

# ÖT KONTINENS

*Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék  
közleményei*

**Special number of the cooperation between ELTE and the  
University of Jyväskylä  
№2012/1.**



**Eötvös Loránd  
Tudományegyetem**



**University of Jyväskylä**



**BUDAPEST  
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**EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY  
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## ***Foreword***

Our review is ten years old, because the first volume of ÖT KONTINENS was published in 2003. This number and the next one in 2004 were published in Hungarian. The volume of 2005 was edited in French and the next volumes were published in foreign languages, first of all in English, in French and in German. Every volume contains texts in Hungarian too. From last year the review appears twice a year and you find abstracts and keywords in English to every study. ÖT KONTINENS is the review of the Department of Modern and Contemporary History (Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Humanities, Budapest). We try to publish studies dealing with the history of the five continents from the 18<sup>th</sup> century to the present. And we try to publish the studies of the colleagues from all over the world.

Nowadays it is not easy to find financial support to edit a review. This is true for us, for ÖT KONTINENS too. In spite of this we managed to publish every year the volumes of our review. These volumes are on the site of the Institut of History of our university - <http://tortenelemszak.elte.hu/index.php/ot-kontinens> - and you can find the volumes of the last year on this site too: [www.cceol.com](http://www.cceol.com) . I hope you can read the texts of the present volume on these sites as soon as possible.

Good reading!

Budapest, 25<sup>th</sup> November 2013.

István Majoros  
editor in chief



## ***Introduction***

This volume is one of the fruits of the cooperation between the Department of Modern and Contemporary Hungarian History of the Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest) and the Department of History and Ethnology of the Jyväskylä University. On 19-20 April 2012 an international conference entitled „*The 20<sup>th</sup> Century Post-War Crises in European Comparative Perspective*” was organised in Budapest.

To take the cue from the historian of postwar, Tony Judt, one may say that although postwar studies have become very fashionable, there remains a lot of „*unfinished business*” from the twentieth century military conflicts.<sup>1</sup> The 1989-1990 overturn opened new fields for de-ideologized approaches which redirected historical studies from, for example, purely post-Versailles political-economic evaluations or post-1945 Cold War studies towards taking toll of the after-effects and consequences of the World Wars from the point of view of the experiences of people and societies themselves.<sup>2</sup> From their point of view, war and peace form dichotomous conceptual pair in which war denotes ‘*terrible killing*’ and peace implies ‘*wonderful calm*’. And even if uncertainty and worry about the future was an everyday experience during the war, the most typical feature of the wartime evidently was that life was steady: it was regulated and controlled by the power. Social institutions were geared to work in a particularly planned or programmed way. In contrast, ensuing peace was often the time for paying the dues, time of retribution and nemesis. Frequently, the price has been so high that post-wars were marked with a period of ‘*peace crises*’, instability, turbulence and social unrest, which are actually quite rare at wartime. To highlight: in recent studies the large extent of postwar peacetime violence and survival processes have come to the fore, pushing aside the sanitization of painful memories of them. These aspects of the crisis include the suffering and survival of civilian population in the following sectors of life: (1) displacement of populations, (2) widespread hunger and starvation, (3) refugee camps and internment, (4) deportations, and (5) destruction in nature and infrastructure.

These abnormalities posed grave challenges to the state and society bound to start functioning properly, and which may disturb or become threats to the reconstruction work. The problems faced by postwar governments can be classified as follows:<sup>3</sup>

1. General demobilization: demobilization of troops; adjusting production to meet peacetime needs.

2. Pacifying and unifying the society: solving political and economic problems; decreasing/increasing social control; reconstruction; war reparations; punishing

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1 JUDT, Tony: *Postwar. A History of Europe since 1945*. The Penguin Press, New York, 2005.2.

2 See BIESS, Frank: "Introduction". IN: *Histories of the Aftermath. The Legacies of the Second World War in Europe*. Eds. BIESS, Frank & MOELLER. Robert G. Berghahn, New York, Oxford, 2010. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Editors' summary of Professor Petri Karonen's opening speech at the Conference 19<sup>th</sup> of April, 2012.

the guilty; strengthening or re-instating the legitimacy of the state

3. The re-integration of veterans: rewarding heroism with land, money and honours; providing homes and employment

4. Welfare provision and re-education

5. Healing of the physical and psychological traumas: providing for invalids, widows, dispossessed and orphans; therapies; institutionalization;

The volume is based on two pivotal concepts: crisis management and the world wars. The topic was chosen in the belief that it is particularly relevant in the face of the current world economic crisis. Finding the right way out of a crisis has always depended on drawing the right conclusions from historical experiences. As we have learnt from the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there have been nations that got out of a post-war crisis stronger than others due to their ability to do just that. And there were countries that have been less successful in making use of their historical experience and remained in „*the crisis zone of Europe*” as Iván T. Berend has put it.

The contributors to this volume come from eight different countries – Finland, Sweden, Russia, Poland, Hungary, Austria, Rumania and Estonia – and they recount the experiences of crisis management from a variety of angles. We, as the editors of the volume are hoping that the results will prove useful also for the wider public.

*Anssi Halmesvirta*  
University of Jyväskylä

*Zsuzsanna Varga*  
Eötvös Loránd University

***The 20<sup>th</sup> Century Post-War Crises in  
European Comparative Perspective***

**STUDIES**



**Ferenc Eiler**

***Edle Vorhaben vs. politisches Kalkül  
Tätigkeit des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses vor und  
hinter den Kulissen (1925-1938)***

**Abstract**

Der Europäische Nationalitätenkongress war in der Zwischenkriegszeit die einzige internationale Organisation in Europa, die das Ziel verfolgte, ein internationales Forum für *alle nationale* Minderheiten zu schaffen, und die Interessen dieser Minderheiten auf der großpolitischen Bühne zu vertreten. Der Nationalitätenkongress deklarierte sich während seiner 14jährigen Geschichte (1925-1938) immer als einheitliche Bewegung der nationalen Minderheiten von Europa. Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich sowohl mit der offiziellen Tätigkeit des Nationalitätenkongresses als auch mit der Realität hinter den Kulissen: mit den Instrumentalisierungsbestrebungen verschiedener Regierungen und mit den Spannungen innerhalb der Organisation.

*Keywords:* Nationalitätenkongress, Minderheitenschutz, nationale Minderheiten, Völkerbund, Deutschland, Ungarn.

