektive von denen, die als Fremde angesehen und behandelt werden. Wie auch die nachfolgenden Ausführungen zeigen, war die ungarische Emigration in Österreich freilich auf vielfache Weise mit – teilweise prominenten – Österreichern und mit österreichischen politischen und gesellschaftlichen Organisationen sowie mit österreichischen Medien in Kontakt, die so auch für die ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste eine Bedeutung bekamen. Zu den innenpolitischen Angelegenheiten von Ungarn gehörte natürlich auch das eigene Image im Ausland, daher waren die ungarischen Behörden in Österreich einerseits besonders vorsichtig und zurückhaltend und andererseits an einer effektiven Arbeit interessiert. Dieser Text wurde also nicht allein aus dem Grund deutsch geschrieben, weil er ein Beitrag zu einer größeren wissenschaftlichen Diskussion sein will, sondern auch, um ihn damit für österreichische Leser auch dann zugänglich zu machen, wenn sie kein Ungarisch beherrschen und so die hier übersetzten Quellen im Original für sie nicht zugänglich sind.

Im Folgenden wird ausführlich aus Akten der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste zitiert. Das hat natürlich den Grund, hier zeitgeschichtliche Dokumente vorzustellen, die historisch relevant sind. Auf möglichst vollständige Wiedergabe wird aus dem Grund Wert gelegt, weil so ein genaueres Bild darüber gemacht werden kann, wie die Staatssicherheitsdienste arbeiteten. So wird erst verständlich und nachvollziehbar, was, warum und wie passierte, können also die einzelnen Ereignisse interpretierbar gemacht und in ihren historischen Zusammenhang gebracht werden. So wird klar, was es bedeutet, dass die Staatssicherheitsdienste auf eine mit den nationalen und internationalen Gesetzen sowie mit den Allgemeinen Menschenrechten nicht zu vereinbarende Weise agierten. Es geht also keinesfalls darum, die Opfer des Kalten Krieges nochmals zu Opfern zu machen, indem man Details ihrer privaten Leidensgeschichte ausbreitet. Es geht um die Aufarbeitung einer Epoche zu einer Zeit, als diese Epoche noch auf vielfache – so unvermeidlich auch auf persönliche – Weise lebendig und wirksam ist.

### ***Bécsi Magyar Híradó***

Die Zeitschrift *Bécsi Magyar Híradó* erschien ab dem 11. Januar 1957 zweimal wöchentlich auf acht Seiten, herausgegeben vom Österreichischen Nationalkomitee für Ungarn zusammen mit dem Österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbund. Sie war also repräsentativ in dem Sinne, dass hinter ihm die Vertreter einer breiten österreichischen Basis gestanden haben. Im Österreichischen Nationalkomitee für Ungarn waren 26 Hilfsorganisationen vertreten. Die erste Redaktionsadresse war Wien I. Fleischmarkt 3-5. Die Zeitschrift bestand bis Anfang 1980, als sie mit dem Tod ihres letzten Chefredakteurs, Gyula Klamár, eingestellt wurde.

Die leitenden Redakteure von *Bécsi Magyar Híradó* waren Pál Szöllősy von

Anfang bis Mitte 1957, Ferenc Ilosvay bis Mitte 1959, dann György Sebestyén und schließlich ab Frühjahr 1962 Gyula Klamár. Der Mitarbeiter, der am längsten dabei war, hieß József Fóti.

Pál Szöllősy, der erste Redakteur der *Bécsi Magyar Híradó*, beschreibt unter Verwendung des Pseudonyms Szabolcs Paál die Entstehung der Zeitschrift nach fünf Jahren so<sup>3</sup>: Szöllősy war erst seit kurzer Zeit in Wien, als er am 14. Dezember 1956 von Antal Reinprecht, einem ebenfalls nach Österreich emigrierten ungarischen Bekannten, das Angebot bekam, dass er dem Präsidenten der „Ungarnhilfe“ vorgestellt wird. Am nächsten Tag, dem 15. Dezember 1956 besuchten beide Otto Molden in dessen Wohnung in Döbling. Molden berichtete über Probleme mit den ungarischen Flüchtlingen, dass man mit der Unterbringung Schwierigkeiten hat und dass diese

*über die Ereignisse nicht ausreichend informiert sind, ihre überwiegende Mehrzahl nicht Deutsch kann und die österreichischen Blätter nicht versteht.*<sup>4</sup>

Molden schlug vor, ein ungarischsprachiges Blatt herauszugeben. Szöllősy sollte an der Redaktion mitarbeiten. Zwei Wochen später fand die erste Redaktionssitzung in einem Büro mit der Adresse Fleischmarkt 3 statt. Der organisatorische Teil war bereits geklärt.

*An dem Tag, also am 3. Januar 1957, habe ich die Mitarbeiter der zukünftigen Redaktion kennengelernt. Und an demselben Tag habe ich erfahren, dass das wöchentlich einmal zu erscheinende Blatt, das innen- und außenpolitische sowie ungarbezogene Berichte und die Flüchtlinge informierende Mitteilungen bringen wird, mich als Redakteur anstellen will.*<sup>5</sup>

Es waren fünf zukünftige Mitarbeiter anwesend. Am 7. hat man angefangen zu arbeiten. Die erste Ausgabe war für den Abend des 10. geplant.

Szöllősys Erinnerungen an die Entstehung der ersten Nummer der Zeitschrift werden von József Fóti, einem der Mitarbeiter, ergänzt.<sup>6</sup> Der Österreichische Gewerkschaftsbund organisierte im November 1956 ein Informationsservice für Flüchtlinge. Es wurden Informationen auf Tonband aufgenommen und diese in den Lagern abgespielt bzw. wöchentlich das von Fóti redigierte *Tájékoztató* [Mitteilungsblatt] publiziert. Am Beispiel von *Tájékoztató* ist dann die Idee gekommen, durch den ÖGB und das Nationalkomitee für Ungarn eine Zeitschrift

---

<sup>3</sup> Szabolcs PAÁL: *Hogyan született a Magyar Híradó* (Wie wurde Magyar Híradó geboren), Magyar Híradó 20. Januar 1962 S. 3f. Alle angeführten Zitate wurden vom Autor dieses Aufsatzes übersetzt.

<sup>4</sup> A. o. a. O.

<sup>5</sup> A. o. a. O.

<sup>6</sup> József FÓTI: *Az osztrák szakszervezetek segítségével* (Die Hilfe der österreichischen Gewerkschaften), Magyar Híradó 20. Januar 1962 S. 4.



herauszugeben. Finanziert werden sollte das Unternehmen durch den ÖGB (mit 80.000 Schilling), das Nationalkomitee („mit einem größeren Betrag“) und der UNO (10.000 Dollar). Bei der Gründung war unter den Mitarbeitern Fóti der einzige professionelle Journalist.

Die Zeitschrift hatte während ihres 23-jährigen Bestehens einige Krisen zu verkraften, denen sie durch entsprechende Anpassungen begegnete. Die erste Änderung trat ein, als die 1956er Flüchtlingswelle vorbei war. Da der Großteil der Ungarn von Österreich weitergewandert ist und die hier gebliebenen genug deutsch gelernt haben, um sich aus der lokalen Tagespresse zu informieren, war der ursprüngliche Zweck der Publikation nicht mehr gegeben. Ab dem Jahrgang II. Nr. 23 vom 7. Juni 1958 heißt die Zeitschrift *Magyar Híradó*, herausgegeben von Fritz P. Molden, Neue Wiener Presse Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H.

Die nächste große Änderung erfolgte mit dem Jahreswechsel 1961/1962.

*Fritz P. Molden, der bisherige Herausgeber von Magyar Híradó (...) hat seine Wiener Tageszeitungen, Die Presse, den Express, die Abend-Zeitung und die Wochen-Presse anderen übergeben und hat seine Kräfte im Aufbau des größten Druckereiunternehmens von Österreich konzentriert. (...) Es ist die Frage aufgetaucht, ob das Blatt auch in 1962 erhalten bleibt. (...) Wir haben uns entschieden, dass Magyar Híradó wir, die Redakteure selbst, herausgeben werden.<sup>7</sup>*

Ab der Nummer vom 21. April 1962 ist der Eigentümer der Magyar Újságírók Bécsi Köre [Wiener Kreis der Ungarischen Journalisten], dessen Vorsitzender Eugen-Géza Pogány ist. Chefredakteur ist Gyula Klamár, Redakteure sind György Sebestyén und József Fóti. Verantwortliche Redakteurin ist nach wie vor Edith Vasváry.<sup>8</sup> Nicht nur der Eigentümer, auch die Erscheinungsform änderte sich. *Magyar Híradó* erschien bis November 1962 als Wochenzeitschrift. Am 23. Juni 1962 wird angekündigt,<sup>9</sup> dass die Zeitschrift während der Sommermonate monatlich einmal, dafür aber umfangreicher und bunter erscheinen wird. Ab November 1962 erscheint sie nun als Monatsmagazin deklariert.

Zeichen der Turbulenzen und Neuorientierungen sind auch Adressenänderungen. Mit dem 1. Oktober 1963 übersiedelt die Redaktion aus dem Pressehaus (Fleischmarkt 3-5) „in die alten Redaktionsräume“ (Liebenberggasse 7). Am 1. April 1965 teilt *Magyar Híradó* seinen Lesern mit, dass die Redaktion aus dem Pressehaus in der Muthgasse Nr 2. in die Köllnerhofgasse 5 übersiedelt. Der Druck erfolgt nach wie vor in der Fritz Molden Großdruckerei und Verlag im Pressehaus.

Edith Vasváry, die verantwortliche Redakteurin der Zeitschrift ist am 4. November 1968 verstorben. Das Amt hat sie nominell ausgeübt, wie im Nachruf<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Magyar Híradó 6. Januar 1962 S. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Magyar Híradó 21. April 1962 S. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *Olvasóinkhoz* (An unsere Leser), Magyar Híradó 23. Juni 1962 S. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Magyar Híradó 1. Dezember 1968.

festgehalten wird: Da das österreichische Pressegesetz das verlangt, musste bei der Zeitschriftengründung eine österreichische Staatsbürgerin das Amt übernehmen. Vasváry war auch Journalistin, arbeitete nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg bei verschiedenen Wiener Zeitungen.

Dezső Peéry's *Jobb egy kis mécseset táplálni...* (Es ist besser eine kleine Flamme zu nähren ...) <sup>11</sup> ist einer der seltenen Texte in der Zeitschrift, wo ein Mitarbeiter darüber schreibt, was das Schreiben für *Magyar Híradó* für ihn bedeutet. Wie aus diesem Text ersichtlich: dies ging weit darüber hinaus, was in den einzelnen Nachrichten und Artikeln stand. Das Wesentliche war die symbolische Bedeutung, dass also das freie Wort möglich ist und dass man in der Emigration ist, weil man durch Zufälle erstens die sog. Rákosi Periode, also den Stalinismus in Ungarn, zweitens den Aufstand und drittens die Flucht überlebte und weil man in der Emigration auch nicht verloren ging. Und das ist auch das, was das sonst schwer verständliche Pathos des Textes selbst erklärt.

In der Ausgabe vom 1. Januar 1973 wurde von Gyula Klamár ein ausführlicher offener Brief über *Magyar Híradó* abgedruckt. <sup>12</sup> Klamár verteidigt das Blatt unter Berufung auf die widersprüchliche globale Situation – offenbar war die Frage, inwiefern die Zeitschrift eine Existenzberechtigung hat und was die Aufgabe sei, zu drängend, nicht zuletzt in finanzieller Hinsicht.

Am 4. Februar 1973 stirbt József Fóti, der von Anfang an dabei und seit dem Tod Vasvárys der verantwortliche Redakteur war. Sein Posten bleibt unbesetzt, Klamár firmiert weiterhin als Chefredakteur.

*Magyar Híradó* kämpfte während so gut wie seiner ganzen Geschichte mit finanziellen Problemen. Mit einiger Regelmäßigkeit erschienen die Aufforderungen, dass die Abonnenten ihre Rückstände bezahlen sollten oder die Ankündigungen, dass der Verkaufspreis der Zeitschrift erhöht werden musste. Die vorhin erwähnten Texte von Peéry und Klamár widmeten sich auch der Aufgabe, das Lesepublikum an seine finanziellen Verpflichtungen zu erinnern.

Am 1. April 1977 teilte die Redaktion in einer kurzen Notiz mit dem Titel *Olvásóinkhoz* (An unsere Leser) mit: Die Aprilnummer ist die letzte, die vom Pressehaus hergestellt wird. Hier wird auch bekanntgegeben, dass im März 1977 ein Redaktionskomitee gewählt wurde, dessen Präsident Tibor Hám ist. Hám, von Beruf Arzt, war nach 1945 ein aktiver Politiker der Kleine Landwirte Partei, im Zuge der politischen Prozesse gegen seine Partei verbrachte er neun Monate im Gefängnis. Seit 1948 lebt er außerhalb Ungarns, zunächst in Frankreich und seit 1951 in den USA.

Wie es am 1. Mai 1977 heißt: Der neue *Magyar Híradó* wird in der Druckerei Herold hergestellt.

Im April 1979 wird aus Anlass eines Leserbriefes <sup>13</sup> kurz darüber nachgedacht, was die Aufgaben von *Magyar Híradó* seien. Die Redaktion, also Gyula Klamár,

<sup>11</sup> Dezső PEÉRY: *Jobb egy kis mécseset táplálni...*, *Magyar Híradó* 1. April 1971 S. 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Nyílt válasz egy jóindulatú kritikusknak* (Offene Antwort an einen gutwilligen Kritiker), *Magyar Híradó* 1. Januar 1971 S. 3.

<sup>13</sup> *A szerkesztőség megjegyzése* (Anmerkung der Redaktion), *Magyar Híradó* 1. April 1979 S. 5.

versucht in die Richtung zu argumentieren, dass es um eine Schnittstelle zwischen West und Ost, um Internationalität und so um das Vorwärtsbringen der Nation ginge. Die diesbezüglichen Entwicklungen konnten aber nicht längerfristig verfolgt werden: Die letzte Ausgabe erschien am 1. Januar 1980. Sie enthält mehrere Artikel über die Zeitschrift selbst, so von Sári Juhász *A Híradó krónikája*<sup>14</sup> (Die Chronik der Híradó), G.P. *Requiem egy újságért*<sup>15</sup> [Requiem für eine Zeitschrift] und Tibor Hanák *A Hírmondótól a Híradóig*<sup>16</sup> (Vom Hírmondó zum Híradó<sup>17</sup>).

Hanák stellt fest, dass Klamár eigentlich kein Emigrant sei – was tatsächlich wahr ist, weil er 1957 auswanderte und nicht flüchtete. Was Hanák allerdings nicht zu wissen scheint, weil er behauptet, Klamár wäre „1956 geflüchtet“. Laut Hanák sei Klamár kein Emigrant, weil er sich nicht für die Fraktionskämpfe der Migration interessierte, sondern unabhängig war. Hanák stellt dabei *Magyar Híradó* in die Reihe der in Wien produzierten ungarischen Literatur und Zeitschriften der letzten zweihundert Jahre.

Juhász schließlich beschreibt etwa dasselbe was Szöllőssy und Fóti auch mitteilten. Otto Molden, der Präsident des Österreichischen Komitees für Ungarn und Fritz Klemmer [richtig: Klenner], der Generalsekretär des ÖGB, haben die Zeitschrift ins Leben gerufen. In der Reihenfolge der Chefredakteure weicht sie von den aus anderen Quellen stammenden Informationen ab. Ihrer Meinung nach wäre August 1957 bis 1958 Sebestyén der Redakteur gewesen, auf ihn folgte für ein Jahr Ilosvay. Die verantwortlichen Redakteure waren Ilse Barcata, Edit Vasváry, József Fóti – und anschließend wohl Gyula Klamár, was hier nicht erwähnt wird. Mitglieder der Redaktion waren bis 1964 György Sebestyén, bis 1968 Eugen-Géza Pogány und bis 1972 József Fóti. Nach 1972 arbeitete Klamár alleine.

Das Impressum der letzten Ausgabe weist den Sohn des verstorbenen Redakteurs, István Klamár, als Chefredakteur aus. Laut Ernő Deák<sup>18</sup> wurden über die Fortsetzung des Blattes Gespräche geführt. Was jedoch als Fortsetzung angesehen werden könnte, erschien – und erscheint bis heute – unter einem anderen Namen als *Bécsi Napló* (Wiener Tagebuch).

### ***Die ersten zwei Redakteure: Pál Szöllőssy und Ferenc Ilosvay***

Über die ersten zwei Redakteure, Pál Szöllőssy und Ferenc Ilosvay, befinden sich im Historischen Archiv der Ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste auffallend wenig Informationen. Der Grund dafür dürfte sein, dass die Behörde nach dem Oktober 1956 völlig überfordert und zugleich ihre Arbeit sehr umständlich war. Bei den Aktenstücken über die weiteren Mitarbeiter, auf die weiter unten eingegangen

---

<sup>14</sup> Sári JUHÁSZ: *A Híradó krónikája*, Magyar Híradó 1. Januar 1980 S. 2.

<sup>15</sup> G.P.: *Requiem egy újságért*, Magyar Híradó 1. Januar 1980 S. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Tibor HANÁK: *A Hírmondótól a Híradóig*, Magyar Híradó 1. Januar 1980 S. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Der Titel bezieht sich auf zwei ungarischsprachige Zeitschriften in Wien, auf *Magyar Hírmondó* 1789-1803 und *Magyar Híradó* 1957-1980.

<sup>18</sup> Der Chefredakteur von *Bécsi Napló* in einem Gespräch am 10. Dezember 2010.

wird, ist klar sichtbar, dass bis eine Information ihren Niederschlag in einem Akt fand, oft Monate vergingen. Erst nachher hat man aufgrund dieser Information in der Zentrale in einer Besprechung darüber verhandelt, ob sie für konkrete Interventionen herangezogen werden wird, also man die Spur verfolgt oder die Information für eine Aktion verwendet. In beiden Fällen wurde anschließend die Vorgangsweise ausgearbeitet, diese nach Wien übermittelt, wo der zuständige Staatssicherheitsdienstoffizier seinem Agenten beim nächsten Treffen den Plan mitteilte. Ob etwas überhaupt und was genau vom Agenten unternommen wurde, wurde frühesten beim nächsten Treffen dem Offizier mitgeteilt, der darüber einen Bericht verfasste und diesen nach Budapest übermittelte. Erst dann gelangte diese Information in Form einer Aktennotiz ins Dossier.

Laut eines Berichts des Informanten Kerekes führte eine fehlgeschlagene Zeitungskampagne zum Rücktritt Szöllösys.

*Der sich mit Politik beschäftigende Anwalt [also Szöllösy] lernte im Juni 1957 Géza Forbáth, einen angeblichen ehemaligen Journalisten von Budapest kennen, der der Keiler von „General“ Kovács war. „General“ Kovács kam aus der Dominikanischen Republik angereist nach Österreich, um 4–5 Tausend ungarische Landwirte in den mittelamerikanischen Staat zu bringen. Kovács wurde vom Präsidenten Trujillo beauftragt und hat Forbáth bestochen, dass er im Blatt die Dominikanische Republik preisende Artikel unterbringen lässt. Forbáth lud den Redakteur Szöllösy ins Restaurant Hübner ein und überredete ihn, die Artikel zu bringen. Aufgrund der „Kovács-Aktion“ sind bald 400–500 Ungarn ins Land vom Trujillo aufgebrochen, wo sie unter die schlimmsten Bedingungen geraten sind. Es kam ein Brief nach dem anderen, das Flüchtlingskomitee der UNO war gezwungen, sich mit der Sache zu beschäftigen, und die Ungarn wurden nach Österreich zurückgebracht. Szöllösy hat, vielleicht aus Angst vor deren Rache, das Blatt verlassen, bekam Studienbeihilfe in der Schweiz, fuhr nach St. Gallen, wo er sich an der Handelshochschule einschrieb.<sup>19</sup>*

Eine andere Darstellung desselben Sachverhalts:

*Pál Szöllösy (...) dissidierte<sup>20</sup> im Dezember. Nach seiner Flucht ist er einer der Gründer der Zeitschrift Magyar Híradó, anschließend bis ca. Sommer 1957 Chefredakteur. Er hatte eine vertrauliche Beziehung zu Otto und Fritz Molden. Entsprechend der Information vom Agenten Kerekes D[reck]n[ame] hat Szöllösy die Hetze auch dann verachtet und*

<sup>19</sup> Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történelmi Levéltára (Historisches Archiv der Staatssicherheitsdienste) im Weiteren ÁBTL 3.2.4 K 173/1 S. 125, undatiert, ca. März 1960.

<sup>20</sup> Dissidieren war der ungarische Ausdruck für das illegale Verlassen des Landes bzw. für den illegalen Auslandsaufenthalt.

*abgelehnt, als er diese in seinem Blatt publizierte (...). In 1957 hat er, aus Rücksicht auf seine Eltern, die damals noch in Ungarn lebten, auf seine Chefredakteurstelle bei Magyar Híradó verzichtet und sich in der Schweiz niederlassen.<sup>21</sup>*

Das Dossier von Ferenc Ilosvay enthält 45 Seiten, ist also im Vergleich relativ dünn. Geführt wurde es zwischen 1958 und 1964, ab 1960 beschäftigte man sich mit Ilosvay nicht mehr – bzw. nicht im Rahmen der Arbeit, für die dieses Dossier angelegt wurde, weil er nach England übersiedelte. Am Anfang wird festgehalten

*Ferenc Ilosvay (...) dissidierte Ende 1956 nach Österreich, nach Wien. Im Juni 1957 wurde Ilosvay durch die Initiative von Otto und Fritz Molden (die Eigentümer von Die Presse) zum Chefredakteur von Bécsi Magyar Híradó. Das Blatt war stark klerikal eingestellt.<sup>22</sup>*

Eine interne Datensammlung hat sich bald ergeben

*Ferenc Ilosvay wurde nach meiner Erinnerung in 1948 mit Erpressung (pressziós alapon<sup>23</sup>) angeworben. Die Anwerbung geschah auf kirchlicher Linie<sup>24</sup>. Er hat den Decknamen „Vándor“ bekommen. Als er auf seinen Onkel (ein hoher katholischer Geistlicher) abgestellt wurde (mikor nagybátyjára állítottuk rá), ist er zum Verräter geworden.<sup>25</sup>*

Der Agent mit dem Decknamen Kövi berichtet im Januar 1958 (der Bericht ist ohne Datum, findet sich aber in einem Konvolut aus dieser Zeit) über Bécsi Magyar Híradó folgendes:

*Das Blatt wurde bald nach der Revolution gegründet, an seinem Zustandekommen waren der Österreichische Gewerkschaftsrat, das Österreichische Nationalkomitee für Ungarn und die hiesige Vertretung der UNO beteiligt.– Die Löhne wurden vom Nationalkomitee (dies ist ein Presse-Interesse) gedeckt, die restlichen Zahlungen wurden vom Gewerkschaftsrat übernommen, und die UNO gab mehrmals, insgesamt 40.000 Dollar. Mit Ende dieses Jahres<sup>26</sup> sind das Gewerkschaftskomitee und das Nationalkomitee ausgetreten*

---

<sup>21</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4 K 173/2 S. 377 nicht geordnete Aktenstücke (Szállás anyag).

<sup>22</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-51 S. 2, Anfang 1958.

<sup>23</sup> Das Wort presszió bzw. der Ausdruck pressziós alapon existiert im Ungarischen außer in diesem Zusammenhang nicht; Erpressung würde zsarolás heißen müssen; eine „korrekte“ Übersetzung wäre hier daher „Pressio“ bzw. „auf der Grundlage von Pressio“, also ein Wort bzw. ein Ausdruck, das bzw. der im Deutschen nicht vorkommt.

<sup>24</sup> „Linie“ im Sinne von „Sachbereich“.

<sup>25</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4.K-51 S. 4f., Anfang 1958.

<sup>26</sup> Also wohl Ende 1957, und daher ist es anzunehmen, dass Kövi an dem Bericht, den er im Januar 1958 ablieferte, längere Zeit schrieb.

*(obwohl ihre Eintragung beim Blatt blieb), die Angestellten des Verlages wurden in den Status der Presse übernommen, die Redakteure wurden vorübergehend bis zum 15. Juli 1958 unter Vertrag genommen, man will innerhalb dieses halben Jahres sehen, ob das Blatt Erfolg hat, dass es sich lohnt, es zu behalten und hat so die eventuellen Verluste des halben Jahres in Kauf genommen. Das Blatt erscheint in einer bedeutenden Auflage, Abonnenten gibt es aber weniger als 200, Einzelexemplare wurden ca. 1.000 verkauft, den Rest haben sie unter den Ungarn gratis verteilt.–*

*Die Gratisverteilung wurde eingestellt, jetzt versuchen sie Abonnenten zu finden, bisher ohne großen Erfolg, weil die Zahl der bisherigen Abonnenten – die bedeutenden Schweizer auch eingerechnet – ist nicht mehr als 1.000, pro Auflage werden jetzt 2.000 Exemplare verkauft, was das Blatt nicht erhalten kann.*

*Das Blatt befindet sich im Presse-Palais (I. Fleischmarkt 3–5) im Halbstock in zwei kleinen Räumen. Chefredakteur ist Pál Szöllösy, der aber nicht in Österreich, sondern in der Schweiz, in St. Gallen studiert und seine Artikel von dort schickt.– Er ist ca. 30 Jahre alt, begabt, von seiner Vergangenheit weiß ich nichts.– Der jetzige Führer ist Ferenc Ilosvay, Redakteur des Szabad Szó [Freies Wort], alter Journalist, von der Bauernpartei<sup>27</sup>, schreibt gut, von Beruf ist er Forst-Ingenieur.– Er musste eine längere Gefängnisstrafe abbüßen. –*

*Ständiger Mitarbeiter ist Zoltán Vér, mit richtigem Namen Zoltán Bányay, 35 Jahre alt, wütender Antikommunist, schreibt gut. –*

*Mitarbeiter sind Dr. Tibor Egerváry, ehemaliger Generalsekretär der Bauernpartei in Pest, ebenfalls 35-jährig, ernsthaft, stur, kluger Kopf. –*

*Hier arbeiten noch László Sándor, ein junger Mann, von dem ich ebenfalls nicht mehr weiß und László [richtig: György] Sebestyén, der Kämpfer war und von der universitären Jugend kam. –*

*Gelegentlich arbeiteten für das Blatt György Molnár, der auf der Wiedner Hauptstraße 8. I. ein Büro hat, er wurde gekündigt, und Pál Szappanos (3. Trubelgasse 5. II. 13, bei Sichenalter, Tel. 72-40-172) ein alter Bekannte und Kunde von Pest<sup>28</sup>, der zweieinhalb Jahre aus nichtpolitischen Gründen im Gefängnis war. –*

*Die Texte von Szappanos würden sie ankaufen, aber er schreibt nicht hierher, sondern nach London zur BBC. –*

*Der Leiter des Verlages ist Tamás Szalay, ein aus einer großen Familie stammender junger Mann, der auf der Linie des alten Militärs große Beziehungen hat. Ilosvay hält ihn – aus nationalen Gesichtspunkten – nicht für vertrauenswürdig.–*

---

<sup>27</sup> Gemeint ist die Független Kisgazdapárt d.i. die Unabhängige Kleine Landwirte Partei.

<sup>28</sup> Kövi ist von Beruf Rechtsanwalt.

*Dort ist noch Valéria Bencze Maschinenschreiberin, die begeisterte Ungarin ist und Tanzen mag, sonst nicht viel tut.–*

*Das Blatt wird gut gemacht, ich habe schon mitgeteilt, wenn die Unterstützung der Presse aufhört, Dr. Sánta will nicht, dass es eingeht, er ist bereit es zu unterstützen.<sup>29</sup>*

Kövis Text dürfte als ein typischer Agentenbericht angesehen werden. Es ist hastig geschrieben, enthält dementsprechende kleine Irrtümer wie z.B. einen falschen Vornamen oder die alternative Verwendung von Gewerkschaftsrat und Gewerkschaftskomitee – anstatt den richtigen Gewerkschaftsbund. Der Agent versucht viele Fakten unterzubringen, was einerseits die Aufgabe war und andererseits ihm Gelegenheit gibt, anderen eines auszuwischen. Diese waren zugleich genau die Daten, aufgrund derer Leute in den Zielkreis der Staatssicherheitsdienste geraten sind.

#### **Der Kollaborateur: György Sebestyén**

Der bereits bezüglich der ersten Redakteure zitierte Bericht von Kerekes beschreibt den Werdegang Sebestyéns bei der Zeitung so:

*Gleichzeitig mit Ilosvay ist auch György Sebestyén zum Blatt gekommen. Sebestyén lernte die Sekretärin des Österreichischen Presse Klubs, Dr. Erika Hanel, kennen, die Vize-Redakteurin der im Pressehaus erscheinenden Wochenpresse ist. Hanel half Sebestyén beim Híradó unterzukommen. Ilosvay und Sebestyén sind miteinander nicht ausgekommen. Ilosvay hatte keine einflussreiche Freundin und so hat Sebestyén ihn aus dem Redakteur-Sessel entfernen lassen. Ilosvay hat gekündigt und wollte nach Tasmanien auswandern, überlegte aber nochmals und ist in Österreich, in der Steiermark geblieben. Seit Ilosvays Ausscheiden redigiert Sebestyén das Blatt allein. Er kennt sich bei der Redaktionsarbeit nicht gut aus, bei der Magyar Nemzet [Ungarische Nation] war er Leiter des Kulturreports, so hat Robert Kertész die Arbeit gemacht. Kertész war der Chefredakteur des 8 Órai Újság [8 Uhr Blatt]. (...) Kertész war ein Jahr lang bei der Zeitung, wanderte im August 1959 in die USA aus. (...) An seiner Stelle ist György [richtig: Gyula] Klamár gekommen, der Redakteur der Kiss Újság [Kleine Zeitung] (...) war. Im September dieses Jahres hat sich Gábor Kocsis, der Redakteur von Nemzetőr von seinem Blatt getrennt und kam zum Híradó. Kocsis ist von Szeged nach Wien gekommen, ist Student, war Leiter des Studentenbundes.*

*Die freien Mitarbeiter des Blattes sind: László Latinecz, ehemaliger Journalist in Pest, Zoltán [unleserlich], Organisator der*

---

<sup>29</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.3. Mt-671/8 S. 143f.

*Pfeiffer Partei, Tibor Egerváry Volkswirt, László Harsányi Karikaturist.*

*Die Berichterstatter sind Tamás Schreiber (Paris), György Gömery (Oxford), Pál Szöllösy (St. Gallen), Olga Stoll (Zürich), Ernő Fothy (Rom), Erzsébet Soós (New York), Judith Nagy (Washington), Andras Huber-Magyar (Los Angeles).*

*Das Blatt wird durch die Presse vertrieben. Es ist so gut wie auf der ganzen Welt erhältlich. Korrespondenten gibt es in jedem Land, wo sich Ungarn ansiedelten.<sup>30</sup>*

Über Sebestyén gibt es drei Dossiers im Historischen Archiv der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste, und auf ihn bezogen finden sich auch Unterlagen verstreut in anderen Dossiers. Aufgrund eines Berichtes von der Mitte der 1970er Jahre wird die Periode 1958–1962, als Sebestyén also für *Magyar Híradó* arbeitete, was ja der Fokus dieses Aufsatzes ist, so zusammengefasst:

*Seine Niederlassung und Beginn seiner Laufbahn in Wien (1957–1962): In 1957 hat er sich scheiden lassen, die Frau ist mit dem Volkswirt Tamás Kepes und mit dem kleineren Kind nach Chile übersiedelt. Die Erziehung des anderen Kindes haben „Irodalmárs“ in Wien lebende Eltern übernommen.<sup>31</sup>*

*„Irodalmár“ hat sich während seiner Arbeitssuche bei der Pressevereinigung gemeldet. Dabei wurde ihm von Dr. Erika Hanel unter die Armen gegriffen (...) und sie hat ihn beim Magyar Híradó untergebracht, bei dem er 1959 Chefredakteur wurde. Das Blatt ist ungarischsprachig, aber offiziell ist es eine österreichische Zeitschrift, steht unter dem Einfluss der Shell Gesellschaft. „Irodalmár“ schickt 1959 auch an diverse Schweizer Blätter seine Artikel. Seine politischen Ansichten sind konfus, er hat zwei Gesichter [jellemző rá a kétarcúság]. Während er bei der Redaktion die Überzeugung wiederholt „... die von ihrer Heimat Getrennten objektiv informieren, und möglichst viele wahrheitsgemäße Berichte im Blatt unterbringen ...“ macht er in seinen Artikeln das genaue Gegenteil. Er arbeitete für das Radio Voice of America und später für den RFE, allerdings ausschließlich auf literarischer Ebene. (...)*

---

<sup>30</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K 173/1 S. 125f.

<sup>31</sup> Das sind typisch zu nennende Informationen, die häufig in den Berichten der Staatssicherheitsdienste stehen. Zwei handschriftliche Bemerkungen finden sich zu diesem Absatz. Zu Tamás Kepes: „Nebensächlich, aber wer ist er?“ und zu den Eltern: „Wie, da laut Seite 2. sie kein Einkommen haben?“. Wie der zitierte Absatz und die handschriftlichen Anmerkungen zeigen, interessierten sich die Staatssicherheitsdienste für die Details des Privatlebens der von ihnen ins Visier genommenen Personen, um bei der Planung ihrer Operationen aufgrund dieser Informationen handeln zu können bzw. um ihr Interesse gegebenenfalls auf die so in den Gesichtskreis geratenen Personen auszudehnen. Berücksichtigt man diese Informationen bei der wissenschaftlichen Aufarbeitung der Tätigkeit der Staatssicherheitsdienste nicht, lässt man einen für die Behörde wichtigen Punkt außer Acht und verfälscht das Gesamtbild.



*Seine Tätigkeit ist gegenüber unserer Heimat zu dieser Zeit eindeutig feindlich: er ist Chefredakteur eines mit den Geldern von US-Amerikanern finanzierten Blattes und als solcher nimmt er aktiv teil an der Organisation und Durchführung der gegen Ungarn und die sozialistischen Länder gerichteten Rufmordkampagne. Entsprechend von Berichten aufgrund des Netzwerkes [Hálózati jelentések alapján<sup>32</sup>] hält er Kontakt mit der Presseabteilung der Wiener Botschaft der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, er überlässt ihnen ungarische Nachrichten zum Zwecke der Publikation.*

*Als Magyar Híradó in einer schwierigen finanziellen Situation war, hat er mit dem Presseattaché unserer Wiener Botschaft Kontakt aufgenommen mit dem Zweck, dass er für das Blatt finanzielle Unterstützung bekommt. Dies konnte er für eine Zeit lang erreichen, aber als für die finanzielle Unterstützung wiederholt Artikel gegen unsere Heimat erschienen sind – haben wir die Dotierung eingestellt.*

*„Irodalmár“ hat nach 1962 geholfen, indem er versucht, Magyar Híradó einem reichen ungarischen Emigranten namens Aurel Föld weiterzugeben, sowie ein/zwei über Ungarn ein objektives Bild gebende Artikel zu platzieren, zieht sich aber von der Zeitschrift immer mehr zurück und verlässt das Blatt.<sup>33</sup>*

Weiter unten wird im selben zusammenfassenden Bericht über „Die Beziehung Irodalmárs und der Wiener Residentur (operativer Hintergrund)“ berichtet:

*Mit der Person „Irodalmár“ hat sich die Abteilung II/B unseres Nachrichtendienstes zu beschäftigen begonnen. Ein Agent der II/2-G Unterabteilung hat die Aufmerksamkeit auf ihn gelenkt als eine Person, die über gute Möglichkeiten verfügt und anwerbbar ist. Den Wert seiner Person hat auch erhöht, dass er der Chefredakteur eines bedeutenden ungarischen Presseorgans war, durch den es ernsthafte Möglichkeiten zu geben schien die Emigration zu beeinflussen und zu zersetzen.*

*Die Untersuchung von „Irodalmár“ („Irodalmár“ tanulmányozását) hat die Wiener Residentur und die II/3-B Unterabteilung im Dezember 1958 begonnen. Die Kontaktperson war bis 1962 Genosse János Fürjes P(olizei)oberstl(eutna)nt. Für die Durchführung der Aufgabe wurde die hiesige und die ausländische Agentur miteinbezogen, sowie auch ein im Ausland Dienst leistender Nachrichtenoffizier.*

*Während der Arbeit (a feldolgozás során) sind wir so weit gekommen dass „Irodalmár“ von sich aus die Zusammenarbeit anbot und versprach, dass er im Magyar Híradó den Interessen der UVR*

---

<sup>32</sup> D.h. entsprechend des im Netzwerk des Staatssicherheitsdienstes, also in diversen Dossiers liegenden Aktenstücken dokumentierten Informationsstandes.

<sup>33</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-173/3 S. 29f.

*(Ungarische Volksrepublik) entsprechende Artikel schreibt und unterbringt. Sein Versprechen hat er wiederholt gebrochen, er ist weiterhin beim feindlichen Ton (ellenséges hangvétel) geblieben. Unsere Organe haben in der Hoffnung, dass sie auf das Blatt Einfluss üben können die Zeitschrift monatelang dotiert, aber angesichts der Erfolglosigkeit – haben sie die finanzielle Unterstützung eingestellt.<sup>34</sup>*

Ob bei der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Sebestyén und dem Vertreter der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste wer wen an der Nase herumgeführt hat, sei hier offen gelassen. Die aus der Zeit der Zusammenarbeit stammenden Berichte zeugen von laufenden Konflikten und zustande gekommenen Ergebnissen. Laut eines Informationsbericht von Urbán:

*Am 13. Februar 1961 habe ich von György Sebestyén, dem Redakteur des Wiener Magyar Híradó die folgenden Informationen bekommen (...).*

*Die Richtung von Magyar Híradó wird sich in der nächsten Zukunft nach links verschieben. Es wird sich stärker von den rechten Richtungen der ungarischen Emigrantenpolitik abgrenzen und wird mehr Nachrichten und Berichte bringen, die in der ungarischen Politik gewisse positive Erscheinungen feststellen. Nach S[ebestyén]s Formulierung werden sie vom bisherigen feindlichen Ton auf einen Ton wechseln, als ob zu Hause ein „oppositionelles“ Blatt erscheinen würde. Diese Änderung hat S[ebestyén] erklärt mit 1. der gemäßigeren Richtung der Politik von Kennedy; 2. Er bekommt eine freiere Hand in der Redaktion; 3. Die bei seinen gegenwärtigen westlichen Reisen wiedergesehenen emigrierten Schriftsteller haben dieselbe Meinung wie er darüber, dass in der innenpolitischen Entwicklung Ungarns – abgesehen von der erzwungenen Kollektivierung in der Landwirtschaft – es immer mehr Positives gibt.*

*Sebestyén würde es angesichts des diesbezüglichen Tonwechsels des Blattes jetzt für besonders wünschenswert halten, dass er zu ungarischen Organisationen gewisse halboffizielle Beziehungen hat. Er will keinesfalls in finanzielle Abhängigkeiten geraten, damit das später, für seine nach wie vor erwünschte Rückkehr keine negativen Auswirkungen hat.<sup>35</sup>*

Das Bild, das sich aus diesen einzelnen Berichten ergibt ist vielschichtig und uneindeutig. Fest zu stehen scheint, dass Sebestyén keine Berührungängste hatte. Er scheint gewusst oder zumindest gespürt zu haben, dass die Mitarbeiter der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste im Österreich der 1960er Jahren einen

---

<sup>34</sup> A.o.a.O. S. 32f.

<sup>35</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.3 Mt-772/2 S. 63f.

beschränkten Handlungsradius haben. Der Kalte Krieg befand sich gerade in einer auftauenden Phase, was die Ungarn genauso für ihre Zwecke nutzen wollten wie Sebestyén für die seinen. Österreich schien dafür der richtige Schauplatz zu sein. Man war in einem neutralen Land, in der unmittelbaren Nähe des Eisernen Vorhanges, in einem Land mit stark durchwachsenen ungarischen Emigrantengemeinschaften, wo alle Abstufungen der Integration vorhanden waren und eine relativ große, mit dem aktuellen Regime sich solidarisierende Menschengruppe auch anwesend war. Es war also alles gegeben, um im Trüben fischen zu können.

### **Versuch einer Anwerbung: Gyula Klamár**

Die Idee, Gyula Klamár als Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheitsdienste anzuwerben tauchte Ende 1958 auf. Der interne Bericht, der das Anliegen formuliert ist mit dem 10. November 1958 datiert.

*I(nnen)M(inisterium) II/3 Abteilung, 5. Unterabteilung*

*Betrifft: die Angelegenheit von „Szegedi“*

*Bericht*

*Budapest 10. November 1958*

*Gyula Klamár, im Weiteren „Szegedi“, geb. Kolozsvár<sup>36</sup>, 7. IX. 1906, Mutter: Ilona Bolgony, verheiratet, ungarische Nationalität, ungarischer Staatsbürger, maturiert, Beruf ehemaliger Journalist, wohnhaft in Österreich.*

*Er stammt aus einer Arbeiterfamilie, sein Vater war Maschinenschlosser bei den ungarischen Staatsbahnen.<sup>37</sup>*

*Anschließend ist er nach Budapest gekommen, hier erhielt „Szegedi“ bei der Kis Újság eine Stelle. Später ist er auch Mitarbeiter von Esti Kurier (Abendkurier) geworden. Beim letzteren als Theaterkritiker, beim ersteren als Redakteur. Als Redakteur der Kis Újság hat er sehr gute Beziehungen aufgebaut, zum Beispiel Graf Gyula Dessesffy, Jenő Erdős, Tibor Nagy, Károly Pataki, Jenő Németh, Béla Simándi, László Csáky Bába, Béla Hollósi etc. waren seine unmittelbaren Mitarbeiter und Freunde.<sup>38</sup>*

*Während der Konterrevolution<sup>39</sup> hat er aktive politische Tätigkeit ausgeübt, hat bei der entstehenden Partei der Kleinen Landwirte eine bedeutende Rolle gespielt, er organisierte die Zeitung der Partei neu.*

---

<sup>36</sup> Deutsch Klausenburg, 1958 hieß es Cluj.

<sup>37</sup> Es folgt eine ausführliche Beschreibung des Werdegangs von Klamár; so war dieser Journalist im südostungarischen Stadt Szeged – daher der Deckname „Szegedi“ was so viel heißt, wie „der aus Szeged“.

<sup>38</sup> Es folgt eine Beschreibung von Klamárs Tätigkeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg mit Zitaten aus Klamárs vor 1957 in Ungarn geschriebenen Lebensläufen, die dem Akt auch beiliegen.

<sup>39</sup> D. i. die ungarische Revolution im Oktober 1956.

Anfang 1957 hat er sich mit dem Gedanken beschäftigt, auszuwandern. Im Januar 1957 reichte er einen Antrag für die Auswanderung ein, der von der gegenwärtigen Abteilung II/1 unterstützt wurde, damit sie seine Wohnung einem Genossen geben können. (Zurzeit ist diese Person nicht bei der Behörde, wegen Machenschaften ist er abgerüstet worden.)

Er wanderte im April 1957 mit einem französischen Visum aus. Entsprechend unseren Informationen ist „Szegedi“ nicht nach Frankreich gegangen, sondern hat sich in Österreich, in Wien niedergelassen.

Ende 1957 ist er aktiv Teilnehmer der Nationalen Widerstandsbewegung<sup>40</sup> geworden. Für die Organisation hat er Anwerbungen durchgeführt. Unser Agent mit dem Decknamen „Sárosi“ ist durch „Szegedi“ angeworben worden. Weiters arbeitet „Szegedi“ zurzeit, nach nicht überprüften Informationen, an der Zusammenstellung der Geschichte der Kleinlandwirtpartei.<sup>41</sup>

Vorschlag:

Die guten Beziehungen des Genannten sowohl Ungarn als auch Westeuropa betreffend, weiters seine Rolle und Tätigkeit in NEM machen ihn dafür geeignet, dass wir uns mit „Szegedi“ zum Zwecke der Anwerbung beschäftigen.

1. Ich schlage vor, dass wir „Szegedi“ in inländischer und ausländischer Hinsicht aufarbeiten (dolgozzuk fel „Szegedit“).

a. In inländischer Beziehung schlage ich vor die Verhörung seiner Geschwister und von László Dezséri.

b. Im Ausland sollten wir „Szegedi“ durch die Agenten mit den Decknamen „Sárosi“ und „Vitéz“ studieren [tanulmányozzuk]. „Sárosi“ hat deshalb Möglichkeiten, um „Szegedi“ zu beobachten, weil vor ca. einem Jahr „Szegedi“ ihn für Mitarbeit bei der NEM angeworben hat. „Vitéz“ verfügt in Österreich über breite Beziehungen.

2. Abhängig von den Ergebnissen der Beobachtung [tanulmányozás] werden wir „Szegedi“ in die Kooperation mit uns einbeziehen, für diesen Zweck werden wir den Bruder von „Szegedi“ nutzen.

3. Im Falle dass die Einbeziehung von „Szegedi“ ergebnislos wäre, oder wenn wir während der Beobachtung feststellen, dass wir „Szegedi“ nicht anwerben können, werden wir die zur Verfügung stehenden kompromittierenden Informationen, z.B. die Informationen aus seinem Lebenslauf, aus seinen für das Systems abgelegten Äußerungen für die Kompromittierung des Genannten verwenden.

Anmerkung:

---

<sup>40</sup> Nemzeti Ellenállási Mozgalom, im weiteren NEM; „nem“ heißt im Ungarischen „nein“, wohl auch im Sinne von „Nein zum Kádárregime“.

<sup>41</sup> Es folgen Angaben zu seiner Familie sowie zu seinem Charakter.

*Den Bericht über „Szegedi“ habe ich aus den Informationen im Personenakt von Gyula Dessewffy sowie aus den während unserer bisherigen Kontrolle beschafften Informationen zusammengestellt. „Szegedi“ ersetzt eine aus ihrer Realisierung gefallene Sache. Ich ersuche um die Genehmigung des Vorschlages mit dem Ziel, dass ich mich mit „Szegedi“ zum Zweck der Anwerbung beschäftige. Gyula Szabó P[olizei] L[eutnant], Unterabteilung 5<sup>42</sup>*

Der Akt trägt einige handschriftliche Anmerkungen, aus denen hervorgeht, dass der Vorschlag angenommen wurde.

Zunächst ist also noch offen, was man mit Klamár vorhat. Dass er Journalist war scheint nebensächlich zu sein, vorrangig ist, dass er Kontakte zu Widerstandskreisen der Emigration hat.

Nach einigen Monaten, als es klar wurde, dass Klamár bei *Bécsi Magyar Híradó* arbeitet, wurde ein konkretes Ziel festgesetzt.

*Innenministerium III/b Unterabteilung  
Vorschlag für die Kompromittierung von Dallos  
Ferenc Ilosvai [richtig: Ilosvay], im Weiteren Dallos (Budapest, 28. August 1918, Mutter: Sára Harkovits, Beruf: Journalist, ungarische Nationalität, ungarischer Staatsbürger, dissidierte Ende 1956), zurzeit Redakteur des Emigrantenblattes Bécsi Magyar Híradó, wohnhaft in Wien.*

*Dallos stammt aus einer kleinadeligen Familie.<sup>43</sup> Er studierte an der István Bocskay Militärischen Hauptrealschule,<sup>44</sup> anschließend Schauspielerei an der Privatschule von Kálmán Rózsahegyi und wurde ab 1937 Journalist. Er arbeitete bei der Wochenzeitschrift Reggel (Morgen), wurde dann der Berichterstatte von Pester Loyd (richtig: Lloyd). Später arbeitete er für Új Idők [Neue Zeiten], Szabadszó (Freies Wort), zuletzt – vor der Konterrevolution – für die Hétfői Hírek (Montagsnachrichten).*

*Er dissidierte Ende 1956. Im Juni 1957 haben Otto und Fritz Molden (die Eigentümer von Die Presse) Dallos zum Redakteur von Bécsi Magyar Híradó ernannt.<sup>45</sup>*

*Wegen seiner Funktion bei der Bécsi Magyar Híradó hat Dallos Konflikte mit den nach Österreich emigrierten Journalisten. Eine der hervorragenden Figuren der gegen Dallos stehenden Journalistengruppe*

---

<sup>42</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S. 72ff.

<sup>43</sup> Während der gesamten staatssozialistischen Periode wurde zwischen Klassenfeind und Klassengenosse unterschieden. In der Rákosi Periode waren die Folgen oft Vermögensentzug und Aussiedlung, in den späteren Jahren ein entsprechender Vermerk bei den Personalakten.

<sup>44</sup> Was in diesem Zusammenhang heißt: er ist nicht nur ein geborener Feind, sondern wurde dementsprechend als Kämpfer ausgebildet. Er ist also ein gefährlicher Feind.

<sup>45</sup> Es folgt eine kurze Charakterisierung von Ilosvay.

*ist der Kandidat mit dem Decknamen Szegedi, mit dem wir uns zum Zwecke der Anwerbung beschäftigen. (...)*

*Zum Zwecke der Lokalisation der feindlichen Tätigkeit von Dallos schlagen wir seine Kompromittierung vor:*

*Wir bringen durch unseren hiesigen Agenten mit dem Decknamen Siklós unserem Kandidaten mit dem Decknamen Szegedi zur Kenntnis, dass Dallos ein Agent der Staatssicherheitsdienstorganisationen war.*

*Szegedi bat mehrfach seinen hier in Ungarn lebenden Bruder – Siklós – dass dieser über Dallos Informationen sammeln soll [gyűjtson adatokat Dallosra]. Szegedi informiert in seinen Briefen Siklós darüber, dass Dallos ihm viele Unannehmlichkeiten verursachte und er will ihn unter allen Umständen von dessen gegenwärtigem Arbeitsplatz entfernen.*

*Siklós hat die Möglichkeit „Informationen zu sammeln“, weil er in den Jahren vor der Befreiung<sup>46</sup> Polizeioffizier war. Für Siklós ist es legalisierbar, dass er von Dallos' Zusammenarbeit mit den Staatssicherheitsdiensten erfahren hat. Die Beziehung war bekannt, weil Dallos selbst mehrmals mit verschiedenen Personen darüber gesprochen hat.*

*Siklós würde in einem Brief Szegedi berichten, dass er über seinen Bekannten feststellen konnte, dass jener ein Agent des ÁHV [Államvédelmi Hatóságok, Staatsschutzorgane] war. Diesen Brief würden wir illegal nach Österreich weiterleiten. Im Besitz der obigen Daten wird Szegedi aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach einen Angriff gegen Dallos starten.*

*Mit unserer Aktion würden wir zwei Ziele erreichen:*

*1. Wir kompromittieren Dallos, der ein Verräter ist und zurzeit als Redakteur der Bécsi Magyar Híradó aktive feindliche Tätigkeit gegen Ungarn ausübt.*

*2. Gleichzeitig werden wir für die ungarischen Abwehrgane durch Siklós auch unseren Kandidaten Szegedi kompromittieren, weil im Wesentlichen wir ihm dazu verholfen haben, dass er Dallos angreifen kann.*

*Wir ersuchen um die Genehmigung des Aktionsplanes sowie die Vorbereitung von Siklós für die Durchführung der Aktion.*

*Beilage: Entwurf des durch Siklós zu schreibenden Briefes.*

*Gyula Szabó P[olizei] o[berst]l[eutnant] op[erativer] Beauftragter<sup>47</sup>*

Der Plan musste allerdings aufgegeben werden, weil die Umstände sich änderten. Laut eines zusammenfassenden Berichtes vom 7. September 1961

---

<sup>46</sup> Felszabadulás ist der offizielle Ausdruck der staatssozialistischen Periode für den Abschluss der sowjetischen Besetzung Ungarns am 4. April 1945.

<sup>47</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4 K-174 S. 111f.

*Szegedi hat nach längerem Wienaufenthalt bei Die Presse eine Stellung bekommen. Währenddessen hat er auch für die Bécsi Magyar Híradó gearbeitet. Zwischen ihm und dem Redakteur der Magyar Híradó, Ferenc Ilosvai (richtig: Ilosvay), entwickelte sich eine scharfe Gegnerschaft, weil Szegedi der Redakteur der Zeitschrift werden wollte. Die Gegnerschaft hat sich so weit entwickelt, dass er seinen in Ungarn lebenden Bruder, László, gebeten hat, dass er über Ilosvai belastende Informationen sammelt. Der Gegensatz zwischen ihnen verschärfte sich aber nicht weiter, weil 1959 Ilosvai von seiner Redakteurstelle entlassen wurde und Irodalmár zum Redakteur von Magyar Híradó ernannt wurde.<sup>48</sup>*

Obwohl Gyula Klamárs Werdegang vom Staatssicherheitsdienst weiterhin verfolgt wurde, der Schwerpunkt bildete Irodalmár, da er der leitende Redakteur war und wohl auch deshalb, weil man dort Chancen sah, Erfolge erzielen zu können.

Da aber, wie wir gesehen haben, die Arbeit mit Sebestyén auch nicht wie erhofft verlief, kam man bald auf Klamár zurück. Ab August 1962 versuchte man wieder den alten Plan aufzugreifen und László Klamár also Siklósi zu mobilisieren.

*Wie bekannt haben wir im Februar 1963 unseren gesellschaftlichen Kontakt mit dem Namen Siklósi<sup>49</sup> nach Wien reisen lassen, um Lipmann<sup>50</sup> zu beobachten, in politischer Hinsicht zu beeinflussen, so dass der feindliche Ton von Magyar Híradó gemildert wird und dass er über den objektiven Ton der Redaktion und seine Zukunft betreffenden Fragen mit einem offiziellen Vertreter unserer Heimat in Verhandlungen tritt. (...) Lipmann war nicht bereit mit uns zu verhandeln. (...) Barclay soll es überwachen, welche Wirkung der Besuch von Siklósi auf Lipmann ausübte. (...) Was ist die Beziehung zwischen Lipmann und dem das Blatt unterstützenden Citisen [richtig: Citizen] Service sowie den Mitgliedern der Redaktion. Das Verfolgen von welcher politischen Linie wird seitens des Citisen Service vom Blatt erwartet.<sup>51</sup>*

Der Bericht Siklósi über seinen Wienaufenthalt zwischen dem 19. und dem 26. Februar 1963 enthält weitere Informationen über die Zeitschrift:

---

<sup>48</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S 167ff.

<sup>49</sup> Statt Siklós verwendet man also den Namen Siklósi. Bei den Staatssicherheitsdiensten gab es eine Reihe von Personen, von denen Informationen stammten, in der Terminologie der Behörde: gesellschaftlicher Kontakt, Agent, Kandidat, Zielperson und Staatssicherheitsdienststoffizier. Dass Siklósi hier als „gesellschaftlicher Kontakt“ anstatt als „Agent“ bezeichnet wird, heißt, dass der den Bericht verfassende Offizier ihn anders einstuft. Der Unterschied zwischen gesellschaftlichem Kontakt und Agent ist, dass der eine das freiwillig und aus ideologischer Überzeugung ausübt, was beim anderen erzwungen wird: der Kampf gegen die Feinde des Sozialismus.

<sup>50</sup> Anstatt Szegedi wird für Klamár inzwischen der Deckname Jack Lipmann verwendet.

<sup>51</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4 K-174 S. 243ff., 19. März 1963.

*Bezüglich von Magyar Híradó habe ich von ihm (Gyula Klamár) erfahren, dass sie früher zum Interessengebiet von Fritz Molden gehörte. Der Schwiegervater Moldens war Dulles (der ehemalige Spionagechef), und es ist möglich, dass sie aus dieser Quelle finanzielle Unterstützung erhalten hat. Vor einem Jahr hat Molden mitgeteilt, dass das Blatt eingestellt wird. Er verkaufte das Blatt den Redaktionsmitgliedern. Zurzeit macht er [Gyula Klamár] das Blatt mit mehreren Redaktionskollegen.<sup>52</sup>*

Die mit Datum versehenen Informationen im Dossier K-174 heißen natürlich nicht, dass sie den Staatssicherheitsdienstbehörden zu dieser Zeit bekannt geworden sind. Man hält die Informationen fest, um damit zu dokumentieren, was derjenige, von dem die Information stammt, wann preisgibt. So werden Informationen geprüft, oder ein Wissensstand festgehalten. Die vom Informanten stammenden Einzelinformationen werden meist nicht kommentiert, ergänzt oder berichtigt, sondern stehen gelassen, um bei einer eventuellen Revision später darauf zurückgreifen zu können. Der Hinweis auf Allen Welsh Dulles, der 1953 bis 1961 Direktor der CIA (und Bruder von John Foster Dulles, zwischen 1953 und 1959 Außenminister der USA) war, ist beispielsweise so ein Detail. Warum die Frage nach der Bedeutung dieses möglichen Kontakts in den Akten über Fritz Molden, über die diversen *Magyar Híradó* Mitarbeiter etc. nirgends vorkommt, lässt sich nur dadurch erklären, dass die Verfolgung dieser Linie den zuständigen Bruderorganisationen überlassen wurde.

Da der Einfluss durch den ausgereisten Agenten nicht die erhoffte Wirkung brachte, probierte man es nochmals. Vorschlag von Bakonyi, am 10. Oktober 1963:

*Angesichts dessen, dass die Zentrale<sup>53</sup> die Beeinflussung, eventuell die Übernahme von Magyar Híradó weiterhin für wichtig hält, und der einzige gangbare Weg dazu zu sein scheint, dass wir uns weiterhin mit Jack Lipmann beschäftigen, schlage ich vor, dass wir in der Angelegenheit einen Initiativschritt tun. Mitte des nächsten Monats wird die Eröffnungsfeier des Ungarischen Hauses (Magyar Ház) stattfinden.<sup>54</sup>*

Der Plan ist, dass Bakonyi Klamár zu diesem Eröffnungsfest<sup>55</sup> einlädt und zusammen mit Parker ihn anspricht. Bakonyi kenne Parker, weil dieser um ein Visum angesucht hat. – Bakonyi war also ein Mitarbeiter der ungarischen Botschaft in Wien, nämlich der für die Visa zuständige Attaché. Diese offizielle

---

<sup>52</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4 K-174 S. 246ff., Ende März 1963.

<sup>53</sup> Központ ist die Bezeichnung der Staatssicherheitsdienstzentrale in Budapest.

<sup>54</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S. 261f.

<sup>55</sup> Was Magyar Ház sei, ist nicht ganz klar. Das Collegium Hungaricum in der Hollandstraße wurde im Frühjahr 1963 eröffnet. Es könnte natürlich um eine Ausstellungseröffnung oder Ähnliches im Collegium Hungaricum gehen.



diplomatische Tätigkeit übte er in Verbindung mit seiner inoffiziellen Tätigkeit als Mitarbeiter der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste aus. Man könnte es auch so formulieren, dass die Staatssicherheitsdienstmitarbeiter diplomatische Decktätigkeiten ausübten, was jedoch einen wesentlichen Aspekt verdecken würde, dass nämlich die zwei Tätigkeiten weitgehend zusammenfielen. Bakonyi lernte ja während seiner offiziellen Tätigkeit die Leute kennen, die er für seine nichtoffizielle Tätigkeit brauchte. Die Arbeit als Attaché, dass man also Visumangelegenheiten besprechen will, gab die Gelegenheit, Leute anzurufen oder in die Botschaft einzuladen. Die Informationen, die man für die Visaformulare brauchte, waren die Grunddaten für die Staatssicherheitsdienstakte. Die Gespräche konnten in eine informelle Diskussion übergeleitet werden, während der man über den Bekanntenkreis der Visaansuchenden und über deren Tätigkeit innerhalb der Migration in Österreich generell Informationen einholen konnte. Aufgrund solcher Gespräche sind zahlreiche Informationsberichte entstanden. Die Erteilung und Verweigerung von Visa war auch ein Lohn bzw. eine Strafe, die man einsetzen konnte.

Der Versuch bei der Eröffnungsfeier des Ungarischen Hauses dürfte auch nicht zum Erfolg geführt haben, weil eine Anmerkung vom 14. November 1963 lautet:

*Mit der Person von Jack Lipmann haben wir ab 1958 begonnen uns zu beschäftigen. Dabei haben wir festgestellt, dass er nicht bereit ist, mit uns zusammenzuarbeiten.<sup>56</sup>*

Da offenbar die Frage von *Magyar Híradó* weiterhin auf der Agenda der Staatssicherheitsdienstbehörden war, führte man das Dossier sporadisch weiter. Laut eines zusammenfassenden Berichtes vom 28. Januar 1964:

*Mit seiner Person haben wir uns vom Oktober 1958 bis Sommer 1963 zum Zwecke der Anwerbung beschäftigt. (...) Er hat im Februar 1963 versprochen, dass er das Blatt in einem objektiven Ton redigieren wird. Er hat aber sein Versprechen nicht eingehalten, das Blatt hat gegenüber unserer Heimat weiterhin einen feindlichen Ton.<sup>57</sup>*

Eine Möglichkeit ist also, dass Siklósi nach seinem Wenaufenthalt dem Mitarbeiter der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste in dem Sinne berichtete, dass er mit seinem Bruder über den Ton von *Magyar Híradó* gegenüber Ungarn gesprochen und dieser ihm versprochen hat, dass es über die Heimat „objektiv“ berichten wird. Wie konkret dieses Versprechen war, geht aus den Akten nicht hervor. Es kann ja durchaus sein, dass Siklósi das so erzählte, weil man genau das von ihm erwartete oder natürlich auch, dass diejenigen, die Siklósis Reise organisiert haben, die Erzählung von Siklósi in ihren Berichten in diese Richtung

---

<sup>56</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S. 269.

<sup>57</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S. 270ff.

deuteten, um ihre Aktion gegenüber ihren eigenen Chefs nachträglich so zu rechtfertigen. Die Anfälligkeit der Staatssicherheitsdienstakte in diesem Sinne zu manipulieren – also die eigenen Erfolge zu betonen und die Fehler herunterzuspielen bzw. anderen zuzuschreiben – ist durchaus dem behördeninternen Stress (man arbeitet ja in einem Zwischenbereich mit illegalen Mitteln) zuzuschreiben und durch die erschwerte Überprüfbarkeit von Behauptungen (aus Konspirationsgründen hatten über einzelnen Aktionen nur wenige Personen Kenntnis) naheliegend gewesen. Das erklärt mit, warum diese Behörde trotz enormem personellen, finanziellen und administrativen Aufwandes so wenige konkrete Erfolge aufweisen konnte.

Der im Dossier befindliche letzte Informantenbericht stammt von 24. September 1964:

*Am 3. September des laufenden Jahres bin ich mit dem Kraftwagen nach Wien gefahren. (...) Am 4. in der Früh traf ich Klamár im Espresso Columbia und wir haben ausgemacht, dass wir im Restaurant Drei Hacken in der Singerstraße mittagessen werden. Sie essen – seit sechs Jahren – jeden Tag dort zu Mittag. (...) Während unseres Gespräches sagte Klamár das Folgende: „In der jüngsten Vergangenheit waren Ferenc Nagy und Béla Varga hier,<sup>58</sup> mit denen ich ständig zusammen war. All ihre Bestrebung ist jetzt darauf gerichtet, dass sie die Kádár Regierung in dieselbe Richtung lenken, wie Rumänien geht. Der Westen würde jetzt Ungarn jede Unterstützung geben. Ich warte jetzt auf einen höheren Beamten des Außenministeriums aus Ungarn, mit dem wir den weiteren Kontakt aufnehmen werden.“ Er sagte (elmondta), dass vor kurzem aus Paris ein ehemaliger ungarischer Attaché zurückkam, der an der weiteren Arbeit ebenfalls aktiv teilnimmt. Dieser Attaché wohnt zurzeit in Wien. Ich habe von ihm auch erfahren, dass Klamárs wichtiger und effektiver Mitarbeiter Dr. Fóti, Mitarbeiter der Magyar Híradó ist. Klamár ist über die ungarischen Verhältnisse voll unterrichtet. So – sagt er [elmondta] – war bei ihm vor kurzem jemand mit dem Namen Kéri, der beim Külimpex oder Monimpex arbeitet, der Klamár mitteilte, demgemäß [melyszerint] er sich entschlossen hätte – mit seinen zwei Kindern – nicht nach Ungarn zurückzukehren, sondern sich in Wien niederzulassen, und bat Klamár um Hilfe, dass er ihm eine Arbeitsmöglichkeit findet. Klamár teilte außerdem mit, dass Anna Kéthli [richtig: Kéthly] sich in Wien niederlassen wird, er war ihr zur Hilfe, auch um eine Wohnung zu suchen. Die Klamárs halten mit dem sowohl in Europa als auch in den USA lebenden Ungarntum ständig Kontakt, so schicken sie die monatlich erscheinenden Ausgaben jedes Mal jedem zu. Mit Dr. Fóti habe ich mich einmal in Klamárs Büro unterhalten, und festgestellt, dass Fóti Klamárs*

<sup>58</sup> Siehe dazu: *A bécsi út ...* (Die Wiener Reise ...), *Magyar Híradó* 1. September 1964.

*vertraulicher Mitarbeiter ist, aber meine Feststellung ist auch, dass Fóti mit Klamár voll unterrichtet zusammen arbeitet. Aus den Mitteilungen von Klamár und Fóti ergibt sich, dass sie ihre Informationen von aus Ungarn ausreisenden Staatsbürgern bekommen, die sie nach ihrem eigenen Stil mittels der durch sie redigierten Magyar Híradó zu verbreiten versuchen. Nach den Mitteilungen von Klamár, erscheint das Blatt monatlich in 7.000–8.000 Exemplaren, die Abonnenten befinden sich in verschiedenen kapitalistischen Ländern. Diese Personen überlassen der Redaktion monatlich 5–15 Dollar. Laut Klamár bekommen sie von mehreren Personen Unterstützung, die die regelmäßige Zusendung des Blattes nicht in Anspruch nehmen. Im Ausland lebende Ungarn wenden sich wiederholt mit dem Wunsch an die Redaktion, dass sie ihre in westlichen Ländern lebenden Bekannten bzw. Verwandten zu finden helfe. Für diesen Zweck überlassen sie der Redaktion ebenfalls bestimmte Summen. Zum Teil deckt auch das die Ausgaben. Die Mitarbeiter der Redaktion stehen wegen der Beschaffung der Informationen mit mehreren in der Emigration lebenden Personen in Kontakt. Das stimmt damit überein, dass sie die dem Westen entsprechende Propaganda abstimmen. Darauf zielt Klamárs Bemerkung auch ab, dass alle ihre Bestrebungen darauf abzielen, dass sie Ungarn entsprechend der politischen Ziele von Rumänien nutzen bzw. die Bestrebung, dass sie Führungspersonen in wichtigen Positionen davon überzeugen, die für sie günstigste Politik zu akzeptieren.<sup>59</sup>*

Aus Informationsberichten wie diesem ist es nicht nur ersichtlich, wie die Staatssicherheitsdienste, sondern auch wie die sozialistische Welt funktionierte. Der Informant hat vor der Niederschrift seines Berichtes mit dem für ihn zuständigen Offizier besprochen, welche Fragen und Themen wichtig sind. Diese waren die genauen Umstände, wo und wen er getroffen hat. Man wusste nun, dass Klamár und seine Mitarbeiter jeden Tag zu Mittag im Restaurant Drei Hacken in der Singerstraße essen, so konnte man sie dort jederzeit antreffen und sie z.B. jemandem zeigen, verfolgen etc. Wichtig war weiters die ideologische Linie, die die Emigration verfolgt; ihre Informationsquellen und -netze, und zwar sowohl Richtung Westen als auch Richtung Ungarn. Hier war natürlich auch wichtig, konkrete Namen zu erfahren, also Personen, die Ungarn verraten, indem sie Informationen weitergeben oder dissidieren wollen, gegen die also konkret vorgegangen werden kann. Weiters die Befehlskette, also die Hierarchie der Emigration und der Kontaktpunkt dieser zu den US Behörden. Man betrachtete *Magyar Híradó* als feindliches Nachrichtenorgan, das also Informationen sammelt, registriert, aufarbeitet, systematisch abändert und verbreitet. Und schließlich war die Finanzierung wichtig und zwar sowohl um welche konkrete Summe es geht als

---

<sup>59</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S. 285f.

auch wie dieses Geld beschafft wird.

Der Informant hat als Gegenleistung gewisse Privilegien und Möglichkeiten bekommen, die er für seine privaten Zwecke nutzen konnte. So z.B. dass er in den Westen reisen konnte, was alleine schon einen hohen gesellschaftlichen Wert darstellte, mit dem beispielsweise verbunden war, dass er gewisse Konsumgüter anschaffen und nach Ungarn bringen konnte, die dort einen hohen Prestigewert hatten. Ein weiteres Motiv war, dass man das Gefühl hatte, etwas für das System getan zu haben, in welchem man hoch gekommen ist. Immerhin hatte der Informant beispielsweise ein Auto, was in den 1960er Jahren nicht nur in Ungarn keine Selbstverständlichkeit war. Er musste in Ungarn als erfolgreicher Mensch ein entsprechendes Ansehen genossen haben. Die Migranten in den Westen bildeten zugleich eine Art Konkurrenz. Sie verkörperten Parallellebensläufe und somit Möglichkeiten, die prinzipiell jedem offenstanden. Man stellte sich automatisch die Frage, wo ich wäre, wenn ich 1956 auch emigriert wäre. So war die Ablieferung eines Informationsberichtes auch eine „*private Rache*“ an denen, die einen – wenn auch unausgesprochen – als Kollaborateur angesehen haben. Dass das alles mit den sehr ambivalenten, weil viel zu oft missbrauchten Kategorien von „*Heimattreue*“ und „*Verrat an der Heimat*“ konnotiert war, hat die Situation nochmals unübersichtlicher gemacht und Möglichkeiten der Rechtfertigung von Unrechtfertigbarem geliefert.

Zusammenfassend: Aus den Akten von Gyula Klamár ist ersichtlich, dass die Beamten der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste erst schrittweise auf die Idee kamen, Klamár als Kandidaten mit dem Schwerpunkt *Magyar Híradó* zu führen. Zunächst wurde er wegen seiner Kontakte zu der Emigrantenorganisation NEM ins Visier genommen. Dass der Anwerbungsversuch bei Klamár scheiterte ist nicht zuletzt darauf zurückzuführen, dass Klamár mit seiner Auswanderung sich den ungarischen Behörden entzogen hat. Ein Zustand, den die ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienstorgane erst sukzessive einzusehen bereit waren. Die Klauen der Behörde reichten weit und man wusste zunächst selbst nicht, wo die Grenze der Reichweite zu ziehen sei.

#### ***Der Informant: József Fóti***

Der Redaktionsmitarbeiter, der in den ersten sechzehn Jahren der Zeitschrift *Magyar Híradó* die Kontinuität bedeutete, war József Fóti. Er hat im Historischen Archiv der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste kein eigenes Dossier, seine Person taucht aber in zahlreichen Aktenstücken auf.

*József Fóthi (richtig: Fóti) ist nach wie vor Leiter des Október 23, steht vollkommen unter dem direkten Kommando von Havas Gewerkschaftssekretär und des indirekten von Herzog.<sup>60</sup> –*

*Über ihn hat Harry (Kiefer), der Sekretär von Herzog, als einen sehr guten Sozialdemokraten gesprochen, der seinerzeit auch zum*

---

<sup>60</sup> Károly Herczog bzw. Herzog war der Ungarn-Referent der SPÖ in Wien.

*Bécsi Magyar Híradó als der Delegierte der Sozialdemokraten gekommen ist und mit deren Genehmigung dort geblieben ist, – „so dass die Richtung des Blattes nicht allzu sehr anti-sozialdemokratisch wird“, sagte mir Harry ebenfalls. Sie hatten nämlich Angst, dass in der Hand von Ilosvay die Richtung des Blattes nach rechts abweicht. Über diesen Mann hört man übrigens wenig, – ich habe nicht gehört, dass er besonders über den anderen stehen würde, ich sehe es eher so, dass man ihn für jemanden hält, der den Parteienweisungen folgt. –*

*Ich konnte auch darüber keine Information bekommen, ob Október 23 eine ernsthaftere Tätigkeit ausüben würde, dieser Verein bewegt sich nämlich nicht sehr, er funktioniert kaum. –<sup>61</sup>*

In der Ausgabe vom 1. März 1973 des *Magyar Híradó* wird die Todesnachricht von József Fóti gedruckt. Laut diesem Nachruf war er 64 Jahre alt, wurde also 1909 geboren, entstammte einer Familie in Sopron, studierte in Wien, Bonn und Paris, promovierte in Budapest an der Wirtschaftsuniversität. Nach dem Krieg war er Journalist in Kecskemét und in Sopron, bis er im Zuge der 1956er Ereignisse Ungarn verließ. In der Emigration war er neben seiner Mitarbeit beim *Magyar Híradó* Präsident des Vereins 23. Oktober und Mitglied der ungarischen Sektion der SPÖ.

Im Dossier K-1418 befindet sich ein Auszug aus dem Bericht von Szénási aus 1960, was weitgehend damit übereinstimmt, was Fóti in *Magyar Híradó* zwei Jahre später am 22. Januar 1962 anlässlich des fünfjährigen Bestehens des Blattes publizierte:

*Im Januar 1957 haben die Wiener Hilfsorganisationen beschlossen, dass sie für die Bewohner der Lager ein Informationsblatt herausgeben bzw. dass sie die wenige Wochen vorher gestarteten Gewerkschafts-Tájékoztató in eine Zeitung umwandeln. Die Presseabteilung des Gewerkschaftszentrums hat die vervielfältigte Tájékoztató herausgegeben, hauptsächlich für die Lager in der Provinz, wohin der Informationswagen mit Tonband und Schmalspurfilmen nur selten kam. Aus diesen Gewerkschafts-Tájékoztató ist Bécsi Magyar Híradó geworden. Das Blatt wurde vom Österreichischen Nationalkomitee für Ungarnhilfe [richtig: Ungarn], geleitet von Otto Molden, dem Bruder von Fritz Molden, des Herausgebers der Die Presse, und vom Gewerkschaftsbund herausgegeben. Jede der Herausgeber- und Hilfsorganisationen hat in die neue Redaktion je einen Journalisten delegiert.<sup>62</sup>*

So ist Fóti selbst als Vertreter des Gewerkschaftsbundes in die Redaktion gekommen.

In den Berichten des Dossiers K-173/1 auf den Seiten 298 bis 342 wird die Überlegung ausgebreitet, *Magyar Híradó* zu übernehmen. Dabei werden die

---

<sup>61</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.3 Mt-671/9 S. 72, 18. Oktober 1958.

<sup>62</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-1418 S. 32, 24. Januar 1960.

Mitarbeiter des Blattes wiederholt aufgelistet, einmal mit den echten und das andere Mal mit den Decknamen. Aus dem Vergleich dieser Listen geht hervor, dass Irodalmár der Deckname von Sebestyén, Szegedi von Klamár und Szénási von Fóti war. Laut eines Befehls vom 10. April 1962<sup>63</sup> wird „*aus operativem Interesse*“ der Deckname Irodalmár auf James Foster geändert. Aus demselben Aktenstück geht hervor, dass statt Szegedi und Szénási die neuen Decknamen Jack Lipmann und Barclay werden. – Was übrigens nicht heißt, dass in Einzelaktenstücken vereinzelt nicht weiterhin die alten Namen verwendet werden. Ob dies darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass über die Namensänderung nicht alle Berichtschreiber verständigt wurden (und eventuell genau deshalb der Name geändert wurde, dass nicht alle Mitarbeiter mitkriegen, um wen es sich bei der Rede über die Agenten, Kandidaten und Zielpersonen handelt), oder dass sie nur schlampig sind, ist aufgrund der vorhandenen Aktenstücke nicht zu entscheiden.

Da weder ein Dossier Fóti zugänglich ist noch Berichte vorhanden sind, in denen es um ihn, also z.B. um seine Sicherheit<sup>64</sup> geht, ist es nicht nachvollziehbar, wie die Verbindung zwischen ihm und den ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdiensten zustande kam. Es ist auch nicht ersichtlich ob Fóti außer Informationen zu liefern für die Ausführung von weiteren Aktionen eingesetzt wurde. Fest steht, dass sowohl Szénási als auch Barclay als „*unser Agent*“ bezeichnet werden.<sup>65</sup>

### ***Die Politik der Emigration***

*Magyar Híradó* wurde bei der Gründung auf eine breite gesellschaftliche Basis gestellt, wo sowohl als konservativ geltende Kreise, so z.B. die Kirche, als auch z.B. die Sozialdemokratie, sowohl österreichische als auch internationale Organisationen, so z.B. die UNO, vertreten waren. Nichtsdestotrotz lassen sich die tonangebenden Personen bei der Zeitschrift dem Umkreis einer Partei zuordnen, nämlich der Független Kisgazdapárt, der Partei der Kleinen Landwirte. Dies ist

---

<sup>63</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-173/2 S. 174ff.

<sup>64</sup> So werden Ausführungen bezeichnet, in denen die Offiziere der Staatssicherheitsdienste möglichst genau beschreiben, ob es Zeichen dafür gebe, dass ein Agent enttarnt werden könnte. In diesen Ausführungen wird oft der Verlauf der Zusammenarbeit kurz zusammengefasst.

<sup>65</sup> Dass József Fóti ein „*Agent der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste*“ war, ist eine Folgerung, die aus rechtlichen Gründen hier ausdrücklich nicht gezogen wird. Laut geltendem ungarischen Recht kann jemand dann als „*Agent der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste*“ bezeichnet werden, wenn drei Kriterien erfüllt werden: es liegt die Einwilligung des Betroffenen in einer Zusammenarbeit mit den Behörden mit Originalunterschrift vor, es liegt sein sogenanntes „*5er Karteiblatt*“ (bzw. sein Anwerbungsossier) vor, das die Staatssicherheitsdienste über jeden Mitarbeiter anlegten und wo u.a. sein Status, also ob er ein Agent war, festgehalten wurde und es liegen Berichte (bzw. Zahlungen) vor, die dem Agenten eindeutig zuzuordnen sind. Da die 5er Karteiblätter der im Ausland tätigen Agenten der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste sich nicht im Historischen Archiv befinden, kann über so gut wie niemanden, über den dieser Aufsatz handelt, behauptet werden, er sei ein „*Agent*“ gewesen. Daher wird das hier auch nicht behauptet, sondern es werden Akten aus dem Historischen Archiv der Ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste zitiert, wo es fallweise von den Mitarbeitern dieser Behörde behauptet wird, jemand sei ein Agent gewesen.

einerseits darauf zurückzuführen, dass in Ungarn in den ersten Jahren nach 1945 diese Partei die stärkste politische Macht verkörperte und daher diese zahlenmäßig die meisten Anhänger hatte. Man kann jedoch z.B. auch Imre Nagy zumindest in der Nähe der politischen Richtung verorten, die diese Partei vertrat. Nagy galt nämlich innerhalb der Kommunistischen Partei als Experte für die Landwirtschaft und hatte mehrmals wichtige Ämter in diesem Bereich inne. So waren diejenigen, die sich als Anhänger von Nagy und somit als Repräsentanten der Revolution 1956 verstanden haben, in einem politischen Lager, das Affinität zu jener Partei hatte. So waren unter den Redaktionsmitgliedern, die im zitierten Bericht von Kövi Januar 1958 aufgelistet wurden, diejenigen, die durch den Agenten zu einer konkreten politischen Gruppierung zugeordnet wurden, so der „*jetzige Führer Ferenc Ilosvay*“ und der „*Mitarbeiter Tibor Egerváry*“ von der Bauernpartei. Da bei der sukzessiven kommunistischen Machtübernahme zuerst (in 1947) die Bauernpartei und erst nachher (in 1948) die Sozialdemokratie ausgeschaltet wurde, und außerdem im Falle der ersteren Teile der Parteileitung in die Emigration gezwungen wurden, während bei der letzteren sie zunächst in eine Einheitspartei integriert wurde, bildeten die 1947er Emigranten eine starke politische Organisation, die es schaffte, im Westen als legitimer Vertreter von Ungarn zumindest symbolisch anerkannt zu werden, indem hohe us-amerikanische Politikerkreise ihre Vertreter empfangen oder bei ihnen als Berater anfragten.

Ein vom 24. September 1964 stammender, vorhin zitierter Informationsbericht hält die Wirkung der Wienreise von Ferenc Nagy und Béla Varga fest sowie dass ein ehemaliger ungarischer Attaché aus Paris zurückkam, jetzt in Wien wohnt und „*an der weiteren Arbeit aktiv teilnimmt*“. Weitere diesbezügliche Berichte stammen von Barclay aus 1965. Der ebenfalls bereits zitierte Plan aus 1963, dass Barclay die Abläufe in der Redaktion von *Magyar Híradó* beobachten soll, wurde demnach offenbar nachhaltig umgesetzt. Barclay meldet also Anfang 1965:

*Ferenc Nagy hat an Gyula Klamár, den Redakteur der Wiener Magyar Híradó, einen Brief geschrieben, in dem er mitteilt, dass er in den USA versucht Geld zu beschaffen, damit das Blatt zweimal monatlich erscheinen kann. (...) Es ist bemerkenswert, dass seit der Wienreise von Nagy die emigrierten Politiker Magyar Híradó nützen, um ihre Ansichten zu publizieren.<sup>66</sup>*

Ein halbes Jahr später, vom Sommer 1965 stammt ein nächster Bericht aufgrund von Barclays Informationen:

*Zwischen Ferenc Nagy, dem ehemaligen ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten und seinen zu Hause gebliebenen, von den ehemaligen Kleinlandwirten verbliebenen Anhängern ist Gyula Klamár, der Redakteur des Wiener Magyar Híradó der*

---

<sup>66</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S. 279, 5. Januar 1965.

*Verbindungsmann. Die ausreisenden Kleinlandwirte suchen ihn auf. Ihre aus der Heimat stammenden Nachrichten leitet Klamár an Ferenc Nagy weiter. Die von Nagy kommenden Nachrichten und Anweisungen erhält Klamár brieflich. Klamár zeigt die Briefe den Ausreisenden und vernichtet sie anschließend. Die Ausreisenden bringen die Botschaften Nagys mündlich ins Land. Nach Ungarn werden – die Nagys Botschaften beinhaltenden – Briefe aus konspirativen Gründen nicht geschickt. Die ungarischen Kleinlandwirte möchten erreichen, dass Ferenc Nagy in Wien ein Emigrantenzentrum organisiert. (...) Unser Agent [nämlich Barclay] hat mehrmals gemeldet, dass Klamár regelmäßig Informationen an Nagy schickt, der diese in das US Außenministerium weiterleitet. Die US Amerikaner sind mit diesen Informationen zufrieden. Sie meinen, ihr Inhalt stimmt mit dem überein, was sie aus anderen Quellen bekommen.<sup>67</sup>*

*Magyar Híradó*, samt seinen zwei Redakteuren Sebestyén und Klamár vertrat also die Linie, die auch Nagy und Varga sowie z.B. Dessewffy vertraten, nämlich die Linie der Kleinen Landwirte. Die Partei gewann in Ungarn 1945 die Wahlen mit einer absoluten Mehrheit, konnte aber auf Druck der sowjetischen Besetzungsmacht keine Alleinregierung bilden. Ihre Führer bekamen zwar hohe Positionen, so wurde z.B. Ferenc Nagy Ministerpräsident und Béla Varga Parlamentspräsident, sie wurden aber sukzessive zum Rückzug gedrängt. Die führenden Politiker mussten einsehen, dass sie entweder in Untersuchungshaft genommen werden oder ins Ausland gehen: Mai 1947 emigrierte Nagy<sup>68</sup> in die Schweiz. Juni 1947 kam Varga über Österreich in den Westen. Pál Auer war von 1946–1947 ungarischer Botschafter in Paris und blieb nach seiner Entlassung weiterhin dort.<sup>69</sup> Diese Politiker wurden zu den Führern der ungarischen politischen Emigration.

Das Magyar Nemzeti Bizottmány (Ungarisches Nationales Komitee) (1947 bis 1957, gegründet in den USA) war die offizielle ungarische „*Emigrantenregierung*“. Der Präsident der Vereinigung war Béla Varga. Pál Auer war für die Außenangelegenheiten zuständig. Zu den Führungspersonlichkeiten gehörte auch Ferenc Nagy. Zu den ehemaligen Kleinlandwirten gehörten weiters die ebenfalls in den Westen emigrierten Tibor Hám, Gyula Desefffy und Zoltán Pfeiffer.

Nach 1956 bildeten sich die Emigrantenstrukturen neu. Hinzukam eine große Anzahl von politisch aktiven, großteils jüngeren Männern sowie einige weitere etablierte Politiker wie Anna Kéthly, eine Sozialdemokratin, die Anfang November 1956 als Mitglied der Imre Nagy Regierung in den Westen gelangte und angesichts des Einmarsches der Sowjettruppen nach Budapest hier blieb. Nachfolgeorganisation

<sup>67</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-174 S. 280f., 18. Juni 1965.

<sup>68</sup> Zur Tätigkeit Nagys in Ungarn siehe u.a. Ferenc NAGY: *Struggle behind the Iron Curtain*, 1948.

<sup>69</sup> Zu Auers Tätigkeit und Ansichten siehe u.a. Pál AUER: *Fél évszázad*, 1971.



von Nemzeti Bizottmány wurde ab 1958 der Forradalmi Tanács (Revolutionsrat).

Es ist eine Frage, inwiefern diese Führungselite (politische Führung mit Varga und Nagy und die journalistische Elite mit Klamár und Sebestyén) eine reale gesellschaftliche Gruppe repräsentiert. Bezeichnenderweise konnte sich die Partei der Kleinen Landwirte in Ungarn weder nach 1945, noch nach 1989 behaupten. Beide Male haben sie von den Wählern eine Aufgabe bekommen,<sup>70</sup> die sie beide Male mittelfristig nicht wahrnehmen konnten. Was 1947 mit den kriminellen Methoden der Kommunisten und mit der globalen politischen Lage erklärt werden konnte, muss in den 1990er Jahren der inzwischen erfolgten Erosion der Bedeutung der Partei zugeschrieben werden. Die Perspektive, die jene Elitegruppe vertrat, funktionierte nur in einer künstlichen Situation wie z.B. die der Emigration.<sup>71</sup>

Das ist, was das Blatt *Magyar Híradó* widerspiegelt. Es vertritt eine populistische Linie und hält einen Geist aufrecht, der als Alternative zum Stalinismus im Jahrzehnt 1945–1956 in Ungarn eine Bedeutung hatte, der aber bereits 1957 überholt war. Das Überleben des Blattes sicherten die Emigranten, die ganz genau diese Erinnerung wach halten wollten, bildete sie doch ihre Identität und rechtfertigte sie ihr Schicksal.

### ***Die Sprache des Staatssicherheitsdienstes***

Die in diesem Aufsatz ausführlich zitierten Akten geben nicht nur Einblick in das Funktionieren der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste und bringen nicht nur zahlreiche Details, die erst in ihrer Fülle die Komplexität der ungarischen Emigration in Österreich in der Periode des Kalten Krieges deutlich machen und somit die Dynamik erklären können, die diese Migration in politischer, kultureller und gesellschaftlicher Hinsicht auch für die Geschichte Österreichs bedeutend macht, sondern eröffnen auch den Blick auf einen Bereich, der sich u.a. auch sprachlich definiert.<sup>72</sup> Diese Berichte verwenden eine Reihe von besonderen Begriffen, weisen spezielle Anwendungen von auch in der Alltagssprache gebräuchlichen Wörtern auf, haben spezifische grammatikalische Strukturen, und spiegeln typische soziolinguistische Eigenheiten wider.

So bilden die Decknamen eine eigene Wortgattung. Wir haben Kövi, Irodalmár und Szegedi, Vitéz, Kerekes und Siklós kennengelernt. Im Weiteren sind Decknamen vorgekommen, die nicht ungarisch klingen, so Lipmann und Barclay. Es scheint eine Regel zu sein, dass Personen, die in Ungarn oder von Ungarn aus agierten ungarisch klingende Decknamen hatten. Ausländer bzw. Ungarn, die dauerhaft im Ausland lebten erhielten fremd klingende Decknamen. Es gibt

---

<sup>70</sup> Die Wahlergebnisse waren 1945 57% und 1990 12%.

<sup>71</sup> Aus dieser Hinsicht ist es erwähnenswert, dass 1989, bei der Wende in Ungarn, kein Emigrantenpolitiker und keine Emigrantenorganisation eine wie auch immer geartete Rolle spielte.

<sup>72</sup> Anregungen zu den Ausführungen in diesem Abschnitt verdanke ich Gesprächen mit Tamás Forgács (Universität Szeged) im Januar 2013.

weitere eine Reihe von Spezialausdrücken bzw. linguistischen Sondergebräuchen, die nur im Staatssicherheitsdienstjargon vorkommen.

Ilosvay war erstens „*klerikal*“ und zweitens „*Verräter*“. Er hat damit einen Verrat begangen, dass er als ehemaliger Agent die Mitarbeit verweigerte. Weiters gehören zum spezifischen Vokabular der Staatssicherheitsdienste Ausdrücke wie *Residentur* und *Linie* sowie Sondergebräuche von alltagssprachlich verwendeten Ausdrücken wie *Zersetzen* (so z.B. in der zitierten Aufgabenbezeichnung „*die Emigration zu beeinflussen und zu zersetzen*“) und *Kompromittierung*.

Eine wiederkehrende Formulierung ist: „*Die Information ist vertrauenswürdig, aber nicht überprüft.*“ Das heißt so viel, dass die Information bzw. der Bericht von einem Agenten stammt (dem man natürlich vertraut), als überprüft würde die Information aber nur gelten, falls sie durch einen zweiten unabhängigen und ebenfalls vertrauenswürdigen Kanal bestätigt wäre. Da den ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienstorganen in Österreich nur wenige Agenten zur Verfügung standen und insbesondere auf ein und dieselbe Aufgabe in den meisten Fällen nur eine einzige Person abgestellt wurde, waren die meisten Informationen „*nicht überprüft*“. Die Einseitigkeit, dass die Emigration betreffend in diesem Aufsatz immer wieder derselbe Agent, nämlich Kövi, zitiert wird, war auch ein Problem der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste. Etwas anders scheint die Situation betreffend von *Magyar Híradó* zu sein. Wie aus den hier zitierten Berichten hervorgeht, konnten die ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste – entweder direkt oder indirekt – durch drei ihrer Mitarbeiter, Irodalmár, Szegedi und Szénási, Informationen beschaffen.

Um die spezifische Tätigkeit der Staatssicherheitsdienstorgane anzugeben wurden allgemein gebräuchliche Tätigkeitswörter weiterentwickelt bzw. auf eine Sonderbedeutung reduziert: jmd. in inländischer und ausländischer Hinsicht aufarbeiten (*feldolgozni*), jmd. studieren (*tanulmányozni*), jmd. auf Grundlage von *Pressio* anwerben (*pressziós alapon beszervezni*), jmd. auf jmd. arbeiten lassen (z.B. *nagybátyjára dolgoztattuk K-174 S. 111f*); auf jmd. Informationen sammeln (z.B. *gyűjtsön adatokat Dallosra K-174 S. 111*).

Es stellt sich natürlich die Frage, wie sich dieser linguistische Sonderbereich entwickelte, also aus welchen anderen linguistischen Sonderbereichen er sich formte. Die aufgezählten Begriffe, Redewendungen und Wortgebräuche stammen aus der Polizei- und Militärsprache (*Befehl*, *Anweisung*), aus der Sprache der Bürokratie (*Bericht*, *zusammenfassender Bericht*), aus der Medizin (*Operation*, *operative Mitarbeiter*, „*Lokalisation der feindlichen Tätigkeit von Dallos*“ K-174 S. 111f.), und Rechtssprechung („*Für Siklós ist es legalisierbar...*“ K-174 S. 111f.) sowie aus der Sprache der sozialistischen Ideologie (*Befreiung* und *Konterrevolution*).

Die Sprache des Sozialismus enthält eine Reihe von Wortschöpfungen, so *Konterrevolution* – für die Revolution 1956 –, *dissidieren* und *Dissident* – im Sinne von einem Landsmann, der sich illegal ins Ausland absetzte bzw. sich im (westlichen) Ausland aufhält. *Kapitalist* und *kapitalistisch* wird im Sinne des

Klassenkampfes als Erzfeind und als „*der Andere*” verstanden, also was man selbst nicht ist bzw. wogegen man auftritt. Die Staatssicherheitsdienstbehörde schrieb sich die Aufgabe zu, gegen die Verhetzung gegen die Ungarische Volksrepublik aufzutreten, gegen diejenigen, die einen Kampf gegen die kommunistische Bewegung – und diesem Namen entsprechend: gegen das Streben für Gerechtigkeit, wo also jeder das Gleiche hat bzw. der Privatbesitz überhaupt abgeschafft ist – führen. Entsprechend der sozialistischen Ideologie wird der Feind als eine Verschwörung dargestellt, deren einzelnen Elemente den historischen Gegnern der kommunistischen Bewegung entsprechen. Es sind die Aristokratie und der Großkapital – deren Vertreter sich laut dem Bericht K-1418 S. 36f. im Österreichischen Nationalkomitee für Ungarn vereinten –, die Nazipartei und die Kirche – ebendort. Faschisten und Legitimisten waren Kräfte, die in der Zwischenkriegszeit in Ungarn politische Rollen spielten, was nach 1945 zur Rechtfertigung der Eliminierung aller Oppositionspolitik diente. Klerikal war der Vorwurf, den man gegen den Chefredakteur Ilosvay erhob – im K-51 S. 2 –, eine Behauptung, die aufgrund der im Blatt gedruckten Artikel nicht begründbar ist. Dieser Vorwurf erklärt sich möglicherweise daraus, dass Ilosvay „*auf kirchliche Linie*” (also durch die Mitarbeiter der Unterabteilung, die sich diesem Aufgabenbereich widmeten) angeworben und drei Jahre lang (nämlich 1948–1951) beschäftigt wurde und als man ihn auf seinen Onkel, der ein hoher geistlicher Würdenträger war, arbeiten lassen wollte, er die Mitarbeit verweigerte und so „*Verrat*” begangen hat. Da in den Akten der Staatssicherheitsdienste diese Vorgeschichte festgehalten war, bezeichnete man Ilosvay „*klerikal*” – er hatte ja etwas mit dem Klerus zu tun – und folgerte daraus, dass das Blatt, das er redigiert, auch klerikal sein muss.

Die Denkweise der Staatssicherheitsdienste wird beispielsweise an der folgenden – einmal bereits zitierten – Stelle deutlich. György Sebestyéns

*Tätigkeit ist gegenüber unserer Heimat zu dieser Zeit eindeutig feindlich: er ist Chefredakteur eines mit den Geldern von US Amerikanern finanzierten Blattes und als solcher nimmt er aktiv Teil an der Organisation und Durchführung der gegen Ungarn und die sozialistischen Länder gerichteten Rufmordkampagne.<sup>73</sup>*

Offenbar stehen, entsprechend der globalen Situation des Kalten Krieges, zwei feindliche Seiten einander gegenüber: der durch die USA gelenkte Block und der sowjetische bzw. kommunistische/sozialistische. Mit Sozialismus wird hier allerdings erst nebenbei argumentiert. Es geht vor allem um „*unsere Heimat*”, die eben in einer sozialistischen Solidaritätsgemeinschaft eingebunden ist. Dass die USA als Anführer des kapitalistischen Blocks mittels Geld ihre Anhänger bewegt entspricht genauso der Logik der Sache, wie dass es sich bei deren Tätigkeit um verwerfliche Angelegenheiten wie etwa eine Rufmordkampagne handelt. Diese

---

<sup>73</sup> ÁBTL 3.2.4. K-173/3 S. 29f.

Kampagne wird als eine große gemeinsame Aktion angesehen, die von den USA orchestriert wird und wie eine Verschwörung funktionieren muss. Ob diese Ideologie von den Mitarbeitern der Staatssicherheitsdienste „geglaubt“ wurde ist hier natürlich zweitrangig. Sie führten ihren Krieg entsprechend dieser Kategorien.

Die sprachlichen Formulierungen und linguistischen Eigenheiten des bereits ausführlich zitierten Berichtes K-174 S. 285ff. vom 24. 09. 1964 verdienen ebenfalls unsere Aufmerksamkeit. In der deutschen Übersetzung ist das freilich nur indirekt vermittelbar, dass es sich hierbei ebenfalls um einen vom Alltagssprachgebrauch abweichenden Verwendungsbereich handelt. Der Verfasser verwendet eine offiziöse Sprache mit antiquiertem Jargon und bestimmten wiederkehrenden Formulierungen. Der Autor dürfte ein Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheitsdienste gewesen sein, der seinen Bericht freiwillig und aus ideologischer Überzeugung ablieferte, somit eine Person, die sich im sozialistischen System eingerichtet hat und dieses System unterstützte. Sein Sprachgebrauch reflektiert diese Stellung: er beschreibt die Details des feindlichen Nachrichtendienstes *Magyar Híradó* (und verwendet daher Begriffe aus dem Vokabular von „kapitalistischen Ländern“ bis „dem Westen entsprechende Propaganda“) in einer umständlichen und unterwürfigen Sprache, wo die Denunziation in einem möglichst sachlichen und unpersönlichen Ton erfolgt. Es dürfte so auch das objektiviert dargestellt werden können, was moralisch problematisch und daher subjektiv schwierig war.

\*

Da alle Bemühungen der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste Ende der 1950er-Anfang der 1960er Jahre im Endeffekt nichts fruchteten, blieb *Magyar Híradó* das Emigrantenblatt, als das es gegründet wurde. Die Redaktion passte sich der sich ändernden internationalen Realität auch in dem Sinne an, dass man entsprechend der aktuellen – und am Anfang der 1960er Jahre hieß das: milderer – Phase des Kalten Krieges auch mit Vertretern des offiziellen Ungarn – zwar weiterhin äußerst schwierigen und umständlichen – Kontakt hatte. Die Zeitschrift entspricht also in jeder Hinsicht ganz genau den historischen Umständen, welche sie kreierte, trugen und welche sie auch in ihren Berichten widerspiegelte.

Die ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste zeigen sich dabei als ein Organ eines Molochs, der ebenfalls nicht bloß dem Moloch, sondern auch der internationalen historischen Situation entspricht. Sie übernahmen diplomatische Aufgaben, die man offiziell nicht wahrnehmen konnte, weil das den diplomatischen Regeln widersprach. Bzw. anders formuliert: sie übernahmen Aufgaben, die laut internationalen diplomatischen Gepflogenheiten, die Staatssicherheitsorgane übernehmen. Daher agierte man im Schatten bzw. als ein Doppel, wobei die agierenden Personen – so der Presseattaché und andere Diplomaten der Wiener Botschaft – Personen mit zwei Aufgabenbereichen waren. Sie bildeten einen integren – also sowohl organisch gewachsenen als auch für das Funktionieren

unabdingbaren – Teil der Strukturen, die das System, also das System des sog. realen Sozialismus, mehr als vier Jahrzehnte, und d.h. rückblickend gesehen, sehr erfolgreich, aufrechterhalten haben.

Das beklemmende Gefühl, das beim Lesen der Originalberichte aus dem Historischen Archiv der ungarischen Staatssicherheitsdienste den Leser immer mehr durchdringt ist ein schwaches Echo dessen, was diese Jahre jeden Betroffenen permanent begleitete. Und zwar auch in der Emigration, also dort, wo man hingelange, um genau diesem „*Gefühl*“ und seinem System zu entkommen.

Dass Österreich dabei nicht nur der geographische Ort war, wo all das sich abspielte, sondern – wie etwa die Ausführungen über die diplomatischen Tätigkeiten oder über die Finanzierungen das zeigen – die Geschehnisse um diese Migration in die gesellschaftliche, politische und kulturelle Strukturen des Landes integriert waren, ist eine Einsicht, die man erst dann datenbasiert, also mit einer wissenschaftlich nennbaren Sicherheit, gewinnen kann, wenn man auf Archivbestände zurückgreift, die Details enthalten, die aus den für die wissenschaftliche Forschung zugänglichen Beständen von österreichischen Archiven nicht herauslesbar sind.



## ***Studies in French***

- the construction of the European electrical system
- visit of the Hungarian foreign minister, János Péter, to Paris in 1965
- 1989, as the cornerstone of the bilateral relations between France and Hungary





**Christophe Bouneau**

## ***Circulations et échanges d'énergie électrique en Europe depuis 1945 : un levier méconnu de la construction européenne***

### **Abstract**

Until the Second World War trans-national exchanges of electricity remained statistically relatively limited. The interconnection technological revolution could not be accomplished until after 1945, when there emerged three favorable factors: the move towards unification and rationalization of businesses in Western Europe; the growth in the period up to the 1970s, and the wish for technical cooperation by the Western European nation states. The construction of a European electrical system can be considered both anticipation, and a metaphor, for the political construction of Europe. After a period of tests and trail and error, the synchronization of the electric infrastructures of the eight founding nations of the UCPTE, (Union for the Coordination of Production and Transmission of Electricity), was completed in 1958, around a core composed of the French, Swiss and German networks. The construction of such a dense system of liaisons, and the perfecting of the regulatory system for frequency/power, allowed a considerable increase in the flux of international exchanges: by the end of the 1980s the UCPTE network was the largest synchronized system in the world, assuring the supply of 280 million people with a high level of spending power. The collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989 made interconnection with the East a new challenge, both technically and economically, which took a decade to be successful. At the same time the major contribution the electricity networks made to the energy market in Europe was build around three European directives: of 19 December 1996, 26 June 2003 and 13 July 2009, which directed the independence of the transmission system operators (TSO) and put in place regulatory agencies. The neo-Saint-Simonian historic trajectory is thus successfully completed, with the European convergence of the TSOs and the regulators.

*Keywords:* Interconnection, Electrification, Large Technical Systems, Networks, Geopolitics, Europeanism, European Construction, Technocracy.

L'histoire de l'interconnexion des réseaux électriques européens depuis le second conflit mondial constitue un excellent prisme de l'étude des dynamiques d'innovation confrontées au nouveau paradigme européen<sup>1</sup>. Ces trajectoires recouvrent les cinq configurations classiques de l'innovation schumpétérienne, au-delà de la seule sphère technologique qui reste au demeurant essentielle, et se déploient dans un espace électrique européen

---

<sup>1</sup> Voir BOUNEAU Ch., DERDEVET M. et PERCEBOIS J.: *Les réseaux électriques au coeur de la civilisation industrielle*, Paris, Timée Editions, 2007, 178. préface de A. Piebals, Commissaire européen à l'énergie.

combinant trois dimensions<sup>2</sup> : d'abord historiquement celle des échanges intermittents de courant, puis celle d'un fonctionnement territorial synchrone, enfin celle d'un marché unique contrôlé par un régulateur européen, dans un horizon prospectif de la seconde décennie du XXI<sup>ème</sup> siècle. Le développement des réseaux électriques à très haute tension (à partir de 220 kV) en Europe occidentale après 1950 montre bien que ces trajectoires de l'innovation ont indéniablement constitué des voies de structuration durable de l'espace européen. Pour autant elles ont dû surmonter de nombreux conflits géopolitiques mais aussi tout simplement commerciaux et entrepreneuriaux, qu'ont bien mis à jour les menaces de black-out dans le berceau de l'Europe électrique (France, Suisse, Italie, Allemagne) en septembre 2003 et novembre 2006<sup>3</sup>.

### ***1. Le pouvoir croissant des réseaux : la genèse de l'Europe électrique jusqu'à la fin des années 1980***

Dans cette trajectoire électrique, qui a *posteriori* tous les traits d'une *success story*, trois leviers d'innovation technologique, sous forme de grappes, ont porté la genèse de l'Europe électrique : la mise au point du réglage fréquence/puissance, l'escalade des tensions de transport à grande distance et le perfectionnement des dispositifs d'interconnexion utilisant le courant continu et les câbles sous-marins de transport d'énergie. Cette innovation technologique n'a pu cependant se déployer efficacement que grâce au nouveau contexte géopolitique de l'Europe occidentale, insérée dans la Guerre froide, et à la conjoncture économique de haute croissance des années cinquante et soixante.

#### **1. La première mystique européenne de l'interconnexion : l'innovation du transport à haute tension comme apprentissage de la solidarité économique**

Le développement du réseau électrique en Europe, marqué depuis les années 1890 par une croissance continue des échelles du local à l'international, qui paraît faussement irréversible dans une perspective d'analyse des cycles d'innovation aussi bien technologique qu'organisationnelle, a été nourri par une véritable « *mystique* » de l'interconnexion<sup>4</sup>.

L'histoire de l'interconnexion répond à deux principes classiques des systèmes techniques à grande échelle: une extension géographique permanente des échanges par élévation des tensions, d'une centaine de kilomètres par des lignes à 60 KV à la veille de la Grande Guerre à plus de 2.000 kilomètres aujourd'hui par

---

<sup>2</sup> Voir BOUNEAU Ch. et GRISET P.(dirs): *Innovations et territoires*, numéro spécial de *Flux, Cahiers scientifiques internationaux Réseaux et territoires*, n° 63/64, juin 2006, 120.

<sup>3</sup> Voir BOUNEAU Ch. et LUNG Y. (dirs): *Les territoires de l'innovation, espaces de conflits*, Bordeaux, éditions de la MSHA, 2006, 302 p.

<sup>4</sup> Voir BOUNEAU Ch.: *Entre David et Goliath. La dynamique des réseaux régionaux en France du milieu du XIX<sup>ème</sup> au milieu du XX<sup>ème</sup> siècles*, Bordeaux, éditions de la MSHA, 2008, 611. 300-322.

des artères à 400 KV et au-delà; une complexité croissante des dispositifs de gestion. Sa logique spécifique réside cependant dans une complémentarité multiforme géographique, technique et temporelle.

Jusqu'à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, les échanges transnationaux d'électricité en Europe restèrent statistiquement assez limités. S'ils recouvraient surtout, outre l'alimentation locale de "poches" de consommation jouxtant la frontière, des échanges interrégionaux, ils n'en jouaient pas moins dès les années 1930 un rôle intéressant de régulation à la marge des systèmes. Les deux milliards de KWh qui traversaient les frontières en Europe occidentale en 1938 contribuaient assurément à l'équilibre des charges, à la sécurité de l'exploitation et évitaient la mise en marche de centrales thermiques trop vétustes.

La révolution technologique de l'interconnexion internationale ne put véritablement s'accomplir qu'après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, grâce à la combinaison de trois facteurs favorables: la logique d'unification et de rationalisation des entreprises d'Europe occidentale, en premier lieu l'entreprise publique E.D.F., la conjoncture de croissance des „Trente Glorieuses" et la volonté de coopération technique des Etats de l'Europe de l'Ouest. En fait la construction d'un système électrique européen peut être considérée à la fois comme une anticipation et une métaphore de la construction politique de l'Europe<sup>5</sup>.

Dans ce processus territorial d'innovation globale les communautés professionnelles et les institutions internationales jouèrent un rôle moteur. Dès l'entre-deux-guerres, elles avaient multiplié les recherches théoriques et les projets économiques sur l'aménagement d'un réseau européen à très haute tension<sup>6</sup>.

Les rapports aux congrès de la Conférence Internationale des Grands Réseaux Electriques (C.I.G.R.E.)<sup>7</sup>, de la Conférence Mondiale de l'Energie et de l'Union Internationale des Producteurs et Distributeurs d'Electricité (U.N.I.P.E.D.E.)<sup>8</sup> en fournissent la preuve directe. Ce dernier organisme créé en 1925 intégra rapidement la quasi-totalité des pays européens, y compris ceux de la partie orientale: il constituait une union d'exploitants qui voulaient confronter leurs expériences de construction et de gestion de réseaux. Après la guerre à l'est, seules la Yougoslavie, la Hongrie et la Pologne continuèrent à participer aux travaux de l'U.N.I.P.E.D.E.

---

<sup>5</sup> Voir VLEUTEN Erik van der et KAUJER Arne (eds): *Networking Europe. Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000*, Sagamore Beach, Ma, Science History Publications, 2007, 326.

<sup>6</sup> Voir BARRERE Julien: *La genèse de l'Europe électrique: les logiques de l'interconnexion transnationale (début des années 1920-fin des années 1950)*. Mémoire de maîtrise, Christophe Bouneau (dir) Université Bordeaux III, 2002, 2 vol., 552 p. et la récente excellente thèse de Vincent LAGENDIJK, réalisée sous la direction de Johan Schot: *Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks*, Eindhoven University of Technology, 2008, 247 p.

<sup>7</sup> Voir BOUNEAU Ch.: *The History of CIGRE (International Council on Large Electric Systems) A key player in the development of electric power systems since 1921*, Paris, Conformes, 2011, 204 p.

<sup>8</sup> Devenue aujourd'hui Eurelectric.

A la fin des années 1940 il existait déjà en Europe une cinquantaine de connexions transnationales de tension comprise entre 70 et 220 KV, permettant d'échanger 2% de l'énergie totale alors consommée, soit trois milliards de kwh. Mais l'interconnexion internationale demeurait toujours à un stade d'ébauche technique car, d'une part, les réseaux restaient cloisonnés en systèmes nationaux qui différaient par la vitesse de marche de leurs alternateurs, et d'autre part, les liaisons ne concernaient que certains ensembles régionaux sans aboutir à un bouclage général. La coordination nécessaire des systèmes interconnectés trouva son promoteur naturel dans l'U.N.I.P.E.D.E., qui créa en 1949 un Comité d'Etude des Interconnexions Internationales. Elle s'appuya également sur un nouvel organisme, l'Union pour la Coordination de la Production et du Transport de l'Electricité: mise en place en 1951 suivant les recommandations de l'O.E.C.E., l'U.C.P.T.E. devait développer la solidarité des exploitants de réseaux, en s'inspirant du modèle organisationnel et technique américain. Aux huit membres fondateurs (France, Italie, R.F.A., Autriche, Suisse, Belgique, Pays-Bas, Luxembourg) s'ajoutèrent dans les années soixante l'Espagne, le Portugal, la Yougoslavie et la Grèce, preuve de la capacité d'attraction de ce pool.

## **2. Le bouclage d'une Europe de l'Ouest électrique : l'irréversibilité d'un processus d'expansion du réseau européen ?**

Grâce à ces progrès de la coopération internationale, les années cinquante virent la genèse industrielle, et non plus seulement théorique, d'un réseau ouest-européen. Les échanges intermittents, de secours, changeaient profondément de régime pour devenir permanents. La révolution technologique du réglage fréquence- puissance, question très ardue, permit de relever ce défi en assurant non seulement la stabilité statique mais aussi la stabilité dynamique d'un système interconnecté de plus en plus vaste. Ce dispositif de régulation toujours en vigueur ajuste en effet la fréquence des réseaux nationaux à 50 Hz et s'assure automatiquement que les échanges réalisés sont bien conformes aux programmes définis à l'avance.

Après une phase classique d'essais et de tâtonnements, la synchronisation des infrastructures électriques des huit pays fondateurs de l'U.C.P.T.E. fut réalisée définitivement en 1958, autour du noyau constitué par les systèmes français, suisse et allemand. A partir de « *l'étoile de Laufenbourg* », devenue célèbre dans la communauté internationale des électriciens, ce bouclage général de l'Europe occidentale représentait une victoire décisive en effaçant les inquiétudes des experts eux-mêmes. Dès le début des années soixante l'U.N.I.P.E.D.E. et l'U.C.P.T.E., travaillant sur les limites de l'étendue d'un complexe synchronisé, montrèrent que celles-ci étaient plus organisationnelles et économiques que techniques. A la même époque, les deux organismes abandonnèrent d'ailleurs les projets de connexions à des tensions supérieures à 400 KV (750 KV voire 1.100 KV) car elles s'avéraient inutiles pour des espaces de fortes densités de consommation: elles ne s'imposaient que pour la traversée de "déserts électriques" sur d'autres continents.

Ce développement en surface s'accompagna naturellement d'un développement en profondeur du réseau ouest-européen durant le trend 1959-1979, séquence majeure d'accélération de la construction de l'Europe électrique. Les méthodes de calcul sur grand ordinateur élaborées dans les années soixante-dix montrent bien que les électriciens européens ont toujours eu pour mission la recherche d'un optimum technologique, situé par définition à un niveau d'interconnexion supérieur, tandis que la conduite quotidienne du système s'affirme comme un arbitrage permanent entre coût et sécurité.

La construction d'un ensemble assez dense de liaisons et la mise au point de la régulation fréquence-puissance permirent une croissance considérable des flux d'échanges internationaux: dans l'espace des douze pays de l'U.C.P.T.E., ils atteignaient déjà en 1991 140 milliards de kwh, représentant 9% de la consommation totale. Le réseau de l'U.C.P.T.E. constituait alors le plus important système synchronisé du monde, disposant d'une puissance de pointe de 250.000 MW et assurant la desserte de 280 millions d'habitants au pouvoir d'achat élevé.

L'effondrement de l'empire soviétique en 1989 a fait de l'interconnexion avec l'Europe de l'Est un nouveau défi technologique et économique majeur. Au début des années quatre-vingt seulement, donc avec un très net retard sur l'U.C.P.T.E., tous les pays de l'ex-bloc communiste furent synchronisés dans le cadre de l'U.P.S.-I.P.S. (United Power System and Interconnected Power System): celui-ci disposait d'une puissance de pointe également de 250.000 MW. Mais le synchronisme étant différent de celui de l'ouest, aucune connexion à très haute tension en alternatif ne reliait directement les deux systèmes au début des années 1990<sup>9</sup>.

Ainsi les projets de l'entre-deux-guerres qualifiés d'utopiques apparaissent en réalité comme de simples anticipations de réalisations techniques effectives, avec un décalage chronologique de l'ordre d'un demi-siècle. La croissance continue de la taille des systèmes interconnectés et la complexification des mécanismes régulateurs en sont la vivante preuve. L'instauration d'une solidarité électrique européenne constitue bien une révolution énergétique au sens plein du terme, marquée par deux accélérations dans les années cinquante et depuis les années 1990.

## ***II Les nouvelles trajectoires de l'interconnexion transnationale depuis les années 1990***

### **1. Le sillage de la déréglementation et la construction difficile d'une politique électrique européenne**

La contribution majeure des réseaux électriques à la construction d'un marché européen de l'électricité a bénéficié d'une impulsion décisive avec la première

---

<sup>9</sup> Voir LAGENDIJK Vincent: *"High Voltage, Lower Tensions. The interconnections of Eastern and Western European electricity networks in the 1970s and 1980s"*, IN: BUSSIERE Eric, DUMOULIN Michel et SCHIRMANN Sylvain (dirs): *Milieus économiques et intégrations européennes au XX<sup>ème</sup> siècle. La crise des années 1970 de la conférence de La Haye à la veille de la relance des années 1980*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2006, 137-165.

directive européenne de l'électricité du 19 décembre 1996<sup>10</sup>. Dans notre perspective elle représente un véritable texte fondateur dans tous les sens du terme, en assignant trois objectifs essentiels aux Etats membres : a) une ouverture progressive des marchés électriques par l'accès libre aux réseaux de clients éligibles, avec un degré minimum d'ouverture fixé à 35% de la consommation nationale en 2003. b) une séparation au moins comptable des activités de production et de transport, dans le cas des entreprises électriques intégrées. c) la mise en place de gestionnaires de réseaux de transport (GRT), chargés dans chaque pays ou dans chaque région d'assurer, en toute indépendance vis-à-vis des producteurs, le bon fonctionnement du système électrique et l'acheminement de l'énergie dans des conditions non discriminatoires.

Une deuxième directive européenne de l'électricité du 26 juin 2003 a approfondi ces objectifs en renforçant l'indépendance des GRT vis-à-vis des autres acteurs du marché de l'électricité : il s'agit désormais d'arriver à une véritable séparation juridique des activités de transport par rapport aux autres secteurs des entreprises autrefois intégrées. Siégeant à Bruxelles les deux associations européennes des gestionnaires de réseaux de transport coordonnent l'animation du marché de l'électricité. Au rôle historique de l'UCTE, dont la mission reste de définir les standards techniques de l'interconnexion, est venu s'ajouter celui d'ETSO (Association of European Transmission System Operators), qui vise à harmoniser en Europe les règles d'accès au réseau et à réaliser un véritable marché intérieur de l'électricité. L'UCPTE a perdu logiquement son P de production en 1999 pour devenir Union pour la coordination du transport de l'électricité. Son périmètre, qui comprend aujourd'hui 210 000 km de lignes HT et THT, 34 GRT dans 23 pays européens desservant une population de près de 500 millions d'habitants, s'étend jusqu'aux frontières de l'ex-URSS. ETSO quant à elle a été créée en juillet 1999 à la fois par l'UCTE, les GRT britanniques et NORDEL (association des GRT scandinaves). Sa mission première consiste à élaborer les modalités économiques et juridiques des transits internationaux d'électricité.

Au-delà de l'intégration très progressive des réseaux de l'ancien bloc soviétique<sup>11</sup>, qui est en réalité loin d'être achevée à cause des conditions très difficiles de recherche du synchronisme, l'horizon de l'interconnexion européenne franchit aujourd'hui les frontières continentales pour s'intéresser au Moyen-Orient et surtout au Maghreb.

## **2. La dilatation européenne de l'espace électrique: la quête du réseau européen infini ?**

En définitive, malgré les vertiges de la complexité, les limites de l'interconnexion ne sont fixées que par les facteurs économiques liés au coût du transport. A la différence

---

<sup>10</sup> Voir ISIDIRO Cécile : *L'ouverture du marché de l'électricité à la concurrence communautaire et sa mise en œuvre (Allemagne, France, Italie, Royaume-Uni)*, LGDJ, 2006, 664.

<sup>11</sup> Ce système est toujours structuré par de grandes pénétrantes à 750 000 V de l'Ukraine vers les pays d'Europe de l'Est, qui leur permettaient de bénéficier d'importations massives d'électricité.

d'autres types de réseaux techniques où la complexité se marie aussi bien avec le maintien de petites tailles<sup>12</sup>, l'accroissement de l'échelle spatiale des systèmes interconnectés semble toujours relever d'une logique irréversible.

A une échelle transnationale, qui ne devint donc que très progressivement européenne, le discours sur le développement du transport d'électricité a mis en avant tous les bénéfices de la croissance du réseau dans un cadre continental, et même désormais partiellement intercontinental par les nouvelles liaisons avec l'Afrique du Nord et la Turquie. Avec cette nouvelle ère des transcontinentaux électriques, les gestionnaires de réseaux et les autorités politiques projettent bien à moyen terme un *Mare Nostrum* de l'électricité, en tissant la toile d'un nouveau système électrique international où les régions d'exploitation englobent désormais plusieurs pays.

Va-t-on ainsi poursuivre, à l'avenir, la constitution d'un vaste système électrique synchrone paneuropéen, couvrant demain une Europe étendue de Marrakech à Vladivostok, en faisant le tour de la Méditerranée ? S'il est une donnée remarquable dans l'histoire des réseaux électriques européens, c'est bien que la construction de l'Europe de l'électricité a toujours précédé l'Union économique et politique. Les relations électriques entre pays européens se sont ainsi établies sur la base à la fois d'un projet technique maîtrisé et de la volonté de quelques-uns, portés par la mystique de la modernisation, de construire un espace économique pacifié.

Aujourd'hui ce sont donc 23 pays, allant de la France à la frontière ukrainienne et du Maghreb à la Scandinavie, qui sont directement interconnectés. Si un moyen de production subit une panne dans l'un de ces pays, tous les autres augmentent en quelques secondes leur production pour rééquilibrer le système et éviter toute perturbation majeure. Le système électrique européen représente ainsi un des plus grands systèmes « mutualisés » au monde, avec une puissance électrique installée de plus de 600 000 MW et une consommation annuelle de 2 300 TWh.

En soixante ans, depuis la fin du second conflit mondial, la solidarité et les échanges mutuels entre pays européens se seront ainsi généralisés, alors que comparativement les Etats-Unis, il est vrai moins densément peuplés, en sont restés à trois systèmes électriques non-interconnectés.

### ***III Les réseaux d'interconnexion, vecteurs fragiles de l'expansion de la circulation de l'énergie électrique en Europe***

#### **1. Le spectre du black-out européen**

Depuis la grève des électriciens parisiens de 1907 le black-out représente à la fois la menace de la paralysie de toutes les activités économiques et sociales vitales, avec à terme l'effondrement de la civilisation industrielle et urbaine, et un levier majeur de communication stratégique, dans le cadre des guerres et des

---

<sup>12</sup> Voir J.M. OFFNER: «Are there such things as small networks? », IN: O. COUTARD (dir): *The Governance of Large Technical Systems*, London et New York, Routledge, 1999, 217-238.

révolutions ; il est aussi enjeu de communication politique et idéologique, dans le cadre des conflits du travail et de la dénonciation des conséquences de la dérégulation et de l'ouverture du marché de l'électricité sur la sécurité d'approvisionnement énergétique.

La représentation du mouvement d'interconnexion européenne reste objectivement profondément ambivalente comme processus à la fois technologique et géopolitique. En effet les gains de mutualisation d'une extension européenne des capacités de production par le jeu de l'interconnexion, et donc le discours sur l'organisation d'un nouvel équilibre énergétique continental, peuvent être largement contrebalancés par les risques de congestion des échanges internationaux d'électricité. Immédiatement surgit alors le spectre de l'effondrement du réseau européen comme un château de cartes conduisant au black-out. Ce spectre est en effet loin d'être lié uniquement au risque nucléaire majeur, du type du scénario de Tchernobyl, il peut malheureusement arriver par les seules défaillances du réseau d'interconnexion lui-même, en l'occurrence l'insuffisance de surcapacité des artères de transport pour répondre à tous les scénarios de crise et de congestion. Une première approximation de ce « *grand soir* » a d'ailleurs été expérimentée en septembre 2003, avec l'effondrement du réseau italien, dû à l'insuffisance des liaisons entre la France, la Suisse et l'Italie, chaque pays se rejetant naturellement les responsabilités, en particulier la Suisse qui a du mal à assumer ses responsabilités internationales de régulateur électrique de l'Europe alpine.

Le scénario de crise et de propagation en cascade du 28 septembre 2003 peut être considéré aujourd'hui comme un archétype des failles de la coordination et de la régulation européennes, sinon comme le premier avertissement sans frais majeurs, avant le « *grand soir* » électrique de l'Europe. Après le déclenchement de la ligne suisse Mettlen-Lavorgno dû à un amorçage avec un arbre, une surcharge intervint sur la ligne voisine Sils-Scazza provoquant des déclenchements en cascade sur le réseau italien. Son effondrement a affecté 57 millions de personnes et son rétablissement a demandé plus de 13 heures. A l'heure de la panne, 3 heures du matin, la demande italienne représentait seulement 45% de la demande de pointe : le parc de production était donc loin de la saturation. Mais la production appelée à ce moment était à 28% d'origine étrangère, pour des raisons de coût comparatif. Sur les 6 950 MW étrangers sollicités, 3610 venaient de Suisse et 2210 de France ; les capacités d'échange avec la Suisse étaient donc largement saturées, la surcharge d'une ligne helvétique et l'absence d'élagage sous cette ligne ayant suffi à provoquer un amorçage avec la végétation. C'est bien la mauvaise coordination entre le GRT (Gestionnaire de réseau de transport) suisse Etrans, regroupant les six opérateurs helvétiques de réseau, et le GRT italien GRTN, qui a empêché de réagir à temps, provoquant en quelques minutes l'effondrement de tout le réseau transalpin et transformant en particulier la fête de la Nuit Blanche à Rome, organisée justement les 27-28 septembre 2003, en nuit noire...La perte de synchronisme a accentué le black-out et l'Italie a dû se couper provisoirement du réseau européen UCTE.



Le retour d'expérience de cette crise majeure a souligné que GRTN n'était pas propriétaire du réseau de transport, détenu alors par Terna, ce qui rendait délicate la programmation des investissements. Depuis les deux entreprises ont fusionné et surtout une amélioration de l'information et de la coordination des procédures entre les GRT européens fut mise en oeuvre. Celle-ci peut sembler encore bien insuffisante puisque une nouvelle grave alerte nous a rapproché du spectre du black-out généralisé le 4 novembre 2006, avec une panne plongeant dans le noir 15 millions de foyers en l'Europe de l'Ouest, pendant plusieurs heures pour certaines régions, en particulier en Allemagne et dans l'Est de la France. L'origine de l'incident est à chercher outre-Rhin à la suite d'une défaillance sur le réseau allemand d'EON, après la coupure volontaire d'une ligne à 400 kV surplombant la rivière Ems et interconnectant le nord et le sud de l'Allemagne : il s'agissait précisément de permettre l'accès d'un gros navire à la mer. Cette coupure a été avancée à une heure de plus forte consommation que prévue, alors qu'initialement elle avait été raisonnablement programmée en pleine nuit. Le pire, c'est-à-dire l'effondrement complet du réseau européen UCTE, a pu quand même être évité grâce aux mécanismes préexistants de solidarité électrique européenne, avec principalement le secours important apporté par RTE.

En tout cas les pannes majeures des systèmes électriques depuis l'été 2003, par un jeu de réactions en chaîne ou phénomène « d'écroulement de château de cartes » aux Etats-Unis et en Europe occidentale<sup>13</sup>, ont montré la place stratégique des réseaux de transport d'électricité dans le monde occidental et ses choix de politique industrielle. Elles inscrivent dans une nouvelle urgence la recherche d'une politique énergétique européenne digne de ce nom.

## **2. Les défis actuels de l'interconnexion européenne : des enjeux de plus en plus complexes**

L'interconnexion en Europe comme aux Etats-Unis est clairement devenue une question de communication politique, dans toutes les acceptions du terme, incarnant les enjeux et les ambiguïtés de la démocratie participative. Dans un domaine où l'innovation technologique proprement dite n'a pas fait de saut décisif depuis trois décennies, avec une grappe complète d'innovations, contrairement par exemple aux télécommunications, un enjeu fondamental réside dans les articulations spatiales à la fois les plus pertinentes et considérées comme prioritaires, au nom d'un intérêt général de plus en plus fragile.

Dans le choc des échelles énergétiques et de leurs territoires, souvent considérés comme des champs clos, la complexité de l'interconnexion, nimbée par le halo du développement durable, est confrontée en permanence à des logiques spatiales concurrentes : 1.) le marquage du territoire de proximité et des réseaux

---

<sup>13</sup> Voir André MERLIN : « Les grandes pannes des réseaux électriques (Europe, Etats-Unis) sont-elles dues à l'ouverture du marché de l'électricité ? », Revue de l'électricité et de l'électronique, mars 2004, 78-85.

d'acteurs locaux, nourris par les deux syndromes NIMBY (Not in my back yard) et BANANA (Build absolutely nothing anywhere near anything).<sup>14</sup> 2.) la prégnance de l'espace national et de l'Etat-Nation, avec la communication croisée de la puissance régaliennne et des entreprises, opérateurs et gestionnaires, de réseaux, sur les enjeux et défis de l'interconnexion. 3.) l'affirmation croissante de l'échelle supranationale, celle à la fois des organismes internationaux (UCTE, CIGRE) et de la Communauté Européenne, avec la question centrale de la création d'un régulateur européen ou du moins de la coordination européenne des gestionnaires nationaux de réseaux.

Les difficultés techniques que les opérateurs doivent résoudre au fur et à mesure (en priorité, comme nous l'avons vu, risque de défaillance en cascade) pour étendre ce grand réseau européen ne sont donc pas insurmontables. Les obstacles géopolitiques semblent en revanche bien plus problématiques. Ne serait-il pas imprudent pour l'Europe de s'engager vis-à-vis de la Russie dans une ouverture de ses infrastructures électriques ou gazières sans une approche partagée en matière de politique énergétique (standards en matière de sûreté nucléaire, sécurité d'approvisionnement, ...), et sans un minimum de réciprocité ? La tentation de la part de la Russie de faire de l'énergie un levier au service de sa puissance est très claire, alors que les règles du jeu européennes exigent clairement l'indépendance des infrastructures, au bénéfice de tous. Dans le domaine gazier, Gazprom est-il prêt à s'y soumettre ? Et quelle sera l'attitude des électriciens russes ? Plus que jamais, chaque nation est soucieuse de sa sécurité d'approvisionnement sur le long terme.

L'ouverture à la concurrence et la création du marché unique de l'énergie rendent plus nécessaires encore les interconnexions transfrontalières pour améliorer la sûreté des systèmes nationaux mais aussi pour accroître les échanges commerciaux d'électricité entre les pays et harmoniser les conditions d'accès à l'énergie de tous les Européens. L'objectif de l'Union n'est pas de juxtaposer 25 marchés électriques concurrentiels mais de créer un marché européen unifié, ce qui passe par une intensification des échanges, pour éviter en priorité les congestions majeures.

Or seuls 7% de l'électricité consommée en Europe traversent au moins une frontière. L'électricité est d'abord produite là où elle est consommée et rares sont les pays qui importent plus de 10% de leurs besoins. L'Italie, avec plus de 15% d'importations, fait figure d'exception et cette dépendance inquiète ses pouvoirs publics: l'électricité est un produit stratégique qui se ne stocke pas et la vulnérabilité à l'égard de l'étranger est très sensible.

Le Conseil Européen des chefs d'état et de gouvernement a pourtant décidé à

---

<sup>14</sup> Voir pour les conséquences de ces deux syndromes NIMBY et BANANA sur l'interconnexion transpyrénéenne, véritable goulot d'étranglement dans la construction de l'Europe électrique VIGUIE Renan : *Histoire des échanges électriques entre la France et l'Espagne de l'entre-deux-guerres à nos jours*, mémoire de Master 2 d'histoire contemporaine ss dir. Ch. Bouneau, Université Michel de Montaigne-Bordeaux 3, 2007, 2 vol, 502 p.

son sommet de Barcelone en 2002 que le niveau d'interconnexion des réseaux électriques entre pays membres de l'Union devait atteindre au moins 10% de la capacité de production de chaque pays. Ce taux dépasse aujourd'hui 20% dans des pays comme la Suède, les Pays-Bas, la Belgique ou l'Autriche et il avoisine les 10% en France et en Allemagne. Certains pays font toutefois figure de « *péninsules électriques* » : l'Italie avec 7%, le Portugal avec 6%, l'Espagne et le Royaume-Uni avec 3%. L'insuffisance des interconnexions accroît les risques de congestions aux frontières en cas de forte demande et empêche la convergence des prix de l'électricité sur les marchés de gros en limitant les possibilités d'arbitrage.

Si la population accepte assez bien le renforcement des lignes existantes, elle manifeste généralement, suivant le syndrome « *Nimby* » (« not in my back-yard »), son opposition à tout nouveau projet, surtout pour des motifs environnementaux. Mais l'enfouissement des lignes THT est très coûteux et impossible sur longue distance (au-delà de 10 km) avec les technologies actuelles...

\*\*\*\*\*

L'histoire de l'interconnexion transnationale, considérée comme vecteur majeur de la construction de l'Europe électrique, révèle pleinement le rôle « *caché* » des réseaux électriques, macro-système technologique par excellence, dans le développement conceptuel mais aussi, et peut-être surtout, dans le développement pratique et quotidien de l'espace européen<sup>15</sup>. Elle s'inscrit pleinement dans un nouveau courant historiographique, largement anglo-saxon, d'études européennes où la dimension globale de la technologie dans notre civilisation industrielle et post-industrielle est pleinement prise en compte, investie par les sciences humaines et sociales, dans un dialogue entre histoire, économie, sociologie et science politique<sup>16</sup>. Les organismes internationaux et européens (UNIPED, CIGRE, UCPT devenue UCTE), dans une ambiguïté permanente entre les deux échelles transnationales, ont en tout cas construit progressivement une gouvernance de l'Europe électrique par la coordination de ses réseaux de transport et d'interconnexion, en liaison étroite avec les entreprises exploitantes, les autorités étatiques et les communautés scientifiques et techniques.

Cette trajectoire de la construction de l'Europe électrique ne forme évidemment pas un tout uniforme et des crises la secouent périodiquement ; celles-ci permettent l'affirmation de solidarités transfrontalières de grande ampleur pour s'opposer à des projets jugés inadaptés par des communautés régionales d'intérêts. L'Europe électrique se trouve alors régulièrement au cœur d'enjeux compétitifs où les acteurs locaux, nationaux et européens dépassent

---

<sup>15</sup> Voir MISA Thomas J. and SCHOT Johan: « *Introduction : Inventing Europe : Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe* », *History and Technology*, vol. 21, n°1, march 2005, 1-19.

<sup>16</sup> Voir globalement BOUNEAU Ch. et LANTHIER P. (dirs) : *Networks of Power, L'électricité en réseaux*, Paris, Victoires Editions, 2004, 192 p.

largement la classe politique et les gestionnaires de réseau, avec la montée d'expertises de plus en plus diversifiées et celle du pouvoir, sinon du lobbying, des associations de citoyens.

En croisant en permanence technologie, milieux innovateurs et gouvernance des réseaux, la construction de l'Europe électrique depuis le second conflit mondial se situe ainsi au cœur du questionnement contemporain des logiques de la construction européenne<sup>17</sup>.

---

<sup>17</sup> Voir BOUNEAU Ch., DERDEVET M. et PERCEBOIS J.: *Les réseaux électriques au cœur de la civilisation industrielle*, op. cit. 150-159.

**Zoltán Garadnai**

## ***La visite de János Péter à Paris (11-12 janvier, 1965)\****

### **Abstract**

From 1964 on, political leaders of the Kádár-regime, struggling with the problem of external-internal détente, were working on the chances, ways and means of re-establishing international relations in its classical sense. Due to the relative „liberalism” of the regime’s domestic policy, Kádár’s personality and policy of consolidation as well as the officially voiced openness towards France’s „European Europe” policy the French paid increasing attention to Hungary once marginalised and considered their enemy. For Hungary the relationship to de Gaulle’s policy gained importance in respect of the country’s international reintegration and the internal and international consolidation of the regime which came to power after the fall of the revolution in 1956. To achieve national and international recognition the Kádár-cabinet tried to gain advantage from the international détente, thus it served as a kind of „internal power-multiplier” in creating political stability and the internal balance of the system. It was in 1965 that Hungarian foreign policy started to expand the country’s foreign relations and replace its earlier defensive policy with active foreign policy by the official visit of János Péter to Paris, which was the starting point of developing Hungary’s „overture to the west”.

*Key words:* Kádár-regime, de Gaulle, János Péter, „European Europe”, detent, foreign policy, Hungary, France, Germany, Chine, Vietnam

### ***La diplomatie française et le changement de la situation internationale (1965)***

Les années 1963-1965 affirma le pouvoir du Général sur le plan intérieure et un certain équilibre se réalisa entre les différentes composantes du pouvoir. L’économie augmentait de 5% par an. Nous pouvons appeler cette période comme les années glorieuses du Général de Gaulle. Cela est également démontré par le fait, que lors des élections présidentielles du 5 décembre 1965 il obtenait 55% des voix, et sa popularité - même si elle montrait une tendance décroissante - lui garantit une base morale à poursuivre sa politique d’indépendance. Dans cette politique l’année 1965 fut un tournant, vue que cette tendance fut renforcée par le fait que les conflits „ouest-ouest” devenaient évidents, non seulement pour les diplomates et les hommes politiques. Au cours de l’histoire de la guerre froide une nouvelle période commença avec de nouvelles conditions et des possibilités pour les nations européennes.<sup>1</sup> La politique d’ouverture de la France envers les pays de l’Est se réalisait progressivement entre 1963 et 1965.

---

\* L’étude a été supportée par la bourse de János Bolyai de l’Académie (2009-2012).

<sup>1</sup> RÉMOND, René: *Le siècle dernier, 1918-2000*, T. VI. Sous la direction de Jean FAVIER, Fayard, Paris. 2003. 633-637. BADALASSI, Nicolas: *Etre un centre ou ne pas être. L’exemple de la France du*

Entre 1963 et 1965 l'attitude envers la politique française de la RFA et des Etats-Unis persuadait le Général de Gaulle de la nécessité de se tourner vers les pays socialistes, et il mettait en oeuvre sa politique européenne.<sup>2</sup> La détérioration et le refroidissement des relations franco-allemandes jouait un rôle important, et le problème allemand déterminait les contacts avec les pays de l'Est - ces pays furent entièrement intéressés à la question allemande - et l'importance des pays socialistes et de l'URSS s'augmentait dans les relations internationales. Le Général de Gaulle s'efforçait de gagner également les états de l'Europe de l'Est à la réalisation de sa politique européenne et la diplomatie gaullienne désirait que sa sortie de l'OTAN soit un exemple stimulant les pays d'Europe de l'Est.

Les Français se préparant à l'ouverture observaient avec inérêt les changements dans l'Europe de l'Est. Ils s'efforcèrent de mesurer les désirs de la coopération découlant des intérêts économiques. Celui-ci est démontré par le fait, qu'au sein du Quai d'Orsay on élaborait des études pour mesurer les possibilités de la coopération avec les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale. L'importance des relations à l'Est, se réévaluèrent à cause des contradictions politiques liées à la réforme de l'OTAN et à cause des questions relatives à l'intégration de l'Europe occidentale.<sup>3</sup> Cette volonté subjective était renforcé par le fait, que la France pour les années 1965-1966, possédait de plus en plus des préconditions ce que lui donnait sa position géopolitique d'être un des éléments les plus importants dans le cadre du système de la guerre froide, afin de changer substantiellement ses relations et son comportement vis à vis du changement du système de l'alliance atlantique. En 1965 la question de la possession des armes nucléaires augmentait encore le précipice entre les conceptions françaises et celles de leurs alliés européens. La France empêche l'acceptation de la stratégie de la flexible réponse et le projet de la Force Atomique Multilatérale (MLF).<sup>4</sup> Le Général de Gaulle fit comprendre à ses alliés sous équivoque le 5 septembre 1965, que la France est désireuse de récupérer le contrôle de ses forces armées jusqu'en 1969 au plus tard. De Gaulle lança une période active en démontrant sa politique d'ouverture à l'Est, et il envoya son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Maurice Couve de Murville à Moscou en octobre 1965. La France n'accepta pas les conceptions relatives aux développements du système de l'OTAN, ainsi que de sa plus grande intégration. De Gaulle renforçait les aspirations françaises de

---

*Général de Gaulle, 1958-1969*, IN: SANDU, Traian - MAAR, Judith - RENAUD, Patrick (ed.): *Ouest-Est dynamiques centre-périphérie entre les deux moitiés du continent. Des regards interdisciplinaires*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2011. 37-68.

<sup>2</sup> BADALASSI, Nicolas: *Adieu Yalta? La France, la détente et les origines de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe, 1965-1975*. Sorbonne III, 2011. 82-83.

<sup>3</sup> VAÏSSE, Maurice: *La France dans les Est-Ouest 1958-1963*, Espoir N° 109, novembre 1996. 55-65. VAÏSSE, Maurice: *L'Europe centrale et orientale dans la politique du général de Gaulle de 1958 à 1969*, Cahiers de la Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1999. N° 6. 129-133. VAÏSSE, Maurice: *La grandeur. Politique étrangères du général de Gaulle 1958-1969*, Fayard, Paris, 1998. 419-420.

<sup>4</sup> BARBIER, Colette: *La France et la Force multilatérale*, IN: VAÏSSE, Maurice-MÉLANDRI, Pierre-BOZO, Frédéric (éd.): *La France et l'Otan (1949-1996)*, Edition complexe, Paris, 1996. 285-305.

détachement argumentant par la situation géostratégique de la France au sein de l'alliance atlantique.<sup>5</sup> Pour Général de Gaulle, cette décision avait de l'importance à cause de la perte de positions internationales de la France entre 1940 et 1958.<sup>6</sup>

Entre 1963 et 1965 on peut constater l'insuccès de la conception gaullienne: l'Europe européenne, vu que la RFA comme la partenaire désignée - d'après Adenauer - ne suivait plus la diplomatie gaullienne, et elle ne prenait plus sur eux le risque d'une rupture avec les Etats-Unis, et l'axe Paris-Bonn ne fonctionna plus. Les relations politiques franco-allemandes en 1965 se refroidirent complètement et le nouveau chancelier allemand - contrairement à la politique suivie par Adenauer - a basé sa politique étrangère sur une coopération étroite avec les Américaines. A partir de 1965, c'est le deuxième élément de la politique du Général de Gaulle *l'Europe de l'Atlantique à l'Oural* qui se renforça, et ce qui plaça l'accent de la politique étrangère française sur la politique d'ouverture à l'Est. Le Traité d'Elysée déterminait des initiatives françaises dans les années à venir en Europe centrale et orientale quand-même. Nous devons souligner, qu'on ne peut comprendre la politique d'ouverture à l'Est du Général de Gaulle qu'en esquissant le cadre européen, vue qu'elle s'intégra dans le processus de repenser la position politique globale de la France. Entre 1963-1965 la position internationale de la France, ainsi que l'appréciation de la personnalité du Général de Gaulle, démontraient des signes de changement. C'était le discours du 4 février 1965<sup>7</sup> de Charles de Gaulle qui plaçait la problématique de la question d'allemande comme le moyen centrale de sa politique d'ouverture à l'Est. Régler la question allemande dans un cadre où les États européens furent intéressés et relier cette question directement à la politique d'ouverture et à la relation avec Moscou, comme un „*fil conducteur*”.<sup>8</sup> Discours du 23 mars 1965: Charles de Gaulle parla également du renouveau de l'amitié franco-soviétique.

En ce qui concerne des relations politico-diplomatique avec les pay socialistes, les premières visites étaient entre 1963 et 1965 dans les relations franco-soviétiques. Dans les processus du développement des rapports Andrej Gromiko, ministre des Affaires étrangères soviétiques visita la France le 25-30 avril 1965 et Maurice Couve de Murville, son homologue français, fut à Moscou entre le 28 octobre et le 2 novembre 1965.<sup>9</sup> Selon la diplomatie française les Soviétiques exprimaient verbalement leur désapprobation à cause des aspirations d'indépendances des petits États de l'Europe de l'Est. Ils l'acceptait à l'exception

---

<sup>5</sup> GAZDAG Ferenc: *Franciaország története 1945-1995*, Zrínyi kiadó, Budapest, 1997. 120-121.

<sup>6</sup> BOZO, Frédéric: *Deux stratégies pour l'Europe. De Gaulle, les États-Unis et l'Alliance atlantique, 1958-1969*. Paris, 1996. 133-166.

<sup>7</sup> DM (*Discours et Messages*) 1962-1965. Pour l'effort PLON, 1974. 338-342. VAÏSSE (1998): 23-26.

<sup>8</sup> OBITCHKINA, Evguenia: *La naissance du dialogue franco-soviétique sur l'Europe de la détente: les premières initiatives soviétiques*. IN: *Vers la réunification de l'Europe. Apports et limites du processus d'Helsinki de 1975 à nos jours*, Sous la direction de Elisabeth du RÉAU et Christine MANIGAND (éd.), L'Harmattan, 2005. 17-26.

<sup>9</sup> Dans les conversations ils parlaient des questions bilatérales, de l'avenir de l'Europe, du problème allemand et de la sécurité européenne, de la guerre vietnam.

des Roumains et toléraient la politique d'ouverture occidentale, tout d'abord à propos de la Tchécoslovaquie et de la Bulgarie, comme les deux pays jugés les plus amicaux vis à vis de l'URSS.<sup>10</sup> La réalisation de la sécurité européenne fut étroitement liée à la solution de la question allemande, et la restriction de la course à l'armement atomique. La diplomatie soviétique jugea le développement de ses relations avec l'Occident bien important, ainsi que les aspirations à l'indépendances utilisé comme moyen politique par la France.<sup>11</sup> Mais les Soviétiques s'efforcèrent de garder les pays satellites sous leur contrôle et voulurent élaborer une „*unité négative*” dont les facteurs principaux étaient les suivants: 1. L'insistance sur la peur de l'impérialisme occidentale. 2. La mise en avant du changement du revanchisme allemand. 3. L'incitation de l'histoire des plans allemands de possessions de l'armement atomique.<sup>12</sup> L'élargissement de la connection française fut nécessaire pour les petits États: 1. La diversification des achats de matières premières. 2. L'obtention des crédits occidentaux et de la modernisation technique pour garantir le développement économique. 3. La satisfaction de l'aspiration de la population à obtenir des articles occidentaux. 4. L'élargissement des relations occidentales dans le domaine des relations culturelles. En général Moscou s'inquiétait de l'offensive diplomatique française envers ses satellites européennes, mais la perception du rapprochement mutuel, et „*du point de vue pratique, les accords conclus entre la France et les pays socialistes dans les domaines techniques, scientifique et économique paraissent très utiles aux yeux des Soviétiques.*”<sup>13</sup>

En 1965 Brejnev encouragea carrément Maurice Couve de Murville afin que la diplomatie française développât ses relations avec les petits pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale: „*Hier je me suis entretenu avec Gomulka et il n'y a pas très longtemps que j'ai vu Kadar et Ulbricht, ainsi que les camarades tchécoslovaques. Nous parlions avec eux de leurs relations avec vous (...) Ils sont prêts à coopérer avec l'état et le peuple français. Vous désirez de renforcer leur politique d'indépendance nationale et cela nous est également proche.*”<sup>14</sup> Général de Gaulle utilisait la politique de „*détente-entente-coopération*” comme la même recette pour les autres pays socialistes (la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie, la Hongrie, la Bulgarie, et bien entendu la Yougoslavie) également. Cela facilitait sa politique, mais ne supprimait pas les préjugés soviétiques vis à vis du Général de Gaulle, bien que l'affaiblissement de l'économie soviétique et les contradictions

<sup>10</sup> AMAE (*Archives de Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*) Europe URSS Carton 1932. Note. L'URSS et le rapprochement entre l'Europe Orientale et les pays occidentaux.

<sup>11</sup> NARINSKI, Mikhail: *Les Soviétique et la décision française*, IN: VAÏSSE, Maurice-MÉLANDRI, Pierre-BOZO, Frédéric (éd.): *La France et l'Otan (1949-1996)*, Edition complexe, Paris, 1996. 503-516.

<sup>12</sup> CADN (*Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes*) Moscou Serie B Carton 452. Note. Politique de l'URSS au cours des 6 derniers mois.

<sup>13</sup> VASSILIEVA, Natalie: *L'URSS et le développement des relations de la France avec les pays d'Europe de l'Est (Pologne et Roumanie)*, IN: *De Gaulle et la Russie* Sous la Direction de Maurice VAÏSSE, CNRS Edition, Paris, 2006. 205-211.

<sup>14</sup> AMAE Europe URSS Carton 1933. Entretien Couve de Murville et Gromiko.



chino-soviétique poussèrent les dirigeants soviétique à plus d'ouverture et à plus de souplesse dans leur politique vers l'Ouest et à plus de compréhension quant à la politique de détente française.<sup>15</sup>

En ce qui concerne les satellites de l'URSS, ce n'est qu'à partir de 1965, que le processus de normalisation redémarra entre Paris et Varsovie. Pour la Pologne communiste la relation aux frontières avec l'Allemagne de l'Est était d'une importance capitale et bien qu'il n'y eût plus d'hostilités à cette époque pour résoudre la question allemande, il y eût toujours une approche soupçonner vis à vis des Allemandes. C'était quand même plutôt le pragmatisme déterminé par les bonnes relations traditionnelles; et à l'opposé de la Hongrie on ne pouvait pas parler d'un compromis entre le régime et la population, l'appréciation des grandes masses vis à vis des Allemandes était toujours une question sentimentales. Les Polonais n'acceptaient aucun compromis sans garanties internationales et ils avaient de mauvaises expériences quant aux grandes puissances; ils comptaient tout d'abord sur la prise de position des pays socialistes, ainsi que sur l'aide stratégique de l'URSS. Le Général de Gaulle jugea par contre légitime et justifia les désirs des Polonais, mais sur la base de l'expérience des relations franco-allemandes entre 1958 et 1963 il estima que la question allemande ne fut plus un danger pour l'Europe.

La Tchécoslovaquie faisant partie des États vainqueurs de la guerre mondiale, reçut la même appréciation que la Pologne. Dès le début de l'année 1964, les relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Tchécoslovaquie devenaient intensives, malgré cela il y avait des problèmes politico-diplomatiques entre les deux pays. L'attitude subjective de Prague dans la question allemande et la déclaration de non existence de l'accord de Munich empêchèrent toute dialogue sur l'avenir de l'Europe. Le pays dépendait grandement de la RFA dans ses relations économiques et il faut ajouter à ce fait le renouveau du stalinisme et cette situation rendit presque impossible le développement libre des relations culturelles entre la RFA et la Tchécoslovaquie.<sup>16</sup>

Quant aux États balkaniques dans la diplomatie française la Roumanie fut considérée au début de 1965 comme l'État le plus désatellisé. Les Roumains refusèrent la réforme du COMECON et ne rompèrent pas leurs relations avec la Chine malgré les discussions entre Moscou et Pékin et ils coopérèrent plus tard dans les questions stratégiques avec l'URSS. Les relations bilatérales devinrent intensives entre 1963 et 1965 dans le domaine économique et politique et un accord commercial fut signé entre la France et la Roumanie. Les Roumains désiraient non seulement le développement de leurs relations avec la France mais la coopération aussi dans les questions européennes, ce qui amenait de Gaulle à mener une politique plus intensive, bien que les Français jugeassent la Roumanie

---

<sup>15</sup> REY, Marie-Pierre: *La tentation du rapprochement. France et URSS à l'heure de la détente (1964-1974)*, Publication de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1991. 48-50. 59-61.

<sup>16</sup> DDF (*Documents Diplomatiques Français*) 1965. I. P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2003. N° 312. Paris, le 28 juin 1965. 814-817.

un pays d'orthodoxe communiste et dictatorial.<sup>17</sup> La Yougoslavie était dans une situation spéciale parmi les pays socialistes entre 1964 et 1968. Selon la diplomatie parisienne c'était le pays le plus ouvert, malgré que la Yougoslavie se trouvait entre des conflits ethniques internes et des difficultés économiques. Mais ce pays cherchait de vrais points de contacts avec la France.<sup>18</sup> L'appréciation de la Bulgarie dans la diplomatie française était la même que celle de la Hongrie mais contrairement à notre pays elle fut jugée un pays staliniste orthodoxe. En même temps au cours de l'année 1965 les relations entre Paris et Sofia commencèrent à se développer dans les relations culturelles.<sup>19</sup>

L'année 1965 signifi la politique d'ouverture à l'Est, et celle de la normalisation et ce fait fut renforcé par la conférence de presse du Général de Gaulle le 3 décembre 1965. Le Général parlait ouvertement sur l'importance d'établir de nouvelles relations avec les pays de l'Est.<sup>20</sup> Selon la diplomatie française la politique soviétique fut définie par les facteurs suivants:<sup>21</sup> 1. Le maintien des territoires conquis par Stalin. 2. Conformément à sa position d'hégémonie et son pouvoir, le maintien de son contrôle au dessus de sa zone d'influence en Europe centrale. 3. Le maintien de la cohésion – politique et idéologique - du camp socialiste, à laquelle l'insistance du danger allemand (comme *un ennemi util*) fut le moyen adéquat de la pression politique (surtout pour la tronçon nord du Pact Varsovie: la RDA, la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie). 4. Le développement des relations économiques avec les pays de sa zone dans le cadre de COMECON.

Le but principal et le succès de la politique du général de Gaulle peuvent être résumés par ces facteurs: 1. La détente Est-Ouest se poursuit et les points de vue se rapprochent bien qu'en réalité ne se réalise pas. 2. Il y aurait une convergence entre Paris et Moscou, si les Américains quittent l'Europe, et l'Allemagne pourrait se réunifier entre ses nouvelles frontières. 3. L'Europe unifiée se baserait sur deux piliers: en Occident sur l'union franco-allemande, en Orient sur l'URSS européenne. Et tous les deux camps établiraient des rapports d'alliance avec la France suivant les principes classiques de la diplomatie: jouer le rôle de „*l'aiguille de la balance*”. Ce serait la politique „*détente-entente-coopération*” servant de base au développement des relations Est-Ouest et suivant la tactique des petits pas concrets. A la suite des changements les nations pourraient atteindre en Europe une équilibre géopolitique naturel. Selon la politique gaullienne elle aboutirait à un *status quo naturel* et à un nouveau cadre pour la sécurité européenne.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> DDF 1965. I. N° 153. Paris, le 22 septembre 1965. 355-358.

<sup>18</sup> DDF 1965. I. N° 198. Paris, le 16 octobre 1965. 456-460. et DDF 1965. I. N° 318. Belgrade, le 10 décembre 1965 et DDF 1965. I. N° 355. Belgrade, le 28 décembre 1965. 802-805.

<sup>19</sup> DDF 1965. I. N° 86. Paris, le 22 février 1965. 211-215.

<sup>20</sup> SCHREIBER, Thomas: *Les actions de la France à l'Est ou les absences de Marianne*, L'Harmattan, Paris-Montréal, 2000. 99-100.

<sup>21</sup> CADN Moscou Série B. Carton 452. Tendances actuelles de la politique extérieure soviétique.

<sup>22</sup> MAILLARD, Pierre: *De Gaulle et l'Allemagne. Le rêve inachevé*, Plon, Paris. 1990. 249-250. SOUTOU, Georges-Henri: *La guerre de Cinquante Ans. Les relations Est-Ouest, 1943-1990*. Fayard, Paris, 2001. 471-472.

En conclusion on peut dire qu'il n'y a pas de grande différence entre la politique du Général de Gaulle en 1965 et en 1944-1945 puisque dans tout les deux cas le Général essaya d'élargir les possibilités de manoeuvres de la France dans la politique internationale. Bien sûr, il y avait des intérêts communs franco-soviétiques concernant les frontières allemandes et l'armement atomique, mais de Gaulle défendit à Moscou le principe de base de l'Allemagne unie à l'encontre des points de vues soviétiques sur le maintien des deux Allemagnes.<sup>23</sup>

### ***L'ouverture envers la France: la visite de Janos Peter à Paris (1965)***<sup>24</sup>

Au milieu des années '60 la France jouait un rôle principal pour la Hongrie dans le processus de l'ouverture envers les pays occidentaux, afin de réaliser la politique de réintégration dans la vie internationale du pays.<sup>25</sup> En même temps, les leaders hongrois communistes s'intéressaient franchement aux idées de l'Europe européenne mais ils devaient respecter les désirs de la population et montrer le changement du prestige international du pays. L'héritage politique de 1956 jusqu'à 1963 ne permettait pas à Budapest de jouer un certain rôle dans les affaires internationales, et c'était le gouvernement français qui demandait l'inscription de la question hongroise à l'ordre du jour du Conseil de Sécurité<sup>26</sup> déterminant ainsi les contacts entre les deux pays.<sup>27</sup> Mais la Hongrie profitait aussi des changements du climat international, et les communistes hongrois essayaient de chercher les relations avec les pays de l'Ouest pour stabiliser les positions internationales de la Hongrie.<sup>28</sup> Au début de 1965 les diplomates français

---

<sup>23</sup> VAÏSSE (1998): 428.

<sup>24</sup> Concernant le sujet voir en français: Zoltán GARADNAI: *La Hongrie de János Kádár et le processus d'Helsinki*, IN: *Vers la réunification de l'Europe. Apports et limites du processus d'Helsinki de 1975 à nos jours*, Sous la direction de Elisabeth du Réau et Christine Manigand (ed.), L'Harmattan, 2005. 123-139. Zoltán GARADNAI: *L'interprétation de la politique européenne du Général de Gaulle en Hongrie (1963-1968)*, IN: Chantal DELSOL - Máté BOTOS (ed.): *Les Deux Europe*, Sandre, Paris, 2007. 369-390. En hongrois: GARADNAI Zoltán: *A magyar-francia kapcsolatok története, 1945-1966*, Külpolitika, Új Folyam 2001/7. 1-2. sz. 113-158. GARADNAI Zoltán: *Péter János külügyminiszter franciaországi útja. (A De Gaulle-i Európa-politika magyarországi értelmezései, Levéltári Közlemények, 74. évf., 2003/1-2. sz. Budapest, 135-158.*

<sup>25</sup> MNL-OL (*Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára*)-XIX-J-1-j-Fr.-001524/11/1965. 47. d. Franciaország helye a szocialista országok külpolitikájában.

<sup>26</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie Dossier 201. Note. Relations politiques franco-hongroises, 8 janvier 1965.

<sup>27</sup> Voir GARADNAI Zoltán: *Iratok a magyar-francia kapcsolatok történetéhez (1957-1962)*. Magyarország és a világ. Diplomáciatörténet. Gondolat Kiadó-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2011a. 367. et GARADNAI Zoltán: *Iratok a magyar-francia kapcsolatok történetéhez (1963-1968)*. Magyarország és a világ. Diplomáciatörténet. Gondolat Kiadó-Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2008. 25-46.

<sup>28</sup> Pour mieux comprendre les hésitations de la politique hongroise voir: FÜLÖP Mihály-SIPOS Péter: *Magyarország külpolitikája a XX. században*, Aula, Budapest, 1998. 434-439. et en français GARADNAI Zoltán: *Les relations franco-hongroises (1963-1968)*, Öt kontinens ELTE az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék közleményei. N° 2010. Budapest ELTE, Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék, 2011b. 121-140. Concernant la préparation de la visite voir: GARADNAI (2008): Documents N°35-43. 146-163.

estimaient qu'il y avait des changements entre les deux pays après l'amnistie, ensuite les relations franco-hongroises s'améliorèrent progressivement entre 1963 et 1965 et le ministre hongrois – János Péter - donna une certaine priorité aux relations franco-hongroises lors de son discours prononcé le 20 novembre 1964 au Parlement.<sup>29</sup>

En arrivant à Paris, le ministre hongrois déclara le 11 janvier 1965 à la gare de l'Est qu'il voulait examiner la politique européenne de Charles de Gaulle.<sup>30</sup> Le voyage de János Péter symbolisa la nouvelle étape de la politique hongroise, et il parla librement sur la conception européenne du Général de Gaulle, mais les vrais raisons de cette ouverture envers la France restait quand même incertaine pour les responsables du Quai d'Orsay.<sup>31</sup> En réponse à des questions relatives à la conception française d'une *Europe indépendante et européenne*, János Péter remarqua que c'était là une question sur laquelle un échange de vues pourrait être poursuivi. Il souligna certaines contradictions entre les principes du Marché commun et les vues du gouvernement français sur l'*Europe européenne*.<sup>32</sup>

Au cours de la conversation entre János Péter et Maurice Couve de Murville (le 12 janvier 1965) les deux diplomates s'exprimaient librement leurs opinions sur l'état du monde, et sur la politique européenne des deux pays, mais il y avait des différences dans l'interprétation des affaires internationales: la question allemande et la reconnaissance de RDA, le désarmement. János Péter participait

<sup>29</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie Dossier 201. Note. Relations politiques franco-hongroises, 8 janvier 1965. et GARADNAI (2008): Document N° 34. 146.

<sup>30</sup> Selon un témoin hongrois (Márton Klein), le ministre avait l'autorisation de faire des déclarations devant les journalistes par sa propre décision. En retournant pour la Hongrie, János Péter ayant peur des échos hongrois et soviétique en raison de ses déclarations à Paris, et il resta tout seul dans le compartiment pendant son retour pour la Hongrie. (Interview avec Márton Klein en 2005) et voir Thomas SCHREIBER : *J'ai choisi la France L'odyssée d'un journaliste qui a traversé trois quarts de siècles*, France Empire, 2010. 232-235.

<sup>31</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie Dossier 201. Déclarations de M. Peter sur l'Europe. Les déclarations de M. Peter sur l'Europe étaient les suivantes: „...Je voudrais étudier plus à fond les idées du gouvernement français sur une Europe indépendante, une Europe européenne et une Europe élargie”. (déclaration le 11 janvier à la Gare de l'Est). „...Nous avons discuté plusieurs questions internationales dans l'esprit de la coexistence pacifique, et parmi celles-ci plusieurs problèmes relatifs à l'Europe...Je me suis enquis de la conception française au sujet de l'Europe européenne, de l'Europe indépendante sur laquelle nous avons procédé à un échange de vues et discuté ensuite les problèmes bilatéraux...”Après la visite, Pierre Francfort – ambassadeur de France en Hongrie - chercha à comprendre les raisons de l'initiative hongroise. Voir: GARADNAI (2003) : 149-152.

<sup>32</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie Dossier 201. Déclarations de M. Peter sur l'Europe. „...Dans l'ensemble j'ai trouvé exactement ce que j'attendais. En ce qui concerne l'idée de l'Europe du gouvernement français je ne puis que répéter ce que j'ai déjà dit à diverses occasions qu'il faudra procéder à d'ultérieurs échanges de vues... La réalisation de la politique de coexistence pacifique exige aussi bien de notre part de la persévérance, de l'abnégation, de la circonspection et de la patience”. (déclaration au correspondant de l'agence de presse hongroise MTI et du NEPSZABADSAG le 13 janvier). (...) „A propos des conceptions françaises sur la coopération des pays européens, il faut, telle est mon opinion, poursuivre les échanges de vues, examiner dans quelle mesure ces conceptions prennent en considération les notions idéologiques, historiques et géographiques. La clarification de ces notions rendrait plus claires d'une part des vues de la politique étrangère française et offrirait d'autre part des possibilités pour l'élaboration de prises de position des pays européens. Interview au NEPSZABADSAG – 31 janvier.

aux programmes volontaires et utilisait un langage inattendu de la part d'un membre d'un gouvernement communiste.<sup>33</sup> En arrivant au bureau du ministre français, il déclara: c'est avec l'attention que la Hongrie suit l'intérêt porté par la France à ses relations avec les pays du camp socialiste, et il souligna l'intérêt de Budapest afin de développer les rapports aux domaines bilatéraux.<sup>34</sup> À propos des conférences de presse du Général de Gaulle tenue le 31 janvier et le 23 juillet 1964, et à son discours à Strasbourg le 22 novembre 1964, il répéta sa question concernant l'idée d'*Europe européenne*, d'*Europe élargie* et d'*Europe indépendante*. Couve de Murville répondit qu'il existait une Europe occidentale, et notamment un Marché commun désireux moins dépendre de l'influence américaine, et proposa la même voie pour l'Europe orientale par rapport à l'URSS. Selon le ministre, il existe une Europe géographique et historique, avec laquelle il faut tenir compte, et les pays de l'Europe doivent réaliser un nouvel rapprochement sur la base de la détente tout en acceptant les nouvelles réalités de l'Europe des années '60, quand les allemands acceptaient les réalités d'après 1945, et personne ne voulait pas vraiment une guerre.<sup>35</sup>

János Péter partagea l'opinion de son homologue, mais il tourna la conversation vers les questions de divergence entre les intérêts des pays de l'Ouest et de l'Est disant que la notion d'une Europe élargie se heurte à l'existence du Marché commun, et celui-ci empêcherait le développement naturel entre les deux parties de l'Europe.<sup>36</sup>

Couve de Murville n'approuva pas l'opinion de son homologue hongrois, mais finalement, ne comprenant pas vraiment les hésitations et préoccupations hongroises, il proposa l'établissement d'un certain équilibre en Europe, et selon lui l'organisation de l'Europe occidentale ne porte en fait préjudice à personne, et la France se propose deux objectifs: 1. Développer le potentiel économique des pays de l'Ouest pour être moins dépendants des États-Unis. 2. Le développement de la part de l'Europe de l'Ouest renforcerait l'équilibre vis-à-vis de l'URSS, et les pays de l'Europe de l'Est pourraient intégrer aussi dans le cadre de la *grande Europe*.<sup>37</sup> Pour comprendre l'interprétation différente de la question européenne, il nous faut souligner que le texte hongrois et celui du français ne sont pas pareilles, et le contexte hongrois nous montre les motivations hongroises émotionnelles, tandis que le texte français montre que pour les diplomates français la question de la normalisation des relations avec la Hongrie est plutôt une question technique. Il est possible que Couve de Murville ne comprit pas encore les désirs hongrois, et la métacommunication de János Péter.

Quant à la question allemande, selon la diplomatie française, les Hongrois furent méfiants à l'égard de la RFA, mais le ton des déclarations des leaders à Budapest

---

<sup>33</sup> SCHREIBER (2000): 96.

<sup>34</sup> DDF. 1965 I. N°19. Paris, le 14 janvier 1965. Circulaire N°6. 45. Pour la version hongroise de la conversation, voir GARADNAI (2008) : Document N° 49. 171-177.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, 45-46.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*, 46.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, 46.

restait bien souvent modéré, moins ferme qu'à Prague et à Varsovie.<sup>38</sup> János Péter aborda bien sûr le problème allemand aussi posant une question à propos de cela à son collègue: après avoir reconnu la Chine (le 24 janvier 1964) Paris n'envisage pas la reconnaissance de la RDA? Il y ajouta que cette manoeuvre diplomatique serait considéré par les pays socialistes comme „*un geste à la fois courageux et réaliste.*”<sup>39</sup> Couve de Murville marqua qu'il n'y avait aucun rapport entre les deux questions puisque selon lui la RDA était un pays artificiel: „*Si les Russes évacuaient l'Est de l'Allemagne, la République démocratique allemande disparaîtrait aussitôt. Si les Alliés, par contre, quittaient la République fédérale, celle-ci subsisterait.*”<sup>40</sup> János Péter accepta l'argument de son homologue exprimant que la détente serait la seule solution pour la question allemande tout en faisant des allusions de régler ce problème dans le cadre européen. Couve de Murville défendit son opinion sur l'Allemagne de l'Est tout en mentionnant l'importance des relations commerciales entre la France et la RDA, et selon lui c'est là une réalité.<sup>41</sup> En même temps, János Péter souligna que l'idée de la réunification était incompatible avec la création de MLF (*Multi Lateral Force*) ce que Couve de Murville ne discutait pas, et il parlait sur son attitude envers les Allemandes à ce sujet.<sup>42</sup>

Posant la question des relations entre la Hongrie et l'Autriche, selon János Péter les relations bilatérales entre les deux pays sont bien importantes, mais il accentua que „*la sécurité de l'Europe centrale exigeait la neutralité de l'Autriche*”, et il refusa l'intégration possible de l'Autriche au Marché commun.<sup>43</sup> Pour la diplomatie française le développement des relations entre Budapest et Vienne montre la nouvelle orientation de la diplomatie hongroise.<sup>44</sup> Après avoir terminé la discussion, les deux diplomates parlaient sur la question du désarmement, et sur la guerre au Vietnam, et les positions des deux diplomates étaient similaires quant à la question du financement des Nations Unies.<sup>45</sup>

À la fin de la conversation les deux ministres examinaient la question des relations bilatérales. János Péter mentionna la conversation entre Mihály Károlyi – ministre de la Hongrie en France entre 1947-1949 – et Maurice Couve de Murville en 1948. Le ministre français était le directeur des questions européennes à l'époque et il parlait sur l'avenir d'intégration de toute l'Europe,<sup>46</sup> et finalement János Péter invita Maurice Couve de Murville à

<sup>38</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie. Dossier 201. Note. Les relations de la Hongrie avec les pays occidentaux et le Tiers Monde. Paris, le 8 janvier 1965.

<sup>39</sup> DDF. 1965 I. N°19. Paris, le 14 janvier 1965. Circulaire N°6. 46.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibidem*, 46-47.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*, 47.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*, 47.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, 47.

<sup>44</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie. Dossier 201. Note. Les relations de la Hongrie avec les pays occidentaux et le Tiers Monde. Paris, le 8 janvier 1965.

<sup>45</sup> DDF. 1965 I. N°19. Paris, le 14 janvier 1965. Circulaire N°6. 47-48.

<sup>46</sup> Le dépeche fut trouvé par Márton Klein, responsables aux affaires francophones, avant la visite. Selon M. Klein János Péter était très content parce que il pouvait mentionner cette conversation devant son homologue français. Voir: GARADNAI (2008): la Citation N°139. 175.

rendre visite à Budapest, ce qu'il accepta.<sup>47</sup>

Après la visite de János Péter en France, et avant la visite Maurice Couve de Murville en Hongrie, les responsables du Quai d'Orsay essayaient de comprendre les raisons des motivations hongroises. Pierre Francfort visitait les dirigeants hongrois pour connaître le changement de la politique des communistes hongrois,<sup>48</sup> et élaborait une note sur la politique européenne de la Hongrie: „*Le trait caractéristique de la diplomatie hongroise n'est certes pas de rechercher des entreprises spectaculaires ou de prendre des initiatives à grand retentissement. La voie hongroise est différente de celle de la Roumanie, (...) elle est différente aussi celle de la Pologne, qui, comme la Tchécoslovaquie, est avant tout préoccupée de rechercher, mais dans le sillon de la politique soviétique, une solution au problème du voisinage avec l'Allemagne*”.<sup>49</sup>

D'un point de vue hongrois, la conclusion de la visite avait une interprétation différente nous montrant la divergence entre la vision du monde français et hongrois. Selon la diplomatie hongroise ce n'était que la France qui s'intéressait vraiment le plus au camp socialiste; et la politique étrangère de la France gaullienne reflétait le clivage de plus en plus marqué entre les puissances de l'OTAN. János Kádár parlait aussi, devant le Comité central du parti (le 12 avril 1967), sur le voyage de son ministre en France: „*Nous nous rappelons cette visite à Paris, nous nous sommes mis d'accord sur son discours, et il disait ce que nous avions voulu dire (aux français). Il a dit (János Péter) que la Hongrie est un pays européen par sa position géographique, et nous nous intéressons à la conception d'Europe. Q'est-ce-que c'est l'idée européenne? C'était l'essence même de celle-ci*”.<sup>50</sup>

En ce qui concerne les leaders communistes hongrois, ils voulurent essayer de stabiliser son régime, mais modifier (dans une certaine mesure) aussi la dépendance économique du pays par rapports au camp socialiste et les communistes hongrois devaient compter sur les émotions antisoviétiques, et la renaissance du sentiment national du peuple hongrois. Dans les conceptions européennes de la Hongrie on peut voir également une certaine allusion à la RFA, et la Hongrie voulut diversifier ses relations économiques en faveur de la France contre l'Allemagne.<sup>51</sup> Cette politique fut renforcée à Budapest aussi par M. Pierre Sudreau, lorsqu'il parla ouvertement sur la nécessité du développement des relations économiques contre les intérêts allemands en Hongrie.<sup>52</sup> En même temps, il faut souligner que la Hongrie fut toujours moins engagées contre l'Allemagne Fédérale (par rapports à la Pologne et Tchécoslovaquie) et adoptait une attitude pragmatique (mais prudente par rapports à la Roumanie). En réalité,

<sup>47</sup> DDF. 1965 I. N°19. Paris, le 14 janvier 1965. Circulaire N°6. 48-49.

<sup>48</sup> GARADNAI (2003) : 149-152.

<sup>49</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie. Dossier 201. Note. De la Hongrie et les idées européennes, Paris, le 14 octobre 1965.

<sup>50</sup> MNL-OL-M-KS-288.f. 4.cs. 87.ő.e./1. (1967) 48.

<sup>51</sup> GARADNAI (2003) : 155.

<sup>52</sup> MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-Fr./1965. 47.d. Francia államférfiak nyilatkozatai, megjegyzései a francia külpolitikát illetően, IV-101., et voir GARADNAI (2008) : Documents N° 65-66. 221-224.

la Hongrie kádérienne resta toujours un échos de la diplomatie soviétique, mais en cherchant les possibilités pour s'exprimer son propre identité, et en évoquant son propre concept concernant l'Europe et la position géographique de la Hongrie en Europe centrale. C'est pourquoi les leaders communistes hongrois s'intéressaient aux idées européennes du Général de Gaulle aussi au début de la détente.

La diplomatie française comprenait l'importance du développement des relations économiques. L'évolution de la politique hongroise montra que les communistes hongrois avaient l'intérêt de développer les relations économiques avec les pays occidentales pour moderniser l'économie hongroise et de telle façon accroître les capacités productives, et pour stabiliser le système kádérien.<sup>53</sup> Pierre Francfort, l'ambassadeur de France en Hongrie, résumait dans son fin de rapport de mission ses expériences en Hongrie. Il estimait que la politique hongroise à propos de l'idée de l'Europe européenne du Général de Gaulle montrait bien l'engagement des dirigeants hongrois à chercher le terrain de rapprochement entre l'Est-Ouest. Après avoir passé trois ans en Hongrie, l'ambassadeur de France commençait à comprendre les frustrations des hongroises. Selon lui seulement les prochaines générations pourront modifier les orientations de la politique hongroises, et il résumait aussi les tâches de la diplomatie française: *„Tous encouragements culturels, économiques et politiques que la France peut leur prêter, les porteraient peut-être, toutes proportions gardées, à s'intégrer dans l'avenir à une Europe élargie qui chercherait ses voies de renouvellement.”*<sup>54</sup>

A Budapest, les dirigeants hongrois avaient l'intention eux aussi d'élargir les relations franco-hongroises avec cette conclusion: *„Si les États-Unis, la RFA, l'Angleterre n'existaient pas, alors De Gaulle pourrait être notre ennemi principal. Mais notre ennemi principal est l'impérialisme américain et son fourrier, la RFA, c'est pourquoi nous devons utiliser les possibilités de la politique indépendante (française) au notre combat contre l'OTAN et ceux des États-Unis. Le rapports envers la France des pays socialistes est mot à mot d'un jeu diplomatique.”*<sup>55</sup>

### **Conclusions**

Les désirs hongrois ressemblaient en beaucoup de points à ceux de la Roumanie, mais les Hongrois étaient de loin les plus prudents quant à leur politique d'ouverture à l'Ouest. La Hongrie avait une place intermédiaire et spéciale dans cette politique, dont les facteurs suivants étaient déterminants: 1. La spécificité du système (l'héritage de 1956, et les difficultés de l'économie). 2. Les

---

<sup>53</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie Dossier 201. Note. De la Hongrie et les idées européennes, Paris, le 14 octobre 1965.

<sup>54</sup> AMAE Europe Hongrie Dossier 201. N°805/Eu. Budapest, le 28 octobre 1965. Rapport de fin de mission, et voir en hongrois GARADNAI (2008) : Document N° 70. 241-242., et voir en français GARADNAI (2011b): 129-130.

<sup>55</sup> MNL-OL-XIX-J-1-j-Fr.-01106/1966. 47.dob. Franciaország helye a szocialista országok külpolitikájában. et voir GARADNAI (2008) : Document N° 79. 275-277.



facteurs géopolitiques et la tradition historique avec le monde germanique, et contradiction entre l'intérêt hongrois à élargir le champ de commerce avec les pays de l'Ouest et la question de la réforme du COMECON.. 3. Les facteurs idéologiques (un comportement modéré au sein du mouvement communiste). 4. Sur le plan psychologique il était important que le gouvernement hongrois s'accordât avec le peuple hongrois souffrant d'un isolement commencé après 1941. Grâce à la visite de János Péter le premier étape de la normalisation des relations entre la Hongrie et la France fut terminée, et les deux partenaires commençaient à réaliser des contacts aux domaines différents des relations bilatérales (techniques et technologie, commerce, transport, économie). Pour les dirigeants hongrois la visite de János Péter à Paris contribua au processus de la normalisation internationale de la position de la Hongrie commencée en 1957, et le prestige du régime kádarien se renforça.

Couve de Murville, 30 ans après ces événements mentionna la Hongrie comme un exemple sans équivoque mais souligna de même, que pour la France c'était la Pologne, qui fut tout au long une exception particulière.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>56</sup> COUVE DE MURVILLE, Maurice: *Le monde en face, entretiens avec Maurice Delarue*, Plon. 1989. 254-256.



**Christopher D. Pichonnier**

## ***1989, année charnière du renouveau des relations franco-hongroises***<sup>1</sup>

### **Abstract**

France and Hungary maintained, throughout the 20th century very modest political, economic and cultural relations. Traditionally considered as a German zone of influence, and *de facto* under Soviet occupation after the Second World War, Hungary has never played a major role in French foreign policy. The internal changes that Hungary underwent during the 1980's, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990's, brought Franco-Hungarian relations to a completely new level. In that regard, the year 1989 represented the cornerstone of this renewal. For Hungary, it marked, after several decades of separation, the „*return to Europe*” while for France it was the time to open up again to the „*East*”.

Based on the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign affairs and on the French and Hungarian press, this article will discuss the main reasons behind this sudden resurgence of interest on both sides, and will then carry on by exposing the main characteristics of these changes in bilateral relations.

*Keywords:* French-Hungarian relations renewal, post-communist Hungary, French foreign policy, Central Europe, „Return to Europe”, European Union.

**L**es relations entre la France et la Hongrie ont été, au fil de l'histoire, assez distantes, placées à la fois sous le signe de la complexité et celui de l'ambiguïté. Traditionnellement considérée comme une zone d'influence germanique, la Hongrie n'a, au cours du siècle passé, jamais été un partenaire privilégié de la France. Pis encore, elle s'est toujours située, de manière quasi mécanique, dans le camp opposé lors de l'ensemble des conflits majeurs de la période. Aux côtés de l'Allemagne lors de la Première puis de la Seconde Guerre mondiale<sup>2</sup>, la Hongrie se retrouve, après 1945, sous l'emprise du joug soviétique. Et si les chefs d'État français en visite à Budapest<sup>3</sup> ont souvent choisi d'insister davantage sur « *ce qui a rapproché le peuple hongrois et le peuple français tout au long des siècles* » que sur les « *moments douloureux* »<sup>4</sup> du passé, il ne faut pas

---

<sup>1</sup> Cet article s'intègre dans le cadre d'une thèse en cotutelle sur les acteurs des relations franco-hongroises (1989-2004) sous la direction des Professeurs Bernard Lachaise (Bordeaux 3) et István Majoros (ELTE).

<sup>2</sup> Il faut nuancer ce point en rappelant que si les relations franco-hongroises sont très hostiles pendant l'entre-deux-guerres, la France et la Hongrie ne se déclarent pas la guerre durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et les relations diplomatiques sont, malgré tout, maintenues.

<sup>3</sup> François Mitterrand s'y rend une première fois du 7 au 9 juillet 1982 puis de nouveau huit ans plus tard les 18 et 19 janvier 1990. Son successeur, Jacques Chirac, y effectue également deux visites, du 16 au 17 janvier 1997 puis les 23 et 24 février 2004. Enfin, le président Nicolas Sarkozy s'y rend pour sa part une fois le 14 septembre 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Allocution du Président de la République Française Nicolas Sarkozy à Budapest devant le

manquer de souligner que, du pays des Lumières, la Hongrie, au 20<sup>e</sup> siècle, n'a longtemps, et surtout, retenu que le « *funeste* » traité du Trianon (1920) et sa confirmation en 1947, le traité de Paris.

Les deux États continuèrent néanmoins d'entretenir des relations après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, mais de façon irrégulière et dissymétrique. Politiquement et diplomatiquement la liaison ne fut jamais rompue<sup>5</sup> mais les échanges économiques – principalement – et culturels – à moindre échelle – restèrent relativement modestes jusqu'à la fin des années 1980.

Dans ces conditions, l'année 1989 représente un « *tournant historique* »<sup>6</sup> des rapports entre les deux pays. En Hongrie, l'année correspond avant tout au début d'intenses transformations intérieures : abandon de l'idéologie communiste, introduction du multipartisme, mise en place de la République, adoption d'une nouvelle Constitution, instauration d'une économie de marché,...<sup>7</sup>. Géopolitiquement,

---

parlement hongrois, 14 septembre 2007. <http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/077002694.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Il faut citer ici, de manière non exhaustive, les travaux de nombreux chercheurs Hongrois et Français à ce sujet, notamment : FEJÉRDY, Gergely : « *La place de la Hongrie dans la politique étrangère de la France entre 1944 et 1949* », *Öt Kontinens. Az Új-es Jelenkori Egyetemes Történelmi Tanszék tudományos közleményei*, Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem, Budapest, 2006.7-23. FEJÉRDY, Gergely : « *La révolution hongroise de 1956 dans les archives françaises* », *Cahiers d'études hongroises*, Temps, Espace, Langage : la Hongrie à la croisée des disciplines, no. 14. tome 2, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2008. 459-464. FEJÉRDY, Gergely : « Les relations diplomatiques et culturelles entre les pays francophones de l'Europe occidentale et leurs rapports avec la Hongrie de 1944 à 1956 ». *Bulletin de l'Institut Pierre Renouvin*, Vol. 1. N° 31. 2010. 141-149. FEJÉRDY Gergely : « A francia kultúrdiplomácia főbb törekvései és lehetőségei Magyarországon 1945 és 1990 között », *Külügyi szemle*, numéro 2, Magyar Külügyi Intézet, Budapest, 2011. 63-75. GARADNAI, Zoltán : « *Nyitási kísérlet a magyar-francia kapcsolatokban* », IN : GAZDAG Ferenc - KISS J. László (szerk.) : *Magyar külpolitika a 20. században*, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2004. 173-192. GARADNAI, Zoltán : « *L'interprétation de la politique européenne du Général de Gaulle en Hongrie (1963-1968) : Des arrière-pensées hongroises au moment de la normalisation des relations diplomatiques* », IN : DELSOL Chantal et BOROS Maté (dir.) : *Les Deux Europes*, Editions du Sandre, Paris, 2007. 369-390. GARADNAI, Zoltán : « *Les relations franco-hongroises 1963-1968* », *Öt Kontinens, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történelmi Tanszék közleményei*, numéro 2010, ELTE, Budapest, 2010. 121-140. GARADNAI, Zoltán : « *A magyar-francia kapcsolatok története 1975 és 1985 között* », *Külügyi szemle*, Magyar Külügyi Intézet, Budapest, 2011. 38-52. GARADNAI, Zoltán : « *La tentative de la politique d'ouverture de la Hongrie aux pays de l'Ouest, 1967-1968. Le cas des relations franco-hongroises* », *Öt Kontinens, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történelmi Tanszék közleményei*, numéro 2010, ELTE, Budapest, 2011. GARADNAI, Zoltán et SCHREIBER Thomas : « *A francia-magyar politikai és diplomáciai kapcsolatok alakulása a Quai d'Orsay szemével* », *ArchivNet*, numéro 2, Budapest, 2009. ([www.archivnet.hu](http://www.archivnet.hu)). KECSKÉS, Gusztáv : *La diplomatie française et la révolution hongroise de 1956*, Thèse de doctorat sous la direction de Mária Ormos et Élisabeth du Réau, Université de Pécs, Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle- Paris III, 3 vol. Paris, 2003. MAJOROS, István : « *Les relations franco-hongroises, 1956-1964* », *Bulletins de la Société d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine*, numéro 3-4. 1996. 75-78. MORELLE, Chantal : « *Les relations franco-hongroises à l'époque du général de Gaulle* », *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 1998. N°1. MORELLE, Chantal : « *La Pologne et la Hongrie dans la diplomatie française (1958-1969)* », *Cahiers de la Fondation Charles de Gaulle*, 1999. N°6.134-144. SCHREIBER, Thomas : *Les actions de la France à l'Est ou les absences de Marianne*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000.

<sup>6</sup> SZAVAI, János : *La Hongrie*, Presses Universitaire de France, Paris, 1996.

<sup>7</sup> Pour le détail des transformations internes du pays voir par exemple, en français, SCHREIBER, Thomas : *Hongrie : La transition pacifique*, Le Monde, Paris, 1991 et aussi KENDE, Pierre : « *Hongrie de la réforme à la transformation* », *Politique étrangère*, numéro 1, 1990. 35-44.

il s'agit aussi, pour le pays qui vu naître Petőfi, du « retour à l'Europe »<sup>8</sup> après plus de quarante années d'assimilation abusive de la part des Soviétiques. En France, enfin, 1989 représente le moment central de la politique de « relance à l'Est », le temps du renouveau des relations avec « la nouvelle Europe ».

En s'appuyant sur les archives de l'ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), celle du Ministère des affaires étrangères et européennes (série Hongrie 1990-1995) et sur la presse hongroise et française de l'époque, cet article analysera le changement de dimension et de nature que représente 1989 dans les relations franco-hongroises en s'interrogeant à la fois sur les origines de ce changement et sur la manière dont il est conduit de part et d'autre. L'année 1989 marque-t-elle la fin des « absences de Marianne »<sup>9</sup> en Hongrie et de « 300 ans d'amour impossible »<sup>10</sup> entre les deux pays ?

### **Relance à l'est et retour à l'Europe :**

#### **« L'histoire frappe à la porte »**

Les principaux conseillers de François Mitterrand font remonter au début de l'année 1988 les premières volontés du chef de l'État de renforcer la présence française en Europe centrale : « Dès avant sa réélection le Président a plusieurs fois évoqué avec Roland Dumas, Jean-Louis Bianco, Jacques Attali ou moi son désir de se rendre dans tous les pays d'Europe de l'est »<sup>11</sup>. Roland Dumas, le Ministre français des Affaires étrangères, précise ce qui motive cette intention : « nous sentions des craquements et nous pensions qu'il fallait soutenir les boutures de liberté qui commençaient à apparaître »<sup>12</sup>. En réalité, l'idée de renforcer la présence française en Europe centre-orientale de manière générale, et en Hongrie en particulier, existe au sein du quai d'Orsay depuis plusieurs mois déjà, sans pour autant que la France ait pressenti en amont les rapides transformations à venir dans le pays<sup>13</sup>. Toutefois, dès avant la seconde visite en France de János Kádár<sup>14</sup> en

---

<sup>8</sup> Le terme est très largement employé par l'ensemble de la classe politique hongroise de l'époque, généralement pour souligner l'abandon de l'ouest et insister sur le devoir moral de réintégration. Notons cependant à ce propos les remarques d'István Majoros dans : MAJOROS, István : « La Hongrie a la recherche de l'Europe », Öt Kontinens, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék közleményei, numéro 2011, ELTE, Budapest, 2012.

<sup>9</sup> SCHREIBER, Thomas : *Les actions de la France à l'Est ou les absences de Marianne*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000.

<sup>10</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (= Arch. MAE) La Courneuve, Série Hongrie (1990-1995), Télégramme diplomatique, 13 décembre 1993, Entretiens politiques, Árpád Göncz. Carton 7111.

<sup>11</sup> VÉDRINE, Hubert : *Les mondes de François Mitterrand, A l'Élysée 1981-1995*, Fayard, Paris, 1996. 452.

<sup>12</sup> FAVIER, Pierre et MARTIN-ROLAND, Michel : *La décennie Mitterrand : Les défis*, Tome III, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1996. 167.

<sup>13</sup> GARADNAI Zoltán et SCHREIBER Thomas : « A francia–magyar politikai és diplomáciai kapcsolatok alakulása a Quai d'Orsay szemével », ArchivNet, numéro 2, Budapest, 2009. (www.archivnet.hu).

octobre 1984, les diplomates français, attentifs à « l'éveil » de la diplomatie hongroise, soulignent l'originalité du modèle intérieur du pays<sup>15</sup>. Roland Dumas semble, pour sa part, s'être persuadé de la nécessité d'affirmer la présence française dans la région dès 1986-1987 à la lumière de ses conversations avec le vice chancelier allemand Hans-Dietrich Genscher<sup>16</sup>. Cependant, jusqu'en 1988 la diplomatie française s'en tient à afficher « une volonté essentiellement incantatoire » de mener à l'égard de ce qu'elle dénomme encore les pays de l'est, « une politique active tout en mesurant l'érosion préoccupante de son influence culturelle et linguistique dans la région »<sup>17</sup>. Il faut donc bien attendre l'été 1988 pour que la France se mette à agir : « Les évolutions à l'est offrent des possibilités d'actions accrues dans tous les domaines : il nous faut les saisir »<sup>18</sup>.

L'explication de ce franc regain d'intérêt côté français réside en trois points :

a) L'affaiblissement de la puissance soviétique dans la région et le processus simultané de démocratisation qui touche la Hongrie : « Au début de l'année 1988 (...) Mitterrand observe que Gorbatchev semble avoir renoncé à employer la force pour maîtriser des régimes qui vont de mal en pis »<sup>19</sup>. Et le président français de noter que « la Hongrie vient d'être le théâtre d'un véritable coup d'État réformateur qu'il importe de conforter d'urgence. Il faut lui proposer un accord financier et politique majeur »<sup>20</sup>. Les Magyars viennent en effet d'adopter quelques semaines auparavant le principe du multipartisme lors d'une session extraordinaire du parti socialiste ouvrier hongrois (PSOH)<sup>21</sup> ainsi que les grandes lignes d'une nouvelle Constitution<sup>22</sup>. En réalité, la France cherche avant tout à maîtriser ces changements. Elle craint particulièrement les conséquences d'une crise économique et ne veut pas être confrontée à un « nouveau 1956 »<sup>23</sup>. L'État français considère donc qu'il est d'« un intérêt essentiel que les mutations à l'Est se passent de façon contrôlée »<sup>24</sup>. Contrôlée aussi de manière à ce que la diplomatie hongroise, qui a multiplié les rapprochements avec la RFA au cours des années précédentes, ne tombe pas dans les bras de nos voisins d'outre-Rhin.

b) La volonté farouche de ne pas autoriser l'Allemagne – surtout – et les autres

<sup>14</sup> La première visite officielle de János Kádár en France remonte à novembre 1978.

<sup>15</sup> SCHREIBER, Thomas : *Les actions de la France à l'Est ou les absences de Marianne*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000. 182.

<sup>16</sup> BOZO, Frédéric : *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005. 64.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Arch. MAE, Sous-Direction d'Europe Orientale, Note A.S, Les évolutions en URSS et en Europe de l'Est, 23 juin 1988, carton 6795.

<sup>19</sup> Hubert Védrine cité par : FAVIER, Pierre et MARTIN-ROLAND, Michel : *La décennie Mitterrand : Les défis*, Tome III, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1996. 167.

<sup>20</sup> Le 16 mai 1988, cité dans ATTALI, Jacques : *Verbatim* (tome III, 1988-1991), Fayard, Paris, 1995.

<sup>21</sup> Les 10 et 11 février 1989.

<sup>22</sup> Arch. MAE La Courneuve, Sous-direction d'Europe orientale, fiche d'entretien, A.S Situations et perspectives des relations Est-Ouest, 16 février 1989.

<sup>23</sup> GARADNAI Zoltán et SCHREIBER Thomas : *op. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> Note d'Hubert Védrine pour le président de la République, 14 décembre 1988, archives privées. Cité par BOZO, Frédéric : 106.

puissances de l'ouest –aussi – à capitaliser sur les changements en cours représente la seconde raison majeure du renouveau de la présence française en Hongrie : « *Nous n'avons aucune raison de laisser les Allemands de l'ouest y mener seuls une politique dynamique* »<sup>25</sup> indique le président François Mitterrand à son conseiller, Jacques Attali. Une inquiétude partagée par Roland Dumas : « *Je voyais l'Allemagne qui avançait partout à l'est, je voyais que Genscher allait tous les mois en Tchécoslovaquie, qu'il se rendait quatre fois par an en Hongrie, je voyais leur rapprochement politique et leurs liens économiques se renforcer* »<sup>26</sup>. Tout en se défendant de craindre l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne à l'est<sup>27</sup> et la reconstitution d'une *Mitteleuropa* sous domination germanique<sup>28</sup>, le Président français ne cache pas son intention d'agir vite en direction de la région.

c) L'opportunité économique qu'offre l'ouverture des marchés à l'est n'a en effet pas échappée au chef de l'État. La Hongrie, qui avait été largement réformiste sur le plan économique au cours des années 1980, met en place, à partir de 1988, une législation favorable aux investissements étrangers (loi sur les sociétés, loi sur les faillites, droit de la concurrence) et modernise son système financier. François Mitterrand est conscient que « *sur le plan économique la Hongrie présente un intérêt particulier* »<sup>29</sup> sans pour autant être profondément convaincu de la solidité de son économie<sup>30</sup>. Malgré tout, la France souhaite voir augmenter de manière importante sa part de marché dans la région et refuse de voir se perpétuer la « *stagnation de son influence en matière économique aux dépens des Allemands, des Américains et des Italiens* » constatant ainsi la nécessité d'une action « *tous azimuts à effet de choc* »<sup>31</sup>.

Et tandis que la France cherche à avancer à l'Est la Hongrie, elle, tente de parcourir le chemin inverse, voyant en Marianne un allié essentiel de son dessein européen<sup>32</sup>. Le double mouvement de rapprochement qui se crée en 1989

---

<sup>25</sup> ATTALI, Jacques : 62

<sup>26</sup> FAVIER, Pierre et MARTIN-ROLAND, Michel : *La décennie Mitterrand : Les défis*, Tome III, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1996. 167.

<sup>27</sup> « *Une sorte de bascule allemande vers les pays de l'est ? Je ne le pense pas. Que l'Allemagne fédérale veuille entretenir de meilleures relations avec l'Union soviétique et les pays qui l'entourent qui s'en étonnera ? La géographie et l'histoire l'y poussent* ». Interview du président de la République française pour le *Nouvel Observateur*, *The Independent*, *El País*, *La Repubblica* et *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 juillet 1989.

<sup>28</sup> MARTENS, Stephen : *La politique à l'Est de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne depuis 1949. Entre mythes et réalités*. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1998.

<sup>29</sup> ATTALI, Jacques : 62

<sup>30</sup> « *En Hongrie et en Pologne, c'est pire qu'au Venezuela ou au Brésil ! Non seulement leur économie est en ruine, mais ces pays ne disposent même pas d'économistes capables de chiffrer les besoins et de proposer des programmes d'aide. Alors, on va payer, mais sans très bien savoir comment cet argent va être utilisé.* » François Mitterrand lors du conseil des ministres le 22 Novembre 1989, cité dans ATTALI, Jacques : 346.

<sup>31</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Conférence des ambassadeurs en poste à l'Est, Compte rendu de la réunion des 3-4 octobre 1988, Carton 272.

<sup>32</sup> ALLAIRE, Françoise : « *Les relations culturelles franco-hongroises depuis 1989* », *Revue d'Europe Centrale*, Tome III /2, Centre d'études germaniques, Strasbourg, 1995. 217-227.

déclenche un effet de synergie qui explique, en partie, l'importance des rapports bilatéraux à partir de cette date.

### « L'Europe, notre destin »

Du côté hongrois, deux éléments viennent favoriser le rapprochement avec la France :

a) Tout d'abord le désir de « retour à l'Europe ». Après presque un demi-siècle de domination soviétique, la Hongrie « plus souvent témoin qu'acteur des relations internationales »<sup>33</sup> retrouve enfin une politique extérieure indépendante<sup>34</sup>. Symboles de celle-ci : la chute du rideau de fer entre la Hongrie et l'Autriche<sup>35</sup> d'une part et la demande d'adhésion au conseil de l'Europe déposée à Strasbourg le 16 novembre 1989 d'autre part<sup>36</sup>. Certes, le pays conserve jusqu'en juin 1991 des troupes russes sur son territoire, mais sur le plan politique il a déjà repris sa liberté, avec un objectif central : intégrer le plus rapidement possible la Communauté Européenne.

En Janvier 1989, Károly Grósz, alors secrétaire général du PSOH, se livre, devant le forum économique international, à un long plaidoyer pour l'intégration de la Hongrie au sein de l'Europe Communautaire : « *l'essor de mon pays a toujours été lié au destin de l'Europe. Au cours de notre histoire nous en avons fait l'expérience, la raison et le cœur nous disent d'une même voix que notre destin c'est l'Europe* »<sup>37</sup>. Citant au fil de son discours Stefan Zweig, Lucrèce, la Bible, les Lumières et la Révolution française, Károly Grósz s'attache à montrer que tout à la fois l'histoire, le droit et la morale lient la Hongrie à l'ouest de l'Europe n'oubliant pas, au passage, de souligner les aspects les plus pragmatiques du sujet en évoquant la nécessité de « *faire entrer les investissements étrangers et de créer des joint-ventures* » dans le pays<sup>38</sup>. Or, dans la réalisation de ce projet, Paris tient une place centrale. Budapest est consciente du rôle moteur de la France dans la construction européenne, à une période où François Mitterrand et Helmut Kohl se rencontrent presque chaque mois autour de cette question. Historiquement proche de l'Allemagne, la Hongrie entend donc renforcer ses liens, plus distendus, avec Paris.

---

<sup>33</sup> HOREL, Catherine : *Cette Europe qu'on dit Centrale – Des Habsbourg à l'intégration européenne 1815-2004* –, Beauchesne, Paris, 2009. 20.

<sup>34</sup> FÜLÖP, Mihály : « *La politique étrangère hongroise dans le contexte de l'Europe centrale* », Politique étrangère, numéro 1, IFRI, Paris, 1994. 115-128.

<sup>35</sup> Les images, le 27 juin 1989 à Sopron, du ministre des affaires étrangères hongrois, Gyula Horn, découplant en compagnie de son homologue autrichien Alois Mock, les fils barbelés séparant les deux pays sont restées célèbres.

<sup>36</sup> FÜLÖP, Mihály : « *L'adhésion de la Hongrie au Conseil de l'Europe* », Jalons pour une histoire du Conseil de l'Europe, Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, Editions Peter Lang, Berne, 1997. 177-189.

<sup>37</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Visite de Károly Grósz en France, Dossier Général, Carton 206.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*



b) La volonté de rééquilibrage des relations extérieures est un thème constant de la diplomatie hongroise à partir des années 1980. Les chiffres comparés de la présence allemande et française en Hongrie en 1988 lui donnent raison : la France investit alors sept fois moins que son voisin<sup>39</sup> et sa langue y est largement moins répandue (34% des élèves étudient l'Allemand au lycée contre 8,5% le Français<sup>40</sup>). Lors de son passage à Paris, les 17-18-19 novembre 1988, Károly Grósz insiste sur la nécessité pour la France de retourner la situation. Il réclame davantage d'investissements et des efforts supplémentaires en matière d'enseignement du Français, jugeant l'influence germanique « *un peu envahissante* »<sup>41</sup>.

Ce qui marque avant tout la particularité de la relation franco-hongroise à la fin des années 1980 c'est donc cette volonté mutuelle – certes intéressée de part et d'autre – de rapprochement. L'un – la France – apparaît comme un partenaire incontournable sur le chemin de l'adhésion à la Communauté Européenne, tandis l'autre – la Hongrie – représente l'élève modèle de la transition à l'est. A l'intérieur de cette équation, 1989 constitue l'année charnière, celle où la réunion « *réelle* » entre les deux pays apparaît le mieux, celle où la Hongrie se transforme le plus, celle où « *désormais le rapprochement des deux Europes constituent la grande affaire de cette fin de siècle* »<sup>42</sup>.

### **Les conditions du rapprochement**

#### **« Le temps des visites »**

C'est avant tout politiquement que la France cherche à agir et ce afin de « *revigorer [ses] relations avec les pays socialistes européens* »<sup>43</sup>. Il s'agit dorénavant non plus d'envisager « *l'Europe comme un bloc* » mais bel et bien d'adopter « *une approche différenciée d'un pays à l'autre* »<sup>44</sup>. La France choisit ici d'abandonner sa stratégie politique européenne « *globale* » au profit d'une politique individualisée pays par pays. Signe de ce changement d'attitude au plus haut niveau de l'État, deux jours avant sa visite officielle à Budapest, le Président François Mitterrand reprend sèchement son ministre de la Défense, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, lors d'un comité de défense : « *Il ne faut pas dire Europe de l'Est mais Europe Centrale : la Tchécoslovaquie, la Hongrie, la Pologne !* »<sup>45</sup>. La France, a, semble-t-il, pris conscience de l'importance des transformations en cours dans

---

<sup>39</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Note préparatoire à la visite de Károly Grósz, 31 octobre 1988, carton 206.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Notes d'entretien avec Károly Grósz, carton 206.

<sup>42</sup> François Mitterrand, Libération, 23 novembre 1988.

<sup>43</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), Conférence des ambassadeurs en poste à l'est, Compte rendu de la réunion des 3-4 octobre 1988, Carton 272.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> ATTALI, Jacques : 398.

« *l'autre Europe* » et tient à le souligner. Dans un discours prononcé devant le parlement européen le 25 octobre 1989 le chef de l'État français rappelle que ce qui se passe à l'est est « *l'évènement le plus important de l'histoire européenne et peut-être mondiale d'après-guerre* » soulignant par ailleurs que la Hongrie en est « *à l'avant-garde* »<sup>46</sup>. Dans cette optique, la France tente d'instaurer un dialogue politique avec la Hongrie à tous les niveaux en systématisant l'envoi de personnalités et en accroissant ses moyens financiers et humains dans la région<sup>47</sup>. Les rencontres bilatérales jugées jusqu'alors « *trop irrégulières et peu fréquentes* »<sup>48</sup> sont intensifiées avec, toujours en arrière-plan, la volonté non dissimulée de ne pas laisser les autres pays de l'ouest capitaliser sur le changement : « *Whitehead se rend pour la deuxième fois de l'année dans les PECO, Geoffrey Howe a visité tous les pays*<sup>49</sup>, *Thatcher va en Pologne. Genscher a multiplié les visites. Kohl a été à Prague, va se rendre en Pologne et a déjà reçu le Premier ministre hongrois* »<sup>50</sup>. En conséquence, la France se doit « *de faire progresser son mouvement et de l'accélérer si possible* »<sup>51</sup>. C'est dans ce but qu'elle multiplie les visites en Hongrie. Après l'envoi du ministre des Affaires étrangères, Jean-Bernard Raimond, en mars 1988<sup>52</sup> et la réception de László Kovács, vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères en octobre<sup>53</sup>, l'année 1989 est marquée par un véritable défilé de personnalités politiques françaises en Hongrie. Au total, pas moins de cinq ministres<sup>54</sup> s'y rendent en moins de douze mois! C'est aussi le cas du président de l'Assemblée nationale, Laurent Fabius, du président du Conseil constitutionnel, Robert Badinter, et de plusieurs dizaines de députés et sénateurs dans le cadre de missions parlementaires<sup>55</sup>. L'ensemble est parachevé en janvier 1990 par la visite du Président de la République<sup>56</sup>, accompagné de 7

<sup>46</sup> Népszabadság, 26 octobre 1989

<sup>47</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), Relance de la politique à l'est, Dossier technique, Note du 26 juin 1988, carton 274.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> John Whitehead est le Secrétaire d'état adjoint américain de 1985 à 1989, Geoffrey Howe le Secrétaire d'État britannique aux affaires étrangères de 1983 à 1989 puis le vice-Premier ministre du royaume de 1989 à 1990.

<sup>50</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), Relance de la politique à l'est, Dossier technique, Note du 26 juin 1988, carton 274.

<sup>51</sup> Roland Dumas, Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), Conférence des ambassadeurs en poste à l'Est, Compte rendu de la séance du 3 octobre 1988, carton 272.

<sup>52</sup> GARADNAI Zoltán et SCHREIBER Thomas : *op. cit.*

<sup>53</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Chronologie de politique étrangère (synthèse mensuelle des visites officielles) d'après le service de l'agence de presse hongroise MTI, carton 214.

<sup>54</sup> Il s'agit de Pierre Joxe, Ministre de l'intérieur, d'Hubert Curien, Ministre de la recherche et de la technologie, de Jean-Pierre Rausch, Ministre du commerce extérieur, de Roland Dumas Ministre d'État et Ministre des affaires étrangères, et de Michel Delebarre, Ministre des Transports.

<sup>55</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Chronologie de politique étrangère (synthèse mensuelle des visites officielles) d'après le service de l'agence de presse hongroise MTI, Dossier général/parlementaires français, carton 214.

<sup>56</sup> Pour plus de détails sur le voyage de François Mitterrand en 1990 voir LACHAISE, Bernard : « *Le voyage de François Mitterrand en Hongrie en 1990* », *Öt Kontinens*, numéro 2009, ELTE, Budapest, 63-

ministres dont 6 nouveaux<sup>57</sup>.

Coté hongrois la diplomatie des visites actives n'est pas non plus en reste. Après avoir reçu Károly Grósz fin 1988 et László Somogyi, ministre de la construction et du développement en décembre<sup>58</sup>, la France invite au cours de l'année 1989 d'éminentes personnalités politiques hongroises dont notamment Csaba Halmos, secrétaire d'état et président de l'office national hongrois des salaires et du travail, Tamás Beck, ministre du commerce, Péter Medgyessy, Vice-Premier ministre en charge de affaires économiques, Péter Várkonyi, ministre des Affaires étrangères puis son remplaçant au poste, Gyula Horn<sup>59</sup>. Paris cherche également à faire venir : « *les personnalités qui montent* »<sup>60</sup> tentant ainsi d'anticiper sur les changements à venir en Hongrie en misant sur la « *recherche des nouveaux talents* »<sup>61</sup>.

Du 3 au 6 décembre 1989, c'est Imre Pozsgay, ministre d'État, qui est reçu à Paris. Celui qui faisait encore quelques semaines auparavant figure de favori pour l'élection présidentielle hongroise<sup>62</sup> est reçu par les plus hauts membres de l'État (Premier ministre, ministre des Affaires étrangères, secrétaire général de l'Élysée, vice-président du Sénat) ainsi que par l'ensemble de la classe politique française (Jacques Chirac, Alain Juppé, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Raymond Barre, Pierre Mauroy, Laurent Fabius,...)<sup>63</sup>. Le natif de Kóny dans la région de Győr, participe également sur Antenne 2 à l'émission politique créée par François-Henri de Virieu, *L'heure de vérité*. Il s'agit là d'un évènement de grande ampleur<sup>64</sup> et l'émission est diffusée en Hongrie dans plus de 200.000 foyers<sup>65</sup>. « *Pozsgay, superstar de la télé française* » titre au lendemain de son apparition le journal *Magyar Nemzet*<sup>66</sup> qui

---

74 et aussi GARADNAI, Zoltán et SCHREIBER, Thomas : « *François Mitterrand elnök második budapesti útja – 1990. január 18–19* » ArchivNet, numéro 3, Budapest, 2009. (www.archivnet.hu).

<sup>57</sup> Le président Français est accompagné de Pierre Bérégovoy, ministre de l'économie, de Roger Fauroux, ministre de l'industrie, de Thierry de Beaucé, secrétaire d'État aux relations culturelles internationales, de Paul Quilès, ministre des télécommunications, des postes et de l'espace, de Jack Lang, ministre la culture et de Roland Dumas, ministre des affaires étrangères. Source : *Magyar Nemzet*, 18 janvier 1990.

<sup>58</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Chronologie de politique étrangère (synthèse mensuelle des visites officielles) d'après le service de l'agence de presse hongroise MTI, carton 214.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Note du 26 juin 1988, Relance de la politique à l'est : dossier technique, carton 274

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> KENDE, Pierre et SMOLAR Aleksander (dir.) : *La Grande Secousse (Europe de l'Est 1989-1990)*, CNRS, Paris, 1990. 67- 86.

<sup>63</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Visite en France de Mr Pozsgay, carton 238

<sup>64</sup> Avant lui un seul homme politique étranger avait été invité, le chancelier allemand Helmut Schmidt. Imre Pozsgay est par ailleurs le premier homme politique invité issu d'un pays du pacte de Varsovie.

<sup>65</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Télégramme diplomatique, 8 décembre 1989, Visite en France de Mr Pozsgay, carton 238.

<sup>66</sup> *Magyar Nemzet*, 5 décembre 1989.

évoque également les thèmes principaux de son intervention : la situation économique et politique du pays, la volonté de se rapprocher de l'ouest, la privatisation des plus grandes entreprises hongroises,<sup>67</sup>. Un dernier thème qui, avec la présence culturelle de Marianne dans le pays<sup>68</sup>, avait été au cœur des discussions du ministre d'État avec les dirigeants français.

### « Un dialogue ininterrompu »

Les relations culturelles sont celles qui étaient restées les plus fortes au cours de la période d'après-guerre, l'ancienne conseillère culturelle de l'ambassade de France évoquant un « *dialogue ininterrompu* »<sup>69</sup> jusqu'en 1989. Néanmoins, et comme ce fut le cas pour les relations politiques, les rapports culturels ont été très inégaux au cours de la période, marqués à la fois par des moments de rapprochements et d'éloignements. Si la période 1945-1947 est caractérisée par une « *atmosphère favorable* »<sup>70</sup> avec notamment la réouverture du lycée français de Gödöllő – originellement créé en 1938 – la reprise des activités de l'Alliance française mais aussi la création de l'Institut français<sup>71</sup>, l'année 1948 ouvre une période plus difficile. Le nouveau régime communiste hongrois vient ternir les bons rapports établis entre les deux pays et ce jusqu'en 1953, date à laquelle de nouveau une faible éclaircie est ressentie<sup>72</sup>. Durant les événements de 1956 les liens sont fortement altérés mais l'Institut français reste malgré tout ouvert<sup>73</sup>. Il faut attendre le début des années 1960 pour voir les relations entre les deux pays s'institutionnaliser avec dès 1961 la signature d'un premier accord culturel puis en 1966 d'un nouvel accord de coopération culturelle, scientifique et technique<sup>74</sup>. L'époque qui va des années 1960 au début des années 1980 est, elle aussi, marquée par des rapports sinusoïdaux. La France, qui affirme alors bien souvent sa volonté de se rapprocher, ne prend, dans les faits, jamais guère plus que quelques mesures sans lendemain. François Mitterrand se voit contraint de l'admettre lors de son premier voyage à Budapest en 1982 : le niveau de coopération n'est pas

---

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Visite en France de Mr Pozsgay, carton 238

<sup>69</sup> ALLAIRE, Françoise : *op. cit.*

<sup>70</sup> LACHAISE, Bernard : « *L'enseignement du français en Hongrie au XXème siècle* », Revue d'histoire diplomatique, Éditions A. Pedone, Paris, 2011. 17-27.

<sup>71</sup> DIENER, Georges : *Une histoire de l'Institut français en Hongrie 1947-1989*, L'Harmattan et Éditions Magvető, Paris – Budapest, 1990.

<sup>72</sup> FEJÉRDY Gergely : « *A francia kultúrdiplomácia főbb törekvései és lehetőségei Magyarországon 1945 és 1990 között* », Külügyi szemle, numéro 2, Magyar Külügyi Intézet, Budapest, 2011. 63-75.

<sup>73</sup> LACHAISE Bernard : « *Un Français en Hongrie 1947-1958 : Guy Turbet-Delof* », Öt Kontinens, az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék közleményei, numéro 2010, ELTE, Budapest, 2011. et TURBET-DELOF, Guy : *La révolution hongroise de 1956. Journal d'un témoin*, Institut français en Hongrie, Budapest, 1996.

<sup>74</sup> OLÁH, Tibor : « *Le renouveau de la francophilie en Europe centrale. La Hongrie et la langue française* », Institut Charles de Gaulle, *De Gaulle en son siècle*, Paris, Plon/La documentation française, 1992. tome 7 : de Gaulle e la culture, 277 - 281.

celui qu'on serait en droit d'espérer<sup>75</sup>. Certes, le français conserve une image de prestige parmi les milieux intellectuels mais son enseignement est encore très peu développé. Les locaux de l'Institut français ne sont plus adaptés, et les échanges, à tout point de vue, restent encore très limités. Une première relance est donc décidée au milieu des années 1980 et la situation s'améliore après le passage du président français<sup>76</sup>. La construction d'un nouvel institut culturel, plus grand, plus pratique, mieux situé, est annoncée<sup>77</sup>, le centre interuniversitaire d'études hongroises (CIEH) ouvre ses portes à Paris en 1985, des lectorats de hongrois sont créés en France<sup>78</sup> alors qu'en Hongrie deux sections bilingues français-hongrois ouvrent dans les lycées Kolcsey de Budapest (1987) et de Pásztó (1988)<sup>79</sup>.

Mais à la veille de 1989 quelle est la véritable place de la culture française en Hongrie ? Quelques jours avant la visite de Károly Grósz en France, le ministère des Affaires étrangères<sup>80</sup>, d'une part, et le conseiller culturel de l'ambassade de France<sup>81</sup>, d'autre part, dressent un bilan sans concession de la situation. Le second rappelle que la France n'a jamais pu intervenir directement au niveau culturel en Hongrie au cours des décennies passées et que l'ensemble des projets qu'elle souhaitait mener à bien se devait de transiter par le ministère hongrois de la culture. Il insiste également sur les difficultés liées au financement de nombreux projets engagés qui ont, selon lui, rarement bénéficiés d'un soutien hongrois adéquat. Il souligne enfin que la France ne bénéficie toujours pas, à l'heure où il écrit, de son nouvel Institut alors même que l'Allemagne vient d'inaugurer « *en grande pompe* », et en présence de Hans-Dietrich Genscher, le nouveau *Goethe Institut*.

C'est le ministère des Affaires étrangères qui fournit les données chiffrées quant à la présence culturelle française en Hongrie à la veille du changement de régime : en 1988, l'Institut français présente une pièce de théâtre par mois et 3,3% des programmes télévisés sont français. Sur le plan des échanges, 173 jeunes français se rendent en Hongrie et 170 jeunes hongrois sont reçus en France dans le cadre de courts séjours (stages, semaines découvertes). Cependant les jeunes hongrois sélectionnés sont souvent « *très encadrés et bien-pensants* »<sup>82</sup>. Au niveau de la langue moins de 9% des étudiants choisissent le Français dans le secondaire, alors que 7% des étudiants en langue en font leur matière principale à l'université (soit

---

<sup>75</sup> FEJÉRDY, Gergely (2011): *op. cit.*

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>78</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Télégramme diplomatique, 9 juin 1987, carton 253.

<sup>79</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Relations culturelles, dossier général, carton 252.

<sup>80</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Notes pour la préparation de la visite de Karóly Grosz, 31 octobre 1988, carton 206.

<sup>81</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Note du conseiller culturel de l'ambassade de France : « *notre action scientifique et technique en Hongrie* », 15 septembre 1988, carton 252.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

seulement 395 étudiants). De manière plus large, 6% de l'ensemble des étudiants du supérieur suivent des cours de français comme matière secondaire (soit 1400 personnes). Les chiffres, très modestes, sont toutefois en progression depuis plusieurs années : à l'université d'économie les effectifs ont ainsi augmenté de 65% depuis 1982<sup>83</sup>. Ces données éclairent mieux les demandes répétées de Károly Grósz et d'Imre Pozsgay à Paris : « *il est nécessaire de concéder des efforts supplémentaires en matière d'enseignement du français* »<sup>84</sup> et la lettre, en date du 14 Novembre 1989, adressée à François Mitterrand par Miklós Németh réclamant la création d'un lycée Français à Budapest<sup>85</sup>. En substance, les dirigeants hongrois expliquent que la France peut, et se doit, de mieux faire sous peine de voir la Hongrie être emportée par l'influence allemande.

Dans ce cadre, 1989 offre une nouvelle chance, les positions ne sont plus figées et les « *cartes peuvent être rebattues* »<sup>86</sup>. Le russe n'est désormais plus obligatoire et deux nouvelles sections bilingues sont créées dans des lycées hongrois à défaut – pour l'instant – du lycée Français tant réclamé par les dirigeants magyars<sup>87</sup>. Dix postes d'experts linguistiques pour la formation de professeurs de français sont également créés dans toute la Hongrie (Szombathely, Szeged, Miskolc, Nyíregyháza,...)<sup>88</sup> et la France met en place un programme de reconversion des professeurs de russe à hauteur de 200 personnes par an. Le pendant du CIEH à Paris, le Centre interuniversitaire des études Françaises (CIEF) est prévu pour 1990 et 240 bourses sont mises en place pour l'accueil de chercheurs et de doctorants<sup>89</sup>. Au total on décide de multiplier le budget de la coopération culturelle par 6,5<sup>90</sup> et de créer l'année suivante la Mission Interministérielle pour l'Europe Centrale et Orientale (MICECO) ayant pour but la mise en place de projets adaptés aux défis de la transition : construction de l'État de droit, reconstruction, mais aussi de nombreux projet culturels. 1989 marque ainsi le début d'un nouvel « *âge d'or* » de la culture française en Hongrie<sup>91</sup>.

#### « Saisir les opportunités »

La coopération économique bilatérale avait été un des thèmes centraux des discussions au cours des visites des dirigeants hongrois à Paris en 1988 et 1989. Il

---

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Télégramme diplomatique, 29 novembre 1988, Visite officielle de Mr Grósz, carton 206.

<sup>85</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Enseignement, carton 253.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> ALLAIRE, Françoise : *op. cit.*

<sup>88</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Relations culturelles, dossier général, carton 252

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> ALLAIRE, Françoise : *op. cit.*

<sup>91</sup> ALLAIRE, Françoise : *Intervention au cours de la table ronde pour les 20 ans de l'Institut Français à Budapest*, 3 avril 2012.

faut rappeler que sur le plan intérieur la Hongrie avait bénéficié, à partir de 1964, d'une certaine latitude dans le cadre de sa politique économique, contrepartie de son strict alignement sur Moscou dans le domaine des affaires extérieures<sup>92</sup>. Cette liberté avait conduit le pays, au cours des années 1970 et 1980, à la modernisation de son économie et à la construction d'un modèle de « *socialisme de marché* »<sup>93</sup>. Dès 1982, le pays avait adhéré au Fonds Monétaire International ainsi qu'à la Banque mondiale et avait reçu d'importants investissements venus de l'ouest (dont principalement de la RFA<sup>94</sup>.) Les réformes entreprises au cours des années 1988-1989 – mise en place de lois sur les sociétés, sur les banques, libéralisation des prix,... – terminèrent de placer la Hongrie dans le cercle des nouveaux pays à économie de marché. Toutefois, jusqu'en 1989, et ce malgré les réformes et la volonté d'ouverture affichée<sup>95</sup>, la Hongrie réalisait 80% de ses échanges à l'intérieur du CAEM<sup>96</sup> tandis que de son côté la France se concentrait davantage sur le développement de ses rapports avec la CECA/CEE et restait timorée dans ses investissements à l'est. Certes un accord de coopération existait depuis 1966 et deux autres accords-cadres avaient été signés en 1976 et 1978<sup>97</sup> ainsi qu'un accord mutuel de protection des investissements en 1986, mais la présence de la France, même en progression, resta, jusqu'à la fin des années 1980, extrêmement modeste. En 1981, la France ne constituait que le 59<sup>e</sup> fournisseur et le 55<sup>e</sup> client de la Hongrie<sup>98</sup>. Les progrès accomplis au cours de la décennie 1980 en général, et durant l'année 1988 en particulier, ne sont jugés « *qu'à demi satisfaisant* »<sup>99</sup> par l'ambassadeur français en poste à Budapest qui évoque notamment la création de liens pour les entreprises Schlumberger, Alcatel, Rhône Poulenc ou encore Bull sans pour autant qu'aucun accord n'ait alors encore été signé. Dans un télégramme du 15 janvier 1989, il appelle les entreprises françaises à un certain volontarisme, soulignant que si les difficultés économiques et les problèmes liés au processus de sortie du communisme existent un simple effort permettrait de les dépasser: « *le risque n'est pas excessif et sauf catastrophe générale la Hongrie*

---

<sup>92</sup> FÜLÖP, Mihály : *op. cit.*

<sup>93</sup> La notion de socialisme de marché trouve ses racines dans la littérature des années 1930, notamment chez LANGE, Oskar : *On the economic theory of socialism*, 1936.

<sup>94</sup> Plus de 50% du commerce réalisé par la Hongrie avec l'Ouest en 1988 l'est avec la RFA.

<sup>95</sup> En 1988, le Ministre hongrois du commerce, Tamás Beck, de passage à Paris dans le cadre d'une tournée à l'ouest, propose à la privatisation les 50 plus grandes entreprises hongroises. Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Chronologie de politique étrangère (synthèse mensuelle des visites officielles) d'après le service de l'agence de presse hongroise MTI, carton 214.

<sup>96</sup> ERDEI, Balázs : *Les Relations franco-hongroises à l'égard de l'élargissement à l'est de l'Union Européenne*, Mémoire de DEA sous la direction de Michel LESAGE, Université Paris1-Panthéon Sorbonne, Juin 2001.

<sup>97</sup> Le premier concerne un accord Creusot-Loire / Nikex sur la collaboration des deux entreprises sur un marché tiers et l'autre Rhône-Poulenc / Chemolimpex sur le principe d'achats réciproques. ERDEI Balázs: *op. cit.*

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid*, 66.

<sup>99</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Télégramme diplomatique du 15 janvier 1989, carton 228.

sera, dans 5 à 10 ans, un partenaire européen de plain-pied »<sup>100</sup>. Dans ce contexte, 1989, sans marquer la ruée vers « l'est-dorado » tant souhaitée par certains<sup>101</sup>, représente la naissance de véritables rapports économiques et commerciaux entre les deux pays. L'année est caractérisée par la multiplication par sept des *joint-ventures*<sup>102</sup>, l'augmentation de 30% des investissements français en Hongrie sur les neuf premiers mois<sup>103</sup> et la multiplication par cinq des voyages professionnels (20 000 en 1989 contre moins de 4.000 les années précédentes)<sup>104</sup>. Parmi les entreprises françaises qui exportent le plus dans le pays, on retrouve Thomson à hauteur de 50 millions de francs, la Vieille Montagne pour 45 millions de francs ainsi que Renault et Citroën, tous deux pour 20 millions de francs<sup>105</sup>. La France choisit, à partir de 1989, de miser sur une politique d'investissement plus active en développant les actions de l'Agence pour la Coopération Technique, Industrielle et Économique (ACTIM), en informant les grandes villes et les régions des perspectives à l'est, en les associant aux déplacements officiels<sup>106</sup>, et en renforçant les moyens de l'ambassade pour l'aide aux PME-PMI<sup>107</sup>. De son côté, le Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF) organise plusieurs réunions pour informer les industriels français des possibilités d'investissements en Hongrie<sup>108</sup>. On y présente notamment la nouvelle loi hongroise sur les sociétés, la loi sur les investissements étrangers (exemptions d'impôts, rapatriement des bénéficiaires en devises, possibilité de créer des sociétés mixtes à capital étranger majoritaires) et souligne, encore une fois, grandement, « les opportunités à saisir »<sup>109</sup>. L'année 1990 voit le prolongement des premières mesures mises en place par l'État avec l'annonce de l'ouverture d'une ligne de crédit à l'exportation de deux milliards de francs sur trois ans et d'un fond d'investissement de 50 millions de francs sous la forme de dons et prêts du trésor<sup>110</sup>. De grandes entreprises choisissent alors d'investir en Hongrie (BNP, GAN, Suez, Sanofi) et plus de 70 nouvelles sociétés sont créées<sup>111</sup>. Les chiffres sont considérables, surtout lorsqu'ils sont rapportés à ceux des années

---

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> MOLNAR, Thomas : « La Hongrie, tête de pont des marchés de l'Est », *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, Volume 20, numéro 1, 1989. 123-132.

<sup>102</sup> 22 sociétés mixtes sont créées en 1989 faisant passer le total de 3 en 1988 à 25.

<sup>103</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Note de l'ambassade : Investissements étrangers en Hongrie et relations économiques franco-hongroises, carton 228.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>106</sup> Des délégations des conseils généraux de la Nièvre et de la Gironde se rendent en Hongrie en 1989-1990.

<sup>107</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Suivi de la réunion des ambassadeurs à l'est : questions économiques, relevés de conclusions, 13 octobre 1988, carton 272.

<sup>108</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Dossier de synthèse, Réunion du CNPF, 30 mars 1989, carton 228

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Télégramme diplomatique, 20 décembre 1990, carton 240.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*



précédentes. Malgré tout, une nuance se doit d'être apportée : la France se concentre essentiellement sur les grands projets (métro, hôtellerie, nucléaire, aviation) et ses PME-PMI ne s'intéressent encore que très peu à la région.

### **Conclusion**

Quel bilan tirer de cette année 1989 ? Incontestablement, en l'absence de décalage idéologique et de tabous, les relations franco-hongroises acquièrent une nouvelle dimension. La France ne considère désormais plus la Hongrie comme une partie d'un bloc et reconnaît sa « *vocation* » à intégrer la Communauté Européenne.

1989 marque ainsi le temps du renouvellement de la coopération bilatérale sur les plans politiques, économiques et culturels. Symboles de cette renaissance, la mise en place, au cours des années suivantes, de nouvelles institutions et de nouveaux partenariats entre les deux pays : association Initiatives France-Hongrie, Alliances françaises, chambre de commerce et d'industrie franco-hongroise, lycée français de Budapest, Fondation Franco-Hongroise pour la Jeunesse... et la signature, en 1991, d'un Traité d'entente et d'amitié. Mais, 1989 demeure avant tout une année symbole ; l'apogée d'un rapprochement qui s'est construit progressivement depuis le milieu des années 1960<sup>112</sup>. La Hongrie n'en est pas pour autant devenu un élément central de la politique étrangère française et Paris ne dépasse pas Bonn en terme de présence sur le territoire hongrois.

A la veille de cette année symbolique Hubert Védrine s'interroge déjà : « *la France a-t-elle les moyens financiers et humains de ses nouvelles ambitions à l'est ?* »<sup>113</sup>. Si les années 1989-1992 tendent à apporter une réponse positive à cette question, la suite de la période vient prouver la légitimité de l'interrogation du porte-parole de la présidence. A partir de 1992, les efforts français et les crédits diminuent, rendant difficile – voire impossible – la poursuite d'une politique de présence active en Hongrie. L'ambassadeur en poste dans la capitale hongroise, évoquant le sujet de l'école française de Budapest, s'en plaint très directement dans un télégramme en date du 20 mai 1992 : « *L'amputation [des crédits] de l'ampleur envisagée compromettrait l'existence même de l'école (...) ce retour en arrière, cette distorsion extrême sont proprement impensables* »<sup>114</sup> faisant ainsi écho à ses propres propos deux ans plus tôt : « *la crédibilité engrangée en deux jours ne l'est pas à titre définitif et aura le plus grand besoin d'être entretenue à*

---

<sup>112</sup> Zoltán Garadnai parle déjà d'une nouvelle collaboration et d'un nouveau dialogue à partir 1975. GARADNAI, Zoltán : « *A magyar-francia kapcsolatok története 1975 és 1985 között* », Külügyi szemle, Budapest, 2011. 38-52, tandis que Le Monde évoque le 15 novembre 1978 lors de la visite de János Kádár à Paris une « *nouvelle étape des relations franco-hongroises* ».

<sup>113</sup> Note d'Hubert Védrine pour le président de la République, 14 décembre 1988, archives privées. Cité par BOZO, Frédéric.

<sup>114</sup> Arch. MAE La Courneuve, Série Hongrie (1990-1995), Affaires culturelles, scientifiques et techniques, Télégramme diplomatique du 20 mai 1992, carton 7101.

*force de persévérance et d'imagination* »<sup>115</sup>. Après 1992, la France semble donc retomber dans les travers de sa politique du « yoyo ». Malgré tout, à cette date, la Hongrie a vu – en partie – son souhait exaucé : elle est « revenue » en Europe. Et si le chemin vers l'adhésion fut encore long – 15ans – et semé d'incompréhensions avec la France, jamais plus il ne fut marqué par l'hostilité ou l'ignorance mutuelle.

---

<sup>115</sup> Arch. MAE Nantes, Ambassade de France à Budapest (1980-1990), 130PO/1, Télégramme diplomatique, 20 janvier 1990, Bilan de la visite du Président de la République, carton 228.

## ***Studies on Latin-America***

- rivalry between France and Germany to establish the European-South American intercontinental air route (1924 – 1934)
- the plans of the British government to build an air route between Great Britain and South America (1919 – 1939)
- the German Antarctic Expedition in 1938/39 – conflicts between Norway and Nazi Germany
- Plínio Salgado and the Brazilian integralism



Ferenc Fischer

***La dimensión „vertical” para eludir el Tratado de Versalles: el papel de las expediciones meteorológicas marítimas de los alemanes por el Atlántico Sur (1924-1927) en el establecimiento de las líneas aéreas según el itinerario Alemania-América del Sur***

**Abstract**

From the middle of the 1920's, a massive rivalry started to develop between Germany and France to establish the European-South American intercontinental air route. The „*Transozeanprojekt*” became one of the largest undertakings of the Weimar Republic. The most significant task was executed by the research vessel called *Meteor* that conducted systematic meteorological surveys between April of 1925 and June of 1927 to reveal the so called „*Luftozean*”, the climate circumstances of the South Atlantic. This enabled the development of a safe foundation for the air mail service between Berlin, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. While the hang-glider (217 units) program examined the lower layers of the atmosphere, the pilot-balloons (814 units) that were used to gain meteorological data analyzed the higher layers of the atmosphere. The 14,000 km long air route, the „*vertical dimension*” proved to be the best „*civilian*” solution for the German aircraft industry to circumvent the military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. After the test flights and meteorological research conducted between 1924 and 1934, the *Luft Hansa* air mail flight began to operate – with a 5 day long flight – between Berlin and Buenos Aires from February of 1934. Despite being defeated in WWI, Germany surpassed its French rival.

*Keywords:* meteorological expeditions (1924-1927), „*Transozeanprojekt*”, „*vertical dimension*”, *Luft Hansa*, air mail service, Berlin – Rio de Janeiro – Buenos Aires, Treaty of Versailles

**E**l „*Transozeanprojekt*”<sup>1</sup> colectivo de la *Luft Hansa*<sup>2</sup>, fundada oficialmente en enero del 1926 – y de su filial española, la *Iberia* fundada en 1927 – además, las filiales alemanas en América del Sur de la *Empresa Zeppelin* y de la *Fábrica Junkers*<sup>3</sup>, era la empresa más grandiosa y – gracias a las subvenciones

<sup>1</sup> Der Reichsverkehrminister an das Auswärtige Amt, an den Herrn Reichswehrminister, an den Chef der Heeresleitung, an den Chef der *Marineleitung*, an den Herrn Reichspostminister, an den Herrn Reichswirtschaftsminister, an den Herrn Reichsminister der Finanzen je besonders. Betrifft: Luftverkehr nach Südamerika. Ergebnis der Besprechung am 28. Juni 1928 im Reichsverkehrministerium. Berlin, 7. Juli 1928. (gezeichnet: Brandenburg, Ministerialdirektor). Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv-Freiburg (BAMA) RM 20 /329

<sup>2</sup> BLEY, Wulf: *Deutsche Luft Hansa A.-G.* Widder - Verlag, Berlin, 1932

<sup>3</sup> Los nombres de las filiales formalmente nacionales como la colombiana *Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes*, (SCADTA), fundada en 1919, el *Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano* (LAB), que empezó su

estatales – más costosa de la Alemania de Weimar fuera del continente europeo. Por la construcción del trayecto aéreo Europa (Sevilla) – América del Sur (Natal, Brasil), el puente aéreo del Atlántico del Sur, se desarrolló una titánica – y por la literatura internacional casi completamente no investigada – rivalización franco-alemana. Los trabajos sincrónicos – como cuando se empieza a construir un túnel desde dos lados – de la construcción de las cabezas del puente en España y Brasil (Argentina), de las compañías aéreas de interés alemán, empezaron a partir del 1923-1924, y en esto tenía una importancia particular el uso del espacio aéreo español, además, se revalorizaba la posición geoestratégica de las islas españolas y portuguesas del Atlántico del Sur.

Durante las investigaciones realizadas en los archivos alemanes – ante todo, en el Archivo Militar Federal y en Archivo Político del Departamento de Asuntos Exteriores<sup>4</sup> – se encontraron varios documentos notables que confirman la importancia de la dimensión vertical (aérea) española-latinoamericana. Hasta ahora, éstos no se han considerado por las investigaciones hechas en los archivos – que se refieren por parte a nuestro tema –; ni por las húngaras<sup>5</sup>, ni por las extranjeras, dedicadas especialmente a esta cuestión histórica, que sean más antiguas<sup>6</sup> o recientes (ante todo, alemanas)<sup>7</sup>.

La actividad aérea alemana en América del Sur recibió un impulso especial del viaje de varios meses del ex-canciller alemán Hans Luther en América Latina en la segunda mitad de 1926. Durante esta visita, todos los viajes posibles se efectuaron en aviones

---

actividad en 1925, el *Condor-Syndikat* brasileño, registrado en 1926, y la *S. A. Empresa de Viacao Aérea Rio Grandese (VARIG)*, también brasileña, fundada en 1927, la ecuatoriana *Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Transportes (SEDTA)* eran sólo seudónimos. Su carácter camuflante hacía posible que estas empresas aéreas bajo las banderas nacionales de Colombia, Bolivia, Brasil y Ecuador cumplieran los objetivos y las tareas aéreas de gran volumen y sistemáticamente conectados entre sí de la *Fábrica Junkers* y la *Luft Hansa*, siempre con aviones y personal alemanes.

<sup>4</sup> Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv – Freiburg (BAMA); Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes – Bonn (PAAA)

<sup>5</sup> ANDERLE, Ádám: *Spanyolország története*, Pannonica Kiadó, 1999. ANDERLE, Ádám: *Megosztott Hispánia (Államfejlődés és nemzeti mozgalmak Spanyolországban)*, Budapest, 1985. HARSÁNYI, Iván: *A Franco-diktatúra születése (1938-1939)*, Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 1988. SZILÁGYI István: *Európa és a hispán világ. Veszprém*, 1998. ORMOS, Mária – MAJOROS, István. *Európa a nemzetközi küzdötéren. Felemelkedés és hanyatlás*, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1998.

<sup>6</sup> HAMAN Konrad: *Deutschland im Weltluftverkehr. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der staatswissenschaftlichen Doktorwürde genehmigt von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin*, Triltsch&Huther, Berlin, 1936. TROTZ, Joachim: *Die deutsche Luftfahrttätigkeit in Lateinamerika (1919 - 1942) - Instrument der Lateinamerikapolitik des deutschen Imperialismus*. Band 1-2. Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Sektion Geschichte. Leipzig, 1975. FRIEHERR KOENIG VON UND ZU WATRHAUSEN, Friedrich-Karl: *Der regelmässige deutsche Luftverkehr nach Südamerika in seiner wirtschafts- und politisch-geographischen Bedeutung*. Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde einer Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen. VerlagBöhlze, Tübingen, 1937.

<sup>7</sup> RINKE, Stefan: *„Der letzte freie Kontinent”*. Deutsche Lateinamerikapolitik im Zeichen Transnationaler Beziehungen, 1918-1933. Band 1-2. HISTORAMERICANA. Herausgegeben von Hans-Joachim König und Stefan Rinke. Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, Akademischer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1996.

alemanes, así por ejemplo la distancia de casi 3000 km entre Buenos Aires y Rio de Janeiro también. La consecuencia más notable de su viaje fue, además de los éxitos de propaganda, que el gobierno brasileño dió la concesión de vuelo a las compañías aéreas brasileñas *Cóndor* y *VARIG*, pertenecientes a la *Luft Hansa*.<sup>8</sup>

A partir de 1924 empezó una rivalidad aérea franco-alemana sistemáticamente bien concebida, que se volvía más y más aguda por el dominio del espacio aéreo español y sudamericano, además, del Atlántico del Sur que los conectaba – es decir, mucho más allá de la dimensión continental europea. En los años 1920, a pesar de las deliberaciones prohibitorias del Tratado de Versalles, la industria de aviones alemana, mayormente desplazada al exterior, llegó a ser un rival serio de la francesa. Sucedió ésto justamente en una área panibérica-latina, o sea, en la Península Ibérica y en América Latina, donde París deseaba cumplir las posiciones de poder y de comercio que se presentaban después de la derrota militar alemana – y parecían ser fáciles de cumplir – y más adelante, aprovechar las posibilidades de negocios y de política militar, ofrecidas por la nueva dimensión aérea.

Después de los escenarios horizontales de los siglos pasados – superficie de los mares y continentes –, la nueva dimensión vertical, el uso del espacio aéreo global que llega más allá de las fronteras geográfico-políticas dió una gran posibilidad para Alemania: es decir que, a pesar de su derrota militar y las disposiciones prohibitivas del Tratado de Versalles, podía ser capaz de seguir siendo un gran poder de vanguardia en Europa en cuanto a la industria y a la técnica, gracias a la rápida construcción del tráfico aéreo civil en Alemania, en Europa y fuera de Europa. Para 1928, la *Luft Hansa* llegó a ser la compañía de mayor tráfico aéreo no solamente de Europa, sino de todo el mundo. La red de trayectos aéreos alemán, europeo y transatlántico de la *Luft Hansa*, la cual era bien desarrollada y tenía a sus espaldas la capacidad de fabricación y mantenimiento de los aviones, hacía un buen servicio a uno de los principales objetivos comerciales, políticos exteriores y de industria, es decir, alcanzar la posición de poder „*igual entre los iguales*”.<sup>9</sup> En la segunda mitad de los años 20, innumerables libros de técnica de aviación, escritos geopolíticos sobre el provenir de la dimensión aérea, ensayos que presentaban los efectos favorables de la aviación a la vida comercial y económica trataban las posibilidades y las tareas de la aviación alemana y de la *Luft Hansa*, incluyendo los efectos del globo que se estaba „*restringiendo*” a „*un día de distancia*” en avión, y a un mundo de „*dos días de distancia*”, a la economía mundial y alemana. Después de la Primera Guerra Mundial, la industria de aviones alemana, de vanguardia técnica, guiada por las ambiciones<sup>10</sup>, podía aparecer ya en la primera mitad de los

---

<sup>8</sup> LUTHER, Hans: *Südamerikanische Reseeindrücke. Vortrag gehalten vom Herrn Reichskanzler am 1. März 1927*, IN: *Lateinamerika* (B). *Mitteilungen über Brasilien*. Hrsg.: Deutsch-Brasilianischer Handelsverband, Deutscher Wirtschaftsverband für Süd- und Mittelamerika. Nr. (B) 91/93. Berlin, September 1927. 813-826.

<sup>9</sup> SACHSENBERG, Gotthard (Junkers-Werke, Dessau): *Luftverkehrspolitik und Oekonomie*. IN: *Jahrbuch für Luftverkehr*. 1924. 119-127.

<sup>10</sup> „*Deutschland ist geistig und technisch unbesiegt, und auf dem Gebiet des Flugzeugbaues haben wir einen bedeutenden Vorsprung erreicht, den wir im Interesse des deutschen Vaterlandes behaupten*

años 1920 como nuevo punto de vista de la política del poder en los esfuerzos (de prestigio y de revancha) de Berlín después de la guerra perdida, para alcanzar la posición de un estado de poder antes desconocido, la de „gran poder de comunicación aérea” (*Luftverkehrsgrossmacht*).

El informe alemán „*Geheim*” („secreto”) del agosto de 1925, que – debido a su destacado valor documentativo – se ha de ser citado más abajo en algunos detalles también, dá unos puntos de vista importantes y hasta entonces desconocidos, nuevos hasta para la abundante literatura internacional dedicada a las relaciones hispano-alemanas de los años 20. Ante todo, que la industria aeronáutica y el *Reichsverkehrsministerium* alemanes, ya a partir de los años 20 aspiraban sistemáticamente a la realización del *proyecto aéreo del transatlántico* y en relación con esto, a la sistemática exploración meteorológica del espacio aéreo del Atlántico del Sur, la „conquista” del espacio aéreo español (incluyendo el Marruecos español y las Islas Canarias también).

**„Secreto!**

**Informe sobre el viaje hecho en España desde abril de 1925 hasta julio de 1925.**

***Efectuado por el capitán Grauert y el teniente Jeschonneck. Madrid - Berlin, agosto de 1925.***<sup>11</sup>

*Anexo número 1.*

*Memorándum sobre la aviación de España. (Informe de una persona de confianza de Madrid.)*<sup>12</sup>

*...Hay que partir a una voz desde el punto que España ha de ser conquistada completamente para Alemania. Al mismo tiempo que España, se puede conseguir América del Sur también. Pues España es hoy en día, mucho más que antes, un*

---

*und auswerten wollen.*” Junkers an Geheimen Baurat Offermann, Buenos Aires. Dessau, 23.12.1919. Citado por: RINKE: T. II. 675-676.

<sup>11</sup> Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. Ausgeführt durch: Hauptmann Grauert, Leutnant Jeschonneck. Madrid-Berlin, August 1925. BAMA RM 20/ 284 (Luftfahrt – Nachrichten der Armee), 249-306 pp. (Las partes subrayadas aparecen también en el documento original.) Algunas partes de este largo documento ya se han publicado. Véase: Ferenc FISCHER: *Actividad militar de Alemania de Weimar en el espacio aéreo, marítimo y terrestre en los países iberoamericanos, 1919-1933*. IN: *Iberoamericana Quinqueeclesiensis* 4. Eds.: Ferenc FISCHER – Gábor KOZMA – Domingo LILÓN. Pécs, Universidad de Pécs, Centro Iberoamericano, 2006. 261-340. FISCHER Ferenc: „A dél-atlanti légiprojekt”. *Francia-német rivalizálás az Európa – Dél-Amerika légi útvonal kiépítéséért (1919-1939)*. IN: *Iberoamericana Quinqueeclesiensis* 1. (Eds. FISCHER Ferenc - KOZMA Gábor - Domingo LILÓN.) Universidad de Pécs, Centro Iberoamericano, 2003. 89-130.

<sup>12</sup> Hasta ahora no se podía identificar el autor del „*Memorándum sobre la aviación de España*”. De todas maneras, el documento formaba parte integrante del memorándum del capitán Grauert y del teniente Jeschonneck con el título „*Informe sobre el viaje en España desde abril 1925 hasta julio del 1925*”. „*Informe de una persona de confianza de Madrid*” escudirá con toda seguridad uno de los encargados dirigentes le la fábrica *Junkers* en España.



*punte hacia América del Sur.*<sup>13</sup>

*...Por lo demás, España es una tierra virgen, donde aún se puede realizar y organizar más o menos todo. De todo ésto resulta que el proyecto completo ha de ser dividido en 4 partes para realizarlas simultáneamente.*

*Las varias tareas en España.*

*Se trata de los quehaceres siguientes:*

a) *Establecer trayectos aéreos en España y hacia las Islas Canarias, incluyendo la correspondencia con la red de trayectos aéreos europeos. (Barcelona – Ginebra)*

b) *Construir la comunicación aérea desde España (las Islas Canarias) hacia América del Sur.*<sup>14</sup>

c) *Empezar la fabricación de aviones en España.*

d) *Instalar una flota aérea para el ejército y la armada (uniéndose a las líneas aéreas comerciales).*

*Algunas observaciones cortas para estos 4 puntos:*

*...La comunicación con las Islas Canarias tiene una importancia particular para España. Esta línea es actualmente objeto de reflexión de modo destacado, aunque de frente a las de arriba, provisionalmente parece menos beneficiosa. Mas esta línea forma el primer tramo de la conexión con América del Sur, y por eso hay que considerarla indudablemente muy importante. (véase el b)*<sup>15</sup>

*...b) En el primer plano del interés está la comunicación aérea con América del Sur. Aquí (en España – F. F.) se acogió con mucho entusiasmo el Zeppelin*<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> „Man muss vernünftigerweise davon ausgehen, Spanien im ganzen Umfange für Deutschland zu erobern. Mit Spanien wird man sich zugleich auch Süd-Amerika erschliessen, denn Spanien ist heute mehr denn je die Brücke nach Süd-Amerika“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April - Juli 1925. op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> En los años 20, la literatura de aviación alemana, precisamente los artículos geopolíticos analizaban a menudo y con una importancia particular la cuestión de „*Construir la comunicación aérea desde España (las Islas Canarias) hacia América del Sur*“, la aspiración alemana expresada en el memorándum citado arriba del 1925. FISCHER VON POTURZYN, Friedrich A.: *Luft-Hansa. Luftpolitische Möglichkeiten*. Werner Lehmann Verlag, Leipzig, 1925. KREDEL, Ernst: *Deutschland im euroäischen und Weltluftverkehr*. IN: *Weltwirtschaft*, 1925. Nr. 13. 146-148. DIX, Arthur: *Forderungen des globalen Zeitalters. Geopolitik und Geoökonomie*. IN: *Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft*. 1925. Bd. Heft. 1. 34-39. HENNIG, Richard: *Geopolitische Wirkungen des beginnenden Weltluftverkehrs*. IN: *Geographische Zeitschrift*. 1928. Heft 10. 580-87. BLUM, Otto – PIRATH, Carl: *Lebensfragen der deutschen Luftfahrt*. Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1928. POLLOG, Carl Hans: *Der Weltluftverkehr. Seine Entwicklung, geographische und wirtschaftliche Bedeutung*. Verlag Teubner, Leipzig und Berlin, 1929. ORLOVIUS, Heinz: *Amerika im Luftverkehr*. IN: *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. 1930. Jg. VII. Heft. 3. 233-243. HOCHHOLZER, Hans: *Zur Geopolitik des Flugwesens*. IN: *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. 1930. Jg. VII. Heft. 3. 243-254. HENNIG, Richard: *Weltluftverkehr und Weltluftpolitik*. Zentral-Verlag G.m.b.H. Berlin, 1930. VOGEL, J.: *Geopolitische Skizzen und Betrachtungen für die Schule*. Luftmeer und Weltpolitik. „Schriften zu Deutschlands Erneuerung“ Nr. 94. Heft 5. Verlag Heinrich Handel, Breslau, 1937

<sup>15</sup> „Von besonderem Interesse ist für Spanien die Verbindung nach dem Canarischen Inseln. Die Linie wird im Augenblick ganz besonders in Erwägung gezogen, obwohl sie vorläufig jedenfalls im Vergleich zu den genannten wenig gewinnbringend erscheint. Aber die Linie ist die erste Etappe zur Verbindung mit Süd-Amerika, und deshalb muss man sie zweifellos als besonders wichtig ansehen.“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> *Zeppelin* estaba contratando ya a partir del 1920 tanto en Buenos Aires como en Sevilla sobre el

(aeronave, el 12 de octubre del 1924 – F. F.), *mas los españoles más previsores, reconocieron mientras tanto que al final la victoria será con toda seguridad del avión (frente a la aeronave – F.F.).*

*La comunicación con América (del Sur – F. F.) sería buen negocio en el sentido financiero también, pues un viaje en barco de vapor a América (del Sur - F. F.) cuesta bastante tiempo y dinero. Se podría cobrar un ingreso considerable, ante todo, a través del tráfico de correos. El proyecto tiene, además del lado económico, una particular importancia política también. Hoy en día, Francia y España rivalizan en efectivo sobre a quién corresponderá el poder en América del Sur. Por éso, se entiende el esfuerzo desesperado de Francia también en cuanto quiere apoderarse de la primera comunicación (aérea – F. F.) con América del Sur. Si Alemania lograrse a realizar esta comunicación (aérea entre Europa y América del Sur – F. F.), aunque sea bajo la bandera española, de tal modo Alemania podría adquirirse una influencia decisiva no solamente en España, sino en América del Sur también. Es por éso que no se puede acentuar suficientemente la importancia de este problema. El trayecto (aéreo – F. F.) que lleva a América del Sur es un problema internacional, y Alemania tiene que asegurarse la prioridad. Francia construirá también con toda seguridad este trayecto (aéreo – F. F.), mas se espera que solamente después de nosotros.<sup>17</sup>*

---

arranque de un vuelo directo de aeronave España – Argentina. Con este fin se fundó en España la *Sociedad Colón Transaérea Española*. Zeppelin fue salvado al final no por la empresa del Atlántico del Sur, sino por una otra del Atlántico del Norte. El gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América en julio del 1922, en el marco de la recompensa alemana, hirió el pedido de una aeronave *Graf Zeppelin*. La LZ 126 partió desde Sevilla a los Estados Unidos el 12 de octubre del 1924.

<sup>17</sup> „Im Vordergrund der Interesse steht die Flugverbindung mit Südamerika. Man hat hier mit Begeisterung die Zeppeline begrüsst, inzwischen hat der nüchtern rechnende Spanier erkannt, dass das Flugzeug schliesslich wohl doch den Sieg davon tragen wird. Die Verbindung nach Amerika würde auch finanziell ein gutes Geschäft bedeuten, denn eine Dampferreise nach Amerika kostet denn doch erheblich Zeit und Geld. Vor allen Dingen aber würde man durch den Briefverkehr erhebliche Einnahmen erzielen. Das Projekt hat aber neben der wirtschaftlichen Seite auch eine eminente politische. Tatsächlich ringt heute schon Frankreich mit Spanien um die künftige Vorherrschaft in Südamerika. Daher sind auch die verzweifelten Anstrengungen zu verstehen, die Frankreich macht, um die erste Verbindung nach Südamerika in seine Hände zu bringen. Wenn es Deutschland gelingt mit seinen Flugzeugen, wenn auch unter spanischer Flagge, diese Verbindung zu erringen, wird Deutschland nicht nur in Spanien, sondern auch in Südamerika starken und vielleicht entscheidenden Einfluss gewinnen. Die Wichtigkeit dieses Problems kann daher gar nicht genug betont werden. Die Linie nach Südamerika ist ein internationales Problem und Deutschland muss sich den ersten Platz reservieren. Frankreich wird auf jeden Fall die Linie auch machen, aber hoffentlich erst nach uns.” Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit. El primer viaje en avión de éxito entre Palos de Moguer (España, de aquí había partido también a su viaje Colón) y Buenos Aires pasando por las Islas Canarias y el „codo brasilero” fue hecho por el capitán español Ramon Franco (hermano menor del general Franco) con el hidroplano tipo *Dornier-Wale* bautizado *Plus Ultra* de la empresa alemana *Dornier* a los principios de enero del 1926. Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Argentinien, informe para el Auswärtiges Amt. Buenos Aires, 1926.03.03. BAMA RM 20/292. Los dos pilotos de Francia, los capitanes Costes y Le Brix repitieron el viaje del capitán Franco en octubre del 1927, mientras que cumplieron el vuelo París – Buenos Aires en varios tramos durante diez días. Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Argentinien. Informe an *Auswärtiges Amt*. Buenos Aires, 1927. 10. 24. Politisches Archiv des *Auswärtiges Amt* (PAAA), Botschaft Paris, Süd-Amerika, 1927-1930, 490a.

c) *Por supuesto, no será posible plantar con un solo ademán la construcción de aviones a España. Mucho más se tratará de establecer, ante todo, talleres de reparación (de aviones – F. F.) que más adelante (en colaboración con otras empresas) podrán ser desarrollados para diventar fábricas autónomas. En estas fábricas, los cargos dirigentes tendrán que ser asumidos por expertos alemanes, por lo demás, ellas tendrán que funcionar como empresas españolas.*

*Naturalmente, esta forma (eludida – F. F.) que hay que seguir también por motivos legales, tendrá para Alemania la ventaja de poder proyectar y construir aquí (en España – F. F.) así como uno quiere, sin ser obstaculizados por el Tratado de Versalles.<sup>18</sup> En cambio, Francia e Inglaterra no tienen por supuesto ningún interés de dar una mano para la construcción de una industria de aviones más o menos autónoma en España.*

d) *En España se reconoce más y más la importancia militar de los aviones en la guerra terrestre y marítima. Los españoles son aviadores buenos y valientes...Provisionalmente, la flota aérea española cuenta con un campeón de los modelos diversos de aviones, sin alguna uniformidad y dirección determinada. Es incuestionable que esto pronto va a cambiar, y que Alemania está especialmente en la posición de asegurarse una hegemonía, justamente en este campo. Francia e Inglaterra no guardan interés de una flota aérea española. En cambio, Alemania sólo puede dar la bienvenida a una España y especialmente a una flota aérea española militarmente fuerte, por supuesto con la premisa de poder formar las relaciones con España siempre amistosamente.*

*El modo más simple para empezar el punto 4.*

*Tenemos que empezar con la construcción de trayectos aéreos, porque la supremacía de los aviones alemanes se manifiesta a lo mejor en el tráfico aéreo. La concurrencia extranjera – que no se puede despreciar – se puede vencer solamente presentando la superioridad (de los aviones alemanes – F. F.) Especialmente Francia es capaz, gracias a su valuta devaluada y a sus grandes reservas de guerra, de transportar a precios muy bajos. La cuestión de precios es bastante decisiva, al menos hasta que la calidad del tipo del avión más costoso no compense la diferencia de precios. Esta superioridad (de la técnica de aviones alemana – F. F.), como ya fijamos, se puede justificar solamente en el tráfico aéreo (español – F. F.) realmente en marcha.*

*Pues se puede afirmar que el punto decisivo es el de los comienzos del tráfico aéreo civil. En el primer plano del interés (alemán – F. F.) está la aviación a las Islas Canarias, como primera estación del tráfico hacia América del Sur, como ya mencionado. De todas maneras, provisionalmente no será rentable el tráfico aéreo hacia las Islas Canarias, más aún al contrario, exigirá una subvención alta.<sup>19</sup> Este tramo es por otro lado muy difícil de volar, ya que pasa por parte*

---

<sup>18</sup> „Für Deutschland bietet diese Form, ...den Vorteil, dass man hier, nicht behindert durch den Versailler Vertrag, konstruieren und bauen kann wie man will.“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> „Im Vordergrund des Interesses steht der Flug nach den Canarischen Inseln als Vorstufe des Verkehrs nach Südamerika... Vorläufig wird sich jedoch der Flugverkehr nach den Canarischen Inseln nicht rentieren, im Gegenteil eine hohe Subvention erfordern.“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach

sobre territorios deshabitados y desiertos.

Los franceses guardan el mayor interés de asegurarse este tramo y evitar que los aviones alemanes o ingleses obtengan la concesión. Para lograr ésto, se presentan dispuestos de volar (en España – F. F.) no obstante la subvención estatal muy baja de parte de España, justamente para que ninguna otra compañía (aérea – F. F.) que no sea francófila, pueda asumirse de este asunto. El gobierno francés de parte suya apoya a la larga la compañía (aérea – F. F.) francesa (Latécoére) que está compitiendo por la concesión. La concurrencia por la aviación hacia América (del Sur – F. F.) trata en la realidad del comienzo del tráfico (aéreo – F. F.) a las Islas Canarias.<sup>20</sup>

Justamente por éso es necesario que el gobierno alemán intervenga y de parte suya subvencione también la empresa alemana que concurre por la aviación (entre España y las Islas Canarias – F. F.). Actualmente, Junkers es la empresa que es accionista principal de la U.A.E. (Unión Aérea Española).<sup>21</sup>

Para las líneas aéreas que se ha de fundar (para los vuelos nacionales – F. F.) hay que instalar talleres de montaje, de los cuales podrán crecer luego las fábricas (de aviones – F. F.). Tanto las líneas aéreas como las fábricas de aviones funcionarán con capital mayormente español y bajo la bandera española, mas las empresas alemanas interesadas podrán asegurar su influencia prestándoles las tecnologías por acciones. Para la tecnología, la mano (de obra – F. F.) alemana seguirá siendo por supuesto inevitable, y ésto será así hasta que la construcción de aviones desarrolle más (tan rápido – F. F.). (Por otro lado, las industrias transportadoras, necesarias para la fabricación de aviones, como la industria del aluminio, ...la fabricación de motores etc., estarán igualmente bajo influencia alemana.)

Es evidente que en España se pueden continuar a la más larga los experimentos para el desarrollo de aviones, pues (en España – F. F.) no solamente acaban las barreras del Tratado de Versalles, sino también porque el proyecto España – América (del Sur – F. F.) exige otras numerosas pruebas.<sup>22</sup>

#### Francia y España

Como ya se trataba de la cuestión del precio, la concurrencia francesa es bastante abrumadora (casi 50% más baja) (que la alemana – F. F.). En la

---

Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

<sup>20</sup> „Der Konkurrenzkampf für den Flug nach Amerika liegt also tatsächlich in der Aufnahme des Verkehrs nach den Canarischen Inseln.“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> „Es dürfte daher nötig sein, dass die deutsche Regierung eingreift und ihrerseits ebenfalls die deutsche Firma subventioniert, die sich um den Flug bewirbt. Dies ist zur Zeit die Firma Junkers, die Hauptaktionärin der U. A. E. (Union-Aerea-Española) ist“. Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

<sup>22</sup> „Es ist selbstverständlich, dass in Spanien in weitgehendsten Masse alle Versuche zur Entwicklung des Flugzeuges weiter betrieben werden können, da ja nicht nur die Hemmungen des Versailler Vertrages wegfallen, sondern auch das Projekt Spanien-Amerika noch umfangreiche Versuche fordert.“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

*cuestión de las líneas (aéreas – F. F.), la concurrencia es también grande y peligrosa, ya que Francia pone en acción unos medios extraordinarios, en interés de sus ambiciones de llegar a África, a las (Islas – F. F.) Canarias, y a América del Sur, justamente a través de España.<sup>23</sup> Las grandes empresas francesas como Bréguet, Devoitine, Lorraine-Dietrich, Hispano Suiza, tienen filiales en España, que son particularmente activas.*

*Finalmente, a esto se puede añadir que Francia ejercita presión política en todas las maneras posibles, y propagandísticamente es muy activa también.*

*A pesar de todo esto, (las ambiciones – F. F.) de Francia están impedidas por la deficiencia cualitativa (de sus aviones – F. F.) y los accidentes como consecuencia de esto.*

*Además, se sobreentiende que Francia no tiene algún interés de apoyar la creación de una industria de aviones española en España; (Francia – F. F.) sólo quiere ver en España un mercado, donde puede vender posiblemente sus (aviones – F. F.) de calidad inferior también, y por lo demás, quisiera aumentar su influencia a través de España en África y en América del Sur.*

#### *Alemania y España*

##### *a) Observaciones generales*

*Por haber sido encadenada por el Tratado de Versalles, Alemania no podía desarrollar su industria de aviones sin obstáculo. Pues había que transferirla al extranjero, como por parte ya se ha llevado a cabo, y de consecuencia, seguramente no tiene obstáculos tampoco que (Alemania – F. F.) fabrique (aviones – F. F.) en España.<sup>24</sup>*

*Una ventaja más de Alemania (contra Francia – F. F.) es sin duda en relación de unos (aviones – F.F.), especialmente en el caso de los aviones construidos completamente de metal, en lo que el clima (incluido el de España y de las Islas Canarias) tiene seguramente un papel importante.*

*Además, es al favor de Alemania que los aviones alemanes despertaron el interés de varias personalidades determinantes (españolas – F. F.) y de círculos más extensos.*

*Para la ventajas arriba mencionadas, es una desventaja que a la actitud (alemana – F. F.) le falta cada unidad. Las empresas (alemanas – F. F.) presentan entre ellas una fuerte concurrencia por otro lado falta la verdadera propaganda que, de todas maneras, cuesta mucho.*

*Si uno se encuentra en España, no puede librarse del sentimiento que en Alemania se subestima absolutamente el valor de España y América del Sur. Aunque el comercio y la industria (alemanes – F. F.) estén actuando en España,*

---

<sup>23</sup> „Auch in der Frage von Verkehrslinien ist die Konkurrenz gross und gefährlich,, weil Frankreich ausserordentliche Mittel aufwendet, insbesondere über Spanien hinweg nach Afrika, Canarias und Südamerika strebt.“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

<sup>24</sup> „Infolge der Fesselung durch den Versailler Vertrag kann sich der Flugzeugbau in Deutschland nicht ungehindert entwickeln. Es muss sich also, wie es ja auch schon zum Teil geschehen ist, ins Ausland verlegen, und infolgedessen bestehen wohl auch keine Bedenken, in Spanien zu bauen.“ Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit.

*les faltan el impulso y la unidad, además, la determinación; sin embargo, nosotros (los alemanes – F. F.) a pesar de todo esto podemos asegurarnos nuevos territorios (de inversión, de influencia – F. F.) justamente en España y en América del Sur, los que pueden tener una infinita importancia financiera, política y militar. En esta relación podríamos aprender mucho de los franceses, que justamente se esfuerzan en un modo denodado para conquistar estos territorios (de influencia en España y América del Sur – F. F.).*<sup>25</sup>

### ***El primer programa meteorológico del „proyecto transoceánico“ a bordo del buque de vapor Minden (marzo-junio de 1924)***

En febrero de 1934, después que había iniciado el vuelo de correo aéreo según el horario semanal de la *Luft Hansa* en la ruta Berlín – Sevilla – Islas Canarias – Bathurst – Recife – Río de Janeiro – Buenos Aires, uno de los expertos de aviación más conocidos y autor de varios libros técnicos, Fischer von Potorzyn, en su obra *„Südatlantikflug“* hizo una recapitulación de las investigaciones meteorológicas alemanas que eran indispensables para los vuelos transcontinentales. En su obra publicada en 1934 asentó *“que la meteorología alemana empezó a investigar las condiciones aeronáuticas y meteorológicas del Atlántico en 1923. El «apuro», criticado por muchos en ese entonces, llegó a ser rentable más adelante. Las mediciones de viento en la atmósfera que alcanzaban la altitud de 25.000 metros, llegando hasta la estratosfera... efectuadas desde hace años por científicos alemanes y oficiales de la marina comercial alemana, en el futuro no lejano serán beneficiosos para el tráfico aéreo de los aviones que vuelan en la misma altitud. ...hoy en día, estos globos rojos de medición son los jalones de la época siguiente del tráfico aéreo.”*<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> *„Wenn man sich in Spanien aufhält, wird man das Gefühl nicht los, dass in Deutschland die Wichtigkeit Spaniens und Südamerika absolut unterschätzt wird. Wohl ist Handel und Industrie tätig, aber es fehlt der grosse Schwung und die Einheitlichkeit und Zielbewusstheit, und doch können wir uns gerade in Spanien und Südamerika neue Gebiete erschliessen, die finanziell, politisch und militärisch von unendlicher Bedeutung sein können. Wir könnten in dieser Beziehung sehr viel von den Franzosen lernen, die gerade zuverweifelte Anstrengungen machen, diese Gebiete für sich zu erobern.“* Geheim! Bericht über die Reise nach Spanien von April-Juli 1925. op. cit. ; Con una subvención notable del gobierno francés, el 1 de marzo del 1928 partió el primer vuelo regular de una duración de 10 días entre Europa y América del Sur, en el trayecto París – Perpignan – Alicante – Casablanca – Dakar – Islas de Cabo Verde (Portugal) – Islas Fernando de Noronha (Brasil) – Recife – Río de Janeiro – Buenos Aires. Por la escasa potencia de los motores de los aviones de entonces, la empresa francesa *Aéropostale* solucionaba la gran distancia oceánica entre las costas africanas y el „ángulo brasileño“ del modo que entre Dakar y las Islas de Cabo Verde comunicaban hidroplanos, mientras entre las Islas de Cabo Verde y las Islas Fernando de Noronha torpederos rápidos. Entre las Islas Fernando de Noronha y Recife había también hidroaviones, luego a lo largo de la costa brasilera, hasta Buenos Aires, se usaban los aviones continentales de *Aéropostale*. *Von heut ab Ozeanflugverkehr. Paris – Buenos Aires in 10 Tagen. Viermal umsteigen. Die Konkurrenz der Zeppeline. Deutsche Flugzeuge in Südamerika.* In: Erste Beilage zur Vossischen Zeitung. 1928.03.01. Nr. 52.; MILCH, Erhardt: *Regelmässiger Transoceanverkehr?* In. *Berliner Tageblatt*. 1928. 09.15.

<sup>26</sup> FISCHER VON POTURZYN, Friedrich A.: *Südatlantikflug. Luftreise zur schwimmenden Insel*

Más o menos en el mismo tiempo cuando se formuló el secreto memorándum alemán a propósito a conquistar del espacio aéreo español y el proyecto aéreo del Atlántico del Sur, escrito en verano de 1925 de que acabamos de citar algunos detalles, en la literatura alemana se puede observar también el exámen meteorológico de carácter científico de un proyecto relativo a los vuelos intercontinentales Europa-América del Sur. Por ejemplo, en el número de marzo 1925 de la *Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv*, revista del Centro de Investigaciones Iberoamericano de Bonn, salió un escrito con el título "*El tráfico aéreo entre Europa y América del Sur. Bases económicas y perspectivas económicas*",<sup>27</sup> cuyo autor era el consejero gubernamental del instituto meteorológico de Hamburgo, dr. Perlewitz. El escrito anunciaba ya con su título que, además de los preparativos secretos de motivo militar, se dedicaba una atención particular a los estudios de las condiciones del vuelo de larga distancia del Atlántico del Sur también de parte de los círculos científicos, meteorológicos alemanes.

Por primero, Perlewitz presentó en su ensayo las ventajas del avión contra el ferrocarril, la navegación fluvial y marítima, el transporte terrestre (el carácter universal y la rapidez del avión como medio de transporte). Estaba partiendo del hecho que tanto en relación del avión como del aeronave, la cuestión decisiva es su uso económico que – en relación de la distancia del vuelo – en grado considerable está determinado por la dirección y la intensidad del viento. Especialmente en el caso de los vuelos intercontinentales de distancia, la economía depende si se logra encontrar un itinerario, una altitud y un tiempo favorables. Por eso, el piloto tiene que conocer contiuamente y en tiempo las condiciones de viento, ya que el conocimiento profesional de éstos puede influir el vuelo en un modo ventajoso. "*Pues el conocimiento de las corrientes de aire y de las condiciones atmosféricas son unas premisas científicas con las cuales se puede construir el tráfico aéreo de distancia económico, especialmente encima del Océano.*"<sup>28</sup> Perlewitz opinaba que ante todo hay que comprender los vientos en el área del Océano Atlántico, investigar las relaciones estratosféricas principales, para pronosticar a los pilotos con una seguridad respectiva las predicciones meteorológicas, dentro de estos, las dirrecciones de los vientos. Consideraba de importancia particular conocer las direcciones de vientos también en los estratos más altos del atmosfera.

El ensayo de Perlewitz estaba basado en su grandioso programa de investigación meteorológica efectuado entre mayo y junio de 1924, con el buque de vapor *Minden* de la compañía de navegación de vapor *Norddeutscher Lloyd*. Durante el viaje de ida y vuelta, en la línea Hamburgo – Madeira – Pernambuco –

---

*Westfalen über Spanisch-, Französisch-, Britisch-Afrika*. Verlag Eher, München, 1934. 140.

<sup>27</sup> PERLEWITZ: *Der Luftverkehr zwischen Europa und Südamerika. Wissenschaftliche Grundlagen und wirtschaftliche Aussichten*. IN: *Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv*. Zeitschrift des Ibero-Amerikanischen Forschungsinstituts, Bonn. Schriftleitung: Professor dr. O. Quelle, Bonn. I. Jahrgang, 1925.03. Heft 2. 101-122.

<sup>28</sup> PERLEWITZ: 104.

Recife – Rio de Janeiro – Santos – Sao Paulo – Buenos Aires expedieron desde el bordo del buque 123 globos aerostáticos adecuados para investigaciones de los estratos más altos del atmosfera. El meteorologista alemán navegó a través de casi toda la zona de los vientos alisios del norte, la de la línea ecuatorial, y la de los vientos alisios del sur, mientras tanto efectuaba sus mediciones meteorológicas.<sup>29</sup> En su ensayo de arriba, Perlewitz reunió solamente los resultados científicos más importantes; el análisis del material de investigación completo se llevó a cabo en el Archivo Meteorológico Marítimo (*Archiv der Deutschen Seewarte*) en Hamburgo. Al meteorologista alemán le ocupaba ante todo la aeronáutica y las posibilidades de los vuelos económicos en el Atlántico, más precisamente, la posibilidad de aprovechar de los corrientes de aire. Estaba buscando la respuesta a la cuestión, cómo se podría hacer aún más económico el vuelo, uno de los medios más importantes de comunicación intercontinental del futuro. La pregunta básica de sus indagaciones era, cuál sería el trayecto más favorable para realizar el tráfico de larga distancia entre Europa y América del Sur? Uno de los designios más importantes de la expedición del meteorologista alemán era, en vez de los esfuerzos a un único resultado deportivo de vuelo, hacer económico y sistemático ante todo el tráfico del Atlántico del Sur, asegurando el tráfico aéreo continuo de comercio y de correos entre Europa y América del Sur.

La aviación alemana consiguió una fama internacional por haber puesto en marcha un aeronave *Zeppelin* entre el 12 y el 16 de octubre de 1924 de España a los Estados Unidos. El transporte, más precisamente el vuelo del *Zeppelin* a los Estados Unidos formaba parte de los transportes alemanes de indemnización de guerra. El viaje sirvió también como experiencia meteorológica. Al contrario del buque de vapor que en el mar navega por una línea más o menos derecha, el aeronave *Zeppelin* trataba de encontrar, durante su navegación horizontal, las direcciones de viento más favorables para utilizar menos energía posible volando contra el filo del viento, y volar encima del océano con un viento en popa más favorable. Después de llegar a España desde Friedrichshafen, región del lago de Boden, y repartido el *Zeppelin*, en vez de elegir el trayecto más corto para su vuelo, por primero avanzaba hacia el suroeste para evitar los contravientos fuertes que hacía más al norte. Además de la navegación horizontal, el viaje del *Zeppelin* dió también experiencias útiles sobre la navegación vertical, pues las alturas de 1000, 2000 o 3000 metros se caracterizan por una intensidad de vientos completamente diferente en un período determinado.<sup>30</sup>

En uno de los subcapítulos de su ensayo, bajo el título „*Die Luftfahrt zwischen Europa und Südamerika*” Perlewitz asentó que, en la relación de los vuelos entre Europa y América del Sur, la dimensión vertical del disfrute de las direcciones de

---

<sup>29</sup> Los aerostatos de caucho de 200 gramos se llenaron de hidrógeno y se expedieron al aire, provistos de diferentes instrumentos especiales de medición. El estrato atmosférico más alto que alcanzaron en su camino era una altitud de 22,4 km, desde allí facilitaban datos atmosféricos.

<sup>30</sup> PERLEWITZ: 111.



viento tiene una importancia particular; más precisamente, la consideración de la altitud del vuelo en las etapas diferentes del viaje de larga distancia. La constatación más importante de Perlewitz fue que, en el trayecto de más de 10 mil kilómetros de dirección norte-sur entre Europa y América del Sur, el factor más importante no es tanto la navegación horizontal, sino las direcciones de viento que se cambian con la altitud. El cambio de la altitud del avión es de mucha importancia, ya que en relación de la altitud, las direcciones de viento cambian rápida y continuamente. Este hecho tiene muchísimas desventajas para el piloto, mas puede tener algunas ventajas también, en cuanto durante la navegación el piloto aprovecha de las direcciones de viento en un modo adecuado. En fin de cuentas, la destacada atención a las condiciones de viento y el disfrute de sus ventajas es uno de los factores más importantes durante todo el vuelo, ya que el consumo de combustible del avión durante la distancia considerable de vuelo intercontinental, depende de esto.

El meteorologista alemán, a base de cálculos complicados, concluyó que, durante el vuelo de miles de kilómetros desde España hasta Buenos Aires – considerando el mes de marzo –, si el piloto elige una altitud favorable para el vuelo, en el 50% del trayecto se puede ir viento en popa.<sup>31</sup> *“Cuáles etapas elegir durante el vuelo Europa-América del Sur, por ejemplo partiendo desde España si volar por las costas de África hasta las Islas de Cabo Verde o progresar por la línea España – Madeira – Islas Canarias – Islas de Cabo Verde – Brasil – Argentina, pues estas etapas tienen que ser precisadas por investigaciones meteorológicas ulteriores... el vuelo se puede hacer verdaderamente económico sólo si el piloto y los técnicos de aviación consideran las previsiones y los consejos de los meteorologistas también.”*<sup>32</sup> En España, Brasil y Argentina, se muestra mucho interés por las comunicaciones aéreas, esto fue la otra experiencia de la expedición de Perlewitz de 1924. Estaba convencido que el tráfico aéreo del Atlántico del Sur tenía un gran porvenir adelante que, en cambio, requiere ulteriores investigaciones meteorológicas sistemáticas. (Véase la imagen Nr. 1.)

***El segundo programa meteorológico del „proyecto transoceánico”: la Expedición Alemana-Atlántica del buque de investigación Meteor (abril de 1925 – julio de 1927)***

No faltaron las „ulteriores investigaciones meteorológicas” en el área del Atlántico del Sur, pronostizadas en el ensayo de Perlewitz. Más aún, por la realización del segundo programa meteorológico del „proyecto transoceánico”, se llevó a cabo una de

---

<sup>31</sup> En junio esto puede ser más de 80% y en el viaje de vuelta, considerando de igual manera marzo y junio, se puede ir viento en popa favorable hasta en un 94% y 64%, si el piloto aprovecha conscientemente de la posibilidad dada. Aprovechando de los resultados de las investigaciones meteorológicas y de las posibilidades del viento en popa, se puede ahorrar tiempo y combustible; así se hace posible aumentar el cargo útil, como la cantidad de los envíos postales.

<sup>32</sup> PERLEWITZ: 121.

las empresas más coordinadas de la Alemania de Weimar. Es decir, el buque de investigación *Meteor* de la *Reichsmarine* estaba haciendo mediciones meteorológicas sistemáticas por más de dos años, entre abril de 1925 y julio de 1927, en el marco de la *Expedición Alemana-Atlántica*, por la revelación científica de las condiciones atmosféricas, de la *dimensión vertical*. Con esto, se crearon las condiciones seguras y económicas del servicio de correos intercontinental directo y según el horario de Berlín - Río de Janeiro - Buenos Aires.

El comandante del buque *Meteor*, el capitán Spiess, en su grueso tomo escrito en 1928, después del regreso del barco, dedicó un capítulo aparte a las observaciones meteorológicas.<sup>33</sup> Como se destaca de los tres imágenes adjuntadas también las observaciones meteorológicas eran especialmente frecuentes donde – entre África (Dakar), las Islas de Cabo Verde y América del Sur (Brasil) – los trayectos aéreos proyectados eran los más cortos, es decir, óptimos. (véase las imágenes Nr. 2. y 3.) Como el buque de investigación *Meteor*, durante su viaje de investigaciones, regresaba a los mismos trayectos siempre en meses diferentes, los resultados de las indagaciones meteorológicas – en comparación con la expedición de *Minden* – resultaron muy ricos<sup>34</sup>. Según el capitán Spiess también, *“acumulamos un material enorme para la investigación de la atmosfera libre”*.<sup>35</sup>

En los comentarios del capitán se puede leer también que, en el extremo sur del área del Atlántico del Sur, se efectuaron relativamente pocas mediciones de cometas o aeróstatos, mas *“como resultado de las mediciones sistemáticas efectuadas, se acumuló un material muy rico sobre las condiciones físicas del Océano Atlántico, especialmente las dos zonas de los vientos alisios y la ecuatorial intermedia”*.<sup>36</sup> Mientras con el programa de cometas se efectuó la investigación minuciosa de los estratos del atmosfera hasta 3000 metros, con expedir los globos aerostáticos se recogieron datos sobre las condiciones meteorológicas de los estratos atmosféricos más altos, de las altitudes hasta 20 km.<sup>37</sup>

Con los cometas, el servicio meteorológico alemán recibió un imagen bastante exacto sobre la zona de los vientos alisios, tanto de su extensión horizontal como de sus características verticales. El meteorologista del buque *Meteor*, dr. Kuhlbrodt sacó quinientas fotografías excelentes de la formación de nubes en la zona de los vientos alisios. La importancia de esta serie de fotografías consiste en la elaboración de un atlas de nubes relativo a la zona del Atlántico del Sur, con el cual se hizo posible el estudio de la formación de nubes en esta región. La cantidad del material de investigación que se acumuló era talmente grande que *“el total del*

---

<sup>33</sup> SPIESS, F.: *Die Meteor-Fahrt. Forschungen und Erlebnisse der Deutschen Atlantischen Expedition 1925-1927*. Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, Berlin, 1928. 356-360.

<sup>34</sup> La expedición de investigación del *Meteor* en el Atlántico del Sur fue el primer gran viaje al extranjero de la *Reichsmarine*. Por su viaje de dos años y dos meses, el buque de investigación *Meteor* recorrió más de 67500 leguas marítimas, o sea, aproximadamente el triple del largo del Ecuador.

<sup>35</sup> SPIESS: 356.

<sup>36</sup> SPIESS: 358.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 358.

*material de observaciones meteorológicas presenta un valor práctico para la aeronáutica del Atlántico.*<sup>38</sup>

Aunque el viaje de la expedición de investigación del Atlántico del Sur era apoyado en sumo grado por el almirante Paul Behncke, jefe de la *Marineleitung* ya desde hace el 1920, por problemas de la política interior alemana, la inflación enorme del marco hacían imposible la organización del viaje de la expedición, y la transformación de un buque de guerra más pequeña en buque de investigación. A principios de los años 20, las posibilidades de la ciencia alemana eran también muy reducidas, ante todo por la falta de recursos financieros. Sin embargo, el profesor Alfred Merz, director del *Institut für Meereskunde* de Hamburgo, elaboró un grandioso proyecto de investigación, partiendo del punto que el océano abierto, la zona del Atlántico del Sur puede servir, a pesar de la derrota en la guerra, como campo de investigación libre para la ciencia y la política de ciencia alemanas. El almirante Behncke apoyaba hasta el fin al padre intelectual del programa de investigación, asegurándolo de que la *Reichsmarine* subvendría los gastos de la transformación del buque de guerra, procuraría el equipo, mientras las instituciones científicas alemanas tendrían que proporcionar los medios de investigación necesarios. El ministro dr. Schmidt-Ott, presidente del *Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft*, uno de los sostenedores principales de la empresa científica del Atlántico del Sur, en mayo de 1924 convocó una reunión conjunta a propósito de la expedición planeada del *Meteor*, donde el profesor Merz hizo conocer su proyecto ante numerosos directores de institutos de investigación alemanes. Los miembros del equipo científico eran geólogos, biólogos, y dos meteorologistas: el profesor Reger, director del observatorio meteorológico de Lindenberg, y Kuhlbrodt, director del instituto meteorológico de Hamburgo; los dos eran muy expertos de experimentos con globos aerostáticos y cometas.

Para noviembre de 1924, transformaron el buque de guerra para su misión de investigación. En el bordo no había armas en absoluto. El buque de investigación transformado *Meteor* hizo su primer viaje de prueba desde Wilhelmshafen el 25 de noviembre de 1924; en esta ocasión el almirante Zenker, jefe de la marina de guerra alemana, hizo también una visita en el buque. Para examinar el barco, desde enero de 1925 se planeó otro viaje de prueba más larga, a las Islas Canarias. Sobre el viaje del barco que partió de nuevo de Wilhelmshafen, salieron poquíssimas noticias. Puesto que por motivos políticos parecía oportuno hacer menos sensación posible con la divulgación de los preparativos de la expedición.<sup>39</sup>

Ya en el viaje de regreso,<sup>40</sup> entre las Islas Canarias y la Península Ibérica, se efectuaron unas observaciones meteorológicas muy importantes. Expedieron al atmosfera globos aerostáticos provistos de instrumentos especiales, con las que siguieron continuamente los datos de la presión atmosférica, la temperatura, la humedad del aire. Elaboraron nuevas soluciones técnicas interesantes, dejando caer al mar una parte de los resultados de las mediciones y recogéndolos más

---

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 359.

<sup>39</sup> SPIESS: 7.

<sup>40</sup> El *Meteor* partió de regreso desde su viaje de prueba el 10 de febrero de 1925.

tarde con el buque. La prueba de la expedición realizada en las Islas Canarias resultó eficaz, ya que probaron con éxito tanto las instalaciones mecánicas del buque como los instrumentos y métodos científicos. Visto que el buque tenía que efectuar la mayor parte de su actividad por más de dos años en la zona tropical, prestaron mucha atención a la colocación y el alojamiento adecuados de los laboratorios, el personal de investigación y el equipaje. Para aumentar el radio del buque y ahorrar con los recursos de carbón y petróleo, equiparon el barco con velas pequeñas también. Durante la elaboración del itinerario tenían que considerar numerosos puntos de vista. También tenían que prestar atención a las provisiones necesarias de carbón, agua, víveres, complementadas siempre por buques de vapor alemanes, además, al contacto continuo con las representaciones diplomáticas – embajadas, consulados – alemanas. El viaje fue organizado considerando de evitar si posible, de echar anclas en los puertos de los estados que habían sido enemigos durante la Primera Guerra Mundial. Tratándose de un viaje de expedición planeado para más de dos años, pensaban renovar el barco a fondo en Buenos Aires, capital de Argentina, país neutral. El buque Meteor que avanzaba en zigzag en la zona del Atlántico del Sur, tenía dos bases que usaba varias veces, es decir Buenos Aires y El Cabo en Sudáfrica.

El buque de investigación *Meteor* fue despedido por el almirante Zenker, jefe de la *Marineleitung*, el 15 de abril de 1925 en Wilhelmshafen.<sup>41</sup> Como primera dirección llegaron a las Islas de Cabo Verde, donde el barco tomó carbón y agua. Se aprovechó del viaje desde las costas europeas hasta Buenos Aires para efectuar mediciones meteorológicas sistemáticas. Las mediciones meteorológicas se proseguían por más de dos años en la zona del Atlántico del Sur, y con su ayuda se podían recoger informaciones sobre los movimientos y las circulaciones hasta entonces desconocidos de los estratos más altos del atmosfera, “*las cuales tienen una importancia particular para la meteorología marítima*”.<sup>42</sup> Para las observaciones meteorológicas sistemáticas, por más de dos años medían tres veces al día: a las horas 7, 14 y 21; con unos instrumentos especiales, analizaban la presión atmosférica, la temperatura y la humedad del aire, la temperatura del agua, la forma y la extensión de la figuración de nubes, la dirección y la intensidad del viento, la intensidad del oleaje del océano (por los hidroaviones), y varios otros datos. Una parte de los datos se transmitía cada día en telegramas a Berlín o a Hamburgo, por todo el viaje.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> SPIESS: 58. En el mismo tiempo partieron los dos oficiales alemanes de aviación, el capitán Grauert y el teniente Jeschonneck a España, – como citamos el informe escritos por ellos más arriba – para estudiar entre otros la posibilidad de construir un trayecto aéreo intercontinental alemán por España – Islas Canarias – América del Sur.

<sup>42</sup> SPIESS: 59.

<sup>43</sup> Como se sabe de la autobiografía del almirante Raeder, desde mediados de los años veinte, la marina alemana prestaba mucha atención – a base de las experiencias de la Primera Guerra Mundial – a tener un contacto telegráfico continuo y seguro con sus barcos de guerra y aviones que se encontraban lejos de las aguas nacionales. SPIESS: 61. RAEDER, Erich: *Mein Leben. Bis zum Flottenabkommen mit England 1935*. Band 1. Tübingen-Neckart, 1956. 54.

Las informaciones más importantes se consiguieron con la expedida de un número total de 814 globos aerostáticos de tamaños diversos, y 217 cometas. En la zona de los vientos alisios, al norte y al sur del Ecuador, los aerostatos meteorológicos alcanzaron una altitud de 21 kilómetros al máximo, mientras los cometas los 5 kilómetros al máximo, teniendo un promedio de 2,5-3 kilómetros de altitud. Los globos aerostáticos se expedían dos veces al día, mientras las alas delta en caso de condiciones de viento favorables. Para investigar los estratos más altos del atmosfera, se usaban en primer lugar los globos aerostáticos y las alas delta. Una parte de los aerostatos se levantaba a la altitud de 20 kilómetros y allí se reventaba. Los aerostatos que llegaban a las altitudes de miles de kilómetros, tramitaban al bordo del buque cada minuto datos sobre su cambio de dirección, la velocidad de su ascensión, los cuales se registraban allí. Para determinar con una relativa exactitud la altitud actual del aerostático y la velocidad de su ascensión, los meteorologistas empleaban los medios técnicos nuevos, combinaciones de instrumentos diferentes para medir la distancia, utilizados por la artillería. Los recursos de gas, necesarios para hinchar los aerostatos, se transportaban para el *Meteor* por las compañías de navegación alemanas en el curso de los dos años. Con los instrumentos especiales de los globos aerostáticos que se levantaban al aire, se trataba de determinar las extensiones y las formas de las nubes también. Las alas delta servían para investigar las corrientes de aire y la estratificación de los vientos en las zonas bajas del atmosfera. Con la ayuda de una guindaleta de 10 kilómetros, se expedía por primero un cometa principal a la altitud de unos 3 kilómetros, y luego cada 1000 metros se colocaban cometas auxiliares en la boza, así que al lado del cometa principal del *Meteor* se podían halar hasta 5-6 cometas menores a la vez. En la distancia entre las costas españolas y Buenos Aires, se expedieron en total de 50 globos aerostáticos y se efectuaron nueve programas con los cometas.

Después de las Islas Canarias y las Islas de Cabo Verde, el barco navegaba hacia el archipiélago situado cerca del „codo” brasilero, llamado Fernando de Noronha. Durante los vuelos proyectados sobre el océano, éste era el punto más cercano al Viejo Mundo (a Dakar en África, y a las Islas de Cabo Verde). Por eso, el *Meteor* navegaba varias veces alrededor del archipiélago Fernando de Noronha; mientras tanto, se expedieron cuatro alas delta y halando las hicieron llegar a la altitud de 4000 metros, con la ayuda de la boza de 8000 metros. De esta manera recibieron un gran número de datos de valor sobre las condiciones meteorológicas existentes delante las costas brasileñas, ya que el objetivo primario de los aterrizajes de aeronaves y aviones posibles era el „codo” brasilero, Natal-Pernambuco, además Fernando de Noronha.<sup>44</sup> Los experimentos con globos aerostáticos en las zonas altas del atmosfera se continuaban también en los años 30.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> SPIESS: 81.

<sup>45</sup> Así por ejemplo, desde 1932 el barco de catapulta *Westfalen* expedía también cada día globos rojos al aire. En pocos meses se expedieron unos 300 globos aerostáticos. Los varios instrumentos de medición colocados en los aerostáticos se levantaban por más de tres horas hasta llegar a la altitud de 20 kilómetros y enviando continuamente los datos al bordo. Los datos recibidos de esta manera encriptados eran transmitidos en seguida desde el barco *Westfalen* a Hamburgo. En el centro meteorológico alemán disponían

El llamado perfil noveno fue la investigación del tramo entre el Cabo San Roque en Brasil y Freetown en África. El Océano Atlántico se restringe aquí a unos 1500 millas. Ésta era la zona de la cual entre los participantes del proyecto se decía que en un futuro ofrecería cercano la posibilidad más grande para la realización del proyecto aéreo del Atlántico del Sur. Los meteorólogos del *Meteor* efectuaban aquí la actividad científica más fuerte. Expedieron dieciocho aerostáticos desde 12.500 hasta 18.900 metros de altitud, pero hicieron mediciones en la altitud de 4600 y 14.000 metros también. Entre los perfiles séptimo y noveno, se sacaron 130 fotografías sobre la formación de nubes. Se efectuaron trece expediciones de ala delta en este tramo más corto entre África y América del Sur, entre la altitud más baja de 3370 metros y la más alta de 4630 metros. El 2 de enero de 1927, los dos buques de la *Reichsmarine* se encontraron en pleno Océano Atlántico, después de quedarse por telégrafo sobre el lugar exacto de la cita. El crucero *Emden*, dirigido por el capitán de navío Foerster y el buque de investigación *Meteor*, dirigido por el capitán de corbeta Spiess se encontraron en el punto de control llamado 246. y los dos barcos estaban anclados uno al lado del otro por varias horas.<sup>46</sup> (Véase la imagen Nr. 4.)

Navegando desde las Islas de Cabo Verde hacia las Islas Canarias, se efectuaban exclusivamente mediciones meteorológicas, es decir, otros programas de globos aerostáticos y alas delta, con las cuales seguían las condiciones de viento, hasta alcanzar la zona de vientos alisios del noreste. Entre las Islas de Cabo Verde y las Islas Canarias, se expedieron 12 aerostatos y 4 alas delta. En las Islas Canarias, el buque *Meteor* fue recibido por el Ministro de Estado Schmidt-Ott, presidente de la *Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft*. El 2 de junio de 1927, para la salutación del buque de investigación *Meteor* llegaron a Wilhelmshafen el almirante Hans Zenker, jefe de la *Marineleitung*, y el Ministro de Guerra imperial, Otto Geßler. El 23 de junio de 1927, el capitán de navío Spiess y su equipo fueron recibidos por el Presidente Imperial Paul von Hindenburg; el capitán lo recordó en su diario también: "sobre el viaje hice una relación militar al Señor Presidente Imperial."<sup>47</sup>

#### **Los vuelos de correo aéreo según el horario Berlín-Río-Buenos Aires de la Luft Hansa y del Zeppelin desde febrero de 1934**

El „Südatlantikflug-Projekt“<sup>48</sup> coordinado por el *Reichsverkehrsministerium* y por la *Luft Hansa*, la aseguración de la rápida comunicación aérea intercontinental Europa –

---

de esta manera de datos exactos y puestos al día, que se podían retransmitir para los aviones que partían desde Berlín o Stuttgart. FISCHER VON POTURZYN: 140. SPIESS: 275.

<sup>46</sup> SPIESS: 292.

<sup>47</sup> Los oficiales del *Meteor* fueron recibidos por el Ministro del Interior Imperial von Reudel también; en el recibimiento participó el almirante Tirpitz también. SPIESS: 332.

<sup>48</sup> FISCHER VON POTURZYN, Friedrich A.: *Südatlantikflug. Luftreise zur schwimmenden Insel Westfalen über Spanisch-, Französisch-, Britisch-Afrika. Mit einer flughistorischen Einleitung von Dr. Heinz Orlovius*. Verlag Eher, München, 1934.

África – América del Sur entre el Mundo Viejo y el Mundo Nuevo de habla hispano-portuguesa significaban un gran desafío para la „diplomacia de aviones” alemana, que se atenía y por su importancia poco a poco superaba la industria de aviones y la diplomacia de buques de guerra. Vencer las enormes distancias aéreas, volar sobre el inmenso océano abierto planteó un sinnúmero de preguntas técnico-formativas a solucionar. Así, el trayecto aéreo intercontinental de 14.000 km entre Berlín y Buenos Aires se mostró el mejor método „civil” y ruta de práctica para que la aviación y la industria de aviones alemanas eludieran las disposiciones militares prohibitivas y restrictivas del Tratado de Versalles. Las fuerzas aéreas alemanas – oficialmente inexistentes – en la realidad desarrollaban y probaban motores de aviones de tipo más fuerte y seguro – para aplicarlos en la aviación militar también – en la área „Grossraum” española, sudamericana y oceánica, libres de las restricciones en el „Luftoccean”. En el servicio de la *Luft Hansa*, en el marco del proyecto del Atlántico del Sur, cientos de técnicos y pilotos estaban construyendo el almacén inmenso de conocimientos técnicos y de aviación, de los cuales se podía aprovechar en el nuevo armamento aéreo empezado después del 1933. Las ventajosas condiciones geopolíticas de Francia – casi la mitad del trayecto aéreo París – Dakar – Río de Janeiro – Buenos Aires pasaba por el espacio aéreo francés (africano) – facilitaban los aterrizajes frecuentes en los arroyos siempre franceses. La industria de aviones francesa – al contrario con la alemana – no estaba obligada a desarrollar tipos de aviones, motores, sistemas de navegación adecuados a los vuelos de larga distancia. Característico es a la rivalización franco-alemana en la zona aérea del Atlántico del Sur, que la compañía aérea francesa *Latécoère* perdió 120 aviones hasta el 1933, haciendo funcionar el trayecto del Atlántico del Sur.

El vuelo de correo aéreo *Luft Hansa*, directo entre Europa y América del Sur – realizado sólo por avión –, después de desarrollos intensivos y varios vuelos de prueba – en el espacio aéreo de América del Sur, Europa del Sur y África del Occidente – comunicaba según horario a partir de febrero de 1934, cada dos semanas y con una duración de vuelo de cinco días entre Berlín y Buenos Aires. (Véase la imagen Nr. 5.) Mientras tanto, la compañía aérea rival, *Latécoère*, pues *Air France* que tomó posesión de la empresa en 1934 – basándose a las ventajas geopolíticas de las colonias africanas de Francia – continuaba el viaje transatlántico de 3500 km entre Dakar en Senegal y Natal en Brasil, o sea, entre los continentes África y América, con torpederos más lentos que los aviones. Así que se quedó atrás en cuanto a la velocidad, frente al servicio de correo aéreo Europa-América del Sur de los alemanes.

En 1930 el gobierno francés firmó un acuerdo con Portugal, a base del cual la compañía aérea *Latécoère* adquirió derechos monopolistas. La parte francesa levantó con este paso barreras aéreas frente al proyecto del Atlántico del Sur de la *Luft Hansa*, ya que los aviones alemanes dirigidos hacia América del Sur, de esta manera no podían hacer uso ni de las colonias francesas de África Occidental, ni de las Islas portuguesas de Cabo Verde, más cercanas al codo brasileño, para sus aterrizajes técnicamente inevitables de consecuencia al radio de los aviones de

entonces. En esta situación, el gobierno alemán acudió a los británicos y pidió su apoyo para que la *Luft Hansa* obtuviera ayuda de aviación y logística en la Gambia Británica, en Bathurst, cerca a la Dakar francesa. Tras la aprobación de Gran Bretaña se escondía el hecho que Londres no deseaba construir vuelos intercontinentales desde el país insular hacia América del Sur, ya que prefería los vuelos imperiales *via Egipto* de largo intervalo a África del Sur y Australia. Los intereses de Berlín y Londres no eran contrarios a propósito del trayecto aéreo Europa – América del Sur, mientras por los conflictos franco-ingleses Londres de ninguna manera no tenía el interés de que París monopolizara el trayecto aéreo Europa – América del Sur. Para superar las distancias de los tramos oceánicos entre África y América del Sur, la *Luft Hansa* desarrolló por un lado unos hidroplanos de gran potencia, capaces de vuelos de larga distancia, por otro lado aplicó el barco de catapulta *Westfalen*, una „isla flotante” que, cruzando en el Océano Atlántico, hizo posible el aterrizaje a los hidroplanos y les aprovisionaba de combustible, haciéndoles partir con la catapulta hacia África o América del Sur. El fondo de esta combinación hidroplano – barco de catapulta llegó a ser, a partir del 1932, la Gambia Británica por el permiso británico.<sup>49</sup>

El primer aeronave *Zeppelin* llegó a América del Sur en mayo del 1930, despertando una curiosidad inmensa, en el marco de una ruta „triangular”: Sevilla – Pernambuco – Rio de Janeiro (Brasil) – Lakehurst (USA). En 1931, siguieron tres vuelos de prueba. En 1932 partió el vuelo regular de aeronaves entre Europa y América del Sur con 9 viajes en la ruta Friedrichshafen – Sevilla – Pernambuco. Desde Pernambuco, el correo se llevaba a Rio de Janeiro con los aviones *Junkers* de la compañía aérea brasileña de interés alemana, *Cóndor* (filial de la *Luft Hansa*), así que los envíos llegaban solo en cinco días desde Berlín a la capital brasileña. En 1933 el *Graf Zeppelin* comunicaba de nuevo 9 veces, y en 1934 ya 10 veces según horario. En los viajes de ida, la duración media era 68 horas, de vuelta 81 horas. (Véase la imagen Nr. 6.)


Después de su primer vuelo alrededor del globo en 1929, y luego su primer vuelo a Brasil en mayo de 1930, el aeronave gigante *Graf Zeppelin* facilitaba desde 1931 con sus vuelos regulares a América del Sur – en colaboración con los vuelos de la *Luft Hansa* –, el servicio de transporte de correo aéreo más aún, de personas

---


<sup>49</sup> El trayecto bisemanal regular de la *Luft Hansa* en el Atlántico del Sur comprendía los tramos siguientes a partir de febrero de 1934: (Berlín) Stuttgart – Sevilla (via Marsella – Barcelona), 2000 km (con *Heinkel H 70* de un motor); Sevilla – Islas Canarias – Las Palmas (via Marruecos español, Juby), 1500 km (JU 52 de tres motores); Las Palmas – Bathurst, Gambia Británica, 1900 km (JU 52 de tres motores); Bathurst – Natal (via barco de catapulta *Westfalen*), 3500 km (*Dornier-Wale* hidroaviones de dos motores); Natal – Rio de Janeiro (via Bahía), 2000 km (JU 52 de tres motores); Rio de Janeiro – Buenos Aires (via Santos – Rio Grande – Montevideo) 2700 km (JU 52 de tres motores). ORLOVIUS, Heinz: *Die Geschichte des Luftverkehrs über den Südatlantik*. IN: FISCHER VON POTURZYN, Friedrich A.: *Junkers und die Weltluftfahrt: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte deutscher Luftgeltung*. Verlag Pflaum, München, 1933.



con una regularidad semanal entre Berlín y Buenos Aires. A pesar de su derrota de guerra, Alemania adelantó su rival en la construcción del trayecto aéreo regular Europa – América del Sur aún antes que Hitler subiera al poder.




**Imagen Nr. 1. Itinerarios aéreos de ida y vuelta y altitudes en el trayecto entre Europa y América del Sur en marzo y junio**  
Fuente: PERLEWITZ: *Der Luftverkehr zwischen Europa und Südamerika. Wissenschaftliche Grundlagen und wirtschaftliche Aussichten.* IN: *Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv. Zeitschrift des Ibero-Amerikanischen Forschungsinstituts, Bonn.* Schriftleitung: Professor dr. O. Quelle, Bonn. I. Jahrgang, 1925. 03. Heft 2. 109.



**Imagen Nr. 2. Itinerarios del programa meteorológico de la expedición en el Atlántico del Sur del buque de investigación Meteor de la Reichsmarine entre abril de 1925 y mayo de 1927. Se expedieron 814 globos aerostáticos y 217 cometas.**

**Fuente: SPIESS, F.: *Die Meteor-Fahrt. Forschungen und Erlebnisse der Deutschen Atlantischen Expedition 1925-1927.* Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, Berlin, 1928. 357.**






**Imagen Nr. 4.** Itinerario de la expedición en el Atlántico del Sur del buque de investigación Meteor de la Reichsmarine (16. 04. 1925. – 02. 06. 1927.)

Encuentro del Meteor con el crucero Emden de la Reichsmarine (02. 01. 1927.)

Encuentro del Meteor con el crucero Berlin de la Reichsmarine (04. 01. 1926. – 07. 01. 1926)



**Imagen Nr. 5. El vuelo intercontinental según horario en el Atlántico del Sur de cinco días de la Deutsche Luft Hansa desde febrero de 1934: Berlín – Sevilla – Islas Canarias – Bathurst (Gambia Británica) – Recife – Rio de Janeiro – Buenos Aires**

**Fuente: TROITZCH, U. –W.: Die Technik von den Anfaengen bis zur Gegenwart. Stuttgart, 1987. 504**



**Imagen Nr. 6. El trayecto Alemania – América del Sur del aeronave Graf Zeppelin (Friedrichshafen, Recife, Rio de Janeiro), desde agosto de 1931**  
Fuente: Botting-DOUGLAS: *Die Luftschiffe. Eltwille am Rhein*, 1993. 147.

**Máté Deák**

***Apresiasi de los espacios aéreos de América del Norte y del Sur, desde el punto de vista de la geopolítica británica (1919–1939)\****

**Abstract**

The British Empire has never interested in to conquer the northern and southern American airspace until the 1930's, however the british company Handly Page already had a plan in 1919 to operate airmail service between Great Britain and South America. The plans were rejected because of the lack of financial background. The principal project was the developement of an air route system from London to India and further to Australia. Also the British government tried to reach South Africa using the west-coast of the African continent across the colonial Gambia. British Gambia was the only african possibility to connect an air route to Brasil and Argentina. Finally the government decided to build the South African air route from London to Cape Town across Khairo. The other solution was to cooperate with the US and operate the air mail system using the North Atlantic air routes from London to New York and then to the Bermudas. Further plans were to reach the airspace of South America from the Bermudas. However these attempts were failed.

*Keywords:* South America, airspace, British Empire, Great Britain, aerial, air mail, 1919-1939, geopolicy, air routes, archive documents, race, Southern Atlantic.

**H**asta los principios de los años 30, el Imperio Británico no mostraba algún interés especial en cuanto a la conquista del continente sudamericano, no obstante que ya en el 1919 se había hecho mérito de la explotación británica de una ruta aérea en el Atlántico del Sur, por la Handley Page Company.<sup>1</sup> El motivo de esto fue, entre otros, que la posición del Imperio y de sus colonias, tradicionalmente colocados a lo largo de un eje primordial orientado de Este a Oeste, por Londres-Bombay-Sydney, no imponía la ampliación del tráfico aéreo en la dirección Norte-Sur. Como excepción, llegar a las colonias sudafricanas del Imperio (Ciudad Del Cabo), solo fue posible por vía aérea a partir de el final de los años 30. En este período, el modo de pensar de la geopolítica

---

\* La investigación se realizó en el marco del proyecto destacado de TÁMOP, número 4.2.4.A/2-11-1-2012-0001, *Nemzeti Kiválóság Program – Hazai hallgatói, illetve kutatói személyi támogatást biztosító rendszer kidolgozása és működtetése konvergencia program* (Programa de Distinción Nacional – Programa de convergencia para elaborar y explotar un sistema de apoyo personal para estudiantes e investigadores nacionales) El proyecto se cumplió con el apoyo de la Unión Europea, con la co.financiación del Fondo Social Europeo.