***Die Idee der Zusammenarbeit aller nationalen Minderheiten in Europa***

**D**ie politische Landkarte von Mittel- und Südosteuropa änderte sich nach dem ersten Weltkrieg tiefgehend. Die alliierten Großmächte entschieden sich in der letzten Phase des Krieges für die Unterstützung territorialer Forderungen ihrer Verbündeten, so hörte die Anwesenheit großer multinationaler Staatengebilden in der von Deutschland, Sowjet-Russland und der Türkei begrenzten Region auf. Die Siegermächte waren aber auch damit im Klaren, dass die Unzufriedenheit der neuen nationalen Minderheiten, die sogar auch konnationale Staaten hinter sich wussten, mit der Zeit zum destabilisierenden Faktor für die Innenpolitik dieser „neuen“ Staaten und somit auch das ganze Friedenswerk werden kann. Um die innere Stabilität dieser Staaten möglichst zu stärken, entschieden sie sich also für den internationalen Schutz sprachlicher, religiöser und nationaler Minderheiten (race) in der Region. In diesem Sinne wurden Minderheitenschutzverträge mit den assoziierten Kleinstaaten unterzeichnen lassen, und die meist identischen Bestimmungen auch in den Friedensverträgen eingebaut. So wurde ein unter die Aufsicht des Völkerbunds gestelltes regionales Minderheitenschutzsystem geschaffen, das zum wichtigen Element des erhofften Systems kollektiver Sicherheit sein musste.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Die baltischen und kaukasischen Staaten sowie Albanien mussten als Voraussetzung ihres Beitritts in den Völkerbund zum Schutze ihrer Minderheiten den in den Minderheitenschutzverträgen festgesetzten allgemeinen Grundsätzen entsprechende Maßnahmen treffen. Estland, Litauen, Lettland

Die deutschen Minderheiten reagierten sehr schnell auf die neue Situation und gründeten 1922 in Wien den Verband deutscher Volksgruppen in Europa.<sup>2</sup> Es wurde mit der prinzipiellen und geheimen finanziellen Unterstützung des Auswärtigen Amtes sogar auch der institutionelle Rahmen der überstaatlichen Zusammenarbeit geschaffen. Die wichtigste Aufgabe des Berliner Büros der Organisation war die Lobbytätigkeit bei den Ministerien und gesellschaftlichen Organisationen in Deutschland sowie die juristische Beratung der deutschen Minderheiten. Die aus verschiedenen Staaten delegierten Mitglieder des Ausschusses kamen jährlich mehrmals zusammen, um die Tendenzen und die konkreten Problemen miteinander zu besprechen. Die deutschen Minderheiten anerkannten den Völkerbund als Garant des internationalen Minderheitenschutzes, und erwarteten von ihm die Steigerung der Effektivität des Garantieverfahrens.<sup>3</sup> An der staatlichen Ebene erwarteten sie von den Regierungen den Respekt der Minderheitenschutzbestimmungen, und die Durchsetzung der Idee der kulturellen Autonomie.<sup>4</sup>

Für die Gründung des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses baten das Minderheitenschutzsystem des Völkerbunds und der Verband deutscher Volksgruppen in Europa den wichtigsten internationalen politischen Hintergrund.<sup>5</sup> Der Initiator Ewald Ammende, estlanddeutscher Journalist nahm schon auch an der Gründung des Verbands aktiv teil.<sup>6</sup> Trotz der negativen Einstellung des Auswärtigen Amtes zur Idee einer überstaatlichen Zusammenarbeit aller nationalen Minderheiten in Europa rief er 1925 die wichtigsten Repräsentanten der Minderheiten von Europa in Genf zusammen.<sup>7</sup> Der Plan wurde von vielen

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und Albanien sowie Finnland unterbreiteten in diesem Sinne dem Völkerbundrat Erklärungen, die mehr oder weniger den Verträgen entsprachen.

<sup>2</sup> An der Gründungssitzung nahmen alle deutsche Minderheiten teil, außer den Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei.

<sup>3</sup> AMMENDE, Ewald: *Gründe, Aufgaben und Programm für eine Zusammenarbeit der Vertreter aller deutschen Minoritäten in Europa*, Nation und Staat, 33, (1932) 62-68.

<sup>4</sup> Es war nicht einfach die unterschiedlichen Interessen aufs gleiche Plattform zu bringen. Für die seit Jahrhunderten weit von Deutschland lebenden Deutschen war die Idee der kulturellen Autonomie annehmbar, einige der neuen deutschen Minderheiten (z.B. in Polen und in der Tschechoslowakei) warteten aber auf die Verwirklichung der Grenzrevision. Von der Dilemma siehe PIEPER, Helmut: *Die Minderheitenfrage und das deutsche Reich 1919-1933/34*. Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, 1974. 77-78.

<sup>5</sup> Von der Tätigkeit des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses siehe BAMBERGER-STEMMANN, Sabine: *Der Europäische Nationalitätenkongreß 1925 bis 1938. Nationale Minderheiten zwischen Lobbyistentum und Großmachtinteressen*. Verlag Herder Institut, Marburg, 2000; EILER, Ferenc: *Kisebbségvédelem és revízió. Magyar törekvések az Európai Nemzetiségi Kongresszuson 1925-1939*. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Ewald Ammende (1892-1936) Estlanddeutscher Journalist, Generalsekretär des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses. Zwischen 1919 und 1922 war er Direktor des Verlags der Rigaschen Rundschau. Mitbegründer des Verbans deutscher Volksgruppen in Europa 1922. Ammende gründete den Europäischen Nationalitätenkongress, und war Generalsekretär der Organisation bis zu seinem Tode in 1936.

<sup>7</sup> Gen. Konsul Müllers Aufzeichnung über den Plan des Nationalitätenkongreßes. Berlin, 5.



Minderheitenpolitikern positiv empfangen, und Vertreter von 28 Volksgruppen aus 12 verschiedenen Staaten nahmen an den Sitzungen teil.<sup>8</sup> Das Echo der Tagung war in der internationalen Presse meistens positiv bzw. abwartend. Die Anwesenden entschlossen sich deswegen für das Wiederholen der Zusammenkunft im nächsten Jahr. Von da an veranstaltete die Organisation bis 1938 jährlich eine Konferenz.<sup>9</sup> Nur anerkannte Politiker und Journalisten schalteten sich in der Vertretung ihrer Minderheiten in die Tätigkeit des Nationalitätenkongresses ein.

Ammende schwebte mehrere Ziele vor. Er wollte eine von den Staaten unabhängige Organisation auf der Palette der internationalen Politik sehen, die die Interessen der nationalen Minderheiten vertreten könnte. Er wollte mit der Zeit erreichen, dass der Nationalitätenkongress vom Völkerbund und den Staaten als Verhandlungspartner in den Themen des Minderheitenschutzes anerkannt wird. Das Endziel der Bewegung war die Durchsetzung der kulturellen Autonomie in den europäischen Staaten. Die Vorbedingung war aber dazu unter anderem die Herstellung der Repräsentativität der nationalen Minderheiten innerhalb der Organisation. Wegen der Empfindlichkeit der Regierungen durfte die Frage der Sezession an den Sitzungen der Konferenzen nie in Frage kommen. Außerdem war es den Delegierten auch verboten, konkrete Kritik an der Minderheitenpolitik einzelner Staaten an den jährlichen Konferenzen zu üben. Diese Einstellung war nicht nur wegen den Staaten wichtig, sondern auch deshalb, weil die nationale Empfindlichkeit der konnationalen Minderheiten unbedingt verschont bleiben musste.

Ammende hoffte auch darauf, dass seine Organisation innerhalb paar Jahren auch zum Katalysator der Solidarität unter den Minderheiten innerhalb der einzelnen Staaten werden kann. Die Situation der Minderheiten war nicht gleich, so verfolgten sie oft nicht die gleichen Ziele. Diese Tatsache erschwerte natürlich die Zusammenstimmung der verschiedenen Forderungen und Strategien. Ammende war aber auch bereit, persönlich für einzelne Minderheiten bei den Regierungen aufzutreten. Als Leiter einer internationalen Organisation wollte er später seinen erhofften Einfluss für sie einsetzen.

Ammende war ein Journalist mit sehr guten internationalen Beziehungen und Engagement. Er war mit dem Einfluss der Presse im Klaren und legte deshalb einen besonderen Akzent darauf, dass die Weltöffentlichkeit über die Tätigkeit der Organisation Nachricht erhält. Die Tagungsberichte wurden deshalb jedes Jahr veröffentlicht, außerdem stellte er monatlich Berichte über die wichtigsten Ereignisse in der Minderheitenthematik zusammen, die den Botschaften und wichtigsten Zeitungen in Europa regelmäßig versandt wurden. Oft veröffentlichte er auch Artikel von den Bestrebungen der Organisation in der internationalen Presse.

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September 1925. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA), R 60462. Ohne Folienzahlen.

<sup>8</sup> Siehe Anhang, Tabelle 1.

<sup>9</sup> Die Tagungen wurden meistens in Genf gehalten. In den 1930er Jahren kamen die Delegierten einmal in Wien, London und Stockholm, zweimal in Bern zusammen.

Der Nationalitätenkongress blieb unter anderem wegen Mangel an finanziellen Quellen eine lockere Kongressgemeinschaft. Die Organisation hatte einen Vorsitzenden in der Person des Slowenen Josip Wilfan, und ein Generalsekretariat unter der Leitung von Ammende mit dem Sitz in Wien.<sup>10</sup> Zu den Aufgaben des Generalsekretärs gehörten die internen Organisationsgeschäfte, die Aufrechterhaltung der Verbindung mit den einzelnen Volksgruppen, das Informieren und Beeinflussung der Presse, die Pflege der Kontakte zu den verschiedenen internationalen Organisationen und die Ausgabe des Bulletins des Kongresses, in dem Nachrichten über die konkrete Lage der einzelnen Minderheiten veröffentlicht wurden.

Für die Vorbereitung der jährlichen Kongresse wurde immer ein Ausschuss gewählt, dessen Mitglieder die Standpunkte und Interessen der größeren nationalen Gruppen vertraten.<sup>11</sup> Sie entschieden sich für die Thematik der Konferenzen, und für die Strategie der Organisation. Die Mitglieder kamen jährlich mindestens zweimal zusammen, und besprachen alle aktuelle Fragen. Wenn es Spannungen innerhalb der Organisation gab, wurden die Probleme meistens in diesem Forum hinter den Kulissen besprochen.

Die Mitglieder der Organisation kamen jährlich einmal zusammen und hielten eine zweitägige Konferenz. Der Ausschuss entschied sich für die zu besprechenden Themen, und ersuchte die Referenten einen Vortrag zu halten. Zu den Vorträgen wurden Korreferate gehalten, danach hatten auch die Teilnehmer Möglichkeit, ihre Standpunkte während der Diskussion zu entwickeln. Die Konferenzen waren immer von hohem Niveau, weil die Referenten Sachverständige der Minderheitenproblematik, meistens auch selbst Juristen, waren. Am Ende der Tagungen wurden Resolutionen entschlossen, die den offiziellen Standpunkt der Organisation in den gegebenen Fragen widerspiegelten.

Zwischen 1925 und 1938 wurden alle Fragen der Minderheitenthematik an den Konferenzen aufgearbeitet. Die Organisation erließ zu den Themen viele allgemeine Resolutionen, die den Standpunkt des Kongresses in den gegebenen Fragen vertraten.<sup>12</sup> Die meisten davon konzentrierten in großen Zügen auf vier Themenbereiche. Viele beschäftigten sich mit der Tätigkeit des Völkerbunds und entwarfen auch konkrete Reformvorschläge zum Garantieverfahren. (Stärkung der völkerrechtlichen Stellung der Minderheiten, Öffentlichkeit beim Petitionsverfahren, Verrechtlichung des Verfahrens, Errichtung einer ständigen Minderheitenkommission beim Völkerbund usw.) Eine andere Gruppe der

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<sup>10</sup> Josip Wilfan (1878-1955) Slowenischer Politiker in Italien, Präsident des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses. Der Triester Politiker war Abgeordneter im italienischen Parlament. Nach einem Streit mit Mussolini musste er 1928 emigrieren, und lebte bis 1939 in Wien. Danach siedelte er in Belgrad um.

<sup>11</sup> Siehe Anhang, Tabelle 2.

<sup>12</sup> Nach allen Tagungen veröffentlichte der Nationalitätenkongress die von Ammende redigierten Protokolle der Sitzungen und die angenommenen Resolutionen mit dem Titel *Sitzungsbericht des Kongresses der organisierten nationalen Gruppen in den Staaten Europas*.

Resolutionen beschäftigte sich mit der Minderheitenpolitik der Staaten. Diese forderten die Staaten auf, die durch Minderheitenschutzverträge gewährten Rechte der Minderheiten einzuhalten. Oft behandelten die Resolutionen auch die Frage der kulturellen Autonomie. Weil diese für einige Minderheiten nicht annehmbar war, wurde es auch betont, dass diese nur mit dem Einverständnis der betroffenen Minderheiten eingeführt werden kann. Der letzte große Themenkreis war die Notwendigkeit innerstaatlicher und überstaatlicher Zusammenarbeit der Kongressmitglieder.

Ammende hatte auch vor, bei den Regierungen im Interesse konkreter Minderheiten oder der Reform des Garantieverfahrens Lobbytätigkeit auszuüben. Oft machte er große Rundreisen, und suchte dann nicht nur die führenden Persönlichkeiten der Minderheiten auf, sondern auch Politiker bzw. Staatsmänner, die auf die Gestaltung der Minderheitenpolitik irgendwelchen Einfluss hatten. Und wenn er sich in Genf aufhielt, besuchte er unbedingt auch die Mitarbeiter der Minderheitensektion des Völkerbundsekretariats, um sie möglichst zu beeinflussen und von ihnen Informationen zu erhalten.

### ***Hinter den Kulissen: innere Spannungen, stockende Kooperation, Instrumentalisierung***

Der Nationalitätenkongress bestimmte sich vor der Weltöffentlichkeit immer als einheitliche Bewegung der nationalen Minderheiten von Europa. Diese Bemerkung entsprach aber der Wirklichkeit nicht. Hinter den Kulissen war die Zusammenarbeit der Mitglieder gar nicht so harmonisch, und die Praxis passte sogar oft nicht zur Theorie.

### ***Autonomie als Endziel***

Mit der Forderung der kulturellen Autonomie waren einige Minderheiten in Wirklichkeit von Anfang an nicht einverstanden. Z.B. die Polen, Dänen und die Sorben hielten diese Forderung wegen Mangel an ihrer finanziellen Stärke für unannehmbar. Für die Ukrainer und Weißrussen war diese Forderung aber viel zu mäßig, sie forderten nämlich Sezession oder mindestens territoriale Autonomie.<sup>13</sup> Beide Gruppen traten deshalb in den ersten Jahren vom Nationalitätenkongress aus. Die Ukrainer kehrten später zurück. Ihre Delegierten sprachen von da an nie von ihren wirklichen Forderungen, aber sie hielten die Teilnahme für wichtig, weil sie die wirklichen Bestrebungen des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands so beurteilten, dass ihre politischen Ziele mit dessen Hilfe in der Zukunft zu erreichen wird. Natürlich gab es auch andere Minderheiten, die die kulturelle Autonomie für sich für wenig hielten. Die Katalanen forderten z.B. territoriale Autonomie, die

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<sup>13</sup> JAKABFFY, Elemér: *Adatok családunk történetéhez*. [Daten zur Geschichte unserer Familie] (Manuskript) OSZK K (Landesbibliothek Széchenyi, Handschriftenarchiv), TLA, KV, K 3066/2005. 5-6.