<sup>1</sup> HIGHAM Robin: *Britain Imperial Air Routes 1918-1939. The Story of Britain's Overseas Airlines.* London–Southampton, 1960. 252.

británica fue determinado en primer lugar por la idea imperial británica y por su aspiración a la dominancia marítima. El geopolítico británico, Sir Halford John Mackinder<sup>2</sup> tenía el foco del pensamiento geopolítico, con la teoría de la zona clave y el territorio núcleo, en los territorios del Medio y Extremo Oriente que se consideraban como territorios clave para la sostenibilidad del Imperio. Su teoría trataba América del Sur como periferia, sin atribuir mucha importancia al continente desde el punto de vista de la política británica de gran potencia.<sup>3</sup>

Que el desarrollo de la ruta aérea del Atlántico del Sur pasó a primer plano, no fue por intereses tradicionalmente imperiales y territoriales. El Ministerio Británico de la Aeronáutica volvió a plantear esta pregunta en 1928 para recuperar el atraso en la competición aérea internacional, mas el proyecto no se podía realizar entonces, por motivos económicos. Viendo los éxitos de los franceses y alemanes en las comunicaciones aéreas, el Imperio sentía más y más la importancia de su presencia en el tráfico aéreo del continente sudamericano, haciendo competencia con las potencias europeas ya mencionadas y tradicionalmente consideradas como adversarios. Por tantos éxitos de la Alemania de Weimar en la política exterior y de tráfico aéreo, los intereses británicos – cejando en su posición anterior – exigieron la presencia del Imperio en la aviación a nivel mundial, para contrapesar la alemana que estaba volviendo más y más fuerte. Tales aspiraciones antes no habían tenido algún apoyo, pues la red de rutas aéreas francesa que se desarrollaba después del Tratado de Versalles y la monopolización de la construcción y explotación de la ruta aérea del Atlántico del Sur, no servía a los intereses británicos. Mas en 1926, Alemania firmó con los vencedores de antes el Convenio Aéreo de París que tuvo como uno de los resultados la fundación de la Luft Hansa (desde el 1933 Lufthansa)<sup>4</sup>, sacando el país del aislamiento de la aviación civil. La expansión inmediata y exitosa, casi agresiva del tráfico aéreo alemán, realizada tan pronto como se firmó el convenio, ya no se podía tener en secreto.

Los resultados llamaron la atención de la élite de la política británica, así de Sir Winston Churchill también. Él reconoció de haber dado cuenta tardíamente de la importancia de los éxitos de la Alemania de Weimar. *„Es difícil juzgar, aún más difícil determinar exactamente, en qué medida pueden adquirir una importancia militar en un momento preciso las fábricas de aviones y los centros de formación militar. Hay un sinfín de modos en los que la realidad puede ser escondida o disfrazada y en los que uno se puede desajustar de los convenios. Fue el aire, y exclusivamente el aire a ofrecer a Hitler la posibilidad de alcanzar y luego también*

---

<sup>2</sup> Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861–1947), geopolítico de origen escocesa, uno de los fundadores de la escuela de geopolítica y el pensamiento geopolítico anglosajones. Los conceptos y teorías relacionados a su nombre son la zona clave (Pivot Area) y el territorio núcleo (Heartland), además, la zona del Océano Mediterráneo – alrededores del Lena (Midland Ocean–Lenaland). SZILÁGYI István: *Geopolitika*. Pécs, 2013. (Geographia Pannonica Nova, 14.) 45.

<sup>3</sup> SZILÁGYI: 35.

<sup>4</sup> DIENEL, Liuduger – SCHIEFELBUSCH, Martin: *German Commercial Air Transport until 1945*. Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 78. 2000. 3-4. 945-967. 957.



*anteceder a Francia y Gran Bretaña en una arma de importancia capital.*"<sup>5</sup> La expansión aérea alemana tuvo éxitos tanto en la política exterior como en la economía – en varios casos más éxito que las aspiraciones de la Aéropostale francesa. La mejor prueba de esto es el hecho que, las empresas sucursales sudamericanas que funcionaban con capital y técnica alemanes (SCADTA, CONDOR), como resultado de su cooperación con la Lufthansa, seguían venciendo las concesiones aéreas que antes habían sido de interés francesa, para el nuevo imperio aéreo: Alemania

Entre las grandes potencias del mundo, los británicos fueron los únicos en no darse cuenta de este proceso; los Estados Unidos lo seguían con más y más atención. América del Sur y su espacio aéreo, desde la manifestación de la doctrina de Monroe, tradicionalmente se consideraba como zona de interés de los EE.UU., por consecuencia no se podían tolerar los éxitos crecientes de un estado europeo perdedor, antes adversario, en el continente americano.

### ***La revalorización de África – un trampolín posible hacia América del Sur***<sup>6</sup>

Es decir, la extensión y explotación de la ruta aérea en África Occidental que conecta Sudáfrica con Londres, habría sido la condición de un corredor aéreo del Atlántico del Sur. El punto básico del vuelo transatlántico en proyecto era la Gambia Británica, colonia británica, y la extensión del tráfico aéreo hasta esta colonia habría servido a su vez la realización tanto de las rutas sudafricanas como de las del Atlántico del Sur.

<b><i>A base de datos del 1926.</i></b>	<b><i>Longitud de las rutas aéreas (en millas)</i></b>	<b><i>Distancia semanal de los vuelos (en millas)</i></b>	<b><i>Número de los aviones explotados (unidades)</i></b>
<i>Gran Bretaña</i>	2300	21.182	20
<i>Francia</i>	8304	74.944	300
<i>Alemania</i>	14.000	180.000	167

El documento titulado *„El futuro de la aviación comercial británica, 1927”* mencionó como una tarea urgente la extensión de la red de rutas aéreas entre Londres y Ciudad Del Cabo. Constató que la aviación británica tenía atrasos a nivel internacional frente a sus rivales tradicionales, Alemania y Francia, comprobando este hecho con varios datos.<sup>7</sup>

Como se ve en las tablas también, en el 1926 Gran Bretaña iba atrasada en todos los tres índices<sup>8</sup>, respecto a los importes franceses y alemanes.<sup>9</sup> Se ve

<sup>5</sup> CHURCHILL, Winston S.: *A második világháború*. I. kötet. Budapest, 1989. 48-49. citación

<sup>6</sup> Por el gran número de los documentos que tratan la aviación británica y el volumen de los mismos, en el ensayo presente sólo vamos a mencionar los cuatro más importantes. Los documentos se encuentran en el Archivo Nacional británico y se pueden descargar totalmente desde la página web del Archivo. (Descargados el: 2013.04.23., web: <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/en>)

<sup>7</sup> The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU. Tabla reportada desde la página 2. del registro N° CAB/24/188. The future of British commercial air transport. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air (1927. Oct.)

<sup>8</sup> Véase el anexo N° 3.

también que Alemania se atenuó en modo remarcable en cuanto a la aviación civil, pues los convenios aéreos internacionales sólo hicieron posible la fundación de la Lufthansa y el permiso de abandonar el propio espacio aéreo en 1926.<sup>10</sup>

La relación acentuó el hecho que el gobierno francés tenía la intención de iniciar una línea regular de vuelo entre África Occidental y América del Sur lo que, en caso de su realización, habría llegado hasta el 50% de la dotación gubernamental para la completa aviación británica! Gran Bretaña no tenía como interés que los franceses monopolizaran esa ruta, por eso más adelante apoyaban Alemania en la realización de sus aspiraciones en el Atlántico del Sur – por ejemplo, cediéndoles más adelante el uso parcial del espacio aéreo de la colonia Gambia. De este documento aún no pone en claro que los británicos consideraban a los alemanes como su enemigo principal, y no a los franceses. Sea como sea, mas el hecho de ser quedados atrás, ya no se podía disimular, y la relación lo formuló en forma inequívoca: „*Sin embargo, regresando al problema actual del tráfico aéreo, sin los esfuerzos citados por mí, Gran Bretaña – como he mencionado – arriesga el atraso desesperado* [es decir, en la competición aérea – D. M.]”<sup>11</sup> El documento resumió en modo explícito también la insostenibilidad de la situación. „*Lo siento como cierta por lo que ha sido arriba mencionado, y mis colegas están de acuerdo también que la nostra posición actual y la nostra política han de ser revisadas inmediatamente. Es seguro que no podemos estar de brazos cruzados cuando la red de la longitud de nuestras líneas aéreas es apenas la cuarta parte de la de los alemanes y de los franceses, la distancia de los vuelos tampoco se puede comparar con los suyos, y nuestra flota civil – aunque sea de calidad excelente – numericamente es despreciable.*”<sup>12</sup> Pues el gobierno británico era consciente de la primacía aérea francesa y del hecho que Alemania en 1926 ya no apareció el escenario internacional como un estado europeo vencido, si no como un nuevo imperio creciente de la aviación civil – y como un adversario digno del tráfico aéreo británico y francés!

En 1933, la extensión de la ruta aérea de África Occidental estaba de nuevo al orden del día. El documento titulado „*El porvenir de la comunicación aérea civil del Imperio, 1933*”<sup>13</sup> presentó al gobierno británico una relación compuesto después del vuelo Londres–Ciudad Del Cabo–Londres de Sir Eric Geddes<sup>14</sup>. Sir Eric Geddes

---

<sup>9</sup> La base de los índices fueron los datos del 1926, siendo éstos los más recientes alcanzables en la época.

<sup>10</sup> Pariser Luftverkehrsabkommen 1926 (véase aún: Paris Air Agreement 1926)

<sup>11</sup> „*To return, however, to the immediate problem of civil aviation, the figures I have cited show conclusively that, unless we bestir ourselves, Great Britain is, I have said, in danger of being left hopelessly behind.*” CAB/24/188. 3.

<sup>12</sup> „*In the light of these few paragraphs I feel sure my colleagues will agree that an immediate review of the position and our present policy is called for. We cannot surely rest content with routes whose length is about a quarter and a sixth of those operated by France and Germany respectively, with a mileage which is in roughly the same ratio, and at least but not last, with a commercial air fleet which, however excellent in quality, is quantitatively negligible.*” CAB/24/188. 4.

<sup>13</sup> Future of Civil Air Communications of the Empire. CAB/24/240. Erik Geddes: *Future of civil air communications of the Empire*. Note by the Secretary of State for Air (1933. Apr.)

<sup>14</sup> Presidente, Imperial Airways. Ya en 1928 alzó la voz en favor de la extensión de la ruta aérea

consideró como destacadamente importante la conexión de África del Sur a la red de tráfico aéreo del Imperio. La explotación regular y estable de los vuelos según horario no solamente debía de cumplir el designio de arriba, si no – a lo largo de la costa occidental de África – servir como base estable para los trayectos de los aviones por el Atlántico del Sur. En el caso de un vuelo Londres–Ciudad Del Cabo–Londres, la ruta aérea hacia Brasil se podía conectar practicamente en cualquier momento, y a la vez, se podía conectar el espacio aéreo de ciertos países de América del Sur a la red de rutas aéreas británica. Para él, el vuelo Londres–Ciudad Del Cabo no debía de ser solamente un „vuelo regular”, mas un corredor aéreo estratégico, con destacada importancia. Y a la vez, no lo hizo sólo por interés del Imperio, más también como presidente del Imperial Airways, viendo las posibilidades también comerciales, y persistiendo en la realización de los mismos también a nivel gubernamental. Tenía un enfoque desde el punto de vista de los correos aéreos y el transporte de mercancías. Puso en evidencia que en la época los usuarios de los correos aéreos y del transporte de mercancías entre América del Sur y el Imperio, además, entre Canadá y el Imperio, era otro país y otra compañía aérea. No obstante, quería realizar la extensión de la ruta aérea del Atlántico del Norte con vuelos de explotación común (cooperación de Imperial Airways–Pan American Airways), y la del Atlántico del Sur, en este caso desde las costas orientales da Canadá via EE.UU. por las Bermudas.<sup>15</sup> *„En cambio, no se puede olvidar – la Comisión está convencido que el Gobierno de Su Majestad tomará en consideración – que la decisión sobre la posibilidad de la extensión de las rutas de los correos aéreos esté en las manos del país de origen; pues considerando que la ruta de los correos aéreos transatlánticos pasa por los Estados Unidos, la Comisión tiene la posición que la explotación de cualquiera ruta aérea se puede realizar exclusivamente con este país. Considerando esto, la Comisión cultivaba siempre una relación de amistad y cooperación con los colegas de Pan American Airways que es de esperar que se considere conveniente en la política aérea de los EE.UU. de parte de Imperial Airways y el Imperio Británico.”*<sup>16</sup> De acuerdo con la citación, Sir Erik Geddes hacia depender de los Estados Unidos no solamente la ruta del Atlántico del Norte, mas todos los vuelos transatlánticos, así también la ruta del Atlántico del Sur! Con esto, formalmente reconoció los derechos reclamados por los EE.UU. en la doctrina Monroe en América del Norte y del Sur. Pues no solamente como compañía aérea pretendía la cultivación de la

---

Londres–Ciudad Del Cabo. Véase. *The Glasgow Herald*, 1928. Sept. 8., 8.

<sup>15</sup> CAB/24/240. 8. Erik Geddes: Future of civil air communications of the Empire. Note by the Secretary of State for Air (1933. Apr.)

<sup>16</sup> *„It must be remembered, however, and the Board is sure that H.M. Government have it in mind, that the power of routing mail traffic, lies with the sending country; and, having regard to the importance of trans-Atlantic mail coming from and routed by the United States of America, the Board visualises that any trans-Atlantic must certainly be operated in conjunction with, and with the goodwill of, that country. Whithat end in view, the Board has consistently maintained cordial co-operation and friendly relations with Pan American Airways, which may perhaps be described as corresponding in the United States air policy to Imperial Airways in the British Empire.”* CAB/24/240. 8.

buena relación mencionada, si no quería respetar también las ambiciones de la gran potencia de los EE.UU.

### ***Las posibilidades de la extensión de la ruta aérea del Atlántico del Norte***

En 1935, Sir Philip Sassoon<sup>17</sup> confirmó la intención del Ministerio Británico de la Aeronáutica que pasó de nuevo en primer plano, es decir que el gobierno británico iniciaría vuelos según horario en América del Sur. El documento británico de los asuntos exteriores sobre aeronáutica „*La línea aérea del Atlántico, 1935*” planteó como problema impostergable el atraso en la competición aérea, haciendo resaltar que el Ministerio Británico de la Aeronáutica y el gobierno británico de siempre tenían delante una cantidad de tareas. A su vez, se hizo notar que la ruta del Atlántico del Norte tenía más y más importancia, con la intención británica de cooperar con los Estados Unidos. „*La Comisión opina – en mi visión, correctamente – que entre las rutas internacionales tenemos que dar el privilegio a lo más pronto posible a la ruta aérea que se ha de extender entre el Reyno Unido y los EE.UU., pues sin equívoco es el vuelo que en el futuro cercano va a proveer un tráfico notable, además, tiene un valor político considerable.*”<sup>18</sup> Este desplazamiento hacia el Norte se podía realizar entre otros porque llegar a Canadá por vía aérea seguía siendo insoluble.

El documento se dedica también a otra cuestión estratégicamente muy importante. El punto básico de la ruta aérea del Atlántico del Norte tendría que estar en el territorio de Irlanda del Norte o en el del Estado Libre Irlandés? Los Encargados del Gobierno llevaban negociaciones avanzadas con la representación del Estado Libre Irlandés sobre la cuestión que de primera puede parecer menos significativa. Mas su importancia no era menos apreciable, pues – aunque en el caso que se eligiera Irlanda del Norte, el gobierno británico habría podido tener el punto de base bajo su control absoluto – las negociaciones con el Estado Libre Irlandés requerían una exclusividad británica, americana (EE.UU.) e irlandesa en su espacio aéreo. Con esto, las Islas Británicas<sup>19</sup> habrían podido cerrar su espacio aéreo completo, excluyendo otros concurrentes europeos, en práctica, monopolizando la ruta aérea entre Europa y América del Norte! „*Una base en Irlanda del Norte podría tener la ventaja de estar completamente bajo nuestro control. Desde otro punto de vista, en cambio, esto dejaría libre el territorio del Estado Libre Irlandés para cada otro país que tiene el afán de explotar vuelos transatlánticos. [...] La posición de la Comisión es de abolir*

---

<sup>17</sup> Subsecretario del Estado británico de la aeronáutica, luego Ministro de la aeronáutica 1924-1937. <http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article12135485> (2013.09.02.)

<sup>18</sup> „*The Committee has taken the view, and I think rightly, that in considering these international routes we should give priority to the establishment, as early as possible, of services between the USA and the United Kingdom, as this is obviously a route which is destined in the comparatively near future to carry a very large amount of traffic, and has great political value.*” CAB/24/256. 1. The Atlantic air route. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air (1935. Aug.)

<sup>19</sup> El Reyno Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, en este caso, junto al territorio del Estado Libre Irlandés.

*completamente, en cuanto sea posible, la posibilidad de la competición internacional, con objetivo de que exploten los vuelos exclusivamente las compañías aéreas de los EE.UU. y de Gran Bretaña, es decir, Imperial Airways Limited y Pan-American Airways.,,*

<sup>20</sup> A base de lo que está descrito, se entiende por qué no insistía tanto el gobierno británico para entrar a la competición de la ruta aérea del Atlántico del Sur, la cual en esa época ya estaba considerada casi como algo completamente propio por los alemanes y franceses, con lo que causaban mucho desagrado a los políticos del exterior de los EE.UU.

### ***El acceso al espacio aéreo sudafricano sigue siendo una prioridad***

En cambio, desde el punto de vista británico, para llegar a África Occidental, la ruta a través de Francia o Portugal seguía siendo la más razonable. Hasta los años 30, el espacio aéreo de Francia y de la Península Ibérica era inevitable, ya que la tecnología no permitía el vuelo sin interrupción de Londres a Lisboa. Pues desde el punto de vista de la aviación británica, el papel de Portugal estaba revalorizada – por eso, en 1935, el gobierno británico empezó las negociaciones aéreas con Lisboa sobre el uso de los espacios aéreos de las colonias portuguesas en África Occidental, para la extensión de la ruta hacia Durban. Mas entrar al espacio aéreo portugués sin entrar a España, seguía siendo técnicamente imposible, así que la realización aún quedó suspendida.

Para el 1936, la construcción de la red de rutas aéreas en África Occidental llegó a ser una tarea más y más importante para el Imperio. Entre los motivos se encontraba la presencia italiana más y más evidente en África y la política agresiva de Mussolini en esa área con el afán de construir un imperio. El gobierno sudafricano ejercitaba una presión constante a Londres, ya que se sentía en peligro por las consecuencias de una extensión italiana. Mientras que los programas de armamentismo ocupaba casi la capacidad completa de la industria británica, seguía en vigor la reglamentación según la cual todos los vuelos británicos tenían que efectuarse con aviones de fabricación británica, con motores exclusivamente británicos. El gesto se podía entender de parte del gobierno, mas técnicamente significaba un desafío irreal para los fabricantes y las compañías aéreas británicas. Los posibles tipos de aviones y motores – aunque ya existían – no fueron accesibles para las compañías aéreas hasta el 1938, por eso los usuarios no tenían experiencias prácticas.<sup>21</sup>

Para marzo de 1937, el gobierno británico eligió y encargó la compañía aérea British Airways de extender y explotar la primera línea aérea sudamericana. El

---

<sup>20</sup> „A base in Northern Ireland would have the advantage of being under our complete control. On the other hand it would leave the territory of the Irish Free State open to exploitation by all other nations desirous of participating in the trans-Atlantic service. [...] The Committee, therefore, takes the view that international competition on this route should be avoided if possible, and that carriage of such traffic as is available should be limited to the national companies of the United Kingdom and the USA, viz., Imperial Airways Limited and Pan-American Airways.” CAB/24/256. 2.

<sup>21</sup> HIGHAM: 257.

gobierno tenía la intención de construir esto en dos etapas: en la primera etapa hasta el espacio aéreo de Gambia, colonia británica, y luego en la segunda etapa hacia el de los países sudamericanos. La importancia de la extensión aérea era importante no solamente por los constantes cambios conminativos de la política internacional, mas también por el hecho que el gobierno británico tuvo que pagar para la transportación del correo aéreo anglosajón hacia América del Sur en 1936 87.500, y en 1937 ya 98.000 libras esterlinas para las compañías aéreas francesas y alemanas.

El documento titulado *El vuelo civil. El tráfico proyectado en el Atlántico del Sur, 1937*<sup>22</sup> – como los documentos de arriba – insistía sobre la importancia de la participación británica en el tráfico aéreo del Atlántico del Sur. A la vez puso en evidencia que los franceses (1928) y los alemanes (1932) explotaban la misma ruta ya con casi un decenio de anticipo y de experiencia. La Cámara de los Comunes decidió el 19 de mayo de 1936 sobre la extensión de la ruta británica en América del Sur, via Lisboa y Gambia, o sea, a lo largo de la costa de África Occidental, que a su vez sirvió como solución para conectar las colonias británicas de allí a la red del tráfico aéreo.<sup>23</sup> Con la extensión y la explotación de este vuelo, el gabinete quería encargar la British Airways Ltd., ya que en su visión esto habría sido entonces una tarea demasiado grande para la Imperial Airways – que desarrollaba y explotaba entretanto las rutas y los vuelos ya existentes. La expansión aérea en África Occidental y la ruta transatlántica del Atlántico del Sur pasaron de nuevo en primer plano porque por los transportes de correo aéreo hacia América del Sur, provistos por los vuelos franceses y alemanes, llegaron a ser extremadamente costosos. Por otro lado, de acuerdo a las nuevas reglas sobre el financiamiento aceptadas en 1936<sup>24</sup>, para el desarrollo de la aviación civil estaba a disposición un máximo de 1.5 millones de libras esterlinas anuales, lo que significa un aumento notable en comparación con las fuentes de 1930. Por los efectos comunes de los factores mencionados, además, por las ventajas debidas a la conexión de los intereses británicos de África Occidental, la evocación de los proyectos de la extensión en el Atlántico del Sur llegó a ser justificada. En cambio, el gabinete seguía con su intención de realizarlos palmo a palmo: *„La opción de la ruta aérea que atraviesa Portugal y a lo largo de la costa occidental de África tendría la ventaja de facilitar el vuelo más corto y rápido, preparando mientras tanto la posibilidad de la extensión hacia América del Sur. A su vez, sería una cierta protección contra los intentos extranjeros, dirigidos a la explotación de la ruta a lo largo de la costa de África Occidental.”*<sup>25</sup> Del documento resulta claro también, que tanto el gobierno como los especialistas de aeronáutica estaban conscientes del hecho que este desarrollo podría

---

<sup>22</sup> *Civil Aviation. Proposed South Atlantic Air Service.* CAB/24/268. N. F. Warren Fisher: *Civil aviation. Proposed South Atlantic Air Service.* Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air (1937. Febr.)

<sup>23</sup> CAB/24/268. 1.

<sup>24</sup> *Air Navigation Act, 1936.*

<sup>25</sup> *„The alternative of an air route travelling through Portugal and down the West Coast of Africa would have the advantage of developing a shorter, and therefore more rapid line, while preparing the way for future extensions to South America. It should also provide some protection against various schemes, mainly of foreign origin, which plan to exploit the West Coast route to South Africa.”* CAB/24/268. 2.

arrancar lo más temprano en 1938, y su extensión al espacio aéreo de ciertos países de América del Sur presumiblemente no se habría realizado antes de 1940. Lo mismo estaban conscientes de que el espacio aéreo de ciertos países de América del Sur estaba enredado por los concurrentes europeos por Este-Oeste, mientras por los EE.UU. por Norte-Sur, y tenían ya sus puntos de conexión también, contruidos exactamente en el período – de casi un decenio – en el que el gobierno británico no dedicaba la atención necesaria a la participación en la competición aérea. A base de todo esto, se entiende que la extensión de la ruta de África Occidental se realizaba lentamente, sin entusiasmo especial, y con el pasar del tiempo estaba más y más claro que tal y como se había proyectado, no se realizaría de ninguna manera. Finalmente, los vuelos de prueba llegaron pues desde Londres hasta Gambia, mas aquí la realización se paró. La extensión del vuelo transatlántico entre Gambia y Brasil ni siquiera empezó.<sup>26</sup>

No obstante, no se pararon los trabajos de planificación, ya que en 1938, un grupo de investigadores salió para Brasil y Argentina, para ver las posibilidades de la extensión de un vuelo Natal–Buenos-Aires, mientras otro grupo de exploradores y especialistas estaba verificando la posibilidad de la ruta Lisboa-Bathurst en África Occidental, pero todo esto llegó solamente hasta la fase experimental. Finalmente, desde el 2 de enero de 1939, tenía que salir el vuelo según el horario Londres–Lisboa–Bathurst (Gambia Británica). La British Airways tenía que recibir por el vuelo y su explotación 116.000 libras esterlinas anuales, mas por las dificultades y los cambios del desarrollo de la red de rutas aéreas planificada, la activación del vuelo ya no fue posible.

Mientras tanto, la Imperial Airways intentaba el mapeo de la ruta Londres–New York–Bermuda con el tránsito por el Atlántico del Norte para llegar al continente sudamericano, mas esta ruta tampoco cumplió las esperanzas. La declaración de la segunda guerra mundial puso fin a las tentativas. La ruta de África Occidental se realizó para el 1939, via Cairo–Khartoum–Takoradi<sup>27</sup>, y las rutas de Johannesburg y de Durban se realizaron también a lo largo del eje Cairo–Khartoum. Bathurst salió de las rutas principales, y perdió su papel en los esfuerzos de la extensión de la ruta británica en el Atlántico del Sur. Durante la segunda guerra mundial ya ni siquiera se tocaron estos argumentos, pues las posibilidades de la movilidad de política exterior y de economía se restringieron, y había otras prioridades dentro del Imperio Británico también.

### **Conclusión**

Las aspiraciones aéreas en el Atlántico del Sur quedaron sin resultados de parte del gobierno británico. Los motivos fundamentales, teniendo presente lo arriba mencionado, son los siguientes: 1.) Durante la extensión de la red de rutas aéreas británicas, no enfatizaban suficientemente la conquista del espacio aéreo del

---

<sup>26</sup> Véase el anexo N° 1.

<sup>27</sup> Véase el anexo N° 2.

Atlántico del Sur, y a la canalización del espacio aéreo de América del Sur en la red de rutas aéreas del Imperio. En cambio, es indiscutible que el gobierno británico era consciente de este defecto y a nivel gubernamental se esforzaba por su realización – mas estos esfuerzos regularmente fracasaron. 2.) Uno de los objetivos primarios de las aspiraciones francesas y alemanas fue la conquista de los espacios aéreos de ciertos países de América del Sur, explotando de parte de ambos países vuelos transatlánticos e intercontinentales según el horario entre Europa y América del Sur, adelantando a los británicos que se quedaron atrás. Para los vuelos en el Atlántico del Sur, los franceses podían aprovechar mayormente de sus propias colonias africanas, los alemanes en cambio, de Gambia Británica. Con todo esto llegaron a tener una ventaja que el Imperio Británico no era capaz de recuperar hasta la declaración de la segunda guerra mundial. 3.) El respeto máximo de las ambiciones de gran potencia y de los intereses reclamados de los Estados Unidos de América fue un objetivo primordial de parte del Imperio Británico. En el caso de los trayectos por el Atlántico del Norte, tenían como inevitable el permiso y la colaboración activa de los EE.UU. Ya que América del Sur pertenecía a los territorios de interés de los Estados Unidos de América, los británicos prestaban mucha atención a la buena relación de aliados en este caso también; los esfuerzos durante las negociaciones para mantener la amistad con la gran potencia mencionada, se podía percibir continuamente en los documentos diplomáticos de la época. 4.) América del Sur no pertenecía a las colonias tradicionales británicas, que primordialmente se hallaban a lo largo de las rutas comerciales hacia el Oriente de Londres. Por eso, en la extensión del tráfico aéreo, la construcción de la ruta Londres–Delhi–Sydney, además, la canalización de las colonias africanas del Imperio Británico a lo largo del eje Londres–Cairo–Ciudad Del Cabo tenían prioridad. Por eso, los objetivos geopolíticos apoyaban mucho menos la construcción de esta ruta que el desarrollo de las otras mencionadas. De consecuencia, estaba presente con menos importancia en la política de exteriores británica que las rutas aéreas de las áreas de India, África o Extremo Oriente.<sup>28</sup> 5.) El interés de la política exterior británica estaba enfocado mucho más al trayecto en el Atlántico del Norte, que en el desarrollo de la ruta del Atlántico del Sur,. Mientras que la presencia en el concurso del mercado para los vuelos sudamericanos donde dominaban los franceses y los alemanes no era seguro ni siquiera en el caso de esfuerzos extraordinarios, los británicos tenían inmensas ventajas con la explotación común de las rutas aéreas de los vuelos de correos, mercancías y personas en el Atlántico del Norte, junto a los EE.UU. Por el espacio aéreo de América del Norte, podían alcanzar en un modo mucho más simple, con menos desafíos técnicos el espacio aéreo de ciertos países del continente sudamericano a través de las Bermudas. A la vez, se presentó también la posibilidad de alcanzar por vía aérea los territorios orientales de Canadá. 6.) Mientras que, como empresas sucursales de sus

---


<sup>28</sup> Véase el anexo N° 4.



compañías aéreas, los franceses y ante todo de los alemanes estaban presentes en varios países de América del Sur a partir de los principios de los años 20, los británicos no disponían de una compañía de este tipo en la región. Por eso, llegar al continente no era solamente una cuestión de aspiraciones geopolíticas y técnicas, más bien una tarea que requería muchísima energía, tiempo y dinero por la construcción de la ruta aérea llegando a su punto terminal en América del Sur. Mas ni la British, ni la Imperial Airways disponía de esa capacidad económica, técnica y de recurso humano.


En su totalidad, podemos decir que el Imperio Británico no participó en efecto en la competición internacional por América del Sur, y los esfuerzos realizados estaban destinados al fracaso también. Esto se confirma también por el hecho que la aspiración británica de cuarenta años antes se pudo realizar solamente para los años 70, cuando partió al vuelo según el horario desde Londres a América del Sur.

## ANEXOS




Anexo N° 1. – La red de rutas aéreas del Imperio Británico en 1937<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> CAB/24/268 6. Citación.



Anexo N° 2. – La red de rutas aéreas británicas verdadera y la proyectada en 1939<sup>30</sup>



Anexo N° 3.: Longitud de las rutas aéreas de Gran Bretaña, Francia y Alemania en 1926<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> HIGHAM: 259. Átvétel.

<sup>31</sup> El gráfico preparado por el autor como ilustración, tiene como base la tabla citada de la 2a página de la relación No. CAB/24/188.



Anexo N° 4.: La red de rutas aéreas estratégicas del Imperio Británico en el Mapamundi<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> SWANSTON, Alexander and Malcolm: *Atlas de la Guerra Aérea*. Madrid, 2011. 76-77.



József Krisztián Szalánczi

## ***International Relations of the German Antarctic Expedition 1938/39***

***Sovereignty dispute between Germany and Norway in the „Polar Desert”***

### **Abstract**

At the end of 1938, with two flying-boats on her board, German catapult ship *Schwabenland* – a former freighter, which was converted and used as a floating airbase – left the docks of Hamburg to execute her secret task in the Southern Ocean: the aerial surveying and mapping of the Antarctic mainland area between the longitudes 12°W and 20°E. Officially, the expedition – which was organized by the German government – was a scientific journey; but in the background, Nazi Germany prepared to claim for herself a South Polar district. However, the above-mentioned territory was not absolutely derelict, because Norwegian explorers visited these coasts of Antarctica several times previously. Norway also vindicated sovereignty rights over the region, thus the international conflict was unavoidable between the two countries.

*Keywords:* Aerial survey, Antarctic, catapult ship, expedition, Germany, New Swabia, Norway, Queen Maud Land, Schwabenland, territorial claims.

**T**he German Antarctic Expedition 1938/39 was a unique and special event in the history of polar research. First of all, it was not a traditional scientific expedition only, but also a characteristic – although lesser-known – momentum of the Third Reich’s power and political ambitions on the distant South Atlantic waters. As an introduction, an attempt to present the diversified international relations of this half-forgotten exploration journey will be followed, above all from the point of view of the evolved territorial dispute between Germany and Norway about the vast areas of the so-called „*Neu-Schwabenland*” or „*Dronning Maud Land*”.<sup>1</sup> It must be mentioned, that the story of this enigmatic polar mission is inseparable from some other important – economic, military and scientific – factors; and in line with political questions, from time to time it is necessary to refer to these contexts.

The United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile and Norway had maintained territorial claims in Antarctica before the Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961.<sup>2</sup> Although at the beginning of the 20th century

---

<sup>1</sup> Dronning Maud Land (Queen Maud Land) is the Norwegian name of the Antarctic region between 20°W and 45°E. (Ca. 2,7 million square kilometres.) Neu-Schwabenland (New Swabia) was the German cartographic name of the polar area between 12°W and 20°E and the location of the German Antarctic Expedition in 1938/39. (Ca. 600.000 square kilometres.)

<sup>2</sup> The Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington in 1959 and after the ratifications, came into effect in 1961. Nowadays, the above-mentioned pretensions appear less conspicuously. Contrary to popular opinion, the Antarctic Treaty does not take stand categorically on territorial claims. Article IV

Germany also took part in the early stages of the race for the discovery of the the Sixth Continent<sup>3</sup>, after her defeat in the First World War, the German state lost all of her overseas possessions in the Versailles Treaty in 1919.<sup>4</sup> Germany has also been excluded from the exploration of Antarctica for the next 15 years; it was a serious disadvantage against the rival nations, that meanwhile – on the basis of they earlier discoveries – established territorial claims in the region. Nazi Germany, when in the middle of the 1930s re-entered the polar debate on the southern half of the Earth, great parts of the continent have already been divided into so-called geographical sectors.<sup>5</sup>

The main reason of the idea of a new Antarctic expedition was economic. Germany was the second largest purchaser of the Norwegian whale oil on the

---

of the Agreement includes the following: „No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force“. The Antarctic Treaty. National Archives of Australia (NAA) A10728. It is important to emphasize, that the disallowance refers only to occurrent new claims – the pretensions, which had officially announced by several countries in the pre-treaty era, are only in „not current“ or „frozen“ status. Otherwise, the status of Antarctica and the far South Atlantic region is a global, but currently perhaps not a mainstream political-economic problem. There are immeasurable amount of raw materials in the depths of the mainland – obviously, hard to dredge – and also in the surrounding waters – although at this moment the Antarctic Treaty System protects the region against all types of mining. Besides this, the strategic significance of the region is not negligible, either. It is not inconceivable, that the White Continent will be a great encounter zone between world powers in the 21<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>3</sup> Before the First World War, Erich von Drygalski (1901-1903) and Wilhelm Filchner (1911-1912) had sailed to the coasts of Antarctica aboard *Gauss* and *Deutschland* as German scientists. The territory between 87-91°E was discovered and named by Drygalski as Kaiser-Wilhelm-II.-Land (Wilhelm II Land). MILLS, W. J.: *Exploring Polar Frontiers*. Santa Barbara (California), 2003. (MILLS 2003) 704. BRUNK, K.: *Kartographische Arbeiten und deutsche Namengebung in Neuschwabenland, Antarktis. Bisherige Arbeiten, Rekonstruktion der Flugwege der Deutschen Antarktischen Expedition 1938/39 und Neubearbeitung des deutschen Namengutes in Neuschwabenland*. Frankfurt am Main, 1986. (BRUNK 1986) 9. Filchner explored the region from 32°W to 77-78°S and named it as Prinzregent-Luitpold-Land (Prince Regent Luitpold Coast.) MILLS (2003): 229. BRUNK (1986): 9. The German government never announced formal claims about these territories; but the Versailles Treaty precluded also the theoretical possibility of the subsequent pretensions. LÜDECKE C. – SUMMERHAYES C.: *The Third Reich in Antarctica. The German Antarctic Expedition 1938/39*. Huntingdon – Norwich, 2012. (LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES 2012) 8.

<sup>44</sup> The 118-119. Articles of the Versailles Treaty pronounce: „In territory outside her European frontiers as fixed by the present Treaty, Germany renounces all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory which belonged to her or to her allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin which she held as against the Allied and Associated Powers...Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.“ (The Versailles Treaty. [Http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partiv.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/partiv.asp). Download: 10/01/2013.)

<sup>5</sup> It is not easy to make a distinction between official and unofficial claims in Antarctica, including also the South Atlantic region. Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Chile and Norway had announced different pretensions on sectors or islands before the end of the Second World War and in some cases, they entered also into disputes about the borders of the claimed territories. STUNZ, H. R.: *Walfisch, Wissenschaft, Wettbewerb – Die deutschen Ansprüche auf Teile der Antarktis. Die „Neuschwabenland“-Expedition von 1938/39 im Kontext*. Norderstedt, 2008. (STUNZ 2008) 18.

market,<sup>6</sup> but after the Norwegian whaler owners doubled their prices in the year of 1935, the German government began to set up his own whaling fleets to reduce its more and more insupportable expenses in foreign exchange.<sup>7</sup> After serious efforts, whale catchers had sailed also under German flag in all whaling seasons between 1936–1939 to the South Atlantic region. The initiator of an actual scientific journey to the coasts of Antarctica was Councillor of State Helmuth Wohlthat, chief of the German whaling industry.<sup>8</sup> Within the so-called second „*Four Year Plan*”<sup>9</sup>, his most important task was to organize the German whaling fleets and reduce the import of the Norwegian whale oil. After the successful beginning, Wohlthat’s next goal was to defend the independence of the new German whaling. The State Councillor forged an ambitious plan: as reviver of the illustrious traditions of former German polar researchers Drygalski and Filchner, Germany organizes an expedition to Antarctica – and after the success of the mission, by right of discovery the German state announces an official claim on the explored territory.<sup>10</sup> Wohlthat’s superior, Hermann Göring „*approved the concept, and on 9 May 1938 assigned resources for a reconnaissance expedition, including a ship and two seaplanes for aerial survey and photographic mapping.*”<sup>11</sup> Of course, the Versailles Treaty practically was dead in 1938 and the Third Reich prepared with full effort for the war.<sup>12</sup> Safeguarding of the whaling was not a negligible issue<sup>13</sup> and the expedition was also a perfect opportunity for the German Navy to

---

<sup>6</sup> LÜDECKE, C.: *In geheimer Mission zur Antarktis. Die dritte Deutsche Antarktische Expedition 1938/39 und der Plan einer territorialen Festsetzung zur Sicherung des Walfangs.* Deutsches Schiffsarchiv 26. 2003. (LÜDECKE 2003) 75.

<sup>7</sup> LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 13.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 15. Wohlthat was the „*key figure*” of the whole story. „*He had...worked for Economic Minister Schacht as head-of-department in the Ministry of Economies, with huge responsibilities aimed at removing the negative trade balance of Nazi Germany, under Minister Schacht’s New Plan, the motto for which was ‘Foreign Trade without Foreign Currency’...After the increase in whale oil prices in 1935, it was his expert advice that changed the official position of the Reich concerning German whaling.*” Ibid. 17.

<sup>9</sup> Under the control of Hermann Göring, the primary aim of the second „*Four Year Plan*” (Vierjahresplan) was to prepare the German industry and armed forces for the next war.

<sup>10</sup> The worry about the independence of the German whaling was not groundless. After the successful execution of the expedition, Wohlthat had published an article in the official journal of the „*Four Year Plan*” where he alludes to the Norwegian whalers, who must pay taxes to Great Britain after they work on the waters of the British Antarctic Territory. (Wohlthat 1939, 613.) The official press report of the journey also contains, that the expedition „*...was necessary to escape the fate of the Norwegians who had pay a tribute to Britain on every barrel of oil.*” German Antarctic Expedition. The National Archives, London (TNA) CO 78/211/2.) Of course, taxation of whaling was not an option for the Third Reich. A German sector in Antarctica would have been the guarantee for the free whaling of the German ships in the surrounding waters.

<sup>11</sup> LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 18.

<sup>12</sup> No need to emphasize, that only for the sake of scientific research, the organization of an expensive and complicated polar expedition would not have been possible at the time.

<sup>13</sup> „(The whale oil) *was also used in making soaps and detergents...A by-product of soap manufacture was gliceryne – raw material for nitro-glycerine...Military uses included explosives and lubrication of precision instruments.*” LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 13. In the summer of 1938, Hermann Göring was very displeased with the production of explosives and he said the following on a

continue his covered military operations in the (South) Atlantic region.<sup>14</sup> The above-mentioned strong political-economic-military relations proved sufficient to begin the preparations for an adventurous exploration journey – and on the eve of the Second World War, Nazi Germany entered into the fight for the „colonization“ of Antarctica again.

The project was grandiose – but the implementation was not easy. The appearance of a new rival power in the area was undesirable for all countries, that were concerned in Antarctic issues; moreover Germany was extremely dangerous in all respects. Great Britain observed all German activities very mistrustfully on the oceans and seas of the world. The United Kingdom and Australia supposed, that the *Kriegsmarine* took into consideration to build a secret military base in the Antarctic region to supply his auxiliary cruisers or submarines in times of war.<sup>15</sup> The British-Australian fear was not groundless, but – against all subsequent theories – there are no data or information about a German station in the South Atlantic region before or during the Second World War; the guidelines of the next planned (1939/40) Antarctic expedition do not contain any references or feedbacks about a supply depot, either.<sup>16</sup> Chile and Argentina also were not relaxed: there were large uninhabited territories, islands and „switchback roads“

---

Four Year Plan-meeting: „*The earlier results of the Four Year Plan were not satisfying...The situation is catastrophic in the field of gunpowders and explosives*“. (Vorbereitung der Reichsverteidigung. Bundesarchiv–Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BAMA) RW 19/1831. 221.)

<sup>14</sup> Although Germany turned back to Antarctica only in the middle of the 1930's, the Atlantic region played an emphasized role for the German Navy in the whole interwar period. The German government – also in the era of the Weimar Republic and not only after 1933 – tried to circumvent the articles of the Versailles Treaty in every way. One of the methods was the detailed mapping of the Atlantic Ocean. German research vessels – for example the *Meteor* between 1925–1927 – did meteorological, nautical, oceanographic, biological, geographical and geophysical investigations in the Atlantic region. FISCHER, F.: „*A háború utáni háború*“. *Az európai hatalmi rivalizálás dél-amerikai dimenziója Németország és Chile haditengerészeti és légi kapcsolatainak tükrében 1919-1939*. Pécs, 2002. (FISCHER 2002) 147-151.) Officially, these were also the main tasks of the German Antarctic Expedition 1938/39. RITSCHER, A.: *Deutsche Antarktische Expedition 1938/39 mit dem Flugzeugstützpunkt der Deutschen Lufthansa A. G. M. S. „Schwabenland“, Kapitän A. Kottas, ausgeführt unter der Leitung von Kapitän A. Ritscher*. Wissenschaftliche und fliegerische Ergebnisse. Erster Band – Textteil; Bilder– und Kartenteil. Leipzig, 1942. 2. Of course, the results of these scientific researches were used not only for civilian, but military goals – and the *Reichs-* or *Kriegsmarine* have always been in the background. The reconsidered German naval doctrines after the First World War in full context: FISCHER, F.: *Die südamerikanischen Ausbildungsreisen der deutschen Kreuzer. Theorie und Praxis des Kreuzerkrieges (1924-1938)*. IN: *Regionalgeschichten – Nationalgeschichten. Festschrift für Gerhard Wanner zum 65. Geburtstag*. Weber, W. Feldkirch, 2004. 349-380.

<sup>15</sup> Nazi basis in the Antarctic. NAA MP150/1, 449/201/807. This file contains a letter from Australian naval commander Griffiths Bowen to the Secretary of Naval Board from 1941 about potential German supply bases in the South Atlantic or Antarctic area. The short response of the Naval Board establishes, that „*quite possible, that the Nazis – or their friends – have a base in the Antarctic...*“ Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Richtlinien für die Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Deutschen Antarktis-Expedition. Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde (BABL) R 2/18372). After the success of the first expedition, the German government immediately began to organize a new one – but because of the outbreak of the Second World War, the preparations were stopped.



in *Tierra del Fuego*, geographically very close to the mainland of Antarctica. Chile realized, that the German Navy has got photos, films and scientific data about hidden fjords and erratically meandering water paths in South Patagonia.<sup>17</sup> Similar natural hideouts would have been perfect locations for a secret military station in these labyrinths of channels, and the two Latin-American states troubled about their territorial sovereignty – it was not inconceivable, that Germany will use a covert place in *Tierra del Fuego* to establish a base behind their backs. Although both of the two countries were the symphatizer of the Nazi Germany, this possibility was of course an unacceptable and upsetting option for them. Moreover, „Germany’s intersts in Antarctica had begun to worry the USA. By early 1939 President Frankin D. Roosevelt had come to belive that a German presence near the Antarctic Peninsula posed a potential threat to the solidarity and defence of the Western Hemisphere should a second world war occur.”<sup>18</sup> The Third Reich stirred up the hornet’s nest with its Antarctic expedition; but first and last, its most unrelenting rival was Norway in this question.

For the execution of the polar mission, the German government chartered the catapult ship *Schwabenland* from the *Lufthansa*.<sup>19</sup> To choose one of the locations of historical German discoveries as research zone, it would not have been a good choice. Kaiser-Wilhelm-II.-Land was the part of the Australian sector; Prinzregent-Luitpold-Land was located in the British Antarctic Territory<sup>20</sup> – both of these were under official and strong claims. After a short hesitation, the Germans had decided: the target of the expedition will be the Antarctic region between 12°W and 20°E. Although the Norwegians did more discoveries there in the previous decade, it was formally an unclaimed area. Nevertheless, Wohlthat exactly knew, that the international confrontation is unavoidable and the plan of the expedition cannot be hidden totally before the watchful eyes of the concerned powers. The real tasks of the mission<sup>21</sup> were top secret, but the fact of a polar journey itself

---

<sup>17</sup> FISCHER (2002): 58-60. German ships, as *Meteor*, *Emden*, *Karlsruhe* and *Schlesien* – that executed (officially) training and scientific tasks with the permission of the germanophile Chilean government – collected materials about the area between 1926-1938. Ibid. 60.

<sup>18</sup> LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 90.

<sup>19</sup> *Schwabenland* was originally a steam freighter, but after her reconstruction in 1934, it functioned as „swimming” or „floating” airbase on the Atlantic Ocean. The ship was able to carry seaplanes on her board and – with the help of a steam catapult – launch them into the air. The *Lufthansa* used the *Schwabenland* in the serve of the German transatlantic mail service. The ship’s main task was to put the German mail-planes on her board in the middle of the ocean and after refuelling, launch them towards to their mainland bases on the shores of Africa or South America. MITTERHUBER, S.: *Die deutschen Katapultflugzeuge und Schleuderschiffe. Entwicklung, Einsatz und Technik*. Bonn, 2004. 118.

<sup>20</sup> The Australian sector located between 45–160°E; the British between 20–80°W. HEADLAND, R. K.: *Chronological List of Antarctic Expeditions and Related Historical Events*. Irthingborough, 1989. (Headland 1989) 291. 263.)

<sup>21</sup> Besides territorial claims, whaling and scientific research, the *Kriegsmarine* also ordered a concrete military task for the expedition. On her return journey, the *Schwabanland* had to visit the small islands of Trinidad and Martin Vaz off the coasts of Brasil to observe: „Are there anchorages to give protection for fuel depots, for equipment for auxiliary cruisers, and for other similar military

was not entirely. To guile the opponents, „as Roald Amundsen had done 27 years previously to deceive his rival, Robert Falcon Scott, the expedition was officially listed as directed to the Arctic. Orders for materials specified that they were for an Arctic expedition.“<sup>22</sup> The *Schwabenland* – with two Dornier-10t-Wal seaplanes on her board – finally left the docks of Hamburg on the 17 December 1938 and under the command of veteran polar researcher Alfred Ritscher,<sup>23</sup> began the journey to her operation district. Of course, the illusion of an Arctic expedition shortly dissolved – otherwise Norway was very mistrustful about the German goals from the beginning.

Whaling in the Southern Ocean also was a cardinal issue for Norway: the Scandinavian state was very active in polar questions. In the period of 1929-1937, Norwegian whalers and explorers visited the Antarctica several times between the British and the Australian sector and they also hoisted flags and gave geographical names in the region, from 20°W to 45°E. Aboard the ship *Norvegia*, Captain Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen – commissioned by Norwegian consul and whaler owner Lars Christensen – discovered more areas in the Antarctic continent during his expedition in 1929–30 and named these as „Kronprins Olav Kyst“ (Prince Olav Coast; January 1930; 40–45°E)<sup>24</sup> and „Kronprinsesse Märtha Kyst“. («Crown« Princess Martha Coast; February 1930; between 5°E and 20°W or in the vicinity of 7,5°W).<sup>25</sup> Next year, the *Norvegia* cruised off the Antarctic coasts again and Riiser-Larsen mapped a new territory in February 1931 between 20-33°E (or 25-33°E) – it was named as „Prinsesse Ragnhild Kyst“ (or: „Prinsesse Ragnhild Land“; Princess Ragnhild Coast).<sup>26</sup> In the same year, „Captain H. Halvorsen on the floating factory *Sevilla*, sighted land in the vicinity of longitude 14°E“.<sup>27</sup> He bestowed the name:

---

requirements?...Are there any installations for telecommunication? Is it possible to supply ships with fresh water? Do the Islands provide animals and plants to supplement U-boat supplies?“ LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 76.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Ritscher was the member of the so-called Schröder-Stranz Expedition to Svalbard (Spitsbergen) in 1912. GEORGI, J.: *Polarforscher Kapitän Alfred Ritscher (1879-1963)*. Polarforschung 32. 1962. 125. In the First World War, he was the commander of an aircraft company of the German Navy in Flanders. LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 30. Alfred Ritscher. BAMA MSG 225/137.) As ship captain and pilot, accompanied by his polar experience, he was absolutely the fittest – and perhaps the only – person in the whole Germany to manage the mission.

<sup>24</sup> Composite map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 28. 26-27. MILLS (2003): 540. HEADLAND (1989): 285. (We need to mention, that there is a contradiction between the sources. Comp. map of A. marks the name „Queen Maud Land“ instead „Prince Olav Coast“. It is strange, because Queen Maud Land is the name of the later announced Norwegian Antarctic sector; Prince Olav Coast is the easternmost part of Queen Maud Land.) Nevertheless, the information is not necessarily incorrect. „There are several accounts of most voyages (commissioned by Lars Christensen) and repetitions have produced some conflict of dates (and occasionally places); further, positions were not always accurate, and features were variously named.“ RIFFENBURGH, Beau: *Encyclopedia of the Antarctic I-II*. New York, 2007. 229.

<sup>25</sup> Composite map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 28. 26–27. Portion of map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 30. MILLS (2003): 535. HEADLAND (1989): 285.

<sup>26</sup> Composite map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 28. 27. MILLS (2003): 535. HEADLAND (1989): 287.

<sup>27</sup> Composite map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 28. 28.

„Prinsesse Astrid Land” (or: „Prinsesse Astrid Kyst”; Princess Astrid Coast).<sup>28</sup> The above-mentioned Lars Christensen, during his last journey to Antarctica in 1936–1937, discovered „Prins Harald Kyst” (or: „Prins Harald Land”; February 1937; Prince Harald Coast) between 34–40°E.<sup>29</sup> Seemingly, the situation was obvious: the discoverers were Norwegians, therefore the Norwegian Kingdom is entitled to announce her legal claims and sovereignty over these areas. But the Germans were ready to query and revise this point of view after their successful expedition. The use of the catapult ship *Schwabenland* and her seaplanes was not a random decision: the main cartographic task of the expedition was to construct a detailed survey map („Übersichtskarte” in German) about the territory between 12°W and 20°E, with the help of aerial photography. In a prospective sovereignty dispute, the German government planned to refer to the following: former Norwegian maps were inaccurate; the locations of geographical objects were not marked precisely; in some cases, the Norwegian „discoveries” were based only on eye-observations without disembarkation; there are lots of natural objects in the areas, which were not seen by the sailors. Of course, the premise of this policy – to vindicate the sovereignty rights on the basis of the *real* discovery – was a very accurate German map – and the Nazi government hoped to have this exactly from Captain Ritscher’s research team and from their hydroplanes.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, Norway didn’t wield effective sovereignty over Antarctic regions. There were, of course, no Norwegian garrisons or research stations in the region;<sup>31</sup> the deployment of a German – for example meteorological – base would have been a strong argument in an international judicial dispute.<sup>32</sup>

After the *Schwabenland* had left Hamburg in the second half of December 1938 and turned to South, the Norwegians realized, that their interests in the South

---

<sup>28</sup> MILLS (2003): 534. HEADLAND (1989): 288. Portion of map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 30. Because of the contradictions between the sources, the detailed history of the Norwegian discoveries is chaotic. For example: in 1933-1934, Lars Christensen discovered an *another* Princess Astrid Land, but it was „not Halvorsens »Prinsesse Astrid Land«...now called Queen Leopold and Queen Astrid Coast.” HEADLAND (1989): 292.

<sup>29</sup> Composite map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 28. 30. MILLS (2003) 531. HEADLAND 1989, 297.

<sup>30</sup> Mention must be made, that the Norwegians – during the expeditions, organised by Lars Christensen – also used seaplanes for aerial survey. (Composite map of Antarctica. NAA, AA1964/7, 28. 26-30.) Nevertheless, the subsequent German „Übersichtskarte” was really more accurate compared to Norwegian maps.

<sup>31</sup> On the basis of the international law, effective sovereignty is an important criteria for legal territorial claims. Because of climatic factors, it was not easy to achieve in the Antarctica. CSATLÓS, E.: *A szuverenitás gyakorlatának nemzetközi közjogban felmerült problémái az Antarktison*. Iustum Aequum Salutare, 8/1. 2012. 118. For example, Great Britain established small meteorological or supply stations in the region (not in the mainland, but on small islands off the Antarctic coasts) to enhance its claims. The administration centre of the South Atlantic territories were the Falkland Islands – but of course, this was an administration trick. The Falklands were not uninhabited – although geographically not an Antarctic region, neither, they are not so far from the White Continent –, therefore the effective sovereignty – formally – came true over the British Antarctic Territory.

<sup>32</sup> Otherwise, as we mentioned above, the construction of a German base was not planned in 1938/39 or in 1939/40 – but theoretically it was not impossible.

Atlantic are in great danger. They had at the moment only theoretical rights, but not officially announced and recognized claims. Adolf Hoel, director of the *Norway's Svalbard and Arctic Ocean Survey* was the best informed Norwegian person about the planned German expedition. Although originally he also only suspected, that the *Schwabenland's* real target will be not the Arctic, last on 22 December Hoel informed the Norwegian Foreign Ministry about his doubts, and capacitated them to find a quick solution.<sup>33</sup> His efforts were not useless and the Norwegian parliament took up the German challenge: on 14 January 1939, by right of its former discoveries, Norway – not only announced its claims, but – formally annexed the *whole* territory (20°W to 45°E) between the British and Australian sectors in a royal decree.<sup>34</sup> The ca. 2,7 million square kilometres large area was named as „*Dronning Maud Land*“ (Queen Maud Land). On the same day „*the Norwegian Government formally recognised the boundaries of the Australian Antarctic Territory, as defined in British Order in Council of 7 February 1933.*“<sup>35</sup>

The unconcealed annexation of Queen Maud Land – five days before the German expedition had reached his operation zone – was an unexpected and intrepid step. The unification of the former Norwegian discoveries in a large geographical sector was a troublesome development for Germany – although the real strenght of the Norwegian announcement depended on the reactions of the true and concerned world powers. Normally, the recognition of this claim wouldn't have been so obvious. But against Nazi Germany – together with its suspicious activities in the Atlantic region –, the answer was not really questionable. After some cogitation, Great Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand had recognized the annexation, although only in the moment of the beginning of the Second World war, exactly on 1 September 1939.<sup>36</sup> Of course, the Germans ignored the royal proclamation. „*Councillor of State Wohlthat informed Ritscher personally by encoded radio transmission on January 17 about the Norwegian claim*“,<sup>37</sup> and he told the following to the expedition leader: „*Your instructions remains unchanged, stop.*“<sup>38</sup> The *Schwabenland* operated in the Antarctic area between 19 January and 6 February 1939.<sup>39</sup> Under the excellent lead of Captain Ritscher – and also thanks to the good weather –, the German research team successfully accomplished the mission and achieved great and unexampled results. Between 12°W and 20°E

---

<sup>33</sup> LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 50-51.

<sup>34</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 300.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Previously, the attitude of the Scandinavian state about the boundaries of the British and Australian sector was not unambiguous. But the Norwegian recognition on 14 January 1939 solved this problem. On 1 September 1939, the British Foreign Office informed the Norwegians, that „*His Majesty's governments in the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand, recognise Norwegian sovereignty over the territory in question.*“ Norwegian Claims Part 3. NAA A981, ANT 51 PART3.

<sup>37</sup> LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 50.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. 53. 66.

„350,000 square kilometres of territory were photographed and in all 600,000 square kilometres recommitted by eye-observation and photography. Material was collected in the course of routine flights totalling in all over 10,000 kilometres, a distance corresponding to a quarter of the world's circumference. A further 2,000 kilometres were covered in seven special flights.”<sup>40</sup> The territory was named as „Neu-Schwabenland” (New Swabia) and geographical objects got German names.<sup>41</sup> During the aerial survey flights, „darts with inscribed swastikas were dropped every 16 miles”.<sup>42</sup> The Germans also executed two demonstrative landing and hoisted their flags on the mainland.<sup>43</sup> It was a broad hint, but after all only an informal territorial pretension, because „the German claim to ownership...never pursued through parliamentary process.”<sup>44</sup> The air photos and the later constructed preliminary survey map exceeded all expectations: „The mapping of the district is more exact than that any other country making claims in the Antarctic. The Expedition is proud to have contributed towards the results that Germany must be consulted regarding the sovereignty of the Antarctic continent”<sup>45</sup> – wrote the above-mentioned German press article about the success of the expedition. After the *Schwabenland* on 11 April put into the port of Cuxhaven, the German government had began the organization of the follow-up Antarctic expedition immediately – under Alfred Ritscher's lead again. The expedition in 1938/39, first of all was a reconnaissance mission; Wohlthat planned a more grandiose manoeuvre in 1939/40 with the participation of *Schwabenland*, steamboat *Kehdingen* and *Wal I* whale catcher.<sup>46</sup> In the end, because of the outbreak of the Second World War, the new mission was dropped. No need to emphasize, that the sovereignty dispute between Norway and Germany never continued before an international forum. In the year of 1940, German troops invaded Norway – but after the fall of the Third Reich, Germany had absolutely lost all of its – theoretical or informal – rights in the Antarctica again. The Norwegian annexation was secured by Germany's defeat – and Queen Maud Land formally remained under Norwegian sovereignty.<sup>47</sup>

The broad contexts of the expedition are also interesting. The *Kriegsmarine*

---

<sup>40</sup> German Antarctic Expedition. TNA CO 78/211/2. This archival source contains the official accounts of the German press reports about the expedition with British annotations. The documents were sent in May 1939 by the British Embassy at Berlin for the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at London.

<sup>41</sup> For example: Mühlig-Hoffman-Gebirge, Drygalskiberge, Wohlthatmassiv, Alexander-v.-Humboldt-Gebirge, Ritschergipfel. BRUNK (1986): 26. 33. 35. 38.

<sup>42</sup> MILLS (2003): 535.

<sup>43</sup> LÜDECKE – SUMMERHAYES (2012): 64.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 51.

<sup>45</sup> German Antarctic Expedition. TNA CO 78/211/2. A British employee appended the following comment to the last sentence: „I should imagine, that this is the chief object.” Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Richtlinien für die Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Deutschen Antarktis-Expedition. BABL R 2/18372. 2-3.

<sup>47</sup> As we mentioned above, nowadays – because of the Antarctic Treaty – it is a „frozen” territorial claim.

exactly knew, that the German whaling – because of the British naval superiority in the Atlantic Ocean – will be impossible in war times.<sup>48</sup> They ordered therefore auxiliary cruisers to the Antarctic area during the whaling seasons to destroy or capture the whaling ships of their enemies. In February 1941, auxiliary cruiser *Pinguin*, under the command of Captain Ernst-Felix Krüder, really captured the whole – and absolutely unsuspecting – Norwegian whaling fleet (two factory and one supply ships with lots of whale catchers) in the far South Atlantic region.<sup>49</sup> Because of the Schwabenland-expedition and similar military manoeuvres, before and during the war, the Royal Navy – as we mentioned above –, worried about the establishment of a secret German supply depot in the area. Moreover, for the United Kingdom, there was also the problem of the two Latin-American states, Chile and – especially – Argentina. Chile announced its claim on the area between 53–90°W – which was the part of the British Antarctic Territory – in 1940; Argentina did the same in 1942 on the territory between 25–39°W – also the portion of the British region.<sup>50</sup> These were very unfriendly, but not surprising steps in the middle of the Second World War war against Great Britain. But finally, the South American countries didn't risk their neutral status and the open confrontation, although Argentina was very close to get into a military conflict with the United Kingdom about the question of the Deception Island, located off the coasts of the Antarctic Peninsula. In 1941, the British „destroyed oil fuel installations and coal stock on Deception Island to deny their use to enemy raiders.“<sup>51</sup> Between 1942–1944, Argentinian and British ships visited the island several times: the sailors hoisted their national flags and removed their opponent's emblems – but in the end, the British replanted their banners and established there a permanent meteorological station.<sup>52</sup> On the whole, Argentina couldn't size the opportunity during the war to enhance its Antarctic claims.

The Norwegians didn't forget the incompleteness of their former discoveries. Between 1949–1952, a combined Norwegian–British–Swedish expedition operated in the area of Queen Maud Land. Besides widespread scientific research, one of the unvoiced political goal of this expedition was to revise to results of the German Antarctic Expedition 1938/39<sup>53</sup>. „The German maps were used to guide the NBSA expedition, and, later the expeditions of countries planning to set up bases in Dronning Maud Land.“<sup>54</sup> Although the German threat ceased, the British

---

<sup>48</sup> Handelskrieg zur See. Walfangfragen. BAMA RW 19/1556. 297.

<sup>49</sup> Kriegstagebuch des Hilfskreuzers „Schiff 33“ („Pinguin“). BAMA RM 100/3. 107–137.

<sup>50</sup> Stunz 2008, 18.; Headland 1989, 303. Of course, Chile and Argentina also were opponents in this question. The pretensions of the three countries partially covered each other, because the Argentinian claim later was extended to 74°W. MILLS (2003): 35.

<sup>51</sup> HEADLAND (1989): 304.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid 304-308.

<sup>53</sup> NAYLOR – DEAN – SIEGERT: *The IGY and the ice sheet: surveying Antarctica*. Journal of Historical Geography, 34/4. 2008. 574.

<sup>54</sup> SUMMERHAYES, C. – BEECHING, P.: *Hitler's Antarctic base: the myth and the reality*. Polar Record 43/1. 2007. 5.

and Norwegians exactly knew, that there are also other possible rivals. The expedition „*provided an opportunity to investigate the region before other, less-friendly wartime neutrals like Argentina or Chile, or emerging world powers like the USA or USSR, had to chance to do so.*”<sup>55</sup> The shadow of „*Neu-Schwabenland*” disappeared for Norway only after the success of the international polar expedition between 1949-1952.

---

55 NAYLOR – DEAN – SIEGERT (2008): 574.





**Leandro Pereira Gonçalves**

## ***Plínio Salgado and integralism: Franco-Luso-Italian Relations***

### **Abstract**

This paper aims to investigate the path followed by Plínio Salgado for the formation and development of Brazilian integralism. On a basis of multiple matrices the movement intended to build an original political doctrine. However, the ideas in circulation at the time influenced its leader considerably concerning the formation of his thought. In Portugal, he had the doctrinaire example of Lusitanian Integralism: a movement of extreme right wing nationalist character whose formation was visibly based on the *Action Française*, which itself was the forerunner of conservatism and like all the political groups of the early twentieth century, it established a practical response to the theory pronounced by Pope Leo XIII in 1891, through the *Rerum Novarum*. This article is based on the concept of political culture and proposes to analyse the thought of the integralist leader, while focusing on the context of the Lusitanian influence and the essentially Catholic precept that accompanied him throughout his life.

*Keywords:* Plínio Salgado, Lusitanian Integralism, Radical Conservatism, Brazil-Portugal.

The Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB) was officially established on 7 October 1932, in São Paulo, setting itself up as a political group, which had as its purpose the formation of a great national movement. From that time onwards, the movement grew intensively, and continued until the New State of Brazil, in November 1937.

Through this political movement, Plínio Salgado became well known as the leader of the group, who presented themselves as a movement which intended to awaken the nation. Integralism, with its forceful discourse and solid Christian basis, directed the anxieties and fears of the middle classes towards political action, making it an instrument of its incorporation into the political process.

The AIB may be regarded as the 'mais bem sucedido dos movimentos fascistas latino-americanos' (most successful of the fascist movements in Latin America).<sup>1</sup> It is possible to identify the existence of fascism beyond the European continent, because the movement is predominantly, but not exclusively a European phenomenon, with the AIB being the sole case of a Latin American fascist movement.<sup>2</sup>

There is no doubt that the peak moment of integralism and Plinio Salgado in Brazilian politics was the period concerning the legality of the AIB, in the fascist

---

<sup>1</sup> PINTO, António Costa: *Os Camisas Azuis: ideologia, elites e movimentos fascistas em Portugal – 1914-1945*. Editorial Estampa, Lisbon, 1994. 143.

<sup>2</sup> GRIFFIN, Roger: *The nation reborn: a new ideal type of generic fascism*. Paper apresentado no XV World Congress of the IPSA, Buenos Aires, 33-38, jul. 1991.

context that Brazil experienced in the 1930s.<sup>3</sup> Through the movement, Plínio Salgado was strengthened as an intellectual leader with ambitious intentions in the Brazilian society of the interwar period. In the study of the integralist movement and its political thought, there is an almost exclusive concentration on the period concerned, one of the reasons for which is the importance that the AIB obtained in the 1930s, especially in political relations and external influences.

In the process of further discussions idealized by the presence of Salgado, in São Paulo, in the 1920s, the AIB was founded, inspired by the thinking of this leader who emerged under the modernist (reformist) aegis. Therefore, it is understood, that *pliniano* thought had at one time, a crystallizing effect on the intellectual period of São Paulo. It was put on the agenda of the *Verde-Amarelo* group and of the later *Anta* movement

There is significant importance in the literary movement of Plínio Salgado in the politic contextualization, with the novel *O estrangeiro*<sup>4</sup> and the manifestations of the modernist group as key elements to understanding the idealization of the AIB, since its nationalist and patriotic nature, as well as its radical conservatism, was a relevant factor in the group, in a role of reinventing the latent feeling of Brazilianness.<sup>5</sup>

The '*integral Brazilianness*', proposed by Plínio Salgado for integralism, had a very clear and explicit objective of synthesizing the elements taken over in the cultural and political venues in recent years in São Paulo, with religion as a central element of discourse and action of the movement. It was at that moment, on the eve of the founding of the AIB and the period after the Art Week at the peak of the discussions and debates about the concept of nationalism, that he identified in himself 'a passagem do *poeta-construtor* para o *homem-índice*, ou, em outros termos, do *gênio literário* para o *gênio-político*' (the transition from the *poet-builder* to the *man-index*, or, in other terms, the *literary-genius* to the *political-genius*).<sup>6</sup> Such expressions were used without modesty, by the integralist leader, analyzing the need for the emergence of new public men in Brazil.

What is remarkable is the connection that is made by the author in an article written in 1931, on the eve of the founding of the AIB, by stating that the genius would emerge from a national movement. The investigation does not define him as a modernist intellectual, but as an opportunist who used the avant-garde movement as a kind of showcase to appear, in the Brazilian political scenario. He said: '*É preciso que nós, intelectuais, tomemos conta do Brasil. Definitivamente. Temos de romper com a tradição medíocre da política. (...) Estamos fartos de vivermos, nós, intelectuais, à sombra dos poderosos. Queremos mandar*' (It is

---

<sup>3</sup> DUTRA, Eliana Regina de Freitas: *O ardil totalitário: imaginário político no Brasil dos anos 30*. Belo Horizonte, UFMG, UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 1997. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Novel wrote in: SALGADO, Plínio: *O estrangeiro*. 3. ed. José Olímpio, Rio de Janeiro, 1936.

<sup>5</sup> PRADO, Antônio Arnoni: *1922 – itinerário de uma falsa vanguarda: os dissidentes, a semana e o integralismo*, Brasiliense, São Paulo, 1983. 77.

<sup>6</sup> PRADO: 99.

necessary that we intellectuals, take care of Brazil. Definitively. We have to break with the mediocre tradition of politics. We intellectuals are tired of living in the shadow of powerful people. We want to rule.)<sup>7</sup>

For this purpose, it was necessary to reach a certain intellectuality, a point which he himself made, in 1933, in the preface of the book *Psicologia da Revolução* when he wrote: '*Este livro não é um livro para o povo, mas para os que pretendem influir nos destinos do povo. Aos políticos e aos intelectuais é que me dirijo nestas páginas*' (This book is not a book for the people, but for those who wish to influence the destiny of the people. It is to politicians and intellectuals that I address these pages).<sup>8</sup> This path had already been trodden by counterparts, such as the *Action Française* and Lusitanian Integralism (IL), which initiated reflections about literature and established a transition to politics: '*O Integralismo Lusitano, à semelhança da sua congênera francesa, Action Française, passou de literário para a atuação e influência política e o seu nacionalismo de estético-literário tornou-se político*' (The Lusitanian Integralism, like its French counterpart, *Action Française*, passed from literary to political influence and action and its aesthetic-literary nationalism became political).<sup>9</sup>

By analyzing the formation of Portuguese integralism, reflections have been recovered of a precursor of the movement, António Sardinha, who used the thought of the founder of the *Action Française*, Charles Maurras, in order to elucidate this process of transition from a literary movement to politics:

Como Sardinha, lembrará mais tarde 'Charles Maurras disse um dia (...) *les lettres nous ont conduit à la politique (...) mais notre nationalisme commence pour être esthétique*. Ao pensar um pouco nas nossas origens literárias (...) eu reconheço que também a nós as Letras nos conduziram à política' (As Sardinha recalls later 'Charles Maurras said one day (...) *les lettres nous ont conduit à la politique (...) mais notre nationalisme commence pour être esthétique*. When you think a little about our literary origins (...) I also realise that the Arts led us to politics'). (Free Translation)<sup>10</sup>

There is a point of unity amongst the radical conservative movements that promoted the influence of the thought idealized by Plínio Salgado, because for this it was necessary to reach the intelligentsia to delineate a corporatist project. Only by the acceptance of the Brazilian intelligentsia could the movement legitimize their discourse. Thus, he acted as a vanguardist, the bearer of a revolutionary discourse; however, what was at stake was the possibility of formalizing his ideas on the Brazilian political scene.

---

<sup>7</sup> Correspondence from Plínio Salgado to Ribeiro Couto, 05 jul. 1933. (Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa/Arquivos Pessoais de Escritores Brasileiros – FCRB/APEB-Pop: 28177).

<sup>8</sup> SALGADO, Plínio: *Psicologia da Revolução*. 2. ed. José Olympio, Rio de Janeiro, 1935. 9.

<sup>9</sup> FERREIRA, Nuno Simão: *A I República e os integralistas: a visão de Alberto de Monsaraz*. Lusíada: história, Lisbon, n. 5-6, 237-193, 2009. 256.

<sup>10</sup> PINTO, António Costa: *A formação do integralismo lusitano (1907-17)*. Análise Social, Lisboa, n. 70, 1409-1419, 1983. 1413.

In July 1933, less than a year after the founding of the AIB, Plínio Salgado boasted of the acceptance that the movement was gaining in literate society: *‘Em S. Paulo, o movimento vai crescendo. Os intelectuais estão compreendendo o alto sentido desta campanha. A classe estudantina já se conta por muitas centenas. Os estudantes estão aproveitando as férias para fazer conferências pelo interior todo’* (In S. Paulo, the movement keeps growing. The intellectuals are realizing the elevated nature of this campaign. The student class has already reach many hundreds. The students are taking advantage of their holidays to give lectures throughout the province)<sup>11</sup>

It can be seen that he assumed an intellectual role with a dual function: to reach the intelligentsia to gain the acceptance of the movement, and the role of pamphleteer, that is an indoctrinator and manipulator of the illiterate class. He stated: *‘Este nosso movimento deve se desdobrar em dois planos: o popular, e o cultural. Enquanto um modifica o ‘sentimento’ da massa; o outro cria os líderes, os chefes, os que deverão conduzi-la, quando vencermos’* (This movement of ours must develop on two levels: the popular and the cultural. While one changes the *‘feeling’* of the masses, the other creates leaders, commanders, who should lead them, when we win)<sup>12</sup> An artifice like this, of evaluating the intellectual, was already known to the political and cultural society, since leaders of political movements set themselves up as intellectuals in society. This is what the IL did, through Hipólito Raposo, an author who, when analyzing the movement, said: *‘eles não podem imaginar o que foi o nosso drama intelectual, nem compreender o desvario das nossas caminhadas, através de erros sedutores que nos afiguravam certezas dogmáticas’* (they can not imagine what our intellectual drama was, nor understand the folly of our paths, through seductive errors that seemed dogmatic certainties).<sup>13</sup> Plínio Salgado, on the other hand, set himself up as the holder of the only truly intellectual movement, a visible quest for opportunistic acceptance in political society.

This thought was a recurring one, but ambiguities marked the organization of Salgado’s thought. In comparison with other models and political organizations, the Plinian proposal did not represent originality. It was nothing more than a theoretical mimicry, imported from the cultural center that he fought against so much, Europe.<sup>14</sup> Position taking with the aim of legitimizing originality was continuous in the movements that were called nationalist. The IL, for example, stated that it was a political organization whose intention was to reject any foreign influence.<sup>15</sup> The timing did not allow for speeches that recognised any influences, however obvious they may have been, as was apparent in the lack of originality of

<sup>11</sup> Correspondence from Plínio Salgado to Ribeiro Couto, 05 jul. 1933 (FCRB/APEB-Pop: 28177).

<sup>12</sup> Correspondence from Plínio Salgado to Ribeiro Couto, 05 jul. 1933 (FCRB/APEB-Pop: 28177).

<sup>13</sup> RAPOSO, Hipólito. *Dois Nacionalismos: L’Action Française e o Integralismo Lusitano*. Lisboa: Fereí Torres, 1929. p. 33.

<sup>14</sup> VASCONCELLOS, Gilberto Felisberto. *Ideologia curupira: análise do discurso integralista*. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1979. p. 47.

<sup>15</sup> PINTO (1983): 1418.

the Brazilian integralist movement as well as the Lusitanian one. When we analyse the economic perspective of the IL, it can be stated that:

Ora foi orientação global do IL afirmar que as premissas especulativas da economia podem ser infletidas em duas direções muito diferentes: 'economia nacionalista cristã' ou 'economia materialista'. Na primeira, o maior grau possível de liberdade de aquisição de bens é atingível pela integração nacional dos fins ditados pela lei natural. Na segunda, o princípio hedonista deixa de ser meramente funcional para se tornar princípio originador de uma sociedade de tipo liberal ou de tipo soviético. A contraposição destas duas economias estava de há muito feita por Le Play, por exemplo, ou na Doutrina Social da Igreja, pelo que *os integralistas não foram nem pretenderam ser originais* (It was the overall orientation of the IL to state that the speculative assumptions of economics can be inflected in two very different directions: 'Christian nationalist economy' or 'materialist economy'. In the former, the greatest possible degree of freedom of the acquisition of goods is attainable by the national integration of the ends dictated by natural law. In the second the hedonistic principle ceases to be merely functional to become the originating principle of a society of the liberal type or the Soviet type. The contraposition of these two economies had been made long before by Le Play, for example, or in the Social Doctrine of the Church, from which it can be seen that *the fundamentalists were not original nor did they aspire to be*).<sup>16</sup> (Free Translation).

Besides there being no originality, the radical conservative movements cited did not show anything modern, in the specific case of Plínio Salgado, except the fragmented form full of intertextuality which can be characterized as a modernist project because the content and related aspects in the political process of the author were nothing more than concepts theorized in the nineteenth century and an idea contextualized in the anti-materialism environment, which was the image of that period with the release of *Rerum Novarum*.<sup>17</sup> With a discourse based on a set of Christian truths, the encyclical was created with the intention of attaining a society in transformation.

By means of the papal encyclical of Leo XIII, radical movements of a conservative nature began to organize themselves and appear worldwide in response to the doctrine. That is, there occurred a form of application of the social theory of the church, and the AIB had as one of its major theoretical foundations this need observed in the Christian community, of the applicability of such dogmas in the twentieth century. '*Uma das influências mais fortes que o integralismo recebeu adveio, claramente, da concepção cristã do mundo*' (One of the strongest

---

<sup>16</sup> HENRIQUES, Mendo Castro: *Perspectivas Ético-Económicas no Integralismo Lusitano*. IN: CARDOSO, José Luís (Org.): *Contribuições para a história do pensamento económico em Portugal: comunicações apresentadas no Seminário sobre História do Pensamento Económico em Portugal organizado em outubro de 1987 pelo Centro de Investigação sobre Economia Portuguesa (CISEP) do Instituto Superior de Economia*. D. Quixote, Lisboa. 1988. 153 (grifo nosso).

<sup>17</sup> CARTA ENCÍCLICA *RERUM NOVARUM*. (1891). Disponível em: [http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/leo\\_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf\\_l-xiii\\_enc\\_15051891\\_rerum-novarum\\_po.html](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_po.html). Acesso em 18 jun. 2011.

influences that integralism received clearly came from the Christian conception of the world).<sup>18</sup> Similar elements occurred in several localities in the western world, especially the already mentioned IL and its focus on inspirational Maurrasianism, the *Action Française*.

The thought of Plínio Salgado was born from the influence of IL, which is derived from Maurrasianism, of the Social Doctrine of the Church, as well as some aspects of the doctrine and practice of Italian Fascism, from which regime it adopted the model of the one-party and state corporatism. Within these conceptions, allied to nationalist-Christian auto-didacticism, as well as the influence of the family and the need for a vanguard discourse, the AIB was born. In 1891, Pope Leo XIII started a struggle against what was called exploitation of the workers, but at the same time, an opposition to class struggle and Marxism.<sup>19</sup> He started to see and defend religion as an element of reform and social justice, while for Marx, such changes could occur only through revolution. There was an appeal in Catholic thought to the Christian spirit in order that employers would respect the workers. Thus the church reached different social segments whose main purpose was undoubtedly to keep materialistic thoughts away from power, thereby preventing any kind of opposition to Western Christian domination.

A significant part of the Marxist opposition was based around a conservative Christian thought of an anti-materialistic character, the central tenet of the propagation idealized in 1891 by Leo XIII and his encyclical, the *Rerum Novarum*.

The Brazilian integralist leader, loyal to the Catholic Christian dogma, did not remain passive with regard to the words coming from the Vatican. In this context, Plinian thought with regard to Brazilian politics was established, since elements to combat communism and liberalism were central conceptions in the words of Leo XIII whose purpose was to '*proclamar o cristianismo como a única forma de se criar uma justiça social, por meio de um apelo às consciências individuais, concitando-os, sem distinção de classe e de credo, ao mesmo espírito social caridoso*' (proclaim Christianity as the only way to create social justice through an appeal to individual consciences, inciting them without distinction of class and

---

<sup>18</sup> RAGO FILHO, Antônio: *A Crítica Romântica à Miséria Brasileira: O Integralismo de Gustavo Barroso*. 1989. 436f. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) – Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, São Paulo, 1989. 157.

<sup>19</sup> But earlier, Pope Pius IX had established intense struggles against the liberalism and communism that was emerging in the mid-nineteenth century. The Pope defined the ideas of freedom coming from the bourgeois philosophers as the main form of destruction of Christian spiritual order. Pius IX began a campaign against what he called false liberalism and in the encyclical *Quanta Cura* of 1864, condemned sixteen propositions that contradicted the Catholic vision at the time. This encyclical was accompanied by *Syllabus errorum* that condemned conceptions like rationalism, socialism, communism, Freemasonry and Judaism. Regarding the Christian struggle he states: '*There remains alternative to salvation in this world, nor to the Church itself, except "the conversion of sinners, the diffusion of the Catholic faith, the sanctity of the clergy, the good example of all believers," in short, the salvation of individual souls faced with the corrupting liberalism, that destroyed the only possible unity, the unity of the Faith. It should be noted as well, that one of the "essential and eternal truths" that embraces integralism, resides in consideration of social inequality among men as a natural and immutable condition.*' RAGO FILHO: 177.

belief, to the same charitable social spirit).<sup>20</sup>

The IL was structured under the same Catholic influence.<sup>21</sup> We highlight the categorical relationship between the message of the pope and the political characterization defended by the Portuguese movement: *'Este modelo era totalmente decalcado do corporativismo ou do sindicalismo de inspiração católica no conjunto de medidas que formavam a doutrina social da Igreja, como demonstrada a encíclica Rerum Novarum (1891) do Papa Leão XIII'* (This model was totally plagiarized from corporatism or from syndicalism of Catholic inspiration in the set of measures that formed the Church's social doctrine, as demonstrated by the encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) of Pope Leo XIII.).<sup>22</sup> When we analyse the political components that exist in the work of Alberto Monsaraz, one of the leaders of the Portuguese movement, we see that:

Inspirou-se amplamente no pensamento da doutrina social da Igreja, preconizada pelo Papa Leão XIII na sua encíclica *Rerum Novarum* de 1891. A doutrina social da Igreja afigurava-se ao entendimento integralista como um caminho orientador da sociedade para a realização da felicidade, através da explicitação da lei natural, que era o fundamento das relações sociais (He was amply inspired by the thought of the Church's social doctrine, preached by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of 1891. The social doctrine of the Church appeared to the integralist understanding of a guiding path for society to the realization of happiness, through the explanation of natural law, which was the foundation of social relations). (Free Translation)<sup>23</sup>

The discourse practiced by the Church around a guiding path for society at the time of creation of the social doctrines used an apolitical basis, placing in God the answer to such creations

In 1891, Pope Leo XIII fiercely rejected any solution that was proposed concerning the socialist or liberal segments. For him, the condition of misery in which the workers lived, was an element of debate and discussion, the combat against these two conditions being essential to the progress of a Christian social indoctrination of the believers because: *'sendo a doutrina social da Igreja um corpo de princípios hauridos, em última instância, nas Sagradas Escrituras, só poderá ser vinculativa para aqueles que acreditem nas mesmas escrituras'* (since the social doctrine of the Church is a body of principles drawn, ultimately, from the Holy Scriptures, it can only be binding for those who believe in those scriptures).<sup>24</sup>

Based on this discourse, several extreme conservative movements created their

---

<sup>20</sup> RAGO FILHO: 180.

<sup>21</sup> HENRIQUES: 153.

<sup>22</sup> FERREIRA, Nuno Simão: *Alberto de Monsaraz e a vaga dos nacionalismos e dos radicalismos político-autoritários europeus do pós-I Guerra mundial: um rumo até o fascismo?* Lusíada: história, Lisbon, n. 4, 267-337, 2007. 283.

<sup>23</sup> FERREIRA (2009): 256.

<sup>24</sup> SILVA, Augusto da: *Continuidade e inovação na doutrina social da Igreja*. *Análise Social*, n. 123-124, 775-786, 1993. 781.

organizational conceptions. Beyond the above-mentioned IL, we can see in the words of Plínio Salgado ideas derived from the social doctrine of the church. In the Manifesto of October 1932, which is the official document of the creation of the AIB, he said: '*A questão social deve ser resolvida pela cooperação de todos, conforme a justiça e o desejo que cada um nutre de progredir e melhorar*' (The social issue must be solved by the cooperation of all, in accordance with justice and the desire that each one nurtures to progress and improve).<sup>25</sup> In short, religious doctrine, with the gist of the social question, took on a crucial role in the exercise of its passage from literary creation to political action; arguing repeatedly that integralism is: '*afirmação de espiritualismo*' (an assertion of spiritualism).<sup>26</sup>

To understand the origin of Brazilian integralism, especially the political thought of Plínio Salgado, it is necessary to resort to, in addition to the social doctrine of the church, the origin of the European counterpart, the IL. The inspirational basis of the Portuguese group is in the movement idealized by Charles Maurras, *Action Française*.<sup>27</sup>

In this regard, to understand the Plinian thought it is necessary to analyze the French organization, which like the IL '*simultaneamente nacionalista e estrangeirado (...) recolheu, em síntese, a tradição antiliberal e católica portuguesa e o pensamento contrarrevolucionário, com uma forte matriz francesa, maurrasiana e positivista*' (simultaneously nationalist and foreign (...) collected in general essence, the Portuguese Catholic and anti-liberal tradition counter revolutionary thought, with a strong French, maurrasianism and positivist matrix).<sup>28</sup>

Maurrasianism is defined as the original discourse of authoritarian thought. It was in the *Action Française* that the revolutionary doctrines, around a nationalist thought of a conservative nature, sought elements of inspiration in various political movements of the twentieth century. In analyzing the origins and existence of fascist movements in Europe,<sup>29</sup> studies<sup>30</sup> establish fundamentals for the understanding of fascism in the French movement.

When making the connection between the *Rerum Novarum* and *Action Française*, in the context of the thought of Plínio Salgado, this study does not aim

---

<sup>25</sup> SALGADO, Plínio: *Manifesto de outubro de 1932*. Secretaria Nacional de Propaganda, Rio de Janeiro? 1932.

<sup>26</sup> SALGADO, Plínio: *Mensagem na semana heroica*. IN: \_\_\_\_\_. *Cartas aos camisas verdes*. José Olympio, Rio de Janeiro, 1935. 131.

<sup>27</sup> LLOYD-JONES, Stewart: *Integralismo Lusitano: "made in France"?* Penélope: Revista de História e Ciências Sociais, Lisbon, n. 28, 93-104, 2003.

<sup>28</sup> FERREIRA (2009): 256.

<sup>29</sup> The Head of Militias of AIB, Gustavo Barroso, developed in 1936, in the second part of the work *Integralismo e o mundo* a list of movements that were understood by him as fascist. In the item: The Fascism in France points to the *Action Française* and Fascism in Portugal, to Monarchist Integralism and National Syndicalist Movement. BARROSO, Gustavo: *Integralismo e o mundo*. Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, 1936.

<sup>30</sup> NOLTE, Ernst: *Three faces of fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York; Chicago; San Francisco? 1966.



to assert that the social doctrine of the church and the French movement have any relationship; on the contrary, the policy of Leo XIII saw the monarchical thinking of Charles Maurras as an opponent in several senses. Despite being a conservative and paternalist conception, the social doctrine of the church was a formula that did not please the *Action Française*. In other words, there is an oppositionist component between the two in some periods, so that the Church assumed a role of condemnation of the French movement, even though it had a strong Catholic base in its program: '*Basking in the glory of its Catholic credentials, the Action Française was totally unprepared for the deluge that overwhelmed it less than a year after it had reached the zenith of its ecclesiastical prestige*'.<sup>31</sup>

One can define him as an intellectual who studied and sought inspiration in both Maurras and the encyclicals of Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, in particular, to compose his thoughts. After all, it is not a new discourse, but it was necessary for it to emerge for the Brazilian intelligentsia as original and vanguard, hence its ambitious entrance into the modernist movement of the 1920s, which raised the status and name of the author from a simple provincial paulista to a respected intellectual in the literary and Christian nationalist political circles of São Paulo.

The necessity of understanding maurrasian thinking within the practice of the *Action Française* has a necessary meaning, since the understanding of the fascist (and/or extreme conservative) discourses existing in the twentieth century has its origins in French thought. The proposal is to analyze this Franco-Lusitanian relationship in its theoretical aspect and the Italian practice as elements of representation of a Brazilian discourse based on Plinian thinking. The relation between French movement and the fascist conceptual elements can be observed in analysis, which establishes proximity with the French movement:

The relationship between the *Action Française* and fascism must not be regarded as one of cause and effect. Direct influences do exist, but by the same token even Italian nationalism – which of all the elements of fascism had the most contact with the *Action Française* – is not to be genetically deduced from it. On the other hand, they are certainly not merely parallel phenomena. If it is true that the practice of a small political group hardly bears comparison with that of a victorious mass movement in the twenty years of its unrestricted rule, it is also true that the precise, self-contained doctrine of the *Action Française*, and the often wavering, continually evolving doctrine of Italian fascism, do not move on the same plane.<sup>32</sup>

There is no intention to identify evolutionist elements; it is merely impossible to make any kind of comparison between a movement of the late nineteenth century and a group of force and mass of the twentieth century. However, it is impossible not to observe the existence of elements of influence between one and

---

<sup>31</sup> ARNAL, Oscar L: *Ambivalent Alliance: the Catholic Church and the Action Française 1899-1939*. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1985. 123.

<sup>32</sup> NOLTE: 145.

the other: *'The doctrine of the Action Française as against that of fascism should rather be looked upon as attracting, but not originating from (...) Hence the Action Française is to fascism – however much both are simultaneously practice and theory'*.<sup>33</sup> Through this parallelism Plinian thinking will be analyzed, which in the 1930s, reached its greatest expression, creating the political and theoretical age.

Nevertheless the fixing of doctrine was recurrent and was part of Portuguese politics and society: *'apesar da consciência dos males engendrados pela Action Française entre os jovens católicos'* (despite awareness of the evils engendered by the *Action Française* among young Catholics),<sup>34</sup> the doctrinal and political continuity was maintained and even transported to Brazil because the relationship between the Brazilian and Lusitanian intelligentsia was easy to identify, even after the condemnation of the movement by the Catholic Church, Maurras was: *'acusado de colocar a política acima da religião'* (accused of putting politics above religion).<sup>35</sup>

The prohibition coming from the Vatican was unable to prevent the dissemination of the ideals in Brazil: *'Católicos brasileiros, já familiarizados com a Action Française e que buscavam nela inspiração, mantiveram-se identificados com o Integralismo Lusitano'* (Brazilian Catholics, already familiar with the *Action Française* and who sought in it inspiration, continued to identify with Lusitanian Integralism).<sup>36</sup> One of the great references for Plínio Salgado, was Jackson de Figueiredo<sup>37</sup> and the practices of the Centro Dom Vital.<sup>38</sup>

As regards the spread of the French conservative movement, it can be seen that: *'L'influence de la doctrine de l'Action française se faisait plus fortement sentir dans les pays latins'* (the influence of the doctrine of the *Action Française* was felt more strongly in Latin countries),<sup>39</sup> even reaching Latin American countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Brazil.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>33</sup> NOLTE: 145.

<sup>34</sup> MOURA, Maria Lúcia de Brito: *A condenação da Action Française por Pio XI repercussões em Portugal*. Revista de História das Ideias, Lisbon, v. 29, 545-585, 2008. 585.

<sup>35</sup> MALATIAN, Teresa: *Império e missão: um novo monarquismo brasileiro*. Nacional, São Paulo, 2001. 85.

<sup>36</sup> MALATIAN: 85.

<sup>37</sup> Lawyer, professor, journalist, philosopher and politician (1891-1928) who converted to Catholicism and developed a large Catholic movement in Brazil to combat liberalism and communism. The organization established as Centro Dom Vital has fundamental importance for the understanding of the integralist movement in Brazil.

<sup>38</sup> Centro Dom Vital was established by Jackson de Figueiredo in 1922, with the assistance of D. Leme. The definition of their role is directly linked to Brazilian social conjuncture. (...) A spirit of excitement and renovation emerged in the postwar period. Political institutions were beginning to come into crisis. (...) O Centro Dom Vital was organized in order to catechize the laws, fighting for peace (...) finally, to contribute to the episcopate in the work of re-catechization of the intelligentsia. DIAS, Romualdo: *Imagens de ordem: a doutrina católica sobre a autoridade no Brasil*. Unesp, São Paulo, 1996. 89-90.

<sup>39</sup> COMPAGNON, Olivier: *Etude comparée des cas argentin et brésilien*. IN: DARD, Olivier - GRUNEWALD, Michel (Dir.): *Charles Maurras et l'étranger l'étranger et Charles Maurras: L'Action française – culture, politique, société* II. Peter Lang, Berne, 2009. 283.

<sup>40</sup> The Integralists Lusitanian defended an operationalization of a common zone of Latin and Latinity, 'composed of nations and Westerners France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal' promoting later a

In the post-war context, maurrasism became a privileged discourse in the Brazilian Catholic intellectual groups,<sup>41</sup> reflecting also in the Centro Dom Vital, in Rio de Janeiro. The Institute was created in 1922 by the initiative of Jackson de Figueiredo<sup>42</sup> who saw in the reaffirmation of Catholicism in Brazil a spiritual necessity, after the changes of the late nineteenth century.<sup>43</sup>

In the person of Jackson de Figueiredo there is an element of greater emphasis on this understanding, particularly through the existing relations with the IL and theories of the *Action Française*. One sees a theoretical relationship of Salgado with Figueiredo in the sense of the defence of extreme nationalism of a conservative nature. He found in IL a deepening element of the maurrasians ideals. In some interpretations, one does not see a simple relationship, but a doctrinal and political action. In 1947, the integralist councillor, Jayme Ferreira da Silva, in a speech in the District Chamber in Rio de Janeiro, about Jackson de Figueiredo, said: '*considerado com razão, como precursor do Integralismo, citando que foi Jackson, quem trouxe ao conhecimento dos brasileiros a obra de António Sardinha*' (correctly considered as the precursor of Integralism, citing that it was Jackson who brought to the knowledge of Brazilians the work of António Sardinha).<sup>44</sup> One sees that even members of the Brazilian movement accept the relationship between the groups.

Around the relationship of maurrasianism with Latin America, we can see questioning when we analyze the thought of the Brazilian integralist leader: '*Néanmoins, on ne peut qu'être frappé par l'absence de toute référence à l'Action française dans des ouvrages aussi fondamentaux que O que é integralismo de Salgado*' (However, it is surprising that there is a total absence of reference to the *Action Française* in fundamental works like *O que é integralismo* by Salgado).<sup>45</sup> The pursuit of originality<sup>46</sup> would never allow him to surrender before a doctrinal force,

---

junction with Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. FERREIRA (2007): 295.

<sup>41</sup> COMPAGNON: 287.

<sup>42</sup> COMPAGNON: 287.

<sup>43</sup> COMPAGNON: 287-288.

<sup>44</sup> SILVA, Jayme Ferreira: *A verdade sobre o integralismo: discurso pronunciado na Câmara do Distrito Federal na Sessão de 9 de julho de 1947*. Imprensa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro, 1947. 7.

<sup>45</sup> COMPAGNON: 295.

<sup>46</sup> Aiming to demonstrate the relation of the fascist optic, Gustavo Barroso, in 1936, in the work *Integralismo e o mundo*, promoted the translation of some journalistic articles about the integralism in periodicals in the U.S.: '*Na importante revista hispano-americana que se publica em Nova Iorque, La Nueva Democracia, no seu número de fevereiro de 1935, o professor Richard Pattee, reitor da Universidade de Porto Rico, publicou o seguinte artigo (...) o movimento integralista é um (...) fascismo adaptado à realidade brasileira, transplantado e modificado no solo americano, proclamando com outro nome, porém no fundo pretendendo-se às doutrinas conhecidas do Velho Mundo. (...) O mesmo crítico estampou a seguinte nota no número de abril de 1935, na revista Books Abroad, órgão oficial da Universidade de Oklahoma, nos Estados Unidos (...) que o integralismo é um fascismo apropriado à realidade brasileira*' (In the important Hispanic-American magazine that is published in New York, *La Nueva Democracia*, in its last edition February 1935, Professor Richard Pattee, dean of the Universidade de Porto Rico, published the following article (...) the integralist movement is a (...) fascism adapted to the Brazilian reality, modified and transplanted on American soil, proclaiming with another name, but

especialmente a European one: 'A constatação de um desequilíbrio entre o país legal e o país real, como diria Charles Maurras, incita o autor, ainda de uma maneira fragmentária, à crítica da utopia democrática' (The confirmation of an imbalance between the *legal country* and the *real country*, as Charles Maurras would say, incites the author, even in a fragmentary way, to criticise the *democratic utopia*).<sup>47</sup> The matter of the impossibility of democratic application is only one example of the many perspectives that exist in *Action Française* and which had in the IL, its foundations and the function of a carrier to Latin America by the AIB.

It is noted that 'Maurras; no entanto, sendo, como para muitos outros integralistas portugueses, o ponto de partida da sua formação política e intelectual; seria ultrapassado nos anos 20 por outras influências mais duradouras' (Maurras, however, being, as for many other Portuguese Integralists, the starting point of his political and intellectual formation; would be replaced in the 20s by other more enduring influences).<sup>48</sup> That is, the fascist force was evident and demonstrated a much more viable and profitable relationship for the success of the AIB, like part of the IL, who joined the fascist adventure through the Movimento Nacional-Sindicalismo (National Trade Union Movement). Also in 1922, Rolão Preto, the greatest Portuguese enthusiast, said: 'as notícias que nos vêm da Itália como as que nos chegam de França são as mais consoladoras e cheias de promessas' (the news that comes from Italy like the news that comes from France is most comforting and full of promise).<sup>49</sup>

Paths of similarity and proximity demonstrate at all levels an intense relationship of one group with the other. Maurrasianism was the root of Plinian thought, as well as several other conservative elements of an extreme nature. However, within this theoretical perspective, Plínio Salgado saw a better practical foundation in the Italian Fascist movement.

It is understood that the seduction of Plínio Salgado by the fascism of Mussolini exceeded the relationship with the Portuguese movement, but since the origin of both is from the fascist elements of the *Action Française*,<sup>50</sup> it is not possible to divide the analytic process, because the doctrinal development of Salgado lies within several points of external relationships. But, as the contact between forms of integralism was in the realm of ideas, it was decided to start by verifying the practical field, which was the Italian movement, so that later we could

---

in its core intending to be known to the doctrines of the Old World. (...) The same critic added the following note in the April edition of 1935, in the magazine *Books Abroad*, the official organ of the University of Oklahoma in the United States (...) that integralism is a fascism appropriate to the Brazilian reality). BARROSO: 230-233.

<sup>47</sup> TRINDADE, Héglio: *Integralismo: o fascismo brasileiro da década de 30*. 2. ed. Difel/UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 1979. 51. (italics added).

<sup>48</sup> PINTO (1994): 38.

<sup>49</sup> PRETO, Rolão: *A Monarquia Social. Nação Portuguesa: revista de cultura nacionalista*. Lisboa, n. 6, 2ª série, 1922. 276. (Arquivo de História Social do Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa – AHS/ICS-UL).

<sup>50</sup> NOLTE: op. cit.

confront the Lusitanian movements and the Brazilian movements in a comparative perspective with the political and doctrinal course of Plínio Salgado.

In 1930, Plinio Salgado made a trip to Italy and emphasized that it was a transforming milestone in his thinking in order to create a truly practical conception of the reactionary and nationalist discourse in Brazil. With 'expectations' and passionate praise of fascism, he returned to Brazil. '*A doutrina fascista estabelece o Estado, como o espelho perfeito do homem, como a própria ampliação do indivíduo*' (The fascist doctrine establishes the state as the perfect mirror of man, as the extension of the individual),<sup>51</sup> he said. The intention of this essay is not to enter into the discussion that has been carried on for decades, whether integralism is fascist or not, but to analyze the matrices of the discourse of Plínio Salgado who is visibly partisan to the fascist doctrine prevailing in the nineteenth century in France. The religious and political association with the image of a nationalist conception in Brazil was the central element for the formation of integralism under the aegis of the genesis of the *Action Française* and, which has in Italian Fascism its main practical example.

It was on June 14, 1930, on a Saturday, at 18.00, when he managed to get an audience with the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini. This meeting, for many years, was seen as a full living proof of the relationship between Salgado and the Italian leader. After recent research,<sup>52</sup> it was discovered that the meeting was nothing more than a brief 15-minute meeting,<sup>53</sup> that is, it was something formal without any kind of mysteries. However, the important thing is that, from that moment, he appeared himself enchanted by the practice of anti-communist and anti-liberal elements, as Leo XIII preached, and radical, with a conservative nature, as Charles Maurras idealized. Based on a spiritual organization of a conservative and nationalist nature, the indoctrination that he was setting up in Brazil was being consolidated: the AIB.

In 1932, he wrote an article for the *Revista Hierarchia*. This article was republished as a leaflet in the same year, by the Sociedade Editora Latina, an emanation of the Italian consulate in São Paulo, directed by Professor Ferruccio Rubbiani, who was one of the cultural advisors to the Italian consulate. This document curiously was not included in the official list of bibliographic references of the author, nor was it inserted in the *Obras Completas*, launched in the 1950s. The reason is clear. Plínio Salgado developed in this material, open and explicit praise of the fascist regime and this image was the one that he wished to exclude after the Second World War. In addition, praise inserted in an article published in the newspaper *O Paiz*, about 1 month after the meeting with the Italian fascist leader, does not appear in any editorial publication of the author. In the *Carioca* periodical he praised Italian fascism, and openly reported the need for a similar movement in Brazil, a wish that was intensified after the meeting.

---

<sup>51</sup> SALGADO: *Como eu vi a Itália*. Hierarchia. mar; abr. 1932. 204. 202-205.

<sup>52</sup> The research was conducted by historian João Fábio Bertonha (UEM/Brazil).

<sup>53</sup> Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Segreteria Particolare del Duce, Carteggio Ordinario, Udienze, b. 3102, f. giugno/1930.

One sees the admiration that Plínio Salgado had for Mussolini. In the article, the Brazilian integralist leader made his desire in Brazil explicit: to create a fascist movement, like the Italian one: *‘Nós éramos o Brasil-Novo que ia falar à Itália ressuscitada no esplendor de uma juventude de primavera. A doutrina corrente entre os moços da nossa Pátria coincidia, nas suas linhas gerais, com os largos lineamentos da ideia fascista’* (We were the New-Brazil, who were going to talk to the resuscitated Italy in the splendor of a youth of spring. The current doctrine among the youths of our country coincided, in general terms, with the broad guidelines of the fascist idea).<sup>54</sup>

In a later article in *Revista Hierarchia*, the author raised Italy to a level of superiority: *‘A Itália que eu vi merece todo o amor do Homem deste século de ameaças’* (The Italy that I saw deserves all the love of Mankind in this century of threats).<sup>55</sup> He placed Mussolini in a position of privilege for having put fascism into practice and he reports that the “meeting” – of 15 minutes - was a unique moment in his life, because he had contact with profound wisdom.

The need to create something solid in Brazil incited him to look to Italy. It is understandable that the author ennobles the Italian fascist regime, but at the same time that he saw fascism as a reference to be followed, he showed the need for a movement based on originality, which represented his ambiguity.

With this view, the author started the practicality of nationalist thought, and around such thoughts, sought the birth of a new and necessary political culture since the emergence of new concepts correspond: *‘às respostas dadas a uma sociedade face aos grandes problemas e às grandes crises da sua história, respostas com fundamento bastante para que se inscrevam na duração e atravessem as gerações’* (to the answers given to a society facing the great problems and major crises in its history, responses with sufficient basis to last through time and over generations).<sup>56</sup>

In late February 1932, the SEP was founded;<sup>57</sup> an entity that was a result of the political work conducted by the newspaper *A Razão*. Its creation had the objective of organizing a group who could discuss the organization of a new political movement based on the principle of a strong conservative and revolutionary nationalism, thus following the proposal of Mussolini. This foundation was the result of several other movements that existed in Brazil in previous years, groups that can be termed pre-fundamentalists. Among these movements we highlight the Ação Imperial Patrionovista Brasileira (AIPB), a neo-monarchist Catholic organization, founded to restore the monarchy in Brazil, following the same

<sup>54</sup> SALGADO, Plínio: *Mussolini e o Brasil Novo*. O Paiz, Rio de Janeiro, 27 jul. 1930.

<sup>55</sup> SALGADO: *Manifesto...*, 205.

<sup>56</sup> BERSTEIN, Serge: *A cultura política*. IN: RIOUX, Jean-Pierre - SIRINELLI, Jean-François. (Dir.): *Para uma história cultural*. Estampa, Lisbon, 1998. 355.

<sup>57</sup> The first meeting for the formation of the Sociedade de Estudos takes place on 24 February 1932, by initiative of Salgado in São Paulo, in the newsroom of *A Razão*. In this meeting a group of young intellectualstook part: Cândido Mota Filho, Ataliba Nogueira, Mário Graciotti, João Leães Sobrinho, Fernando Callage and several students from the School of Law. TRINDADE: 116.

medieval characteristics based on a Royal Catholic structure, and with this movement, Plínio Salgado started to form more clearly the ideas that would become part of the structuring of the AIB.

The AIPB has a fundamental importance in the development of the political structure around the integralist movement in Brazil, because it was through the Brazilian monarchist incentive that the ideals based on the Catholic and monarchist discourse of the IL arrived in the country. The cultural reflection of the Portuguese movement appeared '*inicialmente em movimentos de cariz monárquico como a Ação Imperial Patrionovista Brasileira, criada em 1928*' (initially in movements with a monarchical aspect, such as the Ação Imperial Patrionovista Brasileira, created in 1928).<sup>58</sup>

Besides the characterization he made of the AIB as a Brazilian fascist movement, Gustavo Barroso, when analyzing the *patrionovismo* program, in the work *Integralismo e o mundo*, explained: '*O Patrionovismo é monarquista, porque é integralista*' (*Patrionovismo* is monarchist, because it is integralist).<sup>59</sup> The relation of proximity between the two political processes<sup>60</sup> is evident, '*o brasileiro, posterior ao português, foi expressamente influenciado por este*' (the Brazilian one, which came after the Portuguese one, was explicitly influenced by the latter).<sup>61</sup> However this research does not assert that the Brazilian integralist movement has a monarchical defence, like its Lusitanian counterpart, though, in the 1920s, it maintained good relations with the monarchical regime. Unlike many, the integralist leader did not develop great discourses against the monarchy, despite being a fierce critic of the monarchical model that existed in Brazil until 1889.

The investigation does not affirm that the Brazilian integralist movement included the defence of the monarchy, like its Lusitanian counterpart, although in the 1920s Plínio Salgado enjoyed good relations with the monarchic regime. The relation between the Lusitanian Integralists and the AIPB was a high intensity one, including the promotion of cultural and ideological exchanges between the groups. In the journal *Integralismo Lusitano: estudos portugueses*, which was directed by Luís de Almeida Braga and Hipólito Raposo, there were messages of support in the struggle of Brazilian neo-monarchists in order to defend the doctrine idealized inside the IL:

---

<sup>58</sup> PINTO (1994): 144.

<sup>59</sup> BARROSO: 43.

<sup>60</sup> Besides a theoretical relationship, Plínio Salgado proved to be an admirer of the Lusitanian movement, because besides having multiple contacts with members of the Portuguese counterpart, several clippings and materials of the Integralists were located in the Fundo Plínio Salgado in Arquivo Público e Histórico de Rio Claro, among them poems by António Sardinha and texts by Alberto de Monsaraz. Cf. SARDINHA, António: *Poema do cavalo*. Acção, Lisbon, abr. 1945. (Arquivo Público e Histórico de Rio Claro/Fundo Plínio Salgado – APHRC/FPS-107.002); MONSARAZ, Alberto: (pseudonym: Évora Macedo). A Monarquia Futura I, II, III e IV. *O Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, Lisbon, 14, 15, 16, 21 maio. 1947. MONSARAZ, Alberto: (pseudonym: Évora Macedo). Atlântico e Liberdade. *O Jornal do Comércio e das Colónias*, Lisbon, 26 maio. 1947 (APHRC/FPS-109.004).

<sup>61</sup> MACEDO, Ubiratan Borges de: *O integralismo em Portugal e no Brasil*. Convivium, São Paulo, V. 28, 323-340, 1983. 323.

*Patrionovismo*: com esta designação iniciou-se há poucos anos no Brasil um movimento de ideias político-sociais, destinado a instaurar nos costumes a ordem cristã e latina e a reconduzir a Pátria-Irmã ao caminho perdido da sua Grandeza pela restauração do Império, na pessoa do príncipe Dom Pedro Henrique de Orleans e Bragança. Movimento da mocidade já doutrinada nos princípios antiliberais e antidemocráticos, norteia-o a certeza de que é essencial à conservação da unidade do Brasil a existência de um poder político, forte, contínuo e seguramente nacional nas suas intenções, que não possa ser escravo do partido da maioria, por ficar sobranceiro a todas as facções. Alheios à política do Brasil, como devemos ser, nada nos impede de saudar a grande esperança que a sua juventude põe nos mesmos princípios de salvação pública por que há vinte anos vimos lutando, em obediência à lei do sacrifício pelo bem-comum. Aos rapazes patrionovistas, os integralistas da grande e querida Nação-Irmã, enviamos os mais afetuosos votos e a melhor lembrança de apreço aos órgãos dos seus centros (...) agradecendo a todos as palavras com que acolheram o *Integralismo Lusitano* (*Patrionovismo*: a few years ago in Brazil, a movement of political and social ideas with this designation was initiated aimed at establishing in the customs the Latin and Christian order and redirecting the Sister-Homeland to the lost path of its Greatness, by the restoration of the Empire, in the person of Prince Dom Pedro Henrique de Orleans e Bragança. It is a youth movement which is already indoctrinated in anti liberal and anti democratic principles and it is guided by the certainty that it is essential to the preservation of the unity of Brazil, to have a political power, which is strong, solid and assuredly national in its intentions, which can not be a slave to the party of the majority because it dominates all factions. Extraneous to the politics of Brazil, as we should be, nothing prevents us from hailing the great hope that its youth sets up the same principles of public salvation that for twenty years we have been fighting for in obedience to the law of sacrifice for communal well being. To the *Patrionovistas* boys, the Integralists of the great and beloved Sister-Nation, we send the most affectionate wishes, and a special reminder of appreciation to the organs of their centers (...) thanking all of them for the words with which they embraced Lusitanian Integralism). (Free Translation)<sup>62</sup>

Brazilian Integralism owes its republican option to Miguel Reale.<sup>63</sup> Within the AIB there were several disagreements over the political segment, especially among Plínio Salgado, Gustavo Barroso and Miguel Reale. The last of these occupied the head of the Departamento Nacional de Doutrina and, in turn the control of various political mechanisms, disseminated in the movement. Unlike Plínio Salgado, Reale did not approve of monarchist movements: *‘O republicanismo e um certo preconceito antifrancês explica sua atitude com relação à Ação Francesa e ao Integralismo, ambos monarquistas’* (Republicanism and a certain anti-French prejudice explain his attitude toward the French Action and Integralism, both monarchist).<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup> RES ET VERBA. BRAGA, Luís de Almeida; RAPOSO, Hipólito (dir.): *Integralismo Lusitano*: estudos portugueses. Tip. Inglesa, Lisboa, 1932-1934, 250-251. (AHS/ICS-UL).

<sup>63</sup> TRINDADE: 251.

<sup>64</sup> TRINDADE: 251



From this view, it is far easier to grasp the fact that the goal of the Lusitanian Integralists was not merely to promote the national restoration of the monarchical period but rather, to create an element that would justify the need to regain the Portugal of the so-called „golden times” in the process described as medieval. António Sardinha said: *‘é de uso corrente reputar-se à Idade Média como um eclipse duradouro da inteligência humana, só ressuscitada do seu sono longuíssimo pelos clarões vitoriosos da Renascença. A calúnia da Idade Média é a calúnia contra a Igreja’* (it is in current use to refer to the Middle Ages as a long-lasting eclipse of human intelligence, only resurrected from its extremely long slumber, by the victorious flashes of the Renaissance. Calumny against the Middle Ages is calumny against the Church).<sup>65</sup> That is to say that the medieval values of nationalist defense according to Plínio Salgado, were associated with a Christian practice. This way of thinking led him to state that: *‘Construir uma Pátria é muito difícil. (...) Porque uma Nação pode ser uma obra política, mas uma Pátria é uma arquitetura moral e espiritual’* (Building a Homeland is very difficult. (...) Because a Nation can be a political work, but a Homeland, is a moral and spiritual architecture).<sup>66</sup> To think of nationalism with religious practice was the way he divulged, when speaking to militants defending the relationship between national feeling and Christian thought. In an interview with *Correio da Manhã*, he stated:

Despertar em si próprio as forças do sentimento nacional porque a fusão de todas as centelhas de patriotismo de cada coração formará fogueira que incendiará o grande coração da Pátria Total. Pedir a Deus coragem e paciência, fortaleza e inspiração, energia e bondade, severidade sem alarde, bravura sem ostentação, virtude sem orgulho puritanista, humildade sem dignidade e dignidade sem egolatria (Awakening in oneself the forces of national feeling because the fusion of all the sparks of patriotism in every heart will form a fire that will set the great heart of the Homeland alight. To ask God for courage and patience, fortitude and inspiration, energy and kindness, severity without fuss, bravery without ostentation, virtue without puritanical pride, humility without dignity and dignity without egotism). (Free Translation)<sup>67</sup>

The spiritual renaissance was a movement that appeared under French influence, with the objective of restoring spiritual values in poetry, prose and philosophy. *‘Este movimento de espiritualização dos intelectuais é marcado, como o da França, no início do século, por um espírito antimoderno, antiburguês pela nostalgia da Idade Média’* (This movement of spiritualization of intellectuals is marked, like that of France, at the beginning of the century by an anti-modern spirit, and anti-bourgeois because of nostalgia for the Middle Ages).<sup>68</sup>

---

<sup>65</sup> SARDINHA, António: *A teoria das cortes gerais*. 2. ed. Lisbon: qp, 1975. 20.

<sup>66</sup> SALGADO, Plínio. O drama dos constructores de pátrias. IN: \_\_\_\_\_. *Palavra nova dos tempos novos*. José Olympio, Rio de Janeiro, 1936. 15-18.

<sup>67</sup> SALGADO, Plínio: *Sentido e rythmo da nossa revolução*. IN: \_\_\_\_\_. *A doutrina do Sigma*. Revista dos Tribunais, São Paulo, 1935. 18.

<sup>68</sup> TRINDADE: 30.

With the establishment of the AIB and the undisputed leadership of Plínio Salgado, '*tornou-se insuperável a divergência entre patrionovistas e plinistas*' (the divergence between *patrionovistas* and *plinistas* became insuperable).<sup>69</sup> The divergences between the AIPB and the AIB were very clear and unable to promote a relationship of comprehensive connection between the groups. The separation established between the groups does not mean opposition. At several moments, the Brazilian patrionovistas (which were smaller in numbers) demonstrated support for the Integralists, especially with regard to discourse around the corporatist social practice within a Christian precept of ideas originating from the *Action Française* and the IL. A clear example took place during the presidential election of 1955, in which Plínio Salgado was a candidate. The newspaper *Monarquia: órgão da chefia geral patrionovista*, said in a note: '*Presidência da República – Confirmando por este meio os comunicados anteriores, o Chefe Geral Patrionovista, Com. Prof. Dr. Arlindo Veiga dos Santos, aconselha aos patrionovistas e outros monárquicos não filiados à A.I.P.B. a candidatura de Plínio Salgado*' (The Presidency of the Republic - Confirming by this means the previous announcements, the Patrionovista General Leader, Com. Prof. Dr. Arlindo Veiga dos Santos, advises patrionovistas and other monarchists not affiliated with A.I.P.B. to vote for Plínio Salgado).<sup>70</sup>

With this relationship, the Franco-Lusitanian elements consolidated Plínio Salgado's thinking on Brazilian extreme conservatism. To identify the intellectual conception contained in the fundamentalist movement, it is necessary to analyze the movement of greatest inspiration of the Brazilian leader, the IL, influenced by the *Action Française*, and the practical experience of Italian fascism, based on the Social Doctrine of the church. These movements provided a basis for the political construction of a fascist organization disguised as Christian nationalism, whose sole purpose was to achieve supreme power around the undisputed leader Plínio Salgado, who could, however, take the "*real*" role that did not exist in Republican Brazil. In 1937 the AIB was extinguished by a dictatorial decree of Getúlio Vargas, culminating in the exile of Plínio Salgado in Portugal from 1939 onwards. With direct contact, Lusitanian conservatism promoted a doctrinal reorientation in the political thought of the integralist, establishing the creation of new directives in 1946 when he returned to Brazil. Salazarian politics through a relationship with Catholicism strongly attracted Plínio Salgado who came to be labeled as Luso-Brazilian, an element of thought that he continued with until the end of his life in 1975, based on the matrix of corporatism as exemplified in the Portuguese model.

---

<sup>69</sup> MALATIAN: 67.

<sup>70</sup> *Monarquia: órgão da chefia geral patrionovista*. São Paulo, n. 3, out, 1955 (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo/Arquivo Oliveira Salazar - ANTT/AOS/PC-3R).

## ***History of the Mathematics Education in Hungary***

- Why are some Hungarians so good at math?



**Kristóf Huszár**

## ***Creating a Culture of Problem Solving: The Hungarian Approach to Mathematics Education<sup>1</sup>***

### **Abstract**

Hungary has always been famous for her many renowned scientists, particularly mathematicians. Many important scientific achievements of the twentieth century are related to mathematicians of this small Central European country, nowadays with slightly less than ten million inhabitants. In this paper I would like to give a brief outline on mathematics education, especially talent nurturing in Hungary based on my own experience. In addition, I will try to answer the question: Why are (some) Hungarians so good at math? Finally, I would like to point out some of the main problems of our education system and, what we could learn from the education system of the United States.

*Keywords:* Hungarian mathematics, mathematics education, 20<sup>th</sup> century, mathematical communities, expositors, talent support.

**H**ungary has always been famous for her many renowned scientists, particularly mathematicians. This small country in Central Europe, nowadays with slightly less than ten million inhabitants, has thirteen Nobel-Prize laureates<sup>2</sup> (despite the fact that there is no Nobel-prize in mathematics, I think it is an important fact to mention), three Wolf-Prize<sup>3</sup> (Pál Erdős, 1983; Péter D. Lax, 1987; László Lovász, 1999) and three Leroy P. Steele laureates<sup>4</sup> (Paul R. Halmos, 1983; Peter D. Lax, 1992; Endre Szemerédi, 2008). In addition, John von Neumann won the Bôcher Memorial Prize in 1938,<sup>5</sup> which is only awarded by the American Mathematical Society every five years. But there have been recent prize-winning occasions, as well. János Kollár, specializing in algebraic geometry received the prestigious Cole Prize in 2006 (Pál Erdős also received this prize in 1951),<sup>6</sup> László Lovász (of the Eötvös Loránd University,

---

<sup>1</sup> This article is based on a conference talk given by the author with the same title. The talk was presented at the following places: University of Evansville, Evansville, March 15, 2011. Beloit College, Beloit, WI, April 1, 2011; Wisconsin MAA Spring Meeting 2011, University of Wisconsin-Stout, Menomonie, WI, April 30, 2011, <http://www.uwstout.edu/mcs/maa2011.cfm>; University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI, May 18, 2011. All online material accessed February 24, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Nobelprize.org, All Nobel prizes, 2013. [http://nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/lists/all](http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/all)

<sup>3</sup> Wolf Foundation, Mathematics, 2003. [http://www.wolffund.org.il/cat.asp?id=23&cat\\_title=MATHEMATICS](http://www.wolffund.org.il/cat.asp?id=23&cat_title=MATHEMATICS)

<sup>4</sup> American Mathematical Society (AMS), Leroy P. Steele Prizes, 2013. <http://www.ams.org/profession/prizes-awards/ams-prizes/steele-prize>

<sup>5</sup> AMS, Bôcher Memorial Prize, 2013. <http://www.ams.org/profession/prizes-awards/ams-prizes/bocher-prize>

<sup>6</sup> AMS, Frank Nelson Cole Prize in Algebra, 2013. <http://www.ams.org/profession/prizes-awards/ams-prizes/cole-prize-algebra>

Budapest) the Kyoto-Prize in 2010,<sup>7</sup> and Endre Szemerédi the Abel Prize in 2012. These are only a few examples from a very long list of Hungarian mathematical highlights. And I have not even mentioned the Hungarian combinatorial school, which is famous around the world.

Professional researchers are not the only successful ones in the world of Hungarian mathematics. The Hungarian team is a regular participant in the International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO), which is the most prestigious contest for high school-level competitors. According to the cumulative results, Hungary occupies the third place (with 77 Gold, 147 Silver, 84 Bronze medals, and 9 Honorable Mentions) in a list that includes more than 100 countries.<sup>8</sup> In the third place is the Russian Federation, in the second place is the USA, and in the first place is China. On the other hand, the Eötvös Loránd University team finished first in the International Mathematics Competition (IMC) in 2008. This is an annual contest for undergraduates. There were ninety universities represented, including Moscow State (Russia), Princeton (USA), Sharif (Iran), École Polytechnique (France) and many other universities known world-wide.<sup>9</sup>

All of this international success may lead one to believe that the mathematical education system in Hungary is perfect. Unfortunately, this is not the case. As we will see in the later sections, in general, the Hungarian (Math) education system faces some serious problems. Many of those issues have financial as well as structural origins. For example, the regional IMO Training Centers (TC) in Hungary have been closed recently because of the lack of financial resources.<sup>10</sup> These TCs used to provide mathematics courses, which enhanced the problem-solving skills and the knowledge of the students living in the countryside and in smaller cities. Now anyone, who would like to participate in Olympiad Training, will have to travel to the capital city, Budapest. The trip there and back takes at least six hours by train and the tickets are getting more and more expensive. Many families cannot afford this, so the talented and motivated youngster quits the training after a while and, in some extreme cases might decide, that s/he does not want to deal with math in the future at all.

In this paper I would like to give a brief outline on mathematics education, particularly talent nurturing, in Hungary based on my own experience. In addition, I will try to answer the question: Why are (some) Hungarians so good at math? Furthermore, I would like to point out some of the main problems of education in Hungary and, what we could learn from the education system in the United States.

---

<sup>7</sup> Inamori Foundation, László Lovász – The 2010 Kyoto Prize – Basic Sciences, 2010. [http://www.inamori-f.or.jp/laureates/k26\\_b\\_laszlo/prf\\_e.html](http://www.inamori-f.or.jp/laureates/k26_b_laszlo/prf_e.html)

<sup>8</sup> International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO), Cumulative Results by Country, 2013. [http://www.imo-official.org/results\\_country.aspx?column=awards&order=desc](http://www.imo-official.org/results_country.aspx?column=awards&order=desc)

<sup>9</sup> International Mathematics Competition for University Students (IMC), 15th IMC 2008 Team Results, 2008. <http://www.imc-math.org.uk/imc2008/results2008teams.htm>

<sup>10</sup> CSORDÁS, M. - NAGY, T. (Eds.): *Cserepek a magyarországi matematikai tehetséggondozó műhelyekből*, Bolyai János Matematikai Társulat, Budapest, Hungary, 2010. 180. <http://www.mategye.hu/download/cserepek/cserepek.pdf>

### ***The Brief History of Education in Hungary***

First of all, I would like to highlight some important milestones and periods in the history of Hungarian education that are not directly related to the mathematics education in the 20<sup>th</sup> century but helped to shape our educational system over the past thousand years.<sup>11</sup>

In 996, the first Hungarian Benedictine monastery was founded on Saint Martin's Hill in Pannonhalma. This date can be regarded as the beginning of school education in Hungary. The establishment of the monastery was made possible by the open-minded and progressive politics of Prince Géza and his son, Saint Stephen I, the very first king of Hungary, who was crowned in the year 1000. Under his rule Hungary became a Christian country, which significantly affected the education in the following millennium. King Stephen I founded ten episcopates across the country and chapter schools were established everywhere. In the monastery of Pannonhalma the main aim used to be the education of cleric intellectuals, but this has changed over time. The Benedictine Order in Hungary has been dealing with public education since 1802. Nowadays, the Benedictine Secondary School of Pannonhalma is one of the most excellent secondary schools in Hungary. This is a boarding school for boys.

In 1367, Pope Urban V founded the first university of Hungary in Pécs. The financiers were King Ludwig I of Hungary and Bishop William of Pécs. In the end of the 14th century, the university had about 800 students. However, the university remained in operation only for a relatively short time; within fifty years after its foundation the medieval university of Pécs had lost the majority of its significance. This was partly caused by the death of King Ludwig I and the growing attractiveness of the Western-European universities.<sup>12</sup> In 1923 Pécs became a university city again, after the Elizabeth University (Erzsébet Tudományegyetem) of Bratislava was relocated to the Southwest-Hungarian city.<sup>13</sup> Nowadays, this is a state university with ten different faculties. In addition, the number of people learning here is nearly 28,000.<sup>14</sup>

The Protestant Reformation and later Counter-Reformation brought significant innovation into the education system in Hungary in the 16-17th centuries. Calvinist Colleges and Lutheran Lyceums were founded with very high standards in teaching.

---

<sup>11</sup> This chapter summarizes the history of education in Hungary very briefly. It is based on the following comprehensive book: MÉSZÁROS, I. - NÉMETH, A. - PUKÁNSZKY, B.: *Neveléstörténet*, Osiris tankönyvek, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary, 2005. Source of the facts is this book, unless otherwise stated.

<sup>12</sup> KÉRI, K.: *A pécsi egyetem a középkorban*, Napi Magyarország, March 7, 1998. 16.

<sup>13</sup> KISS, J.: *Visszapillantás a Magyar Királyi Erzsébet Tudományegyetem Evangélikus Hittudományi Karának húsz éves történetére (1923-1943)*. Pécs, 1943. (Magyar Evangélikus Digitális Könyvtár, <http://medk.lutheran.hu/>).

<sup>14</sup> University of Pécs, A Pécsi Tudományegyetem hallgatói létszáma a 2010. október 15-i statisztikai jelentés alapján, 2010. [http://www.pte.hu/files/tiny\\_mce/File/cikk/PTE\\_Stat\\_2010.pdf](http://www.pte.hu/files/tiny_mce/File/cikk/PTE_Stat_2010.pdf)

In a school like a Lyceum, a student could learn from the age of 6 until the age of 28; from the basics to advanced academic knowledge. These schools provided education at all levels and they had also a great tutoring system. (In my opinion, the lack of a well-working tutoring system and the lack of a close master-and-pupil-relationship is a big problem to be solved in the Hungarian higher education system today.)

On the other hand, the Jesuits' institutions played a relevant role in education. In 1599, the Jesuits issued the *Ratio Studiorum* (Latin: „*Plan of Studies*”), which provided new structural concepts in education and a new curriculum, as well. This booklet became so popular that even other Catholic orders (e. g. the Piarists, the Cistercians, Dominicans) used it and implemented its regulations in their education.

In 1635 cardinal-archbishop Péter Pázmány, the leader of the Counter-Reformation movement, founded a university in Nagyszombat (today Trnava, Slovakia) which was the predecessor of the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest, Hungary. The ELTE is one of the largest universities in Hungary with eight faculties and about 27,000 students.<sup>15</sup> In addition, this is the oldest university in Hungary that is in continuous operation. In our case, the most relevant aspect is that generations of excellent mathematicians have been educated here, especially since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Today the Institute of Mathematics at ELTE has eight departments; about 120 professional mathematicians work here teaching the next generations and doing diverse research on various topics.<sup>16</sup> Between 2006 and 2011 the director of the Institute was László Lovász, the former president of the International Mathematical Union and one of the most renowned mathematicians worldwide. His successor is András Frank, who used to be the doctoral student of Lovász, and he also has an international reputation.

In 1777 – one year after the United States Declaration of Independence was issued – Maria Theresa (member of the House of Habsburg) the Queen of Hungary issued the first public education act in Hungary, the so-called *Ratio Educationis*.<sup>17</sup> This was an important reform in the Hungarian educational system. Taking part in education became compulsory for everyone between the ages 6-12. The act broke the hegemony of the Catholic Church in the field of education. All levels of education became the responsibility of the state. It affected the entire educational system. The partition of the school system was as follows: four years of elementary school, three years of „*junior secondary school*”, five years of „*senior secondary school*”, two years of academy, and four years of university.

---

<sup>15</sup> Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE), Hallgatói létszámadatok, 2011. [http://www.elte.hu/file/hallg\\_letsz.xls](http://www.elte.hu/file/hallg_letsz.xls)

<sup>16</sup> Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Science, Institute of Mathematics (Inst. of Math.), Homepage, 2011. <http://www.cs.elte.hu>

<sup>17</sup> In the beginning of the 20th century the *Ratio Educationis* was published again, see FRIML, A.: *Az 1777-iki Ratio Educationis*, Kath. Középiskolai Tanárregyesület, Budapest, Hungary, 1913.



Another milestone in the history of education was the 38<sup>th</sup> Statute in 1868, introduced by József Eötvös, the Minister of Religion and Education in Hungary from 1867 to 1871. Eötvös was a dominant statesman, philosopher, and writer in Hungary in the second half of the 19th century. He was a member of the first government after the Hungarian Revolution in 1848, as well. His son Loránd Eötvös was a renowned physicist and also a minister of religion and education. Here is a brief summary of the 38<sup>th</sup> Statute from 1868: Taking part in education became compulsory for everyone between the ages 6-12 (truancy became punishable). The act fostered the freedom of learning and freedom of education. All religions became equal in the field of education. The statute also stated that „*Everyone should get educated in his/her mother tongue*”. In order to achieve this, state ethnicities could found their own schools where they received education in their mother tongue. And last but not least, founding of „*upper*” public schools in settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants became mandatory. Despite the early death of Eötvös in 1871, in the following decades a remarkable improvement in the education in Hungary was seen. The number of teachers increased quickly and so did the number of public schools, from approx. 10,000 to 16,000.

In 1867, after the so-called Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was established in Central Europe, a constitutional monarchic union of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Austrian Empire.<sup>18</sup> At that time, after the Russian Empire, it was the second largest country in Europe. This can be illustrated by the fact that the former territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy includes (totally or partly) thirteen currently existing countries. It had a multilingual, multicultural and multiethnic society, which contributed to the open-mindedness of the individuals. In addition, newly founded industrial firms – many of them also established experimental laboratories – provided economic growth, innovation and stability.

It is not surprising that during this period of industrialization and urbanization Hungary was strongly affected by the German culture and traditions. Most importantly, Germany made a huge impact on many renowned Hungarian scientists, as a lot of them were studying or teaching in German universities for a shorter or longer time; Loránd Eötvös, Leo Szilárd, Ede Teller and Lipót Fejér are only a few examples. Later, they brought back their experiences to Hungary and spread their knowledge among the younger generations. The main ideas of the German educational system were also adopted in Hungary. This process was led by Mór Kármán (1843-1915), a well-known expert of education and a pedagogical reformer. The establishment of elitist secondary schools (‘gimnázium’), such as the „*Practicing High School*” or „*Model-Gimnázium*” and the improvement of already existing secondary schools, such as the „*Fasori*” Lutheran High School, were consequences of this knowledge-transfer. In these institutions the members of the faculty, who were usually at the level of university professors, could develop and

---

<sup>18</sup> This subsection is based on FRANK, T.: *Teaching and Learning Science in Hungary, 1867-1945: Schools, Personalities, Influences*. Science & Education 20, 2011. 1-26.

practice new teaching methods. Many internationally recognized Hungarian scientists were educated at one of these schools.<sup>19</sup>

Perhaps the greatest organizer and supporter of Hungarian science and mathematics in the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries was Loránd Eötvös, the son of József Eötvös. Like his father, Eötvös Jr. was Minister of Religion and Education (1894-1895). In addition, he was the President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1889-1905). Moreover, he was a renowned physicist and three-time Nobel-Prize Nominee.<sup>20</sup> Eötvös received his Ph. D. degree at the University of Heidelberg, so he was directly influenced by German educational traditions and circumstances. As a minister he also put a special emphasis on teachers' scientific preparation:

*„...we will do great service to the general cultural development of the country, because undoubtedly, the success of teaching in both higher and secondary schools depends above all on the scientific preparation of the teachers.” (Loránd Eötvös, 1892)<sup>21</sup>*

In 1885 Eötvös founded a small Mathematics Circle in Budapest which was expanded in 1891 into the Society of Mathematics and Physics [Mathematikai és Fizikai Társulat]. In 1894 this society made two improvements which were unique in the world at that time. On one hand, an annual contest in mathematics and physics was introduced, the Eötvös Competition (which was renamed later Kürschák Competition and it is the oldest, regularly organized mathematical contest in the world). On the other hand, the High School Papers in Mathematics (Középiskolai Matematikai Lapok) was launched. Its first editor was the outstanding mathematics teacher Dániel Arany. Since its foundation this journal has been providing its readers mathematical challenges, inspiration and enjoyment. Generations have participated in its problem solving contest, and many of the most distinguished contestants became mathematicians and scientists.<sup>22</sup>

In 1895 Loránd Eötvös founded another institution, the 'Eötvös József Collegium' to provide scientific education for future high school teachers at the highest academic level. Its model-institution was the École Normale Supérieure of Paris. The History of the Collegium is very rich, and there are several books dealing with this topic.<sup>23</sup> Destroyed in 1949 and reorganized in 1956, the Collegium made a remarkable impact on Hungarian academic, cultural, and scientific life in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Today it is a college of Eötvös Loránd University for its most talented students.

<sup>19</sup> FRANK (2011): 15-22.

<sup>20</sup> BECK, M.: *A magyar Nobel-díjasok*, Magyar Tudomány 46, 2001. 1444-1452.

<sup>21</sup> EÖTVÖS, L.: *Szaktársainkhoz* (To our colleagues), *Mathematikai és Fizikai Lapok* 1/1, 1892. (Quoted by ÁRVAI WIESCHENBERG, Á.: *Identification and development of the mathematically talented – The Hungarian experience*, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1984. 23.)

<sup>22</sup> FRANK (2011): 7-10.

<sup>23</sup> Eötvös Collegium, *Eötvös Collegium kiadványai*, 2012. <http://honlap.eotvos.elte.hu/eotvos-collegium-kiadvanyai>

*„Since its foundation in 1895 the mission of Eötvös College (“The Collegium”) has been to offer support to Hungary’s most talented university students and to help them achieve academic excellence. Although the Collegium differs in many respects from its renowned pre-war predecessor, its goal is the same: to train highly-skilled experts with the capacity to combine independent research and quality teaching.”<sup>24</sup>*

*„Historians have noted how Baron Eötvös’s educational efforts led to an explosion of genius – such luminaries as the physicists Edward Teller, Eugene Wigner, Leo Szilard, and the mathematician John von Neumann all came out of Budapest during the Eötvös era. The production of Hungarian scientists and mathematicians in the early twentieth century was so prolific that many otherwise calm observers believe Budapest was settled by Martians in a plan to infiltrate and take over the planet.”<sup>25</sup>*

The development of mathematics in Hungary during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is very mixed, mainly due to the historical circumstances. Although we can find several people in this phase who had good ideas, played a supportive role and fostered the development, both world wars meant enormous destruction and deterioration in the society, culture, education and sciences.

The Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920), was extremely disadvantageous – we can say catastrophic – for Hungary. The country’s territory was reduced from 283,000 km<sup>2</sup> to its current area today of 93,000 km<sup>2</sup>, and it lost sixty percent of its population, too. (It was 18.2 million before the treaty, and became 7.2 million after it.) 3.2 million Hungarian people became minorities in neighboring countries.<sup>26</sup> All this was accompanied by terrible inflation and an economic crisis. Kuno Klebelsberg, the Minister of Religion, Culture and Education (1922-1931) saw the only solution in the development of sciences, public education, and culture. During his term in office Klebelsberg made comprehensive reforms in public education. In this difficult period between 1925 and 1930, on account of the minister’s activity, nine to ten percent of the state budget was spent on education and culture; 1,096 new elementary schools (with about 3,500 classrooms) and 1,500 apartments for teachers were built in the countryside. He also restructured the secondary school system. They were divided into three types; one of them was the *reálgimnázium* (for boys only) with special emphasis on scientific education and modern languages. Klebelsberg also conducted the modernization of numerous universities (many university hospitals in the cities of Debrecen, Pécs and Szeged were built at that time), and founded foreign Hungarian cultural institutes, the so-called *Collegium Hungaricum*s (e. g. in Berlin, Rome and Vienna)

---

<sup>24</sup> HORVÁTH, L.: *A Guide to ELTE Eötvös József College*, 2011. 2. [http://honlap.eotvos.elte.hu/uploads/documents/felev11121/EC\\_info\\_en.pdf](http://honlap.eotvos.elte.hu/uploads/documents/felev11121/EC_info_en.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> LEDERMAN, L.M. - TERESI, D.: *The God Particle: If the Universe Is the Answer, What Is the Question?* Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006. 96.

<sup>26</sup> ROMSICS, I.: *Magyarország története a XX. században*, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2001. 141-149.

to create awareness of Hungarian culture in other countries and to provide international study experiences and research opportunities for the young Hungarian intellectuals. Moreover, he introduced a scholarship system to help the gifted students to participate in these study-abroad programs.<sup>27</sup>

The aftermath of the First World War, the increasing anti-Semitism in Europe, and the Great Depression seriously affected Hungary (and many other countries, as well). In the 1920s Hungary lost significant intellectual capital as talented and young Jewish scientists left the country.<sup>28</sup>

*„...(they) knew that if they were to achieve what they were capable of, they must leave, von Neumann went to Berlin, and then to Princeton; Pólya to Zürich and then to Stanford; Szegő to Berlin, Königsberg, and then Stanford; von Kármán to Göttingen to Aachen and then to Cal Tech; Marcel Riesz to Lund; Mihály Fekete to Jerusalem; and so on, through Teller, Eugene Wigner, Leo Szilard, Arthur Erdélyi, Cornelius Lanczos, and Ottó Szász (1884–1952). [Lipót] Fejér and [Frigyes] Riesz, older men with tenured positions, remained in Hungary.”<sup>29</sup>*

Those mathematicians who did not leave the country contributed to the Hungarian mathematical life between the two world wars. The most prominent ones were Lipót Fejér and Frigyes Riesz, who had been active since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Both of them played a very important role in attracting younger people to mathematics during this period. In 1921 the Institute of Mathematics at the University of Szeged was founded under the leadership of Riesz (as executive director), Alfréd Haar and Rudolf Ortway. Since the beginning this institute and its members – many internationally recognized mathematicians – have been playing a very important role in mathematical research and education in Hungary.<sup>30</sup>

Unfortunately, many ambitious students and mathematicians became victims of the Second World War and the persecution of Jewish people. The deaths of Ervin Aczél, Dániel Arany, István Ádám, Mihály Bauer, Pál Csillag, Andor Faragó, Ervin Feldheim, Géza Grünwald, József Jelítai, Béla Kerékjártó, Lipót Klug, Dénes König, József Krausz, Dezső Lázár, Gusztáv Rados, Gyula Sándor, Miklós Schweitzer, Sidon Simon, Antal Sólyi, Adolf Szűcs, István Valkó, László Waldapfel, and many other promising students was an irreplaceable loss (not only) to Hungarian mathematics.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>27</sup> HUSZÁR, Z.: *Utjecaj Trianona na kulturnu i obrazovnu politiku Mađarske u 1920*, -tim godinama u vrijeme grofa Klebelsberg Kune, ministra kulture Povečalo 9, 2012. 97-106.

<sup>28</sup> FILEP, L.: *A 20. századi matematikus-emigráció*, Magyar Tudomány, 2003/7.

<sup>29</sup> HERSH, R. - JOHN-STEINER, V.: *A Visit to Hungarian Mathematics*, The Mathematical Intelligencer 15, 1993. 19.

<sup>30</sup> CSÁKÁNY, B. - VARGA, A.: *A szegedi egyetemi matematikai intézetek hetvenöt éve*, IN: SZENTIRMAI, L. - RÁCZNÉ MOJZES, K. (Eds.): *A szegedi tudományegyetem múltja és jelene, 1921-1998*, József Attila Tudományegyetem, 1999.

<sup>31</sup> KOLLEGA TARSOLY, I. (Ed.): *Magyarország a XX. században I-V*. Babits, Szekszárd, Hungary,

After the Second World War,<sup>32</sup> Hungary became the part of the so-called Soviet zone, and it remained so until 1990. The reorganization of mathematical life after 1945 was surrounded by tough conditions. Despite the difficulties, in 1947 the János Bolyai Mathematical Society (Bolyai János Matematikai Társulat) was founded in a South-East Hungarian city Szeged, the KöMaL<sup>33</sup> was relaunched by Paula Soós and János Surányi, and the Kürschák Competition was restarted. The BJMT<sup>34</sup> founded various prizes for supporting outstanding mathematical achievements. Several additional mathematical competitions were started both at high school level (e. g. Dániel Arany Mathematical Competition) and at university level (e. g. Miklós Schweitzer Competition).<sup>35</sup>

The communist dictatorship in Hungary, which lasted until 1989, affected all segments of life.<sup>36</sup> The central power took control over scientific research which, consequently, was strongly influenced by political ideologies. After the suppression of the 1956 Revolution in Hungary a great number of intellectuals left the country. Although the communist era brought a serious decline in Hungary, mathematical sciences developed even during the hardest times, partly because unlike social sciences and humanities, mathematics was regarded as a politically neutral topic.

In 1949 the Department of Mathematical and Physical Sciences (Matematikai és Fizikai Tudományok Osztálya) was founded on the greatly reorganized Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar Tudományos Akadémia). The department's first president was Frigyes Riesz, and many excellent mathematicians were elected to members of the department. In 1950 the Applied Mathematical Research Institute (Alkalmazott Matematikai Kutató Intézet) was founded under the leadership of the outstanding mathematician Alfréd Rényi and was restructured in 1955 to Mathematical Research Institute (Matematikai Kutató Intézet) which was the predecessor of today's Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics. Five years later, in 1960 the Data Center of the MTA<sup>37</sup> was founded, the predecessor of the Computer and Automation Research Institute (Számítástechnikai és Automatizálási Kutató Intézet [SZTAKI]).<sup>38</sup> Today this is the

---

1996-2000. Volume IV. chapter Matematika, 2000. 23. <http://mek.niif.hu/02100/02185/html/613.html>  
SAIN, M.: *Matematikatörténeti ABC*, Tankönyvkiadó, 1978. 212-213.

<sup>32</sup> This section focuses mainly on changes from the viewpoint of mathematics education. It is not intended to be a detailed description of the „Communist Era”, more specifically, the „Rákosi Era” and the „Kádár Era”.

<sup>33</sup> The abbreviation KöMaL stands for ‘*Középiskolai Matematikai Lapok*’ (High School Papers in Mathematics).

<sup>34</sup> BJMT is the abbreviation of ‘*Bolyai János Matematikai Társulat*’ (János Bolyai Mathematical Society).

<sup>35</sup> KOLLEGA TARSOLY, I.: 2000. 26.

<sup>36</sup> The Rákosi Era (1948-1956), and the Kádár Era (1956-1989) should be handled separately, because of the major differences between them. The Kádár Era can be split into three further parts: Consolidation (1956–1963), „*Goulash Communism*” (1963-1979), and the decline of the Communist system (1979-1989). Detailed description of each period can be found in ROMSICS (2001): 335-536.

<sup>37</sup> MTA is the acronym for ‘*Magyar Tudományos Akadémia*’ (Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

<sup>38</sup> KOLLEGA TARSOLY (2000): 26.

largest one with more than 300 professional employees, but all of these institutions have been playing an important role in scientific research related to mathematics and computer science in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It must be also emphasized that the collaborations between them and the universities provide internships and research opportunities for several graduate students.<sup>39</sup>

The arms race during the „Cold War” resulted in the improvement of sciences, in particular the development of engineering, mathematics, physics and computer science. During that time the Soviet mathematicians were leading in the world in many branches of mathematics (probability theory, differential equations, functional analysis, etc.), and this affected Hungarian mathematics.<sup>40</sup>

But mathematical research was not the only field influenced by the Russian mathematical culture. Because of the limited access to Western mathematical literature at that time, many Russian textbooks were translated into Hungarian and then used in mathematics classes in Hungary. „There were also regular contacts between Soviet and Hungarian mathematicians and mathematics educators in general and between (Andrej) Kolmogorov and (Tamás) Varga in particular.”<sup>41</sup> This kind of exchange of knowledge and experience contributed to the development of mathematics education, especially talent nurturing, in both countries. As the following quotation shows, there were more underlying reasons for the popularity of Russian textbooks:

*„Mathematics teachers tried to use all available books to overcome the limited resources for practicing problem solving. In the meantime, more and more Russian texts and problem books became available. It is important to mention that Russia was a significant channel for receiving literature from other countries as well – often even non Russian books were translated into Russian and then into Hungarian, because translation from Russian could be arranged more easily than translation from their original language.”<sup>42</sup>*

However, education was not free of difficulties during this period. On one hand, many professional mathematicians were interested in educational issues. Mathematicians living abroad (e. g. György Pólya and Zoltán Pál Dienes) and living within the borders (e. g. György Hajós, László Kalmár, Rózsa Péter, Alfréd Rényi, and Pál Turán) considerably influenced school mathematics in Hungary.<sup>43</sup> Tamás Varga and his colleagues elaborated a comprehensive research on mathematical education in the 1960s, the so-called „komplex matematikatanítási kísérlet” (complex experiment on teaching mathematics). Many teachers, inspectors and

---

<sup>39</sup> The Computer and Automation Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA SZTAKI), The Institute. 2013. <http://www.sztaki.hu/institute>

<sup>40</sup> KOLLEGA TARSOLY (2000): 27.

<sup>41</sup> FRIED, K.: *Case of Hungary*, IN: KARP, A. - VOGELI, B.R. (Eds.): *Russian Mathematics Education: History and World Significance*, World Scientific, 2010. 343.

<sup>42</sup> FRIED (2010): 341.

<sup>43</sup> HALMOS, M. - VARGA, T.: *Change in Mathematics Education since the late 1950's – Ideas and Realisation Hungary*, Educational Studies in Mathematics 9, 1978. 226.

educators were involved in this project and the leader of the research group was Varga. The experiment covered mathematics education in primary and middle school (age 6-14).<sup>44</sup> As a result of the project, a new mathematics curriculum for primary and middle school pupils was developed. It contained many new ideas and Varga's work was recognized internationally. On the other hand, the implementation of the new curriculum in the second half of the 1970s was not clearly successful. Many teachers were not prepared for such a radical change and therefore the objectives were not completely achieved.<sup>45</sup> In their paper, Halmos and Varga point out a phenomenon which exists even nowadays in mathematical education in Hungary.

*„Paradoxically, while mathematical excellence was sufficiently supported during these years of extending continued education to many more pupils than ever, we were much less successful in reaching our main goal, an efficient mass education in mathematics. Since the end of the nineteen fifties we have been working toward this goal.”<sup>46</sup>*

After mentioning the most important stations in the history of education, I would like to continue by outlining the main characteristics of the Hungarian education system today. Our education system is no less complicated than the most education systems in the world. Actually, a whole dissertation written by an expert would be necessary to show all the details.<sup>47</sup> The „Pre-Primary” and „Higher Education” levels are clear, but the „General School” and „Secondary” school levels are a little bit confusing. We have three different systems at these levels, but in general, there are only minor differences. Basically, the curriculum is everywhere the same.<sup>48</sup> Education is mandatory between the ages of five and eighteen.

The „8+4”-system is the most common. After four or six years of „General School” the student has the opportunity of changing to „Secondary School”. Six- or eight-year-long secondary school programs are usually offered by special institutions. In Hungary twelve secondary schools have a six-year long Advanced Mathematics program (at secondary school level), which is the most important thing in our case.<sup>49</sup> The very first „Spec-Math” (according to the Hungarian description) class was started in 1962 in the famous „Fazekas School” in Budapest, which is, according to

---

<sup>44</sup> SZENDREI, J.: *When the going gets tough, the tough gets going problem solving in Hungary, 1970-2007: research and theory, practice and politics*, Zentralblatt für Didaktik der Mathematik 39, 2007. 446.

<sup>45</sup> SZENDREI (2007:) 449.

<sup>46</sup> HALMOS – VARGA (1978): 225-226.

<sup>47</sup> Eurypedia - The European Encyclopedia on National Education Systems <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Hungary:Overview>

<sup>48</sup> This is the so called „Nemzeti Alaptanterv” (National Core Curriculum). The document can be downloaded from the homepage of the Ministry of National Resources: <http://www.nefmi.gov.hu/kozoktatás/tantervek/nemzeti-alaptanterv-nat>

<sup>49</sup> Matematika Oktatási Portál (MOP), Speciális matematika tagozatos iskolák és tanáraik, 2013. <http://matek.fazekas.hu/portal/rolunk/spectanarok.html> STOCKTON, J.: *Education of Mathematically Talented Students in Hungary*, Journal of Mathematics Education at Teachers College 1, 2010. 2.

many surveys, one of the best secondary schools in Hungary. From the early sixties „Fazekas” has been an important talent-supporting center, especially in mathematics. Some members of the first math class were: Zsolt Baranyai (†), István Berkes, Miklós Laczkovich, László Lovász, Péter Major, József Pelikán, Lajos Pósa and Katalin Vesztergombi. All of them have become renowned mathematicians.<sup>50</sup>

Obviously, this is only a very short summary of today's system, but in the following, I will provide more information that is strongly connected to this section.

#### ***Four Pillars of Mathematics Education***

We arrive at the main part of this paper. During my secondary school years (2005-2009), I had the opportunity to take part in several mathematics competitions and students' programs, which gave me knowledge, memories and experience for life. In my opinion, these diverse secondary (and primary) school programs lead by great teachers are the most important places of talent nurturing in mathematics in Hungary at this level. I will explore this topic in the second section. The third section will contain the consequence of the second one. In all of these programs most, participants make friends, not jealous rivalries and, therefore, these are the birthplaces of a very strong community where people help each other, not hinder. I will specify my thoughts about this in the fourth section. Initially, I would like to write about the first pillar of the mathematical education in Hungary: its great educators.

#### ***Great Educators in the Past and Present***

At this point I think I am in both a very lucky and unlucky situation. I am lucky because there are many hugely important teachers, especially from the 20<sup>th</sup> century, who created the culture of problem solving not just in Hungary, but also in other countries where they lived during their lives. On the other hand, I am unlucky because I cannot mention all of these great teachers due to the limited length of the paper.<sup>51</sup> More precisely, I can mention only a few examples.

#### **László Rátz (1863-1930)**

*„Ratz did unbelievably much to arouse the attention of students toward mathematics. He founded the Mathematics Journal for Secondary Schools and wrote books which elucidated simple solution of mathematical problems.”<sup>52</sup>*

---

<sup>50</sup> Fazekas Mihály Primary and Secondary School and Teacher Training Centre, Budapest, History of the „Fazekas”, 2011. <http://www.fazekas.hu/iskolank/iskolatortenet>

<sup>51</sup> Some remarkable Hungarian math educators of the 20th century I cannot describe in detail, but their names must be mentioned at least: Tibor Bakos (1909–1998), Tibor Gallai (1912–1992), Endre Hódi (1923–2003), Károly Kőváry „Kavics” (1923–2003), Lóránt Pálmay (1929–2012), István Reiman (1927–2012), Alfréd Rényi (1921–1970), Paula Soós (1903–1996), János Surányi (1918–2006), and János Urbán (1939–2012).

<sup>52</sup> MEHRA, J. (Ed.): *The Collected Works of Eugene Paul Wigner: Historical and Biographical*



He was a legendary mathematics teacher of the famous Fasori Evangélius Gimnázium („Fasori” Lutheran Secondary School) in Budapest from 1890 to 1925. During these thirty-five years of teaching, Rátz reformed mathematical education with his excessively efficient teaching methods and with his personality. He dealt with his students as equals and as colleagues. He often invited them to his home and into the company of his university colleagues, both of which could be very motivating for a talented young person. When he realized that he could not teach more to a student, he then requested another university professor to take him/her over to teach.