Deutschen in Westpolen und alle ungarische Minderheiten Sezession. Diese schwiegen aber von ihren wirklichen Bestrebungen aus taktischen Gründen tief.

### **Unabhängigkeit von den Staaten**

Der Europäische Nationalitätenkongress war keine von Staaten unabhängige Organisation. In Wirklichkeit war er von Anfang an den Instrumentalisierungsbestrebungen verschiedener Regierungen ausgeliefert. Ammende selbst nahm diese Grundregel nicht ernst, weil er sich darüber im Klaren war, dass die Minderheiten gegen den Willen ihrer Patronagestaaten (Mutterstaaten) an der Tätigkeit des Kongresses nicht lange teilnehmen würden. Diese Vorstellung wurde auch zur Gewissheit, als 1927 alle Minderheiten aus Deutschland, sowie die polnischen und tschechischen Minderheiten die Kongressgemeinschaft für immer verließen. Hinter diesem Schritt versteckte sich die heimliche Stellungnahme von Polen und der Tschechoslowakei, die hinter der Organisation schon damals Deutschlands Großmachtinteressen ahnten.<sup>14</sup>

Obwohl der Generalsekretär vor der Presse immer die Unabhängigkeit der Organisation betonte, war diese Bemerkung nicht einmal in der Gründungsphase wahr. Vor der ersten Konferenz führte er z.B. Verhandlungen mit ungarischen und deutschen Ministerialbeamten und Diplomaten, um die geheime Unterstützung von diesen für die Idee einer Organisation solcher Art zu gewinnen. Der ungarische Ministerpräsident unterstützte das Projekt von Anfang an.<sup>15</sup> Das Auswärtige Amt aber erst nach 1928, als es sich herausstellte, dass die Organisation Deutschlands außenpolitische Interessen nicht gefährdet, sondern sie dafür auch von Nutzen sein kann.<sup>16</sup> Bis dann verhinderte das Auswärtige Amt die Teilnahme der deutschen Minderheiten nicht, weil ihre Diplomaten in der Frage geteilt waren, und die Minderheitenpolitiker sich für die Idee entschieden.

Alle Minderheiten mussten einen Mitgliedsbeitrag in die Kasse der Organisation zahlen. Diese Summen stammten aber von Staaten. Die deutschen und ungarischen Regierungen nahmen die Kosten ihrer externen Minderheiten auf sich, und trugen auch zu den Extrakosten der Organisation bei. (In den 1930er Jahren bezahlte sogar den Beitrag der Ukrainer und Katalanen das Auswärtige Amt.<sup>17</sup>) Die ungarische Regierung unterstützte das Ammende-Projekt mit 10.000 Schweizerischen Franken pro Jahr, die deutsche Regierung stellte der Organisation

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<sup>14</sup> Dabei hatten sie damals noch nicht Recht, weil die deutsche Regierung den Kongress bis 1928 finanziell nicht unterstützte.

<sup>15</sup> Das ungarische Außenministerium an den Botschafter Emich in Berlin. Budapest, 11. September 1925. MOL (Ungarisches Landesarchiv), K64, 1925-47-503. Fol. 369.

<sup>16</sup> „Auch ich finde, dass man die Organisation finanziell lebensfähig erhalten sollte. Ich würde aber nicht für eine Zusage laufender Unterstützung sein; bei der Unterstützung von Fall zu Fall behält man die Empfänger besser in der Hand.“ Weizsäcker's Bemerkung in der Kolumne der Aufzeichnung von Poensgen. Berlin, 7. April 1928. PAAA, R 96562, Fol. 088.

<sup>17</sup> Hasselblatt an das Auswärtige Amt. Berlin, 19. Mai 1936. PAAA, R 60496, K 262361 – K 262363.

noch mehr Geld zur Verfügung. Beide Außenministerien versuchten den Generalsekretär mit dem Geld im Schach zu halten. Er musste deshalb bei der Zusammenstellung des jährlichen Programms, in den Organisationsfragen und der Propagandatätigkeit die Erwartungen der zwei Regierungen berücksichtigen. Das führte aber natürlich auch zu Spannungen. Deshalb tauchte nach 1933 die Möglichkeit des Fernbleibens der ungarischen Politiker vom Nationalitätenkongress oft ernst auf.<sup>18</sup> Der Außenminister Kálmán Kánya und der Ausschussmitglied Géza Szüllő waren nämlich der Meinung, dass Ammende und sein Nachfolger Ferdinand von Uexküll-Güldenband schon eindeutig die Interessen des Auswärtigen Amtes vertraten.<sup>19</sup> Die ungarischen Akteure hatten unbedingt Recht dabei, dass der Einfluss des Verbands deutscher Volksgruppen (und hinter ihm das Auswärtige Amt) auf die Tätigkeit des Kongresses und des Generalsekretärs in den 1930er Jahren immer markanter wurde.<sup>20</sup>

### **Repräsentativität und Solidarität**

Es gelang dem Nationalitätenkongress auch nicht die Repräsentativität der nationalen Minderheiten in Europa zu verschaffen. Die polnischen, tschechischen, dänischen Minderheiten hielten sich von der Organisation nach 1927 fern und die zionistische Gruppe unterbrach 1933 die Zusammenarbeit mit der Kongressgemeinschaft für immer. Außerdem erschienen einige Minderheiten gar nicht oder nur paar Mal an den jährlichen Konferenzen. Die Idee der Solidarität der Minderheiten blieb in Wirklichkeit auch nur ein Traum. Der Austritt der polnischen, tschechischen und dänischen Gruppen war schon auch ein Beweis dafür. Es kam aber auch vor, dass die deutschen oder ungarischen Ausschussmitglieder den Beitritt bestimmter Minderheiten verhinderten. Die Mitgliedschaft der Friesen in Deutschland wurde z.B. durch den Deutschen, die der Slowaken in Ungarn durch den Ungarn blockiert.<sup>21</sup> Die Frage der Vertretung der Ungarndeutschen belastete auch zwischen 1936 und 1938 das Verhältnis der deutschen und ungarischen Delegierten. Der Verband deutscher Volksgruppen und später die Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle beharrten auf ihren Willen, dass die von ihnen anerkannten ungarndeutschen Politiker (Georg Huss oder Franz Basch) die

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<sup>18</sup> Kristóffy (Ungarisches Außenministerium) Pro domo. Budapest, 20. März 1933. MOL, K64, 1935-47. (120/1933).