*„This highly individualized treatment brought the subject closer to students, irrespective of the nature of their own individual talent.”<sup>53</sup>*

For his work in education he was awarded the prestigious *Officer d'Académie* award of the French Ministry of Education at a 1910 Paris congress.<sup>54</sup> From 1896 to 1914 he was editor-in-chief of the journal „KöMaL” which has played a very important role in the mathematical talent nurturing in Hungary since 1894. His best-known students were John von Neumann, Eugene Wigner (Nobel-Prize laureate in Physics, 1963) and Alfréd Haar.<sup>55</sup> According to an anecdote, Eugene Wigner was asked in the late 1970s ‘Do you remember Rátz?’ to which he answered, ‘There he is!’ and pointed to a picture of Rátz on his office wall<sup>56</sup> (see Figure 1). Nowadays, the *László Rátz Life Work Award* is one of the most prestigious awards for secondary school teachers in Hungary. In addition, the annual national math teachers' meeting of the Bolyai János Mathematical Society is named after László Rátz.



Figure 1: Eugene Wigner in his office with a photograph of Einstein. Right from his head there is a portrait of László Rátz.

Source: Budapest University of Technology and Economics National Technical Information Centre and Library – Archive of History of Science and Technology. With the permission of Kata Oláh

### József Kürschák (1864-1933)

*„...outstanding mathematicians such as (Eugene) Hunyadi, Julius König, Kürschák and (Gusztáv) Rados have contributed to the high standard of mathematical education at the Technical University (of Budapest). Their scientific*

---

*Reflections and Syntheses*, Part 2. Springer, 1997. 2.

<sup>53</sup> FRANK (2011): 19.

<sup>54</sup> RENNER, J. - RÁTZ László: *Középiskolai Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok* 7, 1930. 69-73.

<sup>55</sup> ROSENBERG, J.: *Non-Commutative Harmonic Analysis*, IN: HORVÁTH, J. (Ed.): *A Panorama of Hungarian Mathematics in the Twentieth Century I*, János Bolyai Mathematical Society and Springer, 2006. 194.

<sup>56</sup> MACRAE, N. - John Von NEUMANN: *The Scientific Genius Who Pioneered the Modern Computer, Game Theory, Nuclear Deterrence, and Much More*, American Mathematical Society, 2000. 69.

*and teaching activity affected mathematical life in the whole country and laid the foundation of the internationally recognized mathematical school in Hungary.*<sup>57</sup>

Kürschák was an outstanding mathematician (especially in algebra and geometry). He was also a great teacher at the turn of the century. At the beginning of his career, Kürschák was a teacher in secondary schools. Besides teaching, he worked on the national mathematics curriculum. In 1891, he started teaching at the Technical University of Budapest and continued to work there the rest of his life. He made important contributions to mathematics, and he was a nurturer of talent, too. Dénes Kőnig and John von Neumann were both students of Kürschák. He was one of the main organizers of the Eötvös Loránd Mathematics Competition for secondary school graduates, which was started in 1894 (in 1949, this competition was renamed the Kürschák József Mathematics Competition in his honor).<sup>58</sup> This is the very first modern mathematical competition of the world! Since it was started, the János Bolyai Mathematical Society has organized the competition every year (during the World Wars there were some exceptions). One of his most important works is the so-called Hungarian Problem Book, issued in 1929. In this work he summarized the challenging problems and solutions of the first thirty-two Eötvös Competitions and Kürschák's extensions. Today this is a widely known four-volume book series and it was translated into English, Russian, Romanian, and even to Japanese, Arabic, and Korean.<sup>59</sup>

### **Lipót Fejér (1880-1959)**

*"It was not given to him to solve very difficult problems or to build vast conceptual structures. Yet he could perceive the significance, the beauty, and the promise of a rather concrete not too large problem, foresee the possibility of a solution and work at it with intensity. And, when he had found the solution, he kept on working at it with loving care, till each detail became fully transparent."*<sup>60</sup>

He was born in Pécs, a southern Hungarian city where I am from, as well. Fejér studied mathematics and physics in Budapest and Berlin. In the Technical University at Budapest he was taught by, among others, Julius König, József Kürschák, Manó Beke and Loránd Eötvös. As a fourth-year student in 1900 Fejér published his most famous paper about the usage of Cesàro-sums to sum the Fourier-series of functions which are continuous but not smooth. Until 1905, he could not find a permanent full-time job, when he became a professor at the University of Kolozsvár.<sup>61</sup> In 1911, he became the leader of the mathematics

---

<sup>57</sup> RÓZSA, P.: *200 years of teaching mathematics at the Technical University of Budapest*, International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and Technology 25, 1994. 805-809.

<sup>58</sup> OBLÁTH, R.: *Képek a magyar matematika múltjából* III. – KÜRSCHÁK József, Középiskolai Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok, 1954. 97-104.

<sup>59</sup> SURÁNYI, J.: *A 100-adik Kürschák József matematikai tanulmányverseny*, 2004. [http://matek.fazekas.hu/portal/feladatbank/adatbazis/Kurschak\\_Jozsef\\_verseny.html](http://matek.fazekas.hu/portal/feladatbank/adatbazis/Kurschak_Jozsef_verseny.html).

<sup>60</sup> PÓLYA, G.: *Leopold Fejér*, Journal of the London Mathematical Society 36, 1961. 501-506.

<sup>61</sup> Kolozsvár is the Hungarian name of a city in Romania, with the Romanian name Cluj-Napoca.

institute at the University of Budapest (later: Eötvös Loránd University) and held that position until his death. During these nearly fifty years he created a very successful school in mathematical analysis. He had many students who later became great mathematicians.<sup>62</sup>

*„Fejér would sit in a Budapest cafe with his students and solve interesting problems in mathematics and tell them stories about mathematicians he had known. A whole culture developed around this man. His lectures were considered the experience of a lifetime, but his influence outside the classroom was even more significant.”<sup>63</sup>*

Some notable students of Fejér: Pál Erdős, John von Neumann, Pál Turán, György Pólya, László Kalmár, Marcell Riesz, Gábor Szegő, Mihály Fekete, Kornél Lánzos, Tibor Radó and Tibor Bakos. Except for Kornél Lánzos and Tibor Bakos, all of the listed people were doctoral students of Fejér.<sup>64</sup> Today the mathematical competition in the county Baranya (the county seat is Pécs) is named after him.

### **György Pólya (1887-1985)**

*„If you can't solve a problem, then there is an easier problem you can solve: find it.” (György Pólya)*

There is no doubt that György Pólya was one of the greatest math educators in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He was born in Budapest and after graduating from the University of Budapest, he became a professor of mathematics at the top Swiss university, ETH Zürich. He held this position from 1914 to 1940, but due to World War II he had to leave Europe. From 1940 until his death, Pólya worked at Stanford University in the United States.<sup>65</sup> In his own words, Pólya became a mathematician because the journal „*KöMaL*”, the József Kürschák Mathematical Memorial Contest, and Lipót Fejér affected him so much.

During his long life Pólya worked in various fields of mathematics: number theory, analysis, geometry, algebra, combinatorics, probability theory, and mathematical physics. He also made great contributions to mathematical education and the methodology of math teaching. Pólya's books are classic masterpieces in this field. Probably his most popular book is *How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method*, issued in 1945 by the Princeton University

---

Before the Treaty of Trianon (1920) the city belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and even today about 20% of the city's population is Hungarian, see: JAKABFFY, E.: *Recensământ 2002*, 2006. <http://recensamant.referinte.transindex.ro/?pg=3&id=819>

<sup>62</sup> HERSH - STEINER (1993): 17-19.

<sup>63</sup> CHUNG, K.L. - BOAS, R.P. - LEHMER, D.H. - SCHATTSCHNEIDER, D. - READ, R.C. - SCHIFFER, M.M. - SCHOENFELD, A.H.: *Obituary of George Pólya*, Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society 19, 1987. 559-608. (Quoted by HERSH - STEINER (1993): 18.)

<sup>64</sup> Mathematics Genealogy Project, Leopold Fejér, 2013. <http://genealogy.math.ndsu.nodak.edu/id.php?id=7488>

<sup>65</sup> CHUNG et al. (1987): 559-570.

Press.<sup>66</sup> The fact that it has been in print continuously since 1945 and has been translated into seventeen different languages tells much about the reputation of the book.<sup>67</sup> In this book Pólya explores the ways of mathematical thinking and makes suggestions (The Four Principles<sup>68</sup>) in problem solving. He emphasizes the heuristic thinking methods, too. The book is used by many teachers, students, problem solvers and mathematicians today, as well. I also clearly remember reading this Pólya-book when I was a secondary school student. Another classic work of him is *Problems and Theorems in Analysis I-II* with another mathematician, Gábor Szegő.<sup>69</sup> This is a very detailed, deep and unique introduction to analysis through exercises and problems. Today this book is often referred only as „*The Pólya-Szegő*”, because it is simply one of the best problem books ever written on this topic. The structure of this book strongly affected László Lovász when he wrote his famous book *Combinatorial Problems and Exercises*.<sup>70</sup> Pólya was an exceptional figure not only in mathematics education. Thanks to his extensive social network, he could present and share his ideas with a very broad audience.

### Tamás Varga (1919-1987)

Tamás Varga was an outstanding figure of mathematics education even from an international perspective. He caught worldwide attention by elaborating on a complex teaching method in mathematics during the 1960s and early 70s. This initiative was the result of an UNESCO symposium on teaching mathematics held in 1962.<sup>71</sup> This was the „*komplex matematikatanítási kísérlet*” (complex experiment on teaching mathematics or „*OPI Project*”) which has been already mentioned. This project was one of the deepest research studies on mathematics education in Hungary.<sup>72</sup> Pilot work was started in a few experimental classes in the early sixties. Within a few years more and more teachers' attention was caught by this „*complex experiment*” and many of them joined the project. „*With very little organization something like an organic growth took place: the increment was proportional to the number of existing pilot classes, and this, of course, resulted in an exponential function, or rather a geometrical progression.*”<sup>73</sup> With his colleagues (the closest ones were Andor Cser and Endre Hódi from the National Institute of Education (Országos Pedagógiai Intézet - OPI) and Endréné Gádor,

<sup>66</sup> PÓLYA, G.: *How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method*, Princeton University Press, 1945.

<sup>67</sup> PÓLYA, G. - CONWAY, J.H.: *How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method*, Princeton University Press, 2004. XIX.

<sup>68</sup> 1. Understanding the Problem; 2. Making a plan; 3. Carrying out the plan; 4. Looking back our work.

<sup>69</sup> PÓLYA, G. - SZEGŐ, G.: *Problems and Theorems in Analysis I-II*, Springer, 1924.

<sup>70</sup> LOVÁSZ, L.: *Combinatorial Problems and Exercises*, North Holland Publishing Company and Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979.

<sup>71</sup> The International Symposium on Mathematics Teaching, August 27 - September 8, 1962, Budapest, Hungary.

<sup>72</sup> SZENDREI (2007): 446.

<sup>73</sup> HALMOS – VARGA (1978): 227-228.

Sándor Pálffy, Istvánné Halmos, Eszter C. Neményi and Julianna Szendrei) he was working carefully on the details and, as a result of their hard work, a completely new, integrated mathematical curriculum was first introduced in primary and middle schools in 1978.

*„There was no textbook – only the series of worksheets which were carefully developed. The worksheets (the so called „Munkalapok”) were continuously revised as teachers reflected on their work. The designers tried to avoid the atomism which could arise from the many parallel mathematics topics covered in the classes. (...) This was not chalk-and-blackboard mathematics. This was the first curriculum in mathematics education in Hungary which prescribed the method, the content, the manuals, the teacher’s guides and the in-service training courses together.”<sup>74</sup>*

Although the implementation of the new curriculum was gradual (it was started in 7% of the classes in 1974<sup>75</sup>), many teachers were not prepared for this great change. Educational authorities were warned by Varga and his fellow workers on this danger, but they didn't accept the arguments of the researchers. The temporary curriculum of the experimental classes became suddenly compulsory in all general schools.<sup>76</sup> On one hand, the objectives were not completely realized, but on the other hand the efforts made by Varga and his followers affected mathematics education from kindergarten to secondary schools in a considerable way. Today's primary and secondary level math education in Hungary is partly based on Varga's main ideas. These ideas are the followings:

- Mathematics classes from the very first years in school.
- Instead of „Arithmetic” and „Geometry” classes there is one „Mathematics” class with various topics.
- Stimulate creativity and mathematical thinking. Calculation techniques are important, as well, but they should not be overemphasized.
- The introduction of abstract concepts should be based on the experience and explorations of the students. This introduction should not be very quick.
- Flexible teachers who are capable of making responsible decisions and regularly train themselves. They are familiar with many areas in mathematics.
- Various activities in classes. Usage of concrete materials, artifacts and teaching materials in the classroom. Playing (mathematical) games is very important.

Even today almost everyone agrees with the high efficiency of Varga's method, however, for some reason, only a few hundred teachers use it in practice. Other countries have already adopted this idea successfully, but in Hungary the process is very slow (not only in regard to the legislation, but in people's attitudes as well). Sometimes even the direction of the development is not obvious.

Tamás Varga was a co-editor of an internationally respected book on teaching

---

<sup>74</sup> SZENDREI (2007): 447-448.

<sup>75</sup> HALMOS (1978): 228.

<sup>76</sup> SZENDREI (2007): 449.

mathematics.<sup>77</sup> Today the national mathematic competition for 7-8th grade middle-school students is named after him.

### **Pál Erdős (1913-1996)**

*„Never, mathematicians say, has there been an individual like Paul Erdős. He was one of the century's greatest mathematicians, who posed and solved thorny problems in number theory and other areas and founded the field of discrete mathematics, which is the foundation of computer science. He was also one of the most prolific mathematicians in history, with more than 1,500 papers to his name. And, his friends say, he was also one of the most unusual.”<sup>78</sup>*

The quotation above is a good characterization of „Pali bácsi” (Uncle Paul). At that time, the Internet and email had not been invented yet, but he had traveled so much during his life that, some people said he was a virtual substitute for electronic mail. There is a quotation, which describes this very kindly: „Want to meet Erdős? – mathematicians would ask. Just stay here and wait. He'll show up”.<sup>79</sup> With no home and no permanent job, Erdős was the most prolific mathematician ever (he had 1,525 publications, more than Leonard Euler had).<sup>80</sup> Although he had no special teaching methodology – when he met somebody, even a talented child, he often told him/her about unsolved problems the first time – he was probably one of the most inspiring mathematicians of all time. He dealt with everyone as colleagues. In his life Erdős won several mathematical prizes with high cash rewards, but he did not need much money due to his strange and puritan lifestyle. He donated most of his fortune to support talented students and he offered cash prizes for solving problems he posed. During his career, Erdős worked with so many people (511 co-authors<sup>81</sup>), that some of his friends introduced the concept of Erdős-number, which describes the „collaborative distance” between a person and him. The definition is the following:

*Definition:* Pál Erdős has the Erdős-number of zero. Someone's Erdős-number is  $k+1$ , where  $k$  is the lowest Erdős-number of any co-authors. If there is no such  $k$ , then the person's Erdős-number is infinite.

Erdős has become a legendary figure of the mathematical folklore, which is proven by many projects (e. g. *The Erdős Number Project*), books, films, jokes and anecdotes related to him.

<sup>77</sup> SERVAIS, W. - VARGA, T. (Eds.): *Teaching School Mathematics*, Penguin Books and UNESCO, 1971.

<sup>78</sup> KOLATA, G. - Paul ERDOS: *a Math Wayfarer at Field's Pinnacle*, Dies at 83, The New York Times (September 24, 1996).

<sup>79</sup> SCHECHTER, B.: *My Brain Is Open : The Mathematical Journeys of Paul Erdos*, Simon & Schuster, 1998. 14.

<sup>80</sup> The Erdős Number Project (ENP), Publications of Paul Erdős, 2010. <http://www.oakland.edu/enp/pubinfo>.

<sup>81</sup> ENP, 2011. <http://www.oakland.edu/enp>.

### ***Diverse Primary and Secondary School Opportunities***

*„A child's brain is like a sponge.” (Proverb)*

Some people say that talented children should be recognized as early as possible and they should get special treatment from a very young age. Other people say that we only have to show the opportunities, and then, let students choose freely from them. I personally do not know which way is better. Probably, there are more than these two choices. Nevertheless, I cannot agree more with the quotation above.

In Hungary, there are many mathematical talent-nurturing programs. This is the consequence of having so many great educators, partly shown in the previous section. There are math contests even for third grade primary school pupils and, from the age of twelve, students who are interested in them have various [mathematical] opportunities.

I started dealing seriously with math when I entered secondary school. The personality and attitude of my math teacher, Vera Lányi played a huge role in my decision of mathematics. I remember that during the first class she showed us the journal „*KöMaL*” and encouraged us to think on the problems posed in it. She is also one of the main teachers of the Erdős Pál School for Mathematical Talents,<sup>82</sup> which is one of the most important mathematical workshops today.

The following section is strongly based on my own experience. Therefore, it is a more subjective than comprehensive introduction to the important building bricks of mathematical talent nurturing.

### **Advanced Mathematics Programs**

Today, twelve secondary schools offer a six-year long advanced mathematics program from the seventh grade up to the twelfth.<sup>83 84</sup> In the higher grades, the curriculum is usually divided into more parts (algebra, geometry, analysis, etc.) and students have seven to eight math classes per week. If this is not enough, the students can take part in extracurricular classes. Probably the most renowned advanced mathematics program is provided by the Fazekas Mihály Primary and Secondary School and Teacher Training Centre in Budapest. The first class was started in 1962 under the leadership of Gyula Komlós, and the teacher of mathematics was Imre Rábai.

---

<sup>82</sup> Pintér, F. - SZOLDATICS, J.: Erdős Pál Talent Recruiting Centre, <http://www.mik.vein.hu/erdosprog/index1.html>

<sup>83</sup> Matematika Oktatási Portál (MOP), Speciális matematika tagozatos iskolák és tanáraik, 2013. <http://matek.fazekas.hu/portal/rolunk/spectanarok.html>

<sup>84</sup> STOCKTON, J.: *Education of Mathematically Talented Students in Hungary*, Journal of Mathematics Education at Teachers College 1, 2010. 2.

## KöMaL – Mathematical and Physical Journal for Secondary Schools

This monthly journal for secondary school students is unique in the world. It was founded by a mathematics teacher, Dániel Arany,<sup>85</sup> in 1894. (At that time the name of the journal was Középiskolai Matematikai Lapok.) During its 118 years of existence (its publication was paused during the World Wars), many generations grew up solving and thinking on problems posed in the journal, which have always offered a great opportunity for students to read about exciting, extra-curricular topics in math and physics and to train themselves by participating in the contests. It is also an extensive source of classroom materials for the teacher.<sup>86</sup>

Many great scientists (mainly mathematicians) of the past and present, when they are asked about it, mention the KöMaL as one of the main sources of motivation at the beginning. There is not enough space in this paper to list all these scientists. I also have very good memories related to KöMaL. While thinking on problems in the journal, one can gain problem-solving experience for life.

*„Nowhere else in the world is there this kind of high school paper, and this more than anything else is responsible for the excellence of Hungarian mathematics.” (Tibor Gallai)<sup>87</sup>*

Nowadays, the KöMaL has four mathematics (A, B, C and K), two physics (P and M), and two computer science (I and S) competitions at different levels. In addition, one can participate in the online competitions, as well. Most contests are year-long challenges. In most cases, there are nine rounds in a school year; the problems are posed at the beginning of each month and the contestants have one month to solve and hand them in via mail or on the Electronic Workbook. One can find a detailed description of the contests on the homepage of the journal.<sup>88</sup> Another hugely motivating reward: the pictures of the best contestants are included to the legendary Photo Archive of the journal.<sup>89</sup> According to the idiom ‘*Practice makes perfect*,’ in the past century KöMaL has been the „playground” of practice not only for mathematicians, but also for many other excellent scientists.

### Mathematical Competitions

We have already explored the contests of KöMaL. Now, I would like to address some other contests. Due to the limitations of time and space, I will mention only

<sup>85</sup> BÓRA, E.: *Ismeretlen ismerősünk: Arany Dániel*, Természet Világa, October, 2009.

<sup>86</sup> NAGY, Gy.: *Tudományok katalizátora*, a KöMaL, Magyar Tudomány, 2003. 1455.

<sup>87</sup> Quoted by: HERSH – STEINER (1993): 16.

<sup>88</sup> KöMaL — Mathematical and Physical Journal for Secondary Schools, Problem Solving Competition: 2008/2009. <http://www.komal.hu/verseny/2008-09/kiiras.e.shtml>

<sup>89</sup> GRÖLLER, Á. - KERÉKFI, P. - NAGY, G. (Eds.): *KöMaL Portait Hall 1925-2012*, 2012. <http://www.komal.hu/tablok>



a few national competitions. For more detail I suggest the comprehensive publication of the János Bolyai Mathematical Society<sup>90</sup> which describes all of the national, regional, and even local mathematical competitions in detail. I will write briefly about the style of some secondary-school level competitions. Most of them have their analogues at lower levels. The historical background can be found in the references.

### ***Proof-based competitions***

- *Kürschák József Mathematical Competition* – started in 1894, it is the oldest mathematics competition in the world and the most prestigious one in Hungary. Even university freshmen are allowed to participate. Three problems are posed to be solved in four hours.
- *Arany Dániel Mathematical Competition* – This is ‘the’ national competition for 9-10th grade students.
- *National Competition for Secondary School Students (OKTV)*<sup>91</sup> – This is ‘the’ national competition for 11-12th grade students. With five hours of thinking time, this is the longest exam-type competition in Hungary.
- *International Hungarian Mathematical Competition* – It has been organized every year since 1991. The participants are Hungarian students from the Carpathian Basin (not only from Hungary).

### **Multiple-choice tests**

- *Math Kangaroo* – An international „speedy” competition. The contestants have only seventy-five minutes to answer thirty questions.
- „*Gordiusz*” *Mathematical Competition* – Very similar to the Math Kangaroo, but the students are given ninety minutes of thinking time.

### **Mathematical Camps and Math-Weekends**

These are the mathematical programs in which I took part during my secondary school years. There are many more opportunities,<sup>92</sup> but I do not have experience with all of the programs.

### ***University of Pannonia’s Erdős Pál School for Mathematical Talents***

This school was founded in 2001 by some enthusiastic math teachers who realized the importance of an institution that can provide intense extra-curricular

---

<sup>90</sup> CSORDÁS - NAGY (Eds. 2010).

<sup>91</sup> OKTV is the abbreviation of „*Országos Középiskolai Tanulmányi Verseny*” which means ‘National Competition for Secondary School Students’ in Hungarian.

<sup>92</sup> Csordás, M., Nagy, T. (Eds.), 2010.

education for those students who are interested in mathematics. Since its beginning, the Erdős Pál School has been in operation under the auspices of the University of Pannonia, which provides financial support to the school. Therefore, the admitted students do not have to pay a tuition fee, but they have to pay for other expenses (travel costs, room and board), however this is a relatively low amount of money.

Every student has to apply annually. The judgment of the applications is based on the applicant's former success in mathematical competitions. The very first time (when most students don't have a record in math contests yet) almost everyone is admitted (obviously a teacher's letter of recommendation is necessary). Each year fifty to sixty students (per grade) get the opportunity to pursue deeper knowledge in mathematics between the walls of the Erdős Pál School. The Erdős Pál School has two parallel programs in the cities Szolnok and Veszprém, which are in the Eastern and Western part of the country, respectively. So talented students from all regions of Hungary have equal opportunities to participate in the program.

The curriculum of the school is deep, extensive and focuses on enhancing the problem-solving skills of the students. The venue of the education is a vocational school in Veszprém, which is a medium size city in Hungary (I was a participant of the Veszprém-program). There are five long weekends in a school-year, when teachers and students meet. On each weekend students take part in seven 90-minute long interactive lectures about various topics presented by the best math teachers in the country. In most cases, a guest speaker (a famous scientist) gives an additional talk. At every math-weekend, teachers organize a problem solving contest. They pose two problems for each grade. Students are free to think on them. The solutions have to be handed in on the last day. The successful competitors' rewards are beautiful books on diverse topics.<sup>93</sup>

The Erdős Pál School for Mathematical Talents has a special place in my memory. I made many friends and met a lot of inspiring teachers there. I continue to have a connection with them. I experienced my first success in mathematics in Veszprém, as well. I regularly took part in the problem-solving contest and often stayed up at night thinking about the problems. I cannot describe the feeling I felt when I won my first book. I am proud of the fact that I was there for all twenty weekends during my secondary school years.

### ***The Mathematical Camps of Lajos Pósa***

Lajos Pósa has been already mentioned, as the member of the very first advanced math class at the „*Fazekas School*” in Budapest. First of all, I would like to write about him and, just after that, about his unique math camps.

---

<sup>93</sup> PINTÉR, F. - SZOLDATICS, J.: *Erdős Pál Talent Recruiting Centre*, <http://www.mik.vein.hu/erdosprog/index1.html>

### Short Biography

He was born in 1947 in Budapest. After graduating as a mathematician from the Eötvös Loránd University, he started teaching at the Department of Analysis. However, he started doing mathematics much earlier. Pósa met Pál Erdős when he was just twelve. I would like to quote Erdős's famous anecdote from 1969 about their first meeting:

*„I will talk about Pósa who is now 22 years old and the author of about 8 papers. I met him before he was 12 years old. When I returned from the United States in the summer of 1959, I was told about a little boy whose mother was a mathematician and who knew quite a bit about high school mathematics. I was very interested and the next day I had lunch with him. While Pósa was eating his soup I asked him the following question: Prove that if you have  $n + 1$  positive integer less than or equal to  $2n$ , some pair of them are relatively prime. It is quite easy to see that the claim is not true of just  $n$  such numbers, because no two of the  $n$  even numbers up to  $2n$  are relatively prime; Actually I discovered this simple result some years ago but it took me about ten minutes to find the really simple proof. Pósa sat there eating his soup and then after half a minute or so he said „If you have  $n + 1$  positive integers less than or equal to  $2n$ , some two of them will have to be consecutive and thus relatively prime.” Needless to say, I was very much impressed, and I venture to class this on the same level as Gauss' summation of the positive integers up to 100 when he was just 7 years old.” (Pál Erdős)<sup>94</sup>*

This little story tells much about Pósa's talent. He was only 15 years old when he caught the world's attention by giving a sufficient condition for the existence of a Hamiltonian circuit in a graph. Today this is known as Pósa's Theorem.<sup>95</sup> But after a while Pósa was not really interested in mathematical research anymore. He completely turned to teaching mathematics. Actually, he started teaching very early. He was still a secondary school student when he had the opportunity to give lectures in front of his class. As a freshman at the university he was requested to teach at his former secondary school, the „Fazekas”. At that time, he had many students who later became relevant mathematicians, e. g. László Babai, György Elekes (†), Péter Komjáth and Imre Z. Ruzsa. During the seventies, he also worked together with Tamás Varga on the reform of mathematics education in Hungary. On March 14, 2011 Pósa received the Széchenyi-Prize, which is one of the most prestigious awards in Hungary.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> HONSBERGER, R.: *The Story of Louis Pósa*, IN: *Mathematical Gems*, The Mathematical Association of America, 1973. <http://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/navigation/ideas/articles/honsberger/index.shtml>

<sup>95</sup> PÓSA, L.: *On the Circuits of Finite Graphs*, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Matematikai Kutató Intézetének Közleménye 8, 1963. 355-361.

<sup>96</sup> Magyar Tudományos Akadémia (MTA), Tizenöten vehettek át Széchenyi-díjat a Parlamentben, 2011. [http://mta.hu/mta\\_hirei/tizenoten-vehettek-at-szechenyi-dijat-a-parlamentben-127147](http://mta.hu/mta_hirei/tizenoten-vehettek-at-szechenyi-dijat-a-parlamentben-127147)

### ***His Mathematical Camps***

Since 1988, Lajos Pósa has organized more than 200 math camps for pupils from the age of 12 to 18. These programs are very different from other mathematics camps. Pósa deals in parallel with many groups of students. In a group there are usually 15-30 youngsters, and he meets with each group twice or three times a year. These meetings are whole-weekend programs with a very intense curriculum.

The main idea of his methodology is „*teaching mathematics through discovery*”. Basically, this means that the student should figure out as many proofs as possible, preferably without help. However, the problems are selected very carefully in order to push the students gently in the right direction. In most cases the problems are strongly related to each other, but these connections are often hidden and they seem to be very tricky at first look. Then, as the student solves more problems, the connection is gradually revealed and there is a magical moment when the last piece of the puzzle finds its place, too. It is amazing and highly respectable that despite having 40-years experience in teaching, Pósa still works very hard to prepare for his next camp. This system works very well. Pósa’s many former students who became successful prove the efficiency of his method.

It is extremely important that the connections between Pósa and his students are not interrupted after they become too old to take part in his camps. He often invites his former students to work with him as ‘teaching assistants’ in the camps. I think I am very lucky that I could and can still learn from him.

### ***Nagy Károly Mathematical Students' Meeting***

This annual conference for secondary school students and teachers was started in 1991 by György Oláh (†) („*Gyuri Bácsi*”), an exceptional mathematics teacher from Komárno, Slovakia. His main aim was to organize a conference for all Hungarian students who are interested in mathematics. They must also live within the borders of the historical Hungary (as they were before the Treaty of Trianon). This Students’ Meeting has a double purpose. Obviously, the first one is the nurturing of the mathematically talented. The second one is to provide the opportunity for students, who are interested in math, to meet each other, no matter where they come from.

I met Gyuri Bácsi in a mathematical summer camp where he invited me to the next Nagy Károly Students’ Meeting. In the following years, I took part in this program five times. Three times as a student, and two times as a lecturer. When I graduated from secondary school, Gyuri Bácsi requested me to give a presentation the following year. It was a huge honor for me and Gyuri Bácsi’s general attitude toward his students was highly motivating, as well. I think this is the most important thing for young math-candidates: to get motivation – and, of course, knowledge – from their teachers.

### ***About the Meeting***

The venues are the Selye János Secondary School and the Vocational School, both located in Komárno, Slovakia. The Nagy Károly Students' Meeting is a weekend-long conference with 90-minute lectures about various topics in mathematics held in different sections. All in all, there are approximately 30-35 lectures during the weekend, but a student has the opportunity to take part only in six lectures, since many of them are held simultaneously. The lectures are often interactive: in some cases the teacher gives handouts to the members of the audience and assigns some tricky problems that will be discussed at the end of the lecture. Traditionally, on the day of arrival there is always a cultural evening organized by the hosts.

The Nagy Károly Mathematical Students' meeting is a unique opportunity for most everyone. Although I am not a secondary school student anymore, every year I look forward to the „*Nagy Károly Days*” very much.

### ***Olympiad Trainings***

A successful participation in the International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO) is the consequence of very good preparation. Although I have never taken part in the IMO, I was a regular visitor of the trainings in Budapest and Pécs. In Budapest there is the central training center, and in the bigger cities there used to be the regional training centers. The key figure of the central trainings was István Reiman (1927-2012) who was the leader of the Hungarian IMO-team from 1961 until 2002. (Due to financial problems the János Bolyai Mathematical Society has recently suspended the regional trainings.<sup>97</sup>)

Surprisingly, I have more pleasant memories about the regional training in Pécs, which was held at the University of Pécs. The instructor was János Ruff, an enthusiastic assistant professor of the University. We understood each other very well and, therefore, I really looked forward to the meetings with him.

Once I was the only student who attended the training. János asked the question: „*Do you know complex numbers?*” My answer was a short „*No.*” „*If no, then we don't have time to waste!*” and the following afternoon János's lecture was an introduction to complex numbers. His explanations were so effective that in the following days, I already could use this tool to solve a hard problem (category A) from the journal *KöMaL*.

### ***Deep and Extensive Academic Curriculum***

In this section I will try to introduce how math education works at the Eötvös Loránd University where I study. Nowadays, the Institute of Mathematics of the ELTE is a renowned workshop of higher mathematics with internationally recognized

---

<sup>97</sup> CSORDÁS - NAGY (2010): 180.

professors and research fellows. As I mentioned earlier, the Institute of Mathematics has eight departments and 120 professional mathematicians who are teaching the next generation and doing research on the cutting edge in various topics.

Due to the financial structure of the education system in Hungary (which means the institution gets a determined grant per student from the state), many universities admit all of their applicants (within physical limits). At the Eötvös Loránd University approximately 200-250 freshmen major in mathematics. When you apply you do not have to worry about your grades. Nearly everybody gets in.<sup>98</sup> It is completely clear that 250 people cannot be taught it the same way. The ELTE has a striking solution for that. On the very first day at the university, all freshmen have to take a test which measures their mathematical backgrounds. If you fail the test, you have to take an additional basic mathematics course that provides a revision of the secondary school curriculum. People who achieve 75% or more get an 'outstanding' certificate. But the most important thing is that in the first year all (!) math courses are offered at three different levels (regular < advanced < intense). Those students who took part regularly in competitions and math programs are supposed to choose the 'intense' level, but this is not mandatory. At the end of the first academic year everyone has to choose one of the four specializations (Mathematical Analyst, Mathematics Teacher, Applied Mathematics, and Pure Mathematics). Instead of highlighting the differences between the U. S. and the Hungarian higher education system (there are too many to list here, and my knowledge in the topic is not sufficient to do it), I would like to give a short outline of the courses of '*Mathematics BSc – Pure Mathematics*' major, which is an undergraduate-level curriculum. However, I have to tell about some differences anyway. In the table below you may notice that there are only six columns. Instead of four years, the undergraduate programs in Hungary are generally three-years long, but most graduate programs need at least two years to complete. The curriculum<sup>99</sup> is enormous and often is not easy to keep up with it.

### ***A Very Strong Community***

*„(...) A community needs a soul if it is to become a true home for human beings. You, the people must get it this soul.” (Pope John Paul II)*

Studying mathematics means not only theory and beautiful thoughts, but it has also meant friendships and lifelong experiences for me. Hungary (and even the world) is small enough, so I can say: there is only one big community in mathematics. Although there are some separate islands, the „*collaborative*

---

<sup>98</sup> Since 2010 there have been intense debates about higher education reform. Many changes will be introduced in 2013, including the cut of number of students funded by the state, and also budget cuts of the institutions. At this point, many features of the new system are not clarified, therefore this part of the article could be inaccurate.

<sup>99</sup> Matematika BSc tantervi háló, 2011-2012. [http://www.cs.elte.hu/~ewkiss/ujbsc/ujhonlap/BSc\\_Mat\\_halo\\_2010.html](http://www.cs.elte.hu/~ewkiss/ujbsc/ujhonlap/BSc_Mat_halo_2010.html)

*distance*” between them is probably less than we think.

Thanks to the many math camps and weekends that I participated in, I already knew almost the entire class when I entered university. My friends were there, my former roommate in a camp was there, and almost everyone [I met at camp] was there. During the Nagy Károly Students’ Meetings, I made friends from the neighboring countries, too. While I was studying at Beloit College during the Spring semester in 2011, I continued to meet many people; mathematicians and non-mathematicians, alike. This is what really counts: making friendships through mathematics, a subject of study that does not know borders or distance.

### ***Challenges Today***

In the last section of my paper I would like to achieve three objectives. My first objective is to highlight the main problems of the mathematical education in Hungary today. Secondly, I would like to write about the future possibilities lying ahead for mathematical education in Hungary. Finally, I would like to summarize my impressions about the education system of the USA and compare them with my Hungarian experiences. In my opinion, both systems have advantages and disadvantages.

### **Problems to Solve**

Nowadays, Hungary is facing serious economical and social challenges. The current worldwide economical recession and financial crisis, international political conflicts and debates have had a deep impact on this country. However, many problems have deeper roots and they have existed in the system for decades. There are lots of difficulties to handle from all areas of life and therefore, educational issues sometimes remain in the background. In the following paragraphs I would like to point out and explore some of the most important problems of mathematical education in Hungary. These problems are closely related to each other.

The first issue I would like to deal with is the relationship between students' mathematical performance and their social backgrounds. The PISA<sup>100</sup> surveys – which measure the ability of application of mathematical knowledge in „*everyday life*” rather than the possession of basic mathematical skills – showed that the performance of students depends highly on their social backgrounds. In 2009, Hungary finished twenty-ninth out of 65 countries in the field of mathematics. (The United States finished thirtieth.) This small country, which has given so many scientists to the world, performed modestly on this test.<sup>101</sup> Since 2000, the beginnings of PISA assessments, teachers and educators have been divided by the survey and its methodology, probably because it is very difficult to interpret the results. Some educators say that despite having the necessary mathematical knowledge and skills (as it was confirmed

---

<sup>100</sup> Programme for International Student Assessment

<sup>101</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), PISA 2009 Results: Executive Summary, 2010. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/60/46619703.pdf>

by the TIMSS<sup>102</sup> surveys, where Hungarian students regularly performed significantly above the average<sup>103</sup>), students are not able to use them in real-life situations (as it was suggested by PISA). Consequently, many different recommendations and reform proposals have been made by politicians, teachers and educators in the past decade in order to create a „better” education system. Some were partially realized. Although there are many different points of view, there is one particular aspect that almost everyone agrees with, and this is the high dependence of the performance of students on social and family backgrounds. The phenomena which have to be mentioned here only partly originate from the nature of math as a school subject. Rather they seem to be the serious, complex problems of the whole school system. The strong material, cultural and lifestyle polarization of the society is clearly mirrored in the school system and in school results.

Poverty is a serious factor that should not be ignored when we try to understand the results of any surveys on education and educational systems. The number of impoverished, unemployed, defenseless people is extremely large in some districts of Hungary. Many children between the ages 6-10 go to school with empty stomach, often exhausted, because there is no food at home. Therefore they cannot pay attention to anything, not even for one or two minutes. They are uninterested, unable to learn, which is closely linked with their bad financial situation. Although a good teacher can do a lot, she/he of course cannot cure the financial and moral injuries alone. For all of these reasons it would be greatly important to provide a satisfactory educational and medical support system and long-term, in-depth programs in the Hungarian society to help these financially handicapped, underprivileged children and to solve their problems gradually.<sup>104</sup>

Moreover, if the results of these surveys are examined in their relationship with the parents' qualifications, it is clear that the children of the least educated parents perform at the lowest level. The living place of students also plays a significant role: children attending the schools of small settlements achieve the worst results in mathematics. Finding a solution to these problems is not entirely a methodology problem. The majority of math teachers must deal with this problem in isolation. The widening of education at secondary school level resulted in new tasks which were not followed by the implementation of adequate pedagogical and methodological techniques.<sup>105</sup>

Although we have a world-class talent-nurturing system, especially in mathematics,

---

<sup>102</sup> Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study

<sup>103</sup> MARTIN, M.O. - MULLIS, I.V.S. - PIERRE, F. (Eds.): *TIMSS 2007 International Mathematics Report: Findings from IEA's Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study at the Fourth and Eighth Grades*. TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, Lynch School of Education, Boston College, 2008. 34-35.

<sup>104</sup> C. NEMÉNYI, E.: *Az alsó tagozatos matematika tantárgy helyzete és fejlesztési feladatai*, Új Pedagógiai Szemle 53, 2002. 89-98. According to education expert and mathematics teacher Zsuzsanna Somfai, the situation today is even worse, than it was in 2002. (Personal communication with Zs. Somfai, 52. Rátz László Vándorgyűlés, Pécs, 2012.)

<sup>105</sup> SOMFAI, Zs.: *A matematika tantárgy helyzete a felső tagozaton és a középiskolában*, Új Pedagógiai Szemle 53, 2002. 99-115.



only a relatively small number of (primary and secondary) schools can be regarded as the venues of talent recruiting. Unfortunately, many secondary schools are falling behind. Although the teaching methods of Tamás Varga, recognized world-wide, are part of the National Core Curriculum, and educators usually acknowledge them, only a few hundred teachers actually follow them in practice. Theoretical knowledge is often overemphasized compared to creativity and experiential learning.<sup>106</sup> Therefore, secondary school graduates have many abstract tools in their hands but, in a new situation, they will not be able to use their knowledge. In most cases there is not enough time to deal with problems from everyday life. The less talented students lose the thread and will carry bad memories from math classes. These people might later get into high governmental positions and make decisions about funding science and education. The bad experiences with mathematics could be detrimental. According to one of my professors at the university, we have to face similar problems. When a mathematician graduates from the ELTE he/she is familiar with many branches of mathematics and knows lots of theories, however, he/she is unable to solve a simple operations research problem.

Another problem is the shrinking number of teachers (especially science teachers). In my opinion, one of the main reasons for this shrinkage is that teachers are seriously underpaid. The net salary of an average secondary school teacher with twenty years teaching experience is about \$10,000 per year.<sup>107</sup> Most young people, who are interested in mathematics, choose specialization '*applied math*' and after graduation they might find a job in the financial sector or at a computer science company. Fortunately, there are some exceptions; some teachers still work enthusiastically 10-12 hours a day (partly for free) to share their knowledge with pupils, to organize math circles, and to nurture talents. But no one is able to do it for a whole life. Those secondary school teachers who are active now are getting older and it is not clear who will be the next generation of teachers. This is a very serious problem to be solved in the Hungarian education system.

Many university professors and secondary school teachers have been complaining about the '*Bologna process*' in higher education, particularly in teachers' education (the renowned mathematician Miklós Laczkovich wrote a tough criticism<sup>108</sup> about the system), which roughly means that the education is split into two parts: three years in undergraduate education and two years in a graduate school. Today in Hungary, a Bachelor's Degree in teaching is virtually worthless; therefore, teacher candidates have to go to a graduate school anyway. Then why split the education process? A lot of people think that a well-structured five year program for teachers would produce much better results.

---

<sup>106</sup> C. NEMÉNYI (2002).

<sup>107</sup> Tudományos és Innovációs Dolgozók Szakszervezete, Közalkalmazotti bértábla, 2010. [http://www.tudosz.hu/2010\\_bertabla.html](http://www.tudosz.hu/2010_bertabla.html)

<sup>108</sup> LACZKOVICH, M.: *Bologna és a tanárképzés*, Fizikai Szemle, 2009. 218-220. <http://www.kfki.hu/fszemle/archivum/fsz0906/FizSzem-200906.pdf>

## Hungary and The United States: A Short Comparison

There are so many differences between the two systems in higher education that the title of this section, '*A Short Comparison*' sounds paradoxical. However, I will try to sum up my experiences (which reflect the viewpoint of a math student from Hungary who spent one semester at a small liberal arts college). I can easily imagine that other people see things differently.

The very first and maybe the biggest difference is that in Hungary, most universities are owned by the state and the first degree is free for all (of course your grades have to be high enough to get into a university). More precisely, the tuition fee for twelve semesters is financed by the state (six semesters in undergraduate school, four semesters in graduate school and you get two extra semesters, too). Compared to the American education system this seems to be very comfortable from the students' viewpoint. Parents do not have to pay thousands of dollars annually to send their children to the university. However, most institutions are struggling with very serious financial problems (even the Eötvös Loránd University which is a top-ranked university in Hungary) and, according to my experiences, the circumstances at an American university are generally much better than at a Hungarian one. In addition, Hungarian university professors are underpaid. On the other hand, I remember my first days at Beloit College (Beloit, Wisconsin). I was flabbergasted by the venues of education. The College's sports center is bigger than the municipal gymnasium in my hometown, Pécs (which is a quite large city in Hungary with its 160,000 inhabitants). And the Center of Sciences at Beloit is simply amazing. In my opinion, sooner or later, the Hungarian government will have to introduce a moderate tuition fee with a fair grant and scholarship system to keep the high quality in education and to avoid financial bankruptcy of the institutions.

Secondly, in Hungary everyone has to declare their major before applying to university. Even in their freshman year students have to take courses mainly from their chosen field of interest. Actually, if you are a math major, you have the opportunity to take, for example, history classes if you are interested in history, but the mandatory courses are so demanding that you simply do not have enough time to deal with other topics. Compared to a liberal arts school (e. g. Beloit College), which provides a broad education, the curriculum at Hungarian universities is greatly/intensely focused. An average student at the Eötvös Loránd University has many more courses per semester, than someone who studies at Beloit College. In addition, we (people who are specialized in pure mathematics) deal with topics even in the first semester, which are regarded as graduate level topics in the United States.

### ***The Future of Mathematics Education in Hungary***

During the previous sections we could see that '*Hungarian Mathematics*' (mathematical research, education and talent support) has very rich traditions and

a long history. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, remarkable educators and researchers have been creating a culture of problem solving not only in their homeland. Hundreds of Hungarian mathematicians (and of course scientists from other fields) have been spending shorter or longer periods abroad, and they spread these traditions in many countries. Several mathematicians were and are still active in the United States, and Marcel Riesz (1886-1969) and Péter Frankl (1953–) have made remarkable contributions to mathematical life in Sweden and Japan, respectively.<sup>109</sup>

After all, many questions arise naturally: How will these traditions survive? Or we could ask a tougher question: *Will* these traditions survive? What is the future of printed textbooks in today's „*e-society*?” These questions are quite complex in my opinion, since the world in which we live changes continuously, and the speed of the change is increasing rapidly. The Internet and various search engines (e. g. *Google, Yahoo!, bing*, etc.) have dramatically affected the way we access information, and it is clear that they have a deep influence on the learning habits. In the following paragraphs I would like to sum up my concerns and reassurances about the future of mathematics education and talent support in Hungary.

In public education, teaching methods should keep up with the technological improvements. Teachers say that nowadays students think differently and they cannot be motivated anymore (or it has become much more difficult to motivate them) in traditional ways.<sup>110</sup>

Despite the generally good conditions in talent-support, there are some valid concerns about the future in this field, too. On one hand, the number of math contests, summer camps and special programs has been probably never as high as today, but on the other hand, the currently existing problems (some were pointed out in the previous subsection) endanger the whole school system, including the recognition and treatment of mathematically talented students.

The journal „*KöMaL*” has also several problems to solve. The regular physics summer camp organized by the editors for secondary school students was canceled in 2011 simply because there were not enough applicants. In addition, the number of the participating contestants shows a decreasing trend. There are various explanations for this phenomenon. First, it is possible that the acquaintance of the journal is not high enough even among math teachers, so many of them are unable to tell their students about the existence of „*KöMaL*”. Second, one may think that the new generation is not motivated anymore to spend time thinking about mathematical problems, simply because there are so many other forms of recreation. However, this monthly *must* be preserved for future generations, and there is one very simple fact that supports this statement:

---

<sup>109</sup> GÁRDING, L.: *Marcel Riesz in memoriam*, Acta Mathematica 124, 1970. I-XI. STAAR, G.: *Az előadóművész: Beszélgetés Frankl Péter akadémikussal*, Magyar Tudomány 45. 2000.

<sup>110</sup> PÁSZTOR, J. - SZÉKELY, M. - MARCZIS, G. - CSÜRKE, Ibolya - KLAGYIVIKNÉ VADKERTI, M.: „*A matematika tanulása örömteli legyen a gyerek számára*” - Kerekasztal beszélgetés. Új Pedagógiai Szemle, 2002. 141-147.

The „*KöMaL*” has always proved to be an excessively significant factor in attracting young students to the world of mathematics and physics, and helping them to become great problem solvers and problem posers.

Although no one can predict the future, I hope that Hungarian traditions in mathematics will survive the rapid social and technological (and moral!) transformations. We have many reasons to believe this and we have to work toward this aim. Hopefully ten, fifteen, twenty, or thirty years from now I will be able to write again about these questions, and to answer them.

### **Conclusion**<sup>111</sup>

This paper is meant to be a short overview about traditions in Hungarian mathematical education. An additional aim was to arouse interest in the topic. Hopefully, both goals were achieved. Throughout the previous sections I have already discussed many questions, phenomena, and problems, so in this closing part of the article I would like to briefly summarize what I regard as the most important messages of those traditions.

The first moral is about the importance of school teachers. As I showed through many examples, the efficiency of an educational system depends highly on the people who work within it – the teachers. The whole machinery is the result of individual stories and master-pupil-collaborations. Several cases confirm that educators can develop a whole culture around themselves. Therefore, it is very important to support them not only financially, but also morally. We should try to establish a suitable teaching and learning environment, regardless to the geographic and social circumstances of the teachers and students, as well. Until the profession of teaching is not honored properly, and acknowledged again by the vast majority of the society, it will be almost impossible to make any progress.

The other message is that we should not forget what great personalities taught us and, what they were working for with total dedication. Nowadays, one can feel that many politicians, educators and alleged reformers unlearn or even worse, they ignore the huge amount of knowledge and experience accumulated through decades by their ancestors. In my opinion – even in this rapidly changing world – we can greatly benefit from our traditions. As a final message, I would like to close my work with the words of Loránd Eötvös: „*Learn from each other so that you can teach better.*”<sup>112</sup>

---

<sup>111</sup> This paper would not have been possible without the support of many people. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ádám Besenyei, Dr. Andras Boros-Kazai, Mary Boros-Kazai, Dr. Paul Campbell, Patrick O'Connor, Dr. Dave Dwyer, Christina Eddington, Dr. Dave Ellis, Dr. Clark Kimberling, Dr. Vilmos Komornik, Dr. István Laukó, Vera Lányi, György Marczis, Margaret McMullan, György Oláh (†), Dr. Gabriella Pintér, Lajos Pósa, Dr. János Ruff, and Dr. Hung-Hsi Wu.

<sup>112</sup> ÁRVAI WIESCHENBERG (1984): 22.

## ***European Questions, 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries***

- history of the cavalry for the Wurmser Freikorps, 1793 – 1794
- debates in the Romanian Press on the dangers of a German empire
- Masaryk and the problem of small nations



**Attila Réfi**

***The Croatian-Slavonic Grenz (Border) Hussars' Role in the Campaigns 1793–94 against the Revolutionary France or the history of the cavalry for the Wurmser Freikorps\****

**Abstract**

The paper elaborates the creation and hitherto practically undiscovered history of the cavalry for the Austrian-Styrian or also known as Wurmser Free Corps based on research in archives. The short-lived body of troops has an importance due to the fact that we can consider it the predecessor of the latter Croatian-Slavonic Grenz Hussar Regiment or the only Imperial–Royal Hussar Regiment with mainly Southern Slav soldiers during the French Wars. The study keeps track the history of the cavalry for the Free Corps from its creation in early 1793 until the official separation from the infantry in the end of 1794. The paper presents the reasons and the process of the road to the independency as a body of troops and the relevant commanders and the officer corps of the formation in addition to the unit's participation in the military operations.

*Keywords:* Hussar, War of the First Coalition, Imperial-Royal Army, *Freikorps* (Free Corps), Military Frontier, Croatia and Slavonia, Southern Slav

It is known the Hussars, which are considered a traditionally Hungarian unit type, have been brought into service of many other armies – especially by Hungarian emigrants – during their days of glory due their versatile tactical adaptability and their success in many battlefields. At the same time it is not widely known that other Hussar units consisting significantly non-Hungarian, other nationalities have been setting up on several occasions, usually for short periods amidst the Hungarian Hussars: these Hussar units was supplemented exclusively from the Croatian-Slavonic Military Frontier<sup>1</sup> and the Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia,<sup>2</sup> so their rank and file was almost entirely Southern Slavs and this

---

\* It was supported by The Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (Hungarian abbreviation: OTKA) within the No. PD 104358 research program called *Hussars, Cuirassiers and Uhlans. A comparative research of the Hungarian, German and Polish cavalry-officers' élite of the Imperial-Royal Army in the Age of the French Wars (1792–1815)*.

<sup>1</sup>The Military Frontier (*Grenze*) was a specific territorial and administrative unit directed by military authorities. An entirely militarized zone was created during the wars against the Ottoman Empire within the Croatian frontier, its population was exempt from taxation, but they have to do military service. The population consisted mostly Croats and other Southern Slavs, who was fleeing from the Turks in the Balkans and they excellently guarded the borders against the frequent Turkish intrusions. The system stood the test, so it extended to Transylvania along the border from the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. See NAGY-L. István: *A császári-királyi hadsereg, 1765-1815. Szervezettörténet és létszámviszonyok* (The Imperial-Royal Army, 1765-1815. The History of Organisation and Strength, Budapest, 2010. PhD thesis, manuscript 79.

<sup>2</sup>The Hungarian and the Croatian Kingdoms made up a personal union from 1091. The latter one

fact is not so surprising regarding the Southern Slav relationships of the Hussars originated during the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries, when the first Hussars units had been established.

However the origin of the branch of service has not been clarified up to the present. It is an established fact the Hungarian light cavalry with its ancient tradition and significant loss of importance due the Western effects had to adapt to the changing conditions because of a new, fearless enemy during its establishing in the period of the Ottoman Empire's aggressive advancement. It was a hugely successful adaptation and undoubtedly the Southern Slavs were playing an important role in this success, since they knew well the Turkish tactics at the time and a lot of them were pushed into the Hungarian border. Among other things it is demonstrated by the fact that the Hungarian light cavalry was called also *Rac* (an old Hungarian name for Serbs) by the native sources in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and it is an explicit reference to the heavy presence of the Serbs and other Southern Slav elements among the Hussars who were having several kind of names at that time – their presence had been generated by the Turkish expansion in the Balkans, which resulted in a human migration – and sharing the same fates, when Hungarians, Southern Slavs and to a lesser degree also Romanians were fighting shoulder to shoulder against the Turks. In the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, when the Southern Slav influx was decreased, the Hungarian ethnic group was become almost exclusively in the rank of the Hussars.<sup>3</sup> In spite of this fact, the official Austrian and then the Western European sources was calling summarily the light cavalry primarily recruited from the countries of the Hungarian Holy Crown as 'Croatian' (Kroaten), in all probability because the first light cavalry units from the Hungarian Kingdoms who made an appearance in the Habsburg armed forces during the reign of Ferdinand the First were riders from Croatia in Count Ferenc Batthyányi, *Ban*<sup>4</sup> of Croatia's service.<sup>5</sup> Henceforward also the ill-informed foreigners used uniformly the 'Croatian' denotation for the real Hungarian Hussars, who had the same bearing as the former ones, in fact very often for the Hungarian light infantry too completely apart from their nationality.<sup>6</sup> The Hussar

---

was divided into several parts: the area between the Drava River and the Croatian seacoast was called Croatia after the Turks had been expelled, while in the eastern part the area between the Drave and the Sava rivers was named Slavonia. Dalmatia hold possessed by the Venetian Republic from the 17<sup>th</sup> century, but its name has been occurred on the official designation.

<sup>3</sup> ZACHAR József (ed.): *A magyar huszár* (The Hungarian Hussar), Corvina, Budapest, 2000. 14-15. Since the Turks had annexed all the former Southern Slavic territories, the opportunities for mass migration to the Hungarian Kingdom have virtually ceased to exist. However in parallel with this phenomenon, the number of the Southern Slavic light cavalry was growing steady in the Ottoman Turkish army.

<sup>4</sup> It is the denomination of the governor for Croatia province.

<sup>5</sup> ZACHAR (2000): 28. WREDE, Alphons Freiherr von: *Geschichte der k. und k. Wehrmacht. Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts*, I–V. Band, Seidel & Sohn, Wien, 1898-1905. III/1. 8. BERKÓ István: *A magyarság a régi hadseregben* (Hungarians in the Old Army), Melléklet a Magyar Katonai Közlöny 1926. évi 11-12. füzetéhez, M. Kir. Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, 7.

<sup>6</sup> Also the *Rac* and the Wallachian names were occurred regard to the Hungarian troops. See BERKÓ: 20.



name became an exclusively used term only during the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century in Hungary and all over Europe in parallel with the rising and international spreading of its classical form.

\*

Regular light cavalry units were setting up and deploying among the infantry on the Croatian-Slavonic Border after the organization of the first military frontier district during the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century and inter alia these units earned their fame in the Thirty Years' War. Light cavalry units from the Military Frontier was fighting for the Austrian Imperial army under the names Slavonic National Hussar Regiment and *Rac* National Hussar Regiment respectively against the Hungarian and Transylvanian freedom-fighters led by Prince Ferenc Rákóczi the Second.<sup>7</sup> Later eleven *Grenz* (Border) regiments were created between 1746 and 1750, when the regular Croatian-Slavonic *Grenz* (Border) units had been organized and in addition four *Grenz* Hussar regiments were established: the Károlyváros, the Warasdín, the Slavonic and the Sylvania Regiments. The latter one was merged with the Slavonic Hussar Regiment in 1750, but at the same time a fourth Croatian-Slavonic Hussar regiment was set up and called the Ban Hussar Regiment.<sup>8</sup> These Hussar units were disembodied as independent regiments between 1779 and 1780, the numbers of their squadrons had been decreased all but the Slavonic Hussars, the regimental staffs had been disbanded and the officer corps and the troops had been divided as follows: a half Hussar squadron went to regiments of Károlyváros, one squadron to the Ban and the Warasdín Regiments and two squadrons to the Slavonic regiments.<sup>9</sup> Also these Hussar squadrons were disbanded on 1 March, 1786 and every regiment just had 40 dispatch-riders.

Previously a light armed unit was created with two infantry battalions and a Hussar division (two squadrons) in 1784, centred in Warasdín and it was called Croatian-Slavonic *Grenz Freikorps* (Free Corps) during the so-called Kettle War, when it seemed a war were about to break out against the Republic of the Seven Netherlands. Also the unit was named Brentano *Freikorps* after its commander. However, when the threat of war ceased to exist, the *Freikorps* was disbanded in 1785.<sup>10</sup>

The Imperial-Royal High Command planned to set up a Slavonic-Banatian Hussar regiment again at the same year and the unit would have operated at peaceful times too. It would have been sent three squadrons by the Pétervárad *Grenz* Infantry Regiment, two squadrons by the Brod *Grenz* and one squadron by

---

<sup>7</sup> See WREDE: III/2. 799-800. – The struggle between the Habsburg Empire and the rebels led by Ferenc Rákóczi called Rákóczi's War for Independence started in 1703 and ended in 1711, when the rebels on the verge of defeat made a compromised peace treaty.

<sup>8</sup> See WREDE: V. 335–338.

<sup>9</sup> WREDE: V. 230. The author improperly mentions companies instead of squadrons, when he describes the events. The company term was not used no more in regard to the cavalry, it meant alone an infantry company and its equivalent was the squadron (*escadron*) in the cavalry.

<sup>10</sup> See WREDE: II. 484 and III/2. 915.

the Gradiska, the German-Banatian and the Wallachian-Illyrian *Grenz* Regiment, respectively. The Banatian regiments were previously ordered to create a squadron for each regiment in 1782, although only the German–Banatian Regiment fulfilled this command. The plan for creating a would-be Hussar squadron to the Wallachian-Illyrian Regiments and itself the plan for creating the regiment was cancelled in 1786 due to the previously mentioned disbanding in regard to the Hussars of the Croatian-Slavonic Military Frontier.<sup>11</sup>

However several Military Frontier *Freikorps* had been created for shorter periods during the Habsburg Empire's last war against the Turks between 1787 and 1791<sup>12</sup> and these units had Hussar squadrons, sometimes even divisions in addition their infantry. We can mention a Serbian *Freikorps*, the Branovacký *Freikorps* and another one, the Vukassovich *Freikorps* – the latter's Hussar squadron became independent and assumed the name Knesevech *Freikorps* in January 1790.<sup>13</sup> These units were disbanded after the end of the military operations in the autumn of 1790 as usual.

Thus at the dawn of a series of bitter struggle starting 1792 and raging on a quarter century between the revolutionary France and Europe of the '*ancien régime*', the Croatian-Slavonic-Banatian Military Frontier had not any Hussar units despite its previously mentioned traditions.

\*

On April 1792, at the time of the French proclamation of war the whole Imperial-Royal Army had 77 line infantry regiments, 17 *Grenz* infantry regiments, 34 cavalry regiments, including 9 Cuirassier, 2 Carabinier, 7 Chevauxleger, 1 *Uhlan* (Lancer) regiments, 20 grenadier battalions, 1 *Tschaikisten* battalion (the special riverboat unit of the *Grenz* troops),<sup>14</sup> 3 artillery regiments, engineer troops, wagon train and health units.<sup>15</sup> The army on peace footing numbered 310,615 soldiers according to the plans, but only 210,914 soldiers were fit for service.<sup>16</sup> In the beginning the Imperial-Royal High Command put into action only 30 percents of its mobilizable army<sup>17</sup> due to partly financial difficulties, partly they underestimated

---

<sup>11</sup> WREDE: V. 231.

<sup>12</sup> The war started without official proclamation of war at the end of 1787 and the Habsburg Empire just sent its proclamation of war in February 1788. The Gyurgyevo Truce put an end to the military operations on 23 September, 1790, although the Peace Treaty was signed only on 4 August, 1791 in Sistovo. See NAGY-L.: 270, 273, 277.

<sup>13</sup> See in detail WREDE: II. 495 and III/2. 917-918.

<sup>14</sup> *Grenzer* (Frontiersmen), who did their military services on the boards of small-boats (so-called *Tschaika*) equipped with sails and oars, howitzers and guns, which were guarding the rivers of the borders.

<sup>15</sup> *Geschichte der Kämpfe Österreichs. Kriege unter der Regierung des Kaisers Franz. Krieg gegen die Französische Revolution 1792-1797*, I. Wien, Seidel & Sohn, 1905. 229., 237.; ZACHAR, József: *Hungarians in the Habsburg army during the first coalition's war against the french 1792-1797*. In: *L'Europa scopre Napoleone 1793-1804*, Edizioni dell'Orso, Alessandria, 1999. 975.

<sup>16</sup> NAGY-L.: 281.

<sup>17</sup> See *ibid.* 282.

the strength and organization of the French Republic in dire straits. Soon the allied Habsburg Empire and Prussia had to face this groundless opinion because of their painful failures. The belittled France had a plenty of drive thanks to its favourable demographic index and economical power and besides the revolutionary ideas to no small degree. Thus the war had been protracted and it was shaping significantly badly for the enemies of the revolution as they planned. Not merely the offensive against France was a failure, but the successful French counter-offensive seized Austrian Netherlands, Mainz, Savoy and Nice too.<sup>18</sup>

In 1793 following the execution of Louis XVI in January, first Great Britain, then the Republic of the Seven Netherlands, Sardinia, Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, Spain, Portugal and Tuscany joined the anti-revolutionary cooperation of the Habsburg Empire and Prussia creating the so-called First Coalition, but henceforward the Habsburg Empire had to shoulder the main burden of the war, so it could not avoid increasing its war efforts. Accordingly the Imperial-Royal High Command was forced to send significant forces to the Holy Roman Empire and The Netherlands again by deploying the not mobilized units of its army and partly throwing in the newly created units for the time of war, especially the above mentioned so-called *Freikorps*. These mobile light troops without the closed battle formation constraints of the line regiments were setting up by volunteering or recruiting usually for the given war time and the Treasury contributed to their organization and maintenance only to a lesser extent, since the expenditures were funded by the commander who had volunteered creating the unit or defrayed by other voluntarily offers.<sup>19</sup> Primarily the *Freikorps* had infantry units and the cavalry troops just played a role to a small degree. However the existence of mixed *Freikorps* with infantry and cavalry was a common thing, but usually the infantry was the predominant force. The cause of it was the fact the cavalry was more costly and the creating and maintaining needed more organization, however it became very important to use Imperial-Royal light troops due to the new French tactics. This kind of units had not been brought into service in regard to the Imperial-Royal infantry, so the *Freikorps* should have fulfilled this task.<sup>20</sup> The Imperial-Royal Army had the best light cavalry of the era due to the Hungarian Hussars, but it worth mentioning the seven Chevauxleger regiments and the *Uhlán* regiment – the latter also was excellent for the light cavalry tactics and it was brought into service in 1791. Thus there was not so urgent need for the *Freikorps* cavalry, but was for the light infantry.

In the first period of the French Wars a lot of similar units were organized on the Military Frontier, where the *Freikorps* had strong traditions. Due to the above mentioned reasons however we find only one Hussar unit among those, except

---

<sup>18</sup> BÁNLAKY József: *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme. 20. rész. A francia háborúk időszaka 1792-1815* (Military History of the Hungarian Nation. Volume 20. Period of the French Wars 1792-1815), Grill, Budapest, 1941. 24.

<sup>19</sup> WREDE: II. 401.

<sup>20</sup> Regarding this topic see NAGY-L.: 122, 130, 191.

the Regiment of Szeckler (Transylvanian) *Grenz*-Hussars, but this unit had stood out among the simple bunch of *Freikorps* within a short time following its excellent performance.

\*

In early 1793, officially on 1 May it was created a *Freikorps* called formally Imperial-Royal Austrian-Styrian Count Wurmser *Freikorps*<sup>21</sup> for the areas belonging to the Croatian and Slavonic Military Frontier and the areas administered by civilian authorities, furthermore for the Turkish borders: the unit would have numbered 5000 men, which was stronger than a typical *Freikorps* and it was made up of two battalions with six infantry companies and four Hussar divisions or eight squadrons per battalions, so it was a mixed unit regarding the branch of military services.<sup>22</sup> Later usually the technical literature has mentioned the unit just Austrian-Styrian or Wurmser *Freikorps* in an abbreviated form.<sup>23</sup> Given the military personnel and the location of the unit the naming is somewhat surprising and its reason the fact the troops' payment party was funded by a committee of Lower Austria, which made up of patriots in Vienna. Following their example the salary for the other half of the troops was financed by a Styrian group made up of similar patriots. After the latter noble act the originally intended name, the Vienna Wurmser *Freikorps* was replaced by the Austrian-Styrian Count Wurmser *Freikorps* (*Oesterreich-Steirischen – Graf Wurmserischen Housarn Frey Corps*).<sup>24</sup>

Although the similar *Freikorps* were mentioned after the name of their commanders, there is some difference regard to the name Wurmser: Count Dagobert Sigmund Wurmser as a General of the Cavalry then a Field Marshal not commanded directly the *Freikorps*, since he was the head of an Imperial-Royal military group with strength 40,000 along the Upper Rhine and the *Freikorps* would have been intended to send here. So the reason of the naming was a respect for the future commandeering general. The infantry and the cavalry of the *Freikorps* represented two, essentially separated organizational units, so given the above mentioned fact they were called Austrian-Styrian Count Wurmser Infantry *Freikorps* and Austrian-Styrian Count Wurmser Hussar *Freikorps*, respectively.<sup>25</sup>

Primarily its military personnel were recruited. A recruit when entered the army got the so-called *Handgeld* (bounty) – the *Handgeld* was 10 Gulden and a single allocation – and his period of service was keeping with the wartime.<sup>26</sup> The

---

<sup>21</sup> See Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (Austrian State Archives, hereafter ÖStA) Kriegsarchiv (KA) MLST Karton-Nr. 10.996 Monath Tabellen and Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabellen.

<sup>22</sup> See ÖStA KA Zentralstellen (ZSt) Wiener Hofkriegsrat (HKR) Akten 1797-62-1933 and ÖStA KA Musterlisten und Standestabellen (MLST) Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabellen. Wrede claims inaccurately the *Freikorps* was made up of only two Hussar divisions. Cp. WREDE: II. 501. and III/2. 923.

<sup>23</sup> Cp. BERKÓ: 39. NAGY-L.: 131, 195. WREDE: V. 340.

<sup>24</sup> WREDE: II. 501.

<sup>25</sup> See ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 10.996 and Karton-Nr. 11.759.

<sup>26</sup> ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Akten 1797-62-1933.

bigger part of the infantry was made up of Southern Slavic refugees driven by the last Turkish war to the borders, especially from Bosnia, while the smaller part was made up of *Grenzer* from the Croatian-Slavonic Military Frontier, of course and also we could find soldiers from the Croatian and Slavonic counties, even from Dalmatia belonging to the Venetian Republic, furthermore from Lower Austria, Moravia and Prussian Silesia and this mixed population was a rarity.<sup>27</sup>

However they had a significant number of former *Grenz* Hussars, since as we have seen earlier, some Military Frontier Hussar units had been dismissed just some years ago and many of them was still on active duty and a lot of them was able-bodied, who was not on active duty. Accordingly the *Freikorps* cavalry was made up mostly former *Grenz* Hussars, furthermore a lot of above-mentioned dispatch-riders had been transferred to these units from the *Grenz* infantry regiments, but we could find here formerly, exclusively infantry troops, even recruits without military experiences.<sup>28</sup> Decisively the officers and the non-commissioned officers had been transferred from the standing army in both branch of service.

Originated from a Croatian and Hungarian family of Herzegovina,<sup>29</sup> János Knesevich, Baron of Szentilona, the earlier lieutenant-colonel of the Brod *Grenz* Infantry Regiment was commissioned as the commander of the *Freikorps* according to the notification of the *Hofkriegsrat* (Imperial War Council) on 22 February, 1793 and the command was taken into effect on 1 May.<sup>30</sup> The experienced and valiant would be Major-General,<sup>31</sup> who was about 50 years old commanded personally only the infantry in addition leading the whole unit. Since strictly speaking it is out of our topic, we are omitting the detailed and further presentation of the history and organization of the *Freikorps* which was disbanded in 1801.<sup>32</sup>

The direct leadership of the Hussars was the duty of Major Petrus von Gvozdanovich, who had been deployed also from the Brod *Grenz* Infantry Regiment and also on 1 May.<sup>33</sup> The 40 years old major from Žumberak

---

<sup>27</sup> Unfortunately we can get an imperfect picture of this topic, because we have documents only for the half of the military personnel. See ST ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 10.996, Assent Listen, Grundbücher, Transferirungs (!) Listen.

<sup>28</sup> See ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr.11.758 Grundbücher, Revisions Listen; Karton-Nr. 11.759 Assent Listen, Transferirungs Listen.

<sup>29</sup> Herzegovina was a small province under Ottoman Turkish rule in the northwest part of the Balkans at that time.

<sup>30</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 10.996 Monath Tabella pro Mense Majo; RÉFI Attila: *A császári-királyi huszárság törzstisztikara a francia forradalmi és a napóleoni háborúk korában (1792-1815)* (The Staff of Field Officers of the Imperial-Royal Hussar Regiments in the Age of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792–1815), Budapest, 2008. PhD dissertation (manuscript), 231.

<sup>31</sup> For biographical data see SCHMIDT-BRENTANO, Antonio: *Kaiserliche und k.k. Generale (1618-1815)*. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, 2006. (<http://www.austria.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=18890> Downloaded: 3 February, 2007.) 50.

<sup>32</sup> However it is worth mentioning regard to this topic that the warriors of the unit were called Redcoats because of their Turkish garment and equipment and their name was feared by the enemy. See VANIČEK, Fr.: *Spezialgeschichte der Militärgrenze*, IV. Band, Wien, Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1875. 4 and WREDE: II. 501.

<sup>33</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabella pro Mense Majo, Vaniček states incorrectly the

(Sichelburg), Croatia started his military career in the Károlyváros *Grenz* Hussar Regiment, then promoted to captain for one of the Hussar squadrons belonging to the Slavonic *Grenz* infantry regiments until their above-mentioned disbanding.<sup>34</sup>

In May 1793, at the time of establishment the other members of the officer corps for the Hussar *Freikorps* were the following ones:<sup>35</sup>

First captains: Georg von Ringelsheim, Ignatz Csivich von Rohr, Adam Ekart, Vincencz Kovachevich, Johann von Morberth, Jakab Varga, Paul von Oreskovich, Simeon Chudich.

Second captains: Count Johann Klebelsberg, Stephan Kobasicza, György Bakoss, Baron Anton Gvozdanovich, Daniel Gvozdanovich, Johann Vuchetich, Marcus Rajakovich, Johann Kerpovich.

First lieutenants: Carl von Gottschlig, Paul Vidak, Jakab Kovács, Baron Carl Guretzky, Vasil Petrovich, Anton Koperczanovich, Joseph Pospischel, Marcus Bosanecz, Joseph Rebracha, Joseph Vlatkovich, Paul Mallinar, Count György Draskovich, Baron Johann Kulnek, Carl Mudrovchich, Johann Kerpan.

Second lieutenants: Demetry von Radubitzky, Michael Vuchetich, Wolfgang Bako, József Szentes, Franz Csavich, Ignatz Lakner, Joseph Rademacher, Marcus Csavich, Johann Loncsar, Michael Nikolich, Michael Stimacz, Ludwig Ettl, Joseph Benne, Thomas Gollner, Petar Nikich, Carl Neugebauer.

However the commission for the first lieutenant of second squadron in the 2<sup>nd</sup> division was taken just in July by István Bogyó.<sup>36</sup>

The composition of the officer corps shows the intention of the high command, namely the officers also will be Southern Slavs like the troops, since they are proficient with the light unit tactics and speak excellently the language of the common soldiers. To fill the officer vacancies the men for the infantry were deployed mostly from the *Grenz* infantry regiments, while the officers for the cavalry were transferred also from the *Grenz* infantry regiments primarily, but the Hussar, Chevauxleger and Cuirassier regiments and even the one and only Uhlan regiment sent officers too. We could find some commissioned officers, who were newly graduated students from the Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt and from the Military Engineering Academy in Vienna.<sup>37</sup>

The cavalry of the *Freikorps* was made up of eight squadrons or four divisions – the strength of a squadron was between 221 and 250 soldiers – and the staff with nine men. The staff consisted of the above-mentioned Major Petrus von Gvozdanovich, as the commander of the cavalry and he was the one and only field officer, Adjutant Simon Stephanacz, two surgeons, a staff trumpeter, a head

---

major was transferred from the Otocac Regiment. Cp. VANIČEK 4.

<sup>34</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 10.996 Transferirungs Listen; ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Transferirungs Lista über den Obristwachtmeister Petrus von Gvozdanovich.

<sup>35</sup> For the officer corps' register see ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabella pro Mense Majo.

<sup>36</sup> See ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabella pro Mense Junio.

<sup>37</sup> Regard to this topic see ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr.11.758 Grundbücher, Revisions Listen; Karton-Nr. 11.759 Assent Listen, Transferirungs Listen.

blacksmith and an assistant blacksmith, a harness-maker and a tailor.<sup>38</sup>

The intended strength of the *Freikorps* was 1,865 men and 1,865 horses in May, but the number was increased up to 1,945 men and 1,945 horses in July. However in the beginning the effective force consisted of 1,848 men and 1,848 horses in end of May and the numbers were raised to 1,865 men in August, but the unit had only 1,842 horses. Of course, subsequently after the first skirmishes the strength of the unit was decreased, thus the effective force consisted of no more, than 1,790 men and 1,645 horses in December.<sup>39</sup> Certainly the able-bodied force was even lower than this, since always there were wounded, ill and detached troops or absentees for other purposes in the unit.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> divisions had been brought up to full strength during May, but it seems it was a longer process for the 1<sup>st</sup> and the 2<sup>nd</sup> divisions and it was just finished in July according to the monthly total strength tables. Typically 17 officers of the officer corps numbered 49 men<sup>40</sup> had not arrived yet to their new unit in May and besides, as we mentioned earlier, an officer commission was vacant.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup> division already began marching to the theatre of war in May due to the different speed of the organizing. The former unit arrived in the Austrian Hereditary Lands in the end of the month and continued its advancing toward Tyrol, then marched through it and reached the Holy Roman Empire on 28 July, then took its designated position in the General Wurmser Group along the Upper Rhine on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August.<sup>41</sup> The 4<sup>th</sup> division left the southern regions of the Hungarian Kingdom on 3 July and also marched over Tyrol then it arrived in the Holy Roman Empire on 15 July and reached the Upper Rhine on 1<sup>st</sup> August or together with the 3<sup>rd</sup> division. The 1<sup>st</sup> division left Hungary just on the same day or 1<sup>st</sup> of August and it was marching over Lower, then Upper Austria to reach the Holy Roman Empire on 29 August, then to the theatre of operations on 23 September. The squadrons of the 2<sup>nd</sup> division began their march to the seat of operations even later, moreover they did it separately. The first squadron of the division departed Hungary on 6 August and was marching over Lower and Upper Austria, took a day of rest on the 31<sup>st</sup> of August and reach the Holy Roman Empire on the 1<sup>st</sup> day of September then the Wurmser Group on 24 September. Two days before the first squadron's leaving the second squadron departed Hungary on 6 August and crossed the border of Lower Austria then it was keeping its march to Upper Austria until 28 August, where the division took two days of rest. It renewed its advancing on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September on the soil of the Holy Roman Empire by this time and arrived at its designated position on 23 September.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> See ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabellen.

<sup>39</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Note the adjutant or aide was not member of the officer corps, but virtually it was a transition between the officers and the non-commissioned officers.

<sup>41</sup> Unfortunately the monthly tables do not provide more detailed data for the precise route of the march. See ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabellen.

<sup>42</sup> See *ibid.*

However the commander of the Hussar *Freikorps* was not Major Gvozdanovich at the time of the military operations, since he was deployed back to the Brod *Grenz* Infantry Regiment with effect on 15 July and a new commander was sent from the Otocac *Grenz* Infantry Regiment on 1 August: he was Major Paul von Bogovich, 43 years old from Szluin, who, like his predecessor, already served in the army as a member of the Károlyváros *Grenz* Hussars, thus he had earned experiences as a Hussar officer.<sup>43</sup>

\*

Thus the preliminary plan of the high command placed the *Hussar Freikorps* along the Upper Rhine, where the military operations were started again in the beginning of the spring. Charles William, Duke of Brunswick, the supreme commander of the allied armies crossed the Rhine with most of his army on 16 March and pushed back General Custine's Rhine Army, who was retreating back to Lauterburg and Weissenburg, behind the so-called Weissenburg Lines, when Wurmser crossed the Rhine on 31 March too. Then the military operations of the allied forces were restricted only to the siege of Mainz and the city was surrendered on 22 July.<sup>44</sup> Subsequently the major operations had been stopped, since the Prussians hesitated to keep the advancing toward Alsace.

According to the available documents the first clashes of the war involved the Hussar *Freikorps* was on 22 August, when the 3<sup>rd</sup> Slavonic Battalion together with a *Grenz* Hussar squadron led by Colonel Kovachevich successfully recaptured the heights beyond Bergzabern (today: Bad Bergzabern) settlement closing the gap between the first and the second columns of the Imperial-Royal army.<sup>45</sup> It was a typically manoeuvre for the *Freikorps*, when it was deployed jointly with other *Grenz* or Hussar units under the command of the former ones and this characteristic feature was survived until the end of the campaign. Of course, also the unit stood the ground independently, for example, on 12 September, 1793. On this day 12,000 French left Lauterburg and attacked Wurmser's two generals, Johann von Jellačić's and Friedrich von Hotze's positions near Hagenbach settlement. Jellačić succeed in retaining his positions and tried lending a hand to Hotze who was pressed hard by the enemy and also the Hussars of the *Freikorps* played an important role during this military enterprise. Jellačić sent a squadron under Major Bogovich against the enemy's cavalry wing and a successful attack was executed near Berg village, while the general made a charge from the neighbouring heights driving the enemy into the forest.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Transferirungs Lista über den Obristwachtmeister Paul von Bogovich.

<sup>44</sup> HORSETZKY, Adolf von: *Kriegsgeschichtliche Übersicht der wichtigsten Feldzüge in Europa seit 1792*. Sechste, neubearbeitete Auflage. Seidel & Sohn, Wien, 1905. 68.

<sup>45</sup> VANIČEK: 7. Vaniček mentions incorrectly the said settlement as Berggabern.

<sup>46</sup> GRÄFFER, August: *Kurze Geschichte der k. k. Regimenter, Corps, Batallions und andere Militär-Branchen; seit ihrer Errichtung bis zu Endes des Feldzuges 1799*, Militärische Buchhandlung, Wien, 1804.



Meanwhile Wurmser was fed up with the hesitating Prussians and made an attack without them against the French of the Weissenburg Lines in the middle of October pushing them to Strasbourg and began to surround Landau.<sup>47</sup> The four squadrons of the *Freikorps* attacked in the formation of the second column in the charge against Weissenburg on 13 October.<sup>48</sup>

They participated in capturing Wanzenau on 26 October, when the *Freikorps'* two divisions was sent to the left and a division of Szekler Hussars deployed to right to outflank the settlement, while the Archduke Ferdinand Infantry Regiment attacked the main frontline, thus the settlement had been fallen after a half an hour. Later two divisions of the unit played a role in the siege of Fort Louis and it was a success again, since the fort was surrendered on 14 November.<sup>49</sup>

The weather took a turn for a worse, so the major operations was finished, but it was just the beginning of the so-called outpost duty for the Hussars of the Imperial-Royal army, including the Hussars of the Wurmser *Freikorps* and they had to provide an appropriate defence for the camped and quartered troops. The outposts created a loose defensive line around the winter quarters keeping a close watch on the enemy, gathering information and holding up the would-be enemy until the main force was prepared.<sup>50</sup> An almost continual battle readiness was a requirement, because the enemy cavalry watched the movements of the troops ceaselessly and even could initiate skirmishes.<sup>51</sup> For example the Hussars of the *Freikorps* had to make heroic efforts against the French in the outposts Killstädt and Herrlisheim on 22 November.<sup>52</sup>

The Hussars of the Wurmser *Freikorps* had a bad start to the year 1794, because their commander, Major Bogonovich suddenly died on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January.<sup>53</sup> His vacant commission had not been filled in for month, since the high command reckoned the commander of the infantry, Knesevich, who had been newly promoted to colonel, was able to perform the duty of the direct commandership of the cavalry too.<sup>54</sup>

Besides the military situation it seemed more favourable for the French despite

---

Neue unveränderte Ausgabe, II. Band, 235.; VANIČEK 8.

<sup>47</sup> CSASZKÓCZY Emil: *Magyar katonák a francia hadszíntéren 1792-1794. évben* (Hungarian Soldiers in the French Theatre of War during the years 1792-1794), Manuscript. Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Budapest (The Archives of War History, Budapest). Kéziratok, tanulmányok gyűjteménye (Collection of Manuscripts and Papers) No. 1898, 19.; HORSETZKY: 68.

<sup>48</sup> VANIČEK: 9.

<sup>49</sup> VANIČEK: 10.; BODART, Gaston: *Militär-historisches Kriegs-Lexikon (1618-1905)*, C. W. Stern, Wien und Leipzig, 1908, 283.

<sup>50</sup> *Studien über die Vorposten*. In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 1862. 393.

<sup>51</sup> BENCZE László: *Mecséry Dániel altábornagy, a Katonai Mária Terézia Rend lovagjának és parancsnoki keresztje tulajdonosának élete*, (Lieutenant General Dániel Mecséry, Life for the Owner of the Commander's Cross of and the Knight of the Military Order of Maria Theresa) Magyar Honvédség Oktatás és Kulturális Anyagellátó Központ, Budapest, 1992. 20.

<sup>52</sup> VANIČEK: 11.

<sup>53</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.760 Monath Tabella pro Januario.

<sup>54</sup> See ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Protocolla (Prot.)1794 Dep. Lit. B 1033.

their failures of the previous year, because they increased their army's strength over 700,000 men due to the introduction of the obligatory military service in 1793.<sup>55</sup> Also the new French strategic and tactical innovations began to spread and yield fruit and they increasingly provided an advantage against the impotent and inflexible high command of the allied forces. The unified leadership spoke in the French Republic's favour compared to the mixed composed and considerably independently allied forces.<sup>56</sup> It was hardly surprising that the French got an upper hand in the military operations of 1794 after the initial allied success and this kind of situation became very clear after the Imperial-Royal defeat at Fleurus on 26 June and subsequently. The allied lost their hold over all of The Netherlands after the defeat step by step by the end of the year.<sup>57</sup>

Similar events took place in the German theatre of operations, which was a more important area from our point of view. In the beginning the allied forces made some attacks here too and tried separating the Rhine and the Mosel Armies of the enemy. In the end of May the Prussian General Möllendorf, commander of the right wing captured Kaiserslautern, while on the left wing the Imperial-Royal Army Corps led by *Feldzugmeister* Friedrich William, Prince of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, including the Wurmser Group and of course the Hussar *Freikorps* pushed back the French to the Weissenburg Lines.<sup>58</sup> However the French forces launched a large-scale counter-offensive in August capturing Trier defended by the Habsburg troops then forced Hohenlohe-Kirchberg to retreat from the ramparts of Weissenburg. Also Möllendorf was made to leave his positions handing over the left bank of the Rhine and withdrew his forces to the right riverbank. Thus the French could reach Mainz without resistance and surrounded Luxembourg too.<sup>59</sup>

Early in the year the Hussar *Freikorps* was garrisoned in the concentrated military camps around Steinmauern, Lanterbourg and Mannheim and they got some supplies. Due to this supply the strength of the unit was increased from 1,790 men to 1,868 and from 1,645 horses to 1,868 until December and besides the able-bodied force was managed to rise from 1,566 men to 1,792.<sup>60</sup>

The renewed skirmishes around the outposts were a clear sign for the Hussars to expect some military operations. Especially the French raids became more and more violent and frequent, although the Free Corps' Hussars usually repelled all of them.<sup>61</sup>

The first major conflict of the war theatre took place in Schifferstadt on 23 May, when the French Rhine Army commanded by this time Divisional General Michaud gained a minor victory over the Imperial-Royal and Prussian forces led by

---

<sup>55</sup> HAHNER Péter: *A Bastille-tól Waterlooig* (From Bastille to Waterloo), Zrínyi, Budapest, 1989, 30.

<sup>56</sup> CSASZKÓCZY: 22.

<sup>57</sup> NAGY-L.: 289-290.

<sup>58</sup> CSASZKÓCZY: 25.

<sup>59</sup> HORSETZKY: 74-75.

<sup>60</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.759 Monath Tabella pro Mense Decembri, valamint Karton-Nr. 11.760 Monath Tabella pro Januario.

<sup>61</sup> VANIČEK: 20-21.

Prince Hohenlohe-Kirchberg. A squadron of the *Freikorps* was participated in the battle.<sup>62</sup>

Later the Hussar *Freikorps* as part of the advance vanguard for the main forces of Hohenlohe-Kirchberg had fought several successful skirmishes. For example, when a vanguard of General Michaud launched an attack against the Plateau Germersheim during the French Offensive, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Slavonic Battalion and the *Freikorps'* Hussars of the advance guard offered a spirited resistance near the forest of Schwegenheim and Gommersheim and fought back the French to their entrenched positions.<sup>63</sup>

Also we could find Hussars of the *Freikorps* in a combined detachment of *Grenzer*, who made a bold reconnaissance toward settlements Schwaig and Asseln in August forcing the enemy to detour for Ellwangen.<sup>64</sup> The Hussars fought a minor skirmish all by themselves near Mannheim in 19 September and they battled with exceptional bravery. In the Battle of Kaiserslautern Prince Hohenlohe-Kirchberg defeated Divisional General Schaal on 20 September and the *Freikorps'* Hussars led by Major-General Baron Siegfried von Kospoth made a distraction at Weissenheim.<sup>65</sup> On 9 October the French launched an attack with 8,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry against the positions of Major-General Count András Karaicsay near Frankenthal and Oggenheim creating a dangerous situation and some units came to help of the General including a *Freikorps* squadron, which distinguished itself by its courageous actions in repelling the attackers.<sup>66</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division and the 2<sup>nd</sup> Squadron of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division were garrisoned in winter quarters by the beginnings of the winter, while the other six squadrons were ordered to march to Breisgau in early November, where they joined the cordon along the border from Mannheim to Basel established by the Upper Rhine Army Corps.<sup>67</sup>

Summarily we can conclude regarding the activities of the Hussar *Freikorps* in the above mentioned campaigns, that it had been used primarily for the so-called small or petty warfare, which was a characteristic feature of the light troops. Practically the petty warfare was composed the military actions executed by smaller detachments between the so-called large-scaled warfare, where major battles fought by big armies. So it was unnecessary to deploy the Hussars of the *Freikorps* strong in numbers and because of this they were thrown into fight as a divided unit: divisions or even smaller military subunits, squadrons or platoons were sent to the areas of military operations. The comprehensive presentation of these military operations is virtually an unfeasible act, because of the large-scale

---

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 21. BODART: 290.

<sup>63</sup> VANIČEK: 21-22. Vaniček mentions incorrectly the Forest of Schwegersheim regarding this event. Cp. VANIČEK: 21.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>65</sup> BODART: 297.; VANIČEK: 23. The latter author reports the date of the battle wrongly.

<sup>66</sup> VANIČEK: 23.

<sup>67</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.760 Monath Tabella pro Novembri.

range of the topic, which it demands an expansive research for sources. So we only could highlight the most important moments as you could see above.

Other important events happened in the life of the *Freikorps* in addition to the countless lesser and greater skirmishes during the year 1794. Changes had been started regard to the structure and the status of the unit and they had a decisive effect on the future of the *Freikorps*. We mentioned the cavalry commander post had been vacant for a long time after death of Major Bogunovich early in the year. It remained so until 24 June when the *Hofkriegsrat* appointed a lieutenant-colonel as the leader of the *Freikorps* cavalry backdated to 23 June, furthermore it created three field officers posts at the unit in the ranks of first, second and third major.<sup>68</sup>

The new commander was a former major of the Blankenstein Hussars, Christian von Uz from Moravia. The newly promoted lieutenant-colonel was about 42 years old with 20 years military experience: he started as a Dragoon then he had served for a short time in a general staff and finally he had become a Hussar for fifteen years, first in a Hussar Regiment – the owner of the regiment was General Wurmser –, which later had been renumbered as the 8<sup>th</sup> Hussars, then in the previously mentioned Hussar Regiment of General Blankenstein, which was later renamed the 6<sup>th</sup> Hussars.<sup>69</sup> So von Uz was not Southern Slav unlike his predecessors and had not any relevant experience as a *Grenzer*, but he possessed a significant experience as a cavalry, even a Hussar officer and also it seems this kind of experience became more important for the high command than before. It clearly proves by the fact that Antal Lovász from Csongrád County, Hungary was promoted to first major from third major rank in the Erdődy, later 9<sup>th</sup> Hussar Regiment.

The latter field officer was about 36 years old with 18 years military experience and he only served as Hussar in the Hussar regiments of Graeven, Barcó and Erdődy.<sup>70</sup> The high command surely assumed the two officers redeploying would be a sufficient step to colour somewhat the life of the unit by increasing the Hussar spirit, thus the second and the third major ranks had not been filled in by redeploying, but the officers were promoted from the unit's own officer corps. The promotions was justified by the fact that the rank and file and the officer corps surely would have displeased and rightly, if too many new and unknown officers had been set over them. On the other hand a better fluent operation was assured by promoting such officers to the officer corps, who had an intimate knowledge of the unit. Certainly we could find officers in the officer corps of the *Freikorps* who earned their promotions due to their military services and courageous behaviours against the enemy.

Accordingly First Captain Simeon von Chudich was promoted to second major and First Captain Johann von Morberth was promoted to third major.<sup>71</sup> The 45 years old Chudich, who was born in the district of the Otocac Regiment<sup>72</sup> and

---

<sup>68</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.760 Monath Tabella pro Mense Junio.

<sup>69</sup> RÉFI: 177-178.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.760 Monath Tabella pro Mense Junio.

<sup>72</sup> The *Grenz* infantry regiments were not only military organizational units, but also territorial and

certainly was a Southern Slav had a considerably military experience due to his 28 years of active services. However he has gained no experience as a Hussar before was sent to the *Freikorps*, because he did military service for 23 years in the Szluin, then for two and half years in the Otocac *Grenz* Infantry Regiments.<sup>73</sup>

The 38 years old Morberth from Glina probably was Croatian by birth and he also was a *Grenzer* for 21 years in the 1<sup>st</sup> Ban *Grenz* Infantry Regiment. He also gave a clear proof his gallantry as a Hussar and undoubtedly it was certified by the fact that Morberth was awarded later by the highest Austrian military medal, the Knight's Cross of the Military Order of Maria Theresa.<sup>74</sup>

In the light of the later developments it seems the appointments of the four field officers with considerably military experiences, including the appointment of Christian von Uz, who was promoted to the rank equivalent to the commander of the whole *Freikorps*, was the high command's purposeful decision and part of a long-time plan for making the cavalry of the *Freikorps* as an independent unit.

When we are talking about previously events it is absolutely worth mentioning the fact that all men of the unit petitioned through the Upper Rhine Army Corps on 4 March, 1794 *'to being not treated as the rank and file of a Freikorps, but as true Grenz Hussars, and as such they will be maintained together with their officers for both wartime and peacetime, furthermore able-bodied horses and green pelisses will be given as it was used to the former Grenz Hussar regiments...'*<sup>75</sup> Since their petition was ignored, they drafted it again and filed the petition in the Military Camp of Heiligenstein on 13 June.<sup>76</sup> Their request was refused again, because the army as a strictly hierarchical institution not really supported any initiative coming from below. Finally the intents of the high command and of the rank and file for the Hussar *Freikorps* were met primarily due to the clear-cut realization, that the deployed Imperial-Royal armies needed some reorganization, because of the increasing superiority of the French and among others this reorganization required to reform the existing military units and to create new ones.

The battle-hardened Hussar units of the Imperial-Royal army proved their worth again and again through their excellent courage and comprehensive usefulness in the previous combats, so it seemed a reasonable decision to increase their ranks.<sup>77</sup> It seemed the most practical and the quickest way for creating a new Hussar unit to make the properly experienced and their worthiness already proved Hussars of the Wurmser *Freikorps* independent and at the same time to raise the unit's strength to a regimental level. Even the intention for resurrection the Hussar traditions of the Croatian-Slavonic Military Frontier might has played a role in the process.

However the reorganizations including the Wurmser *Freikorps'* rearrangements

---

administrative ones.

<sup>73</sup> ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 5646 Transferirungs Lista über den Hauptmann Simeon von Chudich.

<sup>74</sup> For his career see RÉFI: 170–171.

<sup>75</sup> ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Prot. 1794 B 1035.

<sup>76</sup> ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Prot. 1794 B 3127.

<sup>77</sup> Cp. ZACHAR (2000): 52.

could be executed only after the end of the military operations of the year, if they did not want to plunge the fighting ability of the army in danger.<sup>78</sup>

Thus finally a proposition was made on 22 November and it proposed the creation of a new *Grenz* Hussar regiment called Croatian-Slavonic by detaching the four Hussar divisions of the Wurmser *Freikorps* from the infantry and besides it determined the equipments and the uniforms of the unit.<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless, on 5 December a new proposal suggested only the Hussar Corps name for the new unit to be created on 1<sup>st</sup> of the January instead of the Hussar Regiment, because it was not possible to set up a fifth division for the moment. It made a proposition for the necessary enlargement of the general staff, including filling in the office of the judge advocate to be established by transferring Franz Adolf Prohaska from the Otocac District with effect from 1 January.<sup>80</sup> Finally it proposed that the Imperial Horse-Breeding Ranch of Mezőhegyes will pass down 280 new horses to its ancillary stud-farm in Bábolna.<sup>81</sup>

All of the propositions were adopted on 10 December.<sup>82</sup> The cavalry of the *Freikorps* was separated completely from the infantry with effect from 1 January, 1795, although the latter one retained the name Austrian-Styrian Count Wurmser *Freikorps*. However the former one with its earlier officer corps and its somewhat increased rank and file began operating as an independent unit under the name of Imperial-Royal Croatian-Slavonic *Grenz* Hussar Corps.<sup>83</sup> The further history and the heroic struggles of the Southern Slavic *Grenz* Hussars are belonging to another study.

---

<sup>78</sup> That time just smaller changes could be executed. However the really comprehensive, large-scale reforms for the whole army became possible only during the short peacetime after the end of the First Coalition Wars.

<sup>79</sup> ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Prot. 1794 Lit B 5323.

<sup>80</sup> HKR Akten 1794-9-2050 – It is justified to mention Prohaska by name since he made a very successful military career for himself when he became a combatant officer in 1799 (previously he was a non-combatant officer of the army). He was awarded by the Military Order of Maria Theresa, promoted to a general, then he became the second vice-president of the *Hofkriegsrat* and finally he was the head of the military department for the State Council. He was promoted to brevet general of the cavalry, when he was retired in 1848. For his life see RÉFI: 247-248.

<sup>81</sup> ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Akten 1794-9-2050; ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Prot. 1794 Lit. B 5509.

<sup>82</sup> See ÖStA KA ZSt HKR Prot. 1794 Lit B 5509.

<sup>83</sup> Although the official denomination of the unit is Slavonic-Croatian *Grenz* Hussar Corps ('Slavonisch Croatisches Gränz Houssarn Corps') (cp. e.g. ÖStA KA MLST Kroat.-Slav. Gr. Hus. Rgt. ST 1795 Karton-Nr. 11.715), we considered more suitable to use the Croatian-Slavonic name as it is accepted by the English, German and Hungarian technical literature. In the first months of 1795 – January and February – we could find also the name Slavonic-Banatian *Grenz* Hussar Corps ('Slavonisch Bannatisches Gränz Houssarn Corps'). (See ÖStA KA MLST Karton-Nr. 11.715 Monath Tabella pro Januario 1795 és Monath Tabella pro Februario 1795. Regarding the denomination we note that Wrede calls incorrectly the unit as Croatian-Slavonic *Grenz Freikorps* ('Croatisch-slavonisches Grenz-Frei-Corps') omitting the Hussar term in the second part of the Third Volume of his book. (Cp. Wrede: III/2. 923.) Elsewhere he claims wrongly the cavalry of the *Freikorps* became an independent unit under the name of Croatian-Slavonic *Grenz* Hussar Regiment in 1795, since the unit was reorganized as a regiment under the similar name only in 1798. Cp. WREDE: II. 501.

**Mircea-Cristian Ghenghea**

***The Romanians and the Empire of 70 Million Germans.  
Debates and Reactions in the Romanian United Principalities'  
Press (1860-1861)***

**Abstract**

In 1860-1861, in the United Principalities' press started an interesting debate regarding the danger of the inclusion of the Romanian space in a supranational organism dominated by the Germanic race. The situation seemed much worse because of the intention of some great landowners to bring on their estates a large number of families of German colonists to work the land and to introduce some more advanced agricultural techniques. Among those who understood the danger and reacted properly there were personalities like Dionisie Popovici Marțian, Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian and Simion Bărnuțiu. In the specific context of that period, their ideas and arguments represent a true advocacy in favour of economic protectionism, of strengthening and modernizing the national state.

*Keywords:* German colonisation, Romanian press, German empire, Romanian United Principalities, economic protectionism.

**D**uring the 19<sup>th</sup> century Central and South-East Europe was the subject of several projects regarding its organization as a supranational organism mainly elaborated by various representatives of the intellectual and political elites in the Germanic area. Those projects aimed to reconfigure the above mentioned region as a separate entity in the geopolitical background of that time and also appeared as a result of the attempts made to identify viable solutions both for the German question and for the delicate situation of the nationalities of that area. According to the analyses carried by some researchers, most of these projects occurred in moments of major crisis for the continental balance – during and after the Napoleonic wars, during and after the events of 1848-1849, and at the repeated crisis in the German world<sup>1</sup>.

***The main artisans and their projects***

If at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century those who approached the question of unification and uniformization of all the components of this vast region were more or less tributary to the formula of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, after 1815, the year of the Vienna Congress, the problem of the conceptualization and organization of the Central and South-East Europe practically became the privilege of Austria which, through Chancellor Metternich, tried to set out its

---

<sup>1</sup> See Christian CHEREJI: *Identități ale Europei Centrale 1815-2000* (Identities of Central Europe 1815-2000), Cluj-Napoca, 2004. 68.

borders and to impose a particular identity. Thus the idea of a super-state in the centre of the European continent, easily recognizable even in the first years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in various projects developed within the German political and cultural elites – Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich von Gentz, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel, Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg (also known as Novalis), Joseph Hormayr Freiherr zu Hortenburg etc. – acquired new meanings and connotations during the periode of the illustrious Austrian diplomat and statesman, „*the first who gave a consistent form of organization to Central Europe*”<sup>2</sup>. By assuming the theories taught by his mentor, Friedrich von Gentz, Metternich joined the idea of balance with the necessity of the existence of a strong European centre, able to oppose both West and East, as to the revolutionary and national movements. By respecting with sanctity what von Gentz defined since 1805 as the principle of equilibrium as a „*balance of power*”, Metternich did not take into account, just like his magister, the idea of nation and nationalism. Although he admitted the usefulness of the duet Austria-Prussia in configuring the designed entity, the Austrian Chancellor naturally sought the enforcement of the Habsburg supremacy in the Central-European space; yet the Metternich’s formula meant the promotion of the Austrian interests primarily in Western Europe and keeping a strictly defined balance in the continental affairs. As a consequence the Central Europe imagined by Metternich included, as shown during the Crimean War, „*an ensemble of 76 million inhabitants, a compact and invincible mass, which could become the arbiter of Europe*”<sup>3</sup>. This ensemble the Austrian diplomat referred to included the entire German area from the Rhine to Eastern Prussia, from Schleswig to Bavaria, the entire multinational space of the House of Habsburg, from Tyrol to Galicia and Bukovina, from Slovakia to Dalmatia, including the Italian possessions of the Habsburgs.

An obvious relevance for any establishment of a supranational entity in Central Europe had the ideas promoted by two outstanding personalities in the German world, Friedrich von List (1789-1846) and Konstantin Frantz (1817-1891). The first one, an economist by definition, relied on economic arguments and the necessity for Germany (a term used as a generic name in that time) to acquire vital space – *Ergänzungsgebiete* (additional territories)<sup>4</sup>. *Mitteleuropa*, economic protectionism and the achievement of the Great Germany are to be found among his theories of political economy<sup>5</sup>. Thus, List, a convinced supporter of the protectionist economic theories, considered necessary the accomplishment of the supranational assembly of *Mitteleuropa* by forming an economical union which included the member

---

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem, 71.

<sup>3</sup> Jacques DROZ: *L'Europe Centrale. Évolution historique de l'idée de "Mitteleuropa"*, Paris, 1960. 46-47. „*Comme il le disait encore à l'époque de la guerre de Crimée à l'ambassadeur de Prusse, il s'agissait de constituer un ensemble de 76 millions d'habitants, «une masse compacte et invincible, qui puisse devenir l'arbitre de l'Europe»*”.

<sup>4</sup> Louis L. SNYDER: *Macro-Nationalisms. A History of the Pan-Movements*, Westport – London, 1984. 40-41.

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem, 41.



states of *Zollverein*, the Habsburgs' political structures, and also the small neighboring states of the German space – Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland. With Hungary and the Balkan possessions, this supranational entity was supposed to provide the Danubian and Mediterranean routes, Hungary being considered by Friedrich List the key to Turkey and the Near East: „*Germany possesses through the countries of the Lower Danube and Black Sea a hinterland similar to the one that the United States have in the Far West*”<sup>6</sup>.

Through his project, List put, for the first time, the question of Central Europe in a modern perspective, by combining national and liberal concepts, keeping, however, certain imperialist tones. The binder of the organism imagined by Friedrich List was represented by the communion of economic interests of the peoples in the Central and South-East Europe at the same time with the foreshadowing of the common danger, viewed as the aggressive policy of France and Russia towards the Germanic block.

At his turn, Konstantin Frantz, „*another champion of the «Central European» idea*”<sup>7</sup>, believed that one can reach the accomplishment of the plan regarding the appearance of the space dominated by the Germanic race only within a federal union. In his view, both Austria and Prussia had to support this organization formula, and the rivalry between the two powers of the Germanic world would have been neutralized by Pangermanism, a fact that would have presupposed, according to his opinion, an alliance of all Germanic states, including here Netherlands, Scandinavia and England. The leading role of this conglomerate would have to naturally belong to the Habsburg dynasty<sup>8</sup>.

If Metternich's *Mitteleuropa* formula supposed the promotion of Austrian interests primarily in Western Europe and maintaining a strictly defined balance in continental affairs<sup>9</sup>, in the years after 1849 there were changes regarding the essence of the concept, the economic plan becoming of prime interest for the factors involved. Thus, totally explainable, one of the last impact projects on the Empire of 70 million Germans belonged to the knight Karl Ludwig von Bruck, Minister of Commerce (1848-1851) and Minister of Finances (1855-1859) in the Austrian Imperial Cabinet. Equally a theorist and a practitioner, von Bruck launched a series of initiatives designed to unite and to uniform the Habsburg Empire's space in order to create a solid foundation for Austrian economic development and commercial expansion towards the Near East. Initially, his project regarding the unification of Central Europe had been designed to prove the existence of the material conditions necessary to achieve the „*Great Austria*”, a fact previously desired also by Prince Felix von Schwarzenberg; this project was massively inspired by the liberal ideology of Friedrich von List, whose eminent disciple was Karl Ludwig von Bruck<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>6</sup> CHEREJI (2004): 77-78.

<sup>7</sup> SNYDER (1984): 41.

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>9</sup> CHEREJI (2004): 75.

<sup>10</sup> DROZ (1960): 94. „*C'est la idéologie libérale de List qui inspire Bruck, dont on a pu dire qu'il fut*

Von Bruck's basic idea was that small states do not justify their existence or appearance within the frame of the new conditions of global industrialization; the great economic entities like the United States of America or the British Empire were the only ones capable to resist and to affirm themselves. As a natural following, the only chance of the Germans and other nations in the Central and South-East Europe to impose themselves in the international arena was to create a unified economic space, encompassing all territories of the old German Confederation, Habsburg Empire and adjacent states. Von Bruck argued against the lack of economic coherence in the German space, requiring the great cities of Northern Germany to end their isolationism and to join the unified Middle Europe, „a territory including 70 million inhabitants and with free trade”. However, also important is the territory that von Bruck associated with the notion of Central Europe: „from Niemen to Lake Constance, from lower Rhine to the Adriatic and the Danube's mouths, constituting the vital centre of Europe”<sup>11</sup>. One must note that Karl Ludwig von Bruck's policy and ideas did not have an important public adherence, being supported in fact only by a few great industrialists and Hungarian landowners who regarded the unified Central and South-East European space as a real outlet for their products. They were joined by the intellectual and professional circles grouped around the periodical „Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung” and various liberal personalities<sup>12</sup>.

### ***The Romanians and the German Colonization. The „Empire of 70 Million Germans” in the United Principalities' Press***

The question of incorporating the Romanians and the territories they inhabited in what was supposed to become the supranational structure dominated by the

---

*son plus grand disciple”.*

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem, 95: „À la thèse développée par le Prussien R. v. Dellbrück, qui donnait la préférence aux traités de commerce sur l'union douanière, il répondait par le mémoire du 30 décembre 1849, plaidoyer remarquable contre le déchirement économique dont l'Allemagne du Nord, jusqu'alors indépendants du Zollverein, devaient tirer d'une unification de l'Europe du milieu: «Si les États côtiers de l'Allemagne du Nord, écrivait-il, pouvaient hésiter à renoncer à certains avantages contre ceux que leur offrait l'entrée dans une union douanière englobant 29 millions d'habitants seulement..., la chose se présente tout autrement, lorsqu'il s'agit de s'unir à un territoire englobant 70 millions d'habitants et commerçant librement. Les relations commerciales que ces États entretiennent avec les pays de l'Oest et du Nord, notamment avec l'Angleterre et les États-Unis, n'en seront point affectés; par contre, vers le Sud et vers l'Est, ils ouvriront de nouvelles possibilités à savoir l'exploitation des terres vierges et fertiles qui, du Niémen au lac du Constance, du Rhin inférieur à l'Adriatique et aux bouches du Danube, constituent le centre vital de l'Europe». A general presentation of Karl Ludwig von Bruck's life and activity written and published in the 19<sup>th</sup> century little time after his death in *Finanzminister Carl Freiherr von Bruck*. Von Dr. C.A.S., k.k. Staatsbeamter, Wien, 1861. See also *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*. Dritter Band (Bode – v. Carlowitz), Leipzig, 1876. 376-388. Richard CHARMATZ: *Minister Freiherr von Bruck, der Vorkämpfer Mitteleuropas*, Leipzig, 1916. *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, Zweiter Band (Behaim-Bürkel), Berlin, 1955. 643-646.

<sup>12</sup> For Karl von Bruck's projects and his collaboration with Lorenz von Stein, see Leonid BOICU: *Austria și Principatele Române în vremea războiului Crimeii (1853-1856)* (Austria and the Romanian Principalities during the Crimean War 1853-1856), Bucharest, 1972. 266-281. idem, *Les principautés roumaines dans les projets de Karl von Bruck et Lorenz von Stein pour la constitution de la "Mitteleuropa" à l'époque de la guerre de Crimée*, Revue Roumaine d'Histoire, tome VI, N° 2, 1967. 233-256.

Germanic race had particular echoes and connotations in the Romanian space especially in the '60s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This fact was due to the direct involvement of the press (mostly in the Romanian United Principalities), which drew the attention regarding the potential threat to the interests and, in the long run, to the existence of the United Principalities themselves. As we already had the occasion to point out<sup>13</sup>, the question of the appearance of such an organism was intimately connected with another one, which had certain echoes in the Romanian press of that time – the colonization with German ethnic elements of the Principalities themselves. In several gazettes of the '60s in the 19<sup>th</sup> century one can find various articles in which are approached and analyzed the expansionist tendencies manifested by Austria and Prussia in the economic and political plan and also the natural fear of the young Romanian national state that it could not articulate its own economic structures, suitable to enable and support the independent affirmation of its interests.

The much less optimistic perspective foreseen by the partisans of the colonization's idea also led to the assertion of partially or completely erroneous conclusions which played their role in creating an image more than bleak for the future of Romanianism. It suffices to mention here the conclusions drawn in a comprehensive article appeared in the gazette „*Independența*” in Bucharest in late 1860: „*in Bukovina the Romanian language has disappeared; in Banat and Transylvania the Romanian nationality is completely suffocated by the foreign element*”<sup>14</sup>.

Beyond such alarmist exaggerations and assessments which had, however, their role in the effort of raising public awareness about the situation of the Romanians living in territories under foreign rule, and also about the danger in which even the United Principalities themselves might be, one must note that the danger of Germanization was real, already known by the Romanians living in the Habsburg Empire, a fact understood and presented as such in various articles and press analysis<sup>15</sup>. The promotion of the plan regarding the achievement of the „*Empire of 70 million Germans*” by the Viennese decisional structures, as well as the more obvious ambitions of Prussia could only lead to the appearance of some adequate reactions<sup>16</sup>. The press in the United Principalities naturally provided the

---

<sup>13</sup> Mircea-Cristian GHENGHEA: „*Un colț al patriei*” – *despre Bucovina în presa din Principatele Unite Române (1859-1865)* (A Corner of the Country” – About Bukovina in the Press of the Romanian United Principalities 1859-1865), in *Pro Bucovina. Repere istorice și naționale* (Pro Bukovina. Historical and National Reference Points). Volume coordinated by Mihai-Bogdan ATANASIU, Mircea-Cristian GHENGHEA, Bucharest, 2010. 139-140.

<sup>14</sup> P. BUESCU: *Colonizarea germană* (German Colonization), *Independența*, Bucharest, III, N° 4, 3 November 1860. 15.

<sup>15</sup> See for this the article *Românismul și Bucovina* (Romanianism and Bukovina), *Dacia*, Iași, I, N° 4, 14 March 1861. 3, whose author, considering the realities in Bukovina in 1860, shows: „*The Germanizing strength of Austria has probably nowhere made so fast progress than in Bukovina, this beautiful bough of the great tree of the Romanianism*”.

<sup>16</sup> The newspaper „*Românul*” published an interesting study in six parts written by I.C. Brătianu, who underlined inclusively the Germanizing tendencies after 1849 – Ion BRĂȚIANU: *Memoriu asupra Imperiului Austriei în cestiunea Orientului* (Memoir About the Austrian Empire within the Oriental

necessary background of a broad debate which concerned the whole of the Romanian society of those times, even for the simple reason that the entire historical and ethnic Romanian space was included in these ambitious plans, as shown in the newspaper „*Românul*”<sup>17</sup>. Or, in these circumstances, it was considered that the only hope for a real national life in the Romanian territories which were under foreign rule, as Bukovina and Transylvania, was represented by the existence of the United Principalities and the help that might come from there.

A major role in popularizing the issue and in understanding the possible consequences for the Romanian national and state organism belonged to Dionisie Popovici Marțian<sup>18</sup>, a Transylvanian established in the Danubian Principalities, like so many others in those times. He was regarded as „*the most lucid political intelligence in that romantic epoch of liberalism*”<sup>19</sup>, being considered the founder of the Romanian statistical press<sup>20</sup>. He is the author of a very interesting brochure suggestively entitled *Coloniștii germani și România* (The German Colonists and Romania), published in two editions (the first in 1860, the second in 1871, six years after his death), in which he presented the consequences of an eventual German

---

Question), *Românul*, Bucharest, IV, N° 125, 6 May 1860. 377-379; N° 126, 7 May 1860. 381-382. N° 131, 10 May 1860. 389-391. N° 132, 11 May 1860. 393-394. N° 133, 12 May 1860. 398-399. N° 136, 15, 16 May 1860. 406-407.

<sup>17</sup> *Colonisarea germană* (German Colonization), *Românul*, Bucharest, IV, N° 265, 21 September 1860. 797-798: „*The Romanians must be really careful, as Prussia already forgot it was once a Slav country: Posnania is Germanizing; Bohemia, Silezia, Moravia are Germanized, also Illyria; Hungary is half Germanized: Galicia is Jewish, I mean Austrian; Bukovina is even more lost, as the miserable Transylvania, the stronghold of Romania, is in the hands of the Austrians and Germanism presses as a mountain crushing the shins of the Romanian legs, meaning the United Principalities. The Romanians must take care as in Moldavia the commerce, the industry and a great part of the agriculture itself are in the hands of the Austrian Jews; as in Iași, only in the lane in Copou, there are a few boyar houses, and the rest, meaning the entire capital, is owned by the Austrian Jews; and not only the capital, but also all the boroughs of the country without difference. The postal offices, the post chaises are Asutrian*”.

<sup>18</sup> As already shown for decades in our historiography, his correct name is this, and not Dionisie Pop Marțian, which came in use also because of our great economist V. Slăvescu. One of the quite recent works in which this aspect is corrected is that of Liviu BOTEZAN, Ela COSMA, Ionuț ISAC, Atila VARGA: *Dicționar al personalităților Revoluției de la 1848-1849 din Banat și Transilvania* (Chipuri dintr-un an de neuitat). 160 de ani de la eveniment [Dictionary of the Revolution in 1848-1849 in Banat and Transylvania (Faces from an Unforgettable Year). 160 Years from the Event], Bucharest, 2008. 337. See also our considerations in Mircea-Cristian GHENGHEA: *Mișcarea națională a românilor din Transilvania (1859-1865) reflectată în presa românească a vremii* (The Romanians' National Movement in Transylvania (1859-1865) Reflected in the Romanian Press of the Time). PhD Thesis, Iași, 2009. 44, note 44.

<sup>19</sup> Pamfil ȘEICARU, *Istoria presei* (History of the Press). Preface by George Stanca, Pitești, 2007. 217.

<sup>20</sup> In Vienna, Marțian was a student of the great German economist Lorenz von Stein (1815-1890), being familiarized with the ideas that were discussed within the German intellectual circles. At the same time, through the two publications he attended as head of the Statistic Office in Bucharest – „*Anale economice privitoare la partea Munteniei din România*” and „*Analele statistice pentru cunoașterea părții muntene din România*” –, he managed to use a vast documentation regarding the configuration and the economic structure of the Romanian society of that time. Thus, fully aware of the situation, Dionisie Popovici Marțian permanently drew attention upon the national and political connotations of the economic issues, especially for a young state as the United Principalities.

colonization of the United Principalities.

„*The first Romanian economist of protectionist orientation*”<sup>21</sup> proved a very good knowledge of the theoretical principles of the economic liberalism, which he tried to adapt to the Romanian realities, marking the beginning of an era<sup>22</sup>. Called „*List of Romania*”<sup>23</sup>, Marțian argued the need to adopt protectionist measures, practically indispensable to a young state such as the United Principalities, which still lacked the structures and the mechanisms capable of supporting the national economic development. He explained this situation by showing that only the great continental powers benefited directly from the famous free trade, while small states, which had no proper economic force, could only lose from this. Not incidentally, Dionisie Popovici Marțian was one of the few who were not thrilled when, in 1859, Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza stated that the United Principalities’ economic system would be the liberal one, and agriculture, industry and commerce „*will be put under the regime of the absolute liberty*”<sup>24</sup>. In the review „*Analele economice*” he wondered rhetorically: „*But have we*

---

<sup>21</sup> Victor VASILOIU: *Friedrich List și Dionisie Marțian* (Friedrich List and Dionisie Marțian), Bucharest, 1939. 4. For a recent approach of the economic aspect, but with certain gaps regarding the historical background and analysis, see the article of Angela Rogojanu and Liana BADEA: *Răspândirea ideilor economice la români: cazul lui Dionisie Pop Marțian* (The Spread of Economic Ideas at the Romanians: the Case of Dionisie Pop Marțian), *Economie teoretică și aplicată*, Vol. XVII (2010), N° 12 (553), 60-71.

<sup>22</sup> Victor VASILOIU: 4: „*The year 1858, 20 years later after the appearance of the first economics book of Șuțu, is considered the beginning of an era, which dares for the first time to rise and to question the truths of the liberal economy. This year is also regarded as the beginning of the true economic science in Romania, because until here it has not been science, but more a propaganda or a popularization of this science. The liberal economists mentioned (Nicolae Suțu, Ion Ghica, Ion Ionescu de la Brad – our note, M.-C. G.) were trying to adapt the Romanian realities to classical theory and not the other way around as Marțian did*”.

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem, 18: „*Dionisie Marțian is the List of Romania*”.

<sup>24</sup> Alexandru Ioan Cuza’s statement was very well received abroad, an example for this being the famous publication “*Journal des économistes*”, where one can find a vast presentation of the Prince’s message and also the reactions provoked by this – see *Journal des économistes. Revue de la science économique et de la statistique*, Paris, 2<sup>e</sup> série, 6<sup>e</sup> année, tome vingt-cinquième, janvier à mars 1860. 148-152: „*M. Joseph Garnier appelle ensuite l’attention de la réunion sur le message que le colonel Couza (maintenant prince Jean I<sup>er</sup>), élu à la fois par les Moldaves et le Valaques pour exercer le pouvoir exécutif dans les Principautés unies, a tout récemment adressé aux chambres.*

*Ce document, qui nous arrive d’un petit pays où les institutions publiques sont à l’état puissant, est une affirmation éminemment remarquable des saines doctrines économiques qui doivent diriger les gouvernements; il fait le plus grand honneur au prince et aux ministres qui l’ont écrit, et peut servir de modèle aux hommes d’État des grande set moyennes puissances.*

*Il est naturellement question, dans ce message, «d’économie, de modération dans les dépenses,» etc. Mai on voit, par les développements, que ne sont pas là de ces banales assertions comme on en trouve dans la plupart des documents de cette nature.*

*Sur l’invitation de la réunion, M. Joseph Garnier lit divers parties de ce document.*

*(...) La lecture de ces passages est écoutée avec un vif sentiment de curiosité et d’intérêt par la réunion.*

*MM. Michel Chevalier, membre de l’Institut, Pailletet, Auguste Chevalier, député au Corps législatif, et Gabriel Lafond, ministre plénipotentiaire de Costa-Ricca, prennent successivement la parole pour formuler le désir que la Société d’économie politique transmette au prince Alexandre-Jean l’expression des sentiments qu’inspire la lecture de son message aux amis du progrès et des libertés économique”.* See also Victor VASILOIU: 23.

*nothing to defend? Is it compulsory to set the liberty of commerce within the laws to regulate our economic life?*<sup>25</sup>.

Rightly, the question of economic protectionism was intimately connected with the United Principalities' colonization with German ethnic elements. The beginning was caused by a few great landowners' intention of bringing 2500 families of German colonists on their estates who were supposed to be used for working the land and from whom to learn the modern methods of farming. The situation was presented and analyzed in the press<sup>26</sup> and subsequently came to be discussed in

---

<sup>25</sup> See his appreciations in *Anale economice privitoare la partea Munteniei din România*, Bucharest, I, N<sup>o</sup> 1, First Semester of 1860. 6.

<sup>26</sup> See for instance P. BUESCU: 15: „*The German colonization is today an issue which concerns many serious minds. Most journals expressed their opinions; we come now to add a few ideas to what has been said about the German colonization.*

*The colonizations's partisans are some landowners who hope that by colonizing theirs estates they will get rid of their debts and bring in the country labour force, capital and a more advanced agriculture which, according to them, will serve as an example for our peasants; that from here will result a general benefit and the country will shortly reach the greatest prosperity.*

*If these hopes were attainable, it would necessary result a great benefit economically speaking; yet we see only a partial benefit, regarding only the selling landowner, a benefit that perhaps will be paid by the whole country with its disappearance”.*

After analyzing the general course of the European emigration which was mostly directed to America, considered to be „*the continent destined to be populated by Europe's emigrations*”, P. Buescu shows: „*So the fear from a German colonists' conquest should appear as exaggerated; but we have to fear more as we see that the arrival of the emigrants in the country is not something natural, because even if the emigrants do not find enough benefits, while they refuse to go to the French colonies with all the benefits these guarantee them, we see contracts through which Mr. Aritonovici obliges himself to bring in foreign colonists, about 15 families of them being already at Sărulești*”.

„*(...) to all facts previously mentioned we remind the preoccupations of some economists and publicists in Germany and in Austria regarding the German emigrants. These publicists did not cease to propagate for a long time the idea that the German emigration should be set towards the Danubian mouths, where the Romanian and Slav element is much more undeveloped in civilization than the English element in the United States where Germans loose their nationality. So, as Românu! (the periodical “Românu!” – our note, M.-C. G.) already repeated, the idea of colonizing these countries with Germans is not a new idea, it dates for a long time; so one can see that this totally German and Austrian idea envisaged for so long in Germany and Austria becomes reality nowadays and it is supported by a few former notable figures of the country through the organ Conservatorul (the periodical “Conservatorul” – our note, M.-C. G.). The politicians in Germany and Austria support this idea of colonizing the countries with Germans, I said, preserve the German nationality, which is lost in America; but besides this Germans' target a political idea follows, it is the preponderance that especially Austria believes it will gain in these countries. Naturally such tendencies of Austria cannot be hidden anymore. Austria hopes to obtain a conationality protection over these colonists. So it would be very dangerous to indigenate a race with no affection in our country in a time when the consular jurisdiction is so strong here. Yet, if these considerations seem erroneous for the partisans of the colonization, let's go and read the journals in Vienna in 1856, where professor Stein stated that in order to reach its purpose in the Danubian principalities Austria does not really need the army; and the monopoly on the Danube's navigation, telegraph, postal offices (which it has today as before;) and finally the colonization of these countries is the simplest way to posses them.*

*(...) The colonization's evil is obvious; through colonization Austria intended to weaken the different nationalities which compose its empire; in Bukovina the Romanian language has disappeared; in Banat and Transylvania the Romanian nationality is completely suffocated by the foreign element.*

the country's Parliament. Under these conditions Dionisie Popovici Marțian published his study, which played an important role in starting a press campaign at the end of 1860. By explaining the mechanisms which provoked the demographic displacement of the Germans from their historical and ethnic space<sup>27</sup>, Marțian underlined the special stake represented by the Principalities for the followers of the idea of accomplishing the empire of 70 million Germans, whether these were from Austria or from Prussia: „*Perhaps the Germanization idea would seem for many too fantastic. The statesmen who wish to create something cannot completely give up the fantasy, especially a nation that must be excited to a gigantic enterprise. It was said, and it is good to repeat for the Romanians must not forget not even for a moment that there is solidarity between Germany and Austria. Both of them think to get possession of the Principalities, but as Germany is far away from us, it agrees to possess them through the medium of Austria*”.

(...) The main issue of Germany along with Austria is: 1) to maintain at least Trieste, and through this the way to the Adriatic, and 2): who should dictate to the Lower Danube's countries? which are the key of the way to Trebizond and Middle Asia, and which must nurture the German industry. The Principalities' grains and those of the Western Black Sea coast must flow into Germany, and to be changed for its manufactured products.

«*Our commercial and political influence must head towards East, down the Danube.*» they say<sup>28</sup>.

Dionisie Popovici Marțian had all the reasons to be extremely cautious towards Austria, since it had been preoccupied even from 1854-1856 with the annexation of the Principalities by taking advantage of the presence of its occupation troops within the extra-Carpathian areas (a fact stated in the pages of the brochure in 1860)<sup>29</sup>. As shown in the Romanian historiography, the Austrian expansion in South-East Europe, under the aegis of accomplishing the famous *Mitteleuropa*, developed under the protection of the Austrian state authorities, being regarded as a solution for a number of economic and political problems<sup>30</sup>.

The issue of the extension and the increasing of the German economic and political influence did not preoccupy only Dionisie Popovici Marțian. Another name

---

*To all these considerations we must add the religious aspect. Our peasant people are still in its primitive state; through colonization we would introduce among them some propagators of another religion who would also be the propagators of an antinational policy.*

*It is needless to add that our religion had a great role in preserving the nationality and our independence. The religious question is the most serious; regarding the political question, the Serbs claimed that the colonists who wish to settle with them must change their religion.*

*Such a condition made them escape the German colonization*”. The article we cited these passages from is continued, under the same title, in *Independența*, Bucharest, III, N° 8, 12 November 1860. 30-31.

<sup>27</sup> D.P. MARȚIAN: *Coloniștii germani și România* (The German Colonists and Romania), Bucharest, 1860. 1-5.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem, 39-40.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, 6-7.

<sup>30</sup> Leonid BOICU: 264.

that approached and analyzed the consequences of an extension of the German domination in East is Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian. As a legal counselor of the Principality of Moldavia (1861), a position in which he had been appointed by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, he wrote an interesting document for him, entitled *Idealuri naționale ale Nemților, Slavilor, Ungurilor și Românilor* (National Ideals of Germans, Slavs, Hungarians and Romanians). The first part of this „*unique document in the political history of the Romanian countries*”<sup>31</sup> was published in the United Principalities' press (in „*Revista Carpaților*”<sup>32</sup>, where the material was inserted as having an anonymous author<sup>33</sup>, and in „*Dacia*”<sup>34</sup>, and „*Ateneul român*”<sup>35</sup>), showing a critical and lucid mind, detached from the romantic exaggerations specific to that time and demonstrating a special acumen and clairvoyance. The analysis of the meanings of the Prussian expansion towards East (thus also answering to the fears that existed in the Romanian space regarding the German colonization) made him consider that there were three orientations or „*parties*” within the general trend of the German race's extension towards the East of the continent: the Austrian party, the Prussian party and the democratic party. Despite all the contradictions and differences of views between them, the goal remained the same: the accomplishment of the German ideal.

Although skeptical about the possibility of fulfilling that ideal, Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian correctly highlighted the danger of Germanism, considering that it was a real one, and it should not be neglected by the Romanian politicians; in the context of that period, he also reminded the case upon which Dionisie Popovici Marțian insisted, referring to the settlement of German colonies in the territory of the United Principalities: „*This ideal is hard to be accomplished. Yet one cannot say it is impossible.*

*In this situation, it would not be right for the Romanian politicians to look upon it with contempt and indifference. Who does not remember the 1848 Parliament in Frankfurt, where the flower of the German elite gathered, and where all the Germanism's plans were revealed? And who does not see the terrible progresses of the Germanism in the East of Europe? Pest talks German. In Banat, German colonies. In Transylvania, Saxons. Bukovina, Germanised, has almost forgotten that the other day it used to be the most beautiful and strongest side of Moldavia. Moldavia's cities are Jewish, and the Jew who studies says that he is German. In both Principalities hundreds and thousands of Austrian foreign subjects with their own consular jurisdiction. The country's boyars discuss with the German colonizing societies to*

---

<sup>31</sup> Alesandru Papiu ILARIAN : *Antologie* (Anthology). Edition, preface, notes and comments by Corneliu Albu, Bucharest, 1981. 222.

<sup>32</sup> *Idealuri naționale ale Nemților, Slavilor, Ungurilor și Românilor* (National Ideals of Germans, Slavs, Hungarians and Romanians), in *Revista Carpaților*, Bucharest, II, 1 March 1861. 297-305.

<sup>33</sup> See *Revista Carpaților*, Bucharest, II, 15 June 1861, *Tablă de materii*, 1.

<sup>34</sup> *Dacia*, Iași, I, N° 7, 20 March 1861. 4-5. N° 9, 22 March 1861. 3-4.

<sup>35</sup> *Ateneul român*, Iași, I, N° 21, 16 March 1861. 180-183. Presenting this ample study, inserted in the column *Curierul științific* (The Scientific Courier), the redaction of *Ateneul român* shows: „*We reproduce from «Revista Carpaților» an important and too beautiful study about some of the races that share the land of old Europe*”.



*bring in Germans in order to crop the large Romanians' estates. Only a natural and fortunate instinct determined the Romanians to adopt the Latin Europe's culture, without which it would barely be a hope of escape in the future*<sup>36</sup>.

In line with the ideas of Dionisie Popovici Marțian and Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian one can count the observations made by another Romanian from Transylvania established in the United Principalities – Simion Bărnuțiu. Regarded as a true mentor of the 1848 generation in Transylvania, he activated during the '50s and '60s of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a professor in Iași, including at the University of Iași, following its establishment (1860). In one of his posthumously printed works, entitled *Dreptul public al românilor* (The Romanians' Public Law) (1867), it is shown, among other things: „*The Germans destroyed the Roman Empire, they denationalized the Slavs from the Baltic and from elsewhere and continue denationalizing without cease. Their tendency is to colonize, to subdue and to Germanize the Orient, which implies the colonization, the submission and the preliminary Germanisation of the Romanian countries*”<sup>37</sup>. After pointing that the Germans regard Danube as „*their great artery*”, Bărnuțiu, in a very plastic appreciation, shows that „*the Germans flow from the Baltic towards the Black Sea like the rivers in mountains after the spate*”<sup>38</sup>.

Framed in a much wider spectrum of numerous plans and projects of reorganizing and reshaping the continental geopolitics which were discussed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the idea regarding the „*empire of 70 million Germans*” generally led to the appearance of hostile and rejection reactions among the Romanian intellectual circles in 1860-1861. The fact is completely explainable through the need of defending the Romanian national formula promoted by the 1848 generation, even the virtual acceptance of such an idea jeopardizing the entire effort of modernization and institutionalization in the young Romanian state.

Along with other elements with greater or lesser impact on the European and regional level, this issue had a special reception in the United Principalities' press. Through various publications of that time the opinions of those in theme became

---

<sup>36</sup> *Idealuri naționale ale Nemților, Slavilor, Ungurilor și Românilor*, in *Revista Carpaților*, Bucharest, II, 1 March 1861. 299.

<sup>37</sup> Simion BĂRNUȚIU: *Dreptul public al românilor* (The Romanians' Public Law), Iași, 1867. 161. In the same paper, including the problem of the German colonization in a broader background, Bărnuțiu draws attention upon the necessity of protecting the national territory from the massive moves of foreign population that might have had fatal consequences for the future of the state and the Romanian ethnic element; this is why, considering also the necessity of economic development of the nation, his options were towards the peoples with Latin origins: „*Colonization with strangers: namely Jews, Slavs and Germans should not be admitted under any condition, because the Jews carrying only with the exchange of things and having as only purpose the gathering of money extort the country and corrupt it; the Slavs have partly destroyed the Romanians and partly thinned them strongly in Moesia, in Croatia, in Banat, in Maramureș, Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Germans declared they want to Germanise all the peoples in Hungary, Transylvania and the Romanians in the Romanian countries. The national interest is above the economic one; the workers for factories and other products should be brought from Italy*”.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*, 162.

known and nevertheless a warning was launched regarding the danger of colonizing the extra-Carpathian territories with compact groups of German population.

### **Conclusions**

All projects discussed at that time regarding the creation of a superstate dominated by the Germanic race in the Central and South-East Europe proved to be unrealistic and detached from the historical nature of the regions concerned. The force of nationalism and the powerful emergence of the modern nations, these really terrible children of history, the historical anachronisms of the main political organism in the area – the Habsburg Empire –, and also certain aspects regarding the broader framework of the German penetration and influence in the previously mentioned areas turned all these initiatives into failures. The latter and their consequences on the idea of establishing an organism called Mitteleuropa have already been highlighted in the historiography, with some perspectives and conclusions which entitle further research of the issue<sup>39</sup>.

---

<sup>39</sup> See, for instance, the considerations of Robin OKEY, in his study *Central Europe / Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions*, in *Past & Present*, N° 137 (Nov. 1992), 112: „Before 1800 German had already become the chief language of polite society in Hungary, while in Bohemia Palacký wrote his history of the Czech people initially in German because the «active middle classes» he took to be the nation's core spoke and wrote more German than Czech. More than 1500 plays were performed in Zagreb by German professional companies between 1780 and 1860, but not one by equivalent Croatian group till 1840. German was the language of wider commerce in Serbian Belgrade and the Romanian port of Galați; in Russian Poland the census of 1897 recorded seventy thousand Germans in Łódź, the «Polish Manchester». German failure to turn this linguistic and economic preponderance in east-central Europe either into «greater Mitteleuropa» or harmonious co-operation with the lands between is arguably the key to European political history between 1848 and 1945”.

László Gulyás

***State versus Nation. The political thought of Masaryk from  
“The Czech Question” to the “The problem of small nations...”***

**Abstract**

Masaryk was also interested in the relation between the Czech nation and the Monarchy, beside an active role in politics, as a scientist. He considered his two studies, „*The Czech Question*” (1894) and „*Our Current Crisis*,” (1895) as seminal. In both, he deems it decisive in the relationship of a state and nation, that the state satisfy the nation’s needs.

At the outbreak of World War One, Masaryk had, in secret, begun his anti-Monarchy activities. During the fall and early winter of 1914, Masaryk was almost continually abroad. At February of 1915 Masaryk decides not to return to Prague but to continue the organizing abroad, as an émigré. At October of 1917 Masaryk held a lecture at King’s College, the title was „*The problem of small nations in the European crisis*.” This lecture was important because it was the first time that Masaryk presented his ideal, comprehensive program for the Czech resistance abroad.

Our paper aims to analyze Masaryk papers and lecture, and try to outline development of his political thought.

*Keywords:* World War One, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Masaryk, history of Czechoslovakia,

**M**asaryk was born in 1850 in Brno, went to college in Vienna, where he also continued his university studies, obtaining a doctorate in 1876. For a short time, he studied in Leipzig. In 1878, at the age of 28, he is a lecturer at the University of Vienna. Teaching at the University of Prague, beginning in 1883. If we examine his political career, it becomes apparent that he joins into Czech political life after returning to Prague in 1883, at the age of 33.

This was the period of contest between the Old Czechs and the Young Czechs.<sup>1</sup> Since he is dissatisfied with the conservative politics of the Old Czechs but not in total agreement with the Young Czechs, either, he gathers a few similar-thinking politicians around himself (Jozef Kaizl, Karel Kramář) and creates his own gathering, the Realists. To disseminate their views, they take over a newspaper, the *Čas*. It is interesting, and a true picture of the era, that they dabble in both the Old and Young Czech groups. In the 1891 parliamentary elections, several of Masaryk’s group are elected (Masaryk, Kramář, Kaizl).

Masaryk, the inexperienced, beginner politician soon finds himself in a moral dilemma in the daily political skirmishes of a representative (he does not agree with

---

<sup>1</sup> Otto URBAN: *A nagykorúvá érés gyötrelmei. Társadalom és politika a 19. század és a 20. század fordulóján*, IN: SZARKA László (szerk): *Csehország a Habsburg-monarchiában 1618-1918*. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1989. 132-155.

the opposition but refuses to come out openly on the side of the government), he resigns his seat in 1893. His resignation was not the end of his political activities; the time gained from not having parliamentary duties, he spent on writing studies. In 1894, he wrote „*The Czech Question*”,<sup>2</sup> in 1895, „*Our Current Crisis*.” In both, he tried to give a philosophical foundation to Czech politics.

During these years, Masaryk tried to create the framework for a national program, in which he tries to synthesize the traditional with the modern. In 1900, Masaryk and his circle establish a new party, the Czech People's Party (later renamed to Czech Liberal Party). The primary purpose of the party, they felt, was to accomplish Czech-Austrian-German cooperation. In 1907, he is again elected to the Viennese Reichsrat, where he becomes known for his criticism of the Monarchy's Balkan policies. He also devotes considerable time to foreign policy activities.<sup>3</sup>

In 1909, he speaks out in the Reichsrat against the regicide case in Zagreb, later going on several deputations to Belgrade. He played an active role in the case of the Serb-Croat coalition politicians, against Austrian historian Heinrich Friedjung. Between November of 1910 and January of 1911, he carried on a pointed discourse with Aehrenthal, the Monarchy's Foreign Minister. During the Balkan War of 1912-1913, he tried to mediate between the Serbs and the Monarchy, carrying Nikola Pasić's letter – the Serb Prime Minister – from Belgrade to Vienna.

We would draw attention to two important appraisal comments with regard to his previous activities. Kořalka judges Masaryk's pre-1914 activities as: „... *more and more often he is seen as the solitary man of Czech politics, whose expressions and actions are permeated by a moralizing tendency ... his person and work, up to 1914, better known among the Germans, and even more so among the South Slavs.*”<sup>4</sup>

László Szarka gives the following striking appraisal: „*It is but a slight exaggeration to say that his name was better known among those following Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, than in the circles following Czech internal developments.*”<sup>5</sup>

### **State versus nation**

Masaryk was also interested in the relation between the Czech nation and the Monarchy, beside an active role in politics, as a scientist.<sup>6</sup> He considered his two studies, *The Czech Question* and *Our Current Crisis*, as seminal. In both, he deems

---

<sup>2</sup> VÁRADI, Aladár (ed.): *A magyar Masaryk*. Volume II. Bratislava, 1935.

<sup>3</sup> Jiří KOŘALKA: *A világpolitika színpadán. Egy „államnélküli nemzet” a nemzetközi kapcsolatokban 1900 és 1918 között*, IN: *Csehország a Habsburg-monarchiában 1916-1918*. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1989. 167-169.

<sup>4</sup> KOŘALKA: 161.

<sup>5</sup> SZARKA László: *Egy XX. századi államalapító emlékiratai*. Mint utószó, IN: *Masaryk: A világhorradalom 1914-1918*. Európa Kiadó, Budapest, 1990. 429-465.

<sup>6</sup> Roman SZPORLUK: *The political thought of Thomas Masaryk*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1981. 101-125.

it decisive in the relationship of a state and nation, that the state satisfy the nation's needs.

In The Czech Question, he aligns to the reasoning of Palacky's 1865 work – The Concept of the Austrian State – accepting and agreeing with the Austrian program of Czech political law. It is during his second period as a representative, starting in 1907, that he begins to re-evaluate his previous position of the '90's on the relationship of the state (especially the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) and the nation (especially the Czechs).<sup>7</sup> During this reassessment, he comes to the following conclusion regarding the antagonism between the state and the nations (observable in practice with the Germans, Magyars and Russians): in the end, it weakens the state itself, as it impedes the development of the nations.

In 1911, when the delegation for common matters was meeting in Budapest, Masaryk held a lecture for Slovak intellectuals on the problems of the small nations, and the Slovaks.<sup>8</sup> In his presentation, he laid out the following line of thought: after achieving personal and civil rights, 19<sup>th</sup> century development set as a target the acquisition of national rights. The nation is a natural unit (this idea Masaryk took from Herder – auth.), therefore affiliation to it is necessarily stronger than attachment to an artificial institution – and a state is a highly artificial institution. Since a nation is the only organic institution, any development should align to its needs. Since Europe does not have any truly nation states, we should strive towards the ideal of pure and natural national ethos.

If we strip the philosophy from the above lecture and try to grasp the politics, Masaryk stated the confrontation between the state and its nations. If we superimpose the political message onto the concrete situation, Masaryk contrasts the interests of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Czech nation. He has come to a diametrically opposing view he has stated several times in the 1890's, refuting the Austro-Slav political law. As a consequence, it led directly to August, 1914 when, after some wavering, Masaryk began active anti-Monarchy organizing.<sup>9</sup>

### ***Beginning of Masaryk anti-Monarchy activities***

At the outbreak of World War One, neither the Reichsrat, nor the Czech Territorial Assembly were in session, hence, the Czech political parties were 'saved' from the obligation of having to make an official declaration in these official forums regarding the war. The war's outbreak caught almost all the Czech politicians off-guard, most of whom would take a wait-and-see attitude, preferring

---

<sup>7</sup> SZARKA: 436.

<sup>8</sup> Masaryk's Budapest lecture was reported by Milan Hodža on March 3, 1911, in the paper *Nása zástava*. Much later, it was published in book form. Milan HODŽA: *Clánky, reci, studie*. Praha. 1930. vol II. 199-206.

<sup>9</sup> The details see GULYÁS László: Edvard Benes. Közép-Európa koncepciók és a valóság. Attraktor Kiadó. Máriabesnyő-Gödöllő. 2008. 37-40. In English László GULYÁS: *Benes statesman or charlatan? The plans and the reality 1908-1948*. Corvinus Publishing, Toronto-Buffalo, 2008. 39-43.

not to take a stand until they received an indication of the outcome. To this end, the parties and their leaders made statements of loyalty to the Monarchy.<sup>10</sup> Of course, there were qualitative differences between the parties' declarations of loyalty. The staunchest supporters of the Monarchy were the Czech Catholics who stated their „*unwavering loyalty and support for the Empire and towards his Majesty, the Emperor.*”<sup>11</sup>

Of the leading politicians, it was only Karel Kramář who questioned continued loyalty to the Monarchy – although couched in diplomatic terms – when he wrote an article Russophile article in the *Narodní Listy* on August 4, 1914, the day the German armies attacked Belgium. Kramář accepted German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg's view that the war is one between the Germans and the Slavs but cautioned that the future of the Czech nation depends on who wins the war.<sup>12</sup>

We must note that on the question of the loyalty of the Czech politicians, the political elite received a clear sign of what happens when they stray from the path of loyalty. On September 4, Václav Klofáč (member of the Vienna Parliament and a leader of the National Socialist Party), as mentioned earlier, one of the most extremist opponents of the Monarchy before 1914, was arrested on charges of treason.

While Czech politicians issued protestations of loyalty towards the Monarchy, Tomáš G. Masaryk had, in secret, begun his anti-Monarchy activities.<sup>13</sup> As a first step, he passed news and requests to his London friend, Wickham Steed (foreign editor of the London Times), through Emanuel Voska, an American citizen of Czech descent, who happened to be in Prague, on his way to London.<sup>14</sup> Steed received Masaryk's message on August 2, which he immediately forwarded to the Russian Embassy in London. In the message, Masaryk asks the Russian high command not to term any Czech deserters from the Monarchy armies as enemies. Beckendorf – Russia's ambassador in London – replied with the suggestion that deserting Czech soldiers sing „*Hej Slované*” to signal their nationality.<sup>15</sup>

Between September 12 and 26, 1914, Masaryk traveled to Holland (his first trip) – using as an excuse the need to accompany his American sister-in-law – and posted letters from Rotterdam to Ernest Denis (professor at the Sorbonne, avowed French friend of Slav affairs), to Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson, asking for a personal meeting.<sup>16</sup> These took place in October (during his second Trip to

---

<sup>10</sup> Zbyenek ZEMAN: *The Break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy 1914-1918*. Oxford University Press, London, 1961. 43.

<sup>11</sup> ZEMAN: 44.

<sup>12</sup> ZEMAN: 43. KOŘALKA: 181.

<sup>13</sup> For a general summary of the biographies of T.G. Masaryk, see Note 2 in the bibliography.

<sup>14</sup> Emanuel Voska also filled an important role in the organization of the Czechoslovak emigration. He tried to organize the activities of the Czechoslovak emigration, primarily in the USA, according to Masaryk's instructions. Voska's important role is reflected by the inclusion of numerous letters written to him by Masaryk into a publication by Frank HADLER: *Weg von Österreich! Das Weltkrieg von Masaryk und Benes im Spiegel ihrer Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus des Jahren 1914-1918*. Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1995.

<sup>15</sup> T.G. MASARYK: *A világforradalom 1914-1918*. Európa Kiadó, Budapest, 1990. 12.

<sup>16</sup> MASARYK: 13.

Holland, October 14-29, 1914). Masaryk informed Seton-Watson that, with the exception of the aristocracy and the clergy, the entire Czech nation was hoping for its independence. The sequence of events should be – said Masaryk – that, first, the historical Czech provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia should be ‘restored,’ then, append to them the Slovak populated areas of Hungary. It would be „wiser not head the new state with the Russian crown prince, rather a western prince, preferably Danish or Belgian”. The Czech state thus constituted would be bound in the North by an autonomous Poland, in the East by the Russian Empire, expanded by Ruthenia and eastern Galicia.<sup>17</sup>

In September, before the regular month-end editorial meeting, Beneš sought out Masaryk and told him that „in my opinion, we can not idly observe the war, we must do something: he is restless, he would like to be active.”<sup>18</sup> After their conversation, at Masaryk’s request, Beneš joined the activities of one of the opposition groups, organizing the ‘Mafia’.<sup>19</sup>

Beneš remembers the birth of the Mafia in his memoirs: „We held several meetings at the apartment of dr. Boucel. Initially, general informative meetings, which naturally had an anti-Austrian nature, but lacked specifically revolutionary and conspiratorial plans. In time, we debated more and more on the probable outcome of the war, our political aims and tasks.”<sup>20</sup>

During this period – in practical terms, the fall of 1914 – Beneš was busy traveling to Vienna and Germany. The purpose of the Vienna trips was to transport to Prague the documents purloined by an important Mafia member, Kovanda, the valet of Austrian Interior Minister Heinold. The objective of the German trips was to pick up parcels from Seton-Watson at the central Post Office in Dresden, containing the British newspapers *Morning Post* and the *Times*.<sup>21</sup>

During the fall and early winter of 1914, Masaryk was almost continually abroad, essentially promoting Beneš to the second-in-charge of the organization. Hence, it is not surprising that Masaryk, when about to leave Prague for Italy on December 1914, at their last meeting names him as the leader of the Bohemian organization and with maintaining their line of communication.<sup>22</sup>

Masaryk arrived in Rome on December 22, 1914. Practically every European country had diplomatic contact with Italy, since the Italians declared their neutrality at the outbreak of hostilities, allowing these representatives to continue working unhindered. Masaryk traveled to Rome obtain news about the war and make diplomatic contacts, for which Rome was the ideal terrain. His intuition bore fruit and he was able to carry out discussions with numerous south-Slav and a few Polish émigré politicians; through a Russian journalist, he forwarded a

<sup>17</sup> ROMSICS Ignác: *A trianoni békeszerződés*. Osiris Kiadó. Budapest. 2001. 44.

<sup>18</sup> MASARYK: 36-37.

<sup>19</sup> SZPORLUK 126-130; Jíří KOVTUN: *Masarykov triumf. Příběh konce války*. Toronto, 1987. 68-69.

<sup>20</sup> Eduárd BENEŠ: *A nemzetek forradalma I-III*. Bratislava. 1936. Vol I. 30.

<sup>21</sup> BENEŠ vol I. 30-31.

<sup>22</sup> Zbyenek ZEMAN– Antonín KLIMA: *The life of Edvard Benes*. Oxford University Press. London. 1997. 19.

memorandum to the Russian Foreign Minister, as well as having several meetings with the British ambassador to Rome, James Rennell Rodd.<sup>23</sup>

After Masaryk's departure, Beneš continued the organizing activities at home, faithfully traveling to Dresden and Vienna, worked on the editorial staff of the *Čas* and maintained contact with the other members of the anti-Monarch group. At the end of January, 1915, he comes into possession of the information (again forwarded to the conspirators from Interior Minister Hainhold's valet, Kovanda) that the Monarchy's ambassador to Rome, baron Macchio, knows that Masaryk met two outstanding political figures of the south-Slav émigrés, Supilo and Trumbič. According to the original plan, Masaryk was to return to Prague in February of 1915. Hence, it was most probable that he would be arrested on his return by the Austrian police.<sup>24</sup> To avoid it, Beneš traveled to Zurich at the beginning of February, 1915 – Masaryk having moved in the meantime from Italy to Switzerland – to meet with Masaryk.

On the basis of information he received from Beneš, Masaryk decides not to return to Prague but to continue the organizing abroad, as an émigré. At the same time, Beneš' appointed task is to lead and coordinate the clandestine organizational activities, as well as maintain the contact between the homeland organization and the foreign activists (at this point, only Masaryk).

***Te Masaryk's new concept: „The problem of small nations in the European crisis”***

The émigré movement he conjured up needed a clear and understandable program. Actually, two: a fundamental statement, in which the émigré society defines itself and its position, and then, a practical program built on that foundation. Masaryk's thoughts, composed before the war, became the fundamental statement (mission statement in today's terms – ed.). This was an easy task as Masaryk had, already back in 1911, contrasted the concepts of state and nation.

During his stay in Geneva, from January to September of 1915, Masaryk adapted his earlier ideas to the war circumstances, expanding them with a program for small states with his lecture at King's College „*The problem of small nations in the European crisis*”.<sup>25</sup>

Masaryk's British friends accomplish to have Prime Minister Asquith accept the patronage of the lecture, which he did not attend personally, claiming illness but sent a letter addressing the attendees.<sup>26</sup> In the introduction to his lecture, Masaryk stated: „*We Slavs sharply differentiate state and nation.*”<sup>27</sup> Consistent with this

---

<sup>23</sup> MASARYK 45-58. KOVTUN: 68-69.

<sup>24</sup> BENEŠ: vol I. 38.

<sup>25</sup> T.G. MASARYK: *The problem of small nations in the European crisis*. London, 1915.

<sup>26</sup> MASARYK (1915): 2.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 11.



statement, he went on to examine the relationship of state and nation in Europe. He said: In 1915, there are 25 states, inhabited by 62 nations, i.e., Europe has twice as many nations as states. On top of that, of the 28, only seven are inhabited by members of one nation and these are the really small nations (Andorra, Denmark, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Holland, Portugal).

The medium and large states are inhabited by several nations, the majority nation being the ruler – he said, continuing – „yet we have an example where the minority wants to rule – the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary beside them.”<sup>28</sup> He draws attention to the distinctive difference in the two part of Europe „... while there are 18 states in the West, only 8 in the East, and two of them belong partly to the West and partly to the East”.<sup>29</sup>

He makes a claim that the territory bounded by Constantinople, Salonika, Trieste, Gdansk to St. Petersburg is the zone of the small nations, currently ruled by Germany, the Monarchy, Turkey and czarist Russia. To make things worse, Serbs and Croats live in four states and seven administrative regions, Poles in three states, and Czechs and Slovaks in two states. From this, it can be deduced that in this zone, the chief political motivators are the nationality and language issues. The small nations constantly struggle for their freedom and independence. The current war broke out here, in this tinderbox, which will spread unrest and turbulence to the rest of Europe. This belt needs to be politically reorganized. Continuing with his argument, Masaryk groups the nations of Europe into four groups, based on their population:

Physical size and strength can not be the basis of law – he said – „... 70 is undeniably more than 10, but does that give the 70 the right to take away the livelihood of the 10? Do they have the right to resort to force?” – posing the question.<sup>30</sup> He went at length using historical examples to develop his thesis, according to which the small nations have a right and opportunity for independent cultural growth and statehood.<sup>31</sup>

As his concluding argument, he said: „As there is no superman, so the large nations do not have superior rights. No large nation has the right, to treat its smaller neighbors as a toy of its imperialistic appetite or unbounded thirst for power.”<sup>32</sup>

<b>86 – 45 million</b>	<i>Russians, Germans, British</i>
<b>40 – 20 million</b>	<i>French, Italians, Spaniards</i>
<b>Under 20 million</b>	<i>Poles, Romanians, Serb-Croats, Czechs, Swedes, Portuguese</i>
<b>Fragment or sporadic</b>	<i>Other</i>

In his concluding portion, Masaryk expand on his small nations program. His reasoning, as he expounds it, is: England entered the war to protect the small

---

<sup>28</sup> MASARYK (1915): 13.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 19-30.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 30.

Belgium and Serbia. The true pan-German aim of Germany is the creation of a Berlin-Bagdad axis, a building block of which is the Monarchy. The Poles, Serbs, Croats and Czechs are natural enemies of Germany. „*Freeing and supporting these small nations is the only appropriate anti-Prussian blow. A free Poland, Bohemia and Serb-Croatia would be the buffer nations, whose creation would ease and ensure the creation of other small nations, such as Hungary, Greater Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. If this terrible war has any meaning, we can only find it in the liberation of the small nations.*”<sup>33</sup>

According to Kořalka, this lecture is important because it was the first time that Masaryk presented his ideal, comprehensive program for the Czech resistance abroad.<sup>34</sup> It was also an important milestone, in our view, because it offered a program for the Entente – the liberation of the small nation as a war aim – the creation of small nation states. All the while, Masaryk linked the Czech question to the larger Middle European restructuring question, running from the Baltic to the Aegean. He considered the creation of a free Poland, Serb-Croatia and, certainly, a Czech state as an important measure in stemming the eastern spread of Germany. The Masaryk-Benes exiles needed to garner the support and co-operation of the Entente powers. To gain this support, he employed a suite of broad based reasons during the war (and, of course, during the peace talks).<sup>35</sup>

In his lecture, Masaryk laid out, and defined, the reasons and reasoning used by the Czechoslovak émigrés in the coming year to convince the Entente of their cause.

***Beneš's contribution to the Masaryk' concept: „Détruisez L'Autriche-Hongrie”***

Several months later – in the spring of 1916 – Beneš held a series of lectures at the Sorbonne, with the assistance of Denis, on the topic of the Slav question and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.<sup>36</sup> Beneš used this opportunity to further refine the ideas put forward by Masaryk, to expand them and make them usable in the propaganda and diplomatic efforts. Beneš collected his lecture material and published it in pamphlet form, in French.<sup>37</sup>

In *Détruisez* Beneš expanded Masaryk's King's College lecture with two new goals. Through a review of Czech history, he professes to prove that the Germans, Habsburgs and Magyars have always represented an anti-democratic absolutism. In practical terms, Beneš is trying to prop up Masaryk's interpretation of the causes of the war, i.e., the war consists of two camps: the Entente, fighting for democratic principles, and the absolutist Central Powers, whose political and current social structure he has a completely opposing philosophical view. As well,

---

<sup>33</sup> MASARYK (1915): 31-32.

<sup>34</sup> KOŘALKA: 186.

<sup>35</sup> SZARKA: 429-465.

<sup>36</sup> HADLER: 277.

<sup>37</sup> Edvard BENEŠ: *Détruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le Martyre des Tchéco-Slovaques à travers l'histoire*, Paris, 1916.

he is trying to substantiate that the pre-war cultural and historical development of the Czechoslovaks, their psychological and philosophical concepts, their intellectual and social structure, make them members of western European camp.

In *Détruisez* Beneš puts forward the following solution:<sup>38</sup> since Austria-Hungary aids the expansionism and pan-Germanism of Germany, there is but one solution to defeat Germany. Austria-Hungary must be dismembered to be replaced by new and independent states, one of which would be Czechoslovakia, formed from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia. This Czechoslovak state, together with Russia, would form a barricade against Germany. In the East, Transylvania must be given to Romania, in the South, Yugoslavia created from Serbia and the other Serb, Croat and Slovene populated territories. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia must be connected by a corridor running between Austria and Hungary. The principle of nationalities will thus be utilized, concluded Beneš.

Beneš reasons from the French political point of view, why his suggestion for re-drawing Central Europe is advantageous. If Austria-Hungary is dissolved, it can no longer be a support for Germany; Germany would be reduced to its own resources and „*would be incapable of anything*” alone. Also, separating the Hungarians from Austria also prevents them renewing their former policies. He also promises further advantages for the French, writing: „*It will be to Slav's advantage to support each other, from the Baltic to the Adriatic, because the Germans are a common threat. France and Italy, also menaced by the Germans would, of necessity, be their allies.*”

Beneš outlined a plan in *Détruisez* for the re-organization of Central Europe that took into consideration the long-term political objectives of France. Every historian agrees that the chief military objective of the French was the defeat of Germany and leaving it in a weakened post-war state.<sup>39</sup> At most, the French intended to reform the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, with perhaps minor territorial revisions to satisfy her allies. It is most illuminating that in the third year of the war, France seriously considered a separate peace with the Monarchy as a possibility.<sup>40</sup> With this line of reasoning, Beneš allied the apprehensive Czechoslovak exiles and their program – the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia – into an uncomfortable alliance with the French, in such a way that both sides' objectives and war aims seemed in tune. He found a clever solution, offering the key to a French victory over Germany, while ensuring the satisfaction of Czechoslovak needs. This was: the most direct method of gaining French victory was the ending of the Monarchy, which also necessitated the re-organization of Central Europe.

---

<sup>38</sup> BENEŠ: 44-46.

<sup>39</sup> J. NÉRÉ: *The foreign policy of France from 1914 to 1945*. London and Boston, 1975. 3-9. David STEVENSON: *French War Aims against Germany, 1914-1919*. Calderon Press, Oxford, 1962.

<sup>40</sup> PASTOR Péter: *Franciaország hadicéljai*. IN: *Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. században*, Budapest, 1995. 39-40. FEJTŐ Ferenc: *Rekviem egy hajdan volt birodalomért. Ausztria-Magyarország szétrombolása*. (Minerva-Atlantisz, Budapest, 1990. 172-250.

Conceptually, the question may arise as to, How big a portion of the rationale created for the Czechoslovak émigrés was Masaryk's? How much Beneš'? It is impossible to clearly delineate their input, as Borsody puts it clearly in his book: „*The two founders of the Czechoslovak state, Masaryk and Benes, were thousands of kilometers apart at the decisive moments. They hardly communicated. They worked separately and independently, yet in total harmony.*”<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> BORSODY István: *Beneš*. Budapest, 1943. 44.

## *African studies*

- the British foreign policy and the Egyptian affairs in the 1890s
- Lord Carnarvon and the question of the South African federalism



Jaroslav Valkoun

## *The British and Egypt in the 1890s*<sup>1</sup>

### Abstract

This study deals with the British foreign policy and the Egyptian affairs in the 1890s. At the end of the 1880s, the British occupation of Egypt became permanent and the internal political situation started to become complicated because British interventions in the Egyptian administration grew significantly. In January 1892, the Khedive Tawfīq died and the British position in Egypt got complicated because his Anglophobe son Abbas II Hilmi succeeded to the throne. Next two years, the British Consul-General in Cairo, Lord Cromer, got into trouble with the young Khedive over the appointment of Prime Ministers and duties of the British officers in the Egyptian Army and officials in the administration. The crises of 1893 and 1894 were short and non-violent; nonetheless, they left scars on British-Egyptians relations. In relation to the strengthening of the British military presence in the country and of the functioning of its administration, a hostile anti-British nationalistic movement started to gain force. Because of the growing national sentiment, Lord Cromer did his utmost that the Egyptians would perceive the *de facto* permanent occupation positively. The so-called Denshawai Incident is considered to be a turning point of Lord Cromer's era because, the first time since 1882, the Egyptian national movement gained the support of British public opinion and this Incident hastened his departure from Egypt.

*Keywords:* History, British foreign policy, history of Egypt, British colonial policy, Lord Cromer, Abbas II Hilmi

The British administration in Egypt had to face several urgent and pressing tasks in the 1880s. Prime among these was the need to stabilize the incomes and the expenses of the state, especially when the latter was confronted with unexpected military costs in Sudan.<sup>2</sup> Because of this need to tighten one's belt, both the British Consul-General and Diplomatic Agent in Egypt, Sir Evelyn Baring (the Earl of Cromer from 1892), and his financial expert, Sir Edgar Vincent, were indeed unpopular. The latter of the two men was characterized as a strong personality with „*no fear of unpopularity*”<sup>3</sup> and Sir Evelyn regarded him as an ideal Financial Advisor who „*possessed in a high degree the quality specially*

---

<sup>1</sup> This study was written within the Programme for the Development of Fields of Study at Charles University, No. P12 *History from the interdisciplinary perspective*, sub-programme *Europe and (versus) the world: Intercontinental and intracontinental political, economic, social, cultural and intellectual transfers and their consequences*.

<sup>2</sup> Cromer saw the key to British success in Egypt in financial stability; he always bore this fact in mind. CAIN, P. J.: *Character and Imperialism: The British Financial Administration in Egypt, 1878–1914*, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 34, N° 2, 2006. 187.

<sup>3</sup> MILNER, A.: *England in Egypt*, 6<sup>th</sup> Ed., London, 1899. 87.

*necessary for the performance of his duties*".<sup>4</sup> Moreover, to a certain extent, the two men became the symbols of „stinginess”.<sup>5</sup>

From 1889, Sir Evelyn did not consider Egyptian finances threatened anymore. This was the case because various factors enabled commencing solvency, for example the smooth functioning of the administration without serious concerns about the future development. A somewhat symbolic end after the finished „*race against bankruptcy*” was when Sir Edgar Vincent resigned from the post of Financial Advisor in October 1889 and when Sir Elwin Mitford Palmer was appointed to the post in concern. The new Financial Advisor had considerable experience with local financial matters. In addition, it is interesting to note that the Egyptian government, with respect to the need of financial stability and to the previous recommendations of Lord Dufferin, pledged to decrease taxes. Baring fully supported this step and indeed tried to introduce it into the Egyptian economy. In the theoretical sphere, he was influenced by the words of the former British Viceroy in India, Baron Lawrence: „*Like taxation was the panacea for foreign rule.*”<sup>6</sup>

The revision of the land tax was a remarkable deed of Sir Elwin. The original taxation, dating from the rule of Muhammad Ali, was bond to acreage; in theory, less fertile Upper Egypt was to pay more than the region of the Nile Delta that was permanently irrigated. In reality, however, more money was collected in the lower part of the country while the upper part had to contend with constant tax arrears. The newly introduced tax rate depended primarily on the quality of soil. Between 1890 and 1895, the land tax gradually decreased by £E 430,000. In addition, in 1895, a special ten-member commission, the so-called Land Revenue Commission, was established. Its main task was to re-examine in detail the existing tax assessment that itself was supposed to prevent any increase of this tax in the future.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, the Egyptian administration proceeded to the abolition of some of the other payment obligations (for example the Nile toll, the profession tax, river boats and fishing boats fees, etc.) or to their reduction (e.g. some of the minor taxes, registration fees, railway, postal and telegraphic tariffs and customs duties on non-liquid and mineral fuels, building materials and on selected foodstuff). The only tax that was increased was the customs duty on imported tobacco.<sup>8</sup>

Despite vigorous reduction and even abolition of some of the taxes, the income that reached the Egyptian Exchequer grew linearly.<sup>9</sup> This was the result of a more

---

<sup>4</sup> AUCHTERLONIE, P.: *A Turk of the West: Sir Edgar Vincent's Career in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire*, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, N° 1, 2000. 57.

<sup>5</sup> COLVIN, A.: *The Making of Modern Egypt*, London, 1906. 134.

<sup>6</sup> TIGNOR, R. L.: *The „Indianization” of the Egyptian Administration Under British Rule*, The American Historical Review, Vol. 68, N° 3, 1963. 638.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. COLVIN: 233-234. TIGNOR, R. L.: *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt 1882–1914*, Princeton, 1966. 109-110.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. BARING, E.: *Modern Egypt*, Vol. 2, London, 1908. 447-448.; KEMMERER, E. W.: *The Fiscal System of Egypt*, Publications of the American Economic Association, 3<sup>rd</sup> Series, Vol. 1, N° 3, 1900. 205-206.

<sup>9</sup> Government revenue increased from £E10,587,436 (1883) to £E16,337,667 (1906). MARLOWE, J.:



effective collection of taxes and fees and of a commencing economic boom connected to various irrigational projects.<sup>10</sup> In 1883, when Sir Evelyn took over the Egyptian administration, the total Egyptian deficit amounted to £E 96,457,000; £E 4,268,000 was used to amortize the obligations every year. In December 1906, that is at the end of Cromer's governing of the country, the debt was reduced by £E 9,041,000 and the cost of debt service by £E 900,000.<sup>11</sup> Last but not least, from 1890 onwards, and in connection to the advancement of export agriculture and manufacturing industry, foreign investors were gradually becoming more and more interested in the events that took place in Egypt.<sup>12</sup>

The Egyptian government moved on to gradually eliminate the „last relicts” of dual control in the 1890s. To abolish the Daira administration seemed to be the easiest step. Already during the times of Khedive Ismail, his private property served as loan collateral (the Daira Loan). Moreover, creditors enforced the establishment of a special board committee composed of the Egyptian General Director and of British and French controllers. They were supposed to supervise the functioning of this economic unit. When Sir Elwin took up his post, the Egyptian administration managed to negotiate an interest conversion of this loan by one per cent. In the second half of the 1890s, Cromer experienced a lack of funds because of the Sudan expedition and because of the construction of the Aswan Dams. Therefore, in June 1898, he proceeded to selling the Daira region<sup>13</sup> to an international financial consortium headed by a wealthy British banker and businessman with Jewish roots, Sir Ernest Joseph Cassel. Because of his activities all around the world, the man was well known and belonged to the biggest financiers at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>14</sup> He also had a significant influence on

---

*Cromer in Egypt*, London, 1970. 286.

<sup>10</sup> To the problems TVEDT, T.: *Hydrology and Empire: The Nile Water Imperialism and the Partition of Africa*, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 39, N<sup>o</sup> 2, 2011. 173-194; VALKOUN, J.: „The Struggle for Water”: *The British and the Modernization of Egyptian Irrigation*, The Twentieth Century – Dvacáté století, Vol. 1, N<sup>o</sup> 2, 2009. 95-105.

<sup>11</sup> Between 1883 and 1906, indebtedness grew by another £E 18,210,000: a guaranteed loan from 1885 (£E 9,424,000), minor loans for the realization of publicly beneficial projects and the annuity of the Khedive's family (£E 4,882,000), financial operations (interest conversion) from the year 1890 (£E 3,904,000). As a matter of fact, during the twenty three years of Cromer's era more than £E 27,000,000 was repaid. BARING (1908): 449-450.

<sup>12</sup> In 1892, various Egyptian sugar refineries united and fused into one company, *Société Générale des Sucreries et de la Raffinerie*. The company was in the hands of the French. Between 1895 and 1898, several capital investments into the transportation infrastructure of the country were made – for example, narrow-gauge railways were built in the Delta (*Delta Light Railway Company*, *East Light Railway Company*) the same as tram lines in Cairo and Alexandria. British industrialists were traditionally interested in the textile sector – the *Egyptian Cotton Mills* and the *Anglo-Egyptian Spinning and Weaving Company*. Cf. COLVIN: 273. MARLOWE: 293-295. OWEN, R.: *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul*, Oxford, 2004. 310-313.

<sup>13</sup> The Daira region did not include only lands (sugar plantations and vast fields), but also the corresponding infrastructure (roads, railways, irrigational canals), processing facilities (sugar refineries, storehouses), machines (locomotives, steamboats) and even whole cities. The economic units of Daira and the Domains represented a whole fifth of all agricultural land in Egypt. SCHANZ, M.: *Cotton in Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, Manchester, 1913. 42.

<sup>14</sup> In detail TIGNOR (1966): 369-373.

Egyptian economy. The Egyptian government made immediate profit of £E 3,200,000 from this arrangement. Simultaneously, the National Bank of Egypt was established in the form of a private company. Sir Elwin Palmer was its first governor and it was Cassel and his business partners who put the initial capital into it.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore, even more of the Khedive's estates and immovable property, called the Domains, were pledged from 1878 because of a loan provided by the Rothschilds. The Rothschilds wished to administrate this economic unit with the help of a commission composed of a Briton, a Frenchman and an Egyptian, similarly to the Daira case. The Egyptian government managed to gradually repay the debt that had been tied to the region.<sup>16</sup> It was only in the time of Cromer's successor, Sir Eldon Gorst, when the area was sold off in smaller parts. This time, however, it was not done with the help of Cassel's consortium. The parts were sold directly into Egyptian hands, particularly to smaller peasants. Because the Egyptian government did not use a mediator to sell the property, they acquired the whole profit for themselves.<sup>17</sup> In 1913, then, the Domains Loan was fully repaid as well.<sup>18</sup>

Railways, telegraphs and the Port of Alexandria were all under international supervision from November 1876. The former five-member administration was reduced to a three-member British-Egyptian-French one. In contrast to the administration of the regions of Daira and the Domains, the administrators possessed greater powers and a relatively higher number of officials and bureaucrats. However, the management was still inefficient and clumsy. For this reason, it was abolished in 1904 and it was the Egyptian government that took over.<sup>19</sup> Despite the fact that the last significant „relict” of dual administration ceased to exist, the French still held various posts, for example in educational institutions. The Entente Cordiale, signed in 1904, confirmed this state of affairs in its fifth clause.<sup>20</sup>

At the end of the 1880s, the internal political situation started to become complicated because British interventions in the Egyptian administration grew significantly. Furthermore, the Prime Minister of Egypt, Nubar Pasha, resigned formally stating he did so because of the reform of law enforcement forces.<sup>21</sup> In reality, however, he disagreed with growing British influence in those parts of the administration that he considered to be exclusively in the Egyptian sphere. Nubar

---

<sup>15</sup> In the following years, the region was sold again, however, this time in smaller portions; in 1905, the Daira Loan was repaid. See NEWMAN, E. W. P.: *Great Britain in Egypt*, London, 1928. 129; OWEN, 304-305.

<sup>16</sup> In 1905, the debt was „only” £E 1,316,000 of the former £E 8,000,000. BARING (1908): 314-315.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. OWEN: 309. SCHANZ: 42.

<sup>18</sup> NEWMAN: 129.

<sup>19</sup> BARING (1908): 310-312.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. CAMBON, P.; LANSLOWNE: *Declaration between the United Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, Dated April 8, 1904*, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, N° 1, 1907. 7; SLOANE, W. M.: *Egypt and England*, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, N° 3, 1904. 476-477.

<sup>21</sup> SLOANE: 466.

had hoped that Great Britain would only be some kind of a „*manager*” that would set the general outline of developments and that the way how to carry it out would be in the hands of the local officials – naturally under the control of the Prime Minister. The British attempt to control and regulate the incomes and expenses was, however, in absolute contrast and it was impossible to bring the two contrasting conceptions into accord.<sup>22</sup> Subsequently, Riyad (Riaz) Pasha became the new Prime Minister of Egypt.

Nubar and Riyad represented two clearly different political views and approaches. The British respected Nubar who, in order to maintain order, approved the British occupation of Egypt. Lord Cromer regarded him as a respectable statesman who „*correctly understood*” the differences between the eastern and western system of governance. Moreover, Nubar accepted and recognized the fact that the „*only right civilization*” in the world was the European one and, therefore, he pressed for some sort of „*Europeanizing*” of the main Egyptian institutions. Riyad, in contrast, represented the apotheosis of Islam; however, he did admit that some kind of European assistance was necessary to revive Egypt. During the years when he administrated Egypt, he understood its problems better than Nubar had. Furthermore, as a Muslim he possessed greater authority among the Egyptian officials and population.<sup>23</sup> Towards the end of the 1880s, Baring dared to characterize Riyad as „*the most honourable man and a strict pedant*”.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, in May 1891, after the Prime Minister resigned, Mustafa Fahmi Pasha became the head of the Egyptian government. He belonged to the outspoken supporters of the British occupation.<sup>25</sup>

On the 7<sup>th</sup> of January 1892, the Khedive died of pneumonia.<sup>26</sup> It was with his death when the era of Egyptian opposition against the British began. Tawfiq, the deceased Khedive, perceived the occupation as a painful necessity. For this reason, he gave up his powers in favour of the British administrators. During his whole rule he never rebelled, furthermore, there was never even the slightest indication of doing so. Egyptian elites considered him to be nothing else than a mere „*British puppet*”.<sup>27</sup> As for his character and personality, he was an average man who had never gone to Europe and who had never received higher education. A few years after his death, Lord Cromer described his death as a „*great loss for Egypt*”.<sup>28</sup>

According to the rules of primogeniture, Tawfiq’s son Abbas was supposed to take the lead of the country. However, the Sultan’s firman of 1873 stated that the successor to the throne had to be of full (legal) age. This was indeed a

---

<sup>22</sup> DICEY, E.: *The Story of the Khedivate*, London, 1902. 434.

<sup>23</sup> BARING (1908): 336-345.

<sup>24</sup> AL-SAYYID – MARSOT, A. L.: *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, London, 1968. 75.

<sup>25</sup> TIGNOR, R. L.: *Egypt: A Short History*, Princeton, 2010. 234.

<sup>26</sup> Baring thought that a more likely cause of his death was some kind of a venereal disease. Cf. OWEN: 262. TIGNOR (1966): 154. Cf. OWEN: 262. TIGNOR (1966): 154.

<sup>27</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 67.

<sup>28</sup> BARING (1908): 333.

complication in the whole situation as Abbas would be of full age only a couple of months after his father's death. There was, of course, an imperial ordinance that dealt with this possibility: in case of an underage successor, a regent council was to be established. The British Consul-General wanted to avoid the undesirable interregnum and, therefore, he found a way how to settle the complication in a shrewdly manner. He made use of the fact that the firman did not explicitly state what calendar should be used to calculate the age of the throne aspirant. For this reason, he decided to use the Islamic calendar that consists of only 354 or 355 days a year. By doing so, Abbas had been full-aged already two weeks before the death of his father.<sup>29</sup>

Until that point, the young prince spent most of his life abroad and was almost unknown in Egypt. Initially, the British wanted to keep an eye on his upbringing; however, they eventually dropped the idea in order not unnecessarily irritate their relations with Paris. Because the prince received education across the old continent, i.e. from France to the German speaking states, he was fluent in English, French, German and Turkish; however, he did not speak Arabic. In his adolescence years, he was surrounded by mentors, advisors and companions that steered him towards the Francophile nationalist current in Egyptian society. His grandfather Ismail who managed to stand against foreigners was a great idol for him; therefore, he indeed despised his father and his policy. His own vision that Egyptians should administrate their own matters and affairs themselves, independently of the British, was, however, utterly erroneous. He returned to his country with ideas that did not count with or reflect the actual state of affairs and the British occupation.<sup>30</sup>

In mid-January, young Abbas reached Cairo where he was welcomed by a military parade and by the tunes of the Khedive's, the Queen's and the Sultan's anthems. Lord Cromer described his impressions of the young man's character in one of his telegrams to the Marquis of Salisbury: „*He resembles a very gentlemanlike and healthily-minded boy fresh from Eton or Harrow ... I really wish he was not quite so civilized.*”<sup>31</sup> At the beginning, it seemed that everything would be the same as it had been in the times of Tawfiq when a certain understanding functioned between the Khedive, the Consul-General and the highest British and Egyptian officials. Making no obstructions, Abbas confirmed the existing government in office and started to act in a Turkophobic manner as was customary for the ruling Egyptian elite in those times.<sup>32</sup>

France was not going to let the British increase their dominance in the country after the new Khedive took over his post. For this reason, the French Consul-

---

<sup>29</sup> BARING, E.: *Abbas II*, London, 1915. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. DICEY: 459. ELGOOD, P. G.: *The Transit of Egypt*, London, 1928. 124-125.; MANSFIELD, P.: *The British in Egypt*, London, 1971. 150.

<sup>31</sup> MANSFIELD: 151.

<sup>32</sup> At first, the Sultan wanted to make use of the young Khedive's inexperience when he was trying, via his "forgotten" commissioner Muhtar Pasha, to press for the fall of Fahmî's government. In this case, Abbas was grateful for British support. BARING (1915): 3-5.

General in Egypt, Marquis de Reverseaux, did his utmost to manifest the sympathies of the French government for Abbas. During the year 1892, the Khedive was clearly becoming more and more Anglophobe. The fact that he appointed his former openly anti-British teacher and mentor from Vienna, a Swiss named Rouiller Bey, only confirmed this orientation of his. On the contrary, his former hatred for the Sultan changed into loyalty.<sup>33</sup> Young Abbas even called an Ottoman representative to the country and, furthermore, he publicly complained to Muhtar Pasha about all the British interventions into Egyptian affairs.<sup>34</sup> The change in the Khedive's stance was closely connected to governmental changes that had taken place in Great Britain and also to Cromer's summer holiday outside of Egypt. The then Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nubar's son-in-law, a Christian and a patriot of Armenian origin, Tigrane Pasha,<sup>35</sup> who closely followed British press, realized that the desire to evacuate Egypt would reappear with the accession of the new Liberal Government to power; he, therefore, decided to support Abbas in the forthcoming clash with the British.<sup>36</sup>

British occupation of Egypt was considered to be a temporary issue until 1888. In the following years, however, certain tendencies heading towards permanent British presence prevailed. The development corresponded with the more thorough and more distinct advancing of British interests in the Egyptian administration. Around 1890, the British started to step in and intervene more and more in the functioning of the Department of Justice and the Home Office, for example by trying to make the courts work more effective or by reforming the police force. The Egyptians, of course, protested against this development because they perceived the increasing British pressure as an attempt to transform Egypt into a colony and to seize the country's wealth. Indeed, they considered the reorganization of the police force as a clear attempt to take full control over Egypt.<sup>37</sup>

William Ewart Gladstone became the British Prime Minister for the last time in his life in August 1892. It was a question if and to what extent would the new Liberal government listen to the opinions and proposals of the British Consul-General in Cairo. In addition, the personality of Lord Rosebery of the Foreign Office meant a serious obstacle to the efforts of the Egyptian nationalists and of the French, both of whom wanted to eliminate British influence in Egypt. The new head of the Foreign Office was known for his desire to continue in his

---

<sup>33</sup> To the relations between the Sultan and the Khedive in detail HIRSZOWICZ, L.: *The Sultan and the Khedive, 1892–1908*, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, N° 3, 1972. 287-311.

<sup>34</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 155-157.

<sup>35</sup> ELGOOD: 125.

<sup>36</sup> During the British election campaign, the leader of the Liberals marked the British occupation of Egypt as an unpleasant burden. Cf. AL-SAYYID-MARSOT: 102. BARING (1915): 12-13.

<sup>37</sup> To this problems see CANNON, B. D.: *A Reassessment of Judicial Reform in Egypt, 1876-1891*, International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 5, N° 1, 1972. 51-74.; SCOTT, J.: *Judicial Reform in Egypt*, Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation, Vol. 1, N° 2, 1899. 240-252.; TIGNOR (1966): 88, 161.; TOLLEFSON, H.: *The 1894 British Takeover of the Egyptian Ministry of Interior*, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, N° 4, 1990. 547-560.

predecessor's political line, the same as for his imperialist attitudes and for his anti-French stance.<sup>38</sup> Rosebery accepted the post only under the condition that nobody would encroach or try to encroach his powers, and especially so in the Egyptian question.<sup>39</sup>

Mustafa Fahmi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, became seriously ill at the end of December 1892 and, for this reason, the question who should be his successor arose. Cromer wished to see Riyad again in his place; nevertheless, this was very difficult to push through as the Khedive had significant reservations against him. Additionally, only Tigrane, whom Abbas wanted as Prime Minister initially, was *a priori* unacceptable for the British Proconsul in Egypt. After a couple of days, however, Fahmi „miraculously” recovered and the governmental troubles were staved off. Nonetheless, during this episode, Cromer reached the conclusion that a serious conflict between the Khedive and himself would break out sooner or later. However, the crisis itself came indeed unexpectedly. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1893, without any previous consultations with the British Consul-General, Abbas reorganized his Cabinet, including its chairman whom he considered to be nothing else than „*a British puppet.*” His favourite Prime Minister candidate was Husayn Fakhri Pasha, a man who had resigned from the post of Minister of Justice in 1891 in protest against the British reform in his resort that was taking place at that time. His opinions coincided with those of Tigrane and he was, not surprisingly, unquestionably unacceptable for the British.<sup>40</sup>

Cromer learnt about the changes in government during a short courtesy call of the Khedive's private secretary.<sup>41</sup> He reacted briskly to the new situation. He promptly sent a detailed report to Rosebery. Subsequently, he met Abbas who promised he would not publicly announce the changes that had just taken place before the Proconsul discussed them with the London government. Cromer argued that Abbas exceeded his powers when he removed the Prime Minister from his office without seeking British advice beforehand.<sup>42</sup>

News about the situation in Egypt caused a stir in Gladstone's Cabinet. Nobody was ready to accept Cromer's proposal that stated British occupation forces should seize telegraph offices and all governmental buildings until the crisis was solved.<sup>43</sup> Lord Rosebery's telegram of the 16<sup>th</sup> of January 1893 contained the following: „*Her Majesty's government expect to be consulted in such important matters as a change of ministers ... We cannot therefore sanction the proposed nomination of Fakhri Pasha.*”<sup>44</sup> After Cromer announced his government's position, the Khedive gave in. He appointed Riyad Prime Minister on the 18<sup>th</sup> of January 1893, and he formally

---

<sup>38</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 162-163.

<sup>39</sup> AI-SAYYID – MARSOT: 103.

<sup>40</sup> BARING (1915): 17-22; MARLOWE: 161-162.

<sup>41</sup> MANSFIELD: 155.

<sup>42</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 164.

<sup>43</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 164-165.

<sup>44</sup> MANSFIELD: 155.

promised the British resident in Egypt he would follow the advice of the British in all important questions. Even though he had no other choice than to give in, his attitudes found a lot of responses; many deputations expressing gratitude to the Khedive for his patriotic stance reached Cairo.<sup>45</sup>

One might assume that the situation was resolved conciliatorily; in fact, however, the reality was quite the opposite. For Cromer, the crisis continued. Moreover, if his telegram of the 15<sup>th</sup> of January created a stir in the British Cabinet, then Cromer's following dispatches were indeed shocking. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1893, Cromer asked his government to increase the number of occupation troops in Egypt. He regarded the growing anti-British agitation among the Egyptian population and open animosity on the part of the Khedive as reasons serious enough for his request. At the same time, he declared there was no way he could guarantee public order without strengthening the British garrison in the country.<sup>46</sup> The Commander in Chief of the British occupation army in Egypt, General Frederick Forestier-Walker, likewise considered the numbers insufficient.<sup>47</sup> However, considerable resentment rose in the British ministerial ranks against this policy of force, including Gladstone himself. It was only the Foreign Office that fully supported the Consul-General. Initially, the British Cabinet did not agree with sending more troops to Egypt; nevertheless, the decisive factor was the vote of the Foreign Minister. Rosebery found the January governmental crisis as a waste of time and energy; however, to make his Cabinet colleagues agree with the rise in numbers of the garrison, he promised that he would try to solve the Egyptian question after the governmental crisis was over.<sup>48</sup>

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of January 1893, Lord Rosebery sent an extensive telegram to Cromer in which he informed him about the consent to strengthen the occupation forces in Egypt. At the same time, he instructed him to inform Abbas and Riyad appropriately about the matter. In addition, a British infantry battalion that was actually just sailing through the Suez Canal on its way to India went ashore almost immediately. Within only forty eight hours the men marched through the streets of Cairo. The speed with which the soldiers appeared in the city had an indeed deterrent effect. The British clearly demonstrated that there were certain limits of „*their patience*” and they likewise demonstrated their readiness to step in and intervene if it proved necessary.<sup>49</sup> Cromer was pleased with the course of developments. This being the case, he wrote to Rosebery with enthusiasm: „*The lesson which the Khedive has now received will, I am of opinion, cause His Highness to be very careful in his conduct for the present.*”<sup>50</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> BARING (1915): 35.

<sup>46</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 165.

<sup>47</sup> MARLOWE: 167.

<sup>48</sup> MILLER, T. B.: *The Egyptian Question and British Foreign Policy, 1892–1894*, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 32, N<sup>o</sup> 1, 1960. 4-5.

<sup>49</sup> BARING (1915): 38-39.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, 41.

During the crisis, the British could either retreat, i.e. to withdraw from the country altogether and, consequently, stop the on-going reform process, or they had to oppose and face the Khedive and significantly strengthen their current position in the country. As a result of Cromer's steps not only did Abbas's resentment of the British Empire grow, but so did the distaste of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Riyad.<sup>51</sup> In July 1893, the Khedive visited Constantinople accompanied by Tigrane Pasha. He was looking for support of his anti-British policy; however, his efforts proved unsuccessful. The Sultan received him in a friendly manner several times; nevertheless, he never promised him anything. Similarly, Tigrane did not meet with much sympathy during his tour of European embassies in the Ottoman capital.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the fact that Khedive travelled through various provinces throughout the summer likewise did not help the situation or the growing animosity between British and Egyptian officials, on the contrary. Last but not least, Cromer systematically collected various complaints of British officials holding diverse positions in the Egyptian administration. For the moment, however, he was waiting for the next good opportunity to grant the young ruler a „fatherly” lesson.<sup>53</sup>

In January 1894, Abbas, the Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Army, Sirdar Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener, and their adjutants – the Under-Secretary at the Ministry of War, Mahir Pasha, and the Head of the Intelligence Division, Francis Reginald Wingate – undertook an inspection tour of the Egyptian Army garrisons in Upper Egypt. In Aswan, the Khedive complained about the behaviour and the training of the battalions that were commanded by the British. He likewise complained about the state of the local hospital ward.<sup>54</sup> Some of his critical remarks outraged the present British officers as these unfavourable comments stemmed from banal or rather deliberately sought deficiencies.<sup>55</sup> On the 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1894, a military parade took place in Wadi Halfa. This sunken city on the Egyptian-Sudanese border became a witness of a serious clash between the Khedive and the Sirdar; this was the so-called Frontier Incident.<sup>56</sup> During the mentioned parade, Abbas did not forget to throw in disparaging remarks against the British officers. Among other things, he said: „*To tell the truth, Kitchener Pasha, I consider that it is disgraceful for Egypt to be served by such an army.*”<sup>57</sup> As a result of the growing tension between the Khedive and the Sirdar in the past

---

<sup>51</sup> MARLOWE: 170.

<sup>52</sup> MANSFIELD, c. d., s. 156-157.

<sup>53</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 167.

<sup>54</sup> During the parade, he complained about the way the soldiers held their rifles. When he was inspecting the hospital ward, he criticized the local interpreter for his pronunciation in Arabic.

<sup>55</sup> Moreover, Abbas deftly made use of the grudge Egyptian officers felt towards their British counterparts. This grudge had its roots in the administrative advantages for the British in the issue of salaries and rapid promotion.

<sup>56</sup> TOLLEFSON, H.: *Policing Islam: The British Occupation of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Struggle over Control of the Police, 1882–1914*, London, 1999. 94.

<sup>57</sup> MAGNUS, P.: *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist*, London, 1958. 84.



couple of days, Kitchener immediately offered his resignation. Greatly dismayed, Abbas did not accept it. The following day, Abbas, expecting problems because of his rash and imprudent behaviour, decided it would be better to apologize and so he did.<sup>58</sup>

Kitchener naturally informed Cromer about the whole incident who on his part immediately forwarded a message about the situation to Rosebery. The British Consul-General fully realized the seriousness of the incident; however, he also regarded it as an opportunity to humble Abbas. In addition, he perceived the disparagement of Christian officers in the Muslim army very dangerous. In the previous years, the British tried to instil loyalty to the Khedive to the Egyptian soldiers in order to prevent a similar revolt that had taken place in the Arabi period. These British attempts were, however, sapped by Abbas who legitimized potential dissatisfaction of the men with their assigned officers by his statements. Cromer, therefore, stood fully and unflinchingly on Kitchener's side.<sup>59</sup>

On the 21<sup>st</sup> of January 1894, Rosebery took a decisive stance: Firstly, he refused to accept any offensive statements against British officers; secondly, he insisted Mahir Pasha should be immediately removed from his office because, according to Rosebery, he had a „bad” influence on the Khedive; and thirdly, he requested the issuance of a daily order which would mention in a very complimentary manner both the Egyptian Army and the serving British officers. In case these „recommendations” were turned down, the Khedive's army was supposed to be subordinated to the commander of British occupation forces.<sup>60</sup> This telegram caused a political stir in Cairo. Riyad Pasha was afraid that Rosebery's menacing telegram could be interpreted as a hidden threat of establishing a protectorate or even of annexation.<sup>61</sup> Abbas, Riyad and Tigrane expected support on the side of France, however, the French had no intentions to step in and, therefore, they adopted a somewhat reserved attitude.<sup>62</sup> The Khedive had indeed no other choice than to succumb to the British requests once again. On the 26<sup>th</sup> of January 1894, he issued the daily order expressing his satisfaction with the army led by the British. Shortly after that he dismissed Mahir Pasha from his post and he appointed him „only” the Governor of Port Said.<sup>63</sup>

Riyad's government that had been so closely associated with Abbas's anti-British attitudes in the past couple of months resigned in April 1894. The government became untrustworthy and unreliable for Cromer. The Khedive kept his promise to the British Consul-General and in accordance with the British

---

<sup>58</sup> MANSFIELD: 158.

<sup>59</sup> At this time, the Egyptian Army consisted of 12,000 men, 69 British officers and 33 non-commissioned officers. Cf. BARING (1915): 51-56. ELGOOD: 126. MARLOWE: 154.

<sup>60</sup> MARLOWE: 175.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. OWEN: 273. TOLLEFSON (1999): 94.

<sup>62</sup> Telegram of French Consul-General in Egypt Marquis de Reverseaux to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Casimir-Périer, Cairo, January 24, 1894. *Documents diplomatiques français, 1871-1914* (further only *DDF*), 1<sup>re</sup> Série, Tome IX, N° 22. 28-29.

<sup>63</sup> BARING (1915): 59.

proposal he appointed Nubar the Prime Minister of the country. Nubar tried to reconcile the British and Egyptians officials that had been in strife for some time. However, he broke his ankle in the spring of 1895 and this made his already poor health condition even worse.<sup>64</sup> Cromer complained to the newly appointed Foreign Minister, Lord Kimberley, in one of his telegrams, that pitiable Nubar suffered from diabetes and seemed old and exhausted.<sup>65</sup> Nubar had to give up his Prime Minister post in favour of Fahmi Pasha after eighteen months for medical reasons. Nubar died in Paris in January 1899.

Abbas spoke out against the British only occasionally, however, he never reconciled to their presence in the country. In addition, he never had a prearranged program and he often acted spontaneously. When he openly stated what he thought, there was always some sort of dispute. With hindsight, his argument with Kitchener was indeed a serious mistake that only played into Cromer's hands. Moreover, the so-called Frontier Incident also meant the end of Abbas's role as the public leader of the opposition against the British occupation.<sup>66</sup> In the following years, the Consul-General adopted a tactic aiming at keeping the Khedive in constant fear of losing his throne if he supported any significant anti-British tensions in Egyptian society. In the eyes of the British public he was, nevertheless, nothing else than a scamp anyway. This was, in fact, confirmed because Abbas secretly financed anti-British radical nationalists until the First World War broke out in 1914.<sup>67</sup>

After a new Liberal government was elected in Great Britain, there was a certain chance that the Egyptian question would be re-opened. Furthermore, in the autumn months of 1892, the Ottoman Ambassador in London, Rüstem Pasha, did his utmost during his conversations with the British Foreign Minister to find out what the attitude of the London government towards Egypt was. Moreover, the long-time French ambassador to Britain, William Henry Waddington, was also interested in the question in concern.<sup>68</sup> Gladstone acknowledged that Paris possessed the right to initiate the discussions about Egypt; for this reason, he wished to hold talks with the French separately. Rosebery, for instance, was of the opinion that the Egyptian question should be a topic for special Great Power negotiations.<sup>69</sup>

The Egyptian crisis of January 1893, however, considerably complicated the situation. Paris was trying to force the reluctant Sultan, as the Suzerain, to either protest vehemently or to call an international conference.<sup>70</sup> The British Secretary

---

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 61-62.

<sup>65</sup> OWEN: 274.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 273.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. MAGNUS: 89. TIGNOR (1966): 178-179.

<sup>68</sup> Telegram of French Ambassador in London Henry Waddington to Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandre Ribot, London, November 2, 1892. *DDF*, 1<sup>re</sup> Série, Tome X, N<sup>o</sup> 37. 61.; MILLER: 3.

<sup>69</sup> MILLER: 5.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Telegrams of French Ambassador in Constantinople Paul Cambon to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jules Develle, Péra, January 25-26, 1893. *DDF*, 1<sup>re</sup> Série, Tome X, N<sup>o</sup> 133,136. 191-192,197. MILLER: 6.

of State for Foreign Affairs was afraid of complications that could arise during the gathering of the Great Powers and, therefore, he did not want to initiate any discussions about Egypt before the turbulent situation calmed down.<sup>71</sup> Between 1893 and 1894, Rosebery held talks with the Ottoman negotiator, Rüstem Pasha, on a convention which was deftly linked to the Egyptian question, and also to the Straits issue and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It would give the British a legal and a credible basis for their occupation of Egypt. In return, the London government was supposed to confirm the Sultan's rights over Egypt and promise the evacuation of British garrisons in an appropriate time.<sup>72</sup>

The year 1894 brought considerable complications into British-Ottoman relations; both religious and secular pro-Armenian organizations in Great Britain, partly supported by the British press, campaigned against the Ottoman persecution of the Christian population in Asia Minor. In addition, the newly concluded French-Russian alliance also played its role. Negative attitudes over eventual advantages of the convention began to dominate after some time. Great Britain reached the conclusion that British forces could not effectively defend the Straits, not even together with the Sultan's military help, against France and Russia at the same time. Moreover, the British were not ready to accept the implied recognition of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Lord Rosebery, this time, however, as Prime Minister and the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Kimberley, arrived at the conclusion that the Egyptian question could not be satisfactorily resolved if the stance of the French was omitted. For this reason, the issue of Egypt shifted from the British-Ottoman to the British-French plateau between 1892 and 1894.<sup>73</sup>

The crises of 1893 and 1894 were short and non-violent; nonetheless, they left scars on British-Egyptians relations. In contrast to the previous assurances, they confirmed that the British Liberal government had no intentions to evacuate Egypt. In relation to the strengthening of the British military presence in the country and of the functioning of its administration, a hostile anti-British nationalistic movement started to gain force. As the, until then, fragmented opposition publicly declared unity, mutual confrontation seemed more likely than cooperation.<sup>74</sup> The system of administration under British supervision, with autocratic features, became very unpopular among the Egyptian population.

Cromer tried to persuade the others that Egyptian nationalism was not a real phenomenon, but that it was something that had appeared and was encouraged by the „*stubborn Khedive*”.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, during the occupation, there were

---

<sup>71</sup> Telegram of French Ambassador in London Henry Waddington to Minister of Foreign Affairs Jules Develle, London, February 1, 1893. *DDF*, 1<sup>re</sup> Série, Tome X, N° 156. 223-225.

<sup>72</sup> The proposal assumed that the two countries would agree on a fixed date of the departure of the British troops from the country. MILLER: 9.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 10-15.

<sup>74</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 172–176.

<sup>75</sup> OWEN: 275.

different approaches to the employment of the British and of the Egyptians. All top administration posts were obligatorily reserved for British officials; Egyptians, on the other hand, could hold only lower administrative ranks. This was especially difficult to accept for those who inclined to the nationalistic movement.<sup>76</sup> Additionally, it should be noted that the rise of national sentiment was closely connected to the modernization of Egypt.<sup>77</sup> The reforms enabled the formation of a new educated class that possessed a European perspective and range of knowledge. Egyptian nationalists met during various salon-type get-togethers; however, their agitation found response only in the higher and educated strata. Otherwise, the population was only hardly affected.<sup>78</sup>

A new national leader appeared on the scene in the 1890s, and that was Mustafa Kamil Pasha whose public speeches and articles were full of patriotic sentiment. Abbas financially supported Kamil's activities. At first, Kamil pressed for the autonomy of Egypt that was supposed to be an independent province of the Ottoman Empire. He was looking for supporters all across Europe; he found an interested audience primarily in France, the British listened to him only sporadically.<sup>79</sup> Nationalistic hopes put into French help subsided after the failure of Marchand's expedition and especially after the signing of the Entente Cordiale. Turning away from Paris meant alienating the Khedive.<sup>80</sup> After 1904, in accordance with the policy of the Ottoman Empire, Kamil began to focus more on potential support from Germany and Austria-Hungary.<sup>81</sup> Last but not least, it should be mentioned that only a small part of intellectuals wanted the establishment of a secular state and the introduction of Western economic and political institutions in Egyptian conditions.<sup>82</sup>

Because of the growing national sentiment, Lord Cromer did his utmost that the Egyptians would perceive the *de facto* permanent occupation positively. Nevertheless, his efforts encountered opposition and defiance. Dramatizing British successes in Egypt, something the public at home could feel proud of, played a significant role in his policy. Starting in 1891, the Consul-General started to issue annual reports about the situation in country. In most cases, he compiled the records of the Egyptian ministries. He likewise frequently used members of his

---

<sup>76</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 259.

<sup>77</sup> For example, nationalists like Sayyid Jamāl an-Dīn al-Afghānī represented the older generation that came from or had close relations with the Masons. See KUDSI-ZADEH, A. A.: *Afghani and Freemasonry in Egypt*, Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 92, N° 1, 1972. 25-35.

<sup>78</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 260-262.

<sup>79</sup> The most significant Briton among these was Gladstone who supported Kamil in his declining years by stating: „I sympathise with what I understand to be your feelings as an Egyptian, but I am wholly devoid of power. My opinion have always been the same – that we ought to quit Egypt after fulfilling our work for which we went there, with honour and profit to the country. So far as I know, that time arrived some years ago”. HARDY, P. S.: *Thirty-five Years of British Rule in Egypt*, Lausanne, 1918. 32.

<sup>80</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 263-268.

<sup>81</sup> GOMBÁR, E.: *Moderní dějiny islámských zemí*, Praha, 1999. 335.

<sup>82</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 148.

staff to write books and articles that would praise the British mission in Egypt. Lord Cromer believed that annual publications about the British successes in Egypt had a considerable effect on society.<sup>83</sup>

It was Alfred Milner, the Under-Secretary at the Egyptian Ministry of Finance between 1889 and 1892, who contributed to the presentation of Cromer's reform results. His book *England in Egypt* (London 1892) contained a considerable amount of clichés which became established in the consciousness of the British public. Egypt was presented as a country that only the British could administrate successfully because of their exceptional talent for patience, pragmatism and intuition. The book had four editions within only two years; it had even seven more in the following decade. Milner had an unusual ability to present imperialism not just as an obligation and a necessity, but also as a drama.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, the British Consul-General also used financial subsidies to win the Egyptian public opinion's favour. Nevertheless, he had no illusions about the Egyptians' loyalty to the British.<sup>85</sup> It is interesting to note that Cromer's main, and also nearly only, source of detailed information about nationalist agitation or about the attitudes of the population to the British presence in the country, was his „*Oriental Secretary*” and a capable linguist Harry Boyle.<sup>86</sup>

British influence in every part of the Egyptian administration gradually increased between 1892 and 1914.<sup>87</sup> Cromer also „*borrowed*” several Britons from India expecting they would return back once Great Britain was released from its responsibility in the country or when the Khedivate gained independence. From the 1890s onwards, professionally qualified graduates from prestigious British universities started coming to Egypt to work as officials;<sup>88</sup> however, they did not have the relevant colonial experience. Once they got the office, they became almost irrevocable, maybe with the exception of illness, professional misconduct or in the event that the post was revoked.<sup>89</sup> These men often did not know the history, the

---

<sup>83</sup> OWEN: 246-247.

<sup>84</sup> Cromer had good relations also with the correspondent of *The Times*, and the founder of the *Egyptian Gazette*, Charles Moberley Bell who wrote the pamphlet *Egyptian Finance* (1884). Ibid, 248-250.

<sup>85</sup> The British Consul-General financially supported the *Egyptian Gazette* and its Arabic version *Al-Muqattam*. Ibid, 251.

<sup>86</sup> The post of Oriental Secretary was established in the 1890s only for Harry Boyle. For more information about Boyle's life in Egypt, see BOYLE, C.: *A Servant of Empire: A Memoir of Harry Boyle*, London, 1938.

<sup>87</sup> However, Cromer established the principle that the number of Europeans working in the Egyptian administration had to be limited in order to let the Egyptians acquire the necessary experience to take over governmental responsibility. In many cases it was difficult to find Egyptian officials with the corresponding technical skills. Egyptians were likewise quite often discriminated against in higher administrative posts. British influence in provincial offices was negligible. TIGNOR (1966): 181-184.

<sup>88</sup> In 1890, there were 366 Britons working in the Egyptian administration. Of these, 183 worked in various posts of the international administration that was subordinated to the governmental administration; and 144 held lower administrative rank. Only 39 Britons held higher administrative posts. In detail cf. BARING (1908): 299.; MAK, L.: *More than Officers and Officials: Britons in Occupied Egypt, 1882-1922*, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 39, N<sup>o</sup> 1, 2011. 23-25.; MARLOWE: 154.

<sup>89</sup> Egypt was not a British colony and, therefore, the recruitment of non-Egyptian employees was

culture and the mentality of the people they were supposed to help and govern. Often they isolated themselves from the Egyptian population; in everyday life they tended to incline to racist attitudes against the Egyptians.<sup>90</sup> Being in Egypt often meant a way how to gain a good reputation and the necessary experience for their future career. Colonial service offered an excellent opportunity for social advancement or at least to gain some prestige. Many Britons received knighthood for the years during which they had worked in the Egyptian administration.

The duties of the Consul-General and the Agent of Her Majesty in Egypt were not precisely defined; the Proconsul regularly received only general instructions from his government. In ordinary matters he had to follow his own personal judgement.<sup>91</sup> Cromer used „*an iron fist*” and, for this reason, the officials were often afraid of him. Even though they always showed him respect, often they bluntly criticised him behind his back, especially at the end of his era.<sup>92</sup> A certain freedom arising from the nature of his office naturally reflected itself in the way he organized his day. His mornings typically began with an early breakfast. After that he started working intensively, preparing telegrams and giving general framework commands necessary for the functioning of the administration. In the morning, various visitors came, the same as diverse deputations. The Consul usually had lunch together with his family and close staff members. The afternoons were reserved for sport, usually for tennis. Often, there were receptions or masquerades in the evenings, some of which hosted as much as 600 participants. Sometimes there would be only simple get-togethers with a drink and a cigar. Moreover, in the case of banquets, the Proconsul showed great interest in the menu.<sup>93</sup>

In the 1890s, Cromer, his family and closest personnel moved to a new residence by the Nile located between the Khedive’s palace, i.e. the Abdeen Palace, and the British barracks. The new building of the Agency and the Consulate-General, and of today’s British Embassy in Egypt, perfectly epitomized colonial architecture – it was an impressive glowing alabaster building with a long porch and a large garden.<sup>94</sup> However, neither the magnificence of the new building, nor Cromer could stop growing Egyptian nationalism that gradually started to spread from the intellectual environment also to the Egyptian population. The opposition and resistance of the Egyptians against their British masters were symbolized by insulting the occupation forces. In 1895, Cromer set up a special court for trials with this sort of people. Nonetheless, despite all the

---

not subject to a detailed testing as was the case in India for example. University graduates who wanted to work in Egypt had to study both written and spoken Arabic one year before becoming part of the colonial service. The post also required all kinds of other skills, including technical ones for example, on the part of the candidates. Cf. NEWMAN: 124-125. TIGNOR (1966): 186-188.

<sup>90</sup> TIGNOR (1966): 195.

<sup>91</sup> NEWMAN: 126-127.

<sup>92</sup> MARLOWE: 231-232.

<sup>93</sup> OWEN: 279-280.

<sup>94</sup> The construction and the equipment of the building cost £400,000. Ibid, 277-278.

efforts, the number of verbal and physical invectives rose sharply.<sup>95</sup> Cromer's opinion that prosperity would cause general satisfaction proved to be wrong.<sup>96</sup>

The events of 1906 contributed to Cromer's departure from the proconsul office. The so-called Denshawai Incident is considered to be a breakpoint in the British occupation of Egypt comparable to the Amritsar Massacre (known also as the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre) in India in 1919. The small village of Denshawai in the Nile Delta was until then in no way different from any other village in the distinctive Egyptian countryside. However, in that year it witnessed an incident during which both Britons and Egyptians died. It was an unfortunate coincidence and, primarily, it was the result of mutual misunderstanding. It was enhanced by the then atmosphere of indifference, insensitivity and by the general lack of understanding between the British and the Egyptians. Cromer used the following Denshawai Process to teach the Egyptian population a lesson that insulting the British administration and its representatives would not stay unpunished.<sup>97</sup> Fifty two villagers sat in the dock. The special tribunal was composed of three British and two Egyptian judges and it sentenced the defendants to life sentence, long prison sentences, flogging and whipping, and some also to capital punishment.<sup>98</sup>

Europeans who were settled in Egypt agreed both with the process and with the following verdict. On the contrary, Egyptians fervently organized protests and protested against the sentences. The Egyptian national movement could count on the support of British public opinion for the first time since 1882; moreover, Cromer was regarded as a „*true despot*”. The Proconsul's Egyptian policy even earned criticism from the otherwise restrained and reserved British press. Kamil, for instance, regarded the verdict as an „*act of barbarism*”.<sup>99</sup> In addition, he made a trip across France and the British Isles and he had the honour to speak with the British Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. At the end of 1906, a friend of Egyptian patriots, Wilfrid Blunt, wrote into his diary: „*Never since Tel al-Kebir have the fortunes of Egyptian nationalism seemed so smiling.*”<sup>100</sup>

In 1906, the Consul-General's health indeed deteriorated. For years, Cromer suffered from stomach disorder and gastric attacks which caused his frequent petulance and touchiness. By establishing the special tribunal, he set the nationalists against himself.<sup>101</sup> Last but not least, his character and his attitudes

---

<sup>95</sup> TIGNOR, R. L.: *Lord Cromer: Practitioner and Philosopher of Imperialism*, The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 2, N° 2, 1963. 154.

<sup>96</sup> MANSFIELD: 162.

<sup>97</sup> To this problems FAHMY, Z.: *Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919*, Diss., [Tucson] 2007. 177-183.; PELED, M.: *Danšawâi-Fiction and Reality: Reflections on 'Adrâ' Danšawâi by Mahmûd Tâhir Haqqî*, Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 19, N° 1/4, 1979. 98-118.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. GREY, E.: *Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916*, Vol. 1, London, 1926. 136.; MANSFIELD, 169.; MARLOWE, 265.

<sup>99</sup> SABRY, M. : *La question d'Égypte: Depuis Bonaparte jusqu'à la révolution de 1919*, Paris, 1920. 63.

<sup>100</sup> MARLOWE: 267.

<sup>101</sup> MANSFIELD: 172.

were not convenient for the Foreign Office anymore. The Proconsul did not realize, or maybe refused to acknowledge, that times had changed. It was no longer 1883, it was 1906. However, despite this being the case, Lord Cromer held the same views and he kept using the same solutions to problems; nevertheless, these were not right anymore. He regarded the problems of Egyptian society and its national desires from the point of view of a colonial administrator of the heyday of the British Empire.<sup>102</sup> Despite the fact that he did much good and became the notional maker of modern Egypt, or the great architect of the British Empire, he likewise committed many political missteps while he was in office. His health condition and the Denshawai Incident hastened his departure to rest. Indeed, the days when the Foreign Office was in the hands of Marquis of Salisbury, when Cromer had a practically free hand over Egypt and when he was at the height of his powers (1888-1898) were history.<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>102</sup> See VALKOUN, J.: *Some Remarks on Lord Cromer's Imperialism and His View on Orient*, Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, N° 2, 2012. 57-66.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. ALLEN, H. M.: *England's Greatest Viceroy: An Appreciation of Evelyn Baring, First Earl Cromer*, The Sewanee Review, Vol. 26, N° 1, 1918. 44.; ARTHUR, G.: *Lord Cromer*, London, 1932. 179.; GLEICHEN, E.: *Lord Cromer: By the Marquess of Zetland*, Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 32, N° 126, 1933. 42.



**Gábor Szabó-Zsoldos**

***The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon and the South African Confederation - With a Special Emphasis on His Motives and the Factors Influenced His South African Conception***

**Abstract**

Southern Africa during almost the entire nineteenth century was from economic, cultural, ethnical and above all political aspects divided into British colonies, Boer settler communities (from the 1840s republics) and territories controlled by independent native tribes and kingdoms. From the first years of the 1850s to 1881 the leaders of the British colonial policy made several attempts to unite the divided subcontinent (colonies and states) and organize a loyal self-governing, federal, British dominated South African dominion like Canada, New Zealand or Australia. That conception became the main line of Great Britain's South African colonial policy when the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon was the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1874-1878. This study deals mainly with Lord Carnarvon's South African federal scheme as well as those factors which influenced his colonial conception about the subcontinent.

*Keywords:* The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, South African Confederation, British colonial policy, Boer republics, Transvaal, Cape Colony, Southern Africa, James Anthony Froude, Thomas François Burgers, Theophilus Shepstone

**T**he second half of the nineteenth century was one of the most important periods in the history of Southern Africa. Crucial turning points and milestones, like the mineral revolution, the discovery of the diamond fields in Griqualand West and gold on the Witwatersrand, the subjugation of the independent African chiefdoms and tribes as well as the South African War (1899-1902) (or Second Anglo-Boer War), and last but not least the emergence of the South African Union in 1910 had far reaching, long-term effects on Southern Africa. Moreover, the fairly intensive pace of colonization in the age of new imperialism (1870-1914), the rapidly expanding European, British and Boer control over the subcontinent still has a great impact on the South African society.

My hypothesis is that Great Britain's South African colonial policy in the second half of the nineteenth century can be characterized by various tendencies and changes. One of these tendencies was the British intention for the unification of the divided Southern Africa (colonies and states) to organize a loyal, self-governing, white (particularly British)-dominated British South African colony like Canada, Australia or New-Zealand. The policy of unification of the Boer settler communities, later republics and the British controlled territories reached its peak during Disraeli's second premiership (1874-1880) when Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon was the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1874-1878). Under Lord

Carnarvon's leadership the Colonial Office, with the assistance of the men on the spot, the British colonial officials and representatives of the British colonial policy in South Africa attempted several times to establish the South African Confederation. This paper deals mainly with those factors (internal and external) which influenced Lord Carnarvon's conception about the South African Confederation.

Among the historiography of this topic I have to highlight two historians: Clement Francis Goodfellow and Norman A. Etherington. Goodfellow's book, entitled *Great Britain & South African Confederation (1870-1881)*<sup>1</sup>, published in 1966, is still the only one monograph on this issue. One of the most remarkable features of this book is that Goodfellow emphasized the impact of the British statesmen's personalities on Great Britain's South African colonial policy. Furthermore, he found important James Anthony Froude's suggestions and instructions as well as Lord Carnarvon's threats about the effective defence of the empire. In contrast with him, Norman A. Etherington examined Lord Carnarvon's policy from another aspect. In his study, *Labour Supply and the Genesis of South African Confederation in the 1870s*,<sup>2</sup> he highlighted the importance of the labour supply as an engine of the unification and Theophilus Shepstone's political conception. This approach is dominating either in the Cambridge University's recently published synthetic book, the *Cambridge History of South Africa I. From Early Times to 1885*.<sup>3</sup> The authors of the chapter *Diamonds: The Short- and Long-Term Impact*, among them Etherington, emphasized the essential role of development of the diamond fields in the history of the subcontinent.<sup>4</sup>

The main sources of my research were the official correspondence between Lord Carnarvon and the men on the spot, the British colonial officials in Southern Africa. Lord Carnarvon's published political diary<sup>5</sup> is also an important source of this topic. Furthermore, I examined the Hansard's Parliamentary Debates and other official documents, for instance the South Africa Bill. Last but not least, I would like to highlight the contemporary writings, pamphlets on the British South African colonial policy.

#### ***British Conceptions about the South African Federal Unity before 1874***

The British South African federal schemes which preceded Lord Carnarvon's administration can be divided into two main groups: To the first belong those which emphasized the importance of the federal unity of Southern Africa from a

---

<sup>1</sup> GOODFELLOW, C. F.: *Great Britain & South African Confederation (1870-1881)*, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1966.

<sup>2</sup> ETHERINGTON, Norman A.: *Labour Supply and the Genesis of the South African Confederation in the 1870s*, *The Journal of African History* 20, N° 2, 1970, 235-253.

<sup>3</sup> HAMILTON, Carolyn – MBENGA, Bernard K. – ROSS, Robert: *Cambridge History of South Africa I. From Early Times to 1885*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 376-391.

<sup>5</sup> GORDON, Peter (ed.): *The Political Diary of the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 1857-1890. Colonial Secretary and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland*, Cambridge University Press, London, 2011.

humanitarian and philanthropic aspect. For instance the third Earl Grey's plans in which humanitarianism was mixed with strategic considerations.

The history of the British South African federal schemes can be easily traced back to John Russell's first administration (1846-1852). In the Russell Government Sir Henry George Grey, Viscount Howick, the third Earl Grey was the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies (1846-1852). Lord Grey elaborated three conceptions about Southern Africa. In a chronological order the first one purposed the federation of the native tribes of Lake Ngami in order to make the natives under some kind of imperial control strong and organized enough to protect themselves against the encroachments of the Boers. The other aim of his plan was to block the way to the interior of the subcontinent from the Voortrekkers. By Earl Grey's federal conception related to Lake Ngami, a strong and industrialized native confederation would be the cheapest solution to the great challenge that the Great Trek, the exodus of about ten thousand Boers meant for Britain.<sup>6</sup> Lord Grey's second and third plans were concerned with unification of the Boer settler communities and the British controlled territories.<sup>7</sup>

Others viewed the Confederation, a united British South African colony as a possible key to the increased weight of the South African burden on the British taxpayers. In case of the successful establishment of a self-governing British confederation, the organization of the colonial defence would be the colonists' duty, which would take off a heavy stress and responsibility from the shoulders of the Home Government and the Colonial Office. Secretaries of State for the Colonies of the 1860s, for instance Edward Cardwell (1864-1866) or Earl Granville (1868-1870), in order to decrease the imperial responsibilities in the colonies and to reduce the colonial expenditures of the Treasury, proposed the withdrawal of the imperial troops from the British colonial possessions.<sup>8</sup>

It is necessary to highlight Sir George Grey's conception among the antecedents of Lord Carnarvon's policy. Sir George Grey was Governor of Cape Colony and High Commissioner (1854-1861). In his case the federal transformation of the subcontinent was initiated „on the spot”, in South Africa. The reunion of Orange Free State with Cape Colony stood at the centre of his conception.<sup>9</sup> The possibility of a close union of the Boer republics (Orange Free State and the Transvaal), which would mean a serious threatening for the British colonies and settlers of the subcontinent. Taking advantage of the disagreement between Marthinus Wessel Pretorius (President of the Executive Council of the South African Republic, 1857-1860, 1864-1866 and President of the South

---

<sup>6</sup> Earl Grey to Sir H. G. Smith, 12 Nov. 1850. In Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope relative to assumption of sovereignty over the territory between the Vaal and Orange Rivers (1360). 92-94.

<sup>7</sup> WARD, John: *The Third Earl Grey and Federalism, 1846-1852*, The Australian Journal of Politics and History 3, N° 1, 1957. 18-32.

<sup>8</sup> GOODFELLOW: 25.

<sup>9</sup> DE KIEWIET, C. W.: *The British Colonial Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-1872*, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1929. 122.

African Republic, 1866-1871) and Jacobus Nicolaas Boshof (State President of the Orange Free State, 1855-1859) Sir George Grey attempted to draw the Free State closer to Cape Colony. Reunion with Cape became popular idea among the large scale of the Free State's population.<sup>10</sup> Although the Home Government did not support his plans, Grey attempted to realize his scheme.<sup>11</sup> Finally, the numerous differences between his conception and the plans of the Colonial Office as well as his disobedience lead to his recall: „*You have therefore indeed placed her Majesty's Government in this country, as well as the local Government under your own charge, in a position of extreme embarrassment and difficulty. [...] They [Her Majesty's Government] could not safely continue to entrust with your present functions one committed, as you have committed yourself, to a policy of which they disapprove, on a subject of the first importance; nor could they expect from you the necessary assistance, when steps, which you have taken without that authority, have of necessity to be retraced.*”<sup>12</sup> With reference to the roots and origins of Lord Carnarvon's South African federal scheme, the case of Sir George Grey has a special importance. It seems interesting especially concerning the fact that the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon was one of the most prominent initiator of the South African federal unity, opposed and heavily criticised Sir George Grey's plan. In his diary he noticed that the recall of Sir George Grey from Cape Colony was necessary and proper step: „*Recall of Sir George Grey from the Cape. This was necessitated against my will by Sir G. Grey's perverse disobedience.*”<sup>13</sup> More than fifteen years later, when Lord Carnarvon made the conception of the South African Confederation the main line, the leitmotif of Great Britain's South African colonial policy, Sir George Grey reminded the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the fact that Carnarvon was among his critics, although the actual scheme for the South African federal unity seemed for him similar to his former plans.<sup>14</sup>

Even the Earl of Kimberley, Lord Carnarvon's immediate predecessor considered the confederation of the South African colonies and states as an effective solution to the actual fierce disputes between the British colonies, the Colonial Office and the Boer republics over the ownership of the Diamond Fields. Within a confederation the disagreement could be easily settled.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Grey to Lytton 15 Jul. 1858, in Cape of Good Hope. Copies or extracts of all correspondence which has taken place between the Colonial Office and Governor Sir George Grey, respecting his recall from the Cape of Good Hope, and his subsequent re-appointment to the government of that colony 1860 (216), 1-2.; Grey to Lytton 14 Aug. 1858. in *ibid*, 2-3.

<sup>11</sup> GOODFELLOW: 21.

<sup>12</sup> Sir E. B. Lytton to Sir George Grey 4 Jun. 1859., in Cape of Good Hope. Copies or extracts of all correspondence which has taken place between the Colonial Office and Governor Sir George Grey, respecting his recall from the Cape of Good Hope, and his subsequent re-appointment to the government of that colony 1860 (216), 35-38.

<sup>13</sup> GORDON: 111.

<sup>14</sup> GOODFELLOW: 20.

<sup>15</sup> GOODFELLOW: 21.

### ***Influences on the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon's South African Federal Conception***

Conception of the unification and federal conversion of the South African colonies and states became the primary element of Great Britain's South African colonial policy during the first years of Disraeli's second government, when the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon was Secretary of State for the Colonies (1874-1878). Between 1874 and 1881, the year of the Pretoria Convention which restored the almost entire independence of the Transvaal and meant the failure of the unification policy and Carnarvon's conception, the British colonial policy led by Lord Carnarvon and his successors, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach (1878-1880) and then the liberal first Earl of Kimberley (1880-1882) made several attempts to draw the South African British colonies and the Boer republics closer to each other. This period was a revival of the conception of the confederation which meant the strengthening of the tendency of the British intention for organizing the united and self-governing British South African dominion, the South African Confederation.

From many aspects the years 1877-1881 can be seen as the peak of the tendency of the confederation. On 4 January 1877 Sir Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary of State for the Native Affairs in Natal (1856-1877), guarded by 25 Natal mounted police rode from Natal to Pretoria, capital of the Transvaal as a Special Commissioner.<sup>16</sup> The main object of his mission was to convince the Volksraad, the legislature of the South African Republic about the necessity of the British annexation. When Thomas François Burgers, the elected President of the Transvaal (1872-1877) and the political leaders of the country showed unwillingness, Shepstone proclaimed the South African Republic a British colony on 12 April 1877.<sup>17</sup> C. F. Goodfellow in his book stated that the main root of Shepstone's mission and the annexation was the fact that the Volksraad asked the British Government to undertake the governing of their country.<sup>18</sup> I find it interesting that Shepstone in the text of the proclamation did not refer to that request of the Volksraad, rather he emphasized the conflicts and collisions between the Transvaalers and the native tribes which could jeopardize the peace of the whole subcontinent: „[...] and seeing that the circumstances of the case have, from the inherent weakness of the country [Transvaal] already touched upon, become so grave that neither this country nor the British colonies in South Africa can be saved from the calamitous circumstances except by the extension over this state of Her Majesty's authority and protection, by means of which alone oneness of purpose and action can be secured, and a fair prospect of peace and prosperity in

---

<sup>16</sup> SCHREUDER, D. M.: *The Scramble for Southern Africa*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009. 13.

<sup>17</sup> Annexation of the S. A. Republic to the British Empire, in EYBERS, G. W. (ed.): *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History 1795-1910*, Routledge & Sons, London, 1918. 448-453.

<sup>18</sup> GOODFELLOW: 114.

*the future be established*".<sup>19</sup> The leaders of the South African Republic really had to deal with serious dangers. Threatening clouds gathered in the sky of the Boer republic: the failure of Burgers' war with Pedis in North Transvaal and the empty Treasury made the conditions of the Transvaal and the position of Burgers desperate. The political conditions of the republic were changed on 12 April 1877. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that the Transvaal in the years 1877-1881 was under direct British rule. This circumstance offered a unique chance for Lord Carnarvon to promote the cause of the Confederation there.

The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon's South African federal conception can be well described by its three main elements. First of all as C. F. Goodfellow stated in his book, Carnarvon's main motive was to solve the question of the efficient defence of the naval and military base in Simon's Bay nearby Cape Town.<sup>20</sup> The control over that station, which possessed a high strategic importance from an Imperial point view, even in the case of the successful establishment of the Confederation, had to be retained by imperial troops. Carnarvon knew well that the colonist's loyalty was a vital point of the effective defence of this second Gibraltar and the most appropriate way to achieve this purpose was to give self-government to them. The third main element was the issue of the native affairs. Carnarvon was convinced that the common native policy could be the common interest of all the South African white communities.

Lord Carnarvon's South African federal scheme, approach and motivation differed from the former British conceptions by its many features. In contrast with Lord Kimberley, Carnarvon did not wait for the colonial initiation towards the unification of the subcontinent. Furthermore, while the reduction of the South African colonial expenditures possessed a high importance to his predecessors, such as Sir Edward Cardwell (1864-1866) or Earl Granville (1868-1870), Carnarvon did not care much about it. For instance in the spring of 1874, when he worked on the preparation of Froude's South African secret mission, he was eager to do his best to gain enough money from the Treasury, even to convince the incredulous Lord Derby about the importance of Froude's journey and its cost. As he noticed in his diary: „Derby previously had spoken to me on this journey to the effect that he found the expense might be to great for him, £800 for the journey plus £1000 lost to him by cessation of literary work.

*I held out to him some hope that I might be able to manage some help in the way of a grant if he undertook the mission as a public matter. He was, as I have always found him, very delicate in regard to personal interests.*"<sup>21</sup> Few weeks later with reference to „a long conversation with Froude at the Colonial Office" Carnarvon remarked that he succeeded: „Agreed that he [Froude] should have £1000 from Secret Service money, to which Derby and Disraeli have both agreed."<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> EYBERS: 451.

<sup>20</sup> GOODFELLOW: 70-72.

<sup>21</sup> GORDON: 219.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 226.

During the period 1874-1878 Lord Carnarvon adopted numerous political tools and methods in order to involve the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the British colonies in the South African Confederation. These factors can be divided into three main groups: conference and negotiation; the men on the spot; and the South Africa Act.

In the first half of his term of office as Secretary of State for the Colonies, he concentrated on organizing a conference where all of the South African colonies and states would be represented. He hoped that the „*common enemy*”, the threat from a great and powerful anti-colonist native confederation, alliance would be a common ground for the delegates and would convince the British colonies and the Boer republics of the necessity and the advantages of the unification. By Lord Carnarvon's plans a conference where all of the South African white communities were represented could be the first step on the way to the successful establishing of the South African Confederation. Despite the fact that the conference appeared year by year in the official correspondence between the Secretary of State and the British colonial officials in South Africa as a possible and desired solution for the conflicts, the Colonial Office could not convene all the delegations.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, especially in 1874-1875 Carnarvon attempted to persuade President Burgers about the promising advantages of Transvaal's participation in the South African Confederation with promises. The Secretary of State tried to exploit the Boer's land shortage as well as Burgers' long cherished dream about a railway between Pretoria and Delagoa Bay which would provide a sea outpost for the Transvaal, a link to other continents and a chance to break out from the British encirclement and of course would offer a chance to the republic to build connections with other powers, such as Germany. It was the Colonial Office's interest, in order to maintain the British suzerainty over the subcontinent, at best conditional to prevent, at worst to exercise some kind of control over the building of the railway.<sup>24</sup> Thus in case of the Transvaal's willingness to take part in the Confederation, Carnarvon promised British capital to the South African Republics and help to build the railway. Moreover, he envisaged the possibility of expanding the borders of the Transvaal. As Carnarvon noted in his diary in the negotiations in London on 11 May 1875 Burgers seemed to be open for the British conception: „*[Burgers] approved every word and that he would give me every support and assistance in his power*”.<sup>25</sup> Despite the promising signs Burgers travelled to the continent to find

---

<sup>23</sup> Barkly, Letter addressed to the Presidents of the Republics and to Lieutenant-Governors of South African Colonies 25 Jun. 1875, in Correspondence respecting the proposed conference of delegates on affairs of South Africa (C. 1399), 13.; Carnarvon to Bulwer 14 Oct. 1877., in Further correspondence respecting the proposed confederation of the colonies and states of South Africa (C. 1980), 29.

<sup>24</sup> Lord Carnarvon with assistance of the Foreign Office sought to follow the negotiations between the South African Republic and Portugal on the planned railway. Foreign Office (Tenterden) to Colonial Office 2 May 1876., in Correspondence respecting the proposed railway from Delagoa Bay to Transvaal (CO 879/12 N<sup>o</sup> 143), 14.; Foreign Office (Julain Pauncefote) to Colonial Office 15 Sep. 1876., in Correspondence respecting the proposed railway from Delagoa Bay to Transvaal (CO 879/12 N<sup>o</sup> 143), 24.

<sup>25</sup> GORDON: 250.

investors for his railway in Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Germany.<sup>26</sup>

The discussion of the South Africa Bill in the British Parliament happened almost at the same time with the annexation of the South African Republic. The South Africa Act, which received the Royal Assent on 10 August 1877, was to define the main political structure and system of the South African Confederation. Besides the legal and diplomatic tools the men on the spot also played a crucial role in Lord Carnarvon's conception.

The roots and origins of Lord Carnarvon's South African federal scheme can be divided into two main categories. To the first group belong those elements which came mainly from his personality and his personal features, thus we can call them internal factors: Carnarvon's experience with the colonial federation; his conception about a complex colonial defence strategy. While the second group is formed by the external influences: former British South African colonial federal conceptions; the impact of Lord Carnarvon's colleagues at the Colonial Office; men on the spot; Natal expansionism; the lobby of the Eastern Cape merchants. This chapter deals with mainly these factors, the roots, origins and motives of Lord Carnarvon's South African federal conception as well as those elements which influenced his plans.

### ***Internal Factors***

#### **Lord Carnarvon's Former Experience with the Colonial Federation**

The bulk of the historians agree in that Carnarvon's positive experience with the colonial federation played a crucial role in the elaboration of his South African plans. The federal transformation of the British North American colonies, the emergence of Canada happened in 1867 during his first term of office as Secretary of State for the Colonies (1866-1867).

The main ground of this historical approach can be found in Lord Carnarvon's arguments. He often attempted to emphasize the similarities between the British possessions in North America and in Southern Africa. For instance in his speech in favour of the unification of the South African colonies and states in the second reading of the South Africa Bill in the House of Lords he drew a parallel between these areas. Both of these territories were from cultural, economic and above all ethnical, racial aspects divided. The colonies in Canada as in South Africa had to deal with native population, the native affairs. In addition to native question, the colonist population was heterogeneous in North America and in Southern Africa as well. While in the former the effective and smooth cooperation with the French inhabitants of Quebec, in the later the integration of the independent Boer settlers meant a crucial challenge for the Colonial Office. Lord Carnarvon endeavoured to

---

<sup>26</sup> DE KIEWIET, C. W.: *The Imperial Factor in South Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1937. 97-98.



use that parallel to convince the Imperial Parliament about the necessity of the unification and colonial federation in Southern Africa: „*It is now, my Lords, 10 years since I had the honour of moving the second reading of the Bill for the Confederation of the Dominion of Canada, which Bill became law from that time. The Bill now before your Lordships is founded in a great measure on that statue [...] Analogies will be found in the variances of race, language, creed, and laws; difference consists in that great native question which has long been, and must be for many years to come, the hinge upon which South African policy must turn.*”<sup>27</sup> Carnarvon argued for the cause of the confederation with the Canadian positive example. He was convinced that in line with the similarities, the same problems and conditions, the Canadian model, the federal unity of the South African colonies and states could be the only efficient solution for the conflicts of the subcontinent. Moreover the confederation would improve the relations between the mother country and its colonies: „*But in Canada, since the time that the Confederation Act passed, there has been a great development of population, of revenue, of the exports and imports, of all, in fact, which marks the advance of a great country; and yet, with this development, and with the growth of those large Imperial questions which call for the exercise of high constitution qualities, and which, in their absence, would cause grave political friction, happily the relations between the Canadian Colonies and this country have become still closer.*”<sup>28</sup>

The fact that the text of the South Africa Bill,<sup>29</sup> which was to define the political structure and system of the South African Confederation in its many elements followed word by word the British North America Bill<sup>30</sup>, seems to strengthen the view that Lord Carnarvon’s positive experience with the successful unification of the British North American colonies had a great impact on his South African scheme. Furthermore, even Sir Arthur Hardinge, Carnarvon’s biographer highlighted this element of Lord Carnarvon’s motives: „*There were present in South Africa in 1874, even more perhaps than in Canada before Federation, all those causes of useless friction and discontent which result from difference of race, tariffs, laws, and frontiers. Over all these difficulties towered the question of the policy to be pursued towards the vast numbers of coloured men who, numerically superior to the whites, were mostly warlike and often hostile.*”<sup>31</sup> Moreover, Sir Robert George Wyndham Herbert, Carnarvon’s cousin and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (1871-1892) added new points to this parallel. Herbert, who edited the book, called *Speeches on Canadian Affairs, by Henry Howard Molyneux, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon*, in light of the heavy burden of the South African War or Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), emphasized in the

---

<sup>27</sup> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCXXXIII, col. 1646. Carnarvon in Lords, 23 Apr. 1877

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> South Africa Bill [H. L.], 1 Aug. 1877

<sup>30</sup> British North America Bill [H. L.], 26 Feb. 1867

<sup>31</sup> HARDINGE, Arthur: *The Life of Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon, 1841-1890 II.*, Oxford University Press, London, 1925. 157.

introduction of that book the importance of Lord Carnarvon's South African federal scheme and blamed the later British South African colonial policy for the abandonment of the Transvaal: „*While, if we look forward from the past and the present to that completion of the great Colonial trilogy of confederations which must be the work of the very early future, how full of resource Lord Carnarvon would have been if he had lived to take part in a second and successful effort to achieve the union of South Africa under the British flag. How much, at any rate, should we have been spared if the former annexation of the Transvaal had been maintained, and the importance of bringing all the South African Colonies and States under one Federal Administration had not been neglected in days when principles and details would have been easier of settlement.*”<sup>32</sup>

Although the analogies are obvious, numerous differences can also be found between the conditions of the North American British colonies and Southern Africa. First of all, in contrast with Canada where the unification was preceded by a colonial proposal, in South Africa the colonists' main attitude toward the imperial initiation was that the Home Government wanted to force the federal unity upon them.<sup>33</sup> The representatives of the Imperial Parliament, for example Leonard Courtney criticized that way, too: „*There was no parallel between this Bill and the Canadian Bill; the latter came from Canada to us; the Colonial Office had nothing to do but to express its approval of it; it was negotiated in the colonies, and it was put into shape before it came here; and all that this Government did was to give the new State a name; but the Confederation of South Africa had sprung up here, and its main object was to re-attach to us certain territories which had resigned.*”<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, as opposed to Canada where the British became dominant element of the white population, in South Africa the Dutch, the Boers could preserve their majority against the British. Above all, the Colonial Office could not elaborate an efficient answer to the great challenge that the overwhelming majority of the natives meant. As Leonard Courtney stated: „*There were difficulties in South Africa which did not exist in Canada, for in South Africa the great mass of European settlers were Dutch in language, habits, manners, and love of independence; and, besides them, there was a large Native population.*”<sup>35</sup>

### **Carnarvon's Colonial Defence Strategy**

Goodfellow in his book stated that one of Lord Carnarvon's main motives in his conception about the South African Confederation was to secure Simon's Bay, which possessed a high importance from the aspect of the effective defence of the

---

<sup>32</sup> HERBERT, Sir Robert (ed.): *Speeches on Canadian Affairs by Henry Howard Molyneux, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon*, John Murray, London, 1902. xiii-xiv.

<sup>33</sup> MOLTENO, P. A.: *The Life and Times of Sir John Charles Molteno*, Smith, Elder & Co., London, 1900. 350.

<sup>34</sup> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCXXXV, col. 980. Courtney in Commons, 9 Jul. 1877

<sup>35</sup> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCXXXV, col. 980-981. Courtney in Commons, 9 Jul. 1877

British interests in that area. The strong Confederation by Carnarvon's scheme would be the secure hinterland for that second Gibraltar.<sup>36</sup>

The importance of the naval base of Simon's Bay in midway between the British Isles and India had been clear for the British politics already before Lord Carnarvon started his second term of office as Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1874. Despite the opening of the Suez Canal (1869), in 1878 £90 million worth articles were transported through the Cape of Good Hope compared to £65 million through Suez.<sup>37</sup> The strategic value of the military base and coaling station of Simon's Bay was respected by the liberal Secretary of State, the Earl of Granville, too. One of the main points of his South African colonial policy was to reduce the numbers of the imperial troops in this area, in order to decrease the imperial responsibilities there and to facilitate the weight of the South African burden on the Treasury. Despite his conception and political endeavours, Granville found essential to maintain one regiment of red coats in Cape for the defence of Simon's Bay: „[...]with regard to the Cape of Good Hope, we have agreed to retain a regiment at Simon's Bay, and to allow the Colonial Government to place that regiment wherever they think convenient. I believe that nothing has excited public feeling in this country more than the immense sums which the Imperial Government have lavished on the cape of Good Hope; for not merely a regiment, but an absolute army was kept up there.”<sup>38</sup> Three years later Lord Granville's despatch about that issue was quoted in the House of Commons by Sir Alexander Brown: „Meanwhile Her Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that British troops cannot be retained in the colony for colonial purposes, and should be gradually withdrawn, with probable exception of a single regiment, to be left in the colony for the present, with reference to the importance of Simon's Bay for imperial purposes.”<sup>39</sup> The danger of the defenceless condition of Simon's Bay in case of a possible attack was pointed out by Gathorne Hardy in 1876 in the House of Commons: „Nor was that of coaling stations less complex; for instance, if the Suez Canal were stopped up by accident or warlike measures, it would be necessary to send troops round by the Cape, and Simon's Bay would then become important.”<sup>40</sup>

Lord Carnarvon paid a special attention to the appropriate defence of Simon's Bay and attempted to convince Disraeli to develop the armament of the naval base with new guns – mainly ineffective. Carnarvon's anxiety about the defence of the Cape of Good Hope, which was equal for him with the maintenance of the British Empire, incredibly increased during the escalation of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>36</sup> GOODFELLOW: 136.

<sup>37</sup> SCHREUDER: 18.

<sup>38</sup> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCII, col. 484. Granville in Lords, 20. Jun. 1870

<sup>39</sup> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCXIV, col. 1065. Brown in Commons, 27. Feb. 1873

<sup>40</sup> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCXXVII, col. 1478-1479. Hardy in Commons, 6 Mar. 1876

<sup>41</sup> GOODFELLOW: 137.

It seems to prove this hypothesis that Lord Carnarvon a few years after his resignation in 1887 paid a visit to Cape and found it important to remark the fact that he was not content with the conditions of the base of Simon's Bay: „*The sites are all on rather low ground: but nothing is yet done—not a shovel of earth moved—no armaments come, and though the works are done at Simon's Bay, the armaments have not yet arrived there. But these are to be transferred to Cape Town, and their place is to be filled with old 7-2 muzzle-loaders. It is a scandalous case.*”<sup>42</sup>

### **External Factors**

Owing to the limits of the study, in the rest of this chapter I concentrate on just one of the external factors, namely, the men on the spot.

### **Men on the Spot**

The decisions which influenced the British South African colonial policy in the nineteenth century were made at least in two places: in London and in South Africa. Great responsibility rested on the shoulders of the men on the spot in two ways. First of all, the distance between London (centre) and Cape Town (colonies) made the contact complicated and sluggish. For example Sir Henry Barkly's (Governor of Cape and High Commissioner, 1870-1877) letter<sup>43</sup> of 5 August 1875 in which he transmitted P. J. Joubert's (Acting President of Transvaal) answer (16 July 1875)<sup>44</sup> for Lord Carnarvon's proposal for South African Conference was received at the Colonial Office on 9 September 1875. This means that it took almost three month to send Joubert's letter from the Government House, Pretoria to Carnarvon's table. Furthermore, the Colonial Office's primary resource of information about the South African conditions was the reports and correspondence of the British colonial officials. From these aspects it can be easily presumed that the factor of the men on the spot had a crucial impact on Great Britain's South African colonial policy.

It is worth highlighting that one of the most important and effective officials of this factor — who was in fact on his first South African unofficial mission — was James Anthony Froude (1818-1894). Froude was an influential historian, the editor of the *Frazer's Magazine* and the author of numerous articles and books, such as the *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth*.<sup>45</sup> Mainly in 1874-1875 he was Lord Carnarvon's eye and ear in Southern Africa. Norman Etherington in his study called, *Labour Supply and the Genesis of South African*

---

<sup>42</sup> Carnarvon quoted in HARDINGE: *The Life of Henry III.*, 269.

<sup>43</sup> Barkly to Carnarvon 5 Aug. 1875, in Correspondence Respecting the Proposed Conference of Delegates on Affairs of South Africa (C.1399), 20-21.

<sup>44</sup> Joubert to Barkly 16 Jul. 1875, enclosing Barkly to Carnarvon 5 Aug. 1875, in Correspondence Respecting the Proposed Conference of Delegates on Affairs of South Africa (C.1399), 20-21.

<sup>45</sup> FROUDE, James Anthony: *History of England from the fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth*, Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., New York, 1879.

*Confederation in the 1870s* criticised Goodfellow for paying too much importance and attention for Froude's work. Thus it can be interesting to examine Froude's influence on Carnarvon's South African federal policy.

Froude, who identified himself as an imperialist and an enthusiastic supporter of Lord Carnarvon's political ideas and the cause of the federal unification of the British colonial possessions visited the secretary of State for the Colonies on 30 April 1874. During the „interview and conversation”<sup>46</sup> Froude told to Carnarvon his intentions to travel to Australia in order to see for himself „whether there is any possibility of drawing them [Australian Colonies] closer to us and giving permanence to the relation which exist”.<sup>47</sup> Rather than the Australian mission, Lord Carnarvon suggested for him to pay a visit to South Africa where he could help the Government to get proper information about the political conditions of the subcontinent. Froude left England on 23 August 1874 as a secret agent of Lord Carnarvon and the Colonial Office, without any official power.<sup>48</sup> Carnarvon noticed in his diary the main objects of Froude's secret mission: „I explained what I wished him to give his attention to in South Africa, specifying three subjects in particular:

1. generally Federation

2. relations of Free States and Nations and ourselves

3. Natal in reference to recent insurrection. Agreed on this head that if necessary I should write to him and appoint him a Commissioner to enquire on the spot. (...) He expressed himself as fully and entirely satisfied in this respect.”<sup>49</sup> I find interesting the fact that Froude in his published South African journal did not mention with at least one word the cause of the federal unity of the South African colonies and states or the objects of his role in the South African conception of the Colonial Office. Rather he highlighted the issue of Langalibalele, the chief of the Hlubi tribe and the conflicts and disputes about the British annexation of the Diamond Fields (Griqualand West) between Britain and the Boer republics. Froude attempted to hide and cover the purpose of his journey laconically: „In the summer of 1874 I paid a visit to South Africa. Having leisure in my hands, I wished to use it to study the working of an English colony.”<sup>50</sup> Furthermore he emphasized the social and humanitarian aspects of his voyage: „I had been interested in the exertions of Miss Rye to carry the waifs and strays of our swarming population of children to countries where their chances in after life would be more favourable than here, and I desired to ascertain how far the colonial authorities would be willing to assist in carrying out a systematic emigration of children on a larger scale.”<sup>51</sup> Between September and the end of December 1874 Froude travelled to

---

<sup>46</sup> GORDON: 218.

<sup>47</sup> Froude quoted in HARDINGE: *The Life of Henry II.*, 176.

<sup>48</sup> PAUL, Herbert: *The Life of Froude*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1905. 256.

<sup>49</sup> GORDON: 226-227.

<sup>50</sup> WHEELER, David H. (ed.): *Historical and Other Sketches. By James Anthony Froude*, Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London, 1883. 187.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

Cape Colony, Natal, he visited the Diamond Fields, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal and had mixed impressions. For instance with reference to the political and ethnical relations of Natal he wrote that: „*I leave Natal with unhopeful feelings.*”<sup>52</sup> However in the Transvaal Froude had positive experience and he saw the republic as a potential partner in Lord Carnarvon’s federal scheme: „*If we can make up our minds to allow the colonists to manage the natives their own way, we may safely confederate the whole country. The Dutch will be in the majority, and the Dutch method of management will more or less prevail. They will be left wholly to themselves for selfdefence, and prudence will prevent them from trying really harsh or aggressive measures. In other respects the Dutch are politically conservative, and will give us little trouble.*”<sup>53</sup> He was convinced about that President Burgers in return for the compensation of the South African Republic for their loss from the British annexation of the Diamond Fields, would turn to a supporter of the South African Confederation. In contrast with his first journey, second time, one year later in June 1875 Froude travelled to South Africa as the official agent of the British colonial policy. The main line of Carnarvon’s conception was in this period to organize a conference where the South African colonies and states would send their delegates. Froude would represent Carnarvon’s views, thus the imperial interests in the conference.

It might be asked, what the impact of Froude’s suggestions on Lord Carnarvon’s South African colonial policy was. It was also an interesting and disputed question for Carnarvon’s contemporaries. For instance in the House of Commons on 27 May 1875 Alexander McArthur asked James Lowther, the Under-Secretary for the Colonies (1874-1878) about Froude’s mission. Lowther pointed out that Froude was an important source of information about the recent political conditions of Southern Africa and was requested to take part in the South African conference.<sup>54</sup>

By Lord Carnarvon’s diary it is known that the Secretary of State for the Colonies consulted with Froude about the crucial issues of the South African colonial policy: „*A long conversation with Froude in the afternoon as to South African matters. He very much likes my draft despatch concerning the Conference of Representatives of different States, and indicating Confederation as an ultimate object.*”<sup>55</sup> Carnarvon asked Froude for instructions concerned with South African political problems. Such as the delegations of the conference: „*Much conversation with Froude. [...] Question as to Chairmanship of Conference in the failure of Sir H. Barkly and Sir A. Cunynghame. He advises Sir G. Wolseley.*”<sup>56</sup> Besides the consultations Froude helped Carnarvon during the negotiations with Burgers in 1875, when the President of the South African Republic was in London: „*An interview with President Burgers of the Transvaal Republic. He does not seem to*

---

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 208.

<sup>53</sup> Froude quoted in PAUL, 260.

<sup>54</sup> Hansard, 3rd Ser., CCXXIV., col. 923-924., McArthur and Lowther in Commons, 27 May 1875.

<sup>55</sup> GORDON: 249.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 251-252.

*me a very able man, and he appears overcome by his civil reception here, his invitation to the Foreign Office tonight and his dinner with me on Monday. Froude was present.*<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, in the question of the importance of Simon's Bay from an imperial point of view they stood in the same platform and their opinion was absolutely same. Froude noticed that in his South African journal on 25 September 1875: „Now, even now, it was a pleasant thing to see the English flag flying over a spot which, whatever might be its fortunes, was still the most important naval station in the world.”<sup>58</sup>

### **Conclusions**

The starting point of my research and this study, too, was the hypothesis that Great Britain's South African colonial policy during the second half of the nineteenth century can be characterised by different tendencies and changes. One of these tendencies, namely, the conception of the South African federal unity became the main element of Great Britain's South African colonial policy during Benjamin Disraeli's second administration (1874-1880), when the Fourth Earl of Carnarvon was the Secretary of State for the Colonies (1874-1878). On the other hand, the leadership of Lord Carnarvon and his policy can be seen as an attempt (chance) to break the former tendencies, like reluctance and abandonment. The importance of these factors and approaches were inevitable for Carnarvon's predecessors, such as Edward Cardwell or Earl Granville.

Lord Carnarvon's South African federal scheme was influenced by numerous internal and external factors. In this paper I concentrated on one of the latter and one of the former groups as well. Despite the fact that similarities and dissimilarities could be found between Canada and Southern Africa, Carnarvon's positive experience with the federal unification of the British North American colonies could mean a real motivation for him in the case of the South African problems.

Among the external factors, the influence of James Anthony Froude was highlighted. Although the weight of Froude's impact on Carnarvon's South African conception was disputed by Norman A. Etherington, who emphasized the importance of Theophilus Shepstone and the Natal expansionism, in my opinion and as it can be seen from Lord Carnarvon's diary, Froude's work and results cannot be ignored.

Various internal (increasing South African expenditures) and external (resistance of the colonies, clash of the colonial interests) problems caused the failure of Lord Carnarvon's scheme. Despite the fact that it was a complex process, the history of the fall can be traced back to the fact that the Colonial Office

---

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 250.

<sup>58</sup> WHEELER: 194.

between 1874 and 1881 could not make Carnarvon's conception and the method of the imperial initiation acceptable to the political leaders, the Government of Cape Colony. In contrast with Lord Kimberley who waited for the colonial initiation and desire for the federal unification of the subcontinent, Lord Carnarvon did not pay enough attention for this. Without the approval of Cape Colony, in many respects the most powerful colony in that area, which could be the basis of the unification of Southern Africa, Carnarvon's plans became unrealizable.

Although the leaders of the British South African colonial policy between 1874 and 1881 attempted to break certain tendencies, which required innovation in the dimension of the political tools and methods, they failed. Under Gladstone's second administration (1880-1885) the former tendencies strengthened.



## ***European studies – 20<sup>th</sup> century***

- Armenian Genocide and the Nemesis operation against the war criminals
- 1933 Constitution in Portugal
- Against the nuclear arms race in Great Britain



**Zalán Zubor**

## ***Operation Nemesis 1920-1923 – The Post-War Fate of the Perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide***

### **Abstract**

After the Ottoman Empire's defeat in the First World War, plans were made by the victorious powers to trial the Young Turk leaders responsible for the Armenian Genocide. However, due to the lack of today's international laws and the reluctance of the Entente leaders to take actions, almost all of the culprits were allowed to avoid judgement. Due to the lack of action, the leading party of the newborn Democratic Republic of Armenia commissioned a covert operation to hunt down fugitive war criminals. Between 1920 and 1923 nine suspected war criminals were assassinated, including two of the Three Pashas that ruled the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The operation codenamed '*Nemesis*' was executed in almost complete secrecy, and the details of the assassinations were only made public decades later, when the participants published their memoirs and some of the operation's archives were made public. This paper will examine the events and some of the backgrounds of the operations using the participant's recollections and contemporary press.

*Keywords:* Armenian Genocide, Armenians, Ottoman Empire, Young Turks, Assassination, Armenian Revolutionary Federations, Covert Operation

**T**he series of mass murders of Armenians between 1915 and 1918, claiming some 600-800 thousand lives, is widely considered as the first genocide of the twentieth century. After the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire allied to the Central Powers, the Western public learnt of unprecedented crimes. The violent deportation, plundering, and systematic destruction of the Empire's Christian minority caused a huge uproar. Because of that, it is striking that after the events, there was almost no repercussions to speak of. The victorious powers did not issue an international manhunt against the Young Turk leaders charged with planning the genocide and held no criminal suits such as the Nuernberg trials after the Second World War. Taking a closer look at the history of international law, all this becomes clear: before 1918 there were no such laws by which, for example, the Nazi war criminals could be prosecuted. The first law that named genocide as a punishable offense was created in 1946 by the newly founded United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

Although the planners of the Armenian genocide were sentenced to death by the Sultan's court-martials in Constantinople, 1918, they were still legally innocent

---

<sup>1</sup> POWER, Samantha: *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, Flamingo, London, 2003, 1-60.

in foreign states and the short-lived Constantinople Ottoman government was too weak to force out the extradition of the condemned. This legal loophole compelled a number of Armenians to take justice into their own hands.

### ***The Young Turk leaders' escape and the court-martials of Constantinople***

By the Autumn of 1918 The Ottoman Empire suffered a defeat on every front. As the Empire's peripheral territories, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria and Thrace were occupied by Entente troops the Sultan and the Young Turk government had no choice but to start negotiating for a ceasefire. Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha resigned on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October to facilitate the negotiations, ending the hegemony of the Committee of Union and Progress that ruled Turkey since 1913. Sultan Mehmet VI appointed Ahmed Izzet Pasha – former war minister who in 1914 was removed by the three pashas leading the Young Turk Party, Talaat, Djemal and Enver – as Talaat's successor and tasked him with the forming of a new government acceptable for the Entente. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of October the new government gave a general amnesty to all still living deportees and allowed them to return to their homes. On the 30<sup>th</sup> of October an agreement was reached with the Entente: as codified in the newly formulated Mudros Treaty the Turks allowed the Entente to occupy Constantinople, several strategically important forts and the so called Six Vilayets claimed by the Democratic Republic of Armenia.<sup>2</sup>

Izzet's government was heavily criticized for including many ministers who were former members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), or İttihat ve Terakki, even though this was the committee that navigated the Empire to a disastrous war. Actually the government was made up mostly of the party's „*inner opposition*” that was against the entry into the war. Other members of the government belonged to the liberal Liberty and Entente Party, the main opposition to the CUP. But for the Entente even this was unacceptable and after less than a month they forced the government to dissolve.<sup>3</sup> One of the more controversial members of Izzet's government was the minister of war, Fethi Bey, one of the senior members of the İttihad. Fethi had an age old friendship with both Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha, both of them were his former classmates.<sup>4</sup>

Jacques Derogy, author of *'Resistance and Revenge'*, a monograph about Operation Nemesis believes that Fethi Bey collaborated with the Radowitz brothers, senior officials of the German embassy to organize the escape of the leaders of the former regime.<sup>5</sup> On November 1<sup>st</sup> 1918 Talaat opened the last congress of the Young Turk Party where they declared the dissolution of the Committee of Union and Progress. Later that day, all of the participants boarded

---

<sup>2</sup> DEROGY, Jacques: *Resistance and Revenge*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1986. 3.

<sup>3</sup> FLESCHE, István: *Atatürk és kora: Musztafa Kemál Atatürk függetlenségi háborúja*, Budapest, Corvina Kiadó, 2004. 139.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 164.

<sup>5</sup> DEROGY: 3.

the German torpedo boat Lorelei and sailed to Odessa. Most of them moved on to settle in Berlin, while others such as Enver Pasha left to Soviet Russia.<sup>6</sup> Talaat left the country with a large sum from the imperial treasury worth about 10 million German Marks that he used to cover the expenses of his and his companions' immigration.<sup>7</sup> For Izzet Pasha's government, the scandal that erupted from the former leaders' escape was a fatal blow. On the 11<sup>th</sup> of November the Sultan asked Izzet to step down and named Tevfik Pasha as the new Grand Vizier.<sup>8</sup> Apart from Talaat, the former Grand Vizier and minister of interior, many other prominent Young Turks left aboard the Lorelei: Enver Pasha, former minister of war, Djemal Pasha, minister of the navy (and former governor of Constantinople), Dr. Nazim Bey and Dr. Beheaddin Shakir, the two founders of the *çete* militia (a force recruited mostly from former convicts, serving under the *Teskilat-i mahsuse*, the Special Force, who did most of the dirty work during the deportation of the Armenians), Djemal Amzi, governor of Trebizond and Bedri Bey, former chief of the Constantinople police.<sup>9</sup> Later those men were regarded as the chief perpetrators of the Armenian genocide. However, no order of arrest against the Ittihadist leaders, only a court summons was issued and published in the 1919 April 12<sup>th</sup> issue of the *Takvim-i Vekay*, the official gazette of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>10</sup>

Tevfik Pasha's new government was under constant pressure from the Entente to punish the remaining members of the former regime responsible for the entry to the First World War and the atrocities committed during the war. Tevfik eventually appointed a military tribunal on the 16<sup>th</sup> of December 1918 to investigate the crimes committed against Armenians, Aegean Greeks and allied prisoners. The British handed a list of 2000 names of suspected war criminals to the government that contained the names of all wartime ministers, several military and political leaders and local officials. Despite the government's efforts the Brits didn't find the pace of the jurisdiction fast enough: Admiral Calthorpe the British emissary in Constantinople complained in a telegram sent to the Foreign Office on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July that no verdict has been reached so far by the tribunals.<sup>11</sup> On January the 29<sup>th</sup> 1919 the Ottoman authorities were pressured into arresting two hundred suspected war criminals,<sup>12</sup> including thirty CUP-members.<sup>13</sup>

On February the 8<sup>th</sup> allied forces led by French General Franchet d'Esperey occupied Constantinople. D'Esperey also hastened the proceedings and gave the government a new, extended list of war criminals. The Sultan refused to sign this new list, which forced Tevfik to resign in favour of Damad Ferid, who appointed a

---

<sup>6</sup> FLESCH: 141.

<sup>7</sup> BOBELIAN, Michael: *Children of Armenia: A Forgotten Genocide and the Century-Long Struggle for Justice*. Simon & Schuster, New York, 2009. 52.

<sup>8</sup> FLESCH: 141.

<sup>9</sup> DEROGY: 4.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 28-29.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 29.

<sup>13</sup> FLESCH: 145.

new military tribunal. Soon all remaining leaders of the Ittihad were arrested, including former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha, Talaat's predecessor and even Ali Fethi. Damad Ferid tasked Rifat Pasha, ambassador in Berlin to have Talaat and other chief culprits extradited. Rifat's failure (who was subsequently replaced) to bring Talaat to justice was not only his fault; the German foreign ministry was also reluctant to extract the Young Turk ministers, asking for „well-grounded charges” to arrest them.<sup>14</sup> The trials of the Young Turks was also followed by General Mustafa Kemal, later named Atatürk (Father of the Turks). In an interview given to Maurice Prat, reporter of the French newspaper *'Petit Parisien'* he asked: „Why do the Allies delay having all these rascals hung?”<sup>15</sup>

The first proceeding dealing with crimes committed against Armenians began on the 11th of February. One Kemal Bey, governor of Boğazlıyan and vice-governor of Yozgat<sup>16</sup> was accused with atrocities against Yozgat Armenians.<sup>17</sup> On the 8<sup>th</sup> of April<sup>18</sup> he was found guilty together with his accomplice, Tevfik Bey, chief of the Boğazlıyan police.<sup>19</sup> According to the verdict they were responsible for the atrocities their subordinate committed against a convoy of Armenian civilians (mostly women and children) deported from Yozgat, and also for „making possible” the „murders, lootings and rapes” by armed brigands against the deportees. Kemal Bey was sentenced to death by hanging while Tevfik Bey was condemned to fifteen years of forced labour.<sup>20</sup> From the end of March the court-martials met regularly, however, the most important culprits, the leaders of the Young Turk government were not present. Thus the court ruled that the fugitive suspects were guilty of common law crimes, so they can be tried in absentia.<sup>21</sup> On the 5<sup>th</sup> of June Talaat, Enver and Djemal and Dr. Nazim too were sentenced to death in absentia,<sup>22</sup> while Djavid Bey, former finance minister and Mustafa Bey, former minister of agriculture was sentenced to 15 years of hard labour.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile the British started deporting the most important suspects to Malta without judicial proceeding, including Said Halim Pasha, Ali Fethi and author Ziya Gökalp, one of the main ideologists of Turkish nationalism.<sup>24</sup> The trials did not earn

<sup>14</sup> KRAJCSIR Piroška: *Az ifjútörök kormány pere és az örmény kérdés*, IN: *Tanulmányok az örmény népiértás témaköréből*, Ararát Kulturális Egyesület, Dorog, 105.

<sup>15</sup> DADRIAN, Vahagn N.: *The Executions of Some of the Arch-perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide by the Ittihadists and Kemalists, 1915-1926*, The Armenian Reporter, 2001. 6. 6. [www.zoryaninstitute.org/Genocide/genocide\\_docs\\_executions.htm](http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/Genocide/genocide_docs_executions.htm) Accessed: 2011. August 14.

<sup>16</sup> FLESCH: 146.

<sup>17</sup> *Turkish Trials Begin*, The New York Times, 1919. February 12. [www.operationnemesis.com/further\\_reading.html](http://www.operationnemesis.com/further_reading.html), Accessed: 2011. August 6.

<sup>18</sup> DEROGY: 30.

<sup>19</sup> STAFF, Asbarez: *Unfinished „Nuremberg”: On the Occasion of the 90-th Anniversary of the Trial of Young Turks*, 2009, [www.genocide-museum.am](http://www.genocide-museum.am) (Accessed: 2011. August 6.)

<sup>20</sup> DEROGY: 30-31.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>22</sup> *Turkey Condemns Its War Leaders: Court Martial Gives Death Sentence to Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha*, The New York Times, 1919. July 13. [www.operationnemesis.com](http://www.operationnemesis.com), (Accessed: 2011 9. 1.)

<sup>23</sup> DEROGY: 38.

<sup>24</sup> SIMSIR, Bilal N.: *Örmény terrorizmus az elmúlt évszázadban (1878–1999)*, Terebess Kiadó,

much popularity for the Ottoman government or the occupying allies. The Sultan warned the British emissary in 1919 that overly severe reprisals would lead to rebellion, because most Muslims believed that war crimes have also been committed against the Turks.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, the Ottoman press didn't report properly on the background and reasons behind the trials so the public remained ambivalent about the punishing of war criminals.<sup>26</sup> The Sultan's worries were soon realised when, following the Greek invasion of Smyrna (1919. May 15<sup>th</sup>), war minister Mustafa Kemal started to organize a national resistance movement. The last verdicts of the court-martials were reached in January and February 1920: Dr. Behaeddin Shakir was found guilty in the massacres committed by the Special Force in Kharput vilayet and was sentenced to death. His auxiliary, Dr. Nazim was condemned to fifteen years of forced labour. Both verdicts were reached in absentia.<sup>27</sup> By March the British were in open war against the Kemalists, so on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March (being suspicious about the Sultan and his government's loyalty) they occupied the ministries and other public offices in Constantinople. The Ottoman parliament dissolved itself as a protest. The British ordered the arrest of twenty two more suspects, including Said Halim Pasha who were also deported to Malta.<sup>28</sup> By the end of 1920, 118 persons were held prisoners in Malta, of whom 55 were suspected perpetrators of the Armenian massacres.<sup>29</sup>

On 1920 August the 6<sup>th</sup> the Entente signed the treaty of Sèvres with the powerless Constantinople government, under which the League of Nations could make steps to bring the perpetrators of the Armenian genocide to justice and force the Turkish government to extract them to the allied powers.<sup>30</sup> The British imagined the „*Malta Exile*” as a temporary solution, thus no further verdicts were enforced and all proceedings against the prisoners were suspended.<sup>31</sup> Also, some of the prisoners could later be used as leverage in the negotiations with the Kemalists. On 1921 March 16<sup>th</sup> the allies agreed to an exchange of prisoners with Kemal: sixty-four prominent Malta prisoners were released in exchange for allied POW-s. Most of the released prisoners returned to Anatolia, including Ali Fethi and Gökalp, where they joined with the nationalist movement in Ankara. Said Halim Pasha however, was forbidden from returning to Turkey.<sup>32</sup> Instead he settled in Rome, from where he supported Kemal's movement with large amounts of money. After the prisoners' release the Ottoman government gave up on the

---

Budapest, 2001. 32. FLESCHE: 146.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 145.

<sup>26</sup> Gerard CHALIAND - Yves TERNON: *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance*, Zed Press, London, 1981. 85.

<sup>27</sup> DEROGY: 38.

<sup>28</sup> ŞEYHUN, Ahmet: *Said Halim Pasha: an Ottoman statesman and an Islamist thinker (1865-1921)*, Isis Press, 2002. 206.

<sup>29</sup> DEROGY: 39.

<sup>30</sup> STAFF, Asbarez: *Unfinished „Nuremberg”*

<sup>31</sup> KRAJCSIR: 107.

<sup>32</sup> ŞEYHUN: 210.

possibility that the war criminals would ever be brought to justice and ceased asking for their extradition. The revolutionary Ankara government's own court nullified all verdicts reached by the Constantinople courts in 1920.<sup>33</sup> With the fall of the Entente's puppet-regime in Constantinople, there was no official authority left that could enforce the verdicts. Although the British intelligence continued to monitor Talaat and his partners' plotting abroad, after the allies defeat in the Turkish War of Independence, they too essentially gave up on having any of the fugitive war criminals or the Malta exiles stand before justice.<sup>34</sup>

### ***The Armenian response: creating the Nemesis network***

The trials in Constantinople were in full swing when in the autumn of 1919 a different kind of court judged the Young Turk leaders. In Yerevan, the 9<sup>th</sup> World Congress of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or Dashnaksutyun in Armenian (shortened as Dashnak) assembled, where one of the main agendas was the way war criminals should be dealt with. Should they trust the judgement of the victorious powers or should they turn to vigilantism?

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation was founded in 1890 in Tbilisi by a group of Russian-Armenian youth. By the time of the First World War the Dashnak became the most influential Armenian political party, with branches in all countries of the world where the Armenian diaspora was present. Most members of the party were young intellectuals and students, who subscribed to a mix of nationalism and Marxist-socialist thought, and equally opposed the Ottomans and the Amiras, the traditional, osmanized Armenian elite comprised of rich traders and bankers.<sup>35</sup> After 1905 the Dashnak became the leading Armenian party thanks to their more nationalistic politics compared to the purely socialistic Revolutionary Hunchak Party,<sup>36</sup> their aggressive, terroristic revolutionary tactics,<sup>37</sup> and later, their cooperation with the Young Turks (in 1902 the two parties even formed an electoral alliance).<sup>38</sup> Due to their geographical extension the party was extremely decentralized: their smallest units were the local *central committees* (not the same as the central committees leading traditional parties), which represented the Armenian population of a smaller area (as in the case of parts of Anatolia and the Caucasus that as a whole had a significant Armenian population) or that of a whole country. The central committees were almost entirely autonomous organizations. Over them were the party's *eastern and western bureaus*, the former representing the European and American Armenian diaspora, the latter the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Middle East. After the foundation of the

---

<sup>33</sup> DEROGY: 40.

<sup>34</sup> Peter BALAKIAN: *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*, HarperCollins Ebooks, 2003. 344.

<sup>35</sup> FLESCH: 110.

<sup>36</sup> Edward ALEXANDER: *A Crime of Vengeance*, The Free Press, 1991. 33.

<sup>37</sup> DEROGY: 33.

<sup>38</sup> FLESCH: 111.



Democratic Republic of Armenia the two bureaus were united, and the new, strengthened bureau became the party's main decision-making organ. The Dashnak's highest organ was the *international congress*. Assembling every five or four years the congress was a meeting of the representatives of all central committees, where apart from deciding on the general directives of the party, they elected the president and vice-president of the party. The presidential body became more important after the formulation of the Republic, before that, it's main role was to facilitate negotiations with the Ottoman state.

The 1919 congress decided that, on the one hand, the Dashnak should cooperate with the allies who apparently made a serious effort to punish war criminals. In that spirit they gave a list of 100 names to the British, French and Italian authorities, translated to their respective languages. The list was accepted at a secret meeting of the congress, after comparing 23 different blacklists (the first was composed in January 1918). On the other hand, they decided that the party would create its own „*special mission*” (Haduk Gordz in Armenian), which, if needed could avenge war crimes on its own. For this, a „*special force*” (Haduk Marmin) has to be created, an armed commando that can be deployed in anywhere in the world.<sup>39</sup> Proponents of this violent solution cited a clause in the party's constitution that allowed „*political and organizational terror*” as a mean to ends.<sup>40</sup> For this future special mission a new, secret blacklist was composed, containing 650 names: Turkish officials and the leaders of the Azerbaijani Mussavat party which seized power during the 1918 power-vacuum, and of Armenian collaborators charged with taking part in the atrocities during the war. From this long list a committee of the congress chose 41 names, who were marked as the men chiefly responsible for the Armenian genocide.

To oversee the operation the Dashnak appointed a veteran revolutionary, the party's overseas representative and ambassador to the USA, Armen Garo. The operation used the Dashnak's already existing international infrastructure. Each local central committee was responsible for the execution of missions, so every cell of the party become an outstretched arm of the Haduk Marmin. The operation was financed by the Boston central committee, Armen Garo's home.<sup>41</sup> To finance the operation the Dashnak central bureau created a special fund (Haduk Gumar) that was given to the Haduk Marmin to oversee after the congress.<sup>42</sup> The force's finances were managed by a member of the Boston committee, Garo's right hand-man, poet and author Shahan Natali. During the congress Natali went from Boston to Paris to create a link between the Boston Haduk Gordz and the Haduk Marmin in Constantinople, creating an intercontinental network.<sup>43</sup> The recruitment of the soon-to-be assassins took place in Constantinople, in the office of the Armenian

---

<sup>39</sup> DEROGY: 59-60.

<sup>40</sup> SIMSIR: 12.

<sup>41</sup> DEROGY: 59-60.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 59-60.

<sup>43</sup> DEROGY: 73.

newspaper Azadamart. The network they just created was named 'Nemesis', after the Greek goddess of vengeance.

The Dashnak wanted to make sure that no provable connection could be made between the party and the assassinations. The party organizations never gave direct, written orders for the murders, all documents about Operation Nemesis used codenames or blank spaces in the texts.<sup>44</sup> Naturally, the punitive expedition wasn't even a part of the Congress's public agenda. Instead, it mainly focused on the reorganization of the party adapting to the new situation that had arisen with Armenia's independence. One of the first step in the party's reorganization was to unite the western and eastern bureaus, creating a more centralized party: only one bureau remained with 10 members, based in Yerevan. This helped the communication between regional party cells made the execution of operations ordered by the party leadership easier, as now the local organisations received orders directly from the party leaders. This made Armen Garo's job much easier.<sup>45</sup>

### ***Attack in Tbilisi***

The assassination that could be said to have opened Operation Nemesis took place in Tbilisi, 1920 June 19<sup>th</sup>. Its targets were the two leaders of the Mussavat Party, former rulers of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, whose followers committed the last anti-Armenian pogrom during the Turkish occupation of Baku in 1918. During the height of the violence, Baku Armenians were virtually exterminated.<sup>46</sup> The Mussavat's rule was cut short by the Red Army's occupation and most of its leaders fled to Tbilisi.

Towards the end of 1919 the Dashnak cell of Georgia tasked Aram Yerganian to hunt down the Mussavat's leaders. Yerganian was one of the 200 survivors of the Erzerum massacre. At the age of fifteen he was taken in by the Armenian legion fighting with the Russian forces that temporarily invaded Eastern Anatolia in 1916. After the foundation of the Republic he worked for the Yerevan secret police where his job was to track down and liquidate common law criminals as well as spies trying to infiltrate Dashnak bodies. Soon he got his hardest job yet: finding and killing Fathali Khan Khoiski, the former prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan and Khan Mahmadoy, leader of the Mussavat. The groundwork was already being laid by a group of two gunmen and two observers who followed the victims' daily routine, monitored their homes and their favourite cafés. In June 19<sup>th</sup> Yerganian, together with his partner Misak Giragossian waited in a café for the two targets to arrive, and when they came close they opened fire. Khoiski died instantly, but Mahmadoy returned the fire, wounding Giragossian. Although wounded, Mahmadoy left the scene alive.

The Tbilisi attack was more of a separate operation of the Georgian Dashnak

---

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 105.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 54-61.

<sup>46</sup> *Says Baku Armenians Face Extermination*, The New York Times, 1920. May 3.

committee than an actual part of Operation Nemesis, although it is clear it was organized in its spirit. However, the attack was executed solely by the Tbilisi cell alone, without consulting the Haduk Gordz or other units. A few months later Yeraganian travelled to Constantinople and joined the headquarters in the office of Azadamart, to help recruiting volunteers for future assassinations.<sup>47</sup>

### ***Talaat Pasha's assassination***

Mehmet Talaat Pasha was regarded by the Armenians as the number one perpetrator of the genocide. Originally a clerk at the Salonika telegraph company he joined the then democratic Young Turk movement in 1908 and played a crucial role in the revolution at the same year. Between 1909 and 1913 the new regime slowly turned into a dictatorship of the Three Pashas (Talaat, Enver and Djemal), culminating in a coup in 1913, with Enver becoming war minister and Said Halim the Grand Vizier. At the same time, the Young Turk government moved away from its initially pro-minorities stance and embraced the Pan-Turkic ideas of Ziya Gökalp and began a demographic policy to homogenize Anatolia's ethnic makeup. As minister of interior Talaat gave the order for the Armenians' deportation and for the creation of the specialforces that escorted the death convoys through the Syrian desert. During his meetings with US ambassador Henry Morgenthau he made no effort to hide his hatred for Armenians.<sup>48</sup> It is not surprising that Talaat's name was on the top of the Dashnak's blacklist. He was killed in 1921 March 15<sup>th</sup> in Berlin by Nemesis-agent Shogomon Tehlirian.

Like Armen Garo, Tehlirian was driven by a personal thirst for vengeance. Born in 1896 april 2<sup>nd</sup>, he spent most of his childhood in Erzincan. In 1914, as a medic he joined the Russian army's Armenian legion led by General Andranik, one of the finest Armenian generals during the war. During his time in the military he was able to return to Erzincan, but he searched for his mother and sisters in vein.<sup>49</sup> According to survivors, Turkish soldiers and policemen ordered all Armenians to leave the city. They were promised armed protection during their "relocation" . Instead, near the city's outskirts they were rounded up and ordered to convert to Islam. Whoever refusing to convert was killed, including Tehlirian's relatives. According to Tehlirian's autobiography, this was the time he became determined to get revenge on the ones who planned the murders. His long, mysterious illness, with bouts of fainting and epilepsy-like spasms also started there, probably caused by the trauma.<sup>50</sup>

After learning of his family's fate, Tehlirian returned to the front and took part in the fighting until the armistice of Mudros. After the war, in 1919 December 15<sup>th</sup> he decided to go to Constantinople, hoping to find his surviving relatives, but also,

---

<sup>47</sup> DEROGY: 60-61.

<sup>48</sup> *Az örmény népirtás: Az örmények és a történeti emlékezet*, www.htkp.org, (Accessed: 2010. 9. 10.)

<sup>49</sup> DEROGY: 65.

<sup>50</sup> AVAKIAN, Lindy V.: *The Cross and the Crescent*, UCS Press, Phoenix, Arizona, 1989, 41-43.

to find out who was responsible for the massacres. Before going he purchased a revolver. Upon his arrival he went straight to the Azadamart Armenian newspaper's office to publish an advertisement looking for his relatives. At that time, many refugees from Anatolia published such advertisements in Constantinople, the newspapers fulfilled dozens of such requests on that day only. At the office Tehlirian met a teacher named Yeranuhi Danielian, who later recruited him for Operation Nemesis. Although she was originally a member of the Hunchak party, she had several Dashnak friends and after the war, she attended Dashnak meetings as well, as the tragedy of 1915 almost ended all differences between parties.<sup>51</sup> Yeranuhi told Tehlirian about the 1915 purges in Constantinople, when 250 Armenian intellectuals were deported.<sup>52</sup> She told him that the arrests were made possible by an Armenian informer named Megerditchian, who was still living in the city, unpunished. She also claimed that Talaat Pasha was ultimately responsible for the massacres. From this time on, Tehlirian's revenge had a concrete target.<sup>53</sup>

Yeranuhi encouraged Tehlirian to kill Megerditchian. She gave him a photo of the traitor and showed him his young son, who could lead him to Megerditchian. After that, Tehlirian regularly observed Megerditchian's home. One day he saw the boy going into the house carrying some bottles of drinks. Following the boy, Tehlirian sneaked into the building and shot Megerditchian in the chest, and in the ensuing chaos he managed to get away from the policemen staying in the house. Mortally wounded, Megerditchian was rushed to a hospital where he died later that day.

After that, Tehlirian looked forward to extract vengeance on Talaat, who was pointed out by Yeranuhi as the chief culprit of the massacres. First he asked Patriarch Zaven, head of the Armenian Orthodox Church to help him to find Talaat, but as a Christian Zaven refused to take part in a murder. He also tried contacting the Turkish parties opposing the Ittihad, but to no avail.<sup>54</sup> Finally, Yeranuhi took Tehlirian to a clandestine meeting at the home of a Constantinople Dashnak-member, Berge. There, Tehlirian offered his services to Shahan Natali, Garo's right hand man.<sup>55</sup> Natali found Tehlirian a suitable executor of Talaat's death warrant: in her recommendation Yeranuhi described him as a broken man with an almost mad obsession about the thought of vengeance. He also had no real private life, so he had nothing to lose on such a dangerous mission.<sup>56</sup> All this was fitting for Natali's plans, who wanted Tehlirian to be caught and tried, because that way he could publicly speak about the atrocities committed against the Armenians. As a journalist he recognized the power of publicity and knew that when Talaat's deeds are revealed, people will take the side of Tehlirian even if he kills a man.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 46-49.

<sup>52</sup> DEROGY: 67.

<sup>53</sup> AVAKIAN: 50.

<sup>54</sup> DEROGY: 68-69.

<sup>55</sup> AVAKIAN: 63-67.

<sup>56</sup> ALEXANDER: 50.

<sup>57</sup> *Shahan Natalie (A Concise Biography)*, *Apaga Periodical*, 30. szám, 2007. September,

Although Natali tasked Tehlirian with killing Talaat, at that time he could not give him any real aid, as they were not even sure where Talaat was.<sup>58</sup> With no directions Tehlirian went to Paris, spending his remaining money after he learnt that Zaven travelled there. He asked the Patriarch again to help him, but he refused once again.<sup>59</sup> About a year later, Yeranuhi contacted Tehlirian and told him that the Dashnak cell in Boston wants to see him urgently. He went to Boston in October 1920 where he was questioned by Armen Garo in the office of the Hairenik newspaper, to see if he was up for the task. After that he was initiated into the international organization of the Nemesis. He was told that the Young Turk leaders started negotiating with several European powers, hoping to return to power in Turkey. Doing this they revealed themselves to Nemesis: they learnt that the remains of the Ittihad organized a conference in Berlin two months ago, and that Talaat was still staying in the city. Garo told Tehlirian about his conversations with Talaat, the Pasha's hatred and crimes against Armenians. Tehlirian remained in Boston for a month where he was prepared for his mission: he was given photographs of members of Talaat's inner circle, including his wife.<sup>60</sup> Finally, after another month of waiting the order arrived, asking him to get to the office of the Dashnak's Geneva headquarters, in the office of the Droshak (*'Flag'*) newspaper as soon as possible.<sup>61</sup>

The trip to Geneva was only needed for a cover story. In the Geneva office Tehlirian received a coded order to travel to Berlin. The command was disguised as a letter from a make-belief cousin, Ayvazian:

*„Dear Cousin Soghomon,*

*It is with pleasure that I learn of your desire to study mechanical engineering in Berlin. Undoubtedly you will have little difficulty securing a student's visa from the German Embassy in Geneva so that you can attend school here.*

*Do not be overly concerned with the language barrier. My friends and I will assist you son that ultimately you can get your diploma – an occasion that will please us all.*

*Knowing your liking for fine cuisine, I look forward to dining with you at such excellent restaurants as Maxl's in Tiergarten Square.*

*Our family joins me in sending you the best of wishes.*

*Sincerely,*

*Your cousin,  
Ayvazian”<sup>62</sup>*

Tehlirian understood well what the message was about: the *„diploma”* he has to get is Talaat Pasha, Maxl's restaurant is a meeting point and the *„family”*

---

www.apagaonline.com (Accessed: 2011. August 11.)

<sup>58</sup> AVAKIAN: 63-67.

<sup>59</sup> ALEXANDE: 45-46.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>61</sup> AVAKIAN: 82-86.

<sup>62</sup> AVAKIAN: 87-88.

is the group of agents already in the city. On September 3<sup>rd</sup> 1920 he went to Berlin using a Persian passport with the student's visa from the Geneva German embassy in it.

Before Tehlirian's arrival, several agents were already laying the groundwork in Berlin, constantly watching Turkish immigrants possibly in contact with the Young Turks. Most of these agents are only known by their codenames from Tehlirian's autobiography: Hazor, who infiltrated the Turkish students' community (Alexander mistakenly connects him to Dr. Hagop Zorian, later a professor of the Yerevan University, who in fact was staying in Berlin at that time. It is more likely however, that his true name was Garabed 'Hrach' Papazian, who Alexander believed to be an agent known as Hrap). Vaza (Vahan Zachariantz), who later served as the Armenian translator during Tehlirian's trial, Haigo and Sumpat (their identity is not yet known).<sup>63</sup> The lion's share of information gathering before the assassination was done by Hazor (Garabed Papazian). Papazian was born in 1892 into a rich family in Yozgat. After the age of twelve he studied in Constantinople where he learnt to speak Turkish just like a native speaker. He then moved on to study law at the Ottoman University. His knowledge of Turkish customs and ability to speak without an accent made him an especially useful operative. His features also made him look like a Turk more than an Armenian. Later, following Muslim traditions he got himself circumcised so that he could meet Turks in bathhouses too without detection. Disguised as a Turkish student named Mehmet Ali he acquired a fake Turkish passport and students' visa to Germany. With his ability to win over people and make friends, „Mehmet Ali” soon became popular among Turkish students and immigrants, popular enough to be elected „*Turkish Student of the Year*” in 1921.<sup>64</sup> Although the Turkish political immigrants had even less capital than the Dashnak, it is still conspicuous how they had close to no counterintelligence: Dashnak-agents soon explored the homes of almost all prominent immigrants and knew who was leaving the city so they could be followed even outside Berlin. At that time, the Young Turks did not even know where Armenian party members lived.<sup>65</sup>

Talaat's assassination was prepared for with an extensive surveillance. The Dashnak had to make sure that the man they are killing really is the Young Turk leader and murdering an innocent man would only damage their cause.<sup>66</sup> Also, the assassination had to be as clean as possible, with Tehlirian's partners not leaving any clues, so that the police would believe that the crime had been committed by a lone killer.<sup>67</sup> This strategy was used at all following assassinations of Operation Nemesis. Before all assassinations, agents would survey for month. Their work began by watching people (sometimes names on the blacklist) who might have ties with the victim-to be. After the target had been clearly identified, the agents took

---

<sup>63</sup> *ibid*, 51-53.

<sup>64</sup> DEROGY: 148.

<sup>65</sup> AVAKAIN: 112.

<sup>66</sup> ALEXANDER: 58.

<sup>67</sup> DEROGY: 73.

rounds in watching his home and all places (restaurants, cafés, friends' homes) they frequented. They acquainted themselves with the target's daily routine, while they started looking for places where the murder could be committed the cleanest possible way. The agents reported their discoveries in telegrams to the Constantinople headquarters, where, after waging the new information, their superiors decided if the operatives should continue the preparations or if it is time to give the order for execution. The Constantinople headquarters was usually extremely careful, which was more of an annoyance for many agents. More than once they did not wait for the headquarters' orders and committed assassinations by themselves.

As it turned out, there was a large Ottoman immigrant community in Berlin: Dr. Shakir and Dr. Nazim, leaders of the Teskilat-i mahsuse, Bedri bey, former Constantinople chief of police and Djemal Azmi, known as the „*Monster of Trebizond*” by Armenians were Talaat's closest confidants in Berlin. All of them were straying incognito and their favourite meeting place was a tobacco shop owned by Djemal Azmi.<sup>68</sup> However, their staying in Berlin was an open secret. Turkish journalist Mehmed Zeki, who fell out with the Young Turks earlier published an article just before Tehlirian's arrival about the Young Turk leaders staying in Berlin, accusing the Republic of Germany that they were knowingly hiding fugitive war criminals

The British intelligence agency MI6, who still entertained the idea of putting Talaat in front of justice, also knew that he fled to Berlin. Since Germany refused to hand him over they decided that, if necessary they would capture him themselves. Talaat was soon identified during a trip to Stockholm. The MI6 proposed that during his journey back to Berlin the Royal Navy should intercept his ship, however, it was decided that such actions would cause a diplomatic disaster. Instead they sent agent Audry Herbert to Berlin, who interviewed Talaat in a park just nine days before his death. Talaat told him that he wants to convince Muslim states to support Mustafa Kemal and threatened to incite revolts in the Muslim colonies of the British Empire unless they sign an acceptable peace treaty with Turkey. When that interview, Talaat signed his own death sentence. The British intelligence consulted with the Soviet secret services who were also worried about Talaat's Pan-Turkic ideas. The British told the Russians what they knew about Talaat and the two agencies decided to cooperate to have him removed. By that time they probably knew that Armenians are also planning to assassinate him (earlier, in Constantinople Tehlirian offered the Turkish liberal parties collaborating with that British that he would help finding the Ittihadist leaders.<sup>69</sup>) They decided that the easiest thing to do was letting the ARF do the dirty work.<sup>70</sup>

Tehlirian and his partners mostly watched Azmi's shop as it was the only clue

---

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, 74.

<sup>69</sup> DEROGY: 68-69.

<sup>70</sup> ÖKE, Min Kemal: *The Armenian Question 1914-1923*, Oxford, K. Rustem & Brother, 1988. 268-269.

they had, while Hazor was trying to earn the trust of Ekmel, Azmi's son. Talaat was first spotted in the middle of February, after they learnt from the Italian Fascists' newspaper, *Lavoro Fascista* that the Young Turk leaders were organizing a conference in Rome. Talaat showed himself in public at a Berlin railway-station, and upon his arrival back from Rome, Tehlirian followed him home to the Charlottenburg district, until he entered his apartment at Hardenbergstrasse 4.<sup>71</sup> As it turned out, Talaat lived under the alias Ali Salieh with his wives and Dr. Roussouni, a member of the Ittihad central committee.<sup>72</sup> On the 5<sup>th</sup> of March Tehlirian moved from his apartment to a flat in Hardenburgstrasse. From the window of his new home he was able to keep an eye on his target's apartment, so he spent hours a day just watching Talaat' door.<sup>73</sup> Luckily for him, Talaat followed a strict daily routine. Every day between 10 and 11 o'clock he went for a walk, making the assassins' job easier.<sup>74</sup> A few days later, a telegram arrived from the Boston Dashnak headquarters: they confirmed that Ali Salieh is actually Talaat Pasha and gave a green light for his assassination.

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of March, at the usual time of 10 o'clock Talaat left his apartment and started walking down the street. Tehlirian followed him, called out his name, tapped his shoulder and when he turned he shot him in the head at point-blank range, instantly killing the Young Turk leader.<sup>75</sup> After the shot, Tehlirian did not try to flee. With his gun lowered he waited for his capture. He surrendered to the police without any resistance, who took him to the Charlottenburg police station. Later that day the detectives arriving to the murder scene identified the victim as Talaat Pasha.<sup>76</sup>

Talaat's embalmed body was kept in the city morgue for five days, since his friends wanted to bury him in Turkey, however, neither the Sultan's government in Constantinople, neither Kemal's Ankara government allowed the burial, as both regimes wanted to distance themselves from the rumours of war crimes ordered by Talaat that emerged again in the press.<sup>77</sup> Talaat's body was later given to his wife who prepared a funeral in the Tempelhof Turkish mosque, supported financially by the late Pasha.<sup>78</sup> The Berlin community of Turkish immigrants organized a grandiose funeral for the late grand vizier. Muslims from Germany, representatives of both the Weimar Republic and the old German state (two former foreign ministers, Richard von Kühlmann and Arthur Zimmerman, the writer of the famous telegram) showed up at the ceremony. The current German foreign ministry sent a wreath labelled „*In memory of a great statesman and loyal friend.*”

The body laid in Berlin for 23 years, until in 1944. February 25<sup>th</sup>, after the death

---

<sup>71</sup> ALEXANDER: 52-56.

<sup>72</sup> DEROGY: 81-82.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 82-83.

<sup>74</sup> SIMSIR: 27.

<sup>75</sup> *ibid*, 27.

<sup>76</sup> AVAKIAN: 117.

<sup>77</sup> ALEXANDER: 23.

<sup>78</sup> SIMSIR: 29.



of Atatürk it was exhumed and taken to Istanbul. Talaat's coffin was paraded on a gun carriage and was put to final rest after a military ceremony.<sup>79</sup>

### ***Tehlirian's trial***

The assassination of Talaat Pasha caused a huge uproar in the German and international press. Already on that day, Berlin newspapers 'Der Morgen Poste' and 'Morgenpost'<sup>80</sup> reported on the title-page about the case, claiming that there was probably a political motivation behind the murder.<sup>81</sup> Before the trial, most German newspapers expressed sympathy for the victim, respected as a former ally of Germany. A national newspaper, Handes-Zeitung wrote:

*„Berlin: Tomorrow morning a vicious killer will appear before the bar of justice to explain, if he can, his reason for the cold-blooded murder of a Turkish statesman and humanitarian, Talaat Pasha, whose cooperation as an ally with Germany during the last war was proof of his friendship for our country.*

*Sogomon Tehlirian, an Armenian fanatic, who was yet to express one word of gratitude to the Government of Turkey for the generous help it has given to the Armenians, deliberately and with malice aforethought, shot down the man who befriended his people. (...) Justice demands that Sogomon Tehlirian pay the supreme penalty. He must hang by the neck until dead!”<sup>82</sup>*

Most newspapers suspected a political motivation behind the murder, only the right-wing Deutsche Tageszeitung assumed that the motive could have been jealousy, adding that *„such personal disputes are not unusual among our foreign guests.”<sup>83</sup>* The liberal German Peoples' Party's newspaper, Tagliche Rundschau wrote about Talaat:

*„From a friend of Talaat Pasha, we have heard today that he felt pursued and even had premonitions of his fate (...) He believed that a secret organization supported by the Entente (Allies) was out to get him. In those circles which are familiar with Oriental émigré politics, there is a disagreement with Talaat's theory, but it cannot be dismissed that such murder organizations could exist.”<sup>84</sup>*

Due to the outcry the Berlin police considered expelling the 300 Armenian immigrants living in the city. At the beginning of the investigation, the German authorities suspected that there might be an Armenian terrorist organization that is out to kill the Young Turk leaders, so more murders can be expected. However, this supposition was later rejected.<sup>85</sup>

Berliner Tageblatt was the first newspaper to allow itself to criticize Talaat, claiming that although as a politician, he was not trying to amass wealth, but

---

<sup>79</sup> SIMSIR: 30-31.

<sup>80</sup> ALEXANDER: 20.

<sup>81</sup> AVAKIAN: 117.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 122.

<sup>83</sup> ALEXANDER: 13.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 12-14.

<sup>85</sup> *May Expel Armenians*, The New York Times, 1922. April 20.

regrettably, he had blood on his hands.<sup>86</sup> The Catholic newspaper *Germania* published front-page article about Talaat's role in the Armenian genocide, pointing out that for his deeds he was also wanted by the Entente.<sup>87</sup> Two weeks after the murder, an article presenting the „*stance of the Armenian minority*” was published in *Worwarts*, newspaper of the Social Democratic Party. In it an anonymous writer explained that the German public was never informed about their allies' crimes because of the military censorship and that Tehlirian took revenge for the violence against his people. The author stated that Tehlirian did not commit a murder, but a political deed and he hopes that „*the German jurors will interpret it as such.*”<sup>88</sup> Despite the writers good intentions the article did more harm than good to Tehlirian's defense, which was trying to prove that the killer's motive was personal vengeance. Such murders were punished by 15 years of forced labour, a political murder however warranted for death by guillotine.<sup>89</sup>

On March 16<sup>th</sup> New York Times reported on the events. An article stated that Talaat was sentenced to death by the Constantinople court. They interviewed Henry Morgenthau, former ambassador to Turkey, who said that the „*big boss*” of the *Ittihad* was one of the men responsible for the Armenian genocide. The next day another article was published about the subject, which also named the killer. According to the article, „*Salomon Teillierian*” planned the murder in advance, as he wanted to avenge the death of his family members. The police however was not sure if he got no help, maybe from agents of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – his passport, issued in Paris and students' visa pointed to this fact.<sup>90</sup> The third article of the Times explored the crime's financial side: the German police, who denied that they knew about Talaat staying in Berlin, found 10 million marks in his bank account. Tehlirian also received 12 000 marks before the assassination, which reinforces the suspicion that he had helpers.<sup>91</sup> Curiously, the question of the 12.000 marks never came up at the trial. There, Tehlirian was able to explain how he supported himself by saying that after his family's death he took their hidden wealth.<sup>92</sup>

The trial had a great impression on a young Polish law student staying in Berlin, Raphael Lemkin, who in 1944 coined the term '*genocide*' to describe the Nazi Holocaust, and after the Second World War formulated the UN resolution sanctioning genocides. Lemkin was shocked that the judiciary of the same state that could punish Tehlirian had no right to sentence someone like Talaat, since

---

<sup>86</sup> ALEXANDER: 14.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, 20.

<sup>90</sup> *Assassin Boasts of Talaat's Death: 'It Is Not I Who Am the Murderer, It Is He', Sais Young Armenian.*, The New York Time, 1922. March 17.

<sup>91</sup> *Talaat is Mourned as Germany's Friend*, The New York Times, 1922. March 17.

<sup>92</sup> *The Trial of Talaat Pasha: The first day of trial*, kiad. WEGNER, Armin T., <http://armenianhouse.org/wegner/docs-en/talaat-1.html> (Accessed: 2011. August 11.) Shogomon Tehlirian perének jegyzőkönyve.

there are no set international laws that could punish someone outside his home country who were guilty of crimes against humanity.<sup>93</sup> Among the spectators of the trial, Robert M. W. Kempner a Jewish law student was also present, who after the Second World War became one of the attorneys of the Nurnberg trials. In his 1980 he explained how important of a precedent Tehlirian's acquittal created among political trials.<sup>94</sup> Remembering the events, he wrote:

*„For the first time in legal history, the Berlin court recognized the principle (...) that gross violations of human rights, and especially genocide that is committed by a government can be contested by foreign states, and that [such foreign intervention] does not constitute impermissible meddling in the internal affairs of another state.”<sup>95</sup>*

Tehlirian's autobiography contains a detailed account of the trial, however, the description is rather inaccurate, contradicting the minutes in many details and describes events that were not mentioned in the verbatim.<sup>96</sup> Thus when I am describing the trial I am not relying on Tehlirian's account, the only source I am citing are the official records. The trial held at July 2<sup>nd</sup> did not look promising for the accuse: in the lockup, Tehlirian already confessed that he planned the murder in advance (later he revoked the confession, however it still could be used against him) and because of the press coverage and the unignorable political overtones of the cases, it was harder to prove that what happened was not a political murder. A glimpse of hope was that in the USA, the Boston-based Hairenik newspaper started collecting donations to fund the defence.<sup>97</sup> From the money they collected, two of Germany's top lawyers, Dr. Adolf von Gortont and Dr. Johannes Wertenhauert was invited to take up the defense.<sup>98</sup> Tehlirian's defence used three basic tactics: 1. The accused revoked his first confession, that he planned his deed in advance and emphasized his personal grievances with Talaat. 2. The defence tried to derail the trial to be about the „victim” Talaat's crimes by exploring the motivation in detail. Instead of Tehlirian's trial, it turned into Talaat's trial. Tehlirian's lawyers turned into Talaat's prosecutors. 3. By consulting medical specialists the defence tried to prove that the accused suffers from a mental illness and cannot be held accountable.

At the first day of trial, Tehlirian told a widely fictitious story of his life: according to this he saw with his own eyes the massacre of his family in Erzerum, with himself barely managing to survive the bloodbath. Actually, at the time his family was murdered Tehlirian was already at the frontlines, however, the distorted account was more suited to win the judge's and the jury's sympathy. He

---

<sup>93</sup> POWER: 1-60.

<sup>94</sup> VON VOSS, Huberta: *Portraits of hope: Armenians in the contemporary world*, New York, Berghahn Books, 2007. 294.

<sup>95</sup> HOSFELD, Rolf: *The Armenian Massacres and Its Avengers*, IP Global Transatlantic Edition, 2005 őszi szám, 61.

<sup>96</sup> AVAKIAN: 233.

<sup>97</sup> DEROGY: 106.

<sup>98</sup> AVAKIAN: 121.

also did not want to confess that he was fighting in the Armenian resistance, fearing that through this information they could tie him to the Dashnak or other revolutionary organizations.<sup>99</sup> At the second proceedings, afternoon at the same day the court heard the appointed expert, Dr. Johannes Lepsius, former theologian, prominent in German orientalism.<sup>100</sup> Even before the First World War Lepsius observed the situation of Armenians, during the war he was the first to report on the Armenian genocide (his writings were censored by German authorities), and later wrote two books about the subject, titled „*Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei*” and „*Der Todesgang des armenischen Volkes*”.<sup>101</sup> Lepsius presented several documents that proved Talaat’s guiltiness: telegrams, statements signed by the former grand vizier, as well as his own reports on the massacres.<sup>102</sup> One of the documents presented by Lepsius stated that „*the aim of the deportations is annihilation*”. Lepsius also emphasised that Talaat was already sentenced to death in Constantinople, so Tehlirian basically executed a sentence.

To prove that the accused cannot be held accountable, the defence heard four psychiatrists and two neurologists: Dr. Hugo Liepmann, Dr. Richard Cassirer, Prof. Dr. Edmund Forster and Dr. Bruno Haak. All of the doctors agreed that Thelirian suffered from delusions caused by the traumas he went through and at the time of the murder he was mentally affected by his memories, so he cannot be held accountable.<sup>103</sup> Tehlirian himself emphasized his illness: according to his testimony, two weeks before the incident he had nightmares where he saw the corpses of his family members. Suddenly, his mother’s corpse stood up and started to speak: she cursed his son for letting their murderers live unharmed in the city. Awakening Tehlirian decided at once to kill Talaat as soon as possible.<sup>104</sup>

The defence’s tactics and Tehlirian’s shocking testimonies finally proved to be effective. After an hour of discussion the jury pronounced him ‘not guilty’, on the ground that he was not accountable at the time he committed his crime.<sup>105</sup>

A closer inspection of the trial shows that the court reveals several irregularities: although Tehlirian in fact suffered from some kind of mental disorder, with symptoms similar to epilepsy, he was nowhere near being unaccountable. Throughout the trial he gave a very consciously constructed,

<sup>99</sup> *The Trial of Talaat Pasha: The first day of trial*, dir. WEGNER, Armin T. <http://armenianhouse.org/wegner/docs-en/talaat-1.html> (Accessed: 2011. August 11.)

<sup>100</sup> *The Trial of Talaat Pasha: Continuation of the trial after the noon recess*, dir. WEGNER, Armin T. <http://armenianhouse.org/wegner/docs-en/talaat-2.html> (Accessed: 2011. August 11.)

<sup>101</sup> ALEXANDER: 88-93.

<sup>102</sup> *The Trial of Talaat Pasha: Continuation of the trial after the noon recess*, dir. WEGNER, Armin T. <http://armenianhouse.org/wegner/docs-en/talaat-2.html> (Accessed: 2011. August 11.)

<sup>103</sup> *The Trial of Talaat Pasha: The first day of trial*, dir. WEGNER, Armin T. <http://armenianhouse.org/wegner/docs-en/talaat-1.html> Accessed: 2011. August 11.

<sup>104</sup> *The Trial of Talaat Pasha: The second day of trial*, dir. WEGNER, Armin T., <http://armenianhouse.org/wegner/docs-en/talaat-1.html> (Accessed: 2011. August 11.)

<sup>105</sup> *The Trial of Talaat Pasha: The first day of trial*, dir. WEGNER, Armin T., <http://armenianhouse.org/wegner/docs-en/talaat-1.html> (Accessed: 2011. August 11.)

misleading confession. He denied having ties to any political organizations or that he had ever been to Boston. His testimony was well organized and coherent and he was able to explain for any suspicious clues, which does not point to a serious mental illness.<sup>106</sup> It is also strange that, although – as the April 20 article in The New York Times clearly shows – the German police suspected in the early stages of the investigation that Tehlirian was not acting alone and that he acted on behalf of a secret service, this topic was completely omitted during the trial and he was only charged as a lone killer. Not even the question of the 12 000 marks came up during the proceedings. One of his accomplices, Vazan was even in the courtroom, acting as an interpreter and a witness.<sup>107</sup> If there was no deliberate omission, we can say that the German investigators completely blundered. Also, the court was one-sided regarding the interrogations,<sup>108</sup> as they did not hear any Turkish witnesses.<sup>109</sup> About the acquittal, we should also consider that a jury made up of civilians had to decide if Tehlirian was guilty or not, so an emotional appeal could have been more important than any legal expertise. The claim of insanity could be seen as a mere legal formality. Actually, the verdict was a political resolution, meaning that Talaat was the real criminal, and Tehlirian the victim.<sup>110</sup>

The verdict's reception in the press was generally positive in and outside of Germany. Among the German papers, only the nationalist Deutsche Allgemein Zeitung expressed regret, saying that because of the verdict, Germany would lose potential allies in the Muslim world. The New York Post said:

*„The courtroom applause that greeted the release of Soghomon Tehlirian shows that Germany will yet make unanimous the world's verdict regarding the slaughter of the Armenians. Even a court in Germany, which have been Turkey's ally during the great war, could not find it possible to punish this student who avenged the massacre of his people – innocent Christians (...).”<sup>111</sup>*

In Current History, the monthly political issue of the New York Times an article titled *„Why Talaat's Assassin Was Acquitted”* was published. In it, they published ten telegrams, both in English and Turkish, written by Talaat where he ordered the killing of Armenians.<sup>112</sup> The messages, intercepted and decoded by the British, were originally sent to Aleppo, one of the targets of the deportations.<sup>113</sup>

Tehlirian left the prison as a hero, surrounded by a cheering crowd. Simon Vratzian, leader of the Armenian government in exile congratulated him in letter. After the trial, Tehlirian returned to the United States, where the Dashnak took him on a „tour” to the American cities with Armenian communities, where he was

---

<sup>106</sup> ALEXANDER: 74-75.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, 75.

<sup>108</sup> SIMSIR: 30.

<sup>109</sup> ÖKE: 267.

<sup>110</sup> ALEXANDER: 185-187. *Armenian Acquited for Killing Talaat: Defense Introduces Accounts of Grand Vizier's Cruelty in Conducting Massacres*, The New York Times, 1922. June 4.

<sup>111</sup> AVAKIAN: 244.

<sup>112</sup> ALEXANDER: 186-187.

<sup>113</sup> BALAKIAN: 345-347.

celebrated as a hero. In 1922 he married his fiancée, Anahid Tatigian in Yugoslavia, and from 1956 he lived with his family in San Francisco until his death in 1960.<sup>114</sup> After his death a large monument was erected at his grave by the Armenian-American diaspora in Fresno, California.<sup>115</sup>

In total, the first serious act of Operation Nemesis was a huge success for the Dashnak. The targeted was liquidated without complication, and Natali's plan worked, with Tehlirian's trial and acquittal they achieved a great propaganda-victory, gaining political capital for further assassinations.

### ***Assassination in Constantinople***

When in 1920 Mustafa Kemal started negotiating with the Soviets, one of the main issues was the question of Armenia. Earlier, the Soviet's guaranteed the independence of a Greater Armenia which included the six eastern vilayets (Van, Sivas, Erzerum, Diarbekir, Bitlis és Harput). Stalin, at that time commissar of nationalities, wrote in 1918 that the Bolsheviks' goal is the creation of an independent, socialist Armenia.<sup>116</sup>

In 1920 April 26<sup>th</sup> the leader of the Turkish nationalist movement offered a program of cooperation to the Russian Bolsheviks: for 5 million rubels, weapons and medical supplies the Turks would agree to the bolshevization of the independent Caucasus republics. Concerning Armenia, Kemal suggested that the Red Army and the Turkish nationalist forces would attack the republic together, as the pro-British Dashnak is a danger to both movements.<sup>117</sup> On September 3<sup>rd</sup> a Soviet-Turkish treaty was formulated, proclaiming that they do not accept the Sèvres Treaty that dismembered Turkey, and do not recognize the independence of Armenia.<sup>118</sup> Kemal ordered one of his most famous generals, Kazim Karbeir on the 24<sup>th</sup> of October to occupy the province of Kars immediately. The Armenians asked for help from the Allies, but they were not able or willing to land troops in Eastern Anatolia.<sup>119</sup> On November 29<sup>th</sup> a communist revolution was launched in Northern Armenia, centred in Alexandropol, where they proclaimed the new Socialist Republic of Armenia and sent the „*greetings of the proletariat*” to the occupying Turkish forces.<sup>120</sup> Meanwhile, the Red Army also launched an offensive against Russian-Armenia with the help of Azerbaijani guerrillas. Due to the growing pressure the Armenian government asked for a ceasefire on the 4<sup>th</sup> of November, and soon Prime Minister Simon Vratzian agreed with the Turks to draw out from Turkish-Armenia. The Treaty of Gümrü, signed on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December laid down the current borders of the two countries.<sup>121</sup>

---

<sup>114</sup> AVAKIAN: 244-250.

<sup>115</sup> SIMSIR: 31.

<sup>116</sup> WALKER, Christopher J.: *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation*, London, Routledge, 1990, 249.

<sup>117</sup> FLESCHE: 208.

<sup>118</sup> DEROGY: 106-107.

<sup>119</sup> FLESCHE: 214-215.

<sup>120</sup> DEROGY: 107.

<sup>121</sup> FLESCHE: 216.