<sup>19</sup> Szüllös zynische Meinung von Ammende: „Die Konferenz selbst ist nichts wert. Der einzig wertvolle Mensch ist Ammende, der äußerst begabt und bestechlich ist... Heute bezahlen die Deutschen ihn am besten, so tritt er für das Auslandeutschtum in Aktion, und er kann uns auch schädigen.“ Szüllös Bericht über die Konferenz des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses 1933. Ohne Datum. OSZK K, Fond X, X/28. Dok. Nr. 3.

<sup>20</sup> Bis 1932 bestimmten die engere Zusammenarbeit von drei Gruppen die Richtlinie und die Taktik der Organisation: die Deutsche, die Ungarische und die Zionistische. 1933 trat aber die zionistische Gruppe aus der Kongressgemeinschaft aus.

<sup>21</sup> Lutz Korodi an das Auswärtige Amt. Berlin, ohne Datum. PAAA, R 60426, K 435450; Bischof Szeberényis Brief an Ammende. Békéscsaba, 8. August 1931. MOL, K 64, 1935-47 (634/1931).

Deutschen an den Tagungen vertreten dürfen. Das ungarische Außenministerium und so auch die ungarischen Delegierten verweigerten aber die „*internationale Anerkennung*“ der Opposition des von der ungarischen Regierung unterstützten Ungarländisch-Deutschen Volksbildungsvereins. Als Ergebnis der Erpressung des ungarischen Ausschussmitglieds Géza Szüllő vertrat so jahrelang niemand offiziell die Ungarndeutschen an den Konferenzen des Nationalitätenkongresses.<sup>22</sup>

Die Idee der Solidarität erlitt aber den größten Niederschlag 1933, als die zionistische Gruppe die Kongressgemeinschaft und besonders die deutsche Gruppe aufforderte, gegen die Entrechtung des Judentums in Deutschland offiziell Stellung zu nehmen. Die deutschen Delegierten waren aber nicht bereit, ihren Patronagestaat zu verurteilen, und behaupteten in ihrem Resolutionsvorschlag: „*Der Kongress stellt fest: Im Falle der Einleitung und Durchführung nationales Dissimilieren sollen die Freiheiten und Rechte, für die der Kongress der europäischen Nationalitäten in seinen Kundgebungen und Beschlüssen seit seinem Bestehen eingetreten ist, unbeeinträchtigt bleiben.*“<sup>23</sup> Danach brachen alle Vertreter der zionistischen Gruppe die Zusammenarbeit mit der Kongressgemeinschaft ein für alle Mal ab.<sup>24</sup>

Der Nationalitätenkongress konnte nicht einmal zur Vertiefung der innerstaatlichen Zusammenarbeit der Minderheiten beitragen. Der größte Hindernis war dafür, dass die Minderheiten oft unterschiedliche Ziele und Strategien verfolgten. (Aktivismus gegen Passivität.) Während der Geschichte des Nationalitätenkongresses gab es nur einen Versuch, Katalysatorrolle im Verhältnis von zwei Minderheitengruppen zu spielen. Hauptziel der Besprechung unter den ungarischen und deutschen Minderheitenpolitiker in 1927-28 gewesen wäre, die Spannungen zu klären und die eventuelle Möglichkeit der Zusammenarbeit in den Nachbarstaaten von Ungarn zu besprechen.<sup>25</sup> Obwohl die Verhandlung in Wien schon vorbereitet war, sagten die ungarischen Parteien die Teilnahme ab, weil die deutschen Politiker eine wichtige ungarische Forderung im rumänischen Parlament nicht unterstützten.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Szüllös Bericht über die Stockholmer Konferenz des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses 1938. Ohne Datum. OSZK K, Fond X, X/24, Dok. Nr. 1.

<sup>23</sup> AMMENDE, Ewald (ed.): *Sitzungsbericht des Kongresses der organisierten nationalen Gruppen in den Staaten Europas 1933*. Wilhelm Braumüller Verlag, Wien, 1933. 70.

<sup>24</sup> Die ungarischen Delegierten waren aber mit einigen russischen, litauischen und katalonischen Politikern zusammen nicht bereit, diesen von deutschen Delegierten formulierten Text in sich selbst anzunehmen. Sie erließen die Resolution nur mit der folgenden Deklaration: „*Die jetzt in einigen Ländern zu beobachtende Welle von Maßnahmen des ausgesprochenen Antisemitismus sehen wir als gegen die allgemeinen Menschenrechte verstoßende und den Idealen unserer Kongresse widersprechende an.*“ AMMENDE, Ewald (ed.): *Sitzungsbericht des Kongresses der organisierten nationalen Gruppen in den Staaten Europas 1933*. Wilhelm Braumüller Verlag, Wien, 1933. 70.

<sup>25</sup> Villani (ungarischer Botschafter in Bukarest) an das Ungarische Außenministerium. Bukarest, 19. Dezember 1927. MOL, K64, 1928-47 (682/1927).

<sup>26</sup> Das Ungarische Außenministerium an den Botschafter Forster nach Belgrad. Budapest, 21. März 1928. MOL, K64, 1928-47-190 (108/1928).

### **Frage der zu folgenden Taktik**

In der Frage der Propagandatätigkeit des Nationalitätenkongresses gab es auch tiefe Meinungsunterschiede innerhalb der Organisation. Die meisten Teilnehmer waren an der disziplinierten Einstellung des Kongresses interessiert. Sie wollten nämlich keine Konflikte mit ihren Regierungen wegen eines eventuell radikaleren Auftritts. Diese Meinung vertraten sowohl die Deutschen als auch die Slawen. Die ungarischen Minderheiten, von denen die Öffentlichkeit sowieso wusste, dass sie in Wirklichkeit ohne Ausnahme sezessionsorientiert waren, erwarteten aber vom Nationalitätenkongress eine konfrontativere Einstellung. Es entwickelten sich heftige Diskussionen in diesem Thema auf den Ausschusssitzungen, und der Mehrheit gelang es die ungarischen Bestrebungen zu blockieren. Dennoch verletzte die Ungarn öfters die Grundregel der Organisation, und sprachen von den konkreten Beschwerden ihrer Volksgruppen tiefgehend. Diese Auftritte verursachten Skandale an den Tagungen.<sup>27</sup>

Die ungarischen Delegierten wollten aber die „Effektivität“ der Propagandatätigkeit des Kongresses unbedingt steigern, deshalb forderten sie Ammende auf, die Zahl der Mitarbeiter des Sekretariats in Wien zu erhöhen, und so größere Propaganda in West-Europa auszuüben.<sup>28</sup> Das Sekretariat hätte nach dieser Vorstellung in der neuen Struktur auch mit den Petitionen einzelner Minderheiten selbst beschäftigen können.<sup>29</sup> Dieser Anspruch war aber für die deutschen Minderheiten unannehmbar, Nicht nur wegen den großen Kosten, sondern auch deshalb, weil sie an einem losen, jährlich einmal zusammenkommenden Kongress interessiert waren, dessen öffentliche Tätigkeit keine aggressive Gegenreaktion aus den Regierungen hervorruft, wo die deutschen Minderheiten lebten.<sup>30</sup>

### **Einfluss auf den Völkerbund und die Staaten**

Der Völkerbund anerkannte den Europäischen Nationalitätenkongress nie als offizieller Vertreter der europäischen nationalen Minderheiten. Die Minderheitensektion des Sekretariats nahm zwar die Existenz der Organisation zur Kenntnis, und ihre Mitarbeiter nahmen oft an den Sitzungen der Konferenzen teil, aber das war von ihnen nur Höflichkeitgeste.<sup>31</sup> In Wirklichkeit hielten sie den Kongress für eine Versammlung von Unheilstifter. Sie ahnten hinter ihm Deutschland und Ungarn –

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<sup>27</sup> AMMENDE, Ewald: *Sitzungsbericht des Kongresses der organisierten nationalen Gruppen in den Staaten Europas 1932*. Wilhelm Braumüller Verlag, Wien, 1932. 125-129.