At the same day, Vratzian stepped down and gave power to General Drastamat Kanayan, who, instead of the old, Dashnak-centered government created a provisional military regime. The general started negotiations with the Soviets also and recognized Soviet Armenia. The communists soon removed Kanayan, Vratzian retreated to illegality and the sovietization of Armenia began. Although Vratzian and the Dashnak tried creating a resistance movement in Yerevan, in April, they had to retreat to the mountains along the Persian border. Pro-Dashnak guerrillas resisted until the middle of June, but finally, the Armenian communists pushed them out with Soviet help, and most of them fled to Persia. The Bolshevik Alexander Miasnikian became the new, Soviet Armenia's leader.<sup>122</sup>

As the home-country base of the Dashnak was annihilated, the party's centre of power moved to the diaspora. After the fall, Vratzian started formulating a government in exile and held an interim party congress in Bucharest between April 15<sup>th</sup> and May 7<sup>th</sup>. At the conference, almost everyone agreed that Operation Nemesis should be continued. They decided on the creation of a new organization, the Body Responsible Abroad (abbreviated ABM in Armenian) that would be responsible for the logistical details of the operation. Armen Garo appointed Shahan Natali as its leader. Natali, originally name Hakop Ter-Hakopian, was born in 1884 in a village named Husenik, in Kharberd vilayet.<sup>123</sup> From 1908 he attended philosophy and literature at the University of Boston, and joined the editors of the pro-Dashnak newspaper Hairenik, where he soon became editor-in-chief, as well as a member of the Boston Dashnak central committee.

Due to his exceptional organizing skills Natali was soon able to expand the ABM's influence, controlling almost all organs of Operation Nemesis (Haduk Gordz, Haduk Marmin, Haduk Gumar, the American training facility of the Gordz as well as the „recruitment centre” in the Constantinople office of Azadamart). Although most of the organization was done by Natali, Garo, as the „inventor” of the operation still remained the supreme authority in the organization of Nemesis.<sup>124</sup>

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of July the next assassination took place: Bihbud Khan Javanshirt, former minister of interior of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, who ordered the almost complete annihilation of Baku Armenians, was shot dead at an open Constantinople street by Misak Torlakian. Born in 1890 in Trebizond Vilayet, Torlakian became acquainted with terrorism at an early age, as many of his family members, including his father were fedayees (Armenian revolutionaries). In 1910 he joined the Ottoman army's artillery corps, using fake documents, where he was promoted to sergeant. On the onset of the First World War however, he left the army and joined the pro-Russian Armenian volunteer brigades. With his unit he liberated his hometown, captured one of the perpetrators of a massacre of local civilians, a policeman named Hassan, and gave him over to the Russians, who

---

<sup>122</sup> DEROGY: 107-108.

<sup>123</sup> *Shahan Natalie (A Concise Biography)*, Apaga Periodical, 30. szám, 2007. szeptember, [www.apagaonline.com](http://www.apagaonline.com) (Accessed: 2011. August 11.)

<sup>124</sup> DEROGY: 106-114.

executed him. When the fight ceased he was sent to Sochi (Southern Russia) by the Dashnak to help organizing a network to track down war criminals.

In the Constantinople Azadamart office, in December, 1920, he was tasked with the murder of Jivashir together with Harutiun Harutiunian and Yervant Fundukian. Three months later news came that Jivashir was spotted in Constantinople, acting as an emissary of the Soviets, trying to negotiate a trade agreement with the Porte. The agents assigned their roles: Yervant and Harutiun watched the target's movements, and the killing shots would be delivered by Torlakian. A week of observation was enough to track down the former minister of interior. Jivashir did not try to keep a low profile: he was using four limousines, two for himself and two for his large retinue, who were all wearing traditional Russian shapkas. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of July Torlakian spent a whole day following Jivashir and his retainers, and at the evening he killed him with three shots. He tried to flee but Jivashir's brother seized him and he was arrested by the arriving French military police. The next day, during interrogation, Torlakian claimed that he acted upon a personal vengeance, because his family was killed during the Baku massacres.

In the prison he was soon visited by a Dashnak-agent, a woman from Trebizond, who claimed to be his landlady and brought him clean cloths. Actually she was tasked by the Dashnak to advise Torlakian how should he confess to the police and the court. The trial held at the 28<sup>th</sup> of August beard an uncanny reminiscence to Tehlirian's case: the court invested a lot of energy to look into the crimes of the victim. They heard survivors of the Baku massacres and presented orders of execution signed by Jivashir. Unlike the trial in Berlin however, Jivashir's relatives were allowed to speak as well. The defence was represented by three Armenian lawyers, who also used the insanity defence. This time however, this had no ground at all: in his cell Torlakian had to pretend he was having seizures and obtain fake medical documents to „prove” he had an hereditary predisposition for mental illnesses. After two months of proceedings, on the 20<sup>th</sup> of October Torlakian was pronounced „*guilty, but not responsible*”, because he was found unaccountable due to a perceived mental illness. Although he did not have to go to prison, he was expelled from the Ottoman Empire. Eighteen days after the sentence he was taken to Pireus on a Greek ship, then moved to the United States on the expense of the ABM.<sup>125</sup>

After Torlakian's trial, it became clear for the commanders of the Nemesis that the same tactic cannot be employed again. For any further actions the agents were ordered not to let themselves get captured.

### ***The death of Said Halim Pasha***

Parallel to the assassination of Bihbud Khan Javanshir, another operation was launched. Arshavir Shiragian, a former agent of the Turkish secret police in

---

<sup>125</sup> DEROGY: 115-121.



Constantinople went to Rome to find and kill former Grand Vizier Said Halim Pasha. Halim became foreign minister in 1913 and was promoted to Grand Vizier at the same year, after the death of his predecessor, Mahmut Sevket Pasha. He tried to keep his country out of the war in 1914, but he failed and filed his resignation from both of his positions. Pressured by his party and the Sultan he cancelled his plans of resignation and remained head of government until 1917 february 3<sup>rd</sup>, when he was succeeded by Talaat. Said Halim was one of the few Young Turk leaders who did not flee after the collapsing of the fronts. He was one of the last politicians to be arrested during the occupation, so the British could not take him to court, so he too was deported to Malta on the grounds that he was suspected of ordering atrocities against Armenians. He was added to the Armenians' hit list because in 1915 he gave green light to their deportation. In November 1921 Said Halim returned to Turkey but was not allowed to stay. So he went to Rome where he lived in a hotel.<sup>126</sup>

Halim's murderer, Shiragian was 14 when the war started. As an Armenian in Constantinople he was relatively lucky, as in the capital, the government would not had been able to deport the Armenians without too much attention of the outside world. Shiragian was still not completely safe: during the general draft everyone between 16 and 60 of age was drafted or had to pay a war-tax (bedel), and the Armenians had to serve in labour battalions. Hearing of the Massacres many labour servicemen fled the fronts and searched for a haven in Constantinople, where they were hidden by mostly Christian families. A whole underground „army” stood up to hide he refugees of in cellars and attics, called the „army of attics” by those taking part. About 15 000 men and women survived the war in that way. The home of the Shiragians also became a base of this army, many refugees and men over the age of service were hidden by the family, who also allowed the now underground Dashnak's local leader to hold meeting in the house.<sup>127</sup> In the last months of the war Arsahvir met Eshreffel, one of the best agents of the Turkish secret police as well as Vahe Ihsan (originally named *Yessayan*), an Armenian informer. Arshavir was able to earn their trust so Ihsan and Eshref never suspected that the young man's family was hiding refugees. The Shiragians' guests all survived the war.

After the war Shiragian joined a theatrical group and played in a Constantinople theatre. By that time he was a paid (double) agent of the secret police, working for Eshref as a censor: he had to send Ihsan the scripts of all plays about to be shown in the theatre for censorship. Soon after the murder of Megerditchian, Shiragian also asked to join the secret service of the Dashnak. Ihsan soon found out that the young man he thought was his ally is a Dashnak-agent, but he never told anyone, hoping that he could make a deal with the Dashnak, as he knew he was wanted by them. His fate was sealed when it was found out that he had contacted the Kemalists and even sent them a list of Armenian intelligentsia and revolutionaries, who he thought could mean

---

<sup>126</sup> SIMSIR. 31-32.

<sup>127</sup> DEROGY. 123-124.

trouble for the new government. In the Azadamart office Shiragian was trusted with watching Ihsan, as he could easily get near him. Shiragian offered Ihsan to let him live if he gives out another traitor who was above him on the Dashnak's blacklist.<sup>128</sup> He promised that he would give him out, but never completed his end of the bargain.

After this, Shiragian himself offered to kill the informer. He was afraid that Ihsan would flee to the parts of Anatolia controlled by the Kemalists, where the Dashnak's hand could not reach. On 1920 March 27, together with his partner, Arshag 'Yezid' Yezdanian, he killed Ihsan on a public street. (Yezdanian was already a proven assassin, earlier he was ordered to kill another informer, Hemayag Aramiantz by the Dashnak) Shiragian was recognized and the police issued a warrant against him, so he had to spend the next month at a friend's home, in the Scutari district, in the Asia Minor part of the city.<sup>129</sup> The Dashnak soon decided to help Shiragian escape to Yerevan. Under the alias Torkom Ghazarian, after an adventurous journey he got by boat to the port of Batumi, Georgia, from where he went by train to the just stabilized Armenia. There, for a brief time he worked for the secret police under Levon Kalantarian, felkutat and arresting Turkish and Bolshevik spies. Soon he received a different assignment: he had to go to Baku to „neutralize” two former leaders of the CUP, former minister of war Enver Pasha and his uncle, General Khalik Pasha. He was accompanied by another agent, Aram Yerganian, who in 1920 killed the former Azerbaijani prime minister Fathali Khan Khoiski.

With fake Armenian diplomatic passports they got to Tbilisi, where they exchanged the 400 000 rubels they received from the Armenian minister of war to Azerbaijani rubels and obtained fake Turkish documents. However, at the night before their departure, the Georgian secret police searched their room, as the Democratic Republic of Armenia was at that time at the brink of collapse, so the diplomatic immunity no longer applied for them. The policemen found the fake passports and other proof that they were preparing for murder. They were interrogated and taken to the prison of the Medegh fort without a trial, as „suspects” so they said.<sup>130</sup> According to Shiragians autobiography, one of their cellmates, an Armenian robber named Harutiun, who was formerly involved with the Dashnak sent a message to the party's Georgia committee, who did not even knew where their agents were. When it turned out that day would be taken to the desert prison in Koutais, known as the „*Georgian Siberia*”, from where prisoners rarely left alive, they organized their escape. When the two agents were taken by foot to the prison, a three-men rescue party opened fire at the guards to a preconcerted signal, disarmed them and took the prisoners away on a horse-drawn carriage. The joy of the escape was shadowed by the news of Armenia's collapse, and that the Baku assignment had to be abandoned, since the targets already left the city. There was no reason to stay in the Caucasus, moreover, the Bolsheviks were already threatening Georgia with occupation. The thing to do was

---

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, 123-126.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, 126-127.

<sup>130</sup> SHIRAGIAN: 68-69.

to return to Constantinople, however, Shiragian was sentenced to death there for killing Ihsan. But in the great turmoil (many fled the Caucasus because of the Reds' invasion) they managed to get on a ship and get to the capital.

Again, Shiragian hid in Scutari, in the Armenian district. This part of the city was essentially a small Armenian town, home of the Berberian College, many theatres, schools and cafés, so he could feel relatively safe there. In July 1921 Shiragian met one of the members of the Constantinople central committee who told him that he would be sent to Rome, since they learned that many Young Turk leaders were living there, including Said Halim Pasha. Again he received a fake transport, this time, for the name of Arsil Sirag, a Greek from Adrianopol. First, he travelled to Marseilles, where he obtained two American Browning pistols. In Rome, the former Armenian ambassador, Michael Varantian introduced him to an agent already working in the city, who in his autobiography Shiragian only calls *M*. His real name was omitted by Shiragian for discretion, as he had a very low opinion of him, according to Shiragian, *M*'s anxiousness and incompetence often made his job harder. As usual, their first job was finding the homes and meeting points of Turkish leaders. At that time, two Turkish embassies operated in Rome, one for the Ankara government, one for the Sultan's government. *M* was monitoring the latter, while Shiragian kept an eye on the Kemalist embassy. For the time being they did not receive any orders to prepare the assassinations of a certain person, instead they got photos of ten possible targets, who they had to keep track of.

From the list of ten, Dr. Nazim was the first they recognized, and after that, Shiragian got an ear about one of Said Halim's bodyguards, Tefvik Azmir. Azmi was a veteran soldier, one of the heroes of the battle of Gallipoli. Staying loyal to the former Grand Vizier to the end, he followed him to immigration. Although he was not on the list, as he did not take part in any atrocities committed against Armenians, he could help to track his boss down. Shiragian started following Azmi around, who was commuting between the Sultan's and the Kemalist embassy. In a Turkish café near Villa Borghese Shiragian soon spotted Azmi and a group of Turkish youth in the company of an older man, with whom they all acted extremely respectful. Azmi greeted the stranger with a bow. Shiragian deduced that the man must be Said Halim, so he followed him to his residence in Palace Hotel. A few days later, Said Halim must have gotten suspicious, he moved out of the hotel and stopped going around by foot, switching to a carriage. Shiragian followed his carriage outside the city walls and found Said Halim's new apartment in a villa at Via Eustacchio. To make sure he would not arouse suspicion moving around the Pasha's house, he started dating an Italian girl named Helena who lived next door. They were often seen together by the locals, so he did not seem suspicious waiting under her window.

On December 4<sup>th</sup> 1921 Shiragian went to his usual monitoring site with a gun in his pocket. He observed that the Pasha always went for a walk with a bodyguard between two and half past two in the afternoon, so he decided to strike at that time. When Halim's carriage arrived, he jumped before it, stopping the horses,

than climbed onto the side of the carriage undetected. He opened the carriage's window and shot Halim in the temple, disarmed his bodyguard, Azmi and fled.

The Italian police soon searched the apartments of Armenians studying in Rome, and the press reported that the Turkish police would send advisors to help finding the killer. The Italian press first celebrated the death of their former enemy from the war, but later expressed regret after it turned out that Halim wanted to ask for a large loan from the Italian National Bank to support Kemal, but with his death the deal would not be completed.

Shiragian left Rome on the 19th of December on a Vienna-bound train, still using his Greek passport. Nearing Turkey he could not safely use his Greek assumed identity anymore due to the ongoing war between Greece and the Kemalists, so he obtained a new passport in Bulgaria and went to Constantinople by boat. There, he visited the Azadamart office where he was instructed to leave the city in 20 days and go to Berlin, where he would track down three Young Turks, Aziz Bey (former leader of the Interior Ministry's Criminal Investigation Bureau), Djemal Azmi and Dr. Shakir. The new assignment, in which Hrach Papazian and Aram Yerganian took part as well, was commanded personally by Shahan Natali.<sup>131</sup>

### ***The Berlin Double Assassination***

The agents preparing to go to Berlin first met in Vienna, while Hrach Papazian (Hazor) was already waiting for them in Berlin. Natali was the next to go to Berlin, as an American journalist, a reporter for Hairenik he could easily move around the city. The fifth member of the group, Yezid came from a family of peasants from the city of Bitlis. Earlier he was instructed by the Dashnak to kill an Armenian informer, Hemayag Aramians and he hid Shiragian after the murder of Ihsan. In Berlin they were also helped by Seto Jelanian, a former investigator of the Armenian Democratic Republic, who infiltrated the Turkish consulate and was spreading false information in diplomatic circles. Their headquarters was in the Englisches Kaffee (English Café). After their arrival, they could not show themselves together, after the Washington German embassy warned the government that an Armenian terrorist cell is about to enter Berlin. The police warned the Ittihadist immigrants in Berlin and allowed them to keep firearms, since after Said Halim's death they were certain that there is a connection between the murders happening all over Europe's major cities.

Shiragian rented a flat not far from Azmi's tobacco shop, which also helped finding Talaat. It soon turned out that his landlady, Hanna Sack is the mother of the young local chief of the secret police. Shiragian was first scared, then decided to use the situation to his advantage and earn the Sacks' trust, so he would not have to register himself (at that time, every foreign citizens arriving to Germany had to register with the police, and although Shiragian's papers were all right, it

---

<sup>131</sup> DEROGY: 127-146.

was still better for him not being on any police list). He introduced himself to the Sack family as the son of a rich Romanian oil tycoon, first he approached the family's German Shepherd, bringing it left-overs, starting up a discussion with Herr Sack. Shiragian later invited him to the Enlische Kaffeba, he bought him an expensive shirt as a present and took his mother and sister to theatre. The Sacks, who just lost the head of the family a year ago, soon treated him as a member of the family. Meanwhile, Hazor developed a friendship with Djemal Azmi's son, Ekmel, with whom they visited private clubs almost every night. Through him Hazor became well informed about the immigrants' political plans.

During the mission the agents met several obstacles: for a short time, they were joined by M, who warned him that the German police is on to them and it would be better to call off the mission. M even wrote a report to Constantinople, saying that their agents are in danger and they should be called back. Enraged, Natali commanded M to leave Berlin on the first train. They were also unsatisfied with Seto Jelinian's work. Due to his negligence the diplomat often misled the group with false information. They had to reduce the number of targets from three (Aziz Bey, Djemal Azmi, Dr. Shakir) to two, concentrating on Shakir and Azmi. Due to his mistakes Natali had to dismiss Jelinian as well and send him away from Berlin. Soon the same had to be done to Yezid, whose nerves were weakened by the permanent waiting and he started drinking heavily, endangering the others.

Meanwhile Shiragian became more and more fit in with the Sack family. Herr Sack completely forgot about his police registration. During a conversation with him Shiragian learned that the secret police knows everything about the Ittihadist leaders, who asked for police protection, which Sack denied from them.

After they became knowledgeable of Azmi's habits, all that left to do was following Shakir that was the task of Shiragian and Yerganian. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1922 Shakir was spotted walking with an old man, without any retinue or bodyguards. Soon after however, a telegram arrives from the Constantinople headquarters that called off the mission based on false reports from M and Seto. Since the two targets were almost in their grasp, Natali decided to go through with the action anyways. They answered in a telegram: „*Our two targets are in our sights. We will not miss them.*” They decided to carry out their „*holy task during the holy week*” before Easter.

On Easter Monday, Shakir, following his usual routine left his home at three in the afternoon and walked to Azmi's house. After he had entered, Yerganian and Shiragian were standing guard for hours in front of the house. The two targets then went to Uhlanderstrasse 80, where Shakir's friend, the former governor of Smirna was living (he was not on the executioners' list). At quarter to midnight, all of the guests left the apartment and started walking towards Azmi's house. In the front were four women, Djemal Azmi's mother, wife and daughters and his son's bride. Behind them, Azmi and Shakir, followed by the wives of Shakir and Talaat and a German bodyguard. Arshavir and Yerganian ran in front of the group, aiming at the condemned. Shiragian shot Azmi in the head, killing him instantly. He then

shot at Shakir, but only wounded him, Yerganian delivered the killing bullet. The rest of the group survived the attack unharmed, and the German bodyguard fled at the beginning. Yerganian shot at and blew up some of the street lamps and they fled under the cover of darkness.

By that time the German Police knew well that perpetrators were Armenians and that there was a political motivation behind the murders.<sup>132</sup> The next day, several registered Armenian immigrants were arrested. Due to Sack's intervention, Shiragian avoided getting questioned, and Talaat's widow mistook one of the attackers for a Leipzig student named Berberian, who was arrested and spent month in detention. One after the other, the assassins soon left the country: Natali was the first to leave, after he learned from a newspaper that the investigators connected a recently arrived American journalist to the murders. Yerganian, according to his passport, was officially a tourist from Persia, so he could easily avoid being detected by the police. Hazor had to stay in Berlin for a little longer, because Ekmel Azmi chose him as one of the pallbearers at his father's funeral. Shiragian was smuggled out of Berlin by Liberit Nazariantz, an emissary of the Armenian government of exile and Professor Hagop Zorian (since he was not registered with the police, he could not get a lawful visa he needed for leaving the country either).

Shiragian returned to Turkey through Romania and Bulgaria. By that time, the Kemalists were preparing to march into Constantinople, so the ABM had to leave the country. The Constantinople Dashnak committee was also planning its departure, while some members remained there and moved underground. On the 29<sup>th</sup> of August, Shiragian returned to Constantinople for the last time, where he reunited with his fiancée. Gaine, and reported about the Berlin mission at the Azadamart office. On the 1<sup>th</sup> of October he married Gaine, that on the 10<sup>th</sup>, with a passport given to him by Patriarch Zaven he left Turkey. Together with his family he went to France, then moved to the United States, where he lived until his death in 1973.<sup>133</sup>

### ***The Last Assassination***

The last murder committed by the Nemesis-network was organized by the Dashnak cell in Georgia. In July 1922 the Tbilisi central committee learned that Djemal Pasha, former minister of the navy whose name was also on the executioners' list was in the city. The cell's two leaders, Gürun Kazazian and Dikran Avedissian organized the Pasha's assassination. The task was given to Stepan Dzaghigian, the only fidayee they could find. Dzaghigian was born in 1886 in an impoverished Roman Catholic village. He joined the party in 1908 and fought on the side of the Russians during the war. He stayed in the Caucasus during the whole time of the Soviet Occupation, hoping to fined Enver of Djemal.

<sup>132</sup> *Two 'Young Turks' Murdered In Berlin*, The New York Times, 1922. April 19.

<sup>133</sup> DEROGY: 147-162.

Djemal was the only Young Turk leader who tried to distance himself from the Armenian Genocide. In his memoirs he condemned the massacres and asked for forgiveness for the events. He emphasized that he recognized the bravery of the Armenian revolutionaries and reminded of the collaboration between the Dashnak and the CUP. For the massacres he did not hold the state responsible, but rationalized it as an explosion of the tension between Turks, Kurds and the Armenians. He claimed that he had been against the deportations and he made sure that no one was hurt in the areas under his control. He still wrote however, that as the Russians' „*fifth column*”, the Armenians were a danger to the Turkish war plans.<sup>134</sup> Despite all this, he remained in contact with Talaat and others after the war.<sup>135</sup>

In July 1922, Djemal was staying in the Soloaki district of Tbilisi, as a guest of the Soviet Republic of Georgia. The Tbilisi cell sent a Dashnak-agent to follow every step of the former minister. Djemal was always accompanied by two bodyguards and he was often seen entering the local Cheka headquarters and the home of an Armenian Chekist, Atarbekian. Dzazaghian's nephew, Ardasheshev Gevorgian and a fedayee named Bedros Der-Boghassian also participated in the assassination. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of July, the three assassins waited in front of the Cheka headquarters, until Djemal and his two bodyguards appeared. Gevorgian and Der-Boghassian ran behind them and opened fire, Dzazaghian fired at them from the front. Djemal and both of the guards were killed in the firefight. After the attack, Atarbekian notified the leader of the Georgian Cheka, Tsintsadze, who led the investigation personally. With the help of an Armenian informer, Bedrossian, they arrested some 200 Dashnak-activists, but the killers were not among them. Later, after the intervention of General Drastamat Kanayan, the arrested men were freed, but soon, the Cheka got an ear about Kazazian and Stepan Dzazaghian, who were arrested immediately. They were never heard from again.<sup>136</sup>

### ***The Closure of Operation Nemesis***

Not long after its formulation, the ABM, led by Shahan Natali assumed control over all organs of the Nemesis-network, then soon, over the whole intelligence service. By the time of the second Berlin mission, not only the intelligence, but the local Dashnak-committees were almost completely under his control. Due to the quick rise of the new organization, the schism between the unified party bureau, led by Vratzian (centered in Tebriz, Persia) and the ABM was inevitable. The complications and disagreements during the Berlin operation further increased the tensions. The Tebriz bureau was more and more afraid that they would lose control over the „*armed wing*” of the party, although officially, the party had

---

<sup>134</sup> DJEMAL PASHA: *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman*, New York, George H. Doran Company, 1922, IX.: The Armenian Question

<sup>135</sup> DEROGY: 170.

<sup>136</sup> DEROGY: 168-173.

nothing to do with the assassinations. A spectacular divorce happened in 1923, in an interim conference in Vienna, held instead of the Tenth World Congress that was postponed to 1924-25. Natali was questioned about the overly high costs of the Berlin mission, even his former ally, one of the men responsible for the Special Fund (Haduk Kumar), Aharon Sachaklian criticized him for his spending and insubordination, for disobeying the party's orders and not calling off the mission. Natali became more and more isolated and he never regained his former prestige, until he was forced to leave the party.

In addition to these antagonisms, the Dashnak was trying to adopt to a new situation: more and more, Vratzian began to see the Bolsheviks as the main danger instead of the Turks and he was ready to make a deal with the Kemalists. Natali saw this as treason, believing that no peace could exist between Turks and Armenians. The ABM, disregarding Vratzian's position continued to pursue its previous policies. Abraham Gulkhandanian, a member of the ABM recognized Soviet Armenia on behalf of the party, and Armen Garo expressed hope that the Armenian soil would „improve” the Bolsheviks, and the Armenian Bolsheviks, with their Russian allies would be able to bring prosperity to the country. In the Autumn of 1922, Garo, who, due to his deteriorating health was less and less involved in the life of the party left the United States, after he went through an unsuccessful attempt to treat his illness and went to Geneva to spend his last days with his family. He died there in 1923 March 23th. With his death, Natali had to maintain the entire Nemesis-network almost by himself.

After the signing of the Lousanne Treaty between the Entente and the victorious Kemalist movement, the Dashnak seemingly stepped again on a revolutionary path.<sup>137</sup> The reason behind that was that with the Kemalists' victory, they had nothing to lose anymore and apparently, the way of diplomacy failed: they were unable to isolate the Kemalists, instead they became isolated themselves, in the final text of the Treaty of Lousanne (1923. July 24<sup>th</sup>) there was not even a word of the Armenians.<sup>138</sup> So the Armenians were left without an ally, and the party bureau considered that, as they always did in situations like that, they would start an armed resistance. On the Tenth Dashnak Congress in Paris, between 1924 November 24<sup>th</sup> and 1925 January, Natali was instructed to collect funds to finance a new wave of political murders, but four years later, on the Fourteenth Congress he was stripped from all of his titles. Insulted, Natali left the party, definitely ending the existence of the Nemesis network.<sup>139</sup> He went to the United States in 1933 where he founded a new organization named Western Armenian Liberation Alliance, then served as the New England secretary of the charity organization AGBU (Armenian General Benevolent Union). For the remainder of his life he concentrated on his work as a writer and poet. From

---

<sup>137</sup> DEROGY: 163-168.

<sup>138</sup> CHALIAND, Gerard - TERNON, Yves: *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance*, London, Zed Press, 1981, 54.

<sup>139</sup> DEROGY: 168.



1960 he lived in seclusion in Watertownban until his death in 1983-ban at the age of 99.<sup>140</sup>

Ironically, the Nemesis' work was continued not by the Dashnak, but by their enemies, Kemal and the Bolsheviks. The last surviving member of the triumvirate, Enver died in 1922 August 4<sup>th</sup>, fighting the Bolsheviks near Bukhara. In May 1919 Enver travelled to Russia to collaborate with the Bolsheviks, hoping that with their help, he could return to Turkey. His plans however were spoiled by the alliance between the Reds and the Kemalists. After that, Lenin sent him to Turkestan, Central Asia to negotiate between the Soviets and the rebel Muslim chieftains, the so called Basmachis. Enver, believing himself to be a new Timur Lenk decided that he must lead the Basmachi rebellion, liberating Central Asia and creating a Pan-Turkic empire. Arriving to Turkestan he visited a local chieftain, Junaid Khan, who let Enver lead a number of his soldiers and together they fought the Soviet soldiers sent to crush the rebellion, but they were soon beaten by the elite Red Cavalry led by Semyon Budyonny. The final battle was waged in on the 25 of July 1922 near the village of Satalmish in Tajikistan. Enver and his cavalry launched a last, desperate charge, and he died with his men amidst the enemy machine gun-fire<sup>141</sup> In the cavalry brigade fighting Enver, there was a squadron of Armenian Bolsheviks led by Hagop Melkunan. Soon, legends took off Among the Armanians about Enver's death: an Armenian Chekist, G. Abegekov claimed that he lead Budyonny's horsemen to Enver's hideout. Others rumoured that Enver was killed by the commander of the Armenian horsemen. Actually, it is not known who delivered the deadly bullet. The Pasha was simply found lying dead on the battlefield, next to his men after the battle.<sup>142</sup>

Dr. Nazim was the last person from the Dashnak's blacklist to be brought to justice (although for different crimes). Nazim was able to avoid the agents of the Nemesis and after the Kemalists' victory, lived freely in Constantinople for years. However, in 1926 he became involved in a conspiracy against Atatürk: they were trying to kill Kemal with a bomb during one of his public appearances. The Republic's police captured Nazim and was hanged at the same year with is partners in crime, Djavit Bey, Kara Kemal and Ismail Djanpolad.<sup>143</sup> In an interview with Swiss journalist Emile Hildebrand, published in the 1926 August 1<sup>st</sup> issue of the Los Angeles Examiner, Atatürk said about the case that apart from this conspiracy, the condemned were responsible „for the lives of millions of our Christian subjects who were ruthlessly driven en masse, from their homes and massacred”. Thirteen former Young Turks were executed for the conspiracy, apart from Nazim six of them were involved in some ways to the Armenian genocide. Among the executed were three members of the Teskilat-i mahsuse (Halis Turgut, Yenibahçeli Nail and Filibeli Hilmi), who during the war oversaw the deportation and massacre of Armenians.<sup>144</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup> WALKER: 445.

<sup>141</sup> DEROGY: 175-190.

<sup>142</sup> DEROGY: 175-190.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, 195.

<sup>144</sup> DADRIAN, Vahakn N.: *The Executions of Some of the Arch-perpetrators of the Armenian*

\*

\*

\*

During Operation Nemesis, nine persons, three Armenian informers (Aramiantz, Megerditchian, Ihsan) and six Azerbaijani and Turkish war criminals (Talaat, Javanshir, Said Halim, Dr. Shakir, Djemal Azmi, Djemal Pasha) were killed. Apart from them and Kemal Bey executed on April 8<sup>th</sup> 1919 and his helper, no one was punished in any way for their involvement of the Armenian genocide. Thus Operation Nemesis was unfinished. It was an inherently Elève impossible task to try to find all war criminals. The operation still meant a small sense of justice for men who lost friends and relatives during the massacres, as vengeance was dealt upon the arch-perpetrators, the intellectual authors of the genocide and the leaders of the Teskilat-i mahsuse. Because of that, even today many consider Tehlirian, Shiragian and other Nemesis-agents national heroes in Armenia and the diaspora. Although vigilantism is objectionable both morally and, one should consider that Operation Nemesis was a product of a loophole in international law, that made it possible for the murderers of hundreds of thousands of people to remain unpunished. Since the laws did not rhyme with society's sense of justice, people tried to fill the gap by unlawful means.

---

*Genocide by the Ittihadists and Kemalists, 1915-1926*, The Armenian Reporter, 2001. 6. 6. [http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/Genocide/genocide\\_docs\\_executions.htm](http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/Genocide/genocide_docs_executions.htm) (Accessed: 2011. 8. 14.)

Zsombor Szabolcs Pál

**„This independence gives him force and stability” – The President’s Waning Powers in the Portugal New State through the Amendments to the 1933 Constitution**

**Abstract**

After the Portuguese army had overthrown the republican government, their leaders realized that they were sans any coherent economical and ideological visions. Were they to maintain stability and conserve their power, they needed to find somebody who can lay down a solid program. Eventually, they managed to find Salazar, a university professor, who, after stabilizing the country economically, strove to set up a corporative state. To carry out his aim, he kept on needing the army’s support, so, in the new Constitution of 1933, he ostensibly created a semi-presidential system, granting enough power to the chief military statesman, Óscar Carmona, then President of Portugal. However, Salazar remained the Head of Government, and within a few years his informal power dwarfed that of Carmona. Lest this *status quo* could be changed when opposition became more active after WWII, he started to take countermeasures and gradually change the Constitution in order to maintain his power.

*Keywords:* Portugal, Salazar, New State, constitution, presidential elections, amendments, two-headed or diarchic system, corporatism

The Salazarist regime was practically one of the longest-lasting authoritarian systems in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, still its stability and persistence by no means meant that it was monolithic and its very structure always remained the same; even though it stayed invariably overseen by its actual creator, Salazar, moderate changes never really stopped taking place within the original political framework. Some of these alterations can be nicely traced back in the amendments to the Constitution of 1933, which virtually set up the foundation of the whole regime. Accordingly, there are constitutional traces of how Salazar effectively sought to shrink the scope and capacity of the different competing powers: he succeeded in weaken both the legislature and the executive. Part of the latter process was that – apart from gradually cutting back the faculty of his own ministers and concentrating all the governmental powers in his own hands – after a while he started to gain influence over the presidency, too. The present paper attempts to show the outlines of this process.

With the revolution on October 5, 1910, Portugal’s last king was ousted, and hence the country turned into a constitutional republic, a regime which took until the *coup d’état* of 1926. This period was characterized by a rather agitated political life which was, at least partly, due to the excessive powers given to the legislature, and, on the other hand, to the lack of appropriate powers given either to the

President to control the Parliament or to the executive to effectively govern.<sup>1</sup> The problem stemming from this situation is noticeably reflected in Sidónio Pais’ endeavor during 1917-1918 when he made efforts to establish a semi-authoritarian regime with a legislature markedly subordinate to the executive.<sup>2</sup>

After the 16 years of the republican experiment, with Portugal mostly in turmoil, finally the army – being fed up with the situation – decided to put an end to the ruling system and create something much more stable: on May 28, 1926 a military putsch managed to overthrow the faltering republican system. From the three officers leading the new *coup* eventually Óscar Carmona was to consolidate his power.

The new system after the putsch was manifestly a dictatorship; however, it openly regarded itself transitional. The only problem was that military leaders – including Carmona – lacked any clear-cut political program insofar as the later permanent political system was concerned while lower ranking officers were also divided as to which political concept they should support. Even so, despite all the cleavages, it seemed quite certain to everybody that no matter how the new regime would look like, it should avoid the former governmental pitfalls of the First Republic, and therefore it should have a stronger control over the legislature either by a stronger president or by a stronger government.<sup>3</sup>

In the meantime, besides Carmona – who in 1928 was elected president by plebiscite and thereafter left premiership –, another strongman, Oliveira Salazar, stepped onto Portugal’s political stage. A little-known university teacher to the wider public, Salazar was appointed finance minister in 1928 by Carmona and showed outstanding faculties to stabilize the feeble economic situation of his country. As a consequence, he gained relative popularity among the political elite and was largely helped by Carmona, who also nominated him prime minister in 1932. By skillful political maneuvering, Salazar succeeded in civilianizing the higher political bureaucracy which had become overwhelmed by military men after the *coup* of 1926.<sup>4</sup> As it was mentioned, to one part of the political elite, and chiefly to those belonging to the army, a kind of presidential solution had a greater appeal;<sup>5</sup> presumably, this way they aspired to keep control over the country’s political life.

As Salazar gradually became one of the most prominent personalities of the military dictatorship, he also intended to take a leading part in the shaping of the new political structure: even though he had a rather monarchist commitment, he accepted „*republicanism*” in order to guarantee order and stability.<sup>6</sup> According to

---

<sup>1</sup> Tom GALLAGHER: *Portugal: a twentieth-century interpretation*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983. 22. and Douglas L. WHEELER: *Republican Portugal: A Political History, 1910-1926*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1998. 72-73.

<sup>2</sup> GALLAGHER: 26. and WHEELER: 139.

<sup>3</sup> Luís Reis TORRAL: *Estados Novos – Estado Novo*, Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra, 2009. Vol. 1. 374.

<sup>4</sup> WHEELER: 248.

<sup>5</sup> WHEELER: 52.

<sup>6</sup> TORRAL: 375.

the abovementioned ideologies, which regarded the strong legislative as one of the chief problems of the First Republic, he envisaged a strong executive and a weaker legislative:

There is no strong state where strong executive power does not exist, and its debility is the general characteristic of the political regimes dominated by individualist or socialist liberalism, by partisan spirit and by excesses and disorders of the Parliamentarism.

(...)

Should the legislative chambers work this or that way, what you cannot accredit to them is the right to promote and overthrow ministers and to obstruct public life. And by ceasing to be causal combinations of varying groups to conquer the other branch of power, they must be susceptible of discipline and efficiency within their function, working only the time indispensable to exercise it.

The executive power, exercised by the Head of State with ministers freely nominated by him, without depending on any parliamentary indications, has the mission of governing in accordance with the right; it is entitled to the obligation and responsibility to maintain the Nation's existence and honor, to guarantee the public order and security, to follow the law and get it followed, and to grant everything that is important for the state's maintenance and operation.<sup>7</sup>

In the meantime, Salazar also wanted to construct a wholly new type of state (Estado Novo) with a corporatist-style structure.<sup>8</sup> To carry out his plan, he needed a vast support from all the moderate political groups of the country willing to work together on the nation's prosperity. So, in the new Constitution of 1933 written by Salazar, ostensibly, enough power was given to the president and through this position to one of the most powerful group, the army, to keep their help and adherence. However, Salazar might also have wanted to keep his initiative as a prime-minister in the shaping of the country's politics, therefore the new Constitution provided the premiership with some very important powers, too.

Accordingly, the new system was a kind of semi-presidentialism where – at least in theory – the head of the state was not only a ceremonial figurehead but one of the driving forces in political life. He had powers to intervene in many areas of decision-making: he could influence the governmental work by nominating and dismissing the ministers (including the prime minister) and by promulgating its decrees and regulations; he could bear upon the legislative by dissolving, adjourning, or – in urgent cases – convoking the National Assembly (*Assembleia*

---

<sup>7</sup> Mendo Castro HENRIQUES and Gonçalo DE SAMPAIO E MELLO (ed): *Salazar – Pensamento e Doutrina Política*, Editorial Verbo, Lisboa, 2007. 124-126.

<sup>8</sup> The corporatism was a kind of response to both classical liberalism and Marxism. In opposition to the Marxist class conflict, it intended to enhance the cooperation between different groups of society. In contrast to classical liberalism, it underscored that the interest and the well-being of communities – ranging from local communities to the nation as such – was superior to that of the individual.

*Nacional*), and by promulgating and publishing its acts and resolutions; finally, he could take an important part in the administration of foreign affairs as well by attending international conventions, negotiate treaties of peace, alliance, arbitration, and commerce. He could also have an influence on the subsequent constitutionalization works by granting constituent powers to the National Assembly.<sup>9</sup> There were only a few limitations as far as his freedom of action was concerned. According to the Constitution, he was obliged to have a State Council (*Conselho do Estado*) by his side and consult with it whenever he was to exercise some of his powers.<sup>10</sup> However, it was only prescribed that the State Council had to be consulted, whilst it was not that its advices to any extent should be followed.<sup>11</sup> In other cases, he was also compelled to consult the Council of Ministers,<sup>12</sup> and his acts – with only a few exceptions – needed to be countersigned either by the respective ministers, or by the whole government.<sup>13</sup> Finally, as for declaration of war, peace, and international conventions, under normal circumstances, he needed authorization from the National Assembly.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> These powers were defined in the article 81 of the 1933 Constitution. JORGE MIRANDA: *As Constituições Portuguesas*, Livraria Petrony, Lisboa, 1997. 291-292.

<sup>10</sup> Article 83 of the 1933 Constitution. MIRANDA: 293. „*O Conselho de Estado será ouvido pelo Presidente da República antes de serem exercidas as atribuições a que se referem os n.ºs 4.º, 5.º e 6.º do artigo 81.º e o § único do artigo 87.º e em todas as emergências graves da vida do Estado, podendo igualmente ser convocado sempre que o Presidente o julgue necessário*” (The State Council shall be heard by the President of the Republic before his prerogatives referred in the 4<sup>th</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> paragraphs of the 81<sup>st</sup> article and in the single paragraph of article 87 might be exercised and in every state of emergency; the State Council can be equally called together whenever the President considers it necessary.) The referred paragraphs were about dissolving, adjourning, or – in urgent cases – convoking the National Assembly and about granting constituent powers to it.

<sup>11</sup> Articles 83 and 84 of the 1933 Constitution. MIRANDA: 292-293.

<sup>12</sup> Article 110 of the 1933 Constitution. MIRANDA: 349. „*O Conselho de Ministros reúne-se quando o seu Presidente ou o Chefe do Estado o julguem indispensável. Quando o mesmo Presidente ou Chefe do Estado assim o entenderem, a reunião será sob a presidência deste, e sê-lo-á obrigatoriamente quando o Chefe do Estado tenha de usar das atribuições que lhe são conferidas pelos n.ºs 2.º, 3.º, 4.º, 6.º, e 8.º do artigo 81.º.*” (The Cabinet of Ministers comes together whenever its president or the Head of State considers it indispensable. When the President or the Head of State finds it so, the assembly shall be held under the latter’s presidency, but when the Head of State needs to use his prerogatives conferred on him by the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> paragraphs of article 81, it will be obligatory for him to chair these sessions.) The referred paragraphs were about sending messages to the National Assembly, determining the days of the elections for the National Assembly, granting constituent powers to the National Assembly, dissolving the National Assembly, pardoning crimes, and commuting sentences.

<sup>13</sup> Article 82 of the 1933 Constitution. MIRANDA: 292. „*Os actos do Presidente da República devem ser referendados pelo Ministro ou Ministros competentes ou por todo o Governo, sem o que serão nulos de pleno direito*” (The acts of the president shall be countersigned by the competent Minister or Ministers or by the whole Government, without which they shall be void.) The exceptions were as it follows: the nomination and the dismissal of the President of the Council of Ministers; the presidential messages sent to the National Assembly; and the President’s letter of resignation.

<sup>14</sup> Article 91 of the 1933 Constitution. MIRANDA: 297. „*(Compete à Assembleia Nacional): Autorizar o Chefe do Estado a fazer guerra, se não couber o recurso à arbitragem, ou esta se malograr, salvo caso de agressão efectiva ou iminente por forças estrangeiras, e fazer a paz*” (The National Assembly is incumbent to) authorize the Head of State to make war, whenever there is no resort to arbitration, or

Moreover, the Constitution also affirmed that the president was responsible „directly and exclusively for the Portuguese nation”<sup>15</sup> and his person was independent of any voting of the National Assembly. Although the Constitution did not affirm it expressly, but this regulation also indicated that practically he was independent of the government, too, as it was not empowered to remove him. Nevertheless, it was not clearly determined in the constitutional text how the Portuguese nation should challenge him, thus, basically the only way for his impeachment was not reelecting him when his 7-years-long mandate was over. Obviously, this regulation – or rather this lack of regulation – highly increased the range of his action. So, he did not truly depend on the government which he could theoretically dissolve whenever he wanted, and upon the legislative or the judiciary which practically had no powers over him. Finally, neither his dependence on the people voting for him was excessive, as they could not remove him before his term was over.

Salazar also affirmed in a radio interview in 1934 that his own position was subordinated to that of the President as the president had the right to remove him – whenever he felt like doing so:

(the President), exercising his functions as the higher organ of state, do not have any restrictions which would not stem from the constitutional text. He does not depend on the government, which he dissolve whenever it pleases him; he does not depend on the consultation or approbation of any other organ of sovereignty; he does not depend on the chambers whose votes he is not obliged to execute as far as the wielding of his functions or the Government's life is concerned; he does not depend on the country which elected him and cannot depose him; and does not depend on the tribunals which cannot judge him. This independence gives him force and stability.<sup>16</sup>

Even the British ambassador, in 1936, found that Carmona was the most powerful figure of the New State, without whom the whole system would immediately fell.<sup>17</sup> However, the system was only semi-presidential for, as it may have become quite clear above, the head of the state was not identical with the

---

the arbitration fails, except for the effective or imminent aggression by foreign forces, and to make peace).

<sup>15</sup> Article 78 of the 1933 Constitution. MIRANDA: 290. „*O Presidente da República responde directa e exclusivamente perante a Nação pelos actos praticados no exercício das suas funções, sendo o exercício destas e a sua magistratura independentes de quaisquer votações da Assembleia Nacional.*” (The President of the Republic is responsible directly and exclusively before the Nation for his acts performed while exercising his functions, therefore the exercise of these and his magistrate is independent from any voting of the National Assembly.)

<sup>16</sup> Manuel BRAGA DA CRUZ: *O Partido e o Estado no Salazarismo*, Editorial Presença, Lisboa, 1988. 100-101.

<sup>17</sup> António SIMÕES DO PAÇO: *Salazar – O Ditador Encoberto*, Bertrand Editora, Lisboa, 2010. 127.

head of the government; Salazar kept this office for himself – that’s why the regime is frequently referred to as a two-headed or diarchic system.<sup>18</sup> Although in 1935, during another radio interview, Salazar also set forth that the president was the most active leader of the nation, the leader responsible for the nation’s destiny,<sup>19</sup> actually, it was him who could concentrate – over the years – more and more informal powers in his hands.<sup>20</sup> This way, a certain new balance of power developed where the president slowly lost his political initiative and „leading role” whilst the head of the government filled the vacuum left by him – the new constitutional framework made it possible, albeit it was in a slight contradiction to the original meaning of the fundamental law. Presumably, at least in the beginning, Carmona had nothing against this turn of events, as had he wanted to restrain the head of *his* government, he could have used his various powers granted by the Constitution. He might have known that his political existence and future depended on Salazar and that he himself was entirely bereft of any real political or economic visions. Thus, so long as his position was secured, he did not really want to change the situation. Likewise, Salazar was not interested in any change either, since it would have meant a change in the achieved political balance, and, ultimately, the end of his rule.

Due to this optimum balance, where neither of the executive’s two heads called into question the other’s status, there was no real need to change the original constitutional framework as far as the president’s position was concerned. Nonetheless, there was a single amendment which slightly reflected the shift in power: after 1935, according to the article 82 of the Constitution, the president’s acts needed to be countersigned not only by the respective ministers but by the head of the government itself, too.<sup>21</sup>

No matter how well this division of labor worked in the beginning, it was quite obvious that it could not last forever. The first ominous signs appeared after World War II when, for a moment, the existence of all authoritarian systems was challenged, and Portugal – ostensibly following the international democratization trends – tried to pretend that the whole regime was moving towards democracy by increasing the number of voters and loosening the grip on the opposition,<sup>22</sup> which started to organize itself and even make some preparations for a new *coup d’etat*.<sup>23</sup> As a consequence, in 1946, the regime had quite hard time on the elections as the other candidate, Norton Matos,<sup>24</sup> managed to unify the opposition

---

<sup>18</sup> Éva BÁN: *Az Estado Novo politikai rendszere*, Valóság, 2003/4. 70.

<sup>19</sup> Mircea ELILADE: *Salazar e a Revolução em Portugal*, Esfera do Caos Editores, Lisboa, 2011. 230-231.

<sup>20</sup> Jaques GEORGEL: *O Salazarismo*, Publicações Dom Quixote, Lisboa, 1985. 128-129.

<sup>21</sup> MIRANDA: 328. „*Os actos do Presidente da República devem ser referendados pelo Presidente do Conselho e pelo Ministro ou Ministros competentes, sob pena de inexistência*” (The acts of the President of the Republic shall be countersigned by the President of the Council and by the competent Minister or Ministers, when it is missing.)

<sup>22</sup> GEORGEL: 142.

<sup>23</sup> SIMÕES DO PAÇO: 125-126.

<sup>24</sup> Norton Matos, akin to Carmona, was also an officer. He was Minister of Defense and Minister for



and mobilize its voters. However, luckily for Salazar, eventually it was Carmona who won the presidency once again, as, at the last phase of the campaign, Norton de Matos withdrew his candidature with regard to the questionability of the upcoming elections.<sup>25</sup> Still, the victory was not totally flawless, as Carmona – even before the elections – had started to break away with the regime.<sup>26</sup> After all, the whole story made one thing fairly clear: even though Salazar had weakened severely the president's real scope by its informal means, securing this position continued to be a key factor to maintain the Salazarist system; were the delicate equilibrium to upset, Salazar's rule might come to a halt. Finding a strong and attracting nominee, the opposition could have even constitutionally overthrown the whole regime. Another interesting thing to consider is that although Carmona ceased to be the supporter of the regime, he was nominated this time and later on once more, as the regime had no alternatives if it wanted to win the elections; anyway he might have been too old to expressively act against the system.<sup>27</sup>

Having the lesson learnt, in 1951 – when Carmona passed away at the age of 81 – Salazar, fearing that the opposition could find yet another widely accepted candidate who – if being elected – is likely to use its presidential powers and make him step down, sought to realize a twofold change in the Constitution. Firstly, he wanted to modify the candidate selection process, and, secondly, he strove to change the process of presidential election, too. But, as of 1951, he could only bring about the first change.<sup>28</sup>

In the original version of the Constitution, according to article 73, there were not too much conditions laid down insofar as candidature was concerned: the candidates had to attain to the age of 35, enjoy full political and civil rights, and hold Portuguese nationality.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, they were elected by direct popular vote. However, in 1951, a draft bill was created to change article 72 of the Constitution of 1933. The proposed changes were threefold: the Constitution should cease to formulate the way how the President is elected; one's eligibility should depend on the appreciation of the State Council; precautions should be done if the electoral colleges couldn't be convoked on time in case the President's mandate was unforeseeably over.<sup>30</sup> From these three proposals it was the first two which were really important and caused controversies among the members of the

---

the Colonies during the First Republic. Actually, it was him who oversaw the Portuguese preparations for the World War I. Later, he gained popularity as the administrator of Angola.

<sup>25</sup> GEORGEL: 142.

<sup>26</sup> SIMÕES DO PAÇO: 126-127.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> BRAGA DA CRUZ: 101.

<sup>29</sup> MIRANDA: 289. „*Pode ser eleito Presidente da República o cidadão português maior de trinta e cinco anos, no pleno gozo dos seus direitos civis e políticos, que tenha tido sempre a nacionalidade portuguesa.*” (Any Portuguese citizens can be elected President of the Republic in case he attains to the age of 35, enjoys full political and civil rights, and holds Portuguese nationality).

<sup>30</sup> Diário das Sessões, Legislatura V, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 74. 398.

Parliament. The Corporative Chamber,<sup>31</sup> for example, in his opinion emitted after having pondered on the suggested changes, concluded that „the method of electing a new president is laid down in every republican constitutions of the world” so there is no reason for „doing it differently in the Portuguese Constitution”.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, it emphasized the importance of popular vote as far as the President of the Republic was concerned, since it could grant this position the same authority as the National Assembly had.<sup>33</sup> However, they accepted that the popular election also had its own flaws: during the campaign the candidates might become denigrated by a portion of the population, and therefore, after the elections, the winner could become hostile to this portion, loosing so his impartiality needed to act as a real moderating power.<sup>34</sup> However, the Corporative Chamber considered that the pros dwarfed the cons, and that was the reason why it ended up being in favor of maintaining the direct universal suffrage for the presidential elections. Still, on the other hand, it also decided to support the second change proposed by the draft bill, that is to say, the filtration of the candidates by the State Council: according to its opinion it would meliorate the election by direct and universal suffrage, and impede the possibility of any „constitutional coup d’etat” similar to the rise of Hitler.<sup>35</sup>

On the National Assembly, other suggestions related to election of the president also appeared. Some monarchist concluded that the only thing the concurrent political problems proved was that the best remedy for them would be the restoration of hereditary monarchy:

Having a look at the problem fearlessly, without the deformation caused by passions, and the fear to conclude, there is only one adequate solution to our political problem: the restoration of our traditional kingship. And also the restoration of hereditary monarchy, personal power, which should be limited to the functions of state, but sovereign in its own domain, and which also should be in intense relationship with the organized nation through his legitimate representatives. (...) Only the monarchic power can assure the state of unity, continuity and independence. Only the monarchic institution can guarantee a responsible, strong power which is also moderate, humane, and paternal. Only the kingship can incarnate the nation in its permanence and in the continuity of its historic destiny.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> The Portuguese parliament had two different houses. One of them was the National Assembly, which operated as a kind of lower house entitled to debate and vote about governmental initiatives with directly elected deputies. The other one was the Corporative Chamber, a kind of upper house whose members were elected indirectly based on the corporative system, and were entitled to emit opinions upon governmental initiatives.

<sup>32</sup> Diário das Sessões, Legislatura V, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 74. 398.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 398.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 399.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 400.

<sup>36</sup> Diário das Sessões, Legislatura V, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 97. 840.

Their argument was based on the fact that there were other suggestions indicating that the president should be elected in a corporatist way, which would reflect the nation's interest better;<sup>37</sup> however, according to the monarchist, it would only change the nature of contemporaneous political infightings, but it wouldn't be a real remedy for the problem: „Yesterday there were class and party struggles. And now there will be coalitions of groups and interests.”<sup>38</sup>

Nevertheless, these debates proved to be pointless as the government finally accepted the counsels by the Corporative Chamber and only changed the way of how the candidates were selected while the text regarding the election stayed untouched. Thus, in 1951, a new paragraph was added to the Constitution imposing that those candidates who did not offer guarantees of their respect for and fidelity to the fundamental principles of the political and social order expressed in the Constitution could not participate in the presidential elections.<sup>39</sup> This criterion was vague enough to give way to arbitrary decisions. The institution responsible for ascertaining the candidates' abovementioned suitability was called State Council,<sup>40</sup> and according to the article 83 the President of the Council of Ministers also partook in its work.<sup>41</sup> This practically meant that Salazar could exert a heavy informal influence on the candidate selection process. With all these precautions taken, Salazar was able to manipulate the presidential elections of 1951; as through the State Council, he could successfully torpedo the nomination of the left-wing opposition's candidate.<sup>42</sup> Since the other opposition candidate stepped down for similar reasons as Norton Matos, Salazar could get his nominee elected once again.<sup>43</sup> Thus, the balance of power could remain unchanged over again.

However, the shortcomings of this new method became clear in 1958 when one of Salazar's former adherents, Humberto Delgado,<sup>44</sup> could aptly sneak through the abovementioned filtration system and start a highly successful campaign

---

<sup>37</sup> Diário das Sessões, Legislatura V, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 97. 839.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> MIRANDA: 358.: „Não poderão propor-se ao sufrágio os candidatos que não ofereçam garantias de respeito e fidelidade aos princípios fundamentais da ordem política e social consignada na Constituição.” (Candidates who do not offer guarantees of their respect for and fidelity to the fundamental principles of the political and social order expressed in the Constitution should not propose themselves for the presidential elections).

<sup>40</sup> Article 84 of the 1933 Constitution. MIRANDA: 359. „O Conselho reunirá por direito próprio para apreciar as propostas de candidatura à Presidência da República, e às reuniões que celebrar para esse efeito não assistirá o Chefe do Estado nem conselheiro a quem algumas das propostas respeite. (The Council shall assemble in its own right to appraise the candidate proposals for Presidency, and the Head of State or any counselor proposed shall not participate in the assemblies held for this reason).”

<sup>41</sup> MIRANDA: 292-293.

<sup>42</sup> GEORGEL: 131.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Humberto Delgado was a Portuguese officer and official chiefly interested in aviation issues. In 1952, he was sent to Washington as a military attaché. There he was able to face a very different reality from what he had experienced in Portugal. This strongly contributed to his determination to candidate himself for the presidential elections. Following its unpleasant outcome, he fled to Brazil. He kept on organizing the Portuguese opposition until he was killed by the Portuguese secret service in Spain.

against the Salazarist regime. Maybe this was the only time during Salazar’s 36 years in office when his power was put in real jeopardy. As – unlike other opposition candidates – he failed to give up his election campaign in the last moment, his victory could only be impeded by committing electoral frauds.<sup>45</sup> This way finally Salazar’s nominee, Américo Thomaz, became the new president, who could then stay in this position until the fall of regime.<sup>46</sup>

Explicably, this turn of events pushed Salazar to refresh his idea about changing the way of electing presidents which was finally ruled out in 1951. Until 1959, according to article 79 of the Constitution, the president was elected directly by the electorate.<sup>47</sup> However, in that year, the government proposed a new amendment to the Constitution which suggested that from that time on presidents should be elected by the nation but through an electoral college. While in 1951 the Corporative Chamber and the National Assembly were against the reform proposed to them, and so they rejected it, now they proved to be much more receptive to the changes.

The Corporative Chamber, in its opinion emitted about the suggested amendment, mentioned that in the unsteady political climate after the world war, it became quite obvious that as to the presidential election some sort of change was needed since the ideological rifts which had appeared did not serve the nation; moreover, it was unfortunate that debates were not about the competence of the nominees but the transformation of the regime.<sup>48</sup> However, the opinion went on, the way that part of the Constitution was proposed to be changed was rather inadequate. The Corporative Chamber also admitted that its last opinion had proved disputable when it had concluded that direct elections were the best way to find out the nation’s will.<sup>49</sup> The reason for this affirmation was that according to the government’s draft law the abovementioned Electoral College would have consisted of the members of the National Assembly, the members of the Corporate Chamber, the municipal representatives of the different districts and overseas provinces, and, finally, the representatives of legislative councils and of councils of government of the provinces. This way, the Portuguese nation could appear in the elections in its two different dimensions: in a territorial and individualist way (through the members of the National Assembly and the local municipal representatives) and in an organic and corporative way (through the members of the Corporative Chamber). And so, according to the Corporative Chamber, the whole set-up was highly advantageous, as it represented better the corporative concept of the 1933 Constitution while direct

---

<sup>45</sup> SIMÕES DO PAÇO: 147–148.

<sup>46</sup> Américo Thomaz was an officer mainly interested in naval issues. From 1944 to 1958, he was Minister of the Navy.

<sup>47</sup> MIRANDA: 289. „*O Chefe do Estado é o Presidente da República eleito pela Nação.*” (The Head of State is the President of the Republic elected by the Nation).

<sup>48</sup> Diário das Sessões, Legislatura VII, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 93. 461.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, 463.

elections took into account only one structural element of the nation, that is to say, the individuals.<sup>50</sup>

In the National Assembly, there were a bit more heated debates about the new system, but the main focus of these discussions was about whether the municipal representatives really needed to be included in the designed Electoral College.<sup>51</sup> There were only a few deputies who recommended a totally different way to elect presidents.<sup>52</sup> However, naturally, they also approved the draft bill in the end.

So, officially, the new method was regarded as a jump to the next level in the development of the corporatist state:

The corporatist organization, in its wider sense, has developed and gained strength. It has arrived to the point of taking advantage more utterly of the potentials of the corporatist concept and of using it to choose the nation's first magistrate. In the logic of the system, an organic voting was much more preferable than the individual one.<sup>53</sup>

But the reason for implementing the organic voting was somewhat more prosaic and straightforward. It is enough to say that no opposition deputies could ever get in the National Assembly and its members were elected from a list put together by the National Union, which was a sort of state party led and controlled by Salazar. The members of the Corporative Chamber were also appointed by him. Finally, the nomination of the different local representatives depended on the ordinary law, and so, after all, on the government.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, to varying degrees, the whole Electoral College depended on Salazar's informal power which guaranteed that their decision would strictly follow his will.

So, by the constitutional amendment of 1959, Salazar could achieve a twofold aim. Firstly, he ensured that the opposition nominees and popular opposition leaders could not really contest presidential elections. This way the opposition had no chance to change the very structure of the regime by obtaining the presidential mandate and using it against Salazar. Secondly, revamping the constitutional formulae about the election of the president, he could in a way constitutionalize his formerly developed informal influence over this office which also meant that the fulcrum of the earlier balance of power was relocated.

It is little wonder that from 1959 on the opposition became reluctant to nominate any other candidates on the subsequent presidential elections.

---

<sup>50</sup> Diário das Sessões, Legislatura VII, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 93. 465.

<sup>51</sup> For example: Diário das Sessões, Legislatura VII, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 116. 883.

<sup>52</sup> For example: Diário das Sessões, Legislatura VII, Sessão Legislativa 2, n.º do diário 123. 994-995.

<sup>53</sup> GEORGEL: 134.

<sup>54</sup> BRAGA DA CRUZ: 101.



**Anita Madarász**

***„Atoms for peace?” - Against the nuclear arms race in Great Britain with Hungarian sources and relations***

**Abstract**

Using the atomic energy for peaceful purposes or deploying nuclear weapons have been dividing the public opinion generating a serious moral conflict. At the time of the Cold War when this issue became topical when different nations competed to create nuclear weapons when the average people were listening doubtfully to the governments and politicians deciding on this matter – that was the time for peace movements to make their voice heard and to be joined by more and more people day by day. The history of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament – one of the most well-known organizations of the British peace movement – was written several times in different ways. The present essay gives a try to shortly outline the events of the postwar years from the viewpoint of peace movement systems including the example of CND – its creation, methods, popularity. I will deal with the reasons for the split within the movement and the creation of the Committee of 100. I try to introduce the sources of Hungarian relations and the Hungarian network connected to CND.

*Keywords:* Cold War, peace movement, nuclear armament, fighting for peace, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Committee of 100, Hungarian connection with CND

*„It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European and territorial waters and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.”*

(Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament, 1980)<sup>1</sup>

**P**ace movement is an expression covering a considerably wide category. To fight and struggle for peace is not a new activity so its meaning and content changed from time to time depending on the aim to be reached. If we examine only the events of the 20th century we can state that the whole period was pervaded – sometimes in a disguised sometimes in a radical way – by the desire for peace. This was the case at the outbreak of either the First World

---

<sup>1</sup> Documents on the Peace Movement in Hungary. Ed.: Hugh Baldwin. 1986. 1.

War or the Second World War. If we examine the period of World War II and the following ten years – the second part of the 1940-ies and the beginning of the 1950-ies – we meet a much more complex problem: not long after the end of World War II a passive war broke out – the period of the Cold War with the threat of the atomic bomb.

Using the atomic energy for peaceful purposes or deploying nuclear weapons have been dividing the public opinion generating a serious moral conflict: is it proper to take advantage of a devastating energy? At the time of the Cold War when this issue became topical when different nations completed to create nuclear weapons when the average people were listening doubtfully to the governments and politicians deciding on this matter – that was the time for peace movements to make their voice heard and to be joined by more and more people day by day.

There are different ways of reaching peace – for the most part the aim is to solve direct, local problems: to end a war, to inhibit aggressive social measures and so on. Beyond these specific aims peace movements include the desire for a world peace. To reach these aims several ways and means can be employed in the structure of a peace movement. From diplomatic initiatives, through boycotts, protests to bloody clashes everything can be imagined. What a paradox: you desire peace but you have to fight for it. The expression „*fighting for peace*” was unknown in the period between the two world wars<sup>2</sup> but not long after 1945 the expression appeared in the common knowledge and became prominent. During these years there was a difference of opinion among the peace movement organizations as to the solution of seemingly or really dangerous problems.

At the beginning of the essay I try to outline the system of the international peace movement after the Second World War, its changes, the reasons for these changes and what the expression „*fighting for peace*” meant. Then I deal with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) from among the British movements.

The British peace movements were significant, backed in wide circles and set an example on international level for the world. The history of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament – one of the most well-known organizations of the British peace movement – was written several times in different ways. The present essay gives a try to shortly outline the events of the postwar years from the viewpoint of peace movement systems including the example of the CND – its creation, methods, popularity. I’ll deal with the reasons for the split within the movement and the creation of the Committee of 100 led by Bertrand Russell the scientist. I try to introduce the sources of Hungarian relations and the Hungarian network connected to the CND – that is my contribution to the issue.

On 8th December 1953 the US President Dwight Eisenhower addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations. This speech became well-known as

---

<sup>2</sup> SZÉKELY Gábor: *Béke és háború. A nemzetközi békeszervezetek története.* (Peace and War: The history of the international peace movements). Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 304.



'Atoms for Peace' in which President Eisenhower urged to set up the International Atomic Energy Agency at the same time to make researches into the usage of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. „The US knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream in the future (...) Who can doubt that, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable materials with which to test and develop their ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage?”<sup>3</sup> The question is if peaceful usage can be realized at all.

### **International peace movements after World War II**

„Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result, it produces no result at all.” (John Stuart Mill)<sup>4</sup>

The international peace movement had a most interesting history in the 20th century. It had different importance in different periods: once it was strong another time it was weak. The outbreak of World War II destroyed peace movements. „Pacifists retreated, workers' organizations became paralyzed, the churches were in silence. Those who even made their voices heard met with difficulties: the public opinion on the side of the Allies declared the war against fascism a just war, in the countries of fascist powers there were death camps for resistance fighters. In the postwar years the peace movements did not recover to such an extent as it happened in 1917-1918 and after.”<sup>5</sup> With the victory of the Allies it seemed that the end of war resulted in success. „The European and American euphoria was not troubled even by the fact that after the end of the war in Europe there were Soviet-American military operations going on in Asia against Japan: what is more, although the dropping of two atomic bombs triggered great astonishment – mainly in intellectual circles – few people seemed to worry about it.”<sup>6</sup> The question is if the above mentioned events aroused fear in the average people? Was it clear for them what problems nuclear weapons might cause in the future. „Are we going to base our world on a culture of peace or on a culture of violence? Nuclear weapons are fundamentally immoral: their action is indiscriminate, affecting civilians as well as military, innocents and aggressors alike, killing those alive now and generations as yet unborn. The consequence of their use might be to bring the human race to an end. All this makes nuclear weapons an unacceptable instrument for maintaining peace in the world. But this was exactly our policy during, and after, the cold war. Nuclear weapons were kept

---

<sup>3</sup> <http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/eisenhower-atoms-for-peace-speech-text/> – 2013. 01. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Philip NOEL-BAKER: *The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament*. Atlantic Books, London, 1958. iii.

<sup>5</sup> SZÉKELY (1998): 305.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 305.

*as a deterrent, to prevent war by the threat of retaliation.”<sup>7</sup>*

Summing up the situation of the international movements after World War II we can say that: *„The most important reason for traditional peace movement being thrust into the background between the two world wars was the wide acceptance of the thesis of „just war” that made the mainstream of pacifism inefficient: after World War II the basic change of the international situation: the tense opposition of the two world systems then the new form of war the Cold War”.*<sup>8</sup> The break out of the Cold War as well as the foundation of NATO in 1949 divided the former unity of peace movements into two. One part, the old organization the International Peace Office proceeded the former tracks, the other part based on its past between the two world wars was led by the World Peace Council.<sup>9</sup> In my essay I will not deal with these organisations in details I will mention shortly the role of the World Peace Council.

### **Fighting for peace**

*„This country is like a strong camp. It is inspired by one heart one soul one aim. It is standing firmly like a rock and shows itself in its full size. And day-by-day, from minute to minute the army of peace is growing, is getting stronger and self-confident.”<sup>10</sup>*

The organizationally separated, politically divided peace movement gained ground at the time of the Cold War.<sup>11</sup> *„Peace became a fighting word in the late 1940s. Pro-Soviet partisans fought for peace and built peace fronts, while anti-Soviet forces accused them of peace mongering and tried to counter-attack against the Soviet-backed peace offensive. Behind these verbal contortions there was a real political and propaganda struggle over the nature of East-West relations and the very meaning of the word peace in a polarised and militarised Cold War Europe.”<sup>12</sup>* *„The majority of the organizations did not approve of either a peace reached with arms or the violent revision of the unjust peace treaties. The reason for this was that admitting the lawfulness of using arms the base of the organizations would have become narrower (as they could experience at the outbreak of both world wars), in the movement those were in majority who were convinced that it would be inexpedient to use armed violence. The way they judged the possibility of „pacifying” the agressor divided the*

---

<sup>7</sup> Joseph ROTBLAT: *Foreword* IN: Douglas HOLDSTOCK - Frank BARNABY (Ed.): *The British Nuclear Weapons Programme, 1952-2002*. Frank Cass and Company, London, 2003. xxi.

<sup>8</sup> SZÉKELY (1998): 308.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* 313.

<sup>10</sup> Magyar Filmhíradó 1950/45.1950. november – „A békéért harcolunk” („We are fighting for peace”) (magyar békekongresszus – Hungarian peace congress) - <http://www.filmintezet.hu/uj/hirado/> - 2013. 01. 16.

<sup>11</sup> SZÉKELY (1998): 313.

<sup>12</sup> John JENKS: *British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006. 114.

*movement all the time. The dividedness of the international peace movement was not caused by the hardly manageable ideological differences – but the formation of the bipolar world system.*<sup>13</sup> The „fighting for peace” was announced at the II. World Peace Congress in Warsaw in 1950: „Don't wait for peace, fight for it!”<sup>14</sup> „The work of the World Peace Council will make the whole mankind feel secure as we will realize our peace efforts in spite of all the difficulties the seriousness of which we must not underestimate. These demands determine our tasks in fighting for peace in Hungary. (...)”<sup>15</sup> (Mrs. István Vas, Chief Secretary of the Hungarian Women's Association)

In Great Britain the government handled this issue not a domestic but a diplomatic one. „The massive destruction and death of World War II, and the arrival of the atomic bomb, gave strong incentives to avoid further wars. Within the British Labour Party pacifist feelings were still strong, though not nearly as powerful as in the 1930s. But at the same time there was a widespread belief that some things – such as Nazism or other forms of totalitarianism – were worse than war. 'Appeasement' had become a dirty word, and 'peace' would soon become soiled as well.”<sup>16</sup>

The word „peace” had been completely lost its importance in British political discourse by 1953, and non-Communist peace groups were at their low point in Great Britain. One of the biggest problems was that the general public associated most peace groups with the „negative” Communist-model – and because of this stayed far clear of them. In addition the Peace Movement and its innumerable members were still dangerous and damaging in the eyes of the British Government.<sup>17</sup>

### **History of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament**

*„The great tragedies of history often fascinate people with approaching horror. Paralyzed, they cannot make up their minds to do anything but wait. So they wait and one day the Gorgon devours them. But I should like to convince you (...) that strength of heart, intelligence and courage are enough to stop fate and sometimes reverse it.”*<sup>18</sup> (Albert Camus)

As I mentioned in the Introduction the British organizations considerably contributed to the peace movement of the 1950-ies and 1960-ies. Among them one of the most influential movements was CND created in the late 1950-ies.<sup>19</sup> As Canon Collins noted, „CND prospered beyond our wildest dreams.” Its nuclear

---

<sup>13</sup> SZÉKELY (1998): 304.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. 321. See: Second World Peace Congress, Warsaw, November 16-22, 1950. 1951.

<sup>15</sup> Magyar Filmhíradó (Hungarian Newsreel) 1950/49.1950. december – Erősödik a népek békeharca/békemozgalma/ (The peace movement of the nations is getting stronger) - <http://www.filmintezet.hu/uj/hirado/> - 2013. 01. 16.

<sup>16</sup> JENKS (2006): 114.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. 126.

<sup>18</sup> Lawrence S. WITTNER: *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 2009. XV.

<sup>19</sup> SZÉKELY (1998): 316.

disarmament symbol “became as well known as the Union Jack (...) and to thousands the world over it became a sign of sanity and hope.”<sup>20</sup>

At the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s the Nuclear Disarmament Movement was one of the largest peace movements in Great Britain and the most important and prominent as well. Furthermore, Richard Taylor says in his mentioned book that the movement reflected the division of austerity and optimism of the 1950s and the unresolved decade of the 1960s. Then he goes on saying that CND „articulated the growing fear and anxiety amongst many thousands of people, from a wide variety of backgrounds and beliefs, about the seemingly inexorable arms race, and the potential horror of nuclear war.”<sup>21</sup> When did this problem become topical in Great Britain? „Opposition to nuclear weapons emerged in Britain in 1955 when the government of the day announced its decision to manufacture a hydrogen bomb, and reached its peak between 1958 and 1963 when CND succeeded in mobilizing support for unilateralism on a mass scale.”<sup>22</sup>

The Nuclear Disarmament Movement had very different roots and in my opinion these divers variants made this movement more interesting and more complex. First of all, radical pacifism was of central importance and the extra-parliamentary left had its characteristic role. The traditional mainstream of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament originated somewhere else. In some sort the stimulus and impulse for opposition to nuclear weapons came from the Labour Movement. Later the CND had the grass-roots support of common people beyond the „orthodox” political party activists, which characterized CND’s policy.<sup>23</sup>

This time not only CND was established and existed but there were many other movements which protested against nuclear weapons and their testing. These were created in 1957. From among these peace movements I will mention two. One of these is the Direct Action Committee,<sup>24</sup> which was founded „as a result of Harold Steele’s 1957 protest against British H-bomb testing on Christmas Island. A group of Steele’s supporters decided to march on the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston. They elected a Committee, which became DAC. Its

---

<sup>20</sup> WITTNER (2009): 82.

<sup>21</sup> Richard TAYLOR: *Against the bomb: The British Peace Movement 1958-1965*. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988. Introduction

<sup>22</sup> Frank PARKIN: *Middle Class Radicalism. The social bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1968. 1.

<sup>23</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 5.

<sup>24</sup> Report by the Hungarian Embassy, London, 1961: „Both movements were created among the same historical circumstances: the general Cold War efforts of imperialism, the patrol flights of aeroplanes equipped with H-bombs above the country, the American nuclear basis, the government decision to use nuclear weapons in case of any sort of „attack” against the country (...) had a pressure on the inhabitants of Great Britain.” Later the two movements followed different routes: the aims remained the same but their methods were different. CND used propaganda and persuasion while DAC organized such actions as sit-down strikes to arouse attention. As DAC was much more direct it is not surprising that it organized the first Aldermaston protest in the spring of 1958. MOL (National Archives of Hungary) XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449. 1.

*aim expressed in a Policy Statement adopted on 10 April 1958: „to assist the conducting of non-violent direct action to obtain the total renunciation of nuclear war and its weapons by Britain and all other countries as a first step in disarmament”.*<sup>25</sup> The other organization, the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT), was the principal predecessor of CND itself in both organizational and ideological terms.<sup>26</sup>

In 1957 (2 November), the *New Statesman* magazine published an article by J. B. Priestley (this article's title was: „*Britain and the Nuclear Bombs*”) which criticized Aneurin Bevan's (among other things he was the Minister of Health in the post-war Attlee government)<sup>27</sup> attitude because he came out against the suggestion demanding for unilateral nuclear disarmament by Britain.<sup>28</sup> „*One 'ultimate weapon', the final deterrent, succeeds another. After the nuclear bombs, the intercontinental rockets and after the rockets the guided-missile nuclear submarine. But all this is to the good we are told, because no men in their right minds would let loose such powers of destruction. Here is the realistic view. Any criticism of it is presumed to be based on wild idealism. But surely it is the wildest idealism to assume that men will always behave reasonably and in line with their best interests? (...)*”<sup>29</sup> So Priestley's article led to – indirectly or directly – a new movement which tried to fight against the nuclear arms race: this was CND, the very first meeting of which was held at the end of November in the rooms of Canon John Collins to launch the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.<sup>30</sup>

### ***The prosperous period***

*„The lack of autonomous relations generates widespread social alienation. Alienation heightens responsiveness to the appeal of mass movements because they provide occasions for expressing resentment against what is, as well as promises of a totally different world. In short, people who are atomized readily become mobilized.” (William Kornhauser)<sup>31</sup>*

At the first meeting on 21 January 1958 it was agreed to ask Bertrand Russell, the scientist (about him later) to become president of the new campaign. CND was formally arranged and launched after this meeting. The

---

<sup>25</sup> Archive of the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War - <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/library/special-collections/collections/archive-of-the-direct-action-committee-against-nuclear-war/> - 2013. 05. 28.

<sup>26</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 5.

<sup>27</sup> See his life shortly: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic\\_figures/bevan\\_aneurin.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/bevan_aneurin.shtml) - 2013. 05. 26.

<sup>28</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 278.

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-160273199/britain-and-the-nuclear-bombs> - 2013. 05. 10. The original article: J. B. Priestley: Britain and the Nuclear Bombs. *New Statesman*, 2 November 1957.

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.newstatesman.com/society/2007/02/nuclear-world-britain-power> - 2013. 01. 18.

<sup>31</sup> PARKIN (1968): 15.

second meeting with the newly elected members took place at Amen Court on 28 January 1958: this was a really important meeting because a number of significant decisions was taken at it. Canon Collins and Peggy Duff were the dominant figures in the CND leadership during the whole period of CND's success.<sup>32</sup> It was agreed that the executive committee itself „be constituted as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament”. This formal, organizational structure was the determining sign of CND's policy for several years until the pressure for a more democratic structure became too strong to resist. Richard Taylor says that „this was a strongly held élitist view”. As Arthur Gross put it: „we didn't want membership – either people supported us or they didn't support us (...) this is the campaign we are running (...) there's nothing wrong with being self-perpetuating.”<sup>33</sup> The issue was decided finally at the Central Hall meeting on 17 February 1958. The meeting ended in a big success. Not only the Central Hall was filled with 5.000 people but three overflow halls.<sup>34</sup> The aim of the Campaign was to press for a British initiative to reduce the nuclear danger and to halt the armaments race. In CND's opinion Great Britain must: „renounce unconditionally the use or production of nuclear weapons and refuse to allow their use by others in her defence; use her utmost endeavour to bring about negotiations at all levels for agreement to end the armaments race and to lead to a general disarmament convention; invite the co-operation of other nations, particularly non-nuclear powers, in her renunciation of nuclear weapons.” They believe that Britain must: „halt the patrol flights of aeroplanes equipped with nuclear weapons; make no further test of nuclear weapons; not proceed with the agreement for the establishment of missile basis on her territory; refuse to provide nuclear weapons for any other countries.”<sup>35</sup>

After the meeting a few hundred people went to demonstrate at Downing Street. From this moment on CND became a „national Movement” with considerable and apparent support.<sup>36</sup> So we can say that the new organisation had substantial and considerable public interest as early as its birth and draw support from scientists, religious leaders, academics, journalists, writers, actors, musicians and so on. It claimed to be the largest single-issue and extra-parliamentary peace campaign in Europe.

How this movement tried to reach and get touch with average people? One of the most important methods was the Aldermaston March. Between 1959 and 1965 CND organized the Aldermaston March,<sup>37</sup> which was held over the Easter

---

<sup>32</sup> Who were the main members of CND? Canon Collins was the elected chairman of CND, proposed by Michael Foot and seconded by J. B. Priestly; Ritchie Calder became vice-chairman and Peggy Duff, organizing secretary. TAYLOR (1988): 22.

<sup>33</sup> From Arthur Gross and Richard Taylor's conversation (January 1978). Ibid. 23.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. 26.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. 27.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. 27-28.

<sup>37</sup> See: Dick NETTLETON: *Peace and the Easter March*. IN: *The Labour Monthly*, April, 1968. 160-162.

weekend from the Atomic Weapons Establishment near Aldermaston to Trafalgar Square in London. But the first march was organized by not CND but DAC: the Aldermaston March at Easter 1958 was organized by the Direct Action Committee supported by CND after some unwillingness at the beginning.<sup>38</sup> As I mentioned earlier CND had not agreed with the methods used by DAC [see different forms of civilian disobedience – there will be similar problems in case of the Committee of 100 created later – the writer's remark]. CND tried to reach its aims in a constitutional way at the same time it took over the organizing of the Aldermaston Marches in 1959.<sup>39</sup> These marches were very important in the life of the movement.

The importance of the Easter Peace Marches is shown by the fact that even the Magyar Filmhíradó (Hungarian Newsreel) the number one Newsreel of Hungary a country behind the Iron Curtain dealt with the events. It reported in details about the Easter March in 1959, 1963. As the subject matter of the present essay is to introduce the history and politics of CND from Hungarian point of view. I find it important to quote from the scripts of the Magyar Filmhíradó (Hungarian Newsreel) in connection with the Aldermaston Peace Marches. *„The English peacefighters' march started from Aldermaston a town 80 kms from London. They were marching for 4 days till they got to London. They protested against atomic bases being built in England. All the countries of the British Empire were represented in the peace march. Since the end of World War II this has been the greatest protest for peace in England.”*<sup>40</sup> Four years passed and by 1963 CND had such an effect on the crowds of people that the British government was afraid of its influence. The Hungarian Newsreel reported on the March showing how the police dealt with the protesters: *„(...) The protesters were received by policemen, police cars and prison vans in the side streets of the British Parliament. 72 people were arrested.”*<sup>41</sup> Although in the early 1960-ies CND was on the way of decline.

---

<sup>38</sup> Early defections in march to Aldermaston, 5 April 1958. *„Some five hundred men, women, and children were spreading out sleeping-bags and thankfully washing their feet in various church halls in Hounslow last night after marching the eleven miles from Trafalgar Square on the first lap of their descent upon Aldermaston. About a thousand more had returned to their homes in London, perhaps to march again to-day. A lamplight meeting in the well-named Treaty Road, Hounslow, had evoked the first really lusty cheers of the day as Mr Michael Foot denounced the recent Defence White Paper as "the most shameful statement ever made by a British Government." It was Mr Foot who had cried from the plinth on Nelson's Column in the morning, as a cold sun played on some four thousand faces: "This can be the greatest march in English history (...)."* - <http://century.guardian.co.uk/1950-1959/Story/0,,105488,00.html> – 2013. 01. 16.

<sup>39</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449. 2.

<sup>40</sup> Magyar Filmhíradó 1959/16.1959. április - Tüntetés Angliában (Demonstration in Great Britain) <http://www.filmintezet.hu/uj/hirado/> - 2013. 01. 16.

<sup>41</sup> Magyar Filmhíradó 1963/17.1963. április - Béketüntetések Európában (Peace demonstrations in Europe) <http://www.filmintezet.hu/uj/hirado/> - 2013. 01. 16.

### **The behind – the – scenes of CND**

*„CND was more or less accurately a cross section of the community. It was incredible: you could call a meeting in some small town and there was a vicar, and a few (...) middle class people, a few trade union people, the odd anarchist etc (...) even with fairly small committees in CND (...) you always got this kind of cross section of people (...)” (Dick Nettleton)<sup>42</sup>*

I can not mention everything concerning CND's background and supporters but this isn't the task of mine. What I would like to do is to outline in a few sentences where CND's supporters were of. There's no doubt that it was very successful on international level and had supporters within the several tendencies of both sides of the Iron Curtain. It is even more interesting which strata of society its supporters were of in Great Britain and how CND's anti-political commitment turned to be political.

From the outsider's point of view CND was successful for a long time but if we make researches into its history we can meet the problems which led – sooner or later – its decline. The source of problems in the history of this movement – as well as in others – was the inner ideological contradiction and the unsolvable difference in the ways the movement's leaders wanted to follow to reach their aims.

One of the biggest problems was that the movement supporters were deeply divided in almost everything except the issue of nuclear disarmament and this meant a conflict in the course of years. In the early years of the Campaign this diversity was on balance a strength.<sup>43</sup> As time passed, the frustrations of the Movement's failure to reach its objectives and aims became bigger, the mentioned diversity changed to being a „key factor” in the bitter divisions and internal conflicts. These conflicts caused – directly or indirectly – the final decline of CND and this division contributed to the split within the movement. With Richard Taylor's own words: *„in the first years this moral commitment swept along the diverse ideologies in what appeared to be a common cause of overriding importance. Emotional, committed, sincere, internationalist, liberal, and above all convinced of the urgent moral imperative of nuclear disarmament, the rank and file marched and demonstrated in their tens of thousand through 1958, 1959, and 1960, and beyond in the belief that „the world” could not ignore their call of sanity and morality.”<sup>44</sup>*

What was the churches' attitude to the nuclear problem? *„Like British society itself the churches have been sharply divided in their attitude to the hydrogen bomb and nuclear war, not across denominational lines so much as within the*

---

<sup>42</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 36. (From the conversation of Richard Taylor and Dick Nettleton).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. 36.

<sup>44</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 37.



*denominations themselves. (...) CND on the other hand was conspicuously successful in recruiting from the younger age-groups of both sexes. This was another object lesson to the church as far as Christian radicals were concerned.*<sup>45</sup> In any case the Christian influence among the rank and file of CND was important and strong and its representative collaboration was really big.<sup>46</sup> So „*at the leadership level of CND, however, the combination of a Christian-based moralism and a hard-headed and astute political commitment to the 'Labouric tactic' was dominant.*”<sup>47</sup>

The leadership of the movement always considered the Labour Party as the „*natural vehicle*” for carrying CND policy into effect. What did it mean? There was at first an antipathy towards politics as such and in the early period of CND the leadership policy was to keep MPs of any political party out of membership of the executive or other committees.<sup>48</sup> But this attitude soon changed and this change was really interesting. There was an early and clear commitment and obligation to political action through the Labour Party. „*If CND were going to be at all successful, it would need to take into consideration political expediences, and to gear itself to the realities of Britain's parliamentary democracy (...) one of our first aims should be to win a majority for CND policy within the Labour Party, and a second, so to put the case for British nuclear disarmament to the British public as a whole that, at a general action, a Labour Party committed to our policy would be returned to power.*”<sup>49</sup> (Canon Collins)

The genuineness of this apolitical stance was always questionable<sup>50</sup> in CND's and first of foremost in Canon Collins policy – and we see this question and contradiction of principle later again in my essay.

### ***The beginning of the CND – Hungarian connection***

*„There hasn't been such a well-organized world movement of mankind as the present international peace movement.”*<sup>51</sup>

From the very beginning of the 1950-ies Hungary took a deep interest in the British peace movement. Reports dealing with the general situation and significance of the peace movement were continuously made. No matter what the event was - a conference a congress a meeting or just a demonstration - it appeared in the Hungarian reports. The number of the mentioned reports can't be

---

<sup>45</sup> PARKIN (1968): 60. 69.

<sup>46</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 37.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. 42.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. 275.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 275-276.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. 275.

<sup>51</sup> Magyar Filmhíradó 1950/45.1950. november – „*A békéért harcolunk*” („*We are fighting for peace*”) (magyar békekongresszus – Hungarian peace congress) - <http://www.filmintezet.hu/uj/hirado/> - 2013. 01. 16.

neglected but as far as CND is concerned the number of files is much fewer. This is due to the difficulties of getting in touch with the British peace organization - being on opposite political sides and the lack of confidence.

CND was one of the most significant peace movement organizations and as such it meant a sort of a „bridge” between the two opposite political systems - as the desire for peace was the same in both political camps. The connection with CND proved to be useful for the Hungarian policy - all sorts of information about the events of the West were really important. In short we can state that there was real and understandable interest on Hungary's side. With the help of the peace movement Hungary tried to get into the international circulation and to get continuous information about the events beyond the Iron Curtain.

*„The Hungarian peace movement would like to have a closer connection with the British peace movement as the former connection broke in a consequence of the 1956 counter-revolution. To reach this it is necessary that the Peace Council be aware of the opinion of the British peace movement leaders about the most significant issues, the size of the movement, its influence, etc.”<sup>52</sup> One of the decisive steps of this process was that the Hungarian side tried to get in touch with the leaders of CND, with Canon Collins.*

At the beginning of 1960 a delegation comprised of the leading personalities of the World Peace Council had talks with Canon Collins in London (Professor V. M. Csikvadze, Soviet Secretary of WPC attended the talks): this meeting was held to find possibilities for cooperation. On 6 January 1960 the Hungarian Embassy reported the talks successful. During the talks Canon Collins was not speaking clearly in „the Hungarian question” but did not deny getting in touch with Hungary.<sup>53</sup> We can say the connections started here. It was very important for the Hungarian Embassy that Canon Collins shouldn't deny a visit to Hungary. Here is the report of the Hungarian Embassy: *„We did the necessary steps to get in touch with Collins. Comrade Kanyó has been in contact with Mrs. Peggy Duff,<sup>54</sup> the organizing secretary of CND and having received the order he wrote a letter to Peggy Duff in which we invited her for dinner to discuss the possible connections with Collins and to ask for her help.”<sup>55</sup> From the report it comes to light that the Hungarian side possibly wanted to have the meeting in spring (4 April) but Peggy Duff denied this date because of the Eastern Campaign. The aim of the planned visit was to make possible that a Hungarian delegation could take part the International Youth Conference (10 April) that was organized to stop nuclear armament.<sup>56</sup>*

---

<sup>52</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 001101. (31 January 1958)

<sup>53</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964) 54. d. 160. tétel. 00139.

<sup>54</sup> Peggy Duff was born 8 February 1910 and died 16 April 1981. She was a British political activist. She became the Organising Secretary for CND. In this time she organized the second and further Aldermaston marches from 1959 to 1963. - <http://toxipedia.org/display/wanmec/Peggy+Duff> - 2013. 03. 10.

<sup>55</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964) 54.d. 160. tétel. 00139/1.

<sup>56</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964) 54.d. 160. tétel. 00139/1.

After long preparation, cancelling and postponing several meetings on 30 June 1960 Collins and the Hungarian part (the competent member of staff of the embassy) met (Collins asked Mr. Bradshaw, sculptor to attend the meeting). In the course of discussion the staff member outlined the situation of the churches in Hungary, the relation between the state and the churches. He stressed that despite several rumours people can practise their religion freely, the churches are subsidized by the state and the majority of the clergy backs the government policy. Collins was informed that the prohibition of war propaganda and all sorts of racism were codified in Hungary. During the discussion the Hungarian side expressed his view that he highly appreciated the CND's policy and the cooperation of the peace movements of different countries. Collins did not say if he found it appropriate to involve Hungary in the peace movement.<sup>57</sup>

During the discussion Collins remarked: he wanted to organize such an international conference „*which would accept a basic principle: no country should permit foreign military basis on its territory and foreign troops should be withdrawn.*” Collins believed this could be an important step toward general disarmament but – he added - he would consider this effective if both the USA and the Soviet Union consent to this.<sup>58</sup> And he added that the movement of CND was getting stronger and it had numerous supporters in the Labour Party. He remarked he wasn't pro-communist, underlined that he relied on all sorts of social strata and stressed: the movement was independent of parties and of communists as well. This is important remark – he said – otherwise his opponents would condemn him as pro-communist so many people would be scared and would abandon the movement.<sup>59</sup>

The Embassy reported on 4 October 1960 that CND started a campaign to reach its goals. With the support and cooperation of 10 youth organizations CND carried out a canvass for support in several towns in Britain. They demanded „*Great Britain to destroy its nuclear weapons, liquidate the American basis on its territory so that it could play a leading role – being neutral – in the process of general and total disarmament.*”<sup>60</sup> The same year on 3rd September another demonstration (organized by CND) began. A group of 50 people marched from Edingburgh to London arriving on 24th. The aim of this march was to drum up more supporters for the peace movement on the way via Manchester, Birmingham, Bolton etc. The demonstrators arrived at Trafalgar Square in London at 4 o'clock p.m. on 24th September where several thousand people greeted them.<sup>61</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 004771/1. (22 July 1960)

<sup>58</sup> I must add to the standpoint of the Hungarian party that is perhaps not surprising: neither the USA nor the other western countries will agree to this as they have rejected the proposals of the USSR several times. MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 004771/1. (22 July 1960)

<sup>59</sup> At the end of the meeting Canon Collins were given two books of Hungarian relation: To the cities of Europe, Liberated Hungary. MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 004771/1. (22 July 1960)

<sup>60</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 006804. 1.

<sup>61</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 006804. 1.

On the 2nd October CND organized a demonstration in Scarborough just before the opening session of the annual conference of the Labour Party. This demonstration beyond the above mentioned aims of the movement „was against the alarm system to be built on the ground of Flyingdale. As is known this radar-system is being built on the expenses of the USA and Great Britain. The cost of the system is £60 million the 40% of which is covered by Britain. Some weeks ago a missile specialist had a lecture on TV about this alarm system (...) he said that the system gave 4 minutes for the British missile units and squadrons to be ready for a counter-attack and the civilians to find shelters.”<sup>62</sup> In Britain because of the above mentioned reasons there was great anxiety. CND made efforts to turn this anxiety for the benefit of the movement and tried to recruit supporters. According to the information of the Hungarian Embassy the demonstration was aimed directly at a wing of the Labour Party led by Hugh Todd Naylor Gaitskell<sup>63</sup> and his policy. „The demonstrators marched in front of Gaitskell’s hotel protesting against atomic and hydrogen arms. The crowd of 5.000 demonstrators demanded Gaitskell to resign. Among the demonstrators were J. Collins (...), Ian Mikardo, John Horner who attended the Party Conference as party delegates.” The report remarks – as I mentioned earlier – that Collins declared CND was not a political movement and it was not organized as a political party. But the above mentioned facts seem to be inconsistent with this statement.<sup>64</sup>

### **Decline of CND**

*„The task of the man-of-science is not only to tackle sciences the object of which is the human being but – and this is much more difficult – to make the world believe what he has discovered. If his efforts aren’t crowned with success the human being will destroy himself with his cleverness got stuck halfway.”<sup>65</sup> (Bertrand Russell)*

The crisis of CND in the early 1960-ies was caused by several reasons: political and ideological conflicts within the movement (see the creation of Committee of 100) the attitude of the governing parties to CND, the political and military events of the world (see the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962). From among the above mentioned factors I’d like to deal with the Committee of 100 in details.

The differences within CND sharply appeared in 1960: the split in two was unavoidable. On September 1960 Bertrand Russell<sup>66</sup> resigned from the Campaign

---

<sup>62</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 006804. 2.

<sup>63</sup> He was born on 9 April 1906 and died on 18 January 1963. „He successfully, resisted attempts to commit Labour to an unilateralist position on nuclear weapons – losing the vote in 1960 and then rousing his supporters to „fight, fight and fight again to save the party we love”. - <http://www.encyclopedia4u.com/h/hugh-gaitskell.html> - 2013. 05. 12.

<sup>64</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 006804. 2.

<sup>65</sup> Bertrand RUSSELL, <http://www.citatum.hu/idezet/7351> - 2013.01. 16.

<sup>66</sup> Bertrand Russell joined the international politics in the early 1950-ies and became an active

for Nuclear Disarmament in order to set up a new organization the Committee of 100 which became, de facto, the direct action wing of CND. Russell thought that this step was necessary because the press was losing interest in CND and because the danger of nuclear war was so great that it was needed to hinder government preparations for it. He explained his reasons in an article in the *New Statesman* in February 1961. „*The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has done and is doing valuable and very successful work to make known the facts, but the press is becoming used to its doings and beginning to doubt their news value. It has therefore seemed to some of us necessary to supplement its campaign by such actions as the press is sure to report. There is another, and perhaps more important reason for the practice of civil disobedience in this time of utmost peril. There is a very widespread feeling that however bad their policies may be, there is nothing that private people can do about it. This is a complete mistake. If all those who disapprove of government policy were to join massive demonstrations of civil disobedience they could render government folly impossible and compel the so-called statesmen to acquiesce in measures that would make human survival possible. Such a vast movement, inspired by outraged public opinion is possible, perhaps it is imminent. If you join it you will be doing something important to preserve your family, compatriots and the world.*”<sup>67</sup>

The Committee of 100 was set up because of two reasons. I mentioned above the first problem, the second conflict was caused by a personal enmity between Collins and Russell. For Canon Collins, the ‘birth’ of the Committee was a really big problem, concretely a disaster. „*With the advent of the Committee of 100 came bickerings, misunderstandings, irreconcilable attitudes and strained loyalties which inevitably reduced the effectiveness of the Campaign (...) in my view, particularly coming at the time it did, the launching of the Committee of 100 was a serious blow to the Campaign, and one from which it never fully recovered.*”<sup>68</sup> In its report the Hungarian Embassy stated that Collins didn’t agree at all with the creation of this organization. „*Not because Collins wouldn’t like to employ more efficient means and to reach CND’s aims as soon as possible (...) He doesn’t support such actions because he is aware of the fact that they do more harm than good. Namely the action proposed by Russell are unlawful. Therefore it can’t be expected that Russell’s initiatives would meet wide approval.*”<sup>69</sup> Although the Committee of 100 was supported by many in CND, the separation involved serious consequences: the campaign against nuclear weapons was weakened by the

---

participant of the peace movement. He condemned the explosion of the H-bomb on Bikini-Atoll in 1954. Together with Albert Einstein and other Nobel-prize winners he issued a declaration in which he invited the scientists of East and West for a conference. This meant the beginning of the Pugwash-movement the Chairman of which he was elected in 1957. In 1958 he became the leader of people demanding nuclear disarmament. - <http://mult-kor.hu/cikk.php?id=9132&print=1> – 2013. 01. 18.

<sup>67</sup> Bertrand RUSSELL: „*Civil Disobedience*”, *New Statesman*, 17 February 1961. 245-246.

<sup>68</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 62.

<sup>69</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 006804. 3.

conflict and the tension between the two organisations. Its methods significantly differ from that of CND's: „they have illegal radio stations and in some districts they use the BBC's wavelength when the daily program is over. They have created an industrial committee to drum up strikes in order to fight for their unilateralist demands. The Committee of 100 violent protests against the US base at Holy Loch. Its speciality was to have sit-down strikes in front of ministries, at military basis”, on main squares of London etc.<sup>70</sup>

So Bertrand Russell encouraged civilian people to be disobedient. On 18th February he organized a mass sit-down strike on the door of the Ministry of Defence against the production of nuclear and hydrogen arms and against the testing of these arms.<sup>71</sup> More than 5.000 people attended the protest. The declaration made for this occasion was as follows: „The nuclear power of East and West are holding the people of the world to ransom. It is time for the people to act. Today we are taking positive action against the insane nuclear policies of our Government. We demand the immediate scrapping of the agreement to base Polaris carrying submarines in Britain. We demand the complete rejection by our country of nuclear weapons and all policies and alliances that depend upon them. (...) Today the nuclear tyrants of East and West threaten the entire human race with extinction. We call upon people everywhere to rise up against this monstrous tyranny. We call upon the scientists to refuse to work on nuclear weapons. We call upon workers to black all work connected with them and to use their industrial strength in the struggle for life. We call upon people from all walks of life to take direct action to bring the production of nuclear weapons to a halt. Our action today is the first step in a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience. We hereby serve notice on our Government that we can no longer stand aside while they prepare to destroy mankind.”<sup>72</sup>

According to reports from the Hungarian Embassy in London the British MPs denounce the actions against different military basis because the Committee of 100 violated the Official Secret Act. It means that when the Committee was preparing for a protest „maps were made which showed not only the basis but the bomb depositions as well.”<sup>73</sup>

In April 1961 a large-scale demonstration started on Parliament Square, London during which 800 people were arrested by the police.<sup>74</sup> In September 1961 Russell organized another demonstration. 1.300 protesters were arrested among them Bertrand Russell.<sup>75</sup> The 89 year-old Russell was sentenced to 2 months in prison but because of his illness he had to spend only seven days in Brixton Prison.

---

<sup>70</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449. 2.

<sup>71</sup> At the same time a right-of-centre organization Empire Loyalists started a counter-demonstration during which the leaders of Committee of 100 were assaulted. Russell wasn't hurt. MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 003100. (293/1961.)

<sup>72</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 003100. – letter and declaration of Committee of 100.

<sup>73</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449. 2.

<sup>74</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449.

<sup>75</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449.

The Hungarian standpoint concerning this new organization was that the Committee of 100 „influences CND to follow an unhealthy route – that is to be more active. They become active without having political aims. The Committee doesn't offer alternatives. It has no effect on masses of people in the country. It has no policy.”<sup>76</sup>

Following the split of the movement in 1960 beyond demonstrations several conferences were held in Great Britain. The Conference for International Disarmament was held in London on 14-15-16th of September 1961<sup>77</sup> convened by Canon Collins. The conference was initiated by World Peace Council but was organized by the Catholic Action associated with Collins. The probable aim of the Catholic Action was „to gather representatives of as many countries as possible”. At the conference Hungary was represented by Árpád Szakasits and Iván Főti (from the World Peace Council's Office in Vienna). The III. point of the declaration accepted by all the participants condemned the restart of nuclear tests – and this was backed by the Hungarians as well.<sup>78</sup>

Based on the Hungarian Embassy's reports I believe that Hungary seemed to appreciate CND – its aims, methods. The Embassy's standpoint always reflected the political atmosphere in Hungary and is not surprising that it was „moderate” almost all the time. This can be proved by an extract of a report written in December 1961: „CND is more progressive, its aims are developing. It has not only one negative demand – Ban the bomb! – but it opposes more and more the policy of the military blocks. There's an opportunity that this movement weaken the unity of western capitalist countries mainly because of its silent anti-NATO attitude.”<sup>79</sup>

CND's decline as a mass movement accelerated, and by 1965 it was regarded by almost all as an „exhausted” force. „The Movement, which had begun with such high hopes and such massive support in 1957-58 and had grown rapidly into the largest and most important mass movement of recent British times, had been at its peak in 1959-61. From 1962 it was in crisis and slow decline, and, by the end of 1963 that decline [...] was irreversible. By 1965 it was apparent to all that the first mass movement against nuclear weapons was dead.”<sup>80</sup>

What way Hungary and the Hungarian policy related to the movement of CND is not a question to be decided and it can't be. Independent of policy in every-day life the problem of using nuclear energy for peaceful or unpeaceful purposes, the fear of a possible nuclear war united the people of different sides. The present essay tried to show and prove that the people of antagonistic camps, certain strata and groups of nations were ready to sit at a conference table, to back the same

---

<sup>76</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449. 4.

<sup>77</sup> Before that 9-14 September 1961 the International Youth and Student's Conference was held also in London. Collins addressed the opening of the Conference condemning the countries which didn't give passports to students (e.g. Japan). MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 007333. 1.

<sup>78</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 007333. 1-2.

<sup>79</sup> MOL XIX-J-1-j Nagy-Britannia (1945-1964). 54. d. 160. tétel. 00449. 4.

<sup>80</sup> TAYLOR (1988): 112.

movement, to fight for the same aims when they faced a world-wide problem – the threat of nuclear armament was such a problem. The way the current political leadership related to the same issue is a totally different question: scepticism, cautiousness and permanent control characterized both sides. But these „*political arms*” were used within a given country as well – there was no need to cross borders and oceans – all these were reflected in the history of CND.

The peace movements couldn't reach total success against nuclear disarmament not even CND's policy was enough to find a solution suitable for all sides – but it wasn't possible in the given area. The different political tendencies, the governments didn't support nuclear disarmament in every case and didn't seem to hear „*the cry*” of the general public. CND – although the 1960-ies meant a failure – was a significant and internationally important movement in the period of the Cold War with which even the socialist countries of the opposite camp (see Hungary) wanted to get in touch. Although the Cold War and the Iron Curtain formed a gap among the countries I believe that nuclear armament and the fear of atomic tests unified the average people to fight for the same thing on both sides of the symbolical wall.



## *American studies*

- Dominican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican immigration to New York
- Acculturation of Armenians in the United States
- the United States and the Falklands Crisis



**Cserhádi Ferenc**

## ***The History of Dominican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican Immigration to New York***

### **Abstract**

This study offers a description of the historical aspect of Dominican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican immigration to New York. The common link between the immigrants making up the three immigrant minority groups is the common characteristics they have. There were armed conflicts in the history of the home country of all three groups. The members of the three immigrant groups kept close political connections to the mother country throughout their history. Members of the Cuban, Dominican, and Puerto Rican immigrant communities in New York all arrived there in especially large numbers after World War II when there were economic problems in their home country. The population of the three immigrant groups in New York constantly grew. The Cubans, Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans were especially important immigrant groups within the Latino population of New York.

*Keywords:* New York, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, immigration, labor force, politics

**F**rom the late 1970s to the mid-1980s around half a million immigrants were admitted to the United States each year with the status of permanent resident alien. Between fifteen to twenty percent of these immigrants chose to live in New York. The 1980 census reported that of the foreign-born population of the United States, twelve percent resides in New York.<sup>1</sup> Recent immigrants have influenced the labor market in New York. This city and its receiving population have had an impact on newly arriving immigrants. They have conditioned the process of their settlement, adjustment, and mobility. At the same time that immigrants were streaming into New York, the native-born moved out. By 1980 around 27 percent of the population of the New York metropolitan area was foreign-born.<sup>2</sup> The Immigration and Naturalization Service recorded that between 1971 and 1980 seventy percent of the legal immigrants coming to New York were from Asia, Latin America, and the non-Hispanic Caribbean. The immigrants coming from these areas have a high rate of participation in the labor force, thus impacting New York's economy. Immigrants from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic coming to New York after 1965 are so-called „*new immigrants*”.

It is widely known that the magnitude of immigration to the United States

---

<sup>1</sup> Nancy FONER: *New Immigrants in New York*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1987. 35.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, 80.

increased greatly after 1965, the year the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was passed. This explosive wave of immigration was made up of migrants mostly from Asia, the non-Hispanic Caribbean, and Latin America. The number of Europeans coming to the United States has declined to a great extent. The latest waves of immigrants have as their destination large cities.<sup>3</sup> New York is one of these large metropolitan areas. In 1980 the only major city in the United States that had a similar immigrant population to New York was Los Angeles. Many Cubans settled in Miami. Economic incentives have drawn many immigrants to New York. In the 1970s there was high unemployment in New York, but many immigrants settled there, even though there was a high ratio of native-born workers to the amount of available jobs. The demand for labor grew only negligibly.<sup>4</sup> The distribution of immigrants in employment depended on alternative economic opportunities open to them and the socio-demographic composition of the various migration streams to the city. Manufacturing was an area where immigrants were employed in great numbers throughout the 1970s. The employment of immigrants in manufacturing and certain other economic areas had a great impact on the economy of New York.<sup>5</sup>

Since the late nineteenth century New York has been a city that served as a center for the international labor migration and transculturation of Latin American and Caribbean groups. New York gained the status of a world city at this time and was the site of political, cultural, and economic activity. From the Caribbean and Latin American world came scores of merchants, writers, artisans, and political activists.<sup>6</sup> In New York famous Latin American and Caribbean political and ideological figures lived and worked, such as Ramón Emeterio Betances, Eugenio María de Hostos, and Inocencia Martínez. The labor movement and the pan-African movement owed much to Latin Americans and immigrants from the Caribbean region who made New York their home. After a summary of Latin American and Caribbean immigration to New York, this study discusses the historical background of the immigration of members of three Caribbean countries to this city. It will describe the historical aspects of the immigration and condition of the Dominicans, Cubans, and the Puerto Ricans in more detail. The history of Cuban, Dominican, and Puerto Rican immigration to New York is closely related to each other. The three Caribbean groups have certain characteristics in common: a history of conflict in their native countries, American intervention, economic and political turmoil, and the opportunities of migration to New York and other areas of the United States, especially between World War II and the economic crisis of the 1970s. The political activities of these three Caribbean groups living in New York were important aspects of their lives.

---

<sup>3</sup> Nancy FONER: 79.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 79.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, 80.

<sup>6</sup> Agustín LAÓ-MONTES - Arlene DÁVILA: *Mambo Montage: The Latinization of New York*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001. 18.

Starting in the 1970s the character and composition of the Latino segment of the population of New York began to change. Because of the economic crisis of the era massive waves of immigrants came to the United States, among them Latin Americans and inhabitants of the Caribbean region leaving bad economic situations in their home countries. The American economy began to be restructured, with industry moving away from New York.<sup>7</sup> At the same time many people moved to metropolitan areas such as New York. In 1980 there were 1,406,024 people of Latin American descent in New York, but by 1990 this number had increased to 1,783,511 (or 23.7 percent of the total population of New York).<sup>8</sup> Of the Latin Americans present in New York in 1990, 72.1 percent was Caribbean or Caribbean descent. The Puerto Ricans made up 50.3 percent of the New York Latin American population and the Dominicans 18.7 percent. The Cubans made up 3.1 percent of the Latin Americans in New York in 1990. Other important Latin American groups in 1990 were the Colombians, the Ecuadorians, and the Mexicans. The Colombians made up the third largest Latino group and have great cultural influence in the life of New York. When the U.S. Census records the number of Latin Americans living in New York, there is a fairly large margin of error. A culturally and socially biased method of collection leads to their numbers being undercounted. Apart from this practice, there are many undocumented Latin American immigrants present in New York.<sup>9</sup>

The Cuban War for Independence, which ended in 1898, had fundamental importance in the way it altered the ethnic makeup of the Latin American minority of New York, drawing vast numbers from Latin America and the Caribbean region. When the United States won the conflict, it emerged as a great power. The United States continued to intervene in the affairs of Latin America and the Hispanic Caribbean. This was inherent in the way Latin American countries had to restructure their economies and political institutions. The United States opened up to immigrants and travelers, some of whom were Hispanics and came to New York. In the early 1900s Bernardo Vega, a Puerto Rican cigar maker, socialist, and immigrant to New York, wrote that New York was a central area for Hispanic Caribbean cigar producers who set up their stores there and also created a working-class sphere.<sup>10</sup>

In the year 1920 the city of New York took a census of its inhabitants. Some of the statistics on the Hispanic minority show that close to forty percent of it was made up of Caribbean Hispanics. There were 41,094 New Yorkers of Hispanic descent. Around 21 percent of these inhabitants was Cuban or West Indian, almost nineteen percent was Central or South American, almost eighteen percent was

---

<sup>7</sup> LAÓ-MONTES - DÁVILA: 22.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, 22.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, 23.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 19.

Puerto Rican, and around 36 percent was Spanish.<sup>11</sup> New York thus earned the reputation of being a unique center for pan-Hispanic congregation. The 1920s was a special era in the history of New York, because many Hispanic organizations and Hispanic neighborhoods came into existence at this time. The Hispanic neighborhoods were known by their Spanish name of *colonias hispanas*. By 1930 the Hispanic population of New York had more than doubled to 110,223, according to the U.S. Census. The number of Puerto Ricans rose to 44,908 (and accounted for about 41 percent of the New York Hispanic population).

New York was a city where Cubans and Puerto Ricans had settled, worked, and lived for a long time. It was the place where the famous José Martí based his political operation and later founded the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (Cuban Revolutionary Party), or PRC.<sup>12</sup> In the 1830s there came into existence Cuban and Puerto Rican anti-colonial movements. By this time there were already several Cuban and Puerto Rican exile newspapers, political organizations, and revolutionary groups. The high degree of political involvement on the part of New York Cubans and Puerto Ricans turned this city into an important factor in how these two ethnic groups would forge a common Antillean nation and yet preserve their loyalties as to what determined an individual Cuba or Puerto Rico. In 1865 the Sociedad Republicana de Cuba y Puerto Rico was founded, which was an important political club. Two other influential clubs were Los Clubs Borinquen and Las Dos Antillas. These three clubs stressed a single concept of nation which incorporated mutuality and the concept of cultural exclusivity.<sup>13</sup> Their members expressed their sympathy for the independence of Puerto Rico.

The Cubans and Puerto Ricans moving to New York had very different ideas of how to define their nation in the second half of the eighteenth century. In 1868 the Puerto Ricans revolted against the Spanish in the Grito de Lares, a revolt lasting about one month. The Cubans also revolted against the Spanish in 1868, starting a ten-year conflict. This was known as the Grito de Yara and was followed by the La Guerra Chiquita in 1879. The Cuban War for Independence, which began in 1895, was the third conflict against Spain, and resulted in Cuban independence in 1898. These conflicts deeply influenced how Cubans and Puerto Ricans in New York viewed themselves and their ethnic group.<sup>14</sup> Neither the Cubans nor the Puerto Ricans had a common view of how to view their community or their role in creating an independent home country. Both ethnic groups became deeply divided, and tensions arose. There were three groups opposing each other. These were the autonomists, the annexationists, and the so-called independentistas. The main issues causing division were class, race, and differing ideas of how the United

---

<sup>11</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 19.

<sup>12</sup> Alan BRINKLEY: *The Unfinished Nation A Concise History of the American People*, Volume 2. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2008. 539.

<sup>13</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 59.

<sup>14</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 57.

States should get involved in affairs concerning Cuba and Puerto Rico. The Puerto Ricans and Cubans in New York argued as how their homelands should be defined. They debated who their countries should include and exclude, once independence from Spain had been achieved. The immigrants in New York knew that they would have to cooperate in order to reach an agreement with those left on the two island countries as to what made their homeland a nation. The Cubans and Puerto Ricans living in New York also knew they would have to find another approach to the way they thought about their nation, identity, and community, as well as politics.<sup>15</sup>

Even before 1898, when the United States acquired Puerto Rico from Spain, Puerto Ricans had been immigrating to New York in search of industrial jobs. This migratory trend became more intense throughout the twentieth century. By the 1940s many Puerto Ricans preferred moving to New York so as to be able to survive economically, something more difficult if they stayed in Puerto Rico. At the time Puerto Rico was governed by Luis Muñoz Marín.<sup>16</sup> Due to the economic policies of Marín, around 500,000 Puerto Ricans had left their homeland by 1960 with hundreds of thousands of them migrating to New York. The Puerto Ricans succeeded in engulfing the other Latin American minority groups that had been residing there. Even before the massive wave of immigration of Puerto Ricans to New York, there had been Puerto Rican economic, civic, and religious institutions there. In the 1950s there was a decline in the economic interest in the Puerto Rican minority as a cheap labor pool.<sup>17</sup> In the 1960s and 1970s Puerto Rican immigration to New York slowed somewhat, but in the 1990s 250,000 Puerto Rican immigrants came to this city.<sup>18</sup> Many of the Puerto Ricans who came in this decade have by now become educated professionals.

In the era following the Cuban War for Independence the Cubans and Puerto Ricans living in New York found a way to solve their problem by attempting to create a mutual identity supported by alliances between the two ethnic groups. The Cubans and Puerto Ricans also tried to view their situation as a shared struggle. The Antillean nation that Cubans and Puerto Ricans wanted to create had to be completely economically and politically independent. The term "Antillean" was associated with a Caribbean region free of outside influence. Since they were wary of both the United States and Spain, the Cuban and Puerto Rican independentistas wished that Cuba and Puerto Rico be reconfigured in such a way that there would be no colonial influence whatsoever in the future in these two countries. Cubans and Puerto Ricans in New York decided that they would go the way of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica,

---

<sup>15</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 58.

<sup>16</sup> Eileen J. FINDLAY: *Portable Roots: Latin New Yorker Community Building and the Meanings of Women's Return Migration in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 1960-2000*. Caribbean Studies. Vol. 37, N° 2. 2009. 8-9.

<sup>17</sup> José Ramón SÁNCHEZ: *Boricua Power: A Political History of Puerto Ricans in the United States*, New York University Press, New York, 2007. 50.

<sup>18</sup> Eileen J. FINDLAY: 9.

and the West Indies as how to determine their identity and community. For the Cuban and Puerto Rican immigrants in New York one result of this new mode of defining their identity meant that the African connection – the African diasporas and the slave trade in the Caribbean area – gained importance. It was difficult for exiled Cuban and Puerto Ricans and their associated nationalist movements to negotiate the African question. Alfonso Schomburg, an Afro-Puerto Rican who took part in anti-colonialist movements, is credited with founding archives on African American history in New York. The Cuban and Puerto Rican ethnic groups of New York could refashion themselves to accommodate their political views.<sup>19</sup> Puerto Ricans and Cubans in New York often questioned the idea of the nation-state, pitting themselves against each other. They believed that simply being Cuban or Puerto Rican was frequently not enough to sustain the community. There were many attempts to forge a political community, but the method which Cubans and Puerto Ricans defined their nation and national identity constantly changed.

In the 1890s the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (PRC), a Cuban political party, decided to create the Sección Puerto Rico, which had the task of continuing the alliance-based politics, initiated decades earlier. The PRC was successful in creating a solid ethnic community and unifying the immigrant nationalist movement that had been in a state of fragmentation.<sup>20</sup> By this time the Cuban and Puerto Rican activists in New York had become preoccupied with the Cuban War for Independence and it appeared more and more certain that the United States would intervene in the conflict against Spain. The Cuban-Puerto Rican media in New York asked that Puerto Ricans, who were busy as activists or who were immigrants, concentrate on the ongoing war. They were asked for this sacrifice in exchange for the promise that upon winning the conflict, the energies and efforts of the Cuban-Puerto Rican movement would concentrate on Puerto Rico.

After the Cuban War for Independence the Cuban and Puerto Rican communities published many newspapers, magazines, and journals in New York. Three important newspapers were *El Yara*, *El Porvenir*, and *La Doctrina de Martí*.<sup>21</sup> They helped create a political community out of the Puerto Rican and Cuban ethnic groups and helped create and sustain the Puerto Rican and Cuban nationalist and separatist movements. The Puerto Rican revolutionary Sotero Figueroa founded the publication *La Revista Ilustrada* in 1890. It was an influential publication that discussed the political and cultural interests of Latin America. The goal of the Puerto Rican and Cuban media in New York was to inform and entertain Cuban and Puerto Rican immigrants. They also helped them adjust to life in New York at the time that many of them were moving there. One such newspaper was *La Gaceta del Pueblo*, which had a separatist bent. One article in this newspaper, written by Francisco Gonzalo Marín, gave newly arrived

---

<sup>19</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 58.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 59.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 59.



immigrants valuable advice on how to gain intimate knowledge of New York life. Examples of the advice he gave pertained to the noise of the trains in the city, the conditions to be encountered in the factories, and the bustling crowds of millions of New Yorkers. Marín used irony and a foreboding tone to describe the high buildings in order to make the newly arrived immigrants feel minute and to make them realize the differences between New York and their native country.<sup>22</sup> He wanted to tell the newcomers that even though in New York they were to encounter rapid industrialization, the incapability of speaking English could leave them feeling isolated. The ultimate goal of Marín was to construct a viable immigrant community in New York while creating a consciousness of the political affairs of the United States and how they affected Cuba and Puerto Rico. The United States had gigantic political, military, and economic power, which was taken into account by Cuban and Puerto Rican revolutionaries when they crafted their anti-American imperialist political platform. The United States was being used as a means to build nations externally. At the same time its imperialism was being resisted by these Cuban and Puerto Rican revolutionaries. In New York and elsewhere there was tension among the Cubans and Puerto Ricans as to which attitude they should adopt. They could either support annexation of Cuba and Puerto Rico or refuse any ties with the United States.

In the 1940s and 1950s there was a unique wave of Cuban immigrants moving to New York looking for work. One reason why they came was the serious political and economic crisis in Cuba.<sup>23</sup> Some Cubans who came to New York were musicians and were drawn to the film, radio, and music industries found there. The Cubans came in small numbers, and yet succeeded in accumulating the necessary symbolic capital to be able to represent New York's Latin culture. As part of the latinization of New York, Cuban and Puerto Rican nightclubs and restaurants opened. Their music also became emblematic of this process. Since the 1920s the Afro-Cuban group was visible in New York. Their Harlem vaudeville theaters of the 1920s experienced a heyday. Some of the religious traditions of the Afro-Cubans were Santería, Palo Monte, and Regla de Ocha. Beginning in the 1950s these religious traditions became highly influential in the africanization of New York.

After the 1959 revolution in Cuba, the Cuban minority living in New York and other parts of the United States enjoyed great economic success. This was due to several factors. Since the United States was waging the Cold War against communism, the American government gave the Cubans financial and political support. This aid was part of American policies such as the Cuban Refugee Program of 1961. In addition, the Cuban minority living in New York and other areas was already composed of members of the upper and middle class and were

---

<sup>22</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 60.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

mostly white. In 1960, the Cuban population of New York was 42,694, but by 1970 it had climbed to 84,179.<sup>24</sup> The fact that Cubans could achieve success in the United States alone resulted in the relocation of their numbers to other areas such as Miami. Between 1980 and 1990 the number of Cubans living in New York decreased from 63,189 to 56,041.<sup>25</sup> Cubans fleeing the dictatorships of Batista and Castro in the 1950s tended to settle in Jackson Heights and often had entrepreneurial experience and capital with which they established businesses.<sup>26</sup> Cuban commercial establishments were located on Roosevelt Avenue and lent a Latin flavor to the area. Cuba is a country which sent refugees to the United States, a country which had a special refugee policy. Due to this policy Cubans became prominent in New York.<sup>27</sup> Due to the 1959 revolution that took place in Cuba some Cubans chose exile in the United States, with some dissidents moving to New York. *Vida de club* is a monthly magazine that is read mainly by the Cuban elite that lives in cities such as New York, Miami, and San Juan. It neglects politics in favor of high society.<sup>28</sup> This magazine was first published in 1982 and offers valuable information on Cuban exile clubs in the United States. *Vida de club* is of good quality and is read mainly by rich Cubans in New York and other cities. The Cubans of exile clubs in New York and other cities in the United States and Puerto Rico are brought together by the magazine. This is important, because it seeks to establish continuity among the Cubans and preserve the connection still in existence between the era before the 1959 revolution and the present exodus.<sup>29</sup>

One famous Cuban American who lived for a time in New York was David Smith, a painter and sculptor. He was known for transforming sculpture by combining radical modern art with the American machine shop. He was born in 1906 in Decatur, Indiana and studied at Notre Dame and Ohio State. Later he traveled to New York, where he came into contact with European artists, who escaped from Nazi Germany, and their art. These artists made New York the art capital of the world, and David Smith lived in their midst. In New York David Smith began his artistic work as a painter, but then turned to constructivism.<sup>30</sup> David Smith's constructivism meant that small objects such as metal, glass, or bits of newspaper, were to be put on the picture. In this way he made what is termed a construction. At the point in time David Smith was making constructions, he stated that he had been a sculptor.

---

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

<sup>25</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 21.

<sup>26</sup> Ines M. MIYARES: *From Exclusionary Covenant to Ethnic Hyperdiversity in Jackson Heights*, *Queens, Geographical Review*. Vol. 94, N° 4. October, 2004. 474.

<sup>27</sup> Nancy FONER: *New Immigrants in New York*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001. 3.

<sup>28</sup> Jorge DUANY - José A. COBAS: *Cubans in Puerto Rico: Ethnic Economy and Cultural Identity*, University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 1997. 117.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, 117.

<sup>30</sup> Walter LAFEBER - Richard POLENBERG - Nancy WOLOCH: *The American Century A History of the United States Since the 1890s*, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2008. 358.

The Puerto Ricans came to enjoy a unique status among the Hispanics living in New York until the 1980s. There were multiple reasons for this, the first one being the Jones Act of 1917. It gave American citizenship to Puerto Ricans. Furthermore, Puerto Rico had a very poor economy and Puerto Ricans immigrated to the United States mainly for historic reasons. The Puerto Ricans thus became the dominant Hispanic ethnic group in New York. In short, Puerto Rican immigration to New York and elsewhere in the United States became very easy and helped define the political and legal conditions whereby Puerto Ricans became colonial citizens in the United States. By the late 1980s there were roughly one million Puerto Ricans living in New York, with many of them working in the garment trades. Even though the Puerto Ricans were officially American citizens, in New York they faced the difficulties that immigrants in general have to deal with. Language was one problem. Because the Puerto Rican spoke Spanish, they stayed in their own unique ethnic neighborhood where they placed signs in Spanish.<sup>31</sup> The Puerto Ricans living in New York actively engaged in economic, political, and cultural activities, which had great influence on the power they wielded. In 1919 there was a Puerto Rican cigar maker's strike, when the Puerto Rican ethnic community tried to build up its power.<sup>32</sup>

There was a decline in the trend of Puerto Ricans coming to New York in great numbers between the two world wars and especially during the economic depression of the 1930s. However, after World War II Puerto Rican immigration to New York increased dramatically. In the 1950s the exodus of Puerto Ricans to New York caused Puerto Rican writers who stayed behind to reflect on this migration, but did not write from the perspective of the Puerto Rican migrant.<sup>33</sup> These writers were unable to capture the complexity of the bilingualism of these communities and the experience of their bicultural members. In the thirty years after 1940, the Puerto Rican population of New York increased from 61,463 to 811,843.<sup>34</sup> A great number of Puerto Ricans became a special labor force that found employment in New York and other areas of the northeastern part of the United States. New York served as the first port of destination for many Puerto Ricans. In New York the Puerto Ricans came to constitute a working class. They were, more exactly, low-paid workers in the service sector or tended to take on blue-collar jobs. The niche the Puerto Ricans occupied in the labor force was shared with African Americans. These two groups suffered poor conditions in health care, education, and housing.<sup>35</sup> Puerto Ricans were politically powerless and suffered discrimination. It

---

<sup>31</sup> Daniel J. BOORSTIN - Brooks Mather KELLEY: *A History of the United States*, United States of America, Prentice-Hall, 2002. 867.

<sup>32</sup> José Ramón SÁNCHEZ: 45.

<sup>33</sup> Jorge DUANY: *The Puerto Rican Nation on the Move: Identities on the Island & in the United States*, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2002. 20.

<sup>34</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 20.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*, 20.

was with the African Americans that the Puerto Ricans shared other common circumstances. Both groups worked and lived in the same places in New York. These two groups lived in a degree of intimacy, which led to common cultural creations and political attitudes. As for their political attitudes, the Black Panthers and the Young Lords, two militant minority organizations, were in connection with both Puerto Ricans and African Americans living in New York. At the same time there was a distinguishable Puerto Rican and African American identity. Sometimes these two groups stood in opposition to each other. By the time of the global economic crisis of the 1970s manufacturing employment was declining and the economy began to restructure, with the basic living conditions deteriorating for the working classes. As the state of employment, educating, and housing began to decline for the African Americans and Puerto Ricans of New York, they once again experienced marginalization. Once again they became stigmatized and identified as the underclass.<sup>36</sup> The Dominican minority living in New York soon found itself in the same situation.

The Dominicans have a long history of immigration to New York. They promoted many movements and events in this city, starting with the struggle for Dominican independence in the nineteenth century. The Dominicans also migrated to New York in great numbers after World War II. Their reason for immigrating was political. In 1961 the Trujillo dictatorship was toppled and in 1965 the American military invaded the Dominican Republic. The U.S. Census counted 13,293 Dominicans in 1960, but the number increased to 66,914 in 1970.<sup>37</sup> In the year 1980 the number of Dominicans in New York was 125,380 and 332,713 by 1990. In 1990 the Dominicans accounted for 18.7 percent of the Latino minority of New York and became the second largest Latino group there.<sup>38</sup> At the beginning of the twenty-first century the Puerto Ricans and Dominicans were the largest Latino ethnic groups in New York. They are also the most visible and influential. These two ethnic groups are the only minority groups that have sent some of their members to serve in the city and state legislature. The Dominicans and Puerto Ricans have also been socially marginalized and the unemployment rate among them is high. With respect to hegemonic urban discourse, some Dominican and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, such as East Harlem and Washington Heights, unfortunately have a negative reputation.

There was an important phase in the political development of the Dominican minority in New York since the early 1960s. There was an increase in Dominican immigration to the United States in the early 1960s after the dictator Trujillo was assassinated. Juan Bosch was elected president after him in 1962, but was then deposed. In 1966 Joaquín Balaguer was elected president of the Dominican Republic, who had to live in political exile in New York. Between 1962 and 1965 it

---

<sup>36</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 21.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 22.

was in New York where Balaguer rebuilt his power base in order to return to the Dominican Republic and become president. The initial Dominican immigrants coming to New York and elsewhere in the United States belonged mainly to the conservative middle-class and feared the regime of Bosch and the unrest that came after his fall from power. The Dominicans coming to New York during the 1960s could benefit from a wider access to American visas. This was a strategy in the United States to ease the political tensions with the Dominican Republic. The influx of Dominicans to New York in the 1960s was, however, less a result of a change in American foreign policy than the growing economic needs of the Dominican people and the fact that there was a need in New York for cheap and vulnerable laborers.<sup>39</sup> By the 1980s the Dominican Republic had been the largest sender of immigrants to New York. In 1998 around 412,000 immigrants who were born in the Dominican Republic were residents of New York.<sup>40</sup> Most of these immigrants lived in upper Manhattan.

Because of the American control of the Puerto Rican economy in the 1960s it encountered serious problems which urged Puerto Ricans to move to New York and other cities in the United States. Air travel to the United States at this time was less than fifty dollars and there were no restrictions for Puerto Ricans on immigrating. Those Puerto Ricans who came to New York settled in the ghettos in such areas as the Bronx, the Lower East Side, Spanish Harlem, the South Bronx, and parts of Brooklyn. By the 1970s many New York school districts had large Puerto Rican populations.<sup>41</sup> Puerto Ricans had to struggle with the problem of an instable ethnic identity. Skin color unfortunately meant problems for the Puerto Rican ethnic identity and actually divided their group. While in Puerto Rico race had barely been important, in New York and elsewhere in the United States race caused white Puerto Ricans to identify with white Americans rather than with black Puerto Ricans. Black Puerto Ricans had to stress their Spanish language in order to be different from the New York African American population.

Many Puerto Ricans have experienced success in their life while in New York. For example, in 1965 Herman Badillo was elected to the Borough of the Bronx. He had come from Puerto Rico. In 1948 the Welfare Council stated that within the previous thirty years the Puerto Ricans had assimilated rapidly and become excellent citizens of New York.<sup>42</sup> This was a tendency that many politicians, sociologists, and educators had been pointing out for a long time. Orlando Cepeda was a famous baseball player of Puerto Rican origin who had achieved success in New York. Others, such as Jesús María Sanromá, Chita Rivera, and José Ferrer were

---

<sup>39</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 253.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, 251.

<sup>41</sup> James S. OLSON - Samuel FREEMAN: *Historical Dictionary of the 1960s*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1999. 376.

<sup>42</sup> Clarence SENIOR: *The Puerto Ricans in New York: A Progress Note*. International Migration Review. Vol. 2, N° 2. 1968. 73.

also successful New York Puerto Ricans whose Puerto Rican roots few can remember. Joseph P. Fitzpatrick was a sociology professor at Fordham University who studied the Puerto Rican minority living in New York. He came to two conclusions about this New York ethnic group. He found out that the Puerto Ricans had been assimilating at a fast rate, and that, based on the intermarriage occurring in the New York immigrant population, this assimilation was as rapid as the Puerto Rican assimilation in the period between 1908 and 1912.<sup>43</sup> The fact that Badillo was elected to the post of borough president shows that the political situation of New York Puerto Ricans developed in much the same way as their economic situation. Badillo's election also showed that Puerto Ricans were successfully assimilating into New York's community. The so-called „*get out the vote*” campaign has been characteristic of New York Puerto Ricans, with the Puerto Rican vote in elections increasing from 35,000 in 1954 to more than 200,000 in 1966.<sup>44</sup>

Beginning in the 1960s the Puerto Ricans of New York reached the conclusion that they should organize their social and political interests. Many of them decided to join the Democratic Party.<sup>45</sup> New York labor unions and Democratic politicians saw that it was worth having Puerto Ricans register to vote. However, the fact that Hispanics tended to be alienated from political organizations made this task difficult. The common mentality of Puerto Ricans was to concentrate on education as a method of escaping the ghetto. The Puerto Rican College Scholarship Fund was founded in the middle of the 1940s and had the goal of supporting the educational aspirations of Puerto Ricans living in New York. In 1961 it was replaced by ASPIRA, which secured private, founding, and federal support for the Puerto Rican minority in the area of scholarship aid, counseling, and guidance. It supported the civic and educational efforts of Puerto Rican youths by creating 37 Puerto Rican clubs in New York high schools.<sup>46</sup> ASPIRA also supported parent organizations where the process of Puerto Rican student application to elementary and high schools, as well as higher education was supported. The Puerto Ricans demanded that schools and the teachers working there be bilingual and that there be special programs where the Spanish language was preserved. The Puerto Rican immigrants living in New York also wanted their children to learn Puerto Rican history and culture in special courses. They also wanted Puerto Rican teachers and administrators to work in Puerto Rican schools.<sup>47</sup> Jewish and Anglo educators were opposed to the efforts of the Puerto Ricans. They felt threatened and resisted their decentralizational efforts, led by the New York United Federation of Teachers. The Puerto Rican Civil Services Employees Association was founded as

---

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, 74.

<sup>44</sup> Clarence SENIOR: 76-77.

<sup>45</sup> OLSON - FREEMAN: 376.

<sup>46</sup> Clarence SENIOR: 75.

<sup>47</sup> OLSON – FREEMAN: 377.

an organization supporting the Puerto Rican minority living in New York. It had its own building and a successful credit union. Its purpose was to help Puerto Rican government workers. It was still active in the 1960s. Still in the 1960s the East Harlem Tenants Council also decided to do something to support the Puerto Rican minority. Their main goal was to provide Puerto Ricans with safer apartments and lower rents.<sup>48</sup> They also wanted landlords to maintain apartment houses better.

In April 1964 the New York Mayor's Council on Poverty released a report containing statistics on the total number of New Yorkers living in poverty and the number of these people who were Puerto Rican. A total of around 1.5 million New Yorkers were poor, with 389,000 families accounting for 1.2 million of these poor inhabitants. Around 320,000 New Yorkers lived alone, or with people who were not their relatives, and belonged to the poor. Around 69,000 of the 389,000 poor New York families were Puerto Rican.<sup>49</sup> Poor New York Puerto Rican families accounted for eighteen percent of the total. Therefore, poor Puerto Rican families were overrepresented among poor New York families in comparison with the families of New York as a whole. There are further, telling facts about the poverty Puerto Ricans found themselves in. When compared to other ethnic groups, Puerto Ricans lived for a longer period in New York before applying for aid. Except for women and their dependent children, all other Puerto Ricans also tended to get off welfare faster than others. Finally, it is to the credit of the Puerto Ricans that around half of their numbers on welfare was also working. The work they did was not sufficient in itself to support them.<sup>50</sup> The conclusion that can be drawn is that there were signs of progress among the Puerto Ricans in New York.

In 1980 the Mariel Boat Lift took place, which was a massive exodus where Cubans fled to Florida by boat. A total of 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States after departing from the port of Mariel, Cuba.<sup>51</sup> Catholic charities located in New York and Brooklyn relocated many of those who came in the Mariel Boat Lift to New York. The Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the IRC, and the Church World Service were other organizations taking part in the relocation. Within New York the Cuban immigrants settled in Brooklyn, Washington Heights, and the South Bronx. Due to the Mariel Boat Lift of 1980 and the balseros of the 1990s a new group of immigrants emerged in New York. These were colored working-class Cubans.<sup>52</sup>

In the 1960s and 1970s the Dominicans moved to New York for political reasons, but economic advance became the goal of Dominican immigrants over time. Many of them had the desire to gain middle-class status. There were many manufacturing jobs available for the arriving Dominican immigrants and there was

---

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 377.

<sup>49</sup> Clarence SENIOR: 76.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, 76.

<sup>51</sup> Elizabeth BOGEN: Immigration in New York. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1987. 123.

<sup>52</sup> LAÓ-MONTES – DÁVILA: 21.

less intense economic competition among them. Since the 1960s and 1970s the Dominicans had to fight to keep their jobs and save some money in spite of great obstacles. Dominicans have not fared well when compared to other New York Hispanic groups. The Current Population Survey of 1997 stated that the Dominican minority of New York lived in the deepest poverty.<sup>53</sup> The poverty rate among them was 46 percent, but for the whole city it was only 24 percent, while for the Hispanics it was 37 percent. The per capita household income for New York Dominicans was \$6,094 but \$19,043 for the whole city and \$16,560 for the immigrant population on average. For Dominicans the unemployment rate was almost twice the rate for all New Yorkers. There are several explanations for why the economic situation of the Dominican minority living in New York became so poor. They mainly occupy the jobs found in manufacturing or wholesale or retail trades, where the wages have become low and where there were massive layoffs in the preceding decades.<sup>54</sup> Recently, many Mexicans and Central Americans arrived in New York where they were willing to work for lower wages than the Dominicans. They also take on jobs where the working conditions were poorer than the Dominicans would accept. These two factors led to further economic deterioration among the Dominicans of New York. Some Dominicans have created successful businesses. These Dominican business owners reported assets of around one million dollars and a large workforce.<sup>55</sup> However, it was necessary for the Dominicans acting as a group to provide a safety net for these business owners. In 1990 more than sixty percent of the members of their group who were aged twenty-five or over did not finish high school.<sup>56</sup> The lack of at least a high school education was the dominant factor in the stagnation of the wages of Dominicans in New York throughout the 1980s. At the same time it was recorded that Dominican college graduates who lived in New York had an income that was 29 percent higher in 1989 than in 1979. Another social handicap hindering economic advance for the Dominican minority of New York was the fact that many Dominican households were headed by a female. In 1989 a wage-gap was recorded among Dominican men and women. New York Dominican men made an average of \$15,088, while the figure was \$11,347 for New York Dominican women. While the Dominicans were being socioeconomically incorporated into the labor market of New York, they settled in declining areas of New York, such as northern Manhattan, parts of the South Bronx, and Washington Heights.

Dominicans also had to deal with racial discrimination in New York. In 1990 a census recorded the self-identification that New York Dominicans stated when asked. The majority stated that they were either mulatto or black. The Dominicans who considered themselves to be mulatto (fifty percent) reported to the census

---

<sup>53</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 255.

<sup>54</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 255.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 255.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, 255.



officials that they belong to another race, while 25 percent reported that it was black. There was a general correlation between the race of a New York Dominican and their economic status.

In the 1960s and 1970s the Dominican ethnic group of New York was not visible politically and was not an identifiable immigrant minority. Dominicans received little media attention and were often taken for Puerto Ricans.<sup>57</sup> Political candidates believed Dominicans would not acquire American citizenship or vote, so they felt that it was safe politically to refrain from making any campaign promises to serve their interests. There was also a lack of mechanisms to help the Dominican minority group enter the political process, which was different than what the practice had been earlier. During the 1960s and 1970s the Dominican were excluded from the Puerto Rican empowerment movements, even though the members of the reform movements in this time period wanted to get minorities to participate more in the democratic process. The Dominicans still organized themselves during these years, but only within their own minority group. Initially their organizational activity was concerned with recreational, cultural, and professional issues. By the late 1970s the Dominicans had established at least 36 clubs and establishments in the area of Washington Heights. The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) were two branches of Dominican opposition parties located in New York. Within these two parties exiles attempted to gain control of the Dominican Republic, but did not do anything to address the issues and concerns of the Dominican population in New York. It is to the credit of these parties that they set a precedent on the organization of the Dominican immigrant population with respect to their national origin.<sup>58</sup> The Dominican minority was becoming the fastest growing minority in New York and the political parties like the PRD and PLD helped make them more visible politically.

In the 1980s a new group of leaders born in the Dominican Republic but educated in the United States was emerging in New York and becoming a force in New York political life. These leaders wanted power and resources, based on the background of the poor economy and political situation in the Dominican Republic. They also wanted power, based on the fact that the Dominican minority was a growing presence in New York. The cohort of Dominican politicians/leaders wanted to be in control of the local advisory boards that supplied funding for antipoverty programs. They also targeted Dominican representation on neighborhood school boards.<sup>59</sup> A politically active New York Dominican from Washington Heights, Yoland López, tells us about what the aims of the politically active Dominican minority were. She talked of the political campaign of 1980 when the Dominicans tried to gain more influence in the neighborhood schools. These

---

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, 256.

<sup>58</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 257.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*.

schools, located in Community School District 6, were places where most students were Dominican, even in the early 1980s. They were overcrowded, and according to Yolanda López, students left them without being able to read. The politically active Dominicans wanted these schools to respond more to the needs and aspirations of the local Dominican residents, claiming that their children were neglected. They believed that they had to take matters into their own hands to solve this problem.<sup>60</sup> The important step that these politically active New York Dominicans took in the early 1980s was to launch an empowerment movement. In the early years of the 1980s the Community Association of Progressive Dominicans demanded that bilingual education and special programs be established for Dominican immigrants who had arrived in New York. Later, there was a Dominican majority on the school board at the school in Community School District 6. This school has also introduced special programs to satisfy the needs of the Dominican community. They achieved this by conducting an aggressive voter registration drive. A parents' network in the district was another important element in the Dominican victory. A coalition of educators, community organizations, and parents also contributed to the Dominicans' achievement. This event shows us that there had been an ethnic succession in Washington Heights: Dominicans had begun to replace the Jewish residents. In 1986 the Dominicans had a member of their own group elected president of the district's school board. He was the Dominican-born educator Guillermo Linares, who wrote that two important vehicles that the Dominicans used for empowerment were the education struggle and the Community Board elections. If a Dominican could not vote in a regular election due to a lack of American citizenship, they could at least take part in the school board election.<sup>61</sup>

By the end of the 1980s the Dominican minority was no longer an „invisible” group in New York. Now that they were visible, the city government engaged in redistricting in order to make possible more representation for the previously underrepresented Dominicans.<sup>62</sup> Some of the Dominicans were by now skilled in political activities and they set up a new goal for the Dominican community. They wanted a new district in northern Manhattan where the constituency would be dominated in large numbers by Dominicans. The politically skilled Dominican leaders cited their achievements relating to the struggles for control of their local schools. Another argument they used was that they were the leaders of several groups that invested in Washington Heights. The New York City Districting Commission agreed with these arguments, which led to the creation of District 10 in northern Manhattan, which now had a greater Dominican population than previously drawn districts that overlapped the areas where the Dominican minority lived. Guillermo Linares represented this district since 1991.

---

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 258.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

The 1993 Linares campaign to the New York City Council was conducted to appeal to the political interests of Dominicans, with these interests relating to both the Dominican Republic and New York. Linares received endorsements from influential politicians, such as David Dinkins, mayor of New York, and politicians in the Dominican Republic. Linares traveled back to the Dominican Republic to raise money for his campaign. In New York, he took part in rallies that Spanish-language newspapers covered. The mother of Linares even wrote a letter to the New York Dominican minority in which she urged them to vote for him.<sup>63</sup> She stated that her son had a chance to be the first Dominican member of the New York City Council and appealed to the ethnic pride of the Dominican minority.

In 1992 the New York State Assembly underwent redistricting, which meant political gains for the Dominican minority. This process was intended to increase the political representation of the underrepresented Dominican minority. As a part of the redistricting, District 72 was redrawn to make it more likely that Latino candidates would win elections. By 1996 the Dominicans were active politically, and Adriano Espaillat (born in the Dominican Republic) capitalized on it to win an election against an incumbent of Irish descent, John Brian Murtaugh.<sup>64</sup>

New York Dominicans attempted to gain recognition and status in the home country while Dominicans were winning public office in New York. In the early 1980s a special group of New York Dominican entrepreneurs emerged who began lobbying for political rights. Acquiring dual nationality rights was their goal. In the early 1990s the Dominican Senate took action. It set up the Committee on the Affairs of Dominicans Living Abroad.<sup>65</sup> This was a move taken to respond to the economic assistance the Dominican community living abroad had lent the mother country in making its way through economic difficulties. The members of the Committee on the Affairs of Dominicans Living Abroad traveled to New York and other areas in order to discuss the issues of nationality and other matters of political nature.<sup>66</sup> There was a certain importance linked to the discussion of Dominican nationality. As the Dominicans began to emerge in New York politically, it was in the interests of both New York Dominicans and the Dominican Republic to push Dominican immigrants coming to New York and the United States in general to naturalize and participate in American elections. This would lead to more attention to the Dominican cause. In the second half of the 1990s federal and state governments decreased the amount of economic and social benefits allotted to legal immigrants. These measures were part of an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments, which led to the popularity among the Dominicans of New York of the naturalization of arriving Dominican immigrants and their acquisition of voting rights. Recently, naturalized Dominican immigrants stated they became

---

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 259.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

naturalized because of vulnerability and changing laws. The possibility for a Dominican to legally retain his Dominican identity was an incentive for him to acquire American citizenship.<sup>67</sup> In 1994 the constitution of the Dominican Republic made it possible for Dominicans living in New York and elsewhere in the United States to acquire nationality rights.

In 1996 the lawyer Leonel Fernández (raised in New York) was elected president of the Dominican Republic, which meant that there would be further changes in the status of Dominicans living in New York and other parts of the United States. In 1997 several reform laws were passed in the Dominican Republic that changed the lives of Dominican New Yorkers. One reform changed the process of elections. By the year 2000 it was possible for Dominicans abroad (therefore in New York as well) to vote in the presidential elections of the Dominican Republic. The question of managing the logistics of voting was an important factor in delaying the implementation of this political right. The de facto measures to ensure congressional representation of Dominicans living abroad already existed before they became institutionalized. One candidate of the PLD was a member of the party section active in New York and campaigned to represent the Dominican city of Santiago in 1996. There were also less-institutionalized political ties between the Dominican Republic and the Dominican immigrants living outside the home country.<sup>68</sup> Some political parties are still prominent in northern Manhattan today, as they have been for a time. President Fernández launched the *Diálogo Nacional* while in office, which had as its purpose the collection of popular input when proposing state reform. One such meeting was in Washington Heights. Here Bienvenido Pérez, the Dominican consul, declared that the purpose of the meeting was to ensure that Dominicans living abroad could participate in the political affairs of the mother country.<sup>69</sup>

As part of a new political trend the Dominican minority in New York has begun to disperse within the past few decades. The stress on local matters has begun to be replaced by the importance of issues as they pertain to the Dominican minority in the entire United States. The Dominican American National Roundtable was an umbrella group which tried to gain the help of the New York Dominican community.<sup>70</sup> The Dominican American National Roundtable wanted to aid Dominicans across the entire country in the areas of business development, education, political empowerment, and immigration reform. Dominicans in New York have successfully organized themselves politically with respect to their ethnic identity. The latest trend has shown that Dominicans in New York are now concerned with a broader identity. They now stress the pan-ethnicity and race of the members of their ethnic group.

---

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 259-260.

<sup>68</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 260.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

Within the New York Dominican community there have been differences as well. Dominican political candidates have been supported by both the Republicans and the Democrats.<sup>71</sup> In 1997 Linares campaigned for reelection to the New York City Council and was challenged by another Dominican candidate who had the backing of State Assemblyman Espaillat. Dominicans have been very careful to preserve their image in New York as a unified group, and the rivalry between Linares and his fellow Dominican seemed to disprove it and threaten the road to empowerment. What can be said about the future of Dominican political life in New York is that a variety of candidates will be active vying for votes less based on ethnic loyalty. Instead, the character and content of a Dominican leader will become more important.

We can draw the conclusion that the Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Dominican immigrants who came to New York had much in common with each other. They had the same basic characteristics in common in political, cultural, and economic perspectives. They were all politically active in order to serve their own political needs and those of their home countries in the Caribbean region. The Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans of New York always grew in numbers in the past decades and their proportion to the entire population also increased. The immigration of Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans is also fairly recent. We can see that members of all three ethnic groups had a history in which there was a struggle for independence and American influence or invasion and came to New York in great numbers after World War II. However, they were present in smaller numbers prior to this war. The Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans were prominent members of the Latin American minority of New York. We can see that the history of Cuban and Puerto Rican immigration to New York is especially closely related. The identity of the members of the three immigrant groups who are the topic of this study is deeply interwoven with the identity of those in the mother country. The Dominicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans have helped enrich the cultural life of New York and are important in its social landscape. As American immigration policy has changed over the years, the experiences of the Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Dominican minority, as well as those of other immigrants to New York, have had important implications.<sup>72</sup> If we have an understanding of the historical conditions of members of the Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Dominican minority groups living in New York, we are better able to perceive the process of transmigration and international migration. The immigrant experience in New York becomes easier to comprehend.

---

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* 261.

<sup>72</sup> Nancy FONER (2001): 70.



**Katalin Pintz**

## ***Assimilation and Acculturation of Armenian Americans***

### **Abstract**

Armenians, as a diaspora nation, are well known for their ability to resist assimilation. Although the pressure to assimilate is very strong in the United States, Armenians tend to do so at a slower pace with respect to other ethnic groups, such as the Italians or the Hungarians. At the same time, they were eager to acculturate into American society by learning its language and by excelling in the fields of business and education. As to the effect of the various ethnic lobbies on U.S. foreign politics, in the case of the Armenians, one can speak of acculturation, whereas Hungarians and Italians are primarily characterized by assimilation.

*Keywords:* Acculturation, Armenian Americans, Assimilation, Ethnic Groups, Hungarian Americans, Immigration, Italian Americans

**A**mong the countless ethnic groups from Asia Minor that have come to settle in the United States, there is a distinct group of immigrants who have strongly held on to their traditions throughout the twentieth century: the Armenian Americans. Although the force of assimilation in America also affects Armenian Americans to a great extent, nearly a century after the first arrivals of Armenians to the new homeland, Armenian Americans are still strongly aware of their ethnic heritage. At the same time, however, their integration into mainstream American culture has also been successful.

It is interesting to see the assimilation and acculturation process of the Armenian Americans in the light of other ethnic groups. For this reason, I have chosen two other ethnic groups which also formed part of the so-called *New Immigration*,<sup>1</sup> and whose members had their first large-scale arrivals at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the Italians and the Hungarians. Although they are characterized by different cultural, historical, and geographical backgrounds, they share several similarities: they are members of predominantly Christian nations of a non-Protestant background, who form part of the Caucasian race.

---

<sup>1</sup> *New Immigration*: the large-scale arrival of millions of immigrants, predominantly from Eastern and Southern Europe, but also from Asia who arrived from the late 1880s until the first decades of the twentieth century. They were distinct from the *Old Immigrants*, who arrived in the USA from the 1840s until the 1880s from Northern European and Scandinavian countries, and who could easily assimilate into American culture primarily due to their Protestant background or their similar geographical origin, in the case of the Irish. FRANK, Tibor – MAGYARICS, Tamás: *Handouts for US History: A Study Guide and Workbook*, Panem, Budapest, 1999. 243. EASTERLIN, Richard A.: „*Economic and Social Characteristics of the Immigrants*,” IN: *Immigration* (Eds. Richard A. EASTERLIN et al.), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982. 12-13.

Today all three of these ethnic groups are accepted by the majority of American society, yet they have not become entirely assimilated, partly as a result of their own resistance. At the same time, the assimilation rate of Armenians, Italians, and Hungarians has differed due to various reasons, but mainly due to historical factors.

There are only slight differences between the notions of *assimilation* and *acculturation*. Assimilation implies a continuous, step-by-step process and has several stages. Full assimilation takes place when the members of a minority group become identical to those of the majority culture in their customs and attitudes. It is important to stress that assimilation not only involves internal change within a given minority group, but acceptance by the dominant group is also one of its necessary requirements.<sup>2</sup> The process of assimilation can be measured by various factors, such as socioeconomic status, spatial concentration, language preservation and intermarriage.<sup>3</sup>

Acculturation is a process during which two independent groups come into direct contact with each other, in a way that the original culture is influenced by the other or both are influenced by one another. Usually, it is the culture of the dominant group which causes the members of a minority group to adapt to the culture of the dominant group.<sup>4</sup> In contrast to assimilation, the notion of acculturation does not imply the rejection of one's original culture. Also, in order for one to speak of acculturation, out-group acceptance is not needed.<sup>5</sup>

Given that many Armenians originate from diaspora settlements, they are usually fast to acculturate and slow to assimilate in their new immigrant environments. Armenians are generally very proud of their heritage which has a history of approximately 2,500 years and is significantly older than that of the United States. They can easily adapt to the receiving society by acquiring its language and by integrating into its educational, economic and political life. At the same time, they also place an emphasis on maintaining their own language, ethnic schools, churches, organizations, and social networks. They form close friendships with other Armenians and tend to stress the importance of marrying within their own ethnic group.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Although various scholars have defined and used these two terms in a multitude of ways, in this paper I mainly rely on Raymond H. C. Teske's and Bardin H. Nelson's definition, who clearly separated the meanings of the given concepts. For an elaborate discussion of this topic, see TESKE, Raymond H.C. – NELSON, Bardin H.: „*Acculturation and Assimilation: A Clarification*”, *American Ethnologist* Vol. 1, N° 2, 1974. May. 351-367. [www.jstor.org](http://www.jstor.org) (Accessed: 2013. April 4.)

<sup>3</sup> WATERS, Mary C. – JIMÉNEZ, Tomás R.: „*Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges*”, *Annual Review of Sociology* Vol. 31, 2005. April 7. 105-125. [Annualreviews.org](http://Annualreviews.org). (Accessed: 2011. April 16.)

<sup>4</sup> CAVAZOS-REHG, Patricia A. – DELUCIA-WAACK, Janice: „*Education, Ethnic Identity, and Acculturation as Predictors of Self-Esteem in Latino Adolescents*”, *Journal of Counseling & Development* Vol. 87, Winter 2009. 14 April 2011. 48. [http://www.humanresourcefulness.net/CypressCollege/docs/HUSR224/articles/Education\\_Ethnic\\_Identity\\_and\\_Acculturation\\_as\\_Predictors\\_of\\_Self-Esteem\\_in\\_Latino\\_Adolescents.pdf](http://www.humanresourcefulness.net/CypressCollege/docs/HUSR224/articles/Education_Ethnic_Identity_and_Acculturation_as_Predictors_of_Self-Esteem_in_Latino_Adolescents.pdf) (Accessed: 2013. February 28.)

<sup>5</sup> TESKE – NELSON: 365.

<sup>6</sup> TAKOOSHIAN, Harold: „*Armenian Americans*”, IN: *Gale Encyclopedia of Multicultural America*, Gale



### ***Armenian Immigration to the United States***

Although the first Armenian communities were established by Protestant Armenians who arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century seeking higher education in New England,<sup>7</sup> Armenians began to immigrate to America in great numbers only in the 1890s, due to the ethnic cleansings conducted against the Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire, who were considered non-Muslim infidels.<sup>8</sup> Armenians were especially viewed with hostility, since many of them had joined the nationalist revolutionary movements originating from Europe, which were not received favorably in Turkey. Consequently, from 1894 until 1896 300,000 Turkish Armenians were massacred or converted by force to Islam under the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.<sup>9</sup>

The massacres against Armenians lead to several waves of emigration. The first wave of immigrants to settle in the United States arrived between 1899 and 1914, when 51,950 Armenians found shelter in the new homeland.<sup>10</sup> Knarik Avakian writes that the Armenian immigrants had a higher level of literacy rate than most other ethnic groups in the United States, for education has always been highly valued by Armenians. Therefore, the Armenian communities in America could count on a large number of scientists, professors, and teachers.<sup>11</sup>

The systematic and planned killing of Armenians began in 1915 and continued throughout that year, under the rule of the triumvirate consisting of Enver, Talat, and Cemal pashas, when Turkey entered the war on the side of the Germans during World War I.<sup>12</sup> This first genocide of modern history, which lasted until 1923, led to the death of more than a million Armenians during World War I. The second massive wave of Armenian immigration to the United States consisted of 30,771 Genocide survivors, who came from 1920-1924, when the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act set the yearly quota of Armenians in 150 persons.<sup>13</sup>

Those who came to America as Genocide survivors were mostly orphans or adults who lost their family members as a consequence of the death marches. Dennis

---

Group, Detroit, 2000. Encyclopedia.com. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3405800020.html> (Accessed: 2011. April 14.)

<sup>7</sup> KOUYMJIAN, Dickran: „*Armenians in the United States*,” published in a special issue IN: *Arménie: 3000 ans d'histoire* of *Les Dossiers d'Archéologie*, N° 177, Paris, December 1992. 136-138. [http://armenianstudies.csufresno.edu/faculty/kouymjian/articles/us\\_armenians.htm](http://armenianstudies.csufresno.edu/faculty/kouymjian/articles/us_armenians.htm) (Accessed: 2013. April 4.)

<sup>8</sup> TAKOOSHIAN

<sup>9</sup> PAPAŽIAN, Dennis: *Armenians in America*, IN: *Het Christelĳk Oosten*, Vol. 52, N° 3-4, 2000. 311-347. Web edition: 2001. Umd.umich.edu. (Accessed: 2011. April 9.)

<sup>10</sup> AVAKIAN, Knarik: Summary of *The History of the Armenian Community of the United States of America (From the Beginning to 1924)*, (In Armenian, with extensive summary in English) „*Science*” Publishing House of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, 2000. <http://www.armenian-history.com/Nyuter/BIOGRAPHY/Knarik-Avakian.htm> (Accessed: 2013. April 3.)

<sup>11</sup> AVAKIAN

<sup>12</sup> PAPAŽIAN

<sup>13</sup> TAKOOSHIAN

Papazian claims that „to some extent, America became a meeting place for many individuals who had lost track of one another.” Survivors posted advertisements in Armenian American newspapers, hoping to find lost family members.<sup>14</sup>

The third large wave of immigrants arrived after World War II, when the U.S. government allowed the so-called *Displaced Persons* or *DPs* to enter the country and become U.S. citizens, under a special provision.<sup>15</sup> Countless Armenians who had previously fled from Turkey (approximately 700,000) to the Middle East were now forced to leave their new homelands as a result of increasing Arab and Turkish nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, and socialism. Therefore, large numbers of people migrated to Europe and to America from the centers of wealthy Armenian communities such as Egypt (1952), Turkey (1955), Iraq (1958), Syria (1961), Lebanon (1975), and Iran (1978).<sup>16</sup> Harold Takooshian states that it is difficult to estimate the number of people who arrived after World War II, however, based on Census reports it can be said that 60,000 people came during the last decade before the fall of socialism, from 1980-89. 75 percent of them settled in the Greater Los Angeles area, in the cities of Glendale, Hollywood, and Pasadena.<sup>17</sup>

The greatest influx of immigrants came after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, from the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation.<sup>18</sup> Since the beginning of the 1990s, the number of Armenian newcomers to the United States continued to grow steadily, causing a real alarm in present-day Armenia. According to the 2009 National Human Development Report, an estimate of 700,000 to 1,300,000 Armenians left the country between 1990 and 2005, about 22-40 percent of the total population of Armenia in 2008.<sup>19</sup> Whereas in 1990 the number of people with Armenian ancestry was 308,096 in the United States, this number increased to 385,488 in 2000, as indicated by US Census reports.<sup>20</sup> Already in the year 2010 the estimated number of Armenians in the country was 474,559, based on the American Community Survey.<sup>21</sup>

### ***Issues of Assimilation***

Several authors have pointed out the exceptional ability of the Armenians to resist assimilation and to remain faithful to their heritage. One of them is Pulitzer Prize winning dramatist and author William Saroyan, who in his famous quote has

---

<sup>14</sup> PAPAZIAN

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> TAKOOSHIAN

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> PAPAZIAN

<sup>19</sup> National Human Development Report 2009: *Migration and Human Development: Opportunities and Challenges*, United Nations Development Programme Armenia, Republic of Armenia, 2009. 19. [http://www.undp.am/docs/publications/Migration\\_and\\_Human\\_development\\_eng.pdf](http://www.undp.am/docs/publications/Migration_and_Human_development_eng.pdf) (Accessed: 2013. April 3.)

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Census Bureau: „*Ancestry 2000*,” April 2010. 4. <http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/c2kbr-35.pdf> 28 (Accessed: 2013. February)

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Census Bureau: „*People Reporting Ancestry. Universe: Total population. 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimate*” B04006.

pointed out their exceptional capability of ethnic survival: „I should like to see any power of the world try to destroy this race, this small tribe of unimportant people, whose wars have all been fought and lost, whose structures have crumbled, literature is unread, music is unheard, and prayers are no more answered. Go ahead, destroy Armenia. See if you can do it. Send them into the desert without food or water, burn their homes and churches. Then see if they will not laugh, sing and pray again. For when two of them meet anywhere in the world, see if they will not create a new Armenia.”<sup>22</sup>

The preservation of the Armenian language is one of the main aspects of Armenian heritage maintenance and is an often discussed topic by Armenians. Since a large portion of the Armenians live outside the Republic of Armenia, a debated question is whether the knowledge of Armenian is essential for cultural survival. Harold Takooshian writes that according to a U.S. survey done near the year 2000, 94 percent of Armenian immigrants wanted their children to speak the language. Nevertheless, based on Anny Bakalian's study published in 1993,<sup>23</sup> Takooshian pointed out that the ratio of Armenians who had preserved the language had dropped from 98 percent in the case of the first generation immigrants to merely 12 percent in that of the third generation.<sup>24</sup>

It is interesting to consider the statistics concerning the number of Armenian language speakers in the United States. The number of people who speak Armenian in their households has risen by 120.5 percent between 1980 and 2007, that is, from 100,634 speakers to 221,865, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.<sup>25</sup> This can be considered a high number, if one takes into account that 385,488 people have reported to have Armenian ancestry in 2000.<sup>26</sup> Among the 221,865 people who reported to speak Armenian in their households in 2007, 71.8 percent live in Los Angeles, 4.6 percent in New York City, 2.5 percent in Fresno, CA, and 2.4 percent in Boston, MA.<sup>27</sup>

An article entitled „Students speak 68 tongues: Armenian tops English as first language spoken by students” on the Glendale schools of Los Angeles County, published in the L.A. Daily News on May 5, 2002, may support the previously mentioned statistics. According to the article, almost 38 percent of the students who belong to the Glendale Unified School District are learning English as a second language. Most of these foreign students are Armenian, Spanish, and Korean. 10,606 students of the total 30,228 students of the school district speak Armenian as their primary language (those who are fluent in English as well as those who are learning it), whereas those who have stated that English is their first language

---

<sup>22</sup> BAKALIAN, Anny P.: *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1993. 3-4. Google Book Search. (Accessed: 2011. April 9.)

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 256.

<sup>24</sup> TAKOOSHIAN

<sup>25</sup> U.S. Census Bureau: „Language Use in the United States: 2007,” April 2010. 6. <http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-12.pdf> (Accessed: 2013. February 28.)

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, „Ancestry 2000.” 4.

<sup>27</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, „Language Use in the United States: 2007.” 14.

(9,071 students) are only listed in the second place, followed by Spanish, Korean, and Tagalog speakers. The high number of students who speak Armenian is due to the fact that approximately one-third of Glendale's residents are of Armenian origin. Although in 2002 there were thirty-five Armenian teachers among the ninety-six teachers specialized in bilingual education, it was not easy to employ Armenian-speaking instructors, for most students chose Spanish in order to fulfill course requirements.

The question of finding a spouse within the Armenian circles has been of high importance to Armenians at their arrival in the United States, and a considerable part of Armenians still prefer to marry another Armenian even today. However, this was difficult already in the 1920s and 1930s. Matchmakings were organized through friends and relatives; nevertheless, many women had to marry men who were significantly older or below their status. The men who were unable to find an Armenian wife had to make up with marrying non-Armenian women, who were generally not accepted in the circles of Armenians. In the case of these marriages, the husbands insisted that their wives learn Armenian. The fact that these women were not accepted was true even for the women who were of a higher socio-economic status than their husbands, for being Armenian was considered to be of the highest status within the community. If a man married an *odar*, or an outsider, of a lower socio-economic status, they often drifted apart from the community.

As a result of a split within the two Sees of the Armenian Apostolic Church which occurred in 1933 in the United States, many chose to marry a non-Armenian rather than an Armenian from the other See. In 2000 Dennis Papazian wrote that intermarriage was high among Armenians and non-Armenians within the Diocesan community of the Armenian Apostolic Church: at some parishes it could even reach 80 percent. Simultaneously, in the case of the parishes belonging to the Prelacy, the other see of the Armenian Apostolic Church, this number was significantly lower.<sup>28</sup>

Regarding assimilation, it is interesting to consider a Civic Report for the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research by Jacob L. Vidgor, from October 2009, entitled „*Measuring Immigrant Assimilation in the United States.*” Vidgor compared and contrasted the assimilation indexes of 100 immigrant groups on the basis of economic, civic, and cultural indicators. The economic indicators were based on educational attainments, earnings, occupational prestige, employment status, and labor-force participation rates; while the civic indicators were calculated by taking into account citizenship and veteran status. Finally, cultural indicators were calculated based on marriage to a foreign-born spouse, the number of children in the household, one's ability to speak English as well as marital status. The assimilation indexes of the Armenians showed the following results in 2007: their economic index was 100, which is the maximum and shows that Armenians generally have a high education, earnings, occupational prestige

---

<sup>28</sup> PAPAZIAN

and employment status. However, their cultural assimilation index was relatively low, 46/100, and was higher compared to only a few countries: Pakistan (39), India (38), Bangladesh (35), Bosnia (40), China (41), and Albania (42). Uzbekistan's assimilation index was identical to that of Armenia's (46). According to this report, only 6 percent of the total 100 nations have assimilated culturally less than Armenians. It is not stated in the report; however, that this number probably primarily comes from the low intermarriage and divorce rates of Armenians.<sup>29</sup>

The data of the 2000 U.S. Census and of the 2007 American Community Survey reflect the previously mentioned findings. The following numbers confirm Jacob L. Vidgor's results with respect to cultural assimilation. Among the 221,865 people who listed that they spoke a language other than English at home—in this case Armenian—in 2007, 55.1 percent reported that they spoke English very well, 21.7 percent well, 14.9 percent not very well, and 8.2 percent not at all.<sup>30</sup> From the data of the 2000 Census concerning „*People Born in Armenia*,” one can find that the divorce rate of Armenians is significantly lower than the national average: 3.9 percent<sup>31</sup> vs. 9.7 percent<sup>32</sup>. This is probably due to the generally religious and conservative character of Armenians. Regarding economic assimilation and more specifically, education, one can notice that Armenian-born immigrants have similar educational attainment backgrounds to the average of the total U.S. population. The percentage of Armenians who are high school graduates or have a higher educational attainment is 78.7 percent, whereas this number is 80.4 percent for the total U.S. population. Also, the percentage of Armenians who have a Bachelor's or a higher degree is 27 percent, slightly higher than that of the entire U.S. population, which is 24.4 percent.<sup>33</sup> At this point it has to be said that the group of people who were surveyed does not include American-born individuals; neither does it include Armenian immigrants from other countries with significant Armenian minorities. It would be interesting to do a similar study not only for people born in Armenia, but also for all people of Armenian descent, including Armenians born in the United States and in other diasporas. However, it would be increasingly difficult to realize this project, due to the heterogeneous character of Armenians.

---

<sup>29</sup> VIDGOR, Jacob L.: „*Measuring Immigrant Assimilation in the United States*,” IN: *Manhattan Institute for Policy Research*, Civic Report N° 59, 2009. October. [http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr\\_59.htm](http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_59.htm) (Accessed: 2013. February 29.)

<sup>30</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, „*Language Use in the United States: 2007*.” 7.

<sup>31</sup> U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2000, „*Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000. Population Universe: People born in Armenia*” Table FBP-1, n. d. <https://www.census.gov/population/foreign/files/stp-159/STP-159-Armenia.pdf> (Accessed: 2013. February 29.)

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2000, „*Marital Status: 2000*,” 2000. October. 3. <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-30.pdf> (Accessed: 2013. March 7.)

<sup>33</sup> U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2000, „*State and County QuickFacts: USA*,” 2010. November 4. <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html> (Accessed: 2011. April 16.) U.S. Census Bureau: Census 2000, „*Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics: 2000. Population Universe: People born in Armenia*,” Table FBP-1

The issue of assimilation is a topic that is often discussed by Armenians and is nevertheless regarded as a threat by many of them. Being a small nation of approximately eleven million people which has suffered several massacres and the first genocide of the twentieth century, Armenians rightly feel that their cultural existence is in jeopardy. A large number of Armenians were forced to leave their homelands for the United States due to wars and ethnic cleansings. Although they were free to practice their religion and hold on to their cultural identity in their new country, it also became increasingly difficult for many to resist assimilation. The force of assimilation in the USA is very strong, even in the case of such resistant ethnic groups as the Armenian Americans. Some Armenians of the Western Diaspora (United States, France, Argentina, Canada, and other countries) consider assimilation, including the loss of the Armenian language and intermarriage within an immigrant community, the „white massacre.“<sup>34</sup> They claim that with their exiles and assimilation, they are completing exactly what the perpetrators of the Genocide attempted to do in order to eliminate the Armenian race.<sup>35</sup>

It is said that Armenians form a closely-knit group who stick together. A recent experience of mine can also confirm this idea. I was traveling on one of the buses in Budapest when I met a friend who was traveling with her guest from Yerevan on the bus. When I introduced myself to her guest, I told her that I also had Armenian ancestors. She was happy to hear this and asked me what my family name was. Since I told her that I did not have an Armenian family name, for I am only partly of Armenian heritage, she asked me who was of Armenian descent in my family. When we said good-by to each other a few minutes later, she asked me to give her greetings to my father. She later contacted me through her friend and we have exchanged several messages ever since.

There are several cohesive forces that bind those who are in various Armenian diaspora communities together, enabling their people to survive as a nation. A strong force of cohesion between the Armenians is the Armenian Genocide which took place in Turkey during the First World War. Since the prominent intellectual members of the Armenian communities were executed already at the beginning of the Genocide, the later survivors were mostly uneducated people who could pass on only some fragments of folk culture to their offspring.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, the oral narrators of the Genocide survivors were the ones who created a common genesis of history for many Armenians, according to Hrag Varjabedian.<sup>37</sup> The denial of the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish government and the reluctance of many

---

<sup>34</sup> BAKALIAN: 2.

<sup>35</sup> MILLER, Donald Eugene – MILLER, Lorna Touryan: *Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993. 72.

<sup>36</sup> PAPAŽIAN

<sup>37</sup> VARJABEDIAN, Hrag: „*Construction of National Identities: Armenian Peoples of Armenia and the Diaspora*,“ Research Report for Individual Research Opportunities Program. 2004. September 30. 5. <http://www.irex.org/resource/construction-national-identities-armenian-peoples-armenia-and-diaspora-research-brief> (Accessed: 2013. March 1.)

governments to recognize it, including the United States, probably also strengthen the desire of Armenians to impede assimilation.

Another strong force of cohesion for Armenians is religion. The majority of Armenians are Christians who mainly belong to three denominations: Armenian Orthodox people form part of the Armenian Apostolic Church, Protestant Armenians of the Presbyterian Church, while Armenian Catholics are linked to the Roman Catholic Church.

Armenian Catholics belong to the Armenian Catholic Church, which is an autonomous church in full communion with the Bishop of Rome.<sup>38</sup> The Armenian Catholics of the United States and of Canada are under the jurisdiction of the Eparchy of Our Lady of Nareg,<sup>39</sup> which has its headquarters in New York and was founded in 2005. The Eparchy consists of nine parishes and 36,000 people.<sup>40</sup> Protestant Armenians usually arrived as educated people and could easily obtain good jobs as doctors, dentists, pharmacists, lawyers, engineers, and professors. They gave priority to religion rather than to nationality, and as a consequence, they often Americanized their names and tried to assimilate into American society.

Most Armenian Americans pertain to the Armenian Apostolic Church. The parishes which belong to the Prelacy are under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Cilicia, while those pertaining to the Diocese belong to the Catholicosate of Etzmiadzin, due to a split in the Armenian Apostolic Church in America resulting from a political tension during the Cold War. Archbishop Lev Tourian was assassinated in 1933 during a Christmas service in New York. Since the Armenian Church in America had already become divided after the Soviet occupation of Armenia between two opposing sides which accused each other of being pro-Communists and unreliable nationalists respectively, the tensions between the two parties could not be mitigated after the assassination of the Archbishop.

This split in the Church not only resulted in a religious tension, but also had dreadful consequences on the relations between the two groups. Armenians of opposing political sides would not talk to each other and marriage between the members of the two parties was also very rare. As a consequence, the members of the Diocesan parishes began to intermarry with non-Armenians. The general prospects of the Armenian community did not seem to be reassuring at all.<sup>41</sup> Despite the historical tensions, the two branches of the Armenian Church in America are theologically identical to each other. Karekin I., who headed both Catholicossates as the Catholicos of all Armenians from 1995 to 1999, tried to reunite the two branches of the Church; however, he has not been successful in his attempt to do so.

---

<sup>38</sup> The Bishop of Rome is the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church.

<sup>39</sup> *Eparchy*: a church province in the Eastern Christian Churches

<sup>40</sup> Catholic Near East Welfare Association: „*Armenian Catholic Church*,” IN: cnewa.us. n. d. 2. <http://www.cnewa.us/default.aspx?ID=62&pagetypeID=9&sitecode=US&pageno=1> (Accessed: 2013. March 1.)

<sup>41</sup> PAPAŽIAN

Contrarily to Armenians, Italians have linguistically assimilated rather quickly into the dominant culture. This was caused by the relatively late unification of Italy (1961-1970). Prior to its unification Italy had no official language; therefore, people coming from the regions or cities, which were formerly separate states or city states, spoke a myriad of dialects, sometimes incomprehensible even for other Italians. As a consequence of the previous long-term lack of political unity along with the little education and the poor knowledge of standard Italian that most immigrants had, upon their arrival in the United States many were forced to speak a kind of language that was based on the mixture of English, some Standard Italian, and dialectal Italian words.

The lack of geographical and political unity, which characterized the Italian Peninsula after the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD and lasted until its unification in the nineteenth century, resulted in the feeling of *campanilismo*: the excessive attachment to one's place of birth. This sentiment was also accompanied by a kind of rivalry and hostility among Italians who were born in a different village or region.<sup>42</sup> Italian immigrants brought with them the practice of *campanilismo* also to the United States. For instance, in New York immigrants coming from the same region or village tended to settle in the same street and viewed those coming from a neighboring town or village with hostility, referring to each others as foreigners.<sup>43</sup> In his documentary *My Voyage to Italy*, Martin Scorsese mentions the case of his grandparents, who came from two rival districts of Palermo. The members of the two opposing districts settled at the opposite side of New York's Elizabeth Street from one another and continued to treat each other with hostility, as it was the custom in Sicily. Moreover, Scorsese notes that intermarriages between Italians from the rival district remained uncommon for many years.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the fact that Italians were not extremely successful in passing on their language to their offspring, they proved to be resistant to assimilation from the point of view of food. Although at first they were criticized by mainstream society for their culinary customs, Italians nevertheless regarded American food as being inferior to their own cuisine (at first they detested it only within private family circles, but later also defended their own eating habits openly, in the public sphere)<sup>45</sup> and have kept on to their traditions for several generations. Simultaneously, Italian restaurants became widely popular in New York, with the opening of Lombardi's and Mamma Leone's in 1905 and Barbetta in 1906, a very elegant Italian restaurant made popular by Enrico Caruso, Luisa Tetrazzini, and

---

<sup>42</sup> The term *campanilismo* originates from the Italian word *campanile*, meaning *bell tower*, which used to be the symbol of the wealth and power of competing cities and regions in the Middle Ages. VECOLI, Rudolph J.: „*The Italian People of New Jersey*”, IN: *The New Jersey Ethnic Experience* (Ed. Barbara CUNNINGHAM), William H. Wise & Co., Union City, NJ, 1977. 281-282.

<sup>43</sup> MEYER, Gerald: „*Italian Harlem: America's Largest and Most Italian Little Italy*”, n. d. [http://vitomarcantonio.com/eh\\_italian\\_east\\_harlem.html](http://vitomarcantonio.com/eh_italian_east_harlem.html) (Accessed: 2012. March 26.)

<sup>44</sup> SCORSESE, Martin (Dir.): *My Voyage to Italy*, 1999. Documentary.

<sup>45</sup> CINOTTO, Simone: „*Leonard Covello, the Covello Papers, and the History of Eating Habits among Italian Immigrants in New York*,” *The Journal of American History* Vol. 91, N° 2, 2004. 497-521.



Arturo Toscanini. Consequently, Italian food was integrated into mainstream American culture as well.<sup>46</sup> It is interesting to mention that in this case one can not only speak of the resistance to assimilation, but also of acculturation as a two-way process.

Despite the fact that Italian Americans were eager to keep their culinary traditions, they became Americanized in other aspects of their cultural practices. Political scientist and historian Michael Parenti, who grew up as a son of an Italian immigrant family in the 1940s in New York, recalls that although the children of immigrants had become Americanized from the point of view of language, fashion, and entertainment, and had lost their interest in Old World culture, their acculturation usually did not go hand in hand with social assimilation. Parenti writes: „*The group became Americanized in much of its cultural practices, but this says little about its social relations with the host society. In the face of widespread acculturation, ethnic minorities still maintained social group relations composed mostly of fellow ethnics.*”<sup>47</sup>

As to what regards the Hungarians, it can be said that the majority of them wished to assimilate into the dominant American society. Several studies have conformed that in general, 90 percent of Hungarian Americans tend to assimilate within one generation, in terms of language maintenance and intermarriage.<sup>48</sup> However, a fraction of the Hungarian immigrants, especially among those who came after the Revolution of 1956, were eager to keep their culture and pass it on to their children and grandchildren. They were the people who believed to be sojourners in the United States, waiting for Communism to collapse, so that they could go home to Hungary after its fall. Since they only regarded their stay in the United States as a temporary one, they set up an artificial cultural atmosphere in which they taught their children Hungarian dances, folk songs, history, gastronomy, and most importantly, the Hungarian language. Réka Pigniczky and her sister Eszter, daughters of a 1956 Hungarian revolutionary, grew up in this kind of environment in various cities where Hungarian immigrants had formed communities. Based on their experiences, Réka Pigniczky directed a documentary entitled *Incubator*, which serves as a metaphor to describe the artificial Hungarian atmosphere in which they were brought up, based on an idealized concept of

---

<sup>46</sup> MARIANI, John: „*How Italian Food Conquered the World,*” conference lecture presented at the annual conference *The Three F's in Italian Culture: Critical Approaches to Food, Fashion, and Film* at Calandra Italian American Institute. 2011. April 28. <http://calandra.i-italy.org/may-25-2011-calandras-annual-international-conference-iavanet-exhibition> (Accessed: 2012. January 20.) For a detailed study of the image and self-image of Italian Americans, see PINTZ, Katalin: „*Amerikai olaszok New Yorkban: kép és önkép az utolsó 150 évben (Italian Americans in New York: Image and Self-image in the Past 150 Years)*,” IN: *125 éves a budapesti angol szak* (Eds. Tibor FRANK – Krisztina KÁROLY), ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2012. 68-77.

<sup>47</sup> PARENTI, Michael: *Italian American Identity: „To Be or Not To Be,”* IN: *Michael Parenti political archive*, 2009. [http://www.michaelparenti.org/Italian\\_American\\_Identity.html](http://www.michaelparenti.org/Italian_American_Identity.html) (Accessed: 2013. March 14.)

<sup>48</sup> SZENTKIRÁLYI, Endre: „*Growing up Hungarian in Cleveland: Case Studies of Language Use,*” *Hungarian Studies Review* (Ed. Nándor DREISZIGER), Vol. 40, N° 1., Spring 2013. 39. <http://www.hungarianstudies.org/HSR2013.pdf> (Accessed: 2013. April 4.)

Hungary, one which did not coincide with reality. Nevertheless, this „*incubator*” helped keep Hungarian culture and sentiments alive in the New World also among successive second and third generation Hungarian Americans.<sup>49</sup>

In her film Pigniczky focuses on the role of Hungarian scouting, which is one of the fundamental pillars of Hungarian culture maintenance in the USA. The Hungarian boy and girl scouts living in the USA learn the basics of Hungarian history, folk songs, Hungarian embroidery, and most important of all, have to speak Hungarian among themselves during scouting activities and camps. The knowledge of Hungarian is essential for gaining admittance among the scouts.<sup>50</sup>

In fact, Hungarians, although having a difficult language, do not have the kind of problem that Italians have (or even Armenians, with their two major dialects, Western Armenian and Eastern Armenian), since they have had a unified language ever since the foundation of the Hungarian nation state in 1000 A.D. Basically, all Hungarians can understand each other to a great extent (even those living in the isolated regions of Romania), for they do not have mutually unintelligible dialects, only variations in terms of pronunciation and some diversity in terminology. The linguistic unity of Hungarians coming from various regions has influenced Hungarian language maintenance in a positive way. Probably as a result of this unity, the knowledge of Hungarian on the East Coast United States is one of the basic forms of identity preservation along with passing on folk culture and the heritage of 1956.

### ***Issues of Acculturation***

Several examples show that Armenians can quickly acculturate to American society. Firstly, Armenians show a tendency of upward mobility within society. With the exception of a few xenophobic laws in California, where Armenians settled in large numbers, they were generally well accepted by the host society. In fact, British authors of the nineteenth century referred to the Armenians as the „*Anglo-Saxons of the Middle East,*” because they were not only characterized by diligence and frugality, but were also moderate and innovative people who were devoted Christians and could easily adapt to their new environment.<sup>51</sup> In general, Armenians could also successfully adapt to the economic life of the host country. The reasons for this were several: most of them had already had experience in business before arriving in the United States, they were characterized by an outstandingly high literacy rate, and as emigrants of a minority group from their native lands, they could respond to the challenges of the adaptation to a new culture considerably easily.<sup>52</sup>

Given their generally ambitious character, the American-born Armenians were

---

<sup>49</sup> PIGNICZKY, Réka (Dir.): *Incubator*, 56Films. 2009.

<sup>50</sup> PINTZ, Katalin: „*Hungarian Heritage Maintenance in the USA: New Brunswick, N.J., as a Magyar Ethnic Island,*” *Hungarian Studies Review* (Ed. Nándor DREISZIGER) Vol. 38, N<sup>o</sup> 1-2., Spring-Fall 2011. 94-96.

<sup>51</sup> TAKOOSHIAN

<sup>52</sup> MIRAK, Robert: *Armenians*, IN: *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Eds. Stephan THERNSTROM et al.) Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981. 141.

able to leave the lower class and integrate into the middle class. Initially, due to their lack of English knowledge and economic resources upon their arrival in the United States, Armenians mostly joined factories and mills as unskilled laborers. Nevertheless, later many Armenians left the factories and went into business or farming. According to contemporary data, this was because they were displeased with their low wages and were eager to discard their working-class lifestyle.<sup>53</sup>

Secondly, Armenians have been successful in the fields of business, education and the sciences, and most have acquired a good command of English. Attaining education is especially important for Armenians. According to a survey done by the President of the Armenian International College in California in 1990, with the participation of 1,864 Armenians of age 12-19 in 22 states, 83 percent of Armenian students were planning to continue their education in post-secondary institutions. A Canadian sponsor of young Armenians, who has referred to them as „*school crazy*,” may also illustrate the fact how conscious Armenians are of getting higher education. In fact, the role of education has always received high attention in the history of Armenian culture.<sup>54</sup>

The high educational and income rates of Armenians were also reflected upon by Stephan Thernstrom in his book *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible* in 1997: „*Comparing America's ethnic groups clearly reveals their widely differing socio-economic profiles. Consider the 'Cajuns', who reside mainly in rural Louisiana. They are indistinguishable from African Americans in their low rate of college graduation, and have incomes that are 19 percent below the national average. On the other end of the spectrum are Armenians, whose college completion rates are 88 percent above the national average, and who have incomes 45 percent above the average. Armenians, with Greeks and Latvians, are examples of allegedly unassimilable 'new immigrant' groups who arrived on these shores less than a century ago and have already moved ahead of earlier arrivals like the English, Germans, Irish and Swedes.*”<sup>55</sup>

The fact that Armenians are essentially a diaspora nation has enabled them to survive in their new American environment upon their immigration. The Armenian Americans of the United States originate not only from the Republic of Armenia, but also from countries with significant Armenian populations as Russia, the United States, France, Iran, Georgia, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, and many other countries. Therefore, not all Armenians speak Armenian as their native language: some speak Arabic, Turkish, Persian, etc. Simultaneously, others have a bilingual background: they speak Eastern or Western Armenian, one of the two main Armenian dialects, besides the language of their country of birth. Many Armenians, especially in the Middle East, are also fluent in French. Given these facts, Armenians are generally able to learn English quickly and adapt to their new environments easily.

---

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 141-142.

<sup>54</sup> TAKOOSHIAN

<sup>55</sup> THERNSTROM, Stephan – THERNSTROM, Abigail: *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1997. 541.

Regarding the issue of acculturation, one can also speak of the influence of a minority on the majority culture: in this case of the influence of Armenians on American politics. Given the large size of Armenian immigrants and their descendents in key states from the point of view of presidential elections (California, New York, Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, Connecticut, and New Jersey), most of the presidential candidates of the 2008 elections had formed their opinion on important Armenian issues, also on the request of the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA). On the website of ANCA, one can read *„Armenian American voters are well represented in both the Democratic and the Republican parties across the political spectrum and are willing to cross party lines to vote for candidates who have supported issues of special concern to the community.”* The presidential candidates were asked to fill out a questionnaire relating to 19 important questions, among which the crucial ones were the affirmation of the Armenian Genocide, U.S.-Armenia relations, the autonomy of Nagorno Karabagh, and the Turkish and Azerbaijani blockades of Armenia.<sup>56</sup>

There is also a review on the website of ANCA on the positions of the 2008 presidential candidates concerning Armenian issues. Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and John Edwards are mentioned among the previous Democratic candidates. According to the review, as former Senators, both Hillary Clinton and John Edwards supported the congressional adoption of successive Armenian Genocide Resolutions after 2002. Before the elections of 2008, Hillary Clinton stated *„I have twice written to President Bush calling on him to refer to the Armenian Genocide in his annual commemorative statement and, as President, I will recognize the Armenian Genocide.”*<sup>57</sup> In 2008 Barack Obama also pledged to recognize the Armenian Genocide and sent a letter to former President George W. Bush to urge him to do so. On the website it is also stated that Barack Obama criticized the dismissal of former U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Evans, who had honestly expressed his thoughts about the Armenian Genocide, but that Obama nevertheless voted for Richard Hoegland, the candidate to replace Evans, who had denied the events of the Armenian Genocide publicly.

The names of John McCain, Rudy Giuliani, Mike Huckabee, and Mitt Romney are mentioned under the profile of the Republican Party. As a Senator, McCain did not sustain Armenian American matters and even opposed the passing of the Armenian Genocide Resolution in 2008, for he did not want to come into conflict with Turkey. Contrarily to McCain, Rudy Giuliani, the former Mayor of New York City, attended several Genocide Commemorations and delivered various Armenian

---

<sup>56</sup> Armenian National Committee of America: *„Armenian Americans Set to Play Pivotal Role in Primaries: Large Numbers of Voters in Key States: California, New York, Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, Connecticut, and New Jersey,” ANCA.org*, 2008. January 9. [http://www.anca.org/press\\_releases/press\\_releases.php?prid=1360](http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=1360) (Accessed: 2011. April 17.)

<sup>57</sup> Armenian National Committee of America: *„Hillary Clinton Supports Adoption of the Armenian Genocide Resolution; Pledges to Recognize Armenian Genocide as President,” ANCA.org*, 2008. January 24. [http://www.anca.org/press\\_releases/press\\_releases.php?prid=1367](http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=1367) (Accessed: 2011. April 18.)

Genocide proclamations. In 2001 he also welcomed Karekin II., the Catholicos of all Armenians (the current head of the Armenian Apostolic Church) at his residence for breakfast. In 2001 Mike Huckabee publicly stated that Turkey continues to deny the crime against the Armenians. However, Armenians were offended when he issued a proclamation to designate a „*Day of Remembrance of the Turkish and Armenian Tragedy*,” for they claim it was a genocide; not simply a tragedy. Finally, contrarily to the other former Republican candidates, Mitt Romney was not committed to any Armenian issues at all and did not support any of them.<sup>58</sup>

After the election of President Barack Obama, Armenians were disappointed to find out that he had not kept his promise. In fact, the recognition of the events of the Armenian Genocide has been a problematic aspect of the foreign policies of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, although all three of them had promised to officially recognize the Armenian Genocide prior to their election. The reason for their reluctance to state that the Armenian Genocide did take place is due to the importance of the Turkish lobby, U.S.-Turkey relations, and Turkey's constant denial of the Genocide. According to the position of the Turkish government, the death of countless Armenians between 1915 and 1923 was not the result of consciously planned ethnic cleansings, but only an inevitable consequence of the First World War.<sup>59</sup>

Armenian Americans were displeased by President Obama's refusal to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide and organized a protest in Los Angeles against the President's message delivered to the Armenians in April 2009. Although he did mention the word *Meds Yeghern*, meaning Genocide in Armenian, he did not pronounce the word *Genocide* once during his speech. Blogger Unzipped commented „*Effectively he recognised the Armenian Genocide for Armenians only (who understand the meaning of "Meds Yeghern") but not to the outside world.*”<sup>60</sup>

Concerning the power of their lobby, Armenians rank among the most influential ethnic minorities in the USA. In fact, in his July 1, 2006 article which appeared in *Foreign Policy* under the title „*A Dangerous Exemption*,” Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that Armenian Americans were among the most successful lobby groups, together with the Israeli-American and the Cuban-American lobbies, followed by the Greek and the Taiwanese Americans. Brzezinski also admitted that the significance of the once influential Polish lobby has also decreased lately.<sup>61</sup>

Not all Armenians, however, are pleased with the effectiveness of their lobby. A part of Armenians are especially disappointed because they were not able to

---

<sup>58</sup> Armenian National Committee of America: „*Armenians Set to Play Pivotal Role in Primaries*”

<sup>59</sup> TRISTAM, Pierre: „*Ronald Reagan Marks the Holocaust – And Recognizes the Armenian Genocide*,” About.com, 2009. April 26. <http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/qt/me090426a.htm> (Accessed: 2011. April 16.)

<sup>60</sup> TRISTAM, Pierre: „*Obama Breaks His Promise on the Armenian Genocide*,” About.com, 2009. April 25. <http://middleeast.about.com/od/usmideastpolicy/qt/me090426a.htm> (Accessed: 2011. April 16.)

<sup>61</sup> BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew: „*A Dangerous Exemption*,” *Foreign Policy*, 2006. July 1. 63.

reach their main goal, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Benjamin Poghosyan, who studied the Armenian Genocide issue's impact on U.S.-Turkish relations, admits that the recognition of the Armenian Genocide is a key issue in American domestic politics: „*In every election circle both Presidential and Congressional candidates are actively involved in efforts to promote Genocide recognition issue hoping to get more Armenian votes.*”<sup>62</sup> However, he states that it is not an issue of primary importance in foreign policy, because each time the U.S. Congress seemed to get close to recognizing the Genocide, the Turkish government threatened to restrict bilateral relations with the United States. Rather, Poghosyan states that the Genocide issue is „*used by American authorities as a tool to press Turkey and get some concessions without any real intention to recognize the fact of Armenian Genocide.*”<sup>63</sup>

Nonetheless, compared to the Armenians, Hungarians and Italians have less influence in determining the foreign policy of the United States in support of their homeland or ethnic group. This is shown by the fact that if one goes on Google Search for articles on ethnic Hungarian or Italian lobbies, one will find very few results. Nevertheless, the Hungarian media became interested in the effectiveness of the Hungarian lobby during the 2012 US presidential elections. In November 1, 2012 *Heti Válasz* interview with Jenő Megyesy, former Honorary Consul General of Hungary to Denver, Colorado, Megyesy stated that the vote of Hungarian Americans may be crucial in some of the swing states. There are approximately 200,000 Hungarians living in Ohio, but their numbers are also significant in Michigan and Pennsylvania. Although the vote of the Hungarians mostly matters at election times when there is a tie, these are important states on which presidential candidates focus.<sup>64</sup>

The other main difference between the effectiveness of Hungarian and Armenian pressure groups is that Hungarians lack the kind of strong leading organizations which Armenians have. There is also a kind of rivalry present among the leaders of the various Hungarian clubs. However, Megyesy stated that these leaders were able to effectively unite before Hungary joined NATO in 1999, which shows that if the various organizations unite, success can be achieved. When asked why the Armenian community, despite its small size, was more effective in their lobbying than the Hungarians, Megyesy replied that Armenians are willing to make significant financial sacrifices in order to pursue their goals, and they are constantly active in US politics, not just at election times.<sup>65</sup>

As to what regards Italian American interest groups, they are less concerned about political relations with Italy. This is mainly due to the fact that ever since the

---

<sup>62</sup> POGHOSYAN, Benjamin P.: *Turkish-American Relations and the Issue of US Recognition of Armenian Genocide in 1991-2007* (In Armenian, with extensive summary in English), Institute of History Press, Yerevan, 2011. 68-69. [http://www.academia.edu/463649/Turkish\\_-\\_American\\_Relations\\_and\\_the\\_Issue\\_of\\_US\\_Recognition\\_of\\_Armenian\\_Genocide\\_in\\_1991-2007](http://www.academia.edu/463649/Turkish_-_American_Relations_and_the_Issue_of_US_Recognition_of_Armenian_Genocide_in_1991-2007) (Accessed: 2013. April 1.)

<sup>63</sup> POGHOSYAN: 73.

<sup>64</sup> G. F. P.: „*A nemzetiségi szavazatok tétje: Magyar lobbí Amerikában,*” *Heti Válasz*, 2012. November 1. 41.

<sup>65</sup> G. F. P., 41

1920s, the number of Italian Americans who were born in the United States exceeded that of those who were born in Italy.<sup>66</sup> Another reason for this is that today Italy is a democratic country which does not have any conflicts with other nations, such as Armenia has with Azerbaijan, for instance. What upsets Italian Americans is their general negative portrayal in the media, particularly as mobsters and working-class boors. Micheal Parenti writes: „*For us Italians, the immigrant generation was reduced to a Luigi caricature, a simple soul who spoke in a pasta-laden accent. Then came the perennial Mafia mobster, recently given new life with The Sopranos. Also still going strong are the television commercials portraying large boisterous Italian families gathered around the dinner table to shovel immense amounts of food into their mouths and at each other in what resembles an athletic contest.*”<sup>67</sup>

A similar uproar among Italian Americans was caused by MTV’s launching of the reality show „*Jersey Shore*,” which characterized Italian Americans as violent and course uneducated people, in a manner that is far from reality, according to many Italian Americans. It was against this image that the National Italian American Foundation and other Italian American organizations such as UNICO National spoke up prior to and after the show’s launching in 2009. As a result of the organizations’ protests, MTV stopped using the word *guido* in the show’s voice-overs and advertisements,<sup>68</sup> and due to the campaigns of Andre DiMino,<sup>69</sup> the leader of UNICO National, the second season of „*Jersey Shore*” contained less references to Italian culture, for instance, the Italian flag was shown less often than previously.<sup>70</sup>

Contrarily to the Armenians, the majority of Hungarian Americans and Italian Americans have fixed voting preferences within American political life. Although most Hungarian Americans are Republicans—mainly those living in the inner states of the country, as in Colorado, for instance—nevertheless, in other areas, as in Washington, for example, most Hungarian Americans are Democratic voters, according to political scientist Ágoston Sámuel Mráz. Mráz also stated that most Hungarian Americans’ primary concerns are not relations with the homeland, but rather American domestic politics.<sup>71</sup>

Regarding the New York-New Jersey area, Csaba Lukács stated that Hungarian Americans do not even discuss politics. Since Americans in general tend to avoid

---

<sup>66</sup> Progetto ITENETS: *Gli Italiani negli Stati Uniti d’America*, 2003. August. 4-7. [http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc\\_osservatorio/Gli\\_italiani\\_negli\\_USA.pdf](http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc_osservatorio/Gli_italiani_negli_USA.pdf) (Accessed: 2013. March 14.)

<sup>67</sup> PARENTI

<sup>68</sup> DEL RASO, Joseph V.: „*National Italian American Foundation’s Official Statement: MTV’s Jersey Shore*” 2010. <http://www.niaf.org/news/index.asp?id=699> (Accessed: 2013. March 14.)

<sup>69</sup> *Guido*: a term primarily associated with Italian Americans, though not referring only to them. *Guidos* are young people of the Tri-State area (especially of New York and of the New Jersey Shore) in their late teens and early twenties, who lead a careless lifestyle and are obsessed with shopping and tanning. The female version of the term is *guidette*.

<sup>70</sup> The Associated Press: „*Jersey Shore producers agree to tone down Italian-American references*,” IN: [www.nj.com](http://www.nj.com), 2010. June 18. [http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/jersey\\_shore\\_producer\\_agree\\_to.html](http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/jersey_shore_producer_agree_to.html) (Accessed: 2013. April 4.)

<sup>71</sup> MRÁZ, Ágoston Sámuel: personal communications. 2013. April 1.

conflicts, they tend to evade this topic as well. However, after long efforts of trying to understand the voting preferences of local Hungarian Americans at the time of the 2012 presidential elections, he understood that the members of the older generation are more conservative and tend to vote Republican (given that they are mainly composed of those who fled Communism after World War Two and the Revolution of 1956), but that the younger generation does not have such strong party preferences, and primarily decides who to elect based on the personality of the given candidate.<sup>72</sup>

Like many Hungarian Americans, Italian Americans are also more interested in domestic issues, rather than Italian politics. Parenti stated that for many years the Italian Americans were waiting for a fellow Italian American to be appointed to the Supreme Court. By 2006 there were two Italian Americans serving on the Supreme Court of the United States, Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, both Republicans. However, the Democrats, together with Parenti, were not dancing with joy. By that time in fact, Italian Americans were more in favor of having someone of their own party appointed than another Italian American of the opposing political party.<sup>73</sup>

One might ask why the Hungarians and the Italians are less concerned about the political issues related to their homeland. Parenti's claim may serve as an answer to this question, who said that by today „*the white ethnics of the late migrations seem to have assimilated into the electoral mainstream, at least as distinct voting groups.*” In fact, with respect to the 2008 presidential elections, the *Times* analyzed the electorate based on factors as income, gender, educational level, region, and religion; however, no ethnic groups were mentioned besides the Latinos and African Americans. Parenti also stated that there are no contemporary reports done by the Harris and Gallup polls as to what regards the voting preferences of Italian, Irish, Polish, German, Hungarian, Portuguese and Greek Americans, as it once used to be.<sup>74</sup>

### **Conclusion**

Despite the tensions in religious and political life that had weakened Armenian American community life, the Armenians of the United States have managed to resist the force of assimilation. They are generally proud and conscious of their heritage and contrarily to the members other white immigrant groups, they are ready to cross borders in American politics in order to defend their stance on the history of their nation. Although they have remained loyal to their language and culture in general, they were also successful in integrating into American society from the point of view of education and economic life. Finally, they are among the few ethnic minorities that have not only resisted assimilation, but have been able to influence American political life as well.

---

<sup>72</sup> LUKÁCS, Csaba: „*Másnap dolgozni kell...*,” *Magyar Nemzet*, 2012. November 10. 27.

<sup>73</sup> PARENTI

<sup>74</sup> PARENTI



**Ferenc Cserhádi**

## ***The Role of the United States in the Dispute over the Falkland Islands***

### **Abstract**

The purpose of this study is to describe what the role of the United States was in the Falklands Crisis. The United States was involved in the prehistory of the Falklands War, for example in the raid by the U.S.S. Lexington on the Falkland Islands in the 1830s. The United States was surprised by the Argentine strike against the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982, and found itself in a difficult situation. It had to decide which country to support: Argentina or Great Britain. If the United States supported Great Britain, it could alienate Latin America. The United States was at the same time, a member of NATO, just like Great Britain, and had an obligation to support the British. Initially, American government officials attempted to mediate between the two antagonists and find a diplomatic solution. However, it was doomed to failure, and the United States supported Great Britain in the end with intelligence reports and weapons. Great Britain won the Falklands War. Argentina and Latin America came to resent the actions of the United States.

*Keywords:* United States, Great Britain, Argentina, Falklands Crisis, Soviet Union, sovereignty, mediation, Alexander Haig

**T**he Falklands War was fought between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands. The United States was involved in the prehistory of the conflict and the crisis of 1982. To the Argentine people the Falkland Islands are known as Las Malvinas. In 1982, the year when the war began, Great Britain was officially in possession of them and was governing the archipelago as a colony. Argentina wanted to claim the islands, which had a population of 1,700.<sup>1</sup> The population of the Falkland Islands made a living mainly from agriculture. The purpose of this study is to define what the role of the United States was in the Falklands War and its prehistory. The Falklands War can be understood better if it is placed in a historical context. Centuries ago the Falkland Islands were part of the Spanish Empire and Great Britain had, in a sense a weak claim to the islands.<sup>2</sup> In return Spain agreed it would give up its right to navigate and fish in the area of the Falkland Islands. Since there was a small population of Spaniards on the Falkland Islands, this further strengthened Spain's claim to the islands, and Great Britain's claim was further weak. In the first years of the nineteenth century, Great Britain decided that it wanted to take over Spanish trade in the area of the Falkland Islands. In 1806, while the Napoleonic Wars were being waged, Great Britain was

---

<sup>1</sup> REISMAN, W. Michael: *The Struggle for the Falklands*, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 93, N° 2, 1983. 287.

<sup>2</sup> GUSTAFSON, S. Lowell: *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988. 20.

assisting the Latin Americans in pushing the French out of their territories which served the interests of the British because the French were their main rival.<sup>3</sup> Spain had to fight Latin Americans who would later create the country of Argentina. Because of the revolt, Spain had to evacuate the Falkland Islands in 1811, where a small population of Spaniards had been living. It was then that the question of to whom the islands belonged that became ambiguous. It has been argued that it belonged to Spain if it could crush the Argentine revolt. However, the new Argentine nation also had a claim to them. When the revolt was successful, Argentina applied the principle of *uti possidetis* to claim the Falkland Islands.<sup>4</sup> According to this principle the former colony of a colonizing power comes under the administration of the new, independent government. Even though the administration of the former colony might be disorganized, the new government had the right to sovereignty over the colony.

Argentina arguably had a claim to the Falkland Islands based on *uti possidetis*, but Great Britain had been the first Old World country to have discovered it. The British government stated in 1982 that the Falkland Islands were first seen by an English sea captain called John Davis.<sup>5</sup> The British government was essentially stating the same thing that the British author Mary Cawkell had asserted. She stated that Captain John Davis had discovered the Falkland Islands on August 14, 1592. Under these circumstances Great Britain also had a claim to the Falkland Islands. On November 19, 1829 the British chargé stationed in Buenos Aires declared that the British discovery and occupation of the Falkland Islands by the British, as well as restitution of Port Egmont, based Great Britain's claim to the Falkland Islands. It is likely that the British wanted to take over control of the Falkland Islands in order to establish a naval base there.<sup>6</sup> The British had a good chance of taking over the Falkland Islands because Argentina was still weak. In 1830 the American Secretary of State announced that Argentina did not have a really valid claim to the Falkland Islands. In 1831 two American ships were engaging in fishing near the Falkland Islands, but they violated certain fishing regulations. In response Argentina seized both ships. The Americans were offended, because they argued that the two ships were engaging in lawful trade. The United States Supreme Court ruled on the seizure and invoked the position of the U.S. Executive Branch that the Falkland Islands did not belong to Argentina.<sup>7</sup> The American sea captain Silas Duncan, commander of the U.S.S. Lexington, was sent to the Falkland Islands from Buenos Aires to protect the American citizens involved in the dispute. On December 28, 1831 he attacked the Falkland Islands, his attack being approved by President Andrew Jackson. The United States later

---

<sup>3</sup> GUSTAFSON: 21.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>7</sup> KINNEY, Douglas: *National Interest/ National Honor: The Diplomacy of the Falklands Crisis*, Praeger, New York, 1989. 41.

declared that the principle of *res nullius* made the islands the property of no single country. The American Secretary of State, Edward Livingston, stated that the British seizure of the American fishing boats was an act of piracy and lawlessness. President Jackson claimed that the United States had the right to fish off the Falkland Islands.<sup>8</sup> In an address to Congress, he claimed that pirates had threatened American fishing and trading interests in the area of the Falklands and asked Congress to provide a naval force to protect Americans who fished and traded in the South Atlantic.<sup>9</sup> American diplomats in Buenos Aires were notified that they had to inform the British that they did not claim the Falkland Islands, but that they had the right to fish there. Furthermore, the United States decided that it would stand up for its right against both the British and Argentina.<sup>10</sup> Later the decision of the Supreme Court would be reversed, and the policy of the United States towards the Falkland Islands would be that it remained neutral. This neutrality in New World conflicts would stay unchanged until the crisis of the Falklands War in 1982.<sup>11</sup>

Later, Great Britain wanted to re-strengthen its claims to the Falkland Islands. The reasons were that the United States was asserting its right to fish off the islands, the attack of Captain Silas Duncan, the approval of the attack by President Jackson, and the unstable control exerted by Argentina over the islands. Therefore, Great Britain sent two warships to the islands in December 1832 where a simple show of force in January 1833 succeeded in convincing the Argentine settlers to leave. In the historical memory of the Argentine nation, this led to the creation of the myth among the Argentinians that Great Britain had actually used force.<sup>12</sup> Great Britain and Argentina both had reasonable (but conflicting) arguments to claim the Falkland Islands, but the attack of the British in January 1833 gave the Falkland Islands to Great Britain based on the fact that they had conquered the islands. After the conquest, Great Britain settled the Falkland Islands, which, in a sense, made its claim to them more secure.

General Alvear, Argentine minister to the United States in 1841, presented to the United States the claims of his country that it had suffered certain losses because of the raid of the sea captain Silas Duncan. The American Secretary of State, Daniel Webster informed him that the sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands had to be resolved first. By the year 1853 the United States acknowledged that the dispute over the Falkland Islands had still not reached a conclusion.<sup>13</sup> In 1884 the Argentine government again pressed claims of damage inflicted in the raid by the U.S.S. Lexington. In 1885 President Grover Cleveland responded to the Argentine claims by addressing Congress and stating that Silas Duncan, in 1831, had done no more than disband a colony of pirates. The Secretary of State Bayard

---

<sup>8</sup> GUSTAFSON: 25.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 25.

<sup>11</sup> KINNEY: 41.

<sup>12</sup> GUSTAFSON: 26.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 34.

stated on March 18, 1886 that first the question of sovereignty had to be decided before a decision could be made with respect to the Argentine claims. After this announcement, Argentina stopped pressing the United States for satisfaction.

In December 1960 the United Nations adopted Resolutions 1514 and 1541. These resolutions helped determine the concept of self-governance of area country as being the emergence of its sovereignty and independence as a state. The independent state could also associate itself with another independent state or become integrated into another sovereign state. Based on these arguments Argentina had a claim to the Falkland Islands.<sup>14</sup> On December 16, 1965 the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolution 2065, which was recognition of Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands. It was the United States that, in 1965, was one of the fourteen countries that abstained from voting on the resolution. Resolution 2065 had shown that Argentina was part of the anti-colonial nations. On Resolution 3160, passed in 1973, fourteen countries again abstained from voting, including the United States.<sup>15</sup> This resolution had decolonization as its purpose and called for negotiations.

By the year 1982 international laws had changed. It was no longer possible to lay claim to a territory due to conquest, as Great Britain had done in 1833. The change in international law and in the legality of transferring the title to territories by conquest was brought about because of the terrible wars of the twentieth century.<sup>16</sup> In the twentieth century the use of force in an armed conflict was especially threatening to the world. By the time of the Falklands War in 1982 the use of force was an unacceptable threat to the world order and international peace. Even the limited aggression of Argentina potentially could have brought both the United States and the Soviet Union into a conflict.

On March 18, 1982 Argentine scrap merchants landed on the island of South Georgia. On March 30, it was known that the Argentinian president, President Galtieri, gave the order for the Argentine strike against the Falkland Islands. On March 31, Argentine signals were intercepted which showed that the Falkland Islands were going to be invaded. The Falklands War began on April 2, 1982, when Argentine military forces landed on the Falkland Islands and overran them. This attack was made possible by an action of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: her Cabinet ordered in June 1981 that the British naval ship *HMS Endurance*, with twenty Royal Marines onboard, as well as military vehicles and weapons, leave the Falkland Islands.<sup>17</sup> Argentina believed that Great Britain would be unwilling or unable to respond to their strike and that the United States would assume a neutral stance. Two months later, Great Britain responded to the Argentine strike with a major attack and retook the islands. The civilian casualties turned out to be

---

<sup>14</sup> GUSTAFSON: 63.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 180.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 28.

<sup>17</sup> JUDD, Denis: *Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present*, Basic Books, New York, 1996. 403.

negligible, but about 960 military combatants died in the struggle. Throughout the crisis Argentina was isolated within the international community, whereas Great Britain could invoke the support of the United States and several other countries.<sup>18</sup>

When Argentina announced on April 2, 1982 that it had captured the Falkland Islands, the Sandwich Islands, and South Georgia, the political and military situation became volatile. In this situation the United States wanted to see if it could play the role of mediator between Argentina and Great Britain.<sup>19</sup> The United States was surprised by the Argentine attack. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, had no suspicion that Argentina would commit an act of aggression when he visited Buenos Aires. On March 31, 1982 Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador to the United States, stated that Enders had told Secretary of State Alexander Haig in his presence that the Foreign Minister of Argentina had assured the United States that they were not planning an act of aggression similar to the one Argentina carried out on April 2. As the crisis in the Falkland Islands became more serious, the British Parliament responded with inaction. The handling of the Falklands crisis by the United States was similar to how Great Britain handled it, which led to the intensification of the conflict. According to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the policy that Great Britain had to apply to the crisis in the Falkland Islands was that of self-determination. She thought it was proper that the Falkland Islands should only change its status if the local population agreed with it.<sup>20</sup> The United States supported the policy of Margaret Thatcher. When the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 502, it was almost identical to the draft resolution of the British Ambassador to the United Nations Sir Anthony Parsons. The draft was supported by the United States

Since the presidency of John F. Kennedy the United States was concerned about its image in the Third World. This was to the detriment of its obligations with NATO and was the decisive factor in formulating the foreign policy of the United States during previous decades.<sup>21</sup> Another important factor in determining the American policy on the Falklands Conflict reaches back to the Indonesian fight for independence after World War II. The United States wanted to support Indonesia in its claim to the western part of New Guinea, otherwise known as West Irian. The support of the United States did not mean that it supported the Dutch colonizers, but the newly formed native government, led by the leader Sukarno. Indonesia had to take its case to the United Nations, which granted West Irian to the Indonesians. There was a possibility that the United States would follow the example set in West Irian in the case of the Falkland Islands. This scenario meant that the United States would decide to take the side of Argentina. The United Nations would have to recognize the legitimacy of the presence of the

---

<sup>18</sup> LAMARE, W. James: *International Crisis and Domestic Politics: Major Political Conflicts in the 1980s*, Praeger, New York, 1991. 35.

<sup>19</sup> KINNEY: 103.

<sup>20</sup> REISMAN: 307.

<sup>21</sup> GUSTAFSON: 70.

Argentine military forces in the Falkland Islands.<sup>22</sup> After a few years had passed, as the example of West Irian shows, Argentina would lead discussions, and the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands would have to ratify the Argentine possession of their islands.

Just before the Argentine strike against the Falkland Islands, Reagan spoke with President Galtieri by telephone and warned him that the relationship between their countries would deteriorate if there was an Argentine attack. Reagan also told the Argentine leader that the United States was an important ally of Great Britain. Vice president George H. W. Bush told Esteban Takacs, Argentine Ambassador to the United States, that if an Argentine attack took place, the United States could not remain neutral.<sup>23</sup> On April 1, 1982 Secretary of State Alexander Haig told Esteban Takacs that the United States would side with Great Britain in the event of an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. The Argentine leaders themselves had two opinions. They either believed that the invasion that actually took place could not take place or were convinced that the United States would not ally itself with Great Britain against a nation of the Americas.

Arguably, Argentine leaders should have reevaluated their relations to the United States after American officials and leaders had informed them they would not support them in the case of an Argentine attack against the Falkland Islands. However, the Argentine government did not take this course. President Galtieri appears not to remember anything from what Takacs said about what Bush and Haig had mentioned to him in their conversations. After April 1, 1982 the Argentine president stated that he believed that the United States would keep itself to an even-handed policy.<sup>24</sup> President Galtieri did not take into account the strength of the United States and Great Britain when he formed his military strategy.

The media in the United States reported on the Falklands War and perceived the motives of Argentina in the war with derision and handled the conflict as a comical episode.<sup>25</sup> The political stance that the United States assumed towards Great Britain was one of sympathy. Several factors influenced media coverage of the war in the United States media. The media's assessment of the historical background was also distorted. Some American commentators implied that the Argentine government was trying to direct attention away from the poor economic policy it had implemented with a strike against the Falkland Islands and bring the attention of the Argentine people to the conflict. It has been argued that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was in a similar situation as the Argentine government: she needed to fight a popular war to gain popularity. The American media further stressed the difference between the form of government in Great Britain and Argentina (Great Britain was a democracy while Argentina was ruled by

---

<sup>22</sup> GUSTAFSON: 70.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, 134.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, 134.

<sup>25</sup> REISMAN: 287.

a military junta). The attitude of the American media gave the impression that Great Britain was superior to Argentina due to its form of government.<sup>26</sup> As for the press coverage of Great Britain, it was favorable. Not only the American media, but the rest of American society felt sympathy towards the British. Even though Argentina decided that an invasion of the Falkland Islands was conceivable because of its interpretation of what American government officials told them (they sent messages of friendship and solidarity), the American people and media remained distant from Argentina and its nondemocratic form of government.<sup>27</sup> Because of linguistic, historic, and cultural ties, the American people had other reasons to support the British in the Falklands Crisis.<sup>28</sup>

The United States did not hurry to take the position of mediator between Argentina and Great Britain relating to the crisis unfolding in the Falklands War. We know that Great Britain had offered its assistance in the South Georgian scrap merchant affair. On March 28, Lord Carrington had asked Secretary of State Haig about how it could help in this incident, while Argentina had done the same. As for U.S.-Argentine relations, the United States made it clear diplomatically and militarily that they would suffer if the Argentine government chose a military solution to the conflict. The American Embassy in Buenos Aires sent the same message.<sup>29</sup> The American Ambassador to Argentina, Harry Shlaudeman, requested that the Argentine government assure him that Argentina had no antagonistic intent regarding the Falkland Islands, but his request was delayed. Shlaudeman's request to see the Argentine Head of State was also delayed.

There were two prevailing groups in the United States government on who to support after the attempts at mediation failed. Among those who favored supporting Great Britain were President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Laurence Eagleburger, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and most of the government officials involved in foreign policy. The moral consideration of this group was that the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands should determine their own affairs. They had made it known that they wished to belong to Great Britain. This desire was part of self-determination, the principle of Great Britain, and shared by the supporters of Great Britain in the United States government. This group and the British believed that if there was no response to the Argentine display of aggression, then it would set a precedent and the credibility of the Western ability to respond to aggression would suffer. Also, the European group in Washington favored the relationship with Great Britain over connections with Argentina for ideological, economic, and strategic reasons.<sup>30</sup> In addition, some American government officials (such as President Reagan) had

---

<sup>26</sup> REISMAN: 288.

<sup>27</sup> KINNEY: 78.

<sup>28</sup> WELCH, David A.: *Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War*, International Journal, Vol. 52, N° 3, 1997. 495.

<sup>29</sup> KINNEY: 105.

<sup>30</sup> WELCH: 495.

personal ties to their British colleagues.

The second group of American government officials believed that the United States should remain neutral in the Falklands Crisis. The members of this group were Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Undersecretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas Enders, and Senator Jesse Helms. These government officials did not sanction the Argentine attack on the Falklands Islands either morally or legally. However, they believed that the interests of the United States were endangered by publicly siding with Great Britain.<sup>31</sup> Even though Great Britain was an ally in the Cold War, it would stay reliable even if the United States did not support it in the Falklands Crisis. The second group held that the goodwill of Latin America was more difficult to win and was lost more easily. The support of the Latin Americans in fighting Central American communist forces was indispensable during the 1980s. An important circumstance to note was that the scene of the Falklands Crisis was the South Atlantic and not the area which NATO was concerned with. The United States therefore had no obligations to Great Britain regarding collective security. In addition, Great Britain had failed several times to support the United States when it found itself involved in a dispute. This meant that the United States had no moral obligations to assist Great Britain in the crisis concerning the Falkland Islands.<sup>32</sup> It was evident that the pro-British group had more power within the U.S. government. It was more powerful because its members had seniority and because they enjoyed more support from the public. However, everyone in Washington was in favor of a diplomatic solution to the ongoing conflict.

The United States could not excuse Argentina's aggression on April 2, 1982 towards a close ally, Great Britain. However, there was a problem for the United States. The United States had spent great resources in the cultivation of Argentina. Furthermore, it was argued by some that the United States had historically been impartial on the issue of the Falkland Islands. Furthermore, Argentina was playing a particular political and military role that benefited the United States: Argentina was supporting the United States in its campaign against communist forces in Nicaragua.<sup>33</sup> The United States was also aware that the countries of Latin America suspected that in a time of crisis when the United States would have to choose between supporting either European powers or Latin America, they would abandon Latin America. In fact, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, the Nicaraguans adopted a new attitude. They held that Argentina was fighting to help all Latin American countries free themselves from imperialist rule.<sup>34</sup> Sandinista spokesmen claimed that the United States was hypocritical when it stated it would protect Latin American nations but supported the British in the Falklands War instead. For them

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 495.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 496.

<sup>33</sup> BADSEY, Stephen – HAVERS, Rob – GROVE, Mark: *The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future*, Frank Cass, London, 2005. 16.

<sup>34</sup> GUSTAFSON: 199.



this was proof that the United States only wished to maintain its hegemony over the countries of Latin America. However the Latin Americans felt about American treason, they were not ready to fight against Great Britain, NATO, or the United States because of the Falkland Islands. The decision as to who the United States should support became even more difficult because of arguments put forth by the Europeanists, such as Laurence Eagleburger, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Eagleburger and others stated that it would be appalling to desert a member of NATO. Since the Suez Crisis in 1956 the relations between the United States and Great Britain were in a poor state and needed to recover. Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that the United States did not want to desert Great Britain when it had been attacked. Great Britain, being attacked by a dictatorship, could count upon a show of interest everywhere within the American government.<sup>35</sup> If there was to be a political settlement, then the support of the United States was important. The United States was also in the position to lend military support to the British.<sup>36</sup> In most of April 1982 Haig traveled between London and Buenos Aires to attempt to find a peaceful solution to the crisis acceptable to both the United States and Great Britain. Haig constantly tried to convince the Argentine junta that Great Britain had superior military strength and the willpower to fight them, and that Argentina would surely be defeated.<sup>37</sup> The Argentine junta, however did not believe Haig, and accused him of being an agent of the British. The Argentine government did not relent, because they considered the Falklands War to be a fight where the countries of Latin America were pitted against the imperialist forces of the Northern Hemisphere.<sup>38</sup>

Three factors led to the failure of Haig's attempts at mediation during the Falklands Crisis. First, the United States was impartial on few issues because of its superpower status. Because the United States lacked the proper reputation, it made an ineffective mediator.<sup>39</sup> Second, it was obvious that the United States would support Great Britain in the end. It supplied the British military with weapons and intelligence reports even while mediating (this showed that the United States was not truly neutral). Third, Secretary of State Haig lacked the necessary talent and experience for being a diplomat. He could not place himself above his sympathy to Great Britain, which would impair the Argentine government in trusting him. He also had the wrong attitude when speaking with officials in London and Buenos Aires. From Argentina he asked for greater flexibility and more concessions than from Great Britain. Since the United States had no definite policy on the territorial conflict, Haig therefore tried to hide this deficiency. He also wanted to circumvent having to make a choice between supporting Great Britain or Argentina.<sup>40</sup> The mistakes made

---

<sup>35</sup> BADSEY – HAVERS – GROVE: 16.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>37</sup> GUSTAFSON: 134.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 134.

<sup>39</sup> WELCH: 496.

<sup>40</sup> WELCH: 497.

by Haig ended up making American foreign policy appear confused. The end result of Haig's diplomatic attempts at negotiating was that the Argentine government thought he was only giving a promise of a diplomatic solution to the crisis in order to stall and allow the Royal Navy to sail to the South Atlantic. It can be said in Haig's defense that even though he conducted mediation between Argentina and Great Britain poorly, his task was a difficult one. Given the inflexibility of both of these countries in the conflict, mediation was certainly impossible. The ultimate result of the mediation attempt was that the United States was only delayed in publicly stating its support of Great Britain, which was the tactic of the United States.<sup>41</sup> This delay annoyed both Great Britain and Argentina and caused them to question if American foreign policy was sincere and wise. The Falklands War might have been avoided if the Argentine government had realized that the United States would ultimately side with their enemy. By the time they did, the war was essentially lost and Argentina could do nothing.

Great Britain started to question if the United States was really its ally. The reason was that Haig made statements of American neutrality.<sup>42</sup> The British found it questionable why the United States did not protest Argentina's first use of force. Argentina remained persistent in its aggression, which caused a British Member of Parliament to theorize that it was due to the way the Argentine government interpreted the Americans' position. This Member of Parliament referred to the fact that Haig once claimed that there is some legitimacy to the Argentine claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. He argued that the Argentine junta's stubborn behavior showed that the United States wanted to force a compromise on Great Britain which would include a relinquishment of British sovereignty over their possession. A year later another Member of Parliament stated that if the United States had committed itself to the cause of Great Britain from the outset, Argentina would have assessed the probability of a conflict differently. Its hypothetical results would also have been judged differently. The Member of Parliament even went so far as to state that the American even-handed tactic ensured the failure of mediation and caused the war.<sup>43</sup>

The United States had to endure criticism for some of its actions leading up to the Falklands War. From 1980 to late 1981 the United States should have informed the Argentine government that it would not support a conflict that it did not know was being plotted. If the United States had told this to Argentina, Argentina would not have planned a strike it thought the United States would support.<sup>44</sup> A second mistake that the United States could be said to have made was the way they informed the Argentine junta that it would side with Great Britain if a strike occurred. The United States allegedly was either not convincing, or its message did not reach the junta. However, it does appear that Secretary of State Haig did make

---

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 497.

<sup>42</sup> GUSTAFSON: 134.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 135.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, 135.

efforts to inform the Argentine government of its intent to side with Great Britain. A third complication in the situation was that American officials in the Reagan administration sent mixed signals to Argentina. The Argentine government must have thought that the position the United States took could be changed to that of support for Argentina if the officials sympathizing with the cause of Argentina won the inside policy debate within the United States.

Great Britain had to engage in diplomatic maneuvers to gain the support of the United States. The British conducted a publicity campaign in April 1982 to reach that goal. Sir Nicholas Henderson, the British Ambassador to the United States appeared on American television shows and visited American senators, newspaper columnists, and bureaucrats to gain support through persuading them of how right Great Britain was in the Falklands Crisis. Henderson realized that Secretary of State Haig would be his ally. However, Haig had to find a way to pacify those in the States Department who argued that the United States should support Argentina.<sup>45</sup> One major source of opposition to Haig was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who stated that the British were trying to make American foreign policy. The result was intrigue between Reagan aides in the bureaucracy. After the April 2 attack on the Falkland Islands and after a British garrison surrendered to Argentine forces, Kirkpatrick claimed on CBS television that it was not armed aggression if Argentina possessed the islands.<sup>46</sup> In the end Kirkpatrick could have almost no influence on American policy towards Argentina and the Falklands War Because Secretary of State Haig would not allow it.

Alexander Haig was of the opinion that the question the United States government had to answer was not who to support in the Falklands Crisis (he believed that the United States should not support Argentina but rather Great Britain), but what the crisis meant in the context of the Cold War. Haig thought that a more neutral stance was not to be discarded. He was afraid that the Soviets would gain if the United States took up a position opposing Argentina.<sup>47</sup> The Soviets could take advantage of such a scenario by inciting Cuban proxies to cause trouble with respect to Argentina. Haig was of the opinion that the United States had a special position from which a solution to the Falklands Crisis could be negotiated. He thought negotiation was also possible due to the fact that the British had historically managed the question of the possession of the Falkland Islands inadequately. For the United States both Great Britain and Argentina were important allies in the Cold War.<sup>48</sup> The United States did not want the war to escalate. For this reason the policymakers in the United States stated that there should be a negotiated solution. The disadvantage of negotiating between Argentina and Great Britain was that the negotiations could fail. Unfortunately, this was the most likely result, given that in the past the issue could not be solved satisfactorily and that Argentina had now used military force. In addition, both

---

<sup>45</sup> GUSTAFSON: 135.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 136.

<sup>47</sup> BADSEY – HAVERS – GROVE: 17.

<sup>48</sup> WELCH: 495.

Argentina and Great Britain had committed themselves to the use of force. However, there was an element of uncertainty in continuing the hostility, which was an incentive to negotiate.<sup>49</sup> Negotiating also allowed the United States government to postpone having to take sides. Communication became important, and the United States had to avoid offending either side. The British Foreign Minister Francis Pym informed Secretary of State Haig on April 6, 1982 that it was Great Britain's goal to force Argentina to withdraw and reintroduce British administration of the Falkland Islands. Haig had suggested to Nicholas Henderson his idea of a mixed British and Argentine administration over the Falkland Islands.<sup>50</sup> First, Argentina and Great Britain would have to withdraw their military forces, after which peacekeepers would stay in the Falkland Islands who were from Canada, the United States, and two Latin American countries. Only then would the situation be negotiated. The attempts of Alexander Haig to mediate the crisis in the Falklands lasted until the end of April 1982. Even at the end of April he did not want to give up. Throughout April 1982 the Pentagon provided material support to Great Britain. The United States also gave diplomatic support to Great Britain when challenged by the Organization of American States (OAS).<sup>51</sup>

In early June 1982 Spain and Panama decided to propose a resolution in the United Nations. The resolution called for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of both countries. At the time, Great Britain had almost reaped a complete military victory against Argentina. Great Britain was not going to settle for anything less at this stage than British administration of the Falkland Islands.<sup>52</sup> Great Britain would have vetoed the proposal of Spain and Panama, but Kirkpatrick insisted that the United States refrain from voting. In this manner she wanted the United States to show support for Argentina.<sup>53</sup>

According to revisionist interpretations of the role the United States played in the Falklands Crisis, the conflict had been remote from the United States and American involvement had been slight. Some revisionist historians claim that the United States had probably caused the conflict.<sup>54</sup> One of the editors of the *New Republic* stated that when President Galtieri decided to seize the Falkland Islands by force, it was due to mixed signals from military and civilian officials in the Reagan administration. These officials had come to Buenos Aires on goodwill missions.<sup>55</sup> When Argentine officials expressed a desire to regain the Falkland Islands, the American officials gave mixed or sympathetic responses. Furthermore, the Reagan administration sent unclear signals to Argentina during the first two years of Reagan's presidency. According to an analysis of Latin American politics, the United States wanted Argentina to think that the United States was willing to

---

<sup>49</sup> BADSEY – HAVERS – GROVE: 17.

<sup>50</sup> KINNEY: 104.

<sup>51</sup> BADSEY – HAVERS – GROVE: 17.

<sup>52</sup> GUSTAFSON: 136.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid*, 136.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, 132.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 132.

support Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands. The United States even appeared ready to give military assistance. However, the United States never thought that Argentina would ever do anything like it did on April 2, 1982. Before President Galtieri was installed in office, he visited Washington in October 1981. Here he attended the annual conference of the Chiefs of the American Armies. According to an Argentine journalist, President Galtieri thought up the plan to retake the Falkland Islands during this conference.<sup>56</sup> Several American government officials visited Buenos Aires the year before the attack of April 2, 1982, where the plan to seize the Falkland Islands was further developed. Some of these American government officials were the UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders, and the Roving Ambassador Vernon Walters. Even Henry Kissinger traveled to Buenos Aires.<sup>57</sup> Previously, President Jimmy Carter had been critical in his approach to Argentina because of its human rights record. However, President Reagan cultivated a friendly relationship with Argentina. The Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez argued that if there was a conflict involving the Falkland Islands, the United States would, at worst, assume a neutral stance. The United States was somewhat dependent upon Argentina for several reasons. It wanted the support of Argentina in the armed conflict against the Central American Marxists. The United States also wanted Argentina to help staff the Sinai peacekeeping forces and to help fight communists in South America. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders visited Buenos Aires in early March 1982 and was asked by Méndez what the standpoint of the United States was to the conflict brewing in the Falkland Islands. Enders replied that the United States had a „*hands off*” attitude. This linguistic term probably meant that the United States would not take sides in a dispute concerning sovereignty, but this is not certain.<sup>58</sup> Secretary of State Haig, however, stated that Enders had been misquoted. He said that Enders probably meant to say that the conflict should be settled peacefully and that because the conflict was a bilateral dispute between two other countries, the United States would not intervene.<sup>59</sup> Enders himself could not remember using the term „*hands off*”, but three Argentine journalists claimed that his attitude was the reason why the Argentine military junta ruling Argentina hastened its military engagements. Roving Ambassador Vernon Walters visited Argentina in early 1982, and allegedly promised to Argentina that if it attacked the Falkland Islands, the United States would remain neutral or support Argentina against Great Britain.<sup>60</sup> He later repeatedly denied that he had made such promises. There is no evidence to support these accusations. Furthermore, he had no motivation to make such promises to Argentina. A more likely scenario in American foreign relations at the

---

<sup>56</sup> GUSTAFSON: 133.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 133.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 133.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 133.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 133.

time was that American diplomats were preoccupied with other matters. They most likely did not think precisely when it came to Argentine plans for the Falkland Islands. American officials and diplomats generally were not careful in anticipating how their statements would be interpreted by the Argentinians, the British, or anyone else. However, the Argentine government consistently believed that there would be no opposition from the United States if Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.

The relationship between the United States and Argentina was different from the U.S.-British relationship. The United States and Argentina did not have any mutual defense commitment, which was the same situation with the United States and all other Latin American countries.<sup>61</sup> Argentina thought that a special alliance was being formed with the United States based on three things. First, Argentina assessed the interest of the United States in the Southern Cone of South America (Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and drew conclusions from it. Second, American government officials had seemed understanding to the problems the Argentine military government had. Third, the Argentine Army was aiding the United States in fighting communist subversion in Central America. When the Americans stated in April 1982 that their country would terminate its efforts to find a negotiated solution to the crisis and support Great Britain, the Argentine government and people expressed complete disbelief and then felt completely betrayed by the country they thought would be their ally in the Falklands Crisis. Argentina believed that the United States would not ally itself with the British, with this perception being as strong as the belief that Great Britain would not respond to the Argentine invasion.<sup>62</sup> A further miscalculation by the Argentine junta was that the United States and other Western countries would not consider the Argentine strike on the Falkland Islands of April 2 as an impermissible act of aggression. They also did not realize the existence of the historical, moral, and cultural affinities between Great Britain and the United States.<sup>63</sup>

American efforts at mediation ultimately failed, and on April 30, 1982 the United States stated that it would support Great Britain in the conflict. The United States gave up mediation because they perceived that Argentina was behaving obstinately.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, the Americans decided to supply Great Britain with war material and placed Argentina under limited economic sanctions. In addition, the United States discontinued military exports to Argentina. President Reagan stated that the United States had done all it could do for the moment to find a compromise to the crisis and he put the blame on Argentina for resorting to aggression. He stated that the aggression of Argentina should not be allowed to succeed. On the same day Secretary of State Haig stated that since Argentina did not accept a compromise

---

<sup>61</sup> KINNEY: 78.

<sup>62</sup> GUSTAFSON: 133-134.

<sup>63</sup> WELCH: 506.

<sup>64</sup> DAOUDI, M. S. – DAJANI, M. S.: *Sanctions: The Falklands Episode*, *The World Today*, Vol. 39, N<sup>o</sup> 4, 1983. April. 151.

solution, the United States should = not support Argentina's aggression to solve the Falklands Crisis.

A particular tactic used by the United States to avoid the wrath of Argentina and thus ensure that Latin America would not be irritated, was to somehow make sure that President Galtieri held on to power.<sup>65</sup> On May 23, 1982 the *New York Times* assessed the situation in the Falkland Islands. In light of the way many political circles in the United States thought during the Falklands Crisis, Great Britain was sure to win. The United States still did not want Argentina to capitulate completely. Some in the United States theorized about the aftermath of the war. According to them, a new Argentine government would most likely thirst for revenge. If Argentina was humbled completely, then it would probably initiate airstrikes against the Falkland Islands unendingly.<sup>66</sup> This, in turn would probably put a permanent burden on Great Britain and allow the Soviet Union and Cuba to cause more trouble for the United States. The interests of the United States would most likely suffer further. After Great Britain had subdued Argentina, a final settlement was necessary to solve the conflict in the Falkland Islands. It was also possible that Argentina would turn to the Soviets and the Cubans in order to avoid the humiliation of defeat. If President Galtieri fell from power, Argentina might have a new government that was even more anti-American and anti-western. As it turned out, President Galtieri was ready to blame the United States for the Argentine military defeat, stating that his country was fighting an uneven war against the forces of the Americans and British. If communists rose to power in Argentina, which was a reasonable possibility, then the defeat in the Falklands War would not cause Argentina to end its attempts at regaining them. As for Great Britain, it stated that it had sacrificed too much and it did not desire the status quo ante.<sup>67</sup> Although there was pressure on the relation between the United States and Europe throughout the Falklands War, the relation never experienced a crisis.

The United States was involved in the conflict that remained alive after the end of the military victory of Great Britain. Although Great Britain had won the Falklands War, the dispute over who was sovereign over the islands still remained unresolved. One thing was certain: Great Britain would practice administration over the islands and not Argentina. One of the end results of the war was to put a burden on the relationship between Great Britain and Argentina. Great Britain intended to keep its title to the islands (for example, it sent three thousand British marines to man a garrison there). Argentina kept sending its military aircraft in the direction of the islands and Captain Alfredo Corti, leader of the Argentine naval aviation sub-commission located in Paris, allegedly tried to purchase twenty AM3a Exocet missiles on the black market.<sup>68</sup> After the Falklands War came to an end, the United States insisted that negotiations should be held between Great Britain and

---

<sup>65</sup> BADSEY – HAVERS – GROVE: 17.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 17.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, 18.

<sup>68</sup> GUSTAFSON: 178.

Argentina. In November 1982 and November 1983 the United Nations passed resolutions to bring these two countries together to negotiate the issue of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The United States supported both resolutions. This was the position the United States took, even though Sir John Thomson, Great Britain's Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that the resolutions were not timed well. He thought they were ill-considered at the time the people who died in the Falklands War were still being mourned. As for the vote of the United States on the November 1982 resolution, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher allegedly requested from President Reagan that his country abstain from voting on it.<sup>69</sup> The British Foreign Minister, Francis Pym, expressed the dissatisfaction of Great Britain over the vote on the resolution to the American Ambassador to Great Britain after summoning him (the United States had voted with Argentina). Sir John Thomson was of the opinion that the resolution of 1982 showed to Argentina that it could continue harassing the British on the Falkland Islands, so the United States should not have supported the resolution. The British were apprehensive of the United Nations resolutions because they sent Argentina the message that its threats to renew hostilities against them in the Falkland Islands in the future were backed internationally. They thought that Argentina would not believe in a peaceful resolution of the dispute and was not interested in impartial negotiations.<sup>70</sup> Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was disappointed in American support of the resolution, which she met with disbelief. She thought the United States should not have sided with Argentina on the resolutions in the United Nations because of the fact that both Great Britain and the United States shared a commitment to justice, democracy, and freedom. Great Britain ultimately chose not to do what the United States suggested: the British would not change their position because of the resolution and felt confident that Great Britain was sovereign over the Falkland Islands. British-American relations were strained again during the resolution the following year (in November 1983). The United States decided to vote for it. The United States would also resume selling arms to Argentina. Initially, the United States had commenced the embargo against Argentina during the Carter presidency and President Reagan had continued this policy during the Falklands War.<sup>71</sup> Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated to Parliament on November 10, 1983 that she had protested against this act. The British lobbied against the American vote for the resolution of November 1983 and the renewal of American arms sales to Argentina. The response of the United States was to reaffirm its position on its vote in both cases.<sup>72</sup> This was the decision of the United States whenever there was an international action related to the resolution vote and the renewed arms sales. The United States has consistently supported negotiations on all aspects of the disagreements relating to the Falklands Islands when negotiating

---

<sup>69</sup> GUSTAFSON: 179.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, 179.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, 179.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, 179-180.



with either the United Nations or the Organization of American States. One such aspect was the question of sovereignty of the islands. The United States is at present determined to resolve the conflict.

There is possibly an economic side to the Falklands Crisis which involves the United States. Whereas in the past the United States engaged in seal catching off the Falkland Islands, American oil companies have now become interested in the oil found in the South Atlantic. When American oil companies notified the U.S. government about the presence of oil in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands (and other areas in the South Atlantic), it ordered that the oil of the region be explored.<sup>73</sup> Bernardo F. Grossling, author of *Latin America's Petroleum Prospects in the Energy Crisis* which was published in 1975 by the Department of the Interior and also known as *Geological Survey Bulletin 1411*, stated that there were gigantic deposits of oil on the Argentine continental shelf. One promising sedimentary basin was the Falkland Islands. These islands were located near a shelf in the Atlantic Ocean which may hold up to 200 billion barrels of oil. A possible price for one barrel of oil from this deposit would be thirty dollars, meaning the whole deposit near the Falkland Islands could bring six trillion dollars. According to Grossling, foreign companies should aid the process of extraction of the oil through financial means and exploration, as well as by exploration, service contracts, technical assistance, and development. International petroleum companies alone had the necessary personnel (such as petroleum engineers and geologists), as well as the financial capability to invest in the assessment and development of the oil fields off the Falkland Islands and other South Atlantic islands. The U.S. oil companies would be willing to cooperate with the Falkland Islanders, Argentina, or Great Britain to extract the oil. However, the dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands is undecided, with the United States taking an impartial position. There is thus great pressure on those concerned in the dispute over sovereignty to settle it.<sup>74</sup> Only then will there be a way to drill for the oil with the help of the American oil companies.

That the United States supported the UN resolutions of November 1982 and November 1983 shows that American policy regarding the Falkland Islands had decidedly shifted. The shift is evident, since the policy of the United States from 1833 until 1982 was to remain impartial on the issue of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.<sup>75</sup> The reasoning behind this position prior to the shift was that it was the job of other countries to decide it and the United States had no concern regarding it. Therefore, when the United States supported the UN resolutions of 1982 and 1983, it was taking a position on the question of sovereignty.

It was important for the United States to find a resolution to the problems leading up to the Falklands War, because otherwise the conflict could be repeated. For this reason the United States called upon Great Britain and Argentina directly to

---

<sup>73</sup> GUSTAFSON: 88.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, 180.

come to the United Nations and negotiate their ongoing conflict.<sup>76</sup> In this way, the United States appeared to be neutral with regard to the conflict, but instead was supporting the exchange of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. By negotiating the conflict, it was inescapable that the issue of sovereignty would be addressed.

One of the results of the Falklands War was for the Third World to support Argentina less and the United States more. This process had been reflected in 1965 and 1982. In 1965 the fourteen countries that had abstained from voting on Resolution 2065 were white European states. In November 1982 fifty-two countries, mostly in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, had abstained from voting on the resolution. The United States tried to pressure Great Britain into negotiating the sovereignty question of the Falkland Islands, but to no avail. Sir John Thomson pointed out that the Argentine military regime was a „*lame duck*” and that the population of the Falkland Islands elected their own government, which upheld their wish to remain British.<sup>77</sup> He further argued that Argentina was a nondemocratic military regime. With this argument Sir John Thomson hoped to convince everyone that it would not be good for Great Britain to transfer its sovereignty and subject its inhabitants to life in a country which was a dictatorship.

The Falklands War ultimately had an effect upon not only the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, but broader relations between the United States, Great Britain, Argentina, the Soviet Union, and the members of the OAS, NATO, and EEC. After the events of the Falklands War, it was thought that Argentina could go over to the side of the Soviet Union and oppose the United States. It was also theorized that the countries of Latin America would form an organization that excluded the United States, or, perhaps adopted a hostile position towards it.<sup>78</sup> Even though Cuba attempted to frame the role the United States took in the Falklands Crisis as something that could unite the countries of Latin America, in reality the Latin Americans would at most remind the United States that it had exhibited bad behavior in intervening in Latin American affairs.<sup>79</sup> Some Latin American countries warned of a split in the OAS that would be caused by American support for Great Britain in the Falklands War. The inter-American system would crumble, according to these countries. The inter-American system would indeed have crumbled if the rest of Latin America sent material aid to Argentina or if the OAS was reorganized without the United States. However, these actions were never carried out and the threats made by the Latin Americans remained slightly above the level of rhetoric.<sup>80</sup> President Reagan had tried to dissuade President Galtieri from attacking the Falkland Islands with the argument that only the Soviet Union would benefit from this intra-western war. Secretary of State Haig pointed out that the West’s enemies were

---

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 180.

<sup>77</sup> GUSTAFSON: 180.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, 190.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 198.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 198.

looking for opportunities to weaken their opponents, something they had been attempting for a long time. The worst those the Western powers could imagine was that Argentina would ask the Soviets for military equipment or support. If the Soviets did aid Argentina in this way, then Argentina would be obliged to the Soviet Union.<sup>81</sup> Around April 7, the British Member of Parliament David Owen even theorized that the Soviet Navy was heading for the South Atlantic at the same time as the Royal Navy. To Owen the presence of the Soviet Navy meant that the conflict could escalate and caused him to worry that a Soviet influence in Latin America could develop. According to Owen's explanation of this situation, the Soviets would try to incite South and Central America against the Americans and West in general and try to determine the position of British submarines and warships and send this information to the Argentine military.<sup>82</sup> Owen asked the question if the Soviet Union was not already secretly involved in the conflict and was suspicious of the sophistication of the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. This Soviet involvement probably would have meant that Argentina and the Soviet Union were becoming close friends, which meant that an Argentine government that was anti-American would accommodate the Soviets. For example, the Argentine government could let the Soviets use Argentine naval ports for their warships and submarines.<sup>83</sup> However, it remains a fact that the Soviets had little military interest in the Falklands Crisis and gave only moral support. According to the Soviets the threat to Latin American independence came from the United States and other Western countries.<sup>84</sup> As for the Soviet attitude regarding the position of the United States at the beginning of the conflict, the Soviets stated that the United States had fallen into a difficult situation because of the difficult choice it had to make between supporting either Great Britain or Argentina. The Soviets were as surprised as anyone else at the Argentine use of aggression on April 2 and had had, based on the available evidence, no desire to help Argentina plan the invasion or participate in the war.<sup>85</sup>

The Alfonsín government, elected by the Argentine people in 1983, decided to halt its operations against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. He stated that the United States should not view the Sandinistas as a threat to security. President Alfonsín knew that this would attract the attention of the United States. Simply by denying that there was a security threat made American government officials worried that there indeed was one. Because President Alfonsín and the Argentine people disliked American intervention, the new Argentine leader attempted to improve the relations of his country with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua.<sup>86</sup> A concrete example of this was a message from President Alfonsín to the participants of the three-day conference of the Political Youth of Latin America

---

<sup>81</sup> GUSTAFSON: 190.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, 190.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 190.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, 193.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, 194.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 195.

and the Caribbean in December 1984. He stated that American intervention in Nicaragua must be opposed and Argentine democracy must be upheld. Other Argentine government officials supported the Sandinistas in other ways. Foreign Minister Caputo stated on March 8, 1985 that the United States posed a threat to Central America and that the policies of President Reagan were responsible for the deterioration in the relationship with other countries.<sup>87</sup> On May 16, 1985 Caputo stated that since the British recently opened a new airfield on the Falkland Islands, a new, larger conflict could develop between the East and West out of the dispute over them. In March 1985 he told the United States Congress that since the solution to the dispute over the Falkland Islands was delayed, this created international tension which would in turn beget strategic designs alien to the region of the South Atlantic. However, the United States had little to fear from the situation. Caputo stated that Argentina would not take a neutral position in global affairs and was a democratic country that belonged to the West. Since Argentina traded with the United States, it would gain the maximum freedom from both superpowers.

We can state that Argentina would not allow the Soviets to develop a presence in Latin America for the Soviets. The new brand of Argentine nationalism that President Alfonsín created was used primarily to uphold Argentine independence (to the extent possible) from both the Soviet Union and the United States, as has traditionally happened.<sup>88</sup> Argentina is not obliged to the Soviet Union in any way for any event during the Falklands Crisis. President Alfonsín was also reluctant to threaten to use force. Due to this, the British can maintain their control over the Falkland Islands at a lower cost and the United States need not become concerned over any expanding Soviet presence in Argentina.

If we assume that the leaders of the United States were rational, then there are several things we can infer about them according to political rational theory. They had preferences when they made judgments about the Falklands Crisis. When there were alternatives, they weighed their costs and benefits and chose the alternative with the most value. We can assume that the leaders of the United States made analysis of these costs and benefits well. The leaders of the United States could be said to prefer more power, security, and wealth than to less of these. Rational choices were also made in the areas of arms races, the perception of intentions, threats, and incentives, and alliance formation.

The two sides that fought the war – Argentina on one hand and Great Britain on the other, aided by the United States – had differing moral obligations. These obligations were present in the culture and ideology of those involved in the Falklands Crisis.<sup>89</sup> These factors made it difficult for the United States to act as a mediator. Neither the United States nor any of the other two countries involved in the Falklands Crisis was motivated by material or political interests. The British and

---

<sup>87</sup> GUSTAFSON: 196.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 197.

<sup>89</sup> WELCH: 485.

Americans still believed that these were the motives of Argentina and vice-versa. That is why the two sides misjudged each other and failed to perceive each other for what they were doing. In general each of the three countries could understand their own actions on moral grounds. Yet they could not understand or were unfeeling to the moral justifications of the actions of the other side.<sup>90</sup> The Argentine government's moral motive was to bring to an end a historical injustice. The mediation attempts by Haig exemplified that the national interests of countries are bound together with sympathies and ethical standards. His mission showed that national interests should not be hidden, but admitted. The United States can be said to have made many mistakes during the Falklands Crisis because its leaders did not realize that the leaders of Argentina and Great Britain made their moral commitments in their own historical and cultural contexts, as well as in the way they viewed their own national interests. The role of the United States in the dispute over the Falkland Islands highlights the fact that cultural and moral forces exert a special power in world politics and that there are grave consequences if they are underestimated.

---

<sup>90</sup> WELCH: 485.



## ***Studies in Hungarian***

- The Swedish Question and the Russian Diplomacy, 1801 – 1815
- the British women's suffrage movement, 1908 – 1914
- internment of the Japanese-Americans during the World War II
- Foundation for Africa – Hungarian school in Congo





**Bodnár Erzsébet**

## ***Az orosz diplomácia és a svéd/finn kérdés, 1801-1815***

### **Abstract**

The Swedish Question was a problem successfully managed by Russian Diplomacy between 1801 and 1815. Diplomatic documents show that the activity of Russian foreign policy towards this region – which was important geopolitically and strategically – did not decrease during the Napoleonic Wars. At the beginning of his reign, Alexander I (1801-1825) and his diplomatic administration did everything to avoid European conflicts, particularly a war with Sweden. But in the first years of the 19th century Alexander had to give up his foreign program because of the frequently changing alliance relations. In 1807 Napoleon defeated Russia, the Treaty of Tilsit ended Russian influence in Central Europe for a while, but it gave Alexander the opportunity to advance Russian interests in the North against Sweden and in the South against the Ottoman Empire. As a consequence of the alliance policies of the Napoleonic Wars, in the Treaty of Fredrikshamn (Hamina) – which concluded the Finnish War (1808-1809) – Sweden ceded territories of Finland (the Grand Duchy of Finland) to the Russian Empire. The treaty indicated a change which finally led to an alteration of the North-European political system and had an influence on the European policy of Russia. After the peace treaty further agreements stabilized the Russian-Swedish relations and the position of Grand Duchy of Finland in the Russian Empire. The present paper – based on Russian diplomatic sources – tries to investigate the historical and diplomatic changes between 1801 and 1815.

*Keywords:* alliance policies, Napoleonic Wars, Russian foreign policy, Alexander I, Swedish Question, Finnish War, Grand Duchy of Finland

**O**roszország és Svédország kapcsolatának több évszázados történetével, valamint az orosz-svéd háborúk diplomáciai hátterének és eseményeinek vizsgálatával számos munka foglalkozik. A 19. század eleji orosz-svéd kapcsolatok alakulásának rekonstruálása azonban a vizsgált időszakban keletkezett diplomáciai források segítségével máig kevés figyelmet kapott. Az Északon zajló történések a napóleoni háborúk időszakának kis szeletét képezik ugyan, de fontos adatokkal szolgálnak a korszak diplomáciatörténetének alaposabb feltérképezéséhez, és a svéd kérdésben követett orosz külpolitika megvilágításához.

E tanulmány az Orosz Birodalom Külügyi Levéltárának (Moszkva) publikált diplomáciai forrásaira támaszkodva az orosz-svéd kapcsolatok alakulását tekinti át az 1801 és 1815 közötti időszakban. Megvizsgálja, hogy mi vezette a két államot az együttműködés felé a napóleoni háborúk idején, és az orosz diplomácia milyen külpolitikai programok mentén politizált. Számba veszi az utolsó orosz-svéd háború (1808-1809) kitörésének okait és rávilágít arra, hogy annak következményei miként

hatottak a két állam, valamint a nemzetközi kapcsolatok rendszerére, és a két hatalom közé szoruló Finnország helyzetének alakulására.

1801 az orosz állam történetében jelentős változásokat hozott. 1801 márciusában I. Sándor palotaforradalommal került hatalomra. Az új uralkodó és diplomáciája mindent megtett annak érdekében, hogy kimaradjon az európai konfliktusokból, és az európai államokkal, így Svédországgal is jó kapcsolatot ápoljon. I. Sándor a trónra lépésekor számos megállapodást<sup>1</sup> és kötelezettséget örökölt meg az előző uralomtól, I. Páltól (1796-1801).<sup>2</sup> A fő problémát az angolokkal való szembenállás jelentette, valamint az angol flotta közelsége az orosz fővároshoz, Szentpétervárhoz. 1800 folyamán I. Pál Dánia, Svédország és Poroszország részvételével újjáélesztette a fegyveres semlegesség ligáját. A kereskedelmi hajókat ettől kezdve fegyveres erővel védelmezték. Anglia ezt nem hagyta annyiban. A brit flotta 1801 márciusában megjelent Koppenhága előtt, és ágyúival lángba borította Dánia fővárosát.<sup>3</sup> I. Sándor apja politikája révén kötődött a semlegesség ligájához, megígérte szövetségeseinek, hogy nem hagyja őket magukra, de hangsúlyozta azt is, hogy ez a politika korrekciót igényel, Oroszországnak igazodnia kell Londonhoz.<sup>4</sup> I. Sándor 1801. április 6-án utasította a londoni nagykövetét, Sz. R. Voroncovot, hogy adja az angol kabinet értésére: „Oroszország és Anglia között a baráti viszony helyreállítása Dánia és Svédország elleni utolsó hadicselekmények beszüntetésének a függvénye”.<sup>5</sup> 1801. április 9-én a cári informálta a stockholmi orosz követet, A. Ja. Budberget az angolok felé megtett lépésekről.<sup>6</sup> Az orosz kormány Svédországot és Dániát meghívta a tengeri konvenció megkötéséről folytatott angol-orosz tárgyalásokra, Szentpétervárra, de a két hatalom nem élt a lehetőséggel.<sup>7</sup> Az új angol-orosz tengeri konvenciót 1801. június 5-én írták alá.<sup>8</sup>

Miután a konfliktus rendeződött Angliával, az uralkodó körlevelében a külföldön szolgálatot teljesítő diplomatái elé tárta az új orosz külpolitika lényegét. Abban az európai ügyektől való távolmaradását nyilvánította ki azt hangsúlyozva, hogy ilyen hatalmas ország számára, mint amilyen Oroszország, nem szükséges a további területi növekedés. Nem óhajt részt venni az európai viszályokban, a célja

---

<sup>1</sup> *Vnyesnyaja polityika Rosszii 19 i nacsalo 20 veka*, (VPR), Dokumenti Rosszijszkovo Minyisztversztva Inosztrannih gyel, Szer. I. t. 1. Moszkva, 1960. Prim. 662. 703. A barátságról, a kereskedelemről és a tengeri hajózásról szóló orosz-svéd megállapodást 1801. március 1-jén kötötték meg.

<sup>2</sup> *Isztorii vnyesnyej polityiki Rosszii*. Pervaja polovina 19 veka. Ot vojn Rosszii protyiv Napoleona do Parizsszkovo mira 1856 g., Moszkva, 1995. 27. HARTLEY, Janet M.: *Alexander I*. London, 1994. 61.

<sup>3</sup> *VPR*, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 5. Alekszandr I generalu ot kavalerii P. A. Palenu, 8 (20) aprelja 1801 g. 17. Prim. 8. 698.

<sup>4</sup> *VPR*, Szer. I. t. 1. Moszkva, 1960. Dok. 3. Alekszandr I poszlu v Sztokgolme A. Ja. Budbergu, 9. (21) aprelja 1801 g. 18-19. RAGSDALE, H.: *Proszviscsonnij abszolutizm i vnyejnyaja polityika Rosszii v 1762-1815 godah*, Otyecsesztvennaja isztorija, 2001. 3. 15.

<sup>5</sup> *VPR*, Szer. I. t. 1. Alekszandr I Sz. R. Voroncovu, 6 (18) aprelja 1801 g. 16.

<sup>6</sup> *VPR*, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 6. Alekszandr I poszlu Sztokgolme A. Ja. Budbergu, 9 (21) aprelja 1801 g. 22-23.

<sup>7</sup> *VPR*, Szer. I. t. 1. Prim. 19., 699.

<sup>8</sup> A konvenció tartalmát lásd részletesen IN: *VPR*, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 9. Anglo-russzkaja morszkaja konvencija, 5 (17) ijunja 1801 g. 28-39.

az, hogy biztosítsa népe számára a békét.<sup>9</sup> Ez azt jelentette, hogy az el nem kötelezett politika és a béke híve, csak szükség esetén nyúlna fegyverhez és avatkozna be az európai viszályokba. „*Ha mégis fegyvert fognék, [...] akkor azt csak népem védelme érdekében tenném, vagy ha Európa nyugalmát a nagyravágás becsúgyának veszélye fenyegetné*”<sup>10</sup> – írta. Ez a külpolitikai program lényegében azt tartalmazta, hogy az orosz kabinet Oroszország helyzetét a kontinensen a megállapodások rendszerével kívánja stabilizálni, nagyhatalmi pozícióját és az európai ügyekre befolyását izolációs politikájával óhajtja megtartani.<sup>11</sup> Az orosz uralkodó első külpolitikai lépéseivel így arra törekedett, hogy helyre állítsa a diplomáciai kapcsolatát Angliával (ez 1801. június 5-én megtörtént), megerősítse szövetségét Svédországgal, baráti viszonyt létesítsen Ausztriával és Poroszországgal, békét írjon alá Franciaországgal, amelyre végül, hosszú ideig elhúzódó tárgyalásokat követően 1801. október 8-án került sor.

Az orosz külpolitika fő tengelye Közép-Európa lett.<sup>12</sup> A német államok mellett megnőtt a szerepük az északi államoknak, Dániának és Svédországnak Oroszország Európa politikájában. Ez egyrészt azért következett be, mert Oroszországgal szomszédosak voltak, és ez az orosz határ védelme szempontjából egyre fontosabbá vált, másrészt a velük való kapcsolattartás nagyobb mozgásteret biztosított az orosz diplomácia számára a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. A fő feladat, amelyet az orosz kormány maga elé tűzött, az lett, hogy megakadályozza a francia befolyás növekedését a térségben. I. Sándor azt tartotta szükségesnek, hogy olyan korlátot (barriert) építsen a német államokból, amely képes útját állni a francia terjeszkedésnek.<sup>13</sup> Ebben a törekvésében Svédországban partnerre talált, mivel a svéd kabinet tartott attól, hogy Franciaország rátámad észak-német birtokaira.

1802. március 18-án, elhúzódó egyeztetések után, végül Svédország is csatlakozott az angol-orosz tengeri konvencióhoz, amit Dánia már 1801. október 11-én aláírt. A svéd kabinet nem volt teljesen elégedett az oroszok által elért eredményekkel, nehezményezte, hogy a semleges államok érdekei nem jutottak kellőképpen érvényre abban. 1802. május 16-án I. Sándor a hágai orosz követhez, G. O. Stackelberghez küldött levelében ezzel ellentétes véleményének adott hangot. „*Teljességgel meg vagyok győződve arról, hogy sem Dánia, sem Svédország, sohasem kaptak volna Angliától engedményeket, melyeket most megkaptak, hála az én közbenjárásomnak. De akár hogy is történt Svédország csatlakozása a konvencióhoz, ez az ügy, végül, befejeződött*”.<sup>14</sup> Sándor kiemelte

<sup>9</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 12. Alekszandr I poszlannnyiku v Berline A. I. Krjudeneru, 5 (17) ijulja 1801 g. 49-50. 1801. június 27-én A. I. Markov, a párizsi követ, 1801. július 5-én SZ. R. Voroncov, a londoni követ kapta meg az orosz külpolitika új elveit, lehetőségeit tartalmazó instrukciókat. Lásd részletesen: VPR, Szer. I. t. 1. Prim. 20., 699.

<sup>10</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 12. Alekszandr I poszlannnyiku v Berline A. I. Krjudeneru, 5 (17) ijulja 1801 g. 50.

<sup>11</sup> *Isztorija vnyesnyej polityiki Rosszii*, (1995), 33.; SCHROEDER, P. W.: *Transformation of European Politics*, Oxford, 1994. 29-30.

<sup>12</sup> *Isztorija vnyesnyej polityiki Rosszii*, (1995), 33.

<sup>13</sup> Uo. 39-40.

<sup>14</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 78. Alekszandr I poszlannnyiku v Gage G. O. Stakelbergu, 16 (28) maja 1802 g. 213.

levelében, hogy bár baráti a kapcsolat Svédország és Oroszország között, mégis tart attól, hogy a komoly pénzügyi nehézségekkel küszködő svéd állam minden eszközt megragad és elfogadja a francia segítséget. „*Ismeretes, hogy a stockholmi kabinet közeledni próbál a francia kabinethez. A királynak, úgy tűnik, kevésbé van kedve a francia kormányhoz, de másrésztől ez az uralkodó ellenséges érzelmet táplál Anglia felé, ellenséges érzelmet, ami fennmaradhat, és közeledéshez vezethet Franciaországgal különösen akkor, ha az első konzul kimutatja, hogy a szélsőségekig pénzügyi szükségletet szenvedő Svédországnak hajlandó segíteni*”.<sup>15</sup> 1802. május 16-án hasonló tartalmú véleményt fogalmazott meg a madridi követéhez, I. M. Muravjov-Aposztolhoz küldött titkos utasításában, amit később, július 26-án a berlini követe, M. M. Alopeus is megkapott. Továbbra is azt hangsúlyozta, hogy a kapcsolat Svédországgal baráti, de tart a francia-svéd közeledéstől. „*A szomszédságon kívül sajátosan közeli kapcsolatban vagyok IV. Gusztávval*”<sup>16</sup> – írta Alopeusnak, azt remélvén, hogy a svéd uralkodóhoz fűződő családi kötelék megóvja a baráti együttműködést, és Oroszország mellett tartja Svédországot.

1801 elején az orosz-svéd baráti viszony erősítése volt a cél az orosz külpolitikában, ami teljesült is. 1802 őszétől azonban az orosz-svéd kötés gyengülni látszott a svéd külpolitika francia irányultsága miatt. Az orosz kabinet gyanakvóbb lett Svédországgal szemben. Ezt mutatja az is, hogy I. Sándor már nemcsak az európai udvarokban diplomáciai szolgálatot teljesítő követeitől kért információkat a francia-svéd viszony alakulásáról, hanem a konstantinápolyi orosz követétől, A. Ja. Italinszkijtől is. Azzal bírta meg, hogy „*minden eshetőségre, szükséges annak megfigyelése, hogy a svéd misszió a török minisztériumokkal milyen kapcsolatban van*”.<sup>17</sup> Az orosz kormány számolt azzal is, hogy a francia kabinet előhúzza régi „*keleti korlát*” politikáját, és maga mellé állítja Svédországot, valamint az Oszmán Birodalmat Oroszország ellen. Az orosz kabinet nyugtalanságát prezentálja, hogy A. R. Voroncov külügyminiszter 1802. október 6-án kelt levelében az 1801 augusztusa óta Stockholmban ügyvivő D. M. Alopeustól részletes beszámolót kért Svédország anyagi helyzetéről, a hadserege és a flottája állapotáról. Emellett arra utasította, hogy „*figyelmének és a megfigyelésének egyik legfontosabb tárgya az kell legyen, milyen Svédország jelenlegi politikai kapcsolata más államokkal*”.<sup>18</sup>

1803 végétől azonban változott az európai helyzet és azzal együtt az orosz kabinet álláspontja is Svédországot illetően, ismét egy erős szövetségest látott benne, ami összefüggésben állt az ekkor módosított orosz külpolitikai koncepcióval. Világossá vált ugyanis, hogy az 1801 elején meghirdetett önelszigetelő/izolációs

<sup>15</sup> Uo. 214.

<sup>16</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 98. Alekszandr I poszlannyiku v Berline M. M. Alopeuszu, 26 ijlja (7 avgusztja) 1802 g., 265. Prim. 154., 712. IV. Gusztáv Adolf a bádeni hercegnőt, I. Sándor feleségének testvérét vette nőül.

<sup>17</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok., 110. Alekszandr I poszlannyiku v Konsztantyinopolje A. Ja. Italinszkomu, 30 avgusztja (11 szentyabrja) 1802 g. 286.

<sup>18</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 1. Dok. 120. Minyisztr inosztrannih gyel A. R. Voroncov poverennomu v gyelah v Sztokgolme D. M. Alopeuszu, 6 (18) oktjyabrja 1802 g. 311.

politika nehezen tartható, Szentpétervárnak a francia terjeszkedő politikával szemben határozottabb álláspontot kell képviselnie az európai ügyekben.

Anglia és Franciaország között Amiens-ben létesített béke (1802. március 25.) rövid életű volt. 1803. május 12-e után ismét kiújultak a harcok a két állam között, az orosz diplomácia pedig intenzív tárgyalásokba kezdett annak érdekében, hogy katonai szövetséget hozzon tető alá Poroszországgal, majd 1803 decemberében Ausztriával. Miután Oroszország a két német állam között feszülő ellentéteket feloldani nem tudta, és együtt egy Napóleon ellenes koalícióban nem számolhatott velük, (1804 májusában Poroszországgal, 1804 novemberében Ausztriával állapodott meg,) előtérbe került egy orosz-svéd szövetség létesítésének szükségessége.

Napóleon császárrá választása, az 1804-ben bekövetkezett drámai események (Enghieni herceg kivégzése), és a német államok kérdésében követett francia politika félelmet keltett a svéd kormányban is. Mindez kiviláglik A. A. Czartoryskinek, az orosz külügyminiszternek Karl Stedingk-gel, a szentpétervári svéd nagykövettel folytatott megbeszéléséről készített feljegyzésből. A követ arról számolt be, hogy „a svéd király attól tart, Svéd Pomeránia veszélyben van, mert elhelyezkedése és pozíciója folytán egy erődítmény, és Stralsund kikötője van ott, ízes falat, amely meglehet, felkelti az első konzul érdeklődését”.<sup>19</sup> Ezért azt tudakolta, hogy „uralkodója számíthat-e Oroszország segítségére, ha a franciák hadműveleteket kezdenek Pomerániában”.<sup>20</sup> A követ megnyugtató választ kapott, az orosz kormány készen állt Svédország segítségére sietni a veszély közeledtének legkisebb jelére. Sőt, I. Sándor felajánlotta diplomáciája szolgálatait az angol pénzügyi támogatás megszerzéséhez, amibe a svéd kormány beleegyezett.<sup>21</sup> 1805. január 8-án Oroszország Svédországgal konvenciót kötött Észak-Németország védelmére.<sup>22</sup> A tíz cikkelyt és öt titkos külön cikkelyt tartalmazó dokumentumot orosz részről A. A. Czartoryski, valamint D. P. Tatjiscsev titkos tanácsos, svéd részről Karl Stedingk, a szentpétervári svéd követ írták alá. A szerződés preambulumban felsorolták a megállapodást kiváltó okokat, eseményeket. A szövetségkötést azzal indokolták, hogy „a francia csapatok bevonultak Germániába, nem voltak tekintettel ennek a birodalomnak a semlegességére, [...] kirabolták Hannovert, a Hanza-városokat, messzire ment a francia kormány. Ezek a történések kezdettől fogva magukra vonták az orosz és a svéd uralkodó figyelmét. [...] A svéd királynak tekintettel kell lennie Svéd Pomeránia veszélyeztetettségére is,

<sup>19</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t 2. Moszkva, 1961. Dok., 89. Verbalnaja nota (tovariscsa minyisztra inosztrannih gyeł A. A. Csartorijzkovo) svedszkomu poszlu v Sz.-Petyerburge Stedingu, 2 (14) maja 1804 g. 56.

<sup>20</sup> Uo.

<sup>21</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t 2. Prim. 26., 660. D. M. Alopeus orosz követ stockholmi erőfeszítései nagyban hozzájárultak az 1804. december 3-i és 1805. augusztus 19-i angol-svéd konvenció megkötéséhez, amelyben Anglia biztosította Svédországot, hogy pénzügyi támogatást nyújt a Stralsundban állomásozó svéd hadsereg megerősítéséhez.

<sup>22</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t 2. Dok. 89. Russzko-svedszkaja konvencija o szovmesztnih gyejsztvjah po oboronje Szevernoj Germanyii, 2 (14) janvarja 1805 g. 267-271. Ezt megelőzően Oroszország Svédországgal 1799. október 18-án kötött szövetséget Gatcsinában.

amely a francia hadsereg által megszállt Észak-Németországgal határos”.<sup>23</sup>

A konvenció első cikkelye azt tartalmazta, hogy „amennyiben Franciaország és Svédország között tovább romlik a helyzet, és megtámadják Svédország észak-németországi birtokait, az orosz uralkodó a gatcsinai megállapodás értelmében csapatokat küld, melynek létszáma 40-50 ezer fő, a svéd király pedig köteles a saját csapataiból 20-25 ezer főt a rendelkezésükre bocsátani”.<sup>24</sup> A szerződés további cikkelyeiben az orosz és a svéd hadsereg, illetve hadiflotta együttműködésének feltételeiről határoztak. Az első titkos cikkelyben megfogalmazták, hogy „a szövetség nyitott azon hatalmak számára, amelyek részt óhajtanak venni benne”.<sup>25</sup> A negyedik titkos külön cikkelyben leszögezték, hogy „miután a szövetség Anglia érdekeit is szolgálja, Anglia pénzzel segíti Svédországot, hogy ki tudja állítani a 25 ezer fős sereget”.<sup>26</sup> Az ötödik titkos külön cikkely azt tartalmazta, „ha Franciaország a szerződő felek bármelyikére rátámadna, a másik fél a segítségére siet, támogatja a szükséges haderővel”.<sup>27</sup>

Napóleon császárrá koronázása (1804. december 2.) felgyorsította az angol-orosz közeledést is. I. Sándor N. N. Novoszilcevet küldte Londonba, hogy tárgyaljon William Pitt-tel, az angol miniszterelnökkel egy Napóleon ellenes koalíció megszervezéséről. Novoszilcev 1804. december 13-án kelt, Pitt-tel folytatott megbeszéléséről készített feljegyzéséből kiviláglik, hogy az oroszok számítottak Svédországra. Miután Oroszország egyedül nem volt képes harcolni, a cél az volt, hogy minél nagyobb erőt szervezzen meg, és vessen be Napóleon ellen. Az elképzelés az volt, hogy „Oroszország és Anglia együtt vonják be Ausztriát és Poroszországot a koalícióba, amelyhez minden valószínűség szerint az Ottomán Porta, Svédország csatlakozik, meglehetően Dánia is; ennek a koalíciónak a célja abban állna, hogy Franciaország birtoknövelésének, és Bonaparte barbár cselekedeteinek gátat szabjon”.<sup>28</sup> 1805 tavaszán a tárgyalások tovább folytatódtak Londonban az angol-orosz szövetség megkötéséről, amelyet hamar tető alá hoztak, 1805. március 30-án írták alá a megállapodást.<sup>29</sup> Az angol-orosz szövetség, amely a harmadik koalíció alapját adta, és amelyhez Svédország hivatalosan csatlakozott, több okból, szempontból is fontos állomásnak számít az adott időszak orosz külpolitikájában. Egyértelművé vált, hogy Oroszország az európai eseményekből nem maradhat ki, az izolációs politika önelszigetelést hozna, amit ilyen katonai potenciállal rendelkező nagyhatalom nem engedhet meg magának. Továbbá világossá vált az is, hogy az orosz érdekeket sértő francia terjeszkedést az orosz kormány a diplomácia eszközeivel nem tudja feltartóztatni. A harmadik koalíció

---

<sup>23</sup> Uo. 267.

<sup>24</sup> Uo.

<sup>25</sup> Uo. 269.

<sup>26</sup> Uo. 270.

<sup>27</sup> Uo. 271.

<sup>28</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 2. Dok. 79. Zapisz beszedi N. N. Novoszilceva sz premier-minyisztrum Velikobritanyii Pittom, 13 (15) gyekabrja 1804 g., 237.

<sup>29</sup> A megállapodás teljes szövege: VPR, Szer. I. t. 2. Moszkva, 1961. Dok. 117. Anglo-russzkaja szojuznaja konvencijaja o merah k usztanovlenyiju mira v Jevrope 30 marta (11 aprelja) 1805 g. 355-377.

megszervezése háborút jelentett Oroszország számára. Az orosz kabinetet megnyugvással töltötte el, hogy a Napóleon elleni küzdelmében Svédországot szövetségesként maga mellett tudhatja.

1804-től 1807-ig a Napóleon elleni küzdelem foglalta el a központi helyet az orosz külpolitikában. A harmadik koalíció (1805), amelynek Svédország is tagja volt, majd a negyedik koalíció (1806-1807) katonai vereségei után Oroszország arra kényszerült, hogy elfogadja a francia szövetséget, és felvállalja annak terheit, a kontinentális rendszerhez csatlakozást. A tilsiti békekötés (1807. július 7-9.) után Oroszország mozgástere a nemzetközi küzdőtéren beszűkült, és súlyosbította a problémát, hogy a franciákkal való szövetség elégedetlenséget váltott ki az orosz nemesség körében.<sup>30</sup> A tilsiti béke a közép-európai orosz befolyás időszakának végét jelentette, de lehetőséget kínált I. Sándor számára, hogy megvédje Oroszország érdekeit Északon Svédország, Délen az Ottomán Birodalom ellenében. A tilsiti békében arról is megállapodás született, hogy Oroszország Dániát és Svédországot Anglia ellen hangolja. Dánia hajlott rá, Svédország azonban nem csatlakozott az Anglia ellen bevezetett kontinentális blokádhhoz, és I. Sándor ezt használta fel a támadásának igazolására. Nem annyira a gazdasági problémákkal, inkább azzal a stratégiai fenyegetettséggel függött ez össze, amelyet Svédország Oroszország számára a Baltikumban képviselt, amennyiben a svéd kabinet szövetséget létesít Angliával.<sup>31</sup> Mindezek ellenére az orosz kormány nem óhajtott háborúba bocsátkozni a svédekkel, nem akarta Finnországot megszerezni, amit egyébként Oroszország védelme a Baltikumban megkövetelt. Az orosz kormány Franciaország nyomására 1807 novemberében hadat üzent Angliának. Napóleon abban reménykedett, hogy Oroszország Svédország ellen is háborúba lép. Az orosz kabinet azonban minden kifogást előhúzott, halogatta a háború megkezdését egészen 1808 februáráig. Svédország kilátástalan helyzetbe került, mert az Angliával kötött szövetségének fenntartása előrevetítette a konfliktust Oroszországgal, viszont ha csatlakozik a francia-orosz szövetséghez, Angliától kell tartania.<sup>32</sup>

Napóleon elégedett volt azzal, hogy Észak lefoglalja Oroszországot, részben azért, mert névlegesen az a kontinentális rendszer védelme érdekében történt. Sőt, felajánlott katonai segítséget is, de a franciákat 1808 nyarától túlságosan lekötötte a háború Spanyolországgal, így Napóleon nem óhajtott belefolyni az Északon zajló eseményekbe, ami I. Sándor számára is nagy könnyebbséget jelentett. Az orosz

---

<sup>30</sup> BEZOTOSZNIJ, V. M.: *Vnyesnyepolityicseskij vibor Rosszii na geopolityicseszkom prosztransztve Jevropi v epohu 1812 goda*, Otyecsesztvennaja isztorija, 2008. 2. 68. Lásd még: TROICKIJ, Ny.: *Alekszandr I protiv Napoleona*, Moszkva, 2007. 166. LIEVEN, Dominic: *Russia against Napoleon: the True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace*, London, 2009. 96.

<sup>31</sup> HARTLEY: 95.

<sup>32</sup> Annak, hogy Svédország kitartott francia ellenes álláspontja mellett, két oka volt: az egyik, IV. Gusztáv Adolf Napóleon iránti gyűlölete, a másik, Angliához fűződő viszonya. A svéd uralkodó nem kívánta megszakítani a gazdasági szempontból fontos kereskedelmi kapcsolatát Angliával, és végül a rugalmatlan politikájával kiváltotta a háborút. Lásd bővebben: MATTI, Klinge: *Mezsdunarodnije aszpekti finljandszkoj vojni*, Rosszijszkaja isztorija, 2009. 3. 82-83.

hadsereg hamar legyőzte a Finnországban lévő svéd csapatokat, körülbelül 24 ezer orosz ütközött meg 20 ezer rosszul felszerelt és gyengén kiképzett svéd és finn katonával. Csupán a Helsinkihez vezető tengeri utat ellenőrző Sveaborg erődje tartotta magát hosszabb ideig, de májusban ez az erőd is kapitulált. Nyitva állt az út Helsinki felé, I. Sándor bejelentette Finnország Oroszországhoz csatolását.<sup>33</sup>

1809 tavaszán IV. Gusztáv Adolfot megfosztották a hatalmától. Finnországban Porvooba hívták össze az országgyűlést, és ugyanazon a napon, 1809. március 29-én, amikor a finnek hűséget esküdtek I. Sándornak, az orosz cárnak, a svédek és a finnek közös uralkodója lemondott a hatalomról.<sup>34</sup> Az egyesülés Finnországot nagyhercegséggé, sőt „sajátos állammá” változtatta. A „finnek nemzetként a nemzetek sorába” emelve az orosz állam alattvalói lettek, és egyidejűleg politikai képviseleti jogot kaptak uralkodójuk előtt: a rendek közösen képviselheték az egész nemzet érdekét. I. Sándor számára fontos volt az Oroszországra nézve kedvezőtlen nemzetközi helyzetben, hogy Finnországot gyorsan megbékítsék, és megszilárdítsa az ország kormányát a finn vezető személyiségek és rendek együttműködésével. Porvooban a cár uralkodói esküjében ígéretet tett arra, hogy érvényben marad a svéd uralom idejéből származó evangélikus vallás, az alkotmány és a rendek privilégiumai.<sup>35</sup> Finnország a napóleoni háborúk szövetségi politikájának következményeként, a „finn” háborút lezáró friedrichshammi békével (1809. szeptember 5.) került ki Svédország fennhatósága alól, s vált az Orosz Birodalom részévé és egészen sajátos képletet jelentett az autokrata Oroszországon belül.

A friedrichshammi béke aláírását közel egy hónapig tartó egyeztetés előzte meg. A tárgyalásokon orosz részről N. P. Rumjancev külügyminiszter és 1803 és 1808 között Stockholmban követi posztot betöltő D. M. Alopeus, svéd részről 1792-től az orosz-svéd háború kezdetéig Szentpétervárott nagykövetségként tevékenykedő Kurt von Stedingk báró és André Frederich Skjöldebrand ezredparancsnok vettek részt. A svéd és orosz megbízottak 1809. augusztus 2-án találkoztak először, de a hivatalos tárgyalások csak másnap kezdődtek el. Alopeus részletes feljegyzést, jegyzőkönyvi jelentést készített az 1809. augusztus 2-a és szeptember 5-e között zajló egyeztetések menetéről, így pontos képet kapunk a tárgyaló feleknek a vitás kérdésekben kifejtett álláspontjáról, nyomon követhetjük a békeszerződés cikkelyeinek tartalmi módosulásait.<sup>36</sup> A tárgyalások intenzíven folytak, amelyeket I. Sándor ellenőrzése alatt tartott. A svédek már a megbeszélések kezdetekor beleegyeztek Finnország átadásába és az Anglia ellen meghirdetett kontinentális blokádhoz csatlakozásba. Svéd részről egy külön cikkely tervezet készült arról, hogy a svéd lakosság számára néhány fontos áru bevitelét engedélyezzék. Két kérdésről azonban hosszasan vitatkoztak a tárgyaló felek: az Åland-szigetek sorsáról és az orosz-svéd (finn-svéd) északi szárazföldi határ pontos

<sup>33</sup> HARTLEY: 95.

<sup>34</sup> SINGLETON, Fred: *A Short History of Finland*, Cambridge, 1998. 62-63. 178.

<sup>35</sup> HALMESVIRTA, Anssi (szerk.): *Finnország története*, Debrecen, 2001. 144.

<sup>36</sup> Lásd részletesen: VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 79. Dok. 80. Dok. 95. Dok. 100. Dok. 105.



kijelöléséről. Stedingk az Åland-szigetek kérdésében azzal érvelt, hogy „azok sohasem voltak Finnország részei [...] és, ha ezek a szigetek Oroszországhoz kerülnek, Stockholm lakosai egyetlen éjszaka sem fognak nyugodtan aludni, tartván a hirtelen rajtaütéstől, amelyet olyan könnyen meg lehet valósítani. És ezen szigetek birtoklása lehetővé teszi a Botteni-öböl hajóforgalmának ellenőrzését, ez pedig azzal járna, hogy a főváros kapcsolattartása megszakadna azokkal a kikötőkkel, amelyek Stockholmtól északra helyezkednek el”.<sup>37</sup> Továbbá Stedingk közölte Rumjancevvel, hogy nem kapott arra felhatalmazást Stockholmban, hogy az Åland-szigetek átadásáról tárgyaljon. „Rumjancev ezen csodálkozott, mert a levelezésből, amely megelőzte a tárgyalást, előre tudni kellett Stockholmban, hogy arról mi sohasem mondunk le, miután tudjuk, hogy ez a terület Finnország védelme szempontjából milyen fontos”<sup>38</sup> – jegyezte le Alopeus. A határ kérdésében az orosz megbízottak utaltak arra, hogy „az orosz uralkodó fontosnak tartja a határokat északra tolni, hogy utódainak újból ne kelljen háborúzniuk a pontos határáért, [...] és amikor a határokról tárgyalnak, olyan természetes határokat kell keresni, amelyekkel elkerülhető az új háború”.<sup>39</sup> Az Åland-szigetokről és az északi határ kérdéséről nem tudtak érdemben tovább tárgyalni, mert Stedingk szerint az orosz kérdés nem volt ismeretes Stockholmban, ezért futárt kellett menesztenie az újabb instrukcióért. 1809. augusztus 5-étől a tárgyalások szüneteltek a svéd futár visszatéréig. Még ezen a napon Rumjancev levelet küldött a Finnországban állomásozó orosz hadsereg főparancsnokához, Barclay de Tollyhoz, amelyben beszámolt arról, milyen eredménnyel zárult az első konferencia a svédekkel Friedrichshammban. Az orosz külügyminiszter arra kérte Barclayt, hogy mivel a békeszerződést nem írták alá, álljon készen, ha a háborút folytatni kell.<sup>40</sup> 1809. augusztus 12-én kezdődtek újra a tárgyalások, amelyekbe a dánok is bekapcsolódtak. Az oroszok nem mondtak le az Åland-szigetéről, és nem engedtek követeléseikből Oroszország és Svédország északi határának kérdésében sem.<sup>41</sup> Közben az orosz külügyminiszter, Rumjancev augusztus 26-i levelében jelezte a cárnak, hogy rövidesen sor kerül a békekötésre. Beszámolt arról is, hogy körvonalazta a svéd küldött számára az északi államok szövetségének felújítására vonatkozó nézetét. „Stedingk előtt feltártam, hogy az elképzelésem az, hogy a békekötéskor Svédországgal és Dániával együttműködve, a korábbi feltételek esetleges átnézése és javítása mellett, hozzuk létre az Északi Szövetséget, és ennek a szövetségnek az alapját, [...] örökre gondoskodva a Baltikum sorsáról, a három

<sup>37</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Moszkva, 1967. Dok. 79. Protokolnaja zapisz russzko-svedszkih mirnih peregovorov v Fridrihszgame sz 2 (14) po 5 (17) avgusztá 1809 g. 140.

<sup>38</sup> Uo. 141.

<sup>39</sup> Uo. 142.

<sup>40</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 80. Minyisztr inosztrannih gyel N. P. Rumjancev glavnokomandujuscsemu armijej v Finljangyii M. B. Barklaju-de-Tolli, Fridrihszgam, 5 (17) avgusztá 1809 g. 146.

<sup>41</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 95. Protokolnaja zapisz russzko-svedszkih mirnih peregovorov v Fridrihszgame sz 12 (24) avgusztá po 24 avgusztá (5 szentyjabrja) 1809 g., 179-180. Stedingk nem a Calix, hanem a Kemi folyónál kívánta meghúzni a határokat, amit földrajzi szempontból is megfelelőnek ítélt. Rumjancev viszont hasonló okból a Calix folyó mellett érvelt.

monarchia adja. [...] Az elképzelésem tetszett Stedingknek is. [...] Megerősítettem abban a nézetében, hogy Oroszországnak érdekében áll megőrizni Svédországot, függetlenül attól, hogy háborúban áll vele jelen pillanatban, és hogy Svédország a belső ügyei miatt nehéz helyzetben van<sup>42</sup> – írta. Az uralkodó tudomására hozta, hogy ha az oroszok kisebb határmódosításba belemennek, a svédek aláírják a békét. „Stedingk úr megismételte nekem, Uram, hogy amennyiben hajlandó vagyok a Torneo folyóig tolni a határt, akkor kész a békét aláírni”.<sup>43</sup> Rumjancev I. Sándor jóváhagyását kérte ez ügyben, amelyet meg is kapott 1809. augusztus 27-én. Az orosz uralkodó válaszelevele egyben azt igazolja, hogy a béketárgyalást valóban nyomon követte, és kontroll alatt tartotta. A békével kapcsolatban további instrukciókat fogalmazott meg Rumjancevnek, többek között kérte, hogy alkossanak meg egy olyan cikkelyt, amelyben Svédország garantálja Dánia területének épségét, és hogy Oroszországot nem szabad hibáztatni annak következményeiért, amelyek abból fakadnak, amit a svéd trón öröklésének kérdésében az Augustenbourgi herceg kiválasztása von maga után.<sup>44</sup> Végül, apróbb részletek egyeztetése után, a békét 1809. szeptember 5-én aláírták.

A békeszerződés nemcsak Oroszország és Svédország, hanem az észak-európai régió történetében is fontos viszonyokat rögzített. A békeszerződés első cikkelye arról szólt, hogy „innentől béke, barátság és jó viszony honol az orosz uralkodó és a svéd király között”<sup>45</sup>, és arra törekszenek, hogy ezt megőrizzék az államaik és az alattvalóik között. A második cikkelyben megfogalmazták, hogy a svéd uralkodó az orosz uralkodó szövetségeseivel is megköti a békét. A szerződés legfontosabb pontjának számító harmadik cikkelyben Svédország beleegyezett abba, hogy csatlakozik a kontinentális rendszerhez. A svéd király megígérte, hogy az ország kikötőit bezárja a brit hadi- és kereskedelmi hajók előtt. Azonban Svédország a svéd lakosság számára néhány fontos árut (só és gyarmatárúk) behozhatott Oroszország hozzájárulásával, ez az engedmény lehetővé tette, hogy ne valósuljon meg a teljes lezárás. Oroszország megígérte, hogy ezt Franciaországgal és Dániával elfogadtatja. A negyedik cikkely azt tartalmazta, hogy Svédország lemond Finnországról. Szembeötlő azonban, hogy a megállapodásban név szerint Finnországot nem említették, helyette az Oroszországhoz kerülő

<sup>42</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 97. Minisztr inosztrannih gyel N. P. Rumjancev Alekszandru I, Fridrihszgam, 26 avgusztá (7 szentyabrja) 1809 g. 185.

<sup>43</sup> Uo. 186.

<sup>44</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Alekszandr I. minisztru inosztrannih gyel N. P. Rumjancevu, 27 avgusztá (8 szentyabrja) 1809 g. 187. A svédországi fordulatot követően IV. Gusztáv Adolf helyett 1809. május 25-én XIII. Károly került a trónra. Mivel nem volt gyermeke, előkerült a trónörökös kérdése. A választás a dán király rokonára, a Norvégiában állomásozó dán hadsereg parancsnokára, Kristian-August Holstein-Augustenbourgi hercegre esett. 1810 januárjában érkezett a herceg Svédországba, ahol XIII. Károly a fiává fogadta. A svédek azon próbálkozása, hogy a segítségével leválasszák Norvégiát Dániáról, és Svédországhoz csatolják, nem vált valóra. A herceg ugyanis nem sokkal Svédországba érkezése után, 1810 júniusában elhunyt. Ezek után XIII. Károly Napóleon marsallját, Bernadotte-ot fogadta örökbe, aki 1810 után a trónörökös címet viselője lett. VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Prim. 143. 673.

<sup>45</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 106. Mirnij dogovor mezsdu Rosszijej i Svecijej, Fridrihszgam, 5 (17) szentyabrja 1809 g. 220.

kormányzóságokat sorolták fel. A békeszerződés fontos részét képezi az ötödik cikkelye, amely kijelölte a két állam között a határt a Torneo és Muonio folyók mentén, és részletesen felsorolta a folyók mellett található szigetek hovatartozását. Megadta a mérnökök számára azt is, hogy pontosan hol húzzák meg a határt. A hatodik cikkely megerősítette az orosz uralkodónak még a háború idején kinyilvánított ígértét, hogy a hozzákerült Finnország lakossága megtarthatja evangélikus vallását, és a svéd törvények is érvényben maradnak. Számos cikkely Finnország Orosz Birodalomhoz csatolásának technikai részleteit szabályozta.<sup>46</sup> I. Sándor a békéről a testvéréhez, Jekatyerina Pavlovna nagyhercegnőhöz 1809. szeptember 6-án küldött levelében elégedetten nyilatkozott. „A Svédországgal kötött béke fenséges, és teljességében olyan, amelyet akartam. Nem tudom kellően meghálálni ezt a Mindenhatónak. Finnország teljes átadása a Torneoig az Åland-szigetekkel, a kontinentális rendszerhez való csatlakozás és a kikötők lezárása Anglia előtt, és, végül, béke Oroszország szövetségeseivel: mind ez aláírva, közvetítő nélkül”<sup>47</sup> – tudatta.

A friedrichshammi béke végleges megoldást nem adott azokra a problémákra, amelyet Finnországnak az Orosz Birodalomhoz csatolása szült. A békekötés után az orosz kabinet fontosnak tartotta, hogy stabilizálja kapcsolatát Svédországgal, és megerősítse a két állam között meghúzott határt egy új megállapodással. 1810. január 8-án aláírt orosz-svéd konvenció ezt a célt szolgálta, melynek előkészítésében és megkötésében P. K. Suchtelen, I. Sándor holland származású diplomatája fontos szerepet játszott, aki 1809 decemberétől 1811 szeptemberéig, majd 1812 márciusától 1813 áprilisáig gyakorlatilag a követi funkciót töltötte be Stockholmban. 1809. október 28-án Sándor azzal a speciális küldetéssel bízta meg, hogy a svéd fővárosban „megvesse annak a szoros barátságának az alapját, amelyet a birodalmam és a Svéd Királyság között kívánok létesíteni”.<sup>48</sup> A cárnak Suchtelen számára készített instrukciójában előírta, hogy nyugtassa meg a svéd kormányt, „Finnország átadása után nem kell félnie a birodalmamtól, miután Oroszország nem akar semmiféle hasznot húzni Svédország meggyengüléséből. [...] Az érdekem azt kívánja, hogy a legjobbat óhajtsam ennek a királyságnak”.<sup>49</sup> Sándor a svéd trónutódlással kapcsolatos problémákra utalva kifejtette, hogy nem áll szándékában az ország belső nyugalma megzavarni. „Minden nemzet csak maga képes dönteni arról, hogy mi jobb neki, és egyetlen államférfinak sincs joga más nép ügyeibe beavatkozni”<sup>50</sup> – összegezte álláspontját. I. Sándor Suchtelen fő feladatákként jelölte meg, hogy azon munkálkodjon, a két állam között a barátság

<sup>46</sup> A béke alapos elemzését lásd: ROGINSZKI, V. V.: *Isztoricseszkoje znacsenyije fridrihszgamzskovo mira 1809 goda dlja Rossziji*, Rosszjiszskaja isztorija, 2009. 3. 72-79.

<sup>47</sup> Alekszandr I – velikoj knyaginje Jekatyerinye Pavlovnye, 6 (18) sentyjabrja 1809 g. IN: NYIKOLAJ MIHAJLOVICS, velikij knyaz: *Perepiszka imperatora Alekszandra I sz szesztroj velikoj knyazsnoj Jekatyerinoj Pavlovnoj*, SzPb. 1910. 25.

<sup>48</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 134. Insztrukcija Alekszandra I inszenyer-genyeralu P. K. Szuhtelenu, 28 oktyabrja (9 nojabrja) 1809 g. 279.

<sup>49</sup> Uo. 281.

<sup>50</sup> Uo. 282.

megerősödjön. Biztosítsa a svéd uralkodót arról, hogy az orosz uralkodó célja: Svédország boldogságban éljen, amelyet csak ez a béke tud biztosítani. „Ígérje meg neki, azon fogok fáradozni, hogy ez az éppen csak megkötött béke közöttünk sohasem bomoljon fel”<sup>51</sup> – hangsúlyozta.

1810 tavaszán a francia kabinet is számolt Svédország szövetségével. Ez kiviláglik abból a feljegyzésből, amelyet Jean-Baptiste Champagny készített Napóleon kérésére 1810. március 16-án. A francia külügyminiszter rögzítette a francia külpolitika céljait, és meghatározta az Oroszországgal szemben követendő politika fontos elemeit. Champagny úgy értékelte, hogy Anglia gazdasági és politikai érdekei alapján „természetes szövetségese” Oroszországnak, rövidesen elkerülhetetlen a közeledésük. Ezért Franciaországnak a régi, orosz ellenes szövetségi politikájához vissza kell térnie, fel kell élesztenie a „keleti korbát” rendszerét, azaz szövetséget kell létesítenie Törökországgal, Svédországgal, Lengyelországgal. A francia kabinetnek törekednie kell arra, hogy az Oszmán Birodalom jóindulatát megszerezze, az 1806 óta tartó orosz-török háború befejezését húznia-halasztania kell, és közvetítőként a béketárgyalásokon meg kell akadályoznia az orosz érdekek érvényesítését. „Fontos Svédországgal ideiglenesen megerősíteni a szövetséget, mert támaszkodni lehet rá Oroszország ellenében, de óvatosan kell cselekednünk, nehogy akkor idézzük elő Oroszország és Anglia közeledését, amikor a francia csapatok a Pireneusi-félszigeten vannak lekötve”<sup>52</sup> – emelte ki. A francia kormány pontos ismeretekkel rendelkezett az orosz külpolitika törekvéseiről, így a svéd kérdésben követett politikájáról is, és ebben nagy érdeme volt a szentpétervári francia követnek, Armand Caulaincourtnak. A követ 1810. június 10-én jelentette Champagnynak, hogy az orosz külügyminiszter, N. P. Rumjancev több alkalommal az értésére adta, hogy Oroszországnak nincs szándékában beleavatkozni Svédország belügyeibe, beleértve a svéd trónörökös választásának kérdését is.<sup>53</sup> Eközben a párizsi orosz diplomáciai képviselő sem tétlenkedett, igyekezett kideríteni a svéd trónörökös ügyében elfoglalt francia álláspontot. A. I. Csernisev, a párizsi orosz megbízott megtudta, hogy Napóleon Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte marsall jelölését támogatja a svéd trónra. Miután megbeszélést folytatott Párizsban Bernadotte-tal, 1810. július 13-án a Rumjancevnek küldött jelentésében beszámolt arról, hogy „Bernadotte-nak jó a viszonya Oroszországhoz, azt vallja, a svéd uralkodónak barátságosnak kell lennie, hogy északi határait biztonságban tudja”.<sup>54</sup> Ez megnyugtató hír volt az orosz kormány számára, azonnal igyekezett felvenni a kapcsolatot Bernadotte-tal, Svédország új trónörökösével. Az orosz külügyminiszter Suchtelen 1810. október

---

<sup>51</sup> Uo.

<sup>52</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Zapiszka minyisztra inosztrannih gyel Francii Sampanyi Napoleonu I, 16 marta 1810 g. 392.

<sup>53</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Francuzszkij poszol v Sz.-Petyerburge Kolenkur minyisztru inosztrannih gyel Francii Sampanyi, 10 ijunya 1810 g. 456.

<sup>54</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Polkovnyik A. I. Csernisev minyisztru inosztrannih gyel N. P. Rumjancevu, Parizs, 13 (25) ijulja 1810. 481.

21-én kelt levelében azzal bízta meg, hogy tárja fel Károly János (Bernadotte) előtt, hogy „Oroszország teljes egyetértésben és békében akar élni Svédországgal, a királlyal és a trónörökös herceggel”.<sup>55</sup> Suchtelen válasza Stockholmból Szentpétervárra 1810. november 12-én érkezett meg. „Hiszem, hogy Svédország boldogsága nem választható el az Oroszországgal kötött békétől”<sup>56</sup> – tolmácsolta a követ a svéd trónörökös álláspontját. 1810. november 20-án a svéd követ, Stedingk XIII. Károlyt értesítette, hogy Rumjancev igyekezett őt meggyőzni arról, hogy Finnország megszerzése óta Oroszország semmiféle követeléssel sem lépett fel a Svéd Királyság felé, s ha a svéd kormány szorosabbra fűzte volna a kapcsolatot az orosz kabinettel, mint a franciával, akkor elkerülhette volna a háborút Angliával, ami most nehézségeket okoz az orosz kereskedelemben.<sup>57</sup> 1810. december 12-én I. Sándor fordult levelében Károly János trónörökös herceghez, melyben abbéli reményét fejezte ki, hogy megszilárdítják a szövetséget Svédországgal és Oroszországgal között, és szorosabbra fűzik a személyes baráti kapcsolatukat. „Mindig számíthat rám, és sohase adja meg magát a félelemnek, amelyet próbálnak magába ültetni Oroszország viszonylatában”<sup>58</sup> – bízta. Mindezek ellenére az orosz diplomácia egy éves kitaró munkája kellett ahhoz, hogy Oroszország Svédországgal szövetségre lépjen. A francia-orosz viszony romlása, Napóleon egyre nyíltabb orosz ellenes politikája döntő hatással volt a fejleményekre. 1811. január 3-án Csernisev jelentette I. Sándornak Párizsból, hogy Napóleonnak Oroszországgal kapcsolatos kijelentései nem őszinték, és háborúra készül ellene. Ezért azt tanácsolta az uralkodónak, hogy mihamarabb kössön szövetséget Svédországgal és Ausztriával, foglalja el preventív háborúval a Varsói Nagyhercegséget, és kiáltsa ki magát Lengyelország királyának.<sup>59</sup>

1811 őszén a stockholmi diplomáciai képviselő munkája látványosan megelégnék. P. A. Nicolai, a stockholmi orosz ügyvivő elérte, hogy Károly János trónörökös fogadja. 1811. október 19-én a Rumjancevhez küldött levelében beszámolt a vele folytatott megbeszélésekről. Hangsúlyozta, a trónörökös egyértelművé tette számára, hogy Oroszországgal kapcsolatban az álláspontja: a két államnak szoros kapcsolatot kell létesítenie a jövőben, és Északon egységet kell képezniük.<sup>60</sup> A svéd kormány nem volt könnyű helyzetben. 1812. március 13-án Suchtelen I. Sándornak küldött jelentéséből megtudhatjuk, hogy Károly János több alkalommal ellenállt Napóleon nyomásának, és most is visszautasította az ajánlatát,

---

<sup>55</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 255. Minyisztr inosztrannih gyel N. P. Rumjancev inzsenyer-genyeralu P. K. Szuhtyelenu, 21 oktyabrja (2 nojabrja) 1810 g. 569.

<sup>56</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Dok. 264. Inzsenyer-genyeral Szuhtyelen minyisztru inosztrannih gyel N. P. Rumjancevu, Sztokgolm, 12 (24) nojabrja 1810 g. 595.

<sup>57</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Feldmarsal Steding Karlu XIII, Sz.-Petyerburg 20 nojabrja (2 gyekabrja) 1810 g. 604.

<sup>58</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 5. Alekszandr I svedszkomu naszlednyiku princu Karlu Juhanu (Bernadotu), 19 (31) gyekabrja 1810 g. 645.

<sup>59</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 6. Moszkva, 1962. A. I. Csernisev Alekszandru I, 3 (15) 1811 g. 9.

<sup>60</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 6. Dok. 83. Poverennij v gyelah v Sztokgolme P. A. Nicolai minyisztru inosztrannih gyel N. P. Rumjancevu, 19 (31) oktyabrja 1811 g. 214.

hogy Franciaország oldalán lépjen be az Oroszország ellen készülő háborúba.<sup>61</sup> Miután Svédország elveszítette Svéd Pomerániát, 1812 januárjában vonultak be oda a francia csapatok, a nehéz helyzetben lévő svéd kabinet döntő lépésre szánta el magát. 1812 február elején Karl Löwenhielm gróftól rendkívüli megbízatással Szentpétervárra küldték azzal a feladattal, hogy tárgyaljon az orosz kabinettel védelmi szövetség létrehozásáról, és érje el, hogy Oroszország segítsen Norvégiát megszerezni. Az orosz kormány a svédek norvég tervéről Csernisev révén már 1810 decemberében tudomást szerzett. Löwenhielm 1812. február 16-án érkezett az orosz fővárosba, I. Sándor február 24-én fogadta, és késznek mutatkozott a szövetségekötésre. Engeström, a svéd külügyminiszter Suchtelen közvetítésével 1812. március 17-én Szentpétervárra juttatta a svéd szövetség-tervezetet. A projekt értelmében Oroszországnak garantálnia kellett, hogy Svédország megkapja Norvégiát, de oly módon, hogy Dániát kompenzálják a területi veszteségéért, és felajánlanák a dán kormánynak, hogy csatlakozzon a svéd-orosz szövetséghez. A tervezet együttes katonai fellépést irányzott elő Észak-Németországban, és feltételezte Anglia szövetséghez kötését is. Emellett Svédország felajánlotta közvetítő szerepét az orosz kabinetnek a Portával folytatott béketárgyalásain, valamint tanácsolta, nyerjék meg az Oszmán Birodalmat is a szövetségesüknek. Az egyeztetések intenzíven folytak mind a két fővárosban, Stockholmban március 18-án kezdődtek el. A szentpétervári tárgyalásokon két pontban nem értettek egyet a felek. A svédek kitartottak amellett, hogy Norvégia megszerzése ne kitüntetés legyen, Svédország kapja meg azt észak-németországi hadműveleteiért. Az orosz kormány viszont úgy vélte, hogy Dániát még azelőtt kell maguk mellé állítani, mielőtt ellene háborút kezdenének.

Az orosz-svéd támadási és védelmi szerződést 1812. március 24-én kötötték meg. A megállapodás 20 cikkelyből és 4 külön cikkelyből áll. A szerződő felek a preambulumban rögzítették szövetségekötésük okait és céljait, mely szerint *„megerősítik a barátságot és az együttműködést, hogy birtokaik védelmét és Észak függetlenségét biztosítsák, amelyeket Franciaország becsvágya és hódító tervei egyenlő mértékben fenyeget, és hogy e két célt elérjék, kötik meg a jelenlegi megállapodást a véd- és dacszövetségről”*.<sup>62</sup>

Mindezek közepette 1811. december 11-én Szentpétervár rendezte a Finn Nagyhercegség helyzetét az Orosz Birodalomban. I. Sándor rendeletével egyesítette a Finn Nagyhercegséget *„a régi Finnországgal”*, azaz azokkal a területekkel, amelyek az 1721-es nystadti és 1743-as aboi békével kerültek az orosz államhoz.<sup>63</sup>

A friedrichshammi békekötés utáni időszak egyik legfontosabb eseménye az orosz-svéd relációban az 1812. március 24-én Pétervárott aláírt szövetség lett, amelyet két további konvencióval egészítettek ki, 1812. június 3-án Vilnóban,<sup>64</sup>

<sup>61</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 6. P. K. Szuhtyelen Alekszandru I, 13 (30) marta 1812 g. 312.

<sup>62</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 6. Dok. 130. Russzko-svedszkij sojuznij dogovor, Sz.-Petyerburg, 24 marta (5 aprelja) 1812 g. 324.

<sup>63</sup> ROGINSZKI: 77.

<sup>64</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 6. Dok. 171. Dopolnyityelnaja konvencija k russzko-svedszkomu sojuznomu

augusztus 18-án Aboban.<sup>65</sup> Oroszország beleegyezett Norvégia Svédországhoz csatolásába, Svédország pedig végleg lemondott Finnországról.

A francia-orosz szövetség orosz körökben nem volt túl népszerű, 1812 elejére a lengyel kérdés és a kontinentális rendszer miatt egyre több nézeteltérés adódott Franciaország és Oroszország között.<sup>66</sup> A feszültségek végül háborúhoz vezettek. Napóleon gyors győzelemmel akarta Sándort visszakényszeríteni a tiltsi megállapodás feltételeihez, de oroszországi hadjárata kudarcra végződött. Az orosz kormány 1812 végén választhatott, hogy kilép a háborúból, vagy folytatja azt, és részt vesz Európa felszabadításában, a napóleoni uralom felszámolásában. Az oroszok küzdelme Napóleon ellen a hatodik koalícióba bekapcsolódó Svédországgal együtt folytatódott az 1813-1814-es években. A határon túli hadjárat meghozta a sikereket Oroszország számára, megerősödött a befolyása az európai ügyekre, megváltozott a státusa az európai viszonyrendszerben. Európa, illetve a világ legerősebb államaként béketeremtő, missziós politikát vállalt magára. II. Katalin még Oroszország, I. Pál és I. Sándor már Európa érdekeiért harcolt.<sup>67</sup> Svédország is elérte célját, 1814-ben megszerezte Norvégiát.

Összegzőképpen megállapíthatjuk, hogy a svéd kérdés az orosz diplomácia egyik sikeresen kezelt problémájának számított az 1801 és 1815 közötti időszakban. A diplomáciai források arról tanúskodnak, hogy a geopolitikai és stratégiai szempontból is fontos északnyugati régió felé irányuló orosz külpolitikai figyelem, aktivitás nem csökkent a napóleoni háborúk időszakában sem. Az utolsó orosz-svéd háború (1808-1809) egy békés együttműködési periódust morzsol fel ugyan, de nem hatott nyomasztóan az orosz-svéd viszonyra. A jó szomszédi kapcsolat helyreállítására mindkét állam törekedett, Napóleon terjeszkedő politikája, európai hatalmának növekedése elősegítette az orosz-svéd közeledést. A „finn” háborút lezáró friedrichshammi béke, amely Oroszországnak juttatta a Finn Nagyhercegséget, kezdetét jelezte annak az átalakulásnak, amely végül Észak-Európa politikai rendszerének átformálódásához vezetett 1815-re, és kihatott Oroszország európai ügyekben követett politikájára is. A béke után az 1810-ben és 1812-ben kötött megállapodások stabilizálták az orosz-svéd viszonyt, és 1811-ben rendeződött a Finn Nagyhercegség helyzete az Orosz Birodalomban. A régióban új nemzetállamok jöttek létre: az autonómiát élvező Finn Nagyhercegség és a Norvég Királyság, perszónálunióban Svédországgal. A végbement változások teljességgel megfeleltek Oroszország észak-európai irányú stratégiai, külpolitikai érdekeinek.