<sup>28</sup> Siehe Anhang, Tabelle 3.

<sup>29</sup> Ammendes Brief an Wilfan. Budapest, 8. Juni 1934. BA (Bundesarchiv), N 1.250 (Nachlaß Wilfan), Fasz. 8. Fol. 852.

<sup>30</sup> Protokoll über die Sitzung des Ausschusses des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses. Wien, 29. Juni 1934. BA, N 1.250, Fasz. 30. Fol. 7.

<sup>31</sup> Siehe die Einleitung der *Sitzungsberichte* von 1932; 1933; 1934. 1936.

nach 1928 mit Recht. Andererseits passte er nicht in die Organisationsstruktur des internationalen Minderheitenschutzes. Die Minderheiten wurden nicht einmal als Partei in dem Minderheitenschutzverfahren anerkannt, so blieb ihre Organisation gesetzmäßig auch für den Völkerbund für Außenseiter.

Von den Ergebnissen der Verhandlungen von Ammende mit Regierungsbeamten ist nicht viel zu wissen. Es ist aber unwahrscheinlich, dass er im Interesse der nationalen Minderheiten selbst wichtige Erfolge erzielt hätte, sonst hätten die Ausschussmitglieder davon unbedingt Kenntnis erhalten. Vielleicht nur eine Rundreise von Ammende und Wilfan in Schweden, Norwegen, Dänemark, in den Niederlanden und der Schweiz ist in diesem Zusammenhang zu erwähnen, als sie 1928 dort Politiker für die Sache der Reform des Garantieverfahrens mit Erfolg gewinnen versuchten.<sup>32</sup> Ammendes größter Erfolg war eigentlich der Fortbestand der von ihm gegründeten Organisation mit Hilfe der finanziellen Unterstützung der deutschen und ungarischen Regierungen. Das war schon in sich ein großes Ergebnis, weil er die Regierungen von Zeit zu Zeit von den Sinn einer Organisation solcher Art überzeugen musste...

### **Fazit**

Den Spielraum des Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresses begrenzten die Realitäten der europäischen Machtverhältnisse von Anfang an. Es war kein Geheimnis, dass einige Staaten (Deutschland, Ungarn usw.) in Wirklichkeit nie auf eine Grenzrevision verzichteten. Die sog. Minderheitenstaaten der Region waren damit natürlich im Klaren und hielten ihre neuen Grenzen von den Nachbarstaaten für gefährdet. Die Minderheiten (besonders die Grenzminoritäten) waren von ihnen als destabilisierender Faktor betrachtet, deren Loyalität sie immer bezweifelten, oft mit Recht. Der Völkerbund wurde auch geschaffen, um die internationale Stabilität und den Frieden *aufgrund des status quo* zu sichern. Obwohl alle Staaten, die den Nachbarn erhebliche Gebiete abtreten mussten, mit der Zeit dem „Genfer Staatenverein“ beitraten, lebten die scharfen Gegensätze zwischen den Siegern und Besiegten weiter.

Unter solchen Umständen hatte der Nationalitätenkongress naturgemäß nur schwache Lobbykraft. Deutschland und Ungarn unterstützten ihn zwar heimlich, aber die meisten Staaten und selbst auch das Völkerbunsekretariat hielten die Organisation für Unheilstifter. Der Nationalitätenkongress hatte also in Wirklichkeit keine reale Chance, in dieser Situation als maßgebender Faktor in der internationalen Politik auftreten zu können. Das wichtigste Ergebnis der Tätigkeit der Organisation war so ihre große und wirklich wertvolle theoretische Arbeit. Ihre Publikationen sind bis heute wichtige Quellen der Minderheitenforschung, und die meisten ihrer Resolutionen halten die nationalen Minderheiten auch heute für aktuell.

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<sup>32</sup> Ammendes Brief an Khuen-Héderváry (Staatssekretär des ungarischen Außenministeriums). Wien, 13. Dezember 1928. MOL, K 64, 1928-47-757.



## Anhang

**Tabelle 1. Teilnahme der Minderheiten an den Konferenzen (1925-1938)<sup>33</sup>**

Minderheiten/Länder	Teilnahme an den jährlichen Konferenzen
<b>Deutsche</b>	
Polen	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
Tschechoslowakei	1925, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
Estland	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38
Rumänien	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38
Ungarn	1925, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38
Jugoslawien	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37
Lettland	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38
Dänemark	1925, 26, 27, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38
Italien	1925, 26, 28, 37
Belgien	1934, 35
Litauen	1926, 32
<b>Zionisten</b>	
Tschechoslowakei	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32
Lettland	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32
Polen	1925, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32
Bulgarien	1926, 27, 29, 30, 32
Litauen	1925, 26, 27, 28, 30
Rumänien	1927, 28, 29, 31
Estland	1927
<b>Polen</b>	
Tschechoslowakei	1925, 26, 27
Lettland	1925, 26, 27
Litauen	1925, 26, 27
Deutschland	1925, 26, 27
Rumänien	1926
<b>Russen</b>	
Estland	1926, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
Polen	1926, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33
Rumänien	1929, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37
Lettland	1932, 33
<b>Ungarn</b>	
Jugoszlávia	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30**, 31**, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
Csehszlovákia	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38

<sup>33</sup> Die Tabellen wurden aufgrund der *Sitzungsberichte* vom Autor zusammengestellt.

Románia	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
<b>Ukrainer</b>	
Polen	1925, 26*, 27*, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38
Rumänien	1927, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38
<b>Slowenen</b>	
Italien	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38
Österreich	1925, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36
<b>Bulgaren</b>	
Rumänien	1928, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37
Jugoslawien	1929, 30, 33, 34
<b>Litauer</b>	
Polen	1925, 26*, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35
Deutschland	1930, 31, 34
<b>Katalanen</b>	
Spanien	1926, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
<b>Tschechen</b>	
Österreich	1926, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35
<b>Karpato-Ukrainer</b>	
Tschechoslowakei	1925, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34,
<b>Weißrussen</b>	
Polen	1925, 26*, 27*, 28, 31, 33
<b>Kroaten</b>	
Österreich	1926, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35,
<b>Basken</b>	
Spanien	1930, 31, 32, 34
<b>Dänen</b>	
Deutschland	1925, 26, 27
<b>Schweden</b>	
Estland	1930, 37, 38
<b>Sorben</b>	
Deutschland	1925, 26, 27

<b>Griechen</b>	
Italien	1931
<b>Gallier</b>	
Spanien	1933**
*Nur als Beobachter	
**Mit Verspätung angekommen	

**Tabelle 2. Mitglieder des Ausschusses**

Mitglieder des Ausschusses	Tätigkeit in der Politik
<i>Deutsche Gruppe</i>	
Kurt Graebe (1874–1952)	Präsident des Verbands der Deutschen in Polen. Nach 1922 Abgeordneter im polnischen Sejm. Zwischen 1930 und 1933 Leiter der deutschen Fraktion.
<i>Zionistische Gruppe</i>	
Leo Motzkin (1867–1933)	Zionistischer Politiker in Paris. Einer der einflussreichsten Leiter des <i>World Jewish Congress</i> .
<i>Ungarische Gruppe</i>	
Géza Szüllő (1873–1957)	Zwischen 1925 und 1938 Abgeordneter in der Tschechoslowakei. Präsident der Christlich-Sozialen Landespartei (1925-1932).
<i>Ukrainische Gruppe</i>	
Dymitr Levickij (1877–1940)	Ukrainischer Abgeordneter zwischen 1928 und 1935 im polnischen Sejm. Einer der Leiter der ukrainischer Fraktion.
<i>Polnische Gruppe</i>	
Stanisław Sierakowski (1891–1939)	Seit 1922 Abgeordneter im preußischen Parlament. Präsident des Verbands der Nationalen Minderheiten in Deutschland und des Verbands der Polen in Deutschland.
<i>Katalonische Gruppe</i>	
Juan Estelrich i Artigues (1896–1958)	Zwischen 1931 und 1939 Abgeordneter in Spanien.
<i>Slawische Gruppe (nach 1928)</i>	
Josip Wilfan (1878–1955)	Seit 1921 Abgeordneter in Italien. 1928 musste er das Land für immer verlassen. Danach lebte er bis 1939 in Wien.

**Tabelle 3. Ungarische Delegierten in der Organisation**

Delegierten	Konferenzen
<i>Tschechoslowakei</i>	
Szüllő, Géza	1925c, 26c, 27c, 28a, 29a, 30a, 31a, 32c, 33b, 34a, 35a, 36c, 37c, 38a
Flachbarth, Ernő	1925b, 26a, 27a, 28a, b
Jaross, Andor	1929, 30b, 32b
Esterházy, János	1931b, 32b
Aixinger, László	1932
Szvatkó, Pál	1932
<i>Jugoslawien</i>	
Deák, Leó	1925, 26a, 28, 29b, 30, 31b, 32, 34b, 36b, 37, 38
Strelitzky, Dénes	1926, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35b, 36
Törley, Bálint	1926, 27
Palásthy, Ödön	1932
<i>Rumänien</i>	
Jakabffy, Elemér	1925, 26a, 27, 28b, 29, 30, 31, 32b, 33bb, 34a, 35b, 36b
Balogh, Arthur	1925a, 26, 27a, 28a, 30, 32b, 33a, 35a
Sulyok, István	1928, 29b, 30, 31, 37
Jósika, János	1937a, 38a
Ugron, István	1930a
Ambrózy, Andor	1928

a) Referat b) Korreferat c) Begrüßungsrede

**Erdódy Gábor**

## ***Krisenbehandlung nach den napoleonischen Kriegen***

### **Abstract**

The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars have initiated radical changes in the European development. The essence of the complex transformation underlying the modern historical period was determined by the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the unfolding social-political and economical double revolution, the accomplishment of the conception of „*nation*” and the conflicts of the forming nation states.

The Congress of Vienna, by putting an end to the transition and forming a firm basis for modern Europe, guaranteed such an operable system in terms of crisis management that was not to be destroyed by the subsequent revolutions and local wars. This system created favourable conditions for the civilian transformation, the capitalist development, and the flourish of the culture, the disciplines and and the education.

*Keywords:* modernization, balance system, status-quo politics, industrial revolution, national transformation, English model, the era of restauration, the French constitution Charta, South German constitutionalism, the eastern issue.

**D**ie Französische Revolution und die napoleonischen Kriegen haben das System des Kontinents radikal umgestürzt und setzten in der europäischen wirtschaftlichen, gesellschaftlichen, juristischen, geistigen Entwicklung, sowie in den politischen, kulturellen und diplomatischen Prozessen grundlegende Veränderungen in Gang. Die Substanz und die Komponente der umfangreichen und komplexen fundamentalen Transformation, die sich in gesamteuropäischem Kontext entfaltete und die Ouvertüre der neuen historischen Epoche bestimmte, gestaltete: die Umwälzung von Feudalismus in Kapitalismus, die Entfaltung der politisch-gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Doppelrevolution bzw. ihre groben sozialen Widersprüche, die Vollentfaltung der nationalen Idee und die Konflikte der Formierung der neuen Nationalstaaten, die Umbildung der politischen Herrschaftssysteme und ihre juristische – verfassungsgeschichtliche Basis, die politische-geistliche Erneuerung, welche die Bestrebungen nach der Gleichberechtigung der Bürger in den Mittelpunkt stellte, die Teilnahme des Staates in der Modernisierung.<sup>1</sup>

Die qualitativen Veränderungen der letzten 25 Jahren, die kontinentale Modernisierungswelle, welche die Französische Revolution in Bewegung brachte, haben neue Herausforderungen formuliert, deren erfolgreiche Beantwortung einen stabilen internationalen Hintergrund forderte. Die Gestaltung der

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<sup>1</sup> LANGEWIESCHE, Dieter: *Europa zwischen Restauration und Revolution 1815-1849*. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1985. 113.

Grundbedingungen, die einen günstigen internationalen Rahmen zur Erneuerung sichern konnten, d.h. die Gestaltung des internationalen Rahmensystems der Krisenbehandlung, war die Aufgabe des in 1815 tagenden Wiener Kongresses.<sup>2</sup>

Die Veränderungen in den verschiedenen Regionen und Staaten, welche neben den Phasenverschiebungen auch mit wesentlichen qualitativen Unterschieden charakterisiert waren, verliefen natürlich nicht in der gleichen Zeit. Das Wesen und den Inhalt des untersuchten historischen Moments können dementsprechend die umfangreiche Bestimmung der gesamteuropäischen Tendenzen und die Darstellung der regionalen spezifischen Züge gemeinsam, im Zeichen der Vielfältigkeit, bedeuten.

### ***Die Gestaltung des internationalen Rahmensystems der Krisenbehandlung***

Der Wiener Kongress reflektierte auf die dargestellte komplexe Herausforderung, die dort getroffenen Entscheidungen bestimmten die Einführung einer neuen Epoche. Vor allem kehrte er zu den dynastisch-legitimen Mechanismen zurück, wodurch sie langfristig funktionierende Machtverhältnisse zu Stande gebracht haben. Auch wenn die Geschehnisse von 1830 (die Erfolge der belgischen Revolution und die des griechischen Freiheitskampfes) wesentliche Modifizierungen im „Gerüst von Europa“ realisiert haben, es ist doch – ganz bis 1848 – gelungen die, das Wesen des Systems bedrohenden kontinentweite Erschütterungen zu vermeiden und das Primat der monarchistisch-dynastischen Legitimität zu bewahren.<sup>3</sup>