---

dogovoru ot 24 marta (5) aprelja) 1812 g. 428-431.

<sup>65</sup> VPR, Szer. I. t. 6. Dok., 230. Vtoraja dopolnyityelnaja konvencija (szekretnaja) k ruzszko-svedszkomu sozujznomu dogovoru ot 24 marta (5) aprelja) 1812 g. 545-556.

<sup>66</sup> SZOLOVJOV, Sz. M.: Moszkva, 1995. 279-281. BEZOTOSZNIJ: 69.

<sup>67</sup> RAGSDALE: 21.





**Anita Madarász**

## **„Tetteket, ne szavakat!” - Megjegyzések a brit női választójogi mozgalom történetéhez, 1908-1914**

*„A kormányzat elnémitott, de néha a némaság beszédesebb, mint a szavak! Azt üzenem nektek, győzni fogunk harcunkban!”  
(Emmeline Pankhurst, 1914 július) <sup>1</sup>*

### **Abstract**

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the British women's suffrage movement couldn't produce obvious results. They needed a catalyst which accelerated the changes of political and human mentality in this issue – this was the First World War. Still up to that moment a lot of time had gone. The years following 1908 became those, during which the violent, rough women's suffrage policy was born. This was the period of extreme confrontations, temporary calms and results on the surface. I make an attempt to present the organizational development of the women's movement and the solidification of the resistant behaviour of the government policy in the study. I would like to shed light on the reasons, how and why the suffrage movement was transformed into cruel fight from 1908. It is hard to answer the question unambiguously why the women were shut out from the active political life, since we may give a diverse answer to this question – I wish to emphasize only some in this bunch.

*Keywords:* NUWSS, WSPU, civil disobedience, hunger strike, Conciliation Bill, Black Friday, Cat and Mouse Act, Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Emmeline Pankhurst, Herbert Henry Asquith

**A** 19. században a brit nők nem vehettek részt a nemzeti politika alakításában. Nem tölthettek be szerepet a parlamentben, nem volt szavazati joguk. Az indoklás az volt, hogy a nőknek nincs szükségük szavazati jogra, mondván, hogy férjeik vállalják a szükséges felelősséget és szerepet a politikai ügyekben. A nők feladatai kimerültek a gyermeknevelésben illetve a háztartás irányításában. A brit női választójogi mozgalom a 19. század második felétől kezdve lényegében úttörő és mintaadó lépéseket tett a politikai egyenjogúság megszerzéséért. Ezt a mozgalmat általában leegyszerűsítő módon a szüfrazsett kifejezéssel illetjük, holott ez ilyen formában helytelen: a mozgalom kétirányú volt, így különbséget kell tenni a szüfrazsisták és a sokat emlegetett szüfrazsettek között.<sup>2</sup> Azt sem szabad figyelmen kívül hagyni, hogy a szüfrazsettek

---

<sup>1</sup> KERTÉSZ Magda: *A szüfrazsettek*, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1979. 140.

<sup>2</sup> Szüfrazsisták szervezete: Női Választójogi Társaságok Nemzeti Uniója - *National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies* – NUWSS (1897 – elnök: Millicent Garrett Fawcett); szüfrazsettek szervezete: Nők Társadalmi és Politikai Uniója - *Women's Social and Political Union* – WSPU (1903 – elnök: Emmeline Pankhurst).

hivatalos szervezetének megalakulása előtt már beszélhetünk választójogi mozgalomról, amely követelte a változást, noha nem olyan intenzitással, mint a századforduló után, de kétségtelenül felemelte a hangját a nők érdekében.

Közel 40 évnyi békés kampányolás, petíciógyűjtés, a parlamenti képviselők támogatásának elnyerése és számos találkozó után, a női választójog megszerzésének ügye nem került közelebb a céljához. A legtöbb politikus nem vette igazán komolyan a követelést, és ironikusan kezelték magát a kérdést is, amikor a megvitatására került sor az alsóházban. Negyven év leforgása alatt tizenhét vita hangzott el a női választójogáról a képviselőházban. Három törvényjavaslat sikeresen el is jutott a szavazásig. Ugyanakkor mindhárom esetben csak egy elenyésző kisebbség támogatta a javaslatot.<sup>3</sup> Az 1866 és 1908 közötti időszak az óvatos, kezdetben szervezetlen, majd folyamatosan „intézményessé” kiépülő társaságok létrejöttének és megmozdulásoknak a korszaka volt.<sup>4</sup> Az akkori eredmények magukért beszélnek: a nők képtelenek voltak egyről a kettőre jutni a férfiak uralta politikával szemben. Kellott valami katalizátor, amely kikényszerítette a politikai és emberi mentalitás megváltozását ebben a kérdésben. 1914-ben ez a kényszerítő „eszköz” megszületett: kirobbant az első világháború, s a nők nélkülözhetetlenné váltak a termelésben. De ennek bekövetkeztéig nagyon hosszú idő telt el, s e közben megszületett az erőszakos és kíméletlen női választójogi politika.

A szüfrázsisták „*csupán*” a jogi egyenjogúsítást sürgették, nem törekedtek arra, hogy megváltoztassák a fennálló hatalmi viszonyokat. Nem láttak a társadalomban oly meghatározóan éles osztályellentéteket, hogy változást tartssanak szükségesnek, vagyis az embereket nem osztályhelyzetük, hanem a nemük alapján különböztették meg.<sup>5</sup> A parlamentet kívánták felhasználni ügyük sikerének érdekében: folyamatos lobbihadjárat indult a politikusok, képviselők szimpátiájának elnyeréséért. Érte is néhány kritika őket: ez nem elég, nem elég ahhoz, hogy tömegmozgalom jöjjön létre, ezt viszont egy másik szervezet megvalósította a századforduló után – és ez volt a szüfrázsisták hivatalos szerve. Emmeline Pankhurst a manchesteri szüfrázsista csoport tagja volt az 1880-as évektől, de egyre jobban elhidegült a középosztálytól és a NUWSS politikájától. 1903-ban döntött úgy, hogy szakít a NUWSS-sel és létrehoz egy ettől teljesen független szervezetet:<sup>6</sup> a manchesteri születésű WSPU (Nők Társadalmi és Politikai Uniója - *Women's Social and Political Union*) lett a szüfrázsisták legjelentősebb társulása. Pankhurst lányai, Christabel, Sylvia és Adela, elkötelezett tagjai voltak a WSPU-nak.

A szüfrázsisták és a szüfrázsisták közötti eltérések a tárgyalt időszakban mutatkoztak meg leginkább. A WSPU sokkal többet akart megváltoztatni és sokkal

---

<sup>3</sup> KERTÉSZ: 55. A három törvényjavaslat időrendben: 1867 („*man*” mellé a „*woman*” kifejezés használatát javasolták) – 194:73 arányban megbukott; 1870 – 220:94 arányban elvetették a javaslatot; 1871 – 220:151 arány következtében nem emelkedett törvényerejűvé. NAGYNÉ SZEGVÁRI Katalin: *A női választójog külföldön és hazánkban*, Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kft, Budapest, 2001. 40.

<sup>4</sup> Lásd: MADARÁSZ Anita: *Az angol női választójogi mozgalom kibontakozása 1908-ig*, IN: *Háborúk, békék, terroristák. Székely Gábor 70 éves. Főszerk.: MAJOROS István. ROBINCO KFT. Budapest, 2012. 367-382.*

<sup>5</sup> KERTÉSZ: 58.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/higher/history/britsuff/suffrage/revision/3/> - 2013. 09. 15.

messzebb ment el. „*Mi világosan felfogtuk, hogy a magukat liberálisnak mondó kormánytagok ellenezték a választójogot, és mindaddig harcolni kell ellenük, amíg kormányon vannak [...] Először is a mi tagjaink kizárólag egyetlen célt tartanak a szemük előtt. Minden erejüket egyetlen dologra összpontosítják: a férfiakkal való politikai egyenlőségre. A WSPU egyetlen tagjának figyelme sem oszlik meg a választójog és más szociális reformok között.*”<sup>7</sup> A NUWSS-sel ellentétben a WSPU tagjai úgy gondolták, hogy a békés taktikáknak és praktikáknak az ideje lejárt, az eddigi mozgalom egyszerűen kifáradt, vagyis radikálisabb kezdeményezésekre és tettekre van szükség. Ebbe az elgondolásba és magatartásba sok minden belefért: tüntetések, éhségstrájk, törvénysértések, agresszió, köztulajdon és magántulajdon rongálása és még sorolhatnánk.

Az első jelentősebb megmozdulásra azt követően került sor, hogy Herbert Henry Asquith került a liberális kormányzat élére 1908 áprilisában.<sup>8</sup> Nézetei a női választójogi kérdés szempontjából nem elhanyagolhatóak, ugyanis alapvetően határozottan ellenezte a választójogi törvény módosítását. „*Néha kísért a gondolat – nyilatkozta egyszer -, amikor a női választójog támogatóinak érvelését hallgatom meg, hogy semmi sincs, amit ennek érdekében mondani lehet, és néha kísért a gondolat, mikor a női választójog ellenzőinek érvelését hallgatom, hogy semmi sincs, amit fel lehetne hozni ellenük.*”<sup>9</sup> Ennek ellenére májusban a miniszterelnök beleegyezett abba, hogy találkozzon a női kampányolók küldöttségével. Arra kérte őket, bizonyítsák be, a nők szavazati joga iránti követelés széleskörű támogatást élvez, és ha ez a helyzet valóban fennáll, akkor a kormánynak mérlegelnie kell a parlamentben a kérdés napirendre tűzését.<sup>10</sup> A két szervezet (NUWSS, WSPU) ezt számításba véve és mérlegelve megpróbált bizonyítani a miniszterelnöknek: két nagy demonstrációt szerveztek Londonban, a számos kisebb szervezet pedig a nagyobb vidéki városokban. Több mint 10.000 nő vett részt a NUWSS londoni felvonulásán 1908. június 14-én. Az Embankment-től vonultak az Albert Hall-hoz, ahol számos szónok hirdette a női választójog fontosságát. A helyi szüfrázsizta csoportok fáradhatatlanul dolgoztak azért, hogy annyi nő számára biztosítsák a Londonba való eljutást, amennyinek csak lehetséges. A szegényebb nők vonatjegyeinek árát a tehetősebb NUWSS tagok adományából fedezték. Vonatokat béreltek és ételeket, frissítő hideg italokat biztosítottak a vidéki nők számára, mielőtt visszautaztak otthonaikba.<sup>11</sup>

Egy héttel később a WSPU megtartotta a Nők Vasárnapját (Women's Sunday) a Hyde Parkban. 1908. június 21-én több mint félmillió nagyságú tömeg jelent meg a demonstráción. Ismét bérbe vett vonatok vitték a helyszínre a nőket szerte az országból. A vasárnapot választották éppen azért, mert így rengeteg munkásnő

<sup>7</sup> ATKINSON, Diane: *Votes for women*, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 15.

<sup>8</sup> A lemondott miniszterelnök, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman két héten belül meghalt. Asquith kormánya volt az angol történelem utolsó liberális kormánya, amely fontos politikai és szociális reformokat hajtott végre Lloyd George, az akkori pénzügyminiszter segítségével. 19. századi egyetemes történelem, Szerk.: VADÁSZ Sándor. Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 2005. 185.

<sup>9</sup> LLOYD, Trevor: *Suffragettes International*, American Heritage Press, 1971. 53.

<sup>10</sup> ATKINSON: 24.

<sup>11</sup> Uo.

tudott részt venni a találkozón. Több mint 700 bordó, fehér és zöld zászlót vittek a Hyde Parkba. A vagyonosabb női demonstrátorok olyannyira komolyan gondolták, hogy ezeket a színeket fogják hordani, hogy a londoni áruházak már jóval 21-e előtt kifogytak a bordó és fehér ruhákból, illetve a fehér és zöld kiegészítőkből.<sup>12</sup> A felvonulások számadatainak bizonyító erejűeknek kellett volna lenniük Asquith számára, hiszen nyilvánvalóvá vált, milyen széleskörű is a mozgalom. Ez mégsem volt elég, a miniszterelnök nem tartotta a szavát.

### **Konfliktusok és enyhülések kora**

*„A nők többségének politikai véleménye nem nagyon különbözik, és ha majd megkapják a választójogot, akkor sem fog különbözni nagyon osztályuk férfitársaik politikai véleményétől.”<sup>13</sup>*

(John Stuart Mill)

Asquith magatartása nagyban hozzájárult ahhoz, hogy 1908 nyarán meginduljanak az első atrocitások a hatóság és a nők között. Ez év június 30-án szimpatizánsok és kíváncsi érdeklődők ezrei vonultak fel egy demonstrációra, amelyet a WSPU szervezett a Parliament Square-en Londonban. 5.000 rendőrt vezényeltek ki, hogy biztosítsák a rendet, de ez nem sikerült: a találkozó erőszakba torkollott. Két tanár – mindkettő a WSPU tagja – Mary Leigh és Edith New felbőszült a hatósági agresszió láttán, fogtak egy taxit és a Downing Street-re hajtottak, ahol köveket kezdtek dobálni a miniszterelnök lakásának ablakaira. Ezen a napon 27 nő került börtönbe és az első ablaktörők két hónapot töltöttek a Holloway Börtön falai között.<sup>14</sup>

A nyári felvonulások mindezek ellenére bizonyos szempontból sikeresnek bizonyultak. A választójogért folyó küzdelem felkeltette a nagyközönség figyelmét, habár Asquith hozzáállása komoly aggodalomra adott okot. 1908 őszére egyre nagyobb csaldás lett úrrá a szüfrazsetteken. Azt tervezték, hogy október 13-án megrohanják a képviselőházat, hogy Asquith-ot jobb belátásra bírják: 60.000 ember gyűlt össze a Parliament Square-en, hogy lássa a szüfrazsettek azon csoportját, amely megpróbált bejutni az alsóház épületébe. Durva összecsapásokra került sor a rendőrök és a demonstrálók között: 24 nőt, illetve 13 férfit tartóztattak le, a nap végére 10 embernek volt szüksége kórházi ellátásra. Ezt az eljárást követő, nagy nyilvánosságot kapott tárgyaláson Emmeline Pankhurst-öt<sup>15</sup> és Flora

---

<sup>12</sup> Uo. 25.

<sup>13</sup> KERTÉSZ: 46.

<sup>14</sup> ATKINSON: 25.

<sup>15</sup> Emmeline Pankhurst: „Börtönben voltam. A Holloway Börtönben 5 héten keresztül. A börtön számos részében megfordultam. Voltam a kórházban, a börtön szokásos részében [...] voltak itt olyan nők, akik nem sértettek törvényt, csupán azért hozták be őket, mert nem voltak képesek kielégítő, megfelelő kijelentést tenni [...]”. *Women, the Family, and Freedom. The Debate in Documents*. Ed.: BELL, Susan Groag - OFFEN, Karen M. Vol. 2. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1983. 237. A Pankhurst család tagjai tudták, csak úgy tudnak haladást elérni, ha a közvéleményt „felrázzák”, és az embereket érdekeltté teszik a kérdésben. Tudták, hogy ez ellenséges érzelmeket fog kiváltani, de úgy gondolták,

Dummond-ot három hónapos börtönre ítélték, valamint Christabel Pankhurst tíz hetet kapott, amiért az alsóház lerohanására biztatta a tömeget.<sup>16</sup> A nőket a történelem következményeként hamarosan kitiltották a politikai gyűlésekről, vagy csak előzetes átvizsgálás után engedték be őket.

1909 tavaszára a WSPU-nak jó oka volt arra, hogy elégedett legyen a küzdelemmel. Habár a női választójog nem került közelebb, sikerült elfogadtatni magukat politikai szervezetként. 1909 őszétől kezdődően a NUWSS viselkedése mérséklődött a WSPU-hoz képest. Tartottak ugyanis attól, hogy a szüfrazettek erőszakos tevékenysége folytán elvesznek a mozgalom számára oly fontos képviselőházi támogatások. Szerencsétlenségükre a félelmek teljesen megalapozottaknak bizonyultak.<sup>17</sup> A WSPU egyre inkább radikalizálódott – Emmeline Pankhurst úgy vélte, a szervezet tagjai egy politikai harc részeseivé váltak, és ha letartóztatják, illetve bebörtönzik őket, politikai foglyoknak megfelelő státuszt kell számukra biztosítani. Néhány szüfrazett ugyan megkapta ezt a bánásmódot, de a kormány elutasította a speciális privilégiumok széleskörű alkalmazását. A többi fogollyal megegyező elbánás miatti tiltakozás részeként az „*első ablaktörők*” éhségsztrájkba kezdtek, és ezen elhatározásuk egészen addig tartott, amíg meg nem kapták a „*nekik járó*” politikai státuszt.<sup>18</sup>

A hatóságok nem akartak éhező nőt látni a börtönben. Emiatt először ideiglenesen szabadon bocsátották azokat, akik ezt a módszert alkalmazták. Majd néhány hónappal később bevezették az erőszakos táplálás eszközét.<sup>19</sup> A foglyok természetesen nem voltak hajlandók együttműködni: néhányan megpróbálták megakadályozni az eljárást, és elbarikádozták magukat a fogdában. Más tüzet gyújtott a börtöncellájában, s már eszméletlen volt, mire kimentették.<sup>20</sup> A miniszterelnök és a vezető politikusok ettől kezdve nyíltan szembeszegültek a nők követeléseivel. A választójog megszerzésének lehetősége 1909 végén is olyan távolinak tűnt, mint oly sok évvel korábban. A szüfrazetteknek rá kellett jönniük, hogy az erőszak alkalmazása nem viszi közelebb az ügyet az elérni kívánt célhoz. 1910-ben az általuk képviselt politikai magatartás enyhülni látszott: kezdett érlelődni az a gondolat, hogy a kevésbé radikális eszközök megteremthetik a lehetőséget egy megfelelő tárgyalási alaphoz a kormánnyal és a parlamenttel.

1910-ben a WSPU és a NUWSS egyesült akciója meggyőzte a kormányt, hogy állítson fel egy Egyeztetési Bizottságot (Conciliation Committee), amely megfogalmaz

---

hogy az ellenségesség sokkal hasznosabb a közönnél. LLOYD: 46.

<sup>16</sup> ATKINSON: 25-26.

<sup>17</sup> Uo. 26.

<sup>18</sup> Uo. 27.

<sup>19</sup> Megjelent a börtönorvos, néhány női börtönőr kíséretében. A foglyot megragadták és lefogták, majd gumicsövet vezettek le a torkán keresztül a gyomrába. A brutális táplálási módszer megviselte a foglyokat. A többség elájult, és utána sokáig betegek voltak. Az orvosok több esetben nem is merték megismételni a tortúrát: félték attól, hogy a következő beavatkozáskor a fogoly talán belehal a táplálásba. Akiknek gyenge volt a szíve, azoknál pedig meg sem kísérelték ezt, inkább hazaengedték, amíg az éhségsztrájk után valamelyest helyreállt az egészségük, majd ezt követően ismét visszavitték őket a börtönbe. KERTÉSZ: 112.

<sup>20</sup> ATKINSON: 27.

egy minden politikai párt számára elfogadható törvénytervezetet, amely majd megadja a nőknek a választójogot.<sup>21</sup> Emmeline Pankhurst a siker érdekében megálljt parancsolt minden erőszakos WSPU-s tevékenységnek: „fegyverszünet” állt be a „két oldal” között. 1910 júniusában megindultak a tárgyalások egy ún. Kibékítési Törvényjavaslattal (Conciliation Bill) kapcsolatban.<sup>22</sup> A megegyezés ellenzői ugyanazokat az érveket hozták fel, mint amiket az elmúlt negyven évben is minden alkalommal.<sup>23</sup>

A politikai vezetés abszolút mértékben megpróbált kibújni a tervezet megtárgyalása alól. Asquith kijelentette, nincs idő arra, hogy ezt megvitassák a parlamentben, és amikor az üléseket novemberig berekesztette, a tervezet jövője még bizonytalanabbá vált. A WSPU ekkor véget vetett a „fegyverszünet”-nek és november 18-án, pénteken tiltakozást szervezett az alsóház előtt. Több mint 400 szüfrazsett vett részt a demonstráción, amely hamarosan zavargássá fajult. A kormány számított erre a „bonyodalomra” és nagyobb létszámú rendőregységet vezényelt ki a helyszínre. A hatóság azonban nem volt jártas abban, hogyan kezelje a női demonstrálókat, minek következtében 300 nővel „véres küzdelemben” keveredett. Ezt a napot „fekete péntek”-nek nevezték el a szüfrazsettnek.<sup>24</sup> több mint 150 nő lett valamilyen fizikai és szexuális bántalmazásnak az áldozata.<sup>25</sup> Christabel Pankhurst így emlékszik meg nagynénjéről Mary Clarke-ról és a „fekete péntekről”: „A támadást nem tudta kiheverni, valószínűleg súlyos belső sérüléseket is szenvedett. Karácsony napján, amikor összegyűlt nála az egész család, panaszkodott, hogy nagyon fáradt. Szobájába vánszorgott. Anyám aggódott érte. Néhány perc múlva utána ment. Már halott volt.”<sup>26</sup>

A WSPU mindezek után ismét a „fegyverszünet” eszközéhez folyamodott, amely állapot majdnem egy évig fenn is állt. A választójogi kampányolók abban reménykedtek, hogy a Kibékítési Törvényjavaslat 1911 folyamán törvényerejűvé válik. Ebben a periódusban a WSPU mérsékelte antiliberális hozzáállását, és azt nyilatkozta, ha a parlamenti képviselők beleegyeznek a törvényjavaslat

<sup>21</sup> LLOYD: 69.

<sup>22</sup> Millicent Garrett Fawcett személy szerint pesszimistán viszonyult a fennálló helyzethez. Kétszer kellett elolvasni és elfogadni a képviselőházban a javaslatot (amilyen hamar csak lehetett), ha egyáltalán volt rá esély, hogy ebből a közeljövőben törvény legyen. ATKINSON: 29.

<sup>23</sup> A törvényjavaslat második felolvasása júliusban volt esedékes és a NUWSS keményen dolgozott azért, hogy további támogatókat szerezzen. Mindvégig attól tartottak, hogy a WSPU újramezdi az erőszakos kampányolást és kockáztatja az esélyét annak, hogy a törvényjavaslatból törvény legyen. A tervezetet a második alkalommal 1910. július 11-12-én olvasták fel. Az ellenzők ugyanazokat az érveket hozták fel, mint amiket az elmúlt negyven évben is. A két liberális parlamenti képviselő, Winston Churchill és Lloyd George is a javaslattal szemben foglalt állást. METCALFE, Agnes Edith: *Women's effort*, Oxford, 1917 (HardPress, 2012.). 152.

<sup>24</sup> Elsősorban Churchillt, az új belügyminisztert tették felelőssé az eseményekért. Truhanovszkij a Churchill életrajzban a következőket írja: „erre a feltevésre volt is bizonyos alapjuk. A rendőrség azelőtt sohasem folyamodott ilyen módszerekhez tüntetőkkel szemben [...] Aligha van bármi alapja is azoknak az erőfeszítéseknek, amelyekkel némelyek próbálták utóbb kimosni Churchillt ebből a piszkos ügyből.” KERTÉSZ: 118.

<sup>25</sup> ATKINSON: 30.

<sup>26</sup> KERTÉSZ: 118.

támogatásába, akkor a szervezet nem fog az időközi választásokon velük szemben a demonstráció eszközéhez nyúlni.<sup>27</sup>

### ***Ha nincs választójog, nincs népszámlálás!***

1911. április 2-án hivatalos népszámlálást tartottak, azonban az ezen való részvételt kampányolók százai utasították el. Ez miben nyilvánult meg? A népszámlálási űrlapot nem töltötték ki helyesen, vagy azt írták rá: „*Nincs választójog, nincs népszámlálás!*” (No Votes, No Census!). Néhány nő pedig egyszerűen meg sem jelent, illetve nem tartózkodott otthon, amikor a népszámlálási biztosok felkeresték.<sup>28</sup> Habár a kormány törvényes lépésekkel fenyegette azokat a nőket, akik ellenálltak a népszámlálásnak, mégsem történt semmi retorzió az ellenállás ügyében.

A Kibékítési Törvényjavaslat - melynek megtárgyalása májusban volt esedékes - határozott támogatásáról több mint 150 település és megyei önkormányzat biztosította a nőket. A törvénytervezet átment a felolvasáson. Mindenki feszülten figyelte a kormány reagálását: támogatja vagy akadályozza a törvényjavaslatot. A politikai vezetés reakciója alapvetően nem okozott meglepetést: nincs idő arra, hogy a parlamenti ülészek alatt keresztülvigyék a javaslatot. A NUWSS, a WSPU és az Egyeztetési Bizottság tagjainak türelme ekkor fogyott el, habár a kormányban lévő szövetségeseik, szimpatizánsaik nyugalomra intették őket: a javaslat a következő parlamenti ülészek során mindenképpen törvényerejűvé fog válni.<sup>29</sup>

1911 nyara kiváló alkalmat adott a mozgalom számára, hogy megmutassa magát az ország előtt, a lehető legpozitívabb oldaláról, V. György megkoronázása révén.<sup>30</sup> Az esemény alkalmából a világ vezetői valamint a sajtó képviselői nagy számban jelentek meg Londonban. Ez lehetőséget biztosított arra, hogy a nők választójogi kérdésüket békés és hazafias módon lehessen bemutatni ország-világ előtt. 1911. június 17-én a WSPU megtartotta a Nők Koronázási Felvonulását: 6.000 nő vett részt rajta, majd egy hatalmas gyűlést szerveztek az Albert Hall-ban, közvetlenül a felvonulás után. A lépést siker koronázta: az esemény nagymértékben növelte a kampányolók tekintélyét.<sup>31</sup>

1911 őszén Lloyd George pénzügyminiszter kérte a NUWSS-t, adja fel a Kibékítési Törvényjavaslatot és helyette járuljanak hozzá egy új tervezet kidolgozásához, amely az eddiginél is szélesebb körű választójogot biztosítana a férfi polgároknak, és ami a nők szempontjából fontos: a javaslat egy kiegészítést tartalmazhatna, amely engedélyezi a női választójogot valamilyen (!) formában. Vagyis ezen az úton haladva, bizonyos számú nő megkapná ugyan a választójogot, de igazából ez csak egy utólag hozzátett kiegészítése lenne a reformjavaslatnak. A NUWSS először óvatosan kezelte ezt az ajánlatot, októberben viszont már

---

<sup>27</sup> ATKINSON: 30.

<sup>28</sup> Egész estés partikat szerveztek és hatalmas koncerteket tartottak szerte Nagy-Britanniában. Uo. 30.

<sup>29</sup> Uo. 31.

<sup>30</sup> 1910. május 6-án VII. Edward király meghalt, a trónon V. György követte. METCALFE: 150.

<sup>31</sup> ATKINSON: 31.

beleegyezett abba, hogy dolgozni fog az új törvényjavaslaton, de csak akkor, ha tényleg lesz egy női választójogi kiegészítése.<sup>32</sup> Kérdéses volt azonban, hogy a WSPU mit szól majd mindehhez.

A hír november 7-én nyilvánosságra került. Asquith megígérte, hogy a kormány bemutatja a törvényjavaslatot a következő parlamenti ülészen, és arról is biztosította a nőket, hogy a kiegészítést nem fogja megtámadni. Amitől a NUWSS tartott, az nemsokára bekövetkezett: a WSPU tagjai úgy vélték, hogy Lloyd George akciói alattomosak, s így nem hittek a törvényjavaslat sikerében. Novemberben a szüfrassetek „fegyverszüneti” megállapodása ezúton ismételtén érvényét veszttette. Még a sajtó is felháborodott a kormány lépésein. A The Evening Standard megjegyztte: „Nem vagyunk ugyan a női választójog támogatói, de nehéz elképzelni megvetendőbb viselkedést annál, mint amit a kormány tudhat a magáénak.” (1911. november 8.)<sup>33</sup> A WSPU radikális eszközökhöz folyamodott, hogy kifejezze nemtetszését. 1911. november 21-én Londonban több ezer font értékű kárt okoztak a szüfrassetek, amikor a kormányhivatal, a magánhivatalok és a West End-en lévő üzletek ablakait válogatás nélkül betörték: ez alkalommal több mint 200 nőt tartóztattak le. A börtönbüntetésük egy hét és hat hónap között váltakozott.<sup>34</sup>

### **„Tetteket, ne szavakat!”**

*„Biztosítani a nők számára a parlamentben a szavazati jogot, ahogy az a férfiak számára biztosítva van vagy biztosítva lehet [...]. Tettek, s nem szavak, ez volt a mi állandó mottónk.”*  
(Emmeline Pankhurst)<sup>35</sup>

A „fekete péntek”-et követően a felvonulások régi stílusát felváltotta a nyílt törvénysértő módszer, amely azonnali letartóztatást garantált a résztvevők számára. Emmeline Pankhurst az új politika megindoklását a következőképpen fogalmazta meg: „A határozott célunk az, hogy egy elviselhetetlen helyzetet generáljunk a kormányzat számára, és ha szükséges, akkor az összes ember számára.”<sup>36</sup> 1912. március 28-án, ahogy az várható volt, a törvényjavaslatot elutasították, de csak minimális különbséggel - a szüfrasset erőszak ürügyet szolgáltatott a politikusok számára: a javaslat ellen kell szavazniuk. Az Egyeztetési Bizottság munkája véget ért.<sup>37</sup>

A NUWSS annak ellenére, hogy meglehetősen háttérbe szorult, továbbra is folytatta politikáját és a támogatók létszámának növelésére vonatkozó törekvéseit. 1912 folyamán a Munkáspárt kisebb ellenállással fogadta a női választójog

---

<sup>32</sup> Uo. 31.

<sup>33</sup> Uo. 31.

<sup>34</sup> Uo. 32.

<sup>35</sup> Uo. 15.

<sup>36</sup> ATKINSON: 32.

<sup>37</sup> Uo. 32.



támogatásának gondolatát. A párt és a NUWSS közötti tárgyalások után, a szervezet előirányozta a Választási Hadjárat Alap (Election Fighting Fund) megalapítását. Vagyis egy olyan alap létrehozását tervezték, amely a munkáspárti jelöltek segítők kampányt finanszírozná, annak érdekében, hogy bejussanak az alsóház soraiba. Nem minden NUWSS tag tartotta jónak a túl közeli kapcsolatot a Munkáspárttal: aki nem örült a változásnak, egyszerűen kilépett a szervezetből. A Választási Hadjárat Alap júliusban kezdte meg működését, és ugyanebben a hónapban bevezették a Női Választójog Barátai rendszert (Friends of Women's Suffrage scheme). Ez azt jelentette, hogy azok a nők, akik csatlakozni kívántak a mozgalomhoz, de féltek attól, hogy papíron is elkötelezzék magukat, vagy az évenkénti adakozást nem engedhették meg maguknak, mint „barátok” a NUWSS tagjai lehettek. A rendszer nagy sikernek bizonyult, főleg a munkásnők között, és 1914-re több mint 46.000 „barát” társult a NUWSS-hez.<sup>38</sup>

Mindezen események alatt a rend és törvény oldalán álló hatóságok arra az elhatározásra jutottak, hogy a WSPU túlságosan is sokat engedett meg magának az utóbbi időben: tenni kell valamit az atrocitások ellen. Első lépésként 1912. március 5-én szervezett támadást intéztek a Clement Kocsmájában lévő főhadiszállás ellen. Christabel Pankhurst-öt jóakarói előre figyelmeztették, így a támadás előtt Párizsba menekült. A befolyásos Pethick-Lawrence házaspárt<sup>39</sup> letartóztatták a szüfrazsett gaztettek elkövetéséért – kilenc hónapnyi börtönre ítélték őket. Emmeline Pankhurst-öt, annak ellenére, hogy már egy ideje a börtön kényelmét élvezhette, ugyanúgy megvádolták. Ő is és a házaspár is politikai státuszt követeltek, amit végül meg is kaptak. Mikor azonban a többi szüfrazsett is ugyanezt követelte, megtagadták tőlük, minek következtében szerte az országban ismét tömeges éhségsztrájkok kezdődtek a börtönök falai mögött.<sup>40</sup> 1913 és 1914 folyamán a szüfrazsett erőszak tovább növekedett. Most már válogatás nélkül, lelkiismeretlenül romboltak, pusztítottak. Magánházakat, templomokat és köztemetőket rongáltak meg bombatámadásokkal. A lóversenypályák és golfpályák gypebé szlogeneket vágtek, illetve égettek. A telefon és telegráf vezetékeket sorra elválták. Levelek ezrei semmisültek meg, amikor vegyi anyagot öntöttek a postaládákba.<sup>41</sup> 1913 februárjában Lloyd George Surrey-ben lévő újonnan épült otthona csúnyán megrongálódott, amikor az Emily Wilding Davidson által elhelyezett bomba, működésbe lépett. Vasútállomások, sportpavilonok és üres épületek estek áldozatul a házi készítésű szerkezeteknek. Ennek ellenére a hatóságoknak csak néhány merénylőt sikerült elfogniuk.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> Uo, 33.

<sup>39</sup> Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence férje, Frederick Lawrence, a kitűnő ügyvéd, maga is híve volt a nők egyenjogúságának, s ennek bizonyítékeként, amikor Emmeline-t elvette feleségül, felvette annak leánykori nevét. A Pethick-Lawrence házaspár bekapcsolódása a WSPU-ba, az anyagi problémák megoldását jelentette. Újságot alapítottak „Szavazatot a nőknek!” címmel. Nemsokára Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence mint tiszteletbeli pénztáros az Unió egyik vezetője lett. KERTÉSZ: 87.

<sup>40</sup> METCALFE: 196.

<sup>41</sup> HAVIGHURST, ALFRED F.: *Twentieth-century Britain*, Second Edition. Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1962. 112.

<sup>42</sup> ATKINSON: 34.

Mindeközben a szüfrazsett foglyok folytatták az éhségstrájkot és a politikai státusz követelését. Általános felzúdulást eredményezett a kormány erőszakos etetési politikája, a közvélemény lelkiismerete mondhatni felébredt. 1913 áprilisában Reginald McKenna keresztülvitte a foglyok megromlott egészségi állapotuk miatti ideiglenes szabadon bocsátásáról szóló törvényt (Prisoner's Temporary Discharge for Ill Health Act).<sup>43</sup> A WSPU röviden *'Macska és Egér Törvénynek'* nevezte el a jogszabályt. Az intézkedés lehetővé tette a hatóságok számára, hogy ideiglenesen szabadon bocsássák azokat a foglyokat, „Egereket”, akiknek az egészségi állapota erősen leromlott az éhségstrájk és a mesterséges táplálás következtében. Azonban a megengedett otthon töltött idő lejáta után önként (!) vissza kellett vonulniuk a börtönbe, hogy letöltsék hátralévő büntetésüket, amikor a hatóság, avagy a „Macska” úgy rendelte el. Ha nem tettek eleget a felszólításnak, akkor értük mentek és bevitték őket. Ennek az elősegítésére detektívekkel figyeltették azok házákat, akiknél az engedélyezett idő lejárni készült.<sup>44</sup> Abban reménykedtek, hogy ez a megoldás majd demoralizálja a szüfrazsetteteket, de tévedtek. A legtöbb szabadlábra helyezett nő, az „egerek” megpróbálták elrejtőzni, nehogy a rendőrök, a „macskák” megtalálják őket.

1913 legdrámaibb eseménye a már korábban is említett Emily Wilding Davidson tiltakozásához kapcsolódott. Június 4-én ellátogatott a Surrey-ben lévő Epsomba, a „derby” lóversenyre, s ekkor következett be a tragédia. Kifutott a versenypályára, egyenesen a király lova, Ammer elé: július 8-án behalt fejsérüléseibe.<sup>45</sup> Egy másik, ugyancsak híres-hírhedt eset, amely Velázquez híres festményének megcsonkításához kapcsolódott, Mary Richardson nevéhez kötődik.<sup>46</sup> Egy, a kabátujjába csúsztatott baltával megjelent a Nemzeti Galériában, hogy aztán négyszer lesújtson a festményre – a tettéért börtönbüntetésre ítélték. Ezen idő alatt a NUWSS azért harcolt, hogy a közvéleményt maga mellett tartsa, ennek ellenére nehezen tudta meggyőzni arról az embereket, hogy különbözik a WSPU-tól.<sup>47</sup>

Ameddig a kormányzat folytatta a WSPU foglyok erőszakos táplálását, a szüfrazsett erőszak nem enyhült.<sup>48</sup> Ahogy az agresszió növekedett, mindkét oldal

<sup>43</sup> MARIAN RAMELSON: *The Petticoat Rebellion: A Century of Struggle for Women's Rights*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1967. 164.

<sup>44</sup> KERTÉSZ: 126.

<sup>45</sup> A legközelebbi ismerősei sem tudták, hogy mi vezette őt erre. LLOYD: 89-90.

<sup>46</sup> Mary Richardson a könyvében a következőket írta erről: „Vajon egy anyagilag értékes műtárgy megrongálását is olyan közömbösen fogadná a közvélemény, mint amilyen közömbösen tűri Mrs. Pankhurst lassú tönkretételét? [...] Egy festmény jutott az eszembe, Velázquez Vénusza [...] Igen nagyra becsülték, pénzben kifejezhető értéke is rendkívül magas volt. Ha megrongálom a festményt, megvonhatom a párhuzamot.” KERTÉSZ: 129-130.

<sup>47</sup> Megszervezte a Nők Zarándoklatát (Women's Pilgrimage), hogy megpróbáljon békés eszközökkel még több támogatót szerezni az ügynek. 1913 júniusában és júliusában több ezer, az egész országból megjelent nő vett részt a Londonba tartó békés felvonuláson. A „zarándokok” június közepén indultak el, 6 hetet töltöttek úton, mialatt gyűléseket tartottak és pénzt gyűjtöttek az alapjukba. Néhány nő végigsétálta az egész utat, a nagy többség azonban csak egy részét tette meg. A menetelők dalokat énekeltek és a NUWSS színeit, a pirosat, a fehéret és a zöldet viselték. ATKINSON: 34.

<sup>48</sup> Azoknak a doktoroknak az ablakait betörték, akik nem ítélték el az erőszakos etetést. Egy orvost, aki a Holloway Börtönben dolgozott, megtámadtak a szüfrazsett egy ostonnal, azon az úton, amelyen keresztül el tudott jutni munkahelyére. Uo., 35.

magatartása megmerevedett. Néhányan úgy gondolták, revansot vesznek a szüfrazetteken: felforgatták a Bristolban, Birminghamben, Newcastle-ben működő WSPU boltokat. Reginald McKenna, a belügyminiszter nemtetszését nyilvánította ki az éhségstrájkoló rabokkal kapcsolatban és a következő javaslatokat vázolta fel a képviselőháznak: „Az első, hagyni kell őket meghalni. Azt kell, hogy mondjam, ebben a pillanatban ez a legnépszerűbb, megítélve azokból a levelekből, amiket kaptam. A második, deportálni kell őket, a harmadik: úgy kell kezelni őket, mint az elmebetegeket, negyedik: meg kell adni nekik a választójogot [...]”<sup>49</sup> 1914 folyamán a közvélemény még jobban felháborodott a WSPU akciók miatt. A nagymértékű népszerűtlenség ellenére, a szervezet júniusban még megtudott tartani, egy a pénzalap növelése céljából szervezett gyűlést. Azonban 1914 nyarán a női választójogi mozgalom hirtelen abbamaradt. Nagy-Britannia háborúban állt.<sup>50</sup> „Anya és én kijelentettük, hogy támogatni fogjuk az országunkat. Fegyverszünetet jelentettünk be a kormánnyal és felfüggesztettük a küzdelmet a háború idejére. Az ország számára felajánlottuk a szolgálatunkat és felszólítottuk tagjainkat, hogy cselekedjenek hasonlóképpen.” (Christabel Pankhurst)<sup>51</sup>

1914 augusztusában a női választójogi kampány többé-kevésbé teljesen leállt. Az első világháború olyan vészhelyzetet generált, amely drámai módon háttérbe szorította azt az ötvenéves harcot, amelyet a szüfraziszták és a szüfrazettek folytattak. 1914. augusztus 10-én, a kormány szabadon bocsátotta a bebörtönzött WSPU tagokat, azzal a feltétellel, hogy az erőszak ezzel a lépéssel meg fog szűnni. „Amikor a harc elkezdődött” – írta Millicent Garrett Fawcett életrajzírója – „és amikor a németek előrenyomultak Belgiumba, Fawcett asszony volt az egyike azoknak, aki felfogta, hogy az angol intervenció elkerülhetetlen, és nehéz szívvel azon gondolkodott, mit kellene tennie neki és a társaságainak.”<sup>52</sup> A háború nehéz helyzetbe hozta az angol kormányt, a miniszterelnök fokozatosan veszített népszerűségéből: változás kellett...<sup>53</sup>

„Mit ér a szavazati jog, ha elvész az ország, ahol szavazhatunk?”<sup>54</sup>  
(Emmeline Pankhurst, 1914)

<sup>49</sup> Uo. 36.

<sup>50</sup> 1914. augusztus 12-én Nagy-Britannia hivatalosan hadat üzent Németországnak. ORMOS Mária - MAJOROS István: *Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren*, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 229. Maga a hadállapot már augusztus 4-én, éjfélkor beállt a két ország között, s ezt a kormány bejelentette.

<sup>51</sup> ATKINSON: 37.

<sup>52</sup> ATKINSON: 37.

<sup>53</sup> Asquith miniszterelnök még az első évben elfogadtatta a Birodalom védelméről szóló törvényt, amely jócskán kiszélesítette a kormányzat jogkörét, még a háborús hírek cenzúrázását is bevezették. A hadügyminiszterré kinevezett Lord Kitchener azonnal nagyszabású toborzókampányba kezdett, hiszen Nagy-Britanniában már nem volt kötelező a katonai szolgálat. 1916 tavaszáig 2 és fél millió ember jelentkezett önként a harcra. A kormány úgy gondolta, hogy az a legjobb, ha a katonai vezetést a tábornokokra bízzák, de ez a megoldás rossznak bizonyult. 1915 tavaszára az ország vezetését ért bírálatok felerősödtek. 1915 májusában ezért Asquith „nagykoalícióssá” bővítette a kormányt: bekerültek a toryk és jelképesen a Munkáspárt vezetője. Új minisztérium jött létre, a Hadianyag-minisztérium, amelynek élére Lloyd George került. A hadüzemek dolgozóit felmentették a frontszolgálat alól. *20. századi egyetemes történet*, Szerk.: NÉMETH István. I. Köt. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 73.

<sup>54</sup> KERTÉSZ: 139.

Zárásként elmondhatjuk, hogy 1914-ig a nők részvétele a politikai tevékenységben mindenütt bonyolult kérdéseket vetett fel a pártlojalitás és saját nemük iránti szolidaritás tekintetében, valamint arra vonatkozóan, hogy milyen álláspontot képviselve törekedjenek részt venni a közéletben. A nők, bekerülve a politikai életbe, nem csupán a férfikkal egyenlő részesedésre törekedtek, hanem a politikai gyakorlat és értékek megváltoztatására is. A nők parlamenti életben való részvételének követelése, az egyenlő jogok liberális elgondolásán és azon az elváráson alapult, hogy a nőknek legyen beleszólásuk azokba a törvényekbe, melyek hatással vannak az életükre.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>55</sup> HANNAM, June: *Women and politics*. IN: *Women's History: Britain, 1850-1945*, Ed.: PURVIS, June. Routledge, 2004. 233.

Cseh Dániel

## ***A japán-amerikaiak internálása:amerikaiak, vagy ellenséges idegenek?*<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstract**

After the attack on Pearl Harbor President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942 authorizing the eventual relocation and internment of the Japanese-American community in the name of military necessity. According to the government Japanese-Americans posed a national security risk that threatened the war efforts of the United States. The American public and government questioned the assimilation and Americanization of people of Japanese ancestry due to their race and ethnicity. Japanese-Americans were not considered to be loyal citizens, but rather based on collective guilt, they were the enemy within, the fifth column. The anti-Japanese movement that grew out of the fear of the Yellow Peril manifested itself as the fear of military invasion due to war anxiety, strengthening racial prejudice and portraying people of Japanese ancestry as enemy aliens.

*Keywords:* Japanese-American internment, Executive Order N° 9066, War Relocation Authority, Executive Order N° 9102, national security, anti-Japanese movement, assimilation, racial prejudice, fifth column, enemy aliens.

**A** Pearl Harbor elleni támadást követően 1942. február 19-én Franklin D. Rooseveltnél elnök jóváhagyta a japán-amerikai közösség internálását, melynek eredményeként 120.000 embert kitelepítettek – kétharmaduk amerikai állampolgár volt –, a nyugati partról és ideiglenes gyűjtő, majd azt követően tíz végleges internáló táborban kerültek elhelyezésre a háború végéig. Az Egyesült Államok kormánya nemzetbiztonsági érdekekre és katonai szükségyszerűsége hivatkozva megfosztotta a japán származású amerikai állampolgárokat (Nisei generáció) a szabadságuktól és alkotmányos jogaitól. A japán bevándorlók (Issei generáció) a rasszista ideológiáknak köszönhetően eleve nem kaphatták meg az amerikai állampolgárságot.<sup>2</sup> Az Egyesült Államokban tapasztalható előítéletek fontos szerepet játszottak abban, hogy a japán közösség tagjaira, mint másodrendű állampolgárokra tekintettek és Pearl Harbor után ellenséges idegeneknek nyilvánították őket. Az ellenséggel azonosították a közösséget, ezáltal megkérdőjelezték a japán-amerikai Egyesült Államok iránti hűségét, s azt a korábbi meggyőződést, hogy asszimilálódhatnak és szerves részévé válhatnak az amerikai társadalomnak. A kormány számára a fő kérdés a japán közösség asszimilációja és lojalitása volt, az állampolgárságukat nem vették figyelembe.

---

<sup>1</sup> A tanulmány egy része a „Múlt nélkül nincs jövő” - *Egyén és közösség történelmi távlatban* című doktorandusz konferencián került ismertetésre a Debreceni Egyetemen 2012. november 15.-én.

<sup>2</sup> A továbbiakban a japán-amerikai fogalom a teljes közösséget magába foglalja, az Issei és Nisei generációt is.

### **Előítéletek és a japán-ellenes lobb**

A korabeli nézetek alapján az amerikai polgár fehér, angol-szász eredetű, és protestáns volt (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant, továbbiakban WASP). Ez megnyilvánult az amerikai kormány bevándorlás politikájában, az amerikai állampolgárság vitájában, és a bevándorlás-ellenes, valamint a japán-ellenes mozgalmak tevékenységében. A 19. század végén és a 20. század elején az amerikai társadalom egy része továbbra is hitt a fajok közötti különbségekben és a szegregációban. A kormány teret adott a faji előítéleteknek – az 1940-es években még mindig alkalmazták a szegregációs törvényeket –, és a kisebbségek nem részesültek egyenlő bánásmódban.<sup>3</sup> A japán-amerikaiakat alsóbbrendű fajnak tekintették és másodrangú állampolgárokként kezelték. Faji hovatartozásukból adódóan és tisztátalan vérük miatt – még akkor is, ha csak egy csepp japán vér folyt ereikben – nemkívánatos idegeneknek, majd ellenséges idegeneknek tekintették a közösség tagjait. A japánok az átlag amerikai szemében az amerikai életformát, értékrendet, és intézményeket veszélyeztették. Az Egyesült Államok történelmében a bevándorlás-ellenes mozgalom kezdete az 1880-as évek közepére vezethető vissza, míg az ázsiai-ellenesség az 1870-es évek elejére. A mozgalom végül a célját 1924-ben érte el a bevándorlás nemzetiség alapú korlátozásával.<sup>4</sup>

Az amerikai cél egy WASP társadalom volt ezért a régi bevándorlási hullámma jellemző nyugat- és észak-európai csoportokat részesítették előnyben. Ebbe az egyenletbe nem illett bele az ázsiai bevándorlás, így a japán sem, mivel a kor általánosított nézetei alapján a japán bevándorlók idegenek, képzetlenek, és gonoszak voltak, később már kémek és szabotőrök is. Számos bevándorlás-ellenes szervezetet alapítottak ebben a korszakban, mozgósítva a hasonló nézeteket valló amerikaiak tömegeit, mind az előítéletek politikájára, a faji diszkriminációra alapozta programját. Ezek közül csak néhányat szeretnék vázlatosan bemutatni kiemelve a tevékenységükre jellemző rasszista ideológiákat, és hogy azok milyen módon befolyásolták a japán közösség életét.

A bevándorlás-ellenes szervezeteket a céllal alapították, hogy korlátozzák a bevándorlást, kizárják a nemkívánatos csoportokat, deportálják a már az Egyesült Államokban élő bevándorlókat, megfosszák őket és az államokban született gyermekeiket jogaiktól, illetve állampolgárságuktól. Ezen csoportok tevékeny részt vállaltak a bevándorlás korlátozásában, nagy nyomás alá helyezve az aktuális kormányt. A Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West befolyásos bevándorlás-ellenes érdekcsoport volt, amely főleg az ázsiai bevándorlástól, a japán inváziótól féltette Amerikát.<sup>5</sup> Ellenezte a fajok közötti házasságot, a korlátlan

<sup>3</sup> United States Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians*, Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, Washington, D.C. 1997. 45.

<sup>4</sup> DANIELS, Roger: *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life*, Harper Perennial, New York, 1991. 265.

<sup>5</sup> DANIELS, Roger: *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the*

bevándorlást, és támogatta a szegregációt. A japánokat támogató személyeket „*fehér japánoknak*”, árulóknak nevezték. Az American Legion az összes japán kiutasítását követelte és a japán bevándorlók kizárását az országból.<sup>6</sup> A szervezet propagandafilmeket készített *Shadows of the West* címmel, amelyben a japánokat bűnözőkként, kémekként, és erőszaktevőkként ábrázolták, míg a fehéreket az áldozat szerepében tüntették fel.

San Francisco-ban 1905-ben 67 szervezet egyesült, hogy megalapítsák a Japanese Exclusion League elnevezésű japán-ellenes szervezetet. Roger Daniels 1905. május 14-től származtatja a liga alapítását és így a szervezett japán-ellenes mozgalmat Kaliforniában, amikortól kezdve a kaliforniai társadalom minden egyes rétege támogatta a mozgalmat.<sup>7</sup> Számos, a japán-amerikaiak jogait korlátozó törvényt hagytak jóvá, főként a nyugati parton Kaliforniában, és a mozgalom egyre szervezettebb formában tevékenykedett az országban. A liga a japánok kirekesztését, a japán tulajdonban lévő boltok és vállalkozások bojkottját, és az iskolák szegregációját hangsúlyozta a programjában.

A japán-ellenes csoportok egy ötpontos tervezetet fogalmaztak meg:<sup>8</sup> 1.) A Gentlemen's Agreement eltörlése. 2.) A japán menyasszonyok (picture brides) bevándorlásának betiltása. 3.) A japán bevándorlás betiltása. 4.) Az amerikai állampolgársághoz való jog megvonása az ázsiaiaktól. 5.) Az Egyesült Államokban született gyermekek nem lehetnek amerikai állampolgárok abban az esetben, ha mindkét szülő állampolgárságra jogosulatlan.

Az ötpontos tervezetet az 1919-ben alapított California Oriental Exclusion League fogalmazta meg, s a többi szervezet elfogadta.<sup>9</sup> A szervezetek az általuk kifejtett politikai nyomás eredményeként kisebb-nagyobb sikereket értek el, főleg a nyugati parton a japán bevándorlás és a japán származásúak diszkriminálása esetében. A mozgalom céljáról William P. Canber a Native Sons of the Golden West elnöke így nyilatkozott 1920 áprilisában: „*Kaliforniát Isten a fehér embereknek adta, és Isten erejével meg akarjuk azt tartani, ahogy azt Ő nekünk adta.*”<sup>10</sup>

A szervezetek sikereit röviden kívánom ismertetni, a japán bevándorlás és a japán-amerikaiak jogainak korlátozását helyezve előtérbe. A korábban említett Gentlemen's Agreement egy kétoldalú megállapodás volt 1908-ban az Egyesült Államok és a Japán kormány között. Az amerikai fél vállalta, hogy nem tiltja be a teljes japán bevándorlást, míg a japán kormány korlátozta az útlevelek kiadását. Az intézkedés a munkásokra vonatkozott.<sup>11</sup> A korlátozás nem érintette a szülők,

---

*Struggle for Japanese Exclusion*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977. 85-86.

<sup>6</sup> Uo. 90.

<sup>7</sup> United States Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians*, Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, Washington, D.C. 1997. 32.

<sup>8</sup> Uo. 35.

<sup>9</sup> DANIELS, Roger: *The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977. 84.

<sup>10</sup> Uo. 79.

<sup>11</sup> COMMAGER, Henry Steele (ed.): *Documents of American History*, Vol 2, Since 1898, 9<sup>th</sup> ed.

feleségek, és gyermekek bevándorlását, hogy a már az Egyesült Államokban élő rokonokhoz csatlakozzanak. A bevándorlás korlátozása nem bizonyult hatékonynak ezért az 1924-es bevándorlási törvény (Immigration Act of 1924) faji alapokra helyezte a korlátozást. Az 1924-es bevándorlás törvény 2%-ra csökkentette a már korábban 1921-ben jóváhagyott kvótarendszert, és az 1890-es népszámlálási adatokat vette figyelembe. A törvényt Calvin Coolidge elnök írta alá 1924. május 26-án.<sup>12</sup> Az új szabályozás már magába foglalta a japán bevándorlókat, mivel 1924 áprilisában a Japanese Exclusion Act kizárta az állampolgárságra jogosulatlan japán idegeneket,<sup>13</sup> akiknek azzal kellett szembesülniük, hogy származásuk, faji hovatartozásuk miatt nem léphetnek be az országba. Az amerikai kormány a saját hatáskörébe vette a japán bevándorlást és faji alapokra helyezte a korlátozásokat. Fontos megemlíteni: az 1875-ben a honosítási törvény (Naturalization Act of 1875) kimondta, hogy csak szabad fehér személyek, afrikai születésű idegenek, és afrikai származásúak váltak jogosulttá az amerikai állampolgárságra, ezzel módosítva az eredeti 1790. március 26-án jóváhagyott első honosítási törvényt (Naturalization Act of 1790). A japán idegenek állampolgárságra jogosulatlanok voltak és ezt később az Egyesült Államok Legfelsőbb Bírósága 1922-ben a Takao Ozawa perben, két évvel a bevándorlási törvényt megelőzően, alkotmányosnak ítélte.<sup>14</sup>

A bevándorlás és azon belül a japán-ellenes mozgalom a bevándorlók áradatától, a „*sárga veszedelemtől*” (Yellow Peril) félt, attól, hogy egy japán invázió éri el a nyugati partot. A táblázatban látható adatok ezt nem támasztják alá, hiszen ha figyelembe vesszük, hogy 1915 és 1924 között a teljes bevándorlásnak csak a 2,16%-át tette ki a japán bevándorlás, ez az arány elenyésző. Az 1940-ben kapott adatok ennél is alacsonyabbak, és a bevándorlásnak – köszönhetően a szigorú korlátozásnak – arányosan már csak a 0,03%-át tették ki a japánok. Megtévesztő lehet, hogy a japán-amerikai közösség elhelyezkedése a nyugati parton összpontosult, ennél fogva a japán származásúak 70%-a élt Kaliforniában 1940-ben, azonban ez az állam lakosságának csak az 1,6%-át jelentette.<sup>15</sup> Annak ellenére, hogy a közösség koncentrációja a nyugati parton, és azon belül is Kaliforniában kifejezetten nagyarányú volt, ez az összlakosság elenyésző részét tette ki. A „*sárga veszedelemtől*” való félelem nem csak a japán közösség méretére épült, hanem a bevándorlók áradatától való félelmet is jelentette. A táblázatban ismertetett adatok alapján megkérdőjelezendő a japán-ellenesség és az internálás szükségszerűsége, ha figyelembe vesszük a bevándorlási adatokat, és a japán-amerikai lakosság méretét és koncentrációját a nyugati parton.

---

Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1973. 45.

<sup>12</sup> Uo. 192.

<sup>13</sup> BUELL, Raymond Leslie: *Japanese Immigration*, World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol 7, N<sup>o</sup> 5-6, World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1924. 306.

<sup>14</sup> FUKUDA, Moritoshi: *Legal Problems of Japanese-Americans: Their History and Development in the United States*, Keio Tsushin, Tokyo, 1980. 8. 11.

<sup>15</sup> United States Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians*, Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, Washington, D.C. 1997. 31.



### A japán-amerikai közösség és lojalitásuk megkérdőjelezése

A japán bevándorlók számára az Egyesült Államok maga volt a „földi paradicsom” és egyben Japán jótévője mivel véget vetett az ország elszigeteltségének. Amerika a bevándorlók számára a szabadságot szimbolizálta és

Benjamin Franklinra és Abraham Lincolnra követendő példaképként tekintettek, írta Thomas Sowell.<sup>16</sup> Az amerikai álom érdekében sokan kivándoroltak az Egyesült Államokba és főként a nyugati parton illetve Hawaii-on telepedtek le, főként sojourn vendégmunkások, akik később visszatértek családjaikhoz Japánba. Azonban sokan nem tértek vissza és letelepedtek, majd családjaik is csatlakoztak, illetve családot alapítottak. A japán kormány által az 1880-as és 1890-es években kiadott útleveleknek kevesebb, mint a felét adták vissza; sok bevándorló Amerikában maradt.<sup>17</sup> Összehasonlításképpen, az Oroszországba és Kínába utazó

Időszak	Bevándorlók száma	Teljes bevándorlás aránya
1861-1870	218	0,01
1871-1880	149	0,02
1881-1890	2.270	0,04
1891-1900	27.982	0,77
1901-1907	108.163	0,77
1908-1914	74.478	1,11
1915-1924	85.197	2,16
1925-1940	6.156	0,03

TERNSTROM, Stephan – ORLOV, Ann – HANDLIN, Oscar (eds.): *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1980. 563.

japánoknak a többsége visszatért a hazájába. A japán-amerikaiak szoros, izolált közösséget alkottak, mivel egy adott japán közösségből a bevándorlók általában egy adott városban telepedtek le az Egyesült Államokban. Így például előfordulhatott, hogy az Okinawáról származó bevándorlók 90%-a Hawaii-on alkotott egy közösséget, míg 8%-a érte el a nyugati partot.<sup>18</sup> A letelepedést számos tényező motiválta, mint a család, rokonok, és barátok, akik megosztották élményeiket és tapasztalataikat az amerikai lehetőségekről. A közösségek elszigetelődéséhez hozzájárult az Amerikában tapasztalt bevándorlás- és japán-ellenesség. Az előítéleteknek köszönhetően a japán-amerikaiak szervezeteket alapítottak, hogy meg tudják védeni magukat, valamint hogy munkát, vevőket, és ügyfeleket biztosítsanak a közösség tagjainak.

A japán-amerikaiak számos szervezetet alapítottak, hogy megvédjék a jogaikat és összetartsák a közösséget. Az első szervezet a Japán Egyesület (Japanese Association), amelyet az Issei generáció alapított. A Japán Egyesület amerikai

<sup>16</sup> SOWELL, Thomas: *Ethnic America: A History*, Basic Books, New York, 1981. 157.

<sup>17</sup> Uo. 160.

<sup>18</sup> Uo. 159.

hazafias felvonulásokat és piknikeket tartott, adományokat gyűjtött az egyesület által nyújtott szociális szolgáltatásokhoz, szabadidős tevékenységeket és ifjúsági klubokat szponzorált.<sup>19</sup> A Nisei generációt arra tanították, hogy tanuljanak, szerezzenek szakmai képzést, tiszteljék a hatóságokat, és legyenek jó amerikai állampolgárok. A Japán Egyesület hűséges és törvénytisztelő amerikai állampolgároként akarta ábrázolni a közösség tagjait. A közösségen belüli bűncselekményeket a megfelelő hatóságnak jelentették, csökkent a prostitúció, a szerencsejáték, és a bűnözés.<sup>20</sup> A japán közösségen belül kevesebb bűncselekményt követtek el, és kisebb volt a fiatalok bűnesetek gyakorisága. Jellemző volt a szigorú belső felügyelet a család és a közösség részéről. A közösség jóléte elsőbbséget élvezett az egyén kárára, ennél fogva azon személyeket, akik a törvényt, illetve a szabályokat megszegték visszaküldték Japánba. A Japán-Amerikai Állampolgárok Ligát (Japanese-American Citizens' League, továbbiakban JACL) már a Nisei generáció alapította az 1920-as években. A Nisei generáció abból a célból alapította a JACL-t hogy megvédje a japán-amerikaiak jogait, elfogadtassa magát az amerikai társadalommal, és az amerikanizálódást terjessze a közösségen belül.<sup>21</sup> Az amerikanizálódás megosztotta a japán-amerikai közösséget, mivel az Issei szülők úgy vélték, hogy Nisei gyermekeik elhanyagolták a japán kultúrát, annak ellenére, hogy a többségük beszélt a japán nyelvet. Mindazonáltal, gyermekeik jövőjét és jólétét Amerikában látták biztosítottak.

A háború közeledtével a japán-amerikaiak lojalitását megkérdőjelezték annak ellenére, hogy a JACL együttműködött az amerikai kormánnyal. A japán-ellenesség 1924 után alábbhagyott, de 1930-as években a japán agresszió következtében ismét a felszínre tört.<sup>22</sup> A korabeli sajtó újságcikkeit kronológiai sorrendben vizsgálva felfedhetjük a folyamatot, aminek eredményeként a sajtó a japán-amerikaiak ellen fordult. Gary Y. Okihiro és Julie Sly a sajtó szerepét vizsgálta a *The Press, Japanese American, and the Concentration Camps* című tanulmányban. A szerzők nyomásgyakorló csoportként ábrázolják a sajtót, és a fordulópont véleményük szerint a Pearl Harbor elleni támadás volt, mivel a korábbi sztereotípiák, rasszista előítéletek előtérbe kerültek. A támadást követő első hetekben az újságok óvatosságra intették az olvasókat, hogy ne hozzanak elhamarkodott ítéletet a japán-amerikaiak lojalitásáról. A *Browly News* 1941. december 8-án arról írt, hogy a közösségben sok japán szomszéd hűsége Amerika iránt rendíthetetlen. Hasonló véleményen volt a *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1941. december 9-én felszólítva az amerikaiakat, hogy ne mutassanak gyanakvást és

<sup>19</sup> THERNSTROM, Stephan – ORLOV, Ann – HANDLIN, Oscar (eds.): *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980. 564.

<sup>20</sup> SOWELL, Thomas: *Ethnic America: A History*, Basic Books, New York, 1981. 169.

<sup>21</sup> THERNSTROM, Stephan – ORLOV, Ann – HANDLIN, Oscar (eds.): *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980. 565.

illetve SOWELL, Thomas: *Ethnic America: A History*, Basic Books, New York, 1981. 170-171.

<sup>22</sup> HANE, Mikiso: *Wartime Internment*, *The Journal of American History*, Vol 77, N° 2. September 1990. 569-575. 569.

előítéletet.<sup>23</sup> A sajtóban megjelenő cikkek hangulata és üzenete 1942 januárjában megváltozott és már a japán-amerikai közösség kényszerű eltávolítására szólították fel a kormányt, kémkedésre és szabotázsra hivatkozva. A Sun Luis Obispo Independent volt az egyik első újság mely 1941. december 12-én a japánok kitelepítését követelte. A Los Angeles Times 1942. január 23-án még arról írt, hogy a japánok hűségesekek és együttérzést érdemelnek, és nem gyanakvást. Öt nappal később január 28-án már arról írt, hogy a japánok azonnali fogva tartása és eltávolítása szükséges.<sup>24</sup> A San Francisco

Chronicle 1941. december 22-én még toleranciára szólította fel az amerikaiakat, de 1942. február 21-én már kemény lépéseket sürgetett, még akkor is, ha az a polgári jogok kárára történne.<sup>25</sup> A témára visszatérek az *Alkotmányosság és jóvátételi mozgalom* alfejezetben. A japán-ellenes hangulat februárban érte el a tetőpontot a sajtóban: például Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle és a New York Times. A sajtót befolyásolta a japán-amerikaiak ellen irányuló vádaskodás, a kormány intézkedései, és a közvélemény, ezáltal a korabeli hangulatot tükrözték a megjelenő cikkek; azonban a sajtó nyomásgyakorlása tovább táplálta a gyűlöletet, legfőképp a nyugati parton.

A közvélemény-kutatási adatok alapján nagy fordulat állt be a japán-amerikaiak megítélésében 1942 januárja és februárja között. Az első felmérést január utolsó hetében tartották Kaliforniában, 192 interjút készítettek négy körzetben. A válaszadók 36%-a szerint az Egyesült Államokban élő japánok lojálisak, 38%-a szerint hűtlenek, a megkérdezettek egyharmada további intézkedést sürgetett. A harmadik felmérést február utolsó heteiben készítették és a válaszadók 77%-a nem bízott meg a japán-amerikaiakban faji vagy nemzeti alapon, több mint 50%-a

**2. táblázat: Japánok a Kontinentális Egyesült Államokban és Hawaii-on, 1870-1970**

Év	Kontinens	Hawaii	Összesen
1870	55		55
1880	148	116	264
1890	2.039	12.610	14.649
1900	24.326	61.111	85.437
1910	72.157	79.675	151.832
1920	111.010	109.274	220.284
1930	138.834	139.631	278.465
1940	126.947	157.905	284.852
1950	141.768	184.611	326.379
1960	260.059	203.455	463.514
1970	371.149	217.175	588.324

TERNSTROM, Stephan – ORLOV, Ann – HANDLIN, Oscar (eds.): *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1980. 562.

<sup>23</sup> OKIHIRO, Gary Y. – SLY, Julie: *The Press, Japanese Americans, and the Concentration Camps*, Phylon, Vol 44, No 1. 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr., 1983. 66-83. 68.

<sup>24</sup> Uo. 69.

<sup>25</sup> Uo. 69.

megkérdőjelezte a hűségüket, és kevesebb, mint 40%-a volt elégedett a kormány intézkedéseivel. Az utolsó közvélemény-kutatás, amit a szerzők példaként hoznak fel márciusban készült és a megkérdezettek 93%-a egyetértett a japánok kitelepítésével, és 59%-a egyetértett a japán-amerikaiak kitelepítésével annak ellenére, hogy állampolgárok voltak.<sup>26</sup> A japán-amerikaiak Egyesült Államok iránti hűségét megkérdőjelezték, mégis a Hawaii-on élő japán közösséget – Hawaii lakosságának 37%-a volt japán származású 1940-ben, 157.905 fő –, nem evakuálták és helyezték el internáló táborokban.<sup>27</sup> Hawaii japán-amerikai közössége meghaladta a nyugati parton élők számát. A Kontinentális Egyesült Államokban élő japán-amerikaiak száma 1940-ben 126.947 fő volt, de a Hawaii-on élő japánok jobban integrálódtak és komoly gazdasági befolyással rendelkeztek.

Az amerikai kormány csak 1943 januárjában kezdett el foglalkozni a japán-amerikaiak lojalitásával, mivel az internálásukat megelőzően nem készítettek felmérést a közösségen belül és alapjában véve elfogadták, hogy ellenséges idegenekből állt. A Hadügyminisztérium engedélyezte a Nisei számára, hogy az Egyesült Államok Hadseregében szolgáljanak. A kormány kötelezővé tette: a 17 éves és annál idősebb japán származású felnőtteknek ki kellett jelenteniük, hogy lojálisak vagy nem. A japán-amerikaiak hazafiasságát felmérő kérdőívben (Loyalty Questionnaire) megfogalmazott két fontos kérdés mérte fel a japán származásúak lojalitását. A 28. kérdés, hajlandóak-e hűséget esküdni az Egyesült Államoknak, és a továbbiakban megtagadni mindenféle engedelmességet a japán császárnak. A 27. kérdés, hajlandóak-e az Egyesült Államok Hadseregében szolgálni háború esetén. A kérdések megosztották a japán-amerikaiakat és több mint 6.000 adott nemleges választ és 3.000 megtagadta a válaszadást.<sup>28</sup> A nemleges válaszok nem jelentették automatikusan, hogy az adott személyek nem voltak hűségeselek. Figyelembe kell venni, hogy a kérdőíveket az internáló táborokban kellett kitölteni több mint egy évvel Pearl Harbor után, és sokan nem rendelkeztek amerikai állampolgársággal faji alapon.

A korábban már említett honosítási törvénynek és jogi korlátozásoknak köszönhetően a japán bevándorlók állampolgárságra jogosulatlanok voltak, így nem voltak amerikai állampolgárok, de azt kérte tőlük a kormány, hogy mondjanak le a japán császárhoz fűződő hűségükről. Ennek eredményeként az adott személyek ország és jogvédelem nélkül maradtak volna. Sokukat a hűségük a családhoz, rokonokhoz, és barátokhoz kötötte. Nem akarták, hogy a család szétszakadjon, illetve ki viselné a szülőknek a gondját, ha a gyermekük a fronton harcol. Ezt bizonyítja, hogy nemleges választ adó személyek közül később a

<sup>26</sup> OKIHIRO, Gary Y. – SLY, Julie: *The Press, Japanese Americans, and the Concentration Camps*, *Phylon*, Vol 44, N° 1. 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr. 1983. 66-83. 78.

<sup>27</sup> THERNSTROM, Stephan – ORLOV, Ann – HANDLIN, Oscar (eds.): *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1980. 562.

<sup>28</sup> GRODZINS, Morton: *Making Un-Americans*, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 60, N° 6. May 1955. 570-582. 572. 576.

hatóságok által szervezett meghallgatások során sokan megmagyarázták, illetve visszavonták a válaszukat.<sup>29</sup> Az indoklások alapján sokan tiltakozásból adtak nemleges választ, hiszen úgy sem engedték volna el őket, és állampolgári jogukat megsértette a kormány. Egy igenlő válasz azt jelentette volna, hogy elfogadják az állampolgári jogaiktól és szabadságuktól való megfosztást. Azon személyeket, akik nem vonták vissza a nemleges válaszukat elkülönített táborba szállították (Tule Lake internáló tábor).<sup>30</sup>

A japán-amerikaiak többsége lojális maradt amerikanizálódásuk és integrálódásuk eredményeként, s a szülők arra ösztönözték gyermekeiket, hogy adjanak igenlő választ, mert szebb jövő várt rájuk Amerikában. A Japán Egyesület és a JAACL hasonló módon bátorították a japán-amerikaiakat, hogy fejezzék ki hazafiasságukat. A korábban említett tényezők alapján megkérdőjelezendő, a több mint 6.000 nemleges válasz, mert sokan kényszerhelyzetben voltak. Sajnálatosan a kérdőív eredményeit az Egyesült Államok Legfelsőbb Bírósága bizonyítékként kezelte arra vonatkozóan, hogy a japán-amerikaiak hűtlenek az Egyesült Államokhoz (a témát bővebben elemzem az *Alkotmányosság és jóvátételi mozgalom* alfejezetben). Morton Grodzins a nemleges válaszokat a jogfosztásból eredezteti, mivel nem a hazájukért, hanem a kormány politikája és származásuk miatt szenvedtek az internáló táborokban.<sup>31</sup> A japán-amerikaiak közül sokan nem reménykedtek a szebb jövőben és úgy vélték, hogy Japánban újramezhetnek az életüket.

### ***A japán-amerikaiak, mint ellenséges idegnek***

A japánok Oroszország felett aratott győzelmét követően 1905-ben már olyan cikkek jelentek meg az amerikai sajtóban melyek az Egyesült Államokban élő japánokat ellenségként azonosították. Az elkövetkezendő években a japán-ellenesség a korábban már ismerttetett korlátozások bevezetéséhez, szervezetek alapításához vezetett. A San Francisco Chronicle 1905-ben egy esetleges japán inváziót emlegetett *The Japanese Invasion, the Problem of the Hour* című cikkben.<sup>32</sup> A japán invázió már nem, mint bevándorlók áradata fenyegette Amerikát, hanem mint ellenséges erő. A korabeli újságokat ellepték a szenzációhajhász cikkek melyek megpróbálták negatív képet festeni a japán származásúakról és úgy ábrázolták őket, mint bűnözők, erőszaktevők, és Amerika ellenségei. Nemzetbiztonsági okokból az ellenséges idegeneknek tartott személyeket 1939 és 1941 között megfigyelte a Szövetségi Nyomozó Iroda (Federal Bureau of Investigation, továbbiakban FBI). A Custodian

---

<sup>29</sup> Uo. 572.

<sup>30</sup> Uo. 573.

<sup>31</sup> Uo. 581.

<sup>32</sup> United States Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians: *Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians*, Civil Liberties Public Education Fund, Washington, D.C, 1997. 32.

Detention List (továbbiakban „ABC Lista”) a megszerzett adatok alapján kategorizálta a megfigyelt személyeket attól függően, hogy milyen fokú veszélyt jelentettek az Egyesült Államokra.<sup>33</sup> A lista a Tengelyhatalmak iránt érzett lojalitást, rokonszenvet, propaganda tevékenységet, kiadványok előfizetését vette figyelembe, és az ellenséghez köthető szervezetek tagsági listájában található nevekből állították össze. A lista három kategória alapján értékelte, hogy az adott személy milyen fokú biztonsági kockázatot jelentett a nemzetbiztonságra.

„A” lista: ismert veszélyes idegenek.

„B” lista: potenciálisan veszélyes idegenek.

„C” lista: a Tengelyhatalmak iránti szimpátia miatt megfigyelését ajánlották.

A veszélyes idegenek megfigyelése ellenére a kormány 1940-ben törvényben rendelte el az idegenek nyilvántartását (Alien Registration Act). A nyilvántartási adatok alapján 695.363 olasz, 314.715 német, és 91.858 japán élt az Egyesült Államokban.<sup>34</sup> Franklin D. Rooseveltnél 1941 közepén felkérte Curtis Munson-t a Külügyminisztériumból, hogy készítse el egy titkos beszámolót az Egyesült Államok nyugati partján és Hawaii-on élő japán-amerikaiak lojalitásáról. A jelentés 1941 novemberében elkészült (Munson Report) és megállapította, hogy a közösség többsége hűséges amerikai, de a jelentést nem hozták nyilvánosságra 1946-ig.<sup>35</sup> Curtis Munson kiemelte, hogy a japán-amerikaiak közül a Nisei generáció különösen lojális volt és hűségüket be is akarták bizonyítani. Egyedül a Kibei csoportot jelölte meg, mint potenciális veszélyforrás. A Kibei fogalom a japán-amerikaiak azon csoportját fedi, akik az Egyesült Államokban születtek és szüleik tanítási célból visszaküldtek Japánba.

Az adatok alapján – „ABC Lista”, idegenek nyilvántartása – Franklin D. Rooseveltnél kiáltványban (Presidential Proclamation No. 2525-2527) 1941. december 7-8 között rendelte el a 14 éves és annál idősebb nem honosított állampolgárságú ellenséges idegenek (olasz, német, és japán) letartóztatását.<sup>36</sup> Az utasítás eredményeként 11.000 idegent tartóztattak le: 8.000 japánt, 2.300 németet, és néhány száz olaszt. Míg az Amerikában élő ellenséges idegenek 1%-át tartóztatták le, addig arányosan a japán idegenek 12%-át. Nem csak az ellenséges idegenek kiszűrése volt a cél, hanem a közösség megtörése. A letartóztatott japánok közül sokan bankárok, ügyvédek, újságírók, tanárok, üzletemberek voltak, és fontos pozíciót töltöttek be, mint közösségi vezetők a Japán Egyesületben és a JAACL-ben.

<sup>33</sup> DANIELS, Roger: *Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective*, The History Teacher, Vol 35, N° 3. May 2002. 297-310. 300.

<sup>34</sup> Uo. 300.

<sup>35</sup> SUNDQUIST, Eric J.: *The Japanese-American Internment: A Reappraisal*, The American Scholar, Vol 57, N° 4. 1988. 529-547. 541.

<sup>36</sup> DANIELS, Roger: *Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective*, The History Teacher, Vol 35, N° 3. May 2002. 297-310. 300.

A Nyugati Védelmi Parancsnokságot (Western Defense Command) 1941. december 11-én hozták létre és az Egyesült Államok nyugati partját hadszíntérnek minősítették.<sup>37</sup> Henry L. Stimson hadügyminiszternek végül John L. DeWitt altábornagyra esett a választása és kinevezte a parancsnokság élére. John L. DeWitt altábornagy 1942. február 20-án megkapta a hatáskört a katonai területek kijelölésére egy nappal a japán származású személyek internálását elrendelő elnöki rendelet jóváhagyását követően. A döntés nagyban befolyásolta az események menetét, mivel korábban John L. DeWitt indokolatlannak tartotta az internálást, hiszen véleménye szerint a japán közösség hűtlen tagjait el lehetett különíteni. A megnövekvő politikai nyomás hatására a japán közösség kitelepítésének és internálásának támogatói közé állt miközben megkapta a hatalmat és egyben a felelőséget, hogy a nyugati partot védelmezze. Ennek megfelelően 1942. február 14-én engedélyt kért a hadügyminisztertől, hogy kitelepítsenek minden ellenséges idegent, amerikai állampolgársággal rendelkező japán származású személyt a katonai területről.<sup>38</sup> A japán közösség biztonsági kockázatot jelentett; fennállt a veszély, hogy szabotázs és kémkedési tevékenységet folytatnak, amelyek fenyegetést jelentenek Amerika háborús erőfeszítésére. A Kongresszusban a nyugati parti államok delegációja (West Coast Delegation) egy nappal korábban 1942. február 13-án szintén arra kérte az elnököt, hogy a japán származású személyeket telepítsék ki a nyugati partról.<sup>39</sup>

Megdöbbenés, félelem, majd harag jellemezte az amerikai társadalmat a Pearl Harbor elleni támadást követő hónapokban és a nyilvánosság megtorlást követelt; ismét erőre kapott a japán-amerikaiak elleni előítélet. A japán származású személyek evakuálását és deportálását követelték a nyugati parton élők. Az újságok folyamatosan olyan cikkeket publikáltak, amelyekben a japán-amerikaiakra úgy utaltak, mint a belső ellenségre, az ötödik hadoszlopra. A Roosevelti kormányra hatalmas politikai nyomás nehezedett és a korábban említett intézkedések ellenére a kormány úgy döntött, hogy internáló táborokban helyezi el a nyugati parton élő teljes japán-amerikai közösséget. A japán-amerikai közösség történelme során bevándorlókból idegenekké, majd idegenekből ellenséges idegenekké avanszálódott. Faji származásuk alapján az ellenséggel azonosították a közösség tagjait a rendelkezésre álló jelentések ellenére melyek alapján megkérdőjelezendő a nemzetbiztonsági és katonai szükségszerűség.

### ***Internáló táborok Amerikában***

Franklin D. Rooseveltnél a politikai és katonai nyomásnak engedve feladta a háború előtti New Deal politikáját és 1942. február 19-én aláírta a 9066-os

---

<sup>37</sup> McWILLIAMS, Carey: *What About Our Japanese-Americans?*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1944. 5.

<sup>38</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *Impounded People: Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 19.

<sup>39</sup> McWILLIAMS, Carey: *What About Our Japanese-Americans?*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1944. 6.

elnöki rendeletet (Executive Order N<sup>o</sup> 9066).<sup>40</sup> Az elnöki rendelet felhatalmazta a hadügyminisztert a katonai területek kijelölésére, hogy megakadályozza a kémkedést és szabotázszt az amerikai háborús erőfeszítések védelmében. A hadügyminiszternek és a kijelölt katonai parancsnoknak a hatáskörébe tartozott olyan korlátozásoknak megszabása (katonai területek kijelölése, kijárási tilalom előírása, kitelepítés és internálás) melyek elősegítették a nemzet védelmét. A japán-amerikaiak internálása Franklin D. Rooseveltnél elkövetett kudarcának tekinthető. A rendeletet katonai utasítások sorozata követte, korlátozva a japán-amerikaiak szabadságát és jogait.

John L. DeWitt altábornagy 1942. március 2-án létrehozta a katonai övezeteket a nyugati parton (Military Areas N<sup>o</sup> 1, N<sup>o</sup> 2), amelyeket minden japán-amerikaiak el kellett hagynia. A katonai övezetek államai: Kalifornia, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Utah, és Arizona. Az elsődleges önkéntes evakuálás nem volt sikeres, mert zűrzavar jellemezte a folyamatot. Összesen csak 9.000 japán hagyta el a nyugati partot, így John L. DeWitt kénytelen volt március 27-én beszüntetni a katonai övezetek önkéntes elhagyását az ellenőrzött kitelepítés kezdetéig.<sup>41</sup> A szomszédos államok tiltakoztak és a nyugati partot elhagyó japánokat a hatóságok nem hagyták letelepedni. Salt Lake City-ben 1942. április 7-én tárgyalást folytattak a nyugati parti államok és azon államok kormányzói, amelyekben a későbbi internáló táborokat működtették.<sup>42</sup> A küldöttek nem voltak hajlandóak elismerni a japán-amerikaiak jogait még akkor sem, ha állampolgárok voltak; az eltávolításukat, fogvatartásukat, és a háború utáni deportálásukat követelték. A küldöttek követeléseit nagyban befolyásolták a japán-amerikaiak kitelepítésének és internálásának körülményeit. A kormányzók attól féltek, hogy például Kalifornia rájuk hárítja a problémát, hiszen ha a japánok fenyegetést jelentettek a nyugati partra, akkor miért lenne ez másképp az ő esetükben. A gazdasági tényezőket azonban nem vették figyelembe: munkaerőhiány lépett fel a mezőgazdaságban és szükség volt idénymunkásokra is. A kormányzók szembeesülve az ipari és mezőgazdasági cégek és szervezetek lobbijával a kezdeményezés támogatóivá váltak. Következő lépésként a San Francisco-ban tartott konferencia kidolgozta az idénymunkások programját, irodákat hoztak létre a munkások elhelyezésének és szállításának megszervezésére. A konferencia alapján véve megváltoztatta a japán-amerikaiak internálásának irányvonalát és 1942 októberére már 10.000 idénymunkásnak engedélyezték a táborok elhagyását.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> COMMAGER, Henry Steele (ed.): *Documents of American History*, Vol 2, *Since 1898*, 9<sup>th</sup> ed. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1973. 465.

<sup>41</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *Impounded People: Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 20.

<sup>42</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *The Relocation Program*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 6-7.

<sup>43</sup> Uo. 12.



A Háborús Kitelepítési Hatóságot (War Relocation Authority, továbbiakban WRA) 1942. március 18-án hozta létre a 9102-es elnöki rendelet (Executive Order N° 9102). A hatóság feladatai közé tartozott az internáló táborok és létesítmények megfelelő irányítása, az internált személyek szállítása, ellátása, és a háború utáni elhelyezésük a civil életben. A WRA céljai közé tartozott, hogy minél kisebb zavart okozzanak a japán-amerikaiak társadalmi és gazdasági életében.<sup>44</sup> A WRA központja Washingtonban volt, és az élére Milton S. Eisenhowert nevezték ki, de a hatóság regionális irodákkal is rendelkezett, hogy ellásson olyan feladatokat, mint a táborok létesítése, valamint propaganda feladatokat. Miután az internáló táborok felépültek 1942 őszén a regionális irodákat megszüntették, és az adminisztratív feladatokat attól kezdve maguk a táborok látták el, a szolgáltatási funkciók a központi iroda (Central Administrative Services, továbbiakban CAS) hatáskörében maradtak. A CAS feladatait 1944. július 1-én a WRA vette át.<sup>45</sup> A WRA 1942. július 20-án már lehetővé tette a táborok elhagyását.<sup>46</sup> Az engedélyeket a tábor igazgatójának és az országos igazgatónak kellett jóváhagynia, míg az adott személy háttérét az FBI ellenőrizte. A táborok elhagyását olyan esetekben hagyták jóvá, amikor orvosi okokból, tanulmányi célokból, és munkalehetőséget keresve kérvényezték az engedélyt.

1942. március 27-én John L. DeWitt altábornagy egy új kiáltványban (Proclamation N° 4) megtiltotta az összes japán-amerikai számára a katonai területek elhagyását. Ennek ellenére a május 3-án kiadott utasításban elrendelte a japán származású személyek kitelepítését és internálását (Civilian Exclusion Order N° 34), anélkül hogy visszavonta volna a korábban említett kiáltványt.<sup>47</sup> Az ellentmondó utasítások következtében egy

**3. táblázat: WRA internáló táborok**

Tábor	Állam	Kapacitás
<b>Topaz</b>	<b>Utah</b>	<b>10.000</b>
<b>Poston</b>		
<b>1. tábori egység</b>	<b>Arizona</b>	<b>10.000</b>
<b>2. tábori egység</b>	<b>Arizona</b>	<b>5.000</b>
<b>3. tábori egység</b>	<b>Arizona</b>	<b>5.000</b>
<b>Gila River</b>		
<b>Butte Tábor</b>	<b>Arizona</b>	<b>10.000</b>
<b>Canal Tábor</b>	<b>Arizona</b>	<b>5.000</b>
<b>Granada (Amache)</b>	<b>Colorado</b>	<b>8.000</b>
<b>Heart Mountain</b>	<b>Wyoming</b>	<b>12.000</b>
<b>Jerome</b>	<b>Arkansas</b>	<b>10.000</b>
<b>Manzanar</b>	<b>Kalifornia</b>	<b>10.000</b>
<b>Minidoka</b>	<b>Idaho</b>	<b>10.000</b>
<b>Rohwer</b>	<b>Arkansas</b>	<b>10.000</b>
<b>Tule Lake</b>	<b>Kalifornia</b>	<b>16.000</b>

United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 22.

<sup>44</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *Administrative Highlights of the WRA Program*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 1, 6.

<sup>45</sup> Uo. 6. 8.

<sup>46</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *The Relocation Program*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 15.

<sup>47</sup> LEVY, Robert A. – MELLOR, William: *The Dirty Dozen: How Twelve Supreme Court Cases Radically Expanded Government and Eroded Freedom*, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. 2009. 132.

adott személyt a katonai övezet elhagyása miatt a március 27-én kiadott utasítás alapján lehetett felelősségre vonni, míg ha nem hagyta el, akkor a május 3-án kiadott utasítás vonatkozott rá. A Kongresszus által 1942. március 21-én megszavazott 503-as közjogi törvény (Public Law 503) értelmében a katonai parancsok megszegése szövetségi bűncselekménynek minősült.<sup>48</sup> A cél az volt, hogy az ellentmondó utasításokkal és a törvény erejével rákényszerítsék a japán közösséget a nyugati part elhagyására. Az utasítások eredményesek voltak, így március és november között az összes japán személyt internáló táborokba helyezték el. 1942. június 5-re kiűrtették az első számú katonai övezetet (Military Area N<sup>o</sup> 1) és augusztus 7-re a második számú övezetet is (Military Area N<sup>o</sup> 2).<sup>49</sup>

Franklin D. Roosevelt elnök 1944. december 17-én jelentette be a táborok bezárását. A 9066-os elnöki rendeletet visszavonták és a táborokat 1945. január 2-től lehetett elhagyni; a WRA programot 1946. június 30-án szüntették be.<sup>50</sup> A kormány nemzetbiztonsági érdekekre hivatkozott, továbbá demokratizáló folyamatnak tekintette az evakuálást, ami véleményük szerint a japán-amerikaiak érdekét szolgálta. Valójában a kormány nem tudta megkülönböztetni a hűséges japánokat a hűtlen és ellenséges idegenektől, nem tudta megvédeni a közösség tagjait az önbíráskodóktól. Amerikában 1942-ben az „idegen” és az „ellenséges idegen” szavak a japán szó szinonimájává váltak.<sup>51</sup> A japán-amerikai és a japán ellenség egy és ugyanazon személy volt az amerikaiak szemében ennek következtében befolyásolva a nemzetbiztonsági nézetet, mely szerint katonai szükségszerűség állt az internálás hátterében.

### ***A katonai szükségszerűség megkérdőjelezése***

John L. DeWitt altábornagy 1943. július 19-én végső beszámolójában (Final Report) azt sugallta, hogy a nyugati partot közelgő invázió fenyegette. A beszámolót csak sokkal később 1944 januárjában hozták nyilvánosságra, aminek számos oka volt. John L. DeWitt-re nagy hatással volt a Pearl Harbor elleni támadás és az 1942. február 23-án bekövetkezett incidens, amikor is egy japán tengeralattjáró ágyúzta a Santa Barbarához közeli partvidéket.<sup>52</sup> Beszámolójában azt hangsúlyozta, hogy kémkedés és szabotázs veszélye állt fenn, de állítását nem indokolta semmilyen bizonyíték. A Háborús Információs Hivatal (Office of War Information, továbbiakban OWI) 1943. június 14-én azt jelentette, hogy „*Egyetlen japán-amerikait – akár Hawaii-on vagy a kontinensen –, sem ítélték el akár*

<sup>48</sup> Uo. 132.

<sup>49</sup> McWILLIAMS, Carey: *What About Our Japanese-Americans?*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1944.6.

<sup>50</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *Administrative Highlights of the WRA Program*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 72.

<sup>51</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *Impounded People: Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers*, U.S. G.P.O., Washington, 1946. 22.

<sup>52</sup> McWILLIAMS, Carey: *What About Our Japanese-Americans?*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1944.7.

szabotázsért vagy kémkedésért.”<sup>53</sup> 1942. február 14-én már ismert tény volt, hogy nem követtek el szabotázszt Hawaii-on. Mindazonáltal, John L. DeWitt altábornagy úgy értelmezte a szabotázs és kémkedés hiányát, hogy ilyesfajta tevékenységekre a jövőben sor fog kerülni. John L. DeWitt mindenáron el akarta kerülni Husband E. Kimmel tengernagy és Walter C. Short tábornok sorsát, mivel őket kötelességmulasztással vádolták Pearl Harbor után.

Nem csak John L. DeWitt akarta elkerülni a bűnbak szerepét. Megemlítem Frank Knox haditengerészeti miniszter szerepét a történetekben, mivel 1941. december 15-én, miután visszatért Pearl Harbortól – felmérve a támadás okozta károkat – egy sajtótájékoztatón kifejtette, hogy a támadásért a japán-amerikai ötödik hadoszlopot kell okolni.<sup>54</sup> Bűnbakot keresett és a japán-amerikaiak ideális célpontnak minősültek. Miután John McCloy helyettes hadügyminiszter megkapta DeWitt végső beszámolóját arra utasította Karl Bendetsent a hadügyminisztériumban, hogy írják át a jelentést; Karl Bendetsen az internálás támogatója és egyik kidolgozója volt. John L. DeWitt a beszámolójában kiemelte, hogy az idő rövideje nem jelentett problémát a japán-amerikaiak hűségének megállapításában.<sup>55</sup> John McCloy ezek után elrendelte a beszámoló újraírását és a korábbi példányok megsemmisítését. Az átírt beszámoló a kormány álláspontját támasztotta alá, amiben a katonai szükségszerűségekre hivatkozott, valamint átvett információkat az Amerika-ellenes Tevékenységet Vizsgáló Kongresszusi Bizottságtól (House Committee on Un-American Activities). A Bizottság 1941-ben meghallgatást tartott az Egyesült Államokban folytatott japán tevékenységekről.<sup>56</sup> Valótlan információkat tartalmazott, alaptalan pletykákat kémkedésről és szabotázsról. A katonai szükségszerűséggel kapcsolatosan John L. DeWitt altábornagy 1943. április 3-án a haditengerészeti ügyek albizottságának (House of Naval Affairs Subcommittee) meghallgatásán fenntartotta korábbi véleményét. Az érvelését a faji bizalmatlanságra alapozta, miszerint a japán-amerikaiak veszélyesek voltak, attól függetlenül, hogy hazafiak vagy sem. Nem számított az állampolgárság, hiszen a japán származásúakat „nem tudod megváltoztatni egy darab papírral”, amerikai állampolgársággal.<sup>57</sup> A Hadügyminisztérium és a kormány figyelmen kívül hagyta a Curtis Munson, az FBI, és a Haditengerészeti Hírszerző Hivatal, és az OWI jelentését. Kenneth Ringle alparancsnok a Haditengerészeti Hírszerző Hivaltól (Office of Naval Intelligence, továbbiakban ONI) jelentésében a Nisei közösséget tanulmányozta és a japán-amerikaiaknak csak a 3%-át tekintette veszélyforrásnak.<sup>58</sup> Csak úgy, mint a Curtis Munson jelentés, Kenneth

---

<sup>53</sup> Uo. 8.

<sup>54</sup> OKIHIRO, Gary Y. – SLY, Julie: *The Press, Japanese Americans, and the Concentration Camps*, *Phylon*, Vol 44, No 1. 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr. 1983. 66-83. 79.

<sup>55</sup> SUNDQUIST, Eric J.: *The Japanese-American Internment: A Reappraisal*, *The American Scholar*, Vol 57, N° 4. 1988. 529-547. 543.

<sup>56</sup> Uo. 543.

<sup>57</sup> McWILLIAMS, Carey: *What About Our Japanese-Americans?*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1944.10.

<sup>58</sup> SUNDQUIST, Eric J.: *The Japanese-American Internment: A Reappraisal*, *The American Scholar*,

Ringle a Kibei közösséget tekintette potenciálisan veszélyesnek. A korábban említett Kibei csoportot 1942-ben veszélyforrásnak tekintették a Nisei generáción belül. Ez megközelítőleg 9.000 személyt jelentett, akiket 13 éves koruk után Japánba küldtek tanulni.<sup>59</sup>

Az FBI hasonló véleményen volt, hiszen az „ABC Lista” és az idegenek nyilvántartása alapján 1941. december 7 és 8 között letartóztatták az ellenséges idegeneket. Az FBI igazgatója az ügynököket már 1941. december 5-én arra utasította, hogy készüljenek fel a japán idegenek letartóztatására; J. Edgar Hoover arra számított, hogy háború fog kitörni a két ország között.<sup>60</sup> Hoover ugyanazon a véleményen volt, mint Kenneth Ringle, hogy az állítólagos kémkedés és szabotázs ügyeket egyedi alapon, esetről-esetre kellett volna vizsgálni, és megkérdőjelezte a belső fenyegetést; továbbá ellenezte az elnöki rendeletet, mert a potenciálisan veszélyes idegeneket már letartóztatták. Francis Biddle igazságügy miniszter arra utasította 1944-ben az FBI-t, hogy vizsgálja meg a végső beszámolóban felhozott érveket, mint például a kémkedés tényét. J. Edgar Hoover 1944. február 7-én egy bizalmas memóban arról tájékoztatta az igazságügy minisztert, hogy az FBI-nak nem volt információja kémkedésről.<sup>61</sup> Az FBI alkalmazásában állt számos japán-amerikai, JAACL tag, és több ezer Nisei szolgált az Egyesült Államok Hadseregében a 442. ezredben. Igen fontos az a tény, hogy maga a japán hírszerzés megállapította, hogy a japán-amerikaiak és az Egyesült Államokban élő japán származásúak Amerikához voltak hűek, túlságosan amerikanizálódtak; ebből arra következtek, hogy nem voltak megbízhatóak. Az OWI 1943. június 14-én azt jelentette, hogy a japán hírszerzés Amerikában élő nem japán származású ügynököket alkalmazott.<sup>62</sup> Franklin D. Rooseveltnél elnök figyelmen kívül hagyta a jelentéseket és a 9066-os elnöki rendelettel jóváhagyta a japán-amerikaiak internálását. A japán-amerikaiak hűtlenségét kész tényként kezelte a kormány és a hadügyminisztérium. A kollektív bűnösség elvét alkalmazva a teljes japán-amerikai közösséget kitelepítették nemzetbiztonsági érdekekre és katonai szükségszerűségekre hivatkozva.

### ***Alkotmányosság és a jóvátételi mozgalom***

A San Francisco Chronicle, 1942. február 21-én kemény lépéseket sürgetett a japán-amerikaiak szabadságának és jogainak kárára, azokat feláldozva. Az Egyesült

---

Vol 57, N° 4. 1988. 529-547. 542.

<sup>59</sup> United States Department of the Interior, War Relocation Authority: *WRA: A Story of Human Conservation*, U.S. G.P.O. Washington, 1946. 6-7.

<sup>60</sup> OKIHIRO, Gary Y. – SLY, Julie: *The Press, Japanese Americans, and the Concentration Camps*, Phylon, Vol 44, N° 1. 1<sup>st</sup> Qtr., 1983. 66-83. 79.

<sup>61</sup> LEVY, Robert A. – MELLOR, William: *The Dirty Dozen: How Twelve Supreme Court Cases Radically Expanded Government and Eroded Freedom*, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. 2009. 134.

<sup>62</sup> SUNDQUIST, Eric J.: *The Japanese-American Internment: A Reappraisal*, The American Scholar, Vol 57, N° 4. 1988. 529-547. 542.

illetve McWILLIAMS, Carey: *What About Our Japanese-Americans?*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1944. 8.

Államok Legfelsőbb Bírósága alkotmányosnak ítélte a kormány intézkedéseit: kijárási tilalom, kitelepítés, és a közösség internálása. Négy bírósági per jutott el az Egyesült Államok Legfelsőbb Bíróságához: Hirabayashi v. United States (1943), Yasui v. United States (1943), Korematsu v. United States (1944), és az Ex parte Endo (1944). Gordon Hirabayashi megkérdőjelezte a katonai utasítások alkotmányosságát és tiltakozásul megszegte a kijárási tilalmat. Miután felhívta az FBI-t és letartóztatását kérte bírósági ügye egészen a Legfelsőbb Bíróságig jutott. A Legfelsőbb Bíróság 1943-ban alkotmányosnak ítélte a kijárási tilalmat, annak ellenére, hogy egy adott etnikai csoportra, a japán származású személyekre vonatkozott.<sup>63</sup> Minoru Yasui szintén a kijárási tilalmat szegte meg, és a Yasui v. United States döntésben a bíróság helyt adott a kormány intézkedésének, csak úgy, mint a Hirabayashi döntésben.<sup>64</sup> A korábbi esetekhez képest 1944-ben a Korematsu v. United States Legfelsőbb Bírósági döntésben a bírósági kimondta, hogy Fred Korematsu-t nem a származása miatt büntették, illetve akarták kitelepíteni – Korematsu megszegte a katonai utasítást és nem hagyta el a kijelölt katonai övezetet –, hanem azért, mert az Egyesült Államok hadban állt Japánnal. A bíróság elfogadta a kormány érvelését, azaz a katonai szükségszerűséget, valamint azt, hogy a kijárási tilalom és a származás alapján elrendelt kitelepítés a kormány hatáskörébe tartozott.<sup>65</sup> Az 1943-ban kitöltött kérdőívekben megadott nemleges válaszok alapján a bíróság azt feltételezte, hogy a japán-amerikai közösség nem volt hűséges, így indokoltak voltak a kormány intézkedései. Ennek ellenére az Ex parte Endo döntésben 1944-ben a Legfelsőbb Bíróság kimondta, hogy a Kongresszus nem hagyta jóvá a lojális állampolgárok internálását.<sup>66</sup> Mindazonáltal, a döntés nem érintette a Mitsuye Endo által kifogásolt kitelepítést és internálást. A döntések jóváhagyták a japán-amerikaiak kitelepítését és internálását, valamint felmentették a Rooseveltt kormányt bármilyen felelősség alól.

A japán közösségnek 1976. február 19-ig kellett várnia, amikor is Gerald Ford elnök egy elnöki kiáltványban (Presidential Proclamation No. 4417) elismerte, hogy a japán-amerikaiak kitelepítése jogtalan döntés volt, és hogy az Egyesült Államokban élő japánok mindig is hűséges amerikaiak voltak.<sup>67</sup> Az 1970-es években a társadalmi mozgalmak jogorvoslatot és jóvátételt követeltek a kitelepítés áldozatainak. Jimmy Carter elnöksége alatt 1980-ban a Kongresszus létrehozott egy szövetségi bizottságot (Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, továbbiakban CWRIC), hogy kivizsgálja a kormány

---

<sup>63</sup> DANIELS, Roger: *Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective*, The History Teacher, Vol 35, N° 3. May 2002. 297-310. 305.

<sup>64</sup> SUNDQUIST, Eric J.: *The Japanese-American Internment: A Reappraisal*, The American Scholar, Vol 57, N° 4. 1988. 529-547. 531.

<sup>65</sup> LEVY, Robert A. – MELLOR, William: *The Dirty Dozen: How Twelve Supreme Court Cases Radically Expanded Government and Eroded Freedom*, CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. 2009. 136.

<sup>66</sup> SUNDQUIST, Eric J.: *The Japanese-American Internment: A Reappraisal*, The American Scholar, Vol 57, N° 4. 1988. 529-547. 531.

<sup>67</sup> DANIELS, Roger: *Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective*, The History Teacher, Vol 35, N° 3. May 2002. 297-310. 306.

felelősségét és feltárja az internálás okait. A CWRIC 1980 és 1983 között meghallgatásokat tartott és 1983-ban nyilvánosságra hozott jelentésében a faji előítéletet, a háborús hisztériát, és a politikai vezetés mulasztását jelölte meg, mint az internálás főbb okait.<sup>68</sup> A katonai szükségszerűség a bizottság véleménye szerint nem indokolta az internálást. A CWRIC jelentésében azt javasolta, hogy a kormány kérjen bocsánatot és egyszeri kárpótlást fizessen az áldozatoknak. A Kongresszus Képviselőháza 1987. szeptember 17-én megszavazta a CWRIC javaslatát, a H.R. 442 törvényjavaslat formájában. A H.R. 442 előírta, hogy az áldozatok \$20.000 kárpótlásra jogosultak – \$1,5 milliárdos keret állt rendelkezésre –, és a kormány bocsánatkérésre kötelezte.<sup>69</sup> Ronald Reagan elnök ellenezte a jóvátételt, úgy vélte, hogy az amerikai kormány konzervatív gazdasági álláspontját és kiegyensúlyozott költségvetését fenyegeti, ezért Reagan ellenállt a belpolitikai és a külföldi nyomásnak. Yasuhiro Nakasone japán miniszterelnök kormánya azért bírálta Reagan elnököt, mert nem hagyta jóvá a törvényjavaslatot és fennállt a veszély, hogy megvétózza. A jóvátételi mozgalomnak egészen 1988. augusztus 10-ig kellett várni, amikor is Ronald Reagan aláírta az 1988-as polgárjogi törvényt (Civil Liberties Act of 1988).<sup>70</sup> Reagan elnök pártja jövőjét szem előtt tartva, a közelgő elnökválasztás miatt engedett a politikai nyomásnak ezzel biztosítva George H. W. Bushnak 1988-as elnökválasztási győzelmét.

### Összegzés

A Pearl Harbort 1941. december 7-én ért támadást követően háborús hisztéria lett úrrá az Egyesült Államokon és a felszínre törtek a faji előítéletek. A fenyegetést jelentő ellenséges idegeneket az FBI már korábban megfigyelte, beazonosította, és a törvény is előírta az idegenek nyilvántartását. Az intézkedések és a rendelkezésre álló jelentések ellenére csak a japán-amerikaiak kitelepítését és internálását rendelte el a kormány faji hovatartozásuk alapján, a kollektív bűnösség elvét alkalmazva. A japán közösség lojalitását megkérdőjelezték és csak 1943-ban egy kérdőív formájában mérték fel hazafiasságukat, amikor már egy éve az internáló táborokban éltek. Leland Ford kongresszusi képviselő úgy vélte, hogy ha a Nisei generáció tagjai, akik amerikai állampolgársággal rendelkező japán-amerikaiak, hűségeseek, akkor úgy járulhatnak hozzá az ország biztonságához, hogy elfogadják a kitelepítést és az internálást.<sup>71</sup> Míg korábban az előítélet a faji diszkrimináción, rasszista ideológiákon alapult, Pearl Harbor után ez az ellenség képével párosult. Az Amerikában élő japán származású közösségre úgy tekintettek, hogy az az Egyesült Államok ellen irányuló inváziót vezető ötödik hadoszlop;

<sup>68</sup> MAGA, Timothy P.: *Ronald Reagan and Redress for Japanese-American Internment, 1983-88*, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol 28, N° 3. Summer 1998. 606-619. 608.

<sup>69</sup> Uo. 610, 612.

<sup>70</sup> Uo. 617.

<sup>71</sup> HANE, Mikiso: *Wartime Internment*, *The Journal of American History*, Vol 77, N° 2. September 1990. 569-575. 572.

azonban ez már nem a japán bevándorlást megtestesítő „sárga veszedelemtől” való félelem volt, hanem katonai inváziótól való rettegés. A japán ellenség, és a japán-amerikai egy és ugyanazon személy volt az amerikai társadalom szemében; nem lehetet őket megkülönböztetni, hiszen nem tekintették őket igazi amerikaiaknak. Nem számított, hogy amerikai állampolgárok voltak, sem az a tény, hogy sokan már évtizedek óta éltek az Egyesült Államokban, mivel japán vér folyt az ereikben. A tanulmány címében megfogalmazott kérdésre, hogy valójában a japán-amerikaiakra hogyan is tekintett az amerikai kormány és a katonai vezetés, maga John L. DeWitt altábornagy adta meg a választ: „*A japán faj egy ellenséges faj, és míg sok az Egyesült Államok területén született másod- és harmad-generációs az Egyesült Államok állampolgárságával rendelkező japán amerikanizálódott, a faji kötelék hígíthatlan maradt...*”<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>72</sup> John L. DeWitt altábornagy jelentése, 1943: McWILLIAMS, Carey: *What About Our Japanese-Americans?*, Public Affairs Committee, New York, 1944.10.





**Mészáros Zsolt**

## ***College Othniel: egy „magyar” iskola Kongóban***

### **Abstract**

The Foundation for Africa, a Hungarian NGO founded by the Congolese France Mutombo, operates a middle and high school and an orphanage in Kinshasa, DRC. The Foundation has spent the last 10 years building offering the possibility for underprivileged students to study in acceptable surroundings with professional staff in the impoverished Munganga district of the capital city. This paper provides an insight into the challenges, glories and sorrows the founders had to face while making their dreams come true. The Foundation had to overcome constant financial, cultural, administrative and logistical obstacles, not to talk about the ever-present corruption and incompetence, in a country where the basic infrastructure does not exist for running a school. In spite of all the hardships, the Foundation succeeded in bringing invaluable education to thousands of Congolese youngsters in need. The learning process that the Foundation has gone through can provide useful experience and know-how to start-up NGOs in the field of education and to established educational institutions in the Third World. And in the *First World as well...*

*Keywords:* Foundation, NGO, Congo, Kinshasa, school, Hungary, Africa, orphanage, learning, class, teach, study, France, education

**A** Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaságból származó France Mutombo Tshimuanga 1999 óta azon munkálkodik, hogy a kongói gyerekek is az európai gyerekekhez hasonló oktatásban részesüljenek. A több mint tíz éves ötletből mára egy ezerfős korszerű iskola, egy árvaház és megannyi humanitárius, oktatásfejlesztési és szociálpedagógiai projekt nőtt ki. 2004-ben magyar felesége, Angelika is bekapcsolódott a munkába és ma már egy tíz éves múltra visszatekintő alapítvány – Afrikáért Alapítvány – keretén belül fejtik ki tevékenységüket az afrikai gyerekek oktatásának minőségi fejlesztése érdekében. E tanulmány egy modern iskola születését mutatja be egy olyan afrikai országban, ahol a körülmények (anyagi, jogi, kulturális) kicsit sem kedvezőek az Európában természetesnek vélt nyilvános iskola létrehozásához.

France Mutombo Tshimuanga 1997-ben érkezett Magyarországra, teológiai tanulmányokat folytatni a herceghalmi Sola Scriptura Teológiai Főiskolán. Első ízben 1999-ben tért vissza hazájába – Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaság – látogatóba. A nálunk eltöltött két év megváltoztatta hozzáállását a világ dolgaihoz. *„Otthon a szegénység a normális, mind az anyagiakban, mind a szemléletben. Amíg el nem jövünk onnan és nem látjuk az ellenpéldát, azt hisszük, hogy ez a természetes állapot,”* – nyilatkozta a vele készült interjúban.<sup>1</sup> Hazájában az

---

<sup>1</sup> Interjú France Mutomboval. Budapest, 2012. október 22.

iskolába járás, a napi háromszori, változatos étkezés, a betegségek megelőzése érdekében tett alapvető higiéniai teendők ismerete vagy a kórház fogalma egyáltalán nem megszokott dolog. A kutatások kimutatták, hogy nincs több betegség Fekete-Afrikában, mint Európában, mégis valamiért betegebbek az emberek, többet éheznek, pedig évente négyszer aratnak néhány helyen. France a fent említett okok mögött nem is annyira az anyagi nélkülözést látja, hanem inkább a „szemléletbeli nyomort”. „*A szegénységnek nincsen erkölce, ahogy azt már Illyés Gyula is leírta a nincstelen pusztai cselédekről*” – fogalmaz ezzel kapcsolatban Kozma Judit<sup>2</sup>.

Ha tudományos magyarázatot keresünk, akkor Maslow axiómájára hivatkozhatunk, mely szerint, amíg a szükségletek hierarchiájának alsóbb szintjén elhelyezkedő alapvető szükségletek (az étel, a hajlék, a biztonság és a szeretet) kielégítetlenek, a hierarchia felsőbb szintjén elhelyezkedő szükségletek (a megbecsülés, a kognitív és esztétikai szükségletek, valamint az önmegvalósítás) kielégítésére nem kerülhet sor. A legalapvetőbb szükségletek kielégítetlensége miatt ezek a családok képtelenek biztosítani azt a védelmet és támogatást, ami a gyermek beilleszkedett felnőtté válásához nélkülözhetetlen lenne.<sup>3</sup>

France példaként a kongói hulladékfeldolgozás analógiáját hozza fel. Kongóban a szemét kezelésének módja nem létezik, vagyis mindenki ott hajítja el a szemetet, ahol éppen áll. Ezért van az, hogy aki egyszer hozzá szokik a kukák látványához, az már nem tudja „*minden érzelem nélkül*” elfogadnia régi állapotokat. „*Amikor 1999-ben először tértem haza Kongóba és a kinshasai reptéren kifújtam az orrom, fél óráig kerestem a szemetest, ahova eldobhatnám a zsebkendőt, mire rájöttem, hogy ilyen itt nincs! Aztán már – bár kényszeredetten – de ismét elhajigáltam a papír zsebkendőt, ahogy régen csináltam,*” – emlékezik vissza.

Két éves európai tartózkodása olyan mély hatást gyakorolt az alapítóra, hogy nem tudott szó nélkül elmenni amellett, amit hazalátogatásai alkalmával tapasztalt szülőföldjén. Egyszer itthon egy szabadkai néni hozott neki lekvárt, befőttet, savanyúságot a tél kellős közepén. France ekkor eszmélt rá, hogy mit is jelent a befőzés, tartósítás, tárolás. Kongóban annyi mangó van, hogy az utcán rohad a fele. De a mangó szezon csak két hónapig tart, utána az emberek éheznek, és a boltokban veszik a drága, importált mangót. „*A lekvár luxus nálunk. Anyukám nem tud lekvárt főzni!*”<sup>4</sup> – panasolja France.

Magyarországi visszatérte után France-ban mély nyomokat hagytak a kint tapasztaltak és elhatározta, hogy valamilyen formában segíteni fog honfitársain. Mi az, amivel leginkább el lehet érni a szemléletváltást, a tervezésre szoktatást, a hosszabb távú gondolkodást? Az utóbbi 40 év segélypolitikája bizonyította, hogy szimplán pénzzel, segélyekkel sajnos nem lehet előrelépést elérni. A külső

<sup>2</sup> KOZMA Judit. *A szegénység pszichológiai vonatkozásai*. Esély 2003/2. 9

<sup>3</sup> PAP Ágota. *A szegénység pszichológiája az okok boncolgatása nélkül*. IN: *Ni(c)kodémus*. [http://nickodemus.blog.hu/2009/12/18/a\\_szegenyseg\\_pszichologiaja\\_az\\_okok\\_boncolgatasa\\_nelkul](http://nickodemus.blog.hu/2009/12/18/a_szegenyseg_pszichologiaja_az_okok_boncolgatasa_nelkul). Letöltés: 2012. október 21.

<sup>4</sup> Interjú France Mutomboval. Budapest, 2012. október 22.

környezetet meg lehet változtatni anyagi javakkal, de a belsőt nem. Azt csak a *tudás* formálhatja át, a képességek és szemléletek ifjúkori elsajátítása. Ahogy Comenius is kifejtette már a 17. században: „*nemcsak az egyén üdvözülése szempontjából fontos az értelmi, erkölcsi és vallásos nevelés, hanem a társadalmi bajok gyógyítása érdekében is.*”<sup>5</sup>

France két évig csiszolta, rendezgette gondolatait, míg végül három ötlet megvalósítását tűzte ki célul: a) OKTATÓ ÉS NEVELŐKÖZPONT LÉTREHOZÁSA Egy már meglévő, bár elég kezdetleges iskola keretein belül kell elkezdni a „*tudáspestis*” terjesztését és a didaktikai módszertan mellé fel kell venni a neveléspedagógia elveket, módszereket (erkölcstan, etika, viselkedéstan); b) EGÉSZSÉGNEVELÉS: az egészségmegőrzés és az egészséges életmódra való nevelés (étkezés, testmozgás, higiénia, stb.) alapja az oktatásnak és e nélkül nem működhet a fenti központ sem; c) SZOCIÁLIS ELLÁTÁS: árvaház létesítése, ahol a szülők nélkül maradt gyerekek is részesülhetnek törődésben, szeretetben, valamint élvezhetik az iskolába járás előnyeit.

Az alapító másik célkitűzése a szegénynegyedekben élő azon gyermekek oktatásának támogatása volt, akiknek a szülei nem voltak képesek kifizetni a tandíjat. Kongóban az ingyenes állami oktatás fogalma ismeretlen, még a legegyszerűbb segédeszközt és berendezést nélkülöző iskolában is fizetni kell a tanuláért. Az „*óra*” szót is csak idézőjelben lehet értelmezni, mert mindössze annyi köze van a nálunk megszokott tanórákhoz, hogy van egy tanár és vannak a tanulók. Harminc fő alatti létszámmal csak drága elitiskolákban találkozhatunk. A 80-100 diák számú ritkaságnak, akik a túlsúlyos, sötét, villany és szellőzés nélküli termeknek nehezen nevezhető döngölt padlójú viskókban tanulnak. A pad név alatt futó ülőalkalmatosságot többnyire három-négyszer annyian használják, mint amennyire azt hivatalosan tervezték. Ceruza, toll, jegyzetfüzet, papír csak a kiváltságosoknak jut, a többieknek marad a tananyag fejbéli elsajátítása. Jobb esetben a tanár rendelkezik táblával, de gyakran a föld szolgál írófelületként és egy faág íróeszközként. És akkor ne is beszéljünk a mosdóról, tornateremről, étkezőhelyiségről, mivel ilyen „*luxus kiegészítők*” nincsenek egy átlagos iskolában. Az iskola kizárólag a tudás átadásának a színhelye, a frontális oktatásé; a figyelem fenntartását egy erős pálca segítségével érik el a többnyire alulképzett oktatók az alultáplált diákoknál. Az Othniel általános iskola hasonló körülményekkel „dicsekedhetett”, amikor azt France 2002-ben egy terepszemle alkalmával meglátogatta

France 2001-ben jegyezte be Magyarországon az Afrikáért Alapítványt és egy évvel rá kiutazott Kongóba két magyar társával felmérést készíteni a támogatandó iskolákról. Nagy segítség volt számára az Adventista Egyház, mert tőlük kapott ösztöndíjat magyarországi tanulmányai folytatásához. Az egyház által figyelmébe ajánlott iskolákat végiglátogatták, felmérték az iskolák anyagi helyzetét,

---

<sup>5</sup> Pukánszky Béla: *Johannes Amos Comenius pedagógiai szintézise*. IN: MÉSZÁROS István – NÉMETH András – PUKÁNSZKY Béla: *Neveléstörténet*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2005. 8. <http://magyar-irodalom.elte.hu/nevelestortenet/06.01.html>. Letöltés: 2012. november 5.

osztálylétszámot, tanári kart, vezetőséget, tantervet, valamint a támogatási lehetőségeket. A végső döntés a College Othniel-re esett, egy adventista misszionárius által alapított iskolára, melyet később egy helyi bizottság vett át és működtetett szerény lehetőségeihez mérten. Kongóban az iskoláknak az állam nem ad pénzt (sőt, megadóztatja őket), ami azt jelenti, hogy a tanárok a fizetésüket a szülők befizetéseiből fedezik, valamint az egyéb működési költségeket is a szülők állják. France végül úgy döntött, hogy magyar példa szerint bevezeti az ingyenes oktatást az iskolában. Az ingyenességhez azonban pénz kellett, ezért támogatókra volt szüksége, az iskola folyamatos működtetése szempontjából pedig rendszerese havi bevételre. Így született meg 2002-ben az Afrikáért Alapítvány első projektje: a *Fogadj örökbe!* program, melynek keretén belül magyar adakozók virtuálisan örökbe fogadnak egy-egy iskoláskorú gyereket és havi 2-3.000 Ft támogatással állják a gyerek iskolai költségeit (tandíj, tanszerek, egyenruha, stb.). Az első évben az iskola 200 tanulójaiból mintegy ötven „virtuális szülőre” talált Magyarországon, biztosítva ezzel nemcsak az ő ingyenes oktatásukat, hanem a többi gyerekét is. Az örökbefogadók a támogatásért cserébe rendszeres helyzetjelentést kaptak „gyermekük” tanulmányi teljesítményéről, mindennapjaikról, sőt, a szerencsésebbek szervezett utazások keretében találkozhattak is kiválasztottjukkal. A hír hallatára az iskola létszáma a következő évben megduplázódott, az örökbe fogadott gyerekek száma 2003-ban már elérte a százat.

2004-ben került sor a második missziós útra,<sup>6</sup> melyre France magával vitte a támogató szülők személyes ajándékait is, melyet nagy örömmel fogadtak a *Fogadj örökbe!* programba bekerült gyerekek. Ebben az évben már 800-an tanultak a College Othniel szűkös falain belül. A már jelentősre duzzadt létszám miatt ekkor kezdett kibontakozni az igény egyfajta adminisztrációs rendszer bevezetésére, hogy a gyerekek létszámát valamilyen módon számon lehessen tartani. A vezetőség beiratkozási kérdőívet osztott ki, melyekben a diákokat szociális és anyagi környezetükről kérdezte, valamint személyes adataikat rögzítette. Mérföldkő az iskola életében France és Angelika találkozása egy magyarországi nyári táboroztatás alatt. Angelika, France későbbi felesége, tevékenyen veszi ki részét az alapítvány működtetéséből; fontos szerepe volt és van a tanterv és adminisztráció kidolgozásában, implementálásban. Ez idő tájt jegyzik be a magyar alapítvány kongói szárnyát – *Fondation pour l’Afrique* –, amely 2005-ben megvalósítja France nagy álmát: átveszi az iskola teljes üzemeltetését a helyi bizottságtól. Az átvétel fontos pillanat, mert a fent felsorolt három alapelv megvalósítása csak részben volt lehetséges, mivel az iskola működtetését a helyi bizottság látta el és a támogatók keze bizonyos fokig kötve volt. Az új „tulajdonosok” középiskolával bővítik a létesítményt és belefognak egy új iskolaépület felépítésébe, mely korszerű otthont nyújt majd az évről évre duplázódó diákseregnek. Hála a nagylelkű magyar, amerikai és európai céges és

---

<sup>6</sup> Az elnevezés kétértelmű lehet, mivel az alapító elmondása szerint az útnak és az iskolatámogatásnak nincsenek térítői szándékai

magán támogatásoknak, az első kongói-magyar általános és középiskola megnyithatta kapuit, s „2006. szeptember 14-én, Kinshasa város Munganga nevű szegénynegyedében felcsendült a magyar himnusz. Felhúzták a magyar és a kongói zászlót, kongói és magyar személyekből álló vendégsereg jelent meg az eseményen”<sup>7</sup>.

A nem mindennapi építkezés hatására a TV2-es Jakupcsek Gabriella a helyszínen forgatta a „Világ árvái” egyik epizódját. A Vodafone helyi vállalata padokat adományozott az új iskolának, egy magyar napelem-gyártó cég az addig nem létező áramellátást tette lehetővé ajándék napelem-rendszerével. A régi tanári és vezetői gárda megmaradt, és immár 1.800 gyerek tanulhat térítésmentesen egy korszerűen felszerelt iskolában. Mutombo álma megvalósulni látszik. A megnyitót követően a mindaddig passzív szerepet betöltő Oktatási Minisztériumból egyre gyakrabban jöttek revizorok (inspecteur), akik különböző adót és illetéket próbáltak behajtani az iskola új üzemeltetőin. A kb. 2 USD-nyi fejadó mellett az iskola fizette az ellenőrök utazását, étkezését, valamint a Kongóban természetes hálapénzt (petite motivation) is.

Az ingyenes közoktatás megálmodói büszkén hirdették a College Othniel-t, mint példaintézményt Kongóban, ahol minden gyerek – függetlenül anyagi háttérétől – tandíjmentesen tanulhat. Amikor a minisztérium tudomást szerzett az ingyenes iskoláról, kételkedve fogadták a kezdeményezést. „Nem vagy normális! Kongóban senki nem tanul ingyen!”, röhögtek az illetékesek Mutombo tervén,<sup>8</sup> eleinte nehezen értette a minisztérium munkatársainak érvelését, de lassan rá kellett jönnie, hogy a helyi körülmények nem egyeznek az európaiakkal és „nem engedhető meg” az ingyenes oktatás.

Az első bizonyítékot arra, hogy az oktatás Kongóban áru és értéke van, a „korrupció” tanárok szolgáltatották, akik az órák alatt pénzt kértek a diákoktól, hogy aztán kiemelt figyelemben és jobb elbírálásban részesítsék őket, mint a többieket. A második jel a nagy fluktuáció és komolytalanság volt, amit a diákok mutattak az ingyen iskola iránt. Volt olyan tanuló, aki beiratkozott, de soha többé nem látták, egyesek a felénél hagyták abba és inkább elmentek dolgozni vagy csavarogni, míg mások fél távnál csatlakoztak be vagy éppen óra közben másztak ki és be az ablakon.

Az iskolai oktatás kultúrája nem vert még gyökeret a kongói társadalomban, ahol a gyerek munkaerő és a mindennapi túlélésben segít a családnak, s ha kell, akár a tanítási időszak alatt, helyett is. Mivel az oktatás hosszú távú pozitív hatása kevés embert érint, az iskolának nincs olyan társadalmi presztízse, hogy az ösztönzőleg hasson a gyerekekre, vagy akár a szülőre. Ilyen tudat hiányában a szülők azt vallják: járjon a gyerek iskolába, valamire biztos jó lesz, de ha dolgozni kell, akkor a munka az első. A szülők és a gyerekek sem részesülnek a rendszeres tanulásból származó előnyökből, és ezért nem érzik át annak felelősségét sem.

---

<sup>7</sup> MUTOMBO France: *Beszámoló*. Afrikáért Alapítvány. [http://afrikaert.hu/hu/utinaplok/reszletek/38/iskolamegnyito\\_nehezsegekkel\\_spontan\\_magyar\\_himnusszal\\_es\\_napele/](http://afrikaert.hu/hu/utinaplok/reszletek/38/iskolamegnyito_nehezsegekkel_spontan_magyar_himnusszal_es_napele/). Letöltés: 2012. szeptember 30.

<sup>8</sup> Interjú France Mutomboval. Budapest, 2012. október 29.

A költségmentesség miatt megnövekedett létszám is ellehetetlenítette a minőségi oktatást. A túlszűfolt termekben gyakran 60-80 diák is „ült” egyszerre. Előfordultak lopások, gyakori volt a fegyelmetlenség és ebből adódóan az óra nagy része fegyelmezéssel telt. Az is megnehezítette a helyzet kezelését, hogy France és Angelika Magyarországon tartózkodtak, és innét próbálták irányítani az egyre nagyobb adminisztrációt igénylő intézményt. Szerencsére a vezetőségben régóta ismert, megbízható, becsületes emberek ténykedtek, akik a Magyarországról átutalt pénzekkel körültekintően bántak. Már ez is nagy teljesítmény egy olyan országban, ahol a korrupció a legalacsonyabb szintektől a legfelsőig áthatja a társadalmat. A tanári létszám 22 főből állt, egy tanár havi fizetése 100-150 USD között mozgott.

2008-ban Magyarországot is elérte a gazdasági válság, aminek következményeként érezhetően megcsappant a támogatók és örökbefogadók száma. Míg az előző években minden évben ez a szám megduplázódott, 2008-ban stagnálni kezdett a *Fogadj örökbe!* program és a céges támogatások is elapadtak. Változtatni kellett az eddigi rendszeren, és hosszas mérlegelés után az ügyvezetők kihirdették a reformokat.

France és Angelika megfogadták a többiek javaslatát és a 2008-2009-es tanévben eltörölték az térítésmentességet. Ez óriási értetlenkedést és méltatlankodást váltott ki a szülőkből, de az átmeneti felháborodás után kénytelenek voltak belátni, hogy jelenleg Kongóban aki tanulni akar, az fizet. A költségterítéses képzés (havi 7-10 USD/diák) célja a minőségnevelés volt a következő területeken: 1.) ERKÖLCSI TÉREN: Megkezdődött a morális értékek promotálása és az ellenkezők szankcionálása (a „lopós” tanárokat azonnal elküldték, a késést, lógást büntették, az egyenruha viselését kötelezővé tették); 2.) ADMINISZTRÁCIÓS TÉREN: Új ügyvezetőt jelöltek ki, beiratkozási és szülői kérdőív kitöltésére kötelezték a diákokat, adatbázist vezettek a gyerekekről és rendszeres egészségügyi állapotfelmérést végeztek (utóbbi elsőként Kongóban); 3.) LÉTSZÁMKORLÁTOZÁS: Az osztálylétszámot maximum 50 főben korlátozták; 4.) KAPACITÁSFELJESZTÉS: Új tanárok alkalmazása, a régiók továbbképzése; 5.) INFRASTRUKTURÁLIS FEJLESZTÉSEK: Berendezések, segédeszközök korszerűsítése; kerítés kiépítése, hogy kizárják a fizetés nélküli „belógókat”; vizesblokk kiépítése (WC, zuhanyzó), kút építése, aggregátor vétele az áramellátás folyamatossága és a kút szivattyújának működtetéséhez; 6.) TANTERVI REFORM: „Para-college” kiegészítő nevelési modul kialakítása, kulturális-, színházi- és sportnapok szervezése, ösztöndíj bevezetése (szociális alapú és a Privilege-ösztöndíj).

Külön említést érdemel a kút kiépítése 2010-ben, mely nemcsak az iskolát látta el ivóvízzel, hanem az egész környék lakosságát, több mint 10.000 embert. Az aggregátor beszerzése is nagyban növelte az iskola működésének hatékonyságát. Ettől kezdve számítógépekkel végezték az adminisztrációt, sőt, egy, a diákok számára kialakított számítógépterem kiépítése is megkezdődött, ami 2011-ben meg is nyílt.

A reformok megvalósítását és az átállást megkönnyítendő, a Mutombo házaspár a 2009-2010-es tanév idejére Kongóba költözött. Személyesen

felügyelték a reformokat és vezették be a kongói oktatástól távol álló nevelésfejlesztő modult, amit France „*para-college*”-nek nevezett.

A Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaságban az Oktatási Minisztérium által kiadott Nemzeti Kerettanterv adja minden iskolai tanterv gerincét. A könyvecskében felsorolt modulok, tantárgyak oktatása kötelező, de emellett szabad mozgásteret biztosít a fakultatív tárgyakkal. Didaktikai és módszertani javaslatokat is tartalmaz a Kerettanterv. Az általános iskolai (6-12 év) tanmodul szerint a tanulónak a következő területeket kell elsajátítania: kongói nyelvek, francia, matematika, erkölcsstan, környezet- és egészségismeret, környezetismeret, történelem, földrajz, természettudományok, rajz, szépírás, ének, testnevelés, kézügyesség.

Az oktatás a College Othniel általános iskolában reggel 7.30 és déli 12.00 között zajlik, egy 25 perces szünettel 10.00-10.25 között. Étkeztetés nincs, ebédidőben kinyitják a kapukat, az utcai árusok beözönlenek, felsorakoznak az udvaron és egy improvizált „*svédasztal*” tárul a diákok elé, a főtt tésztától a fagyig majdnem minden kapható. Egy osztályt egyetlen tanár visz végig az első évfolyamtól kezdve a hatodik osztályig, s ennek végén a kisiskolásoknak le kell tenniük az állami érettségi vizsgát, ami komoly kihívás egy 12 éves nebuló számára. A középiskolások 12.30-tól veszik birtokukba az épületet és 17.15-ig tanulnak. A két 2,5 órás tömböt csak a 15.00 órakor kezdődő 25 perces szünet töri meg. Több pihenő tartása azért lehetetlen, mert az egyenlítőnél egész évben 18.00-kor sötétedik, és a gyerekeknek gyakran 40-50 percet is kell gyalogolniuk hazáig. Az ő oktatásuk már jobban hasonlít az európaikra, minden osztálynak van egy osztályfőnöke, s a tárgyakat más és más szaktanár tanítja.

A College Othniel középiskolában csakúgy, mint Kongó minden iskolájában a kétéves alapozó képzés után „*szakosodnak*” a tanulók. Az alábbi szakok közül választhatnak: a) KERESKEDELEM: Érettségi után főleg a közgazdaságtan, üzleti tanulmányok, államigazgatás irányában tanulnak tovább az e szakot választók; b) BIOLÓGIA-KÉMIA: Innét többnyire orvosképzésre jelentkeznek a végzősök; c) SZABÁS-VARRÁS: Csaknem kizárólag nők vesznek részt ezen a szakon és utána a textiliparban próbálnak elhelyezkedni.

A középiskolai modul (12-18 év) a következő tudományok középfokú ismereteit hivatott átadni: kongói nyelvek, testnevelés, francia nyelv, hittan-erkölcsstan (biblia ismeretek), francia írás és olvasás, kémia, történelem, biológia, földrajz, rajz, matematika, számítástechnika, angol.

A fenti tárgyak kötelezőek, bizonyos kreditmennyiséget el kell végezni a középiskolai tanulmányok alatt. Érdekes, hogy a középiskolában az ének nem tartozik a törzstárgyak közé. Talán azért, mert Kongóban annyira természetes dolog az éneklés, hogy fel sem merült annak az ötlete, hogy ezt tanítani kellene. A Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaságban a helyi nyelvek ismerete nagyon fontos. Lakóhelytől függ, hogy ki melyik kongói nyelvet tanulja (lingala, csiluba, szuahéli vagy kikongó), de az oktatás nyelve a francia.

Az értékelés százalékban történik: 50% alatt bukik meg a tanuló. Az osztályelső, osztály második, legjobb érettségi, legjobb záróvizsga (általános iskola végén)

díjazásban részesül: az iskolai ünnepélyeken tárgyi ajándékot kapnak, illetve a legjobb érettségiző továbbtanulási támogatásban részesül. Ha rászorul a tanuló, akkor tandíjkezdményt is kaphat, illetve a kérelem elbírálásánál is sokat számít, hogy milyen eredményeket mutat fel.

Újításnak számít a tantervi kereteken kívüli foglalkozás, a „*para-college*”) bevezetése a College Othnielben. Az amerikai szakirodalomban *extra-curricular activity* (iskolán kívüli elfoglaltság<sup>9</sup>) néven ismert foglalkozások közösségépítő, személyiségfejlesztő nevelési célokat fogalmaznak meg a „*teljes gyermek*” nevelése érdekében<sup>10</sup>. A College Othnielben a para-college két pillérre támaszkodik: 1.) ISMERETTERJESZTÉS: AIDS Program, környezetvédelmi előadások; 2.) ÖNMEGVALÓSÍTÁS/ÖNREFLEXIÓ: Espace Jeune (Fiatalok Tere). 3.) AIDS Program.

Kongóban nincs család, amelynek legalább egy tagja ne legyen fertőzött a HIV vírussal. A fertőzött embert kiközösítik, babonás félelem lengi körül, pedig gyakran nem is tehet a betegségéről. Az esetek nagy részében a kicsapongó életmódot folytató férj hozza be a családba a vírust, de a lelki, testi terhet a szívósabb asszonyoknak kell elviselnie, mivel a férjet általában hamarabb elviszi a betegség, ezzel magára hagyva a megfertőzött feleséget. Az asszonynak nem csak saját magáról kell gondoskodnia, hanem a család többi tagjáról is, betegen, egyedül, kirekesztve egy boszorkányhiedelmekkel átitatott, férfiközpontú világban.

Az AIDS program keretén belül egy szakképzett kongói pszichológus heti egy alkalommal csoportos foglalkozást tart a gyerekeknek, és ugyanilyen rendszerességgel a szülőknek, tanároknak. Első lépésként a pszichológus felmérést készít arról, hogy milyen tévhitekkel (fertőzés menete, babonák, stb.) rendelkeznek a gyerekek az AIDS/HIV-ről. Ezt követik az ismeretterjesztő órák, melyek a férfi-női nemiség alapismereteitől indulva jutnak el a családtervezésig, megelőzésig. Mindeközben a programban részt vevő orvos ügyeleti-tanácsadói órákat tart, ahol önkéntes alapon szűrést végeznek, valamint életviteli, családtervezési tanácsokat is adnak az érdeklődőknek. Az egy éven át tartó foglalkozások a felelősségérzet magjait igyekeznek elhinteni a gyerekekben, a prevenció, mint legjobb gyógymód elvét alkalmazván.

Az Espace Jeune egy ifjúsági szakkör, mely önreflexióra és önmegvalósításra buzdítja a diákokat, akikkel a tanórák után az élet mélyebb kérdéseit vitatja meg a foglalkozásvezetővel, az iskola lelkésze. A Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaságban az ilyen „*elmélyült*” beszélgetések ritkák, mert az utcán a ki a menőbb elv érvényesül, s azért, mert kevés lehetőség van hasonló, értelmes emberekkel összegyűlni. Az iskola lelkésze kiváló moderátor és mozgatórugója a beszélgetéseknek, melynek 10 fős magjához szokott 10-15 kevésbé elkötelezett diák csatlakozni. A heti egyszeri találkozásokat havonta egy teadélután, valamint kirándulás is kíséri.

<sup>9</sup> SZTAKI Angol-magyar szótár. <http://szotar.sztaki.hu>. 2012. október 24.

<sup>10</sup> *Progressive Education*. (2002) IN: GAVIN LOSS, Catherine - LOSS, Christopher P.: *Encyclopedia of Education*. [http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/progressive\\_education.aspx](http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/progressive_education.aspx). Letöltés: 2012. október 29.



Külsős szakemberek is gyakran tartanak előadást az iskolában. Egyszer kertészeti alapfogalmakat mutatott be egy mezőgazdasági szakember a nagyvárosi gyerekeknek, máskor egy műanyag-újrahasznosító üzem mérnöke szemléltette a PET palackok újrafeldolgozását. France, mint az Alapítvány elnöke, gyakran tart etikaórát a becsületességről, a morális tartásról, példákat emelve ki saját életéből. France előadásait mindig nagy érdeklődéssel hallgatják, és nagy tisztelet övezi személyét. Lelkészként megértően és szeretettel viszonyul mindenkihez, kitartó, megalkuvást nem tűrő munkamorálja Európában is példaértékű lenne.

2010-ben az Afrikáért Alapítvány nyert az Európai Önkéntes Szolgálat (European Volunteer Service – EVS) pályázaton, aminek köszönhetően 2011 januárjában öt magyar önkéntes fiatal utazott Kinshasa-ba fél évre. Az önkéntesek közt volt angoltanár, informatikus, szociális munkás és védőnő is. Utóbbi beindította, Kongóban egyedülálló módon a diákok egészségügyi szűrését.

Az EVS önkéntesek egy különleges felkészítő tanfolyamon vesznek részt az indulás előtt. Jordanidisz Ágnes és a Hátország Egyesület személyre szabott képzéstervet készített az Afrikáért Alapítvány önkénteseinek, ami tartalmaz válságkezelési tanácsadást, beilleszkedési javaslatokat a kultúrsoikk kivédésére, valamint higiéniai és életviteli tanácsokat a trópusi betegségek megelőzésére.<sup>11</sup>

A magyar önkéntesek – európai mivoltuk miatt már pusztán megjelenésükkkel – motiváló faktorként hatottak. Mindenki náluk akart tanulni. Munkásságuk révén a diákok tiszteletét is hamar elnyerték. Szakmai fejlődés szempontjából fontos szerepet játszanak az önkéntesek a kongóiak életében. A magyar fiatalok példája bizonyítja, hogy kitartó, becsületes munkával ki lehet érdemelni a társadalom megbecsülését. A jelenleg is kint tartózkodó önkéntesek mindennapi kihívásait, élményeit a <http://fiatalokafrikaert.blogspot.hu> oldalon lehet követni.

A College Othniel általános és középiskola a főváros, Kinshasa Munganga negyedében található, a 11 milliós metropolisz egyik szegényebb városrészében. Az itt élő családok nagy része a mindennapi megélhetésért küzd, élelemre sem mindig jut elegendő pénz. A családokban a napi egy étkezés a normális és gyakran „kimarad” az élelem egy-egy napra. Ami a közbiztonságot illeti, az órák a tanulók biztonsága érdekében negyed hatkor véget érnek, hogy a gyerekek még sötétedés előtt hazaérjenek. A trópusokon egész évben este hat óra körül megy le a nap. Az utcák kaotikusak, közlekedési szabályok csak papíron léteznek, járda, gyalogátkelő nincs. A diákok gyakran egy órát is gyalognak az iskolába, mivel a tömegközlekedés sincs megoldva. Áramellátás csak nemrégiben lett biztosítva a College Othniel-ben, de naponta többször előfordul áramszünet. Az Alapítvány által építtetett kút sokak számára az egyetlen tiszta ivóvízforrás a környéken.

A Kongói Demokratikus Köztársaság minden szintjét áthatja a korrupció. Legyen szó pár frankos csúszópénzről, vagy milliós lenyúlásokról, lefizetésekről, a társadalom mindennapjainak szerves részévé vált a korrupció. Ez a fajta mentalitás

---

<sup>11</sup> A Hátország Egyesület fő profilja az oktatás fejlesztése. Pedagógus továbbképzésekkel, a gyermekek fejlesztésével foglalkozik. További információ az egyesület honlapján található: <http://www.hatorszag.hu>.

– párosulva a *carpe diem* életfelfogással – odáig vezet, hogy minden döntés kizárólag a ma és most tényezőinek figyelembevételével születik (gyermekáldás, oktatáshoz való hozzáállás, élelembeszérlés, higiénia, stb.). Ezt tetőzik a késleltetett kifizetések is: gyakran 3-4 hónapos tartozást halmoznak fel a cégek a munkavállalókkal szemben és nem ritka, hogy a végén az alkalmazott később sem lát egy fillért sem a pénzéből. Ezek után nem meglepő, hogy aki egy kis pénzre tesz szert, nehezen adja ki azt a kezéből. Néhány példa a College Othniel mindennapjaiból: az iskola pénztárosa egyik napról a másikra lelépett a befizetett tandíjak jelentős részével. A konyhás néni az ételre szánt pénz felét magára költötte, míg az egyik szociális munkás a karácsonyi étkezésre szánt összeg felét szintén „lenyelte”.

A fent példák jól mutatják az Afrikáért Alapítvány előtt tornyosuló falat, melyet France és társai próbálnak áttörni. A szankcionálás (kizárás, elbocsátás, büntetés) és szigorú ellenőrzések a reform nélkülözhetetlen részei, de a negatív visszacsatolás hosszú távon nem vezet eredményhez.

Ösztönzőleg hat a szemléletváltásra a jól teljesítő diákok nyilvános elismerése, díjazása, lelki és anyagi támogatása. Egy nagyon újszerű – Magyarországon is megfontolandó – kezdeményezés a *Felelős Szülő Díj*, amit azok a szülők kapnak, akik rendszeresen járatják iskolába gyermeküket, időben befizetik a tandíjat és pozitív hozzáállásukkal támogatják az iskola működését. Az összes gyereket a College Othniel-be járató családok úgyszintén kiemelt elbánásban részesülnek: az ötödik gyermekükre tandíjmentességet kapnak.

2010-ben az előző évi széleskörű reformok megszilárdítása volt a cél: a „*tiszta mag*” konszolidációja. Az alapítók a pozitív emberi értékeket és viselkedési normákat tudatosítják a kongói emberekben. Ez azonban szigorú intézkedéseket kívánt meg: szankcionálni kellett azokat, akik loptak, csaltak, élőködtek; és díjazni kellett azokat, akik becsületesen tanultak, fizettek, dolgoztak.

Az első ilyen lépés a tandíjat nem fizető diákok kizárása volt (ezt elősegítette az iskola köré épített kerítés is). Ennek következtében egyes osztálylétszámok 50 főről ötre zsugorodtak! De az addig elnyomott, csendes, szorgalmas diákok hirtelen kivirultak. A fizetések rendezése után lassan visszaeresztették a kizárt tanulókat is, akik felnőttek a „jókhöz”. France és Angelika lehetőséget adott minden olyan gyereknek, aki *igazából* akart tanulni. Ha volt pénze, ha nem, valamilyen úton-módon megoldották az iskolai tandíj fizetését (szociális alapú támogatás vagy csökkentett tandíj).

France és Angelika elhatározták, megjutalmazzák azokat, akik becsületesen végigcsinálták a reformokat követő első évet, vagyis időben befizették a tandíjat, nem buktak meg és fegyelmezetten viselkedtek. A Privilege-ösztöndíj 10% kedvezményt nyújtott a következő évi tandíjból minden egyes diáknak, aki megfelelt a fenti követelményeknek. Az ösztöndíj célkitűzése a hosszú távú gondolkodás és felelősségteljes magatartásforma interiorizálása volt a gyerekekben és a szülőkből.

Furcsa módon az iskola vezetésének rövidtávú gondolkodása hiúsította meg a Privilege-ösztöndíj működését. Azért szavaztak a javaslat ellen, mert kizárólag a

számok alapján döntöttek, ami szerint az ösztöndíj bevezetéséből fakadó bevételkiesés túl nagy lett volna. Abban igazuk volt, hogy egy év alatt nem térült volna meg a befektetés, de nem is az volt az ösztöndíj célja, hanem az, hogy 3-4 év alatt olyan szintre emelje az oktatás minőségét, hogy távolabb élő családok is szívesen küldjék gyermekeiket a College Othniel-be, növelvén mind a tanulói létszámot, mind az iskola bevételét. Azt sem vette figyelembe a vezetőség, hogy az előző évi tanári tartozásokat úgy törlesztette az iskola, hogy a tanárok csemetéinél eltekintettek a tandíj befizetésétől, ami kb. 10.000 USD bevételkiesést jelentett. Ez az iskola teljes éves költségvetésének közel a negyede volt, és a következő évre már nem vonatkozott volna a kedvezmény.

Bár az oktatás állami szabályozása a gyakorlatban szinte nem létezik, felügyelőkből „Kongót” lehetne rekeszteni. Címeres szakfelügyelők heti rendszerességgel látogatják az órákat, hogy ellenőrizzék a megfelelő módszertan alkalmazását. A látottakat egy nagyon hivatalos jegyzőkönyvben ismertetik az igazgatóval, egy kiadós ebéd társaságában, majd a nyújtott szolgáltatásért cserébe elvárják némi hálapénzt és természetesen útiköltség-térítést is.

A másik érdekesen működő szervezet a szülői munkaközösség, mely normális körülmények között a szülői kontrollt hivatott gyakorolni az iskola felett, árképzési, tantervi és egyéb kérdésekben. Kongóban elvileg a családlátogatások, a szülők és az iskola közötti ügyek elrendezése lenne a dolguk, de ehelyett a vezetőjük – Angelika szerint egy „alkoholista pióca”<sup>12</sup> – egyetlen célnak az iskola megfejését tartotta. A szülők informálása helyett rémhíreket és pletykákat terjesztettek, például a 2010-es nyári szünetben azt, hogy az iskola be fog zárni és kórház nyílik a helyén. Az ilyen szervezeteket, felügyelőket és a fentebb említett lopós tanárokat, alkalmazottakat csak egy céltudatos, határozott vezető tarthat kordában. 2006-2010 között a College Othniel igazgatója egy keménykezű, autoriter ember volt, parancsai megkérdőjelezhetetlenek voltak. A Harrison-féle szervezeti kultúrák közül leginkább a Zeusz szerű klub kultúra jellemezte az igazgató által megkövetelt szervezeti struktúrát.

A Zeusz kultúra úgy működik, mint egy klub, amelyik a vezető köré tömörül, aki a szervezetet saját személyiségének kiterjesztéseként értelmezi<sup>13</sup>. Bár hatásos volt az élősködők ellen, de munkatársai rokonszenvét sem sikerült elnyernie, mivel nem fogadott el semmiféle kritikát, javaslatot. Bukását is ez okozta: a tanárok és a többi vezetőségi tag is elpártolt mellőle. Őt váltotta France középiskolájának egykori igazgatója, egy értelmes, Európában tanult, szakmailag felkészült pedagógus. Úgy tűnt, hogy minden sínen halad, az új igazgató nagyon szakszerű módon végezte a munkáját, egészen addig, amíg nem került konfliktushelyzetbe. Az ilyen szituációkat legszívesebben elkerülte, de ha nem tudta, akkor is mindig a könnyebb megoldást választotta. A szülői munkaközösséggel való konfrontációkban gyakran állt át a másik oldalra és hagyta magára saját

<sup>12</sup> Interjú Angelika Mutombo-val. 2012. október 18.

<sup>13</sup> BÁBOSIK István et al.: *Az iskola belső világa*. ELTE PPK Neveléstudományi intézet, Budapest, 2006. 46.

kenyéradóját, az Afrikáért Alapítványt. Valamiért nem tudta teljesen elkötelezni magát a College Othniel mellett, sosem derült ki, hogy miért. Talán irigységet érzett amiatt, hogy az egyik volt tanítványa saját iskolát alapított, ami ma már konkurál az ő általa egykor igazgatott neves gimnáziummal. A végén neki is mennie kellett és egy külsős ismeretlen helyett két belső munkatársban találták meg a megfelelő embereket a feladatra. Az egyik bizottsági tag az a középkorú férfi lett, aki fegyelmi igazgatóként már régóta ténykedett az iskolában és nagyon megbízható, becsületes munkaerőnek bizonyult. A bizottság elnökének azt a fiatal, szorgalmas fiút jelölték, aki informatikusként kezdte karrierjét az iskolában és onnét került a számlálétra legfelső fokára.

Egy iskola eredményességének legkézzelfoghatóbb mutatója a sikeresen letett érettségi vizsgákban mérhető. Mivel a vizsgákat a kongói állam írja ki és az országban egységesen minden diáknak le kell tennie, ezért összehasonlítási alapként is szolgál egyes iskolák között. A College Othniel-ben a 2008-2009-es tanév végén 40 diák próbálkozott a vizsgával, de csak 4-nek sikerült. Ekkortájt még ingyenes volt a beiratkozás és fent említett tényezők miatt az oktatás minőségét hűen jellemezte a kiábrándító eredmény. A reformokat követően – bár csökkent az érettségizők száma – de az utóbbi két évben minden végzős tanuló sikerrel vette az akadályt.

A sikeres érettségizőkön kívül az intézmény még számos sikertörténettel büszkélkedhet. Az iskola egykori informatikusa és fegyelmi igazgatója hosszú évek szorgos, kitartó munkájával jutottak el a vezetői bizottság élére. Egy árván maradt, nagy szegénységből kiemelt gyerek 2008-ban a legjobb tanulóként végzett a középiskolában, és magyar támogatással ma a neves orvosi egyetemen tanul Kinshasában. Számos hasonló esetet lehetne még említeni, arról, hogy milyen sikereket értek el a végzős hallgatók későbbi életükben, de sajnos a pályakövető rendszert még nem vezették be a College Othniel-ben és a fiatalok idővel elvesztik a kapcsolatot egykori középiskolájukkal.

2012 nyarán az Afrikáért Alapítvány megvásárolta az árvaház épületét, biztosítva az árvák ellátását, gondoskodását és oktatását. A következő lépés az árvaház működési reformjának lebonyolítása, az épület állagának javítása, megfelelő szakemberek alkalmazása, valamint az elkötelezettség növelése az árvák iránt.

A reformok befejeződtek: az alapítók által megálmodott felelősségteljes gondolkodás kultúrája lassan kezd teret hódítani az iskolai szereplők között, a kontroll-folyamatok megvalósultak, távolból is lehet ellenőrizni az elvégzett, illetve a nem elvégzett feladatokat. Az Afrikáért Alapítványt ma egy minőségi oktatást nyújtó, messzi földről diákokat vonzó iskola üzemeltetőjeként ismerik.

### ***Authors of the volume***

BODNÁR, Erzsébet, associate professor, University of Debrecen  
BOUNEAU, Christophe, professor, Michel de Montaigne University of Bordeaux 3  
CSEH, Dániel, Ph.D. student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
CSERHÁTI, Ferenc, Ph.D. student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
DEÁK, Máté, Ph.D. student, University of Pécs  
FISCHER, Ferenc, professor, University of Pécs  
GARADNAI, Zoltán, head of department, Hungarian National Archives, Budapest  
GHENGHEA, Mircea-Cristian, PhD, Assistant Researcher, „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”  
University of Iași  
GONÇALVES, Leandro Pereira, professor, doctor in Social History by Pontifícia  
Universidade Católica de São Paulo Brasi  
GULYÁS, László, associate professor, University of Szeged  
HUSZÁR, Kristóf, Mathematics BSc student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
KÓKAI, Károly, lecturer, University of Vienna  
MADARÁSZ, Anita, Ph.D. student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
MÉSZÁROS, Zsolt, Ph.D. student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
PÁL, Zsombor Szabolcs, Ph.D. student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
PICHONNIER, Christopher D., Ph.D. student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
and Michel de Montaigne University of Bordeaux 3  
PINTZ, Katalin, Ph.D. student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest  
RÉFI, Attila, Ph.D., Associate Research Fellow, Research Center for the Humanities,  
Institut of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences  
SZABÓ-ZSOLDOS, Gábor, Ph.D. student, University of Debrecen  
SZALÁNCZI, József Krisztián, Ph.D. student, University of Pécs  
VALKOUN, Jaroslav (PhDr), Charles University, Prague  
ZUBOR, Zalán, MA student, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