Der Grundstein der neuen Ordnung bildete – wie es bekannt ist – den Ausbau des neuen europäischen Machtssystems. Die Eroberungen von Napoleon wurden vernichtet, die hegemonialen Positionen von Frankreich wurden liquidiert, der Status quo ante wurde wiederhergestellt, im Interesse der Stabilität wurden aber auch wesentliche abweichende Lösungen geschaffen. Im Hintergrund dieser Abweichungen kamen Überlegungen, nämlich ein neues Gleichgewichtssystem gegenüber Frankreich auszubauen und dadurch dem Ausbruch einer neuen Revolution vorzubeugen, zur Geltung. Als Gegengewicht wurden Pufferstaaten (wie die Vereinigten Niederlande) kreiert: die Rheinland- Provinzen an den Königtum Preußen geknüpft (Berlin hat auch fast die Hälfte von Sachsen erhalten), die Neutralität von der Schweiz haben die Großmächte garantiert, das Königreich Piemont-Sardinien wurde mit Savoya und mit der ehemaligen Republik von Genua befestigt, Österreich hat Lombardei und Venetien bekommen. Gleichzeitig ist die gewaltige Stärkung Russlands geschehen. Das Zarenreich erwarb endgültig das Finnische Großherzogtum und den größten Teil Polens mit der Ernennung „Königreich Polen“. Den großen und gefährlichen Expansionsambitionen von Sankt-Peterburg wurde gleichzeitig das starke

<sup>2</sup> DIÓSZEGI, István: *A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada 1789-1939.* (Anderthalb Jahrhundert der Machtpolitik 1789-1939.) História – MTA Történettudományi Intézete, Budapest, 1994. 13-14.

<sup>3</sup> LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 6.

Österreich und Preußen gegenüber gestellt.<sup>4</sup>

In der gesamten Neuordnung kam eine bestimmende Grundidee zur Geltung, nämlich die nationale Demütigung des Besiegten zu vermeiden. Frankreich verlor keines seiner alten Territorien, die auferlegten Entschädigungszahlungen (700 Millionen Francs) waren maßvoll. Damit entstand für Paris keine unerträgliche und unannehmbare Situation, welche Revanchebestrebungen und den Ausbruch neuer Konflikte hätte unvermeidbar herausprovokieren können. Der Versöhnungsfrieden ermöglichte die schnelle Rückkehr von Paris aus der Verbannung, seine Reaktivierung als gleichrangiger Partner und bestimmender Faktor in der europäischen Zusammenarbeit. Frankreich gehörte schon 1818 wieder als vollberechtigtes Mitglied dem Kreis der Großmächte an.<sup>5</sup>

Im Zeichen der konservativen Solidarität und der Geltendmachung der Legitimität konnten die durch die Revolutionen verjagten Herrscher zurückkehren; ihre Rehabilitation und Entschädigung war aber nicht vollständig. Österreich hat z.B. Belgien nicht zurückbekommen, das Heilige Römische Reich wurde nicht wiederhergestellt, seine Funktion hat im Großen und Ganzen der Deutsche Bund (mit 34 Fürstentümern und 4 freien Reichsstädten) übernommen. Es bedeutete, dass die Gültigmachung der dynastischen Solidarität nur unter den Rahmen der Interesse der Großmächte, und deren völlig untergeordnet an Boden gewinnen konnte.<sup>6</sup>

Um das neue Gleichgewichtssystem aufrechtzuerhalten, die christlichen Ideale zu verteidigen, d.h. die oppositionellen und revolutionären Bewegungen zu unterdrücken, wurde die Heilige Allianz im Namen der Brüderlichkeit der christlichen Monarchen, aufgrund der Initiative von Alexander dem Ersten, bzw. mit der Zusammenwirkung von Österreich und Preußen zu Stande gebracht. England hat den Vertrag nicht unterschrieben, schloss sich aber der sg. Quadrupelallianz an, welche für die Mitglieder der Deffensivallianz die gegenseitige Verpflichtung zur internationalen Friedenswahrung, wenn es nötig ist auch mit militärischen Mitteln vorgeschrieben hatte. So wurde das Sicherheitsnetz auf völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen ausgebaut.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> URBÁN, Aladár: *Európa a forradalom forgószeleiben 1848-1849.* (Europa im Wirbelwind der Revolution 1848-1849.) Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1970. 6-9. ERDŐDY, Gábor: „Szabadságot mindenben és mindenkinek.” *A belga alkotmányos rendszer létrejötte és működése 1831-1848.* („Freiheit in alles und für alle.” Die Entstehung und Funktionierung des belgischen konstitutionellen Systems.) Argumentum Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 50-53. DIÓSZEGI (1994): 54-57. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 7-8.

<sup>5</sup> DIÓSZEGI (1994): 64. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 45-46. PRICE, Roger: *Franciaország története.* (Die Geschichte von Frankreich.) Maecenas Könyvkiadó – Talentum Kft. 2001. 155-156. Budapest, VADÁSZ, Sándor (red.): *19. századi egyetemes történet 1789-1890.* (Universalgeschichte des 19-ten Jahrhunderts 1789-1890.) Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 95-96.

<sup>6</sup> ERDŐDY, Gábor: *A 19. századi német liberalizmus.* (Der deutsche Liberalismus im 19-ten Jahrhundert) Argumentum Kiadó, Budapest, 1993. 28-29. GONDA Imre – NIEDERHAUSER Emil: *A Habsburgok.* (Die Habsburgen) Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1977. 160-161. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 8.

<sup>7</sup> DIÓSZEGI (1994): 62. SZÁNTÓ György Tibor: *Anglia története.* (Die Geschichte von England) Maecenas Könyvek Talentum Kft. Budapest, 1999. 185-186. URBÁN (1970): 11-12. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 11.

### **Die gesamteuropäischen Grundtendenzen der Krisenbehandlung**

Das Ziel des in Wien gestalteten neuen europäischen Systems war ein Staatensystem ohne Hegemonialmacht, d.h. aufgrund der Idee des *Mächtegleichgewichts* zu schaffen. Obwohl die Tendenzen der ideologischen Differenzierung in zwei Lager um das liberale-konstitutionelle England und das konservativ-absolutistische Russland schon von Anfang der 20er Jahre klar erschienen sind, kreuzte die Interessenpolitik der Großmächte die Impulse der Blockbildung immer wiederkehrend durch. Das innenpolitische Wesen der Neuordnung war nicht auf die *Restauration* zu vereinfachen, diese existierte gar nicht als allgemein gültiger Epochenbegriff. Wenn auch für die Restaurationsbestrebungen ein breiter Spielraum zur Verfügung stand, verhinderte das europäische Vertragswerk von 1815 gar nicht die Realisierung wichtiger und erfolgreicher *Reforminitiativen*.<sup>8</sup>

Eines der Hauptziele des Wiener Kongresses war die *Liquidierung der geistigen Ausstrahlungen* der französischen Revolution. Es bedeutete aber keine totale Vernichtung der Erbschaft, keine unsinnige und kontraproduktive Restauration. Der Feudalismus wurde in Frankreich doch nicht wiederhergestellt, das die bürgerlichen Rechtsverhältnisse schaffende, Code Napoleon wurde in Belgien und in den Rheinland-Provinzen in Geltung gelassen. Auch die *verfassungspolitischen Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten* blieben offen. Als Ergebnis der modellhaften Ausstrahlung der französischen Chartre von 1814 (welche auch den Einfluss von Benjamin Constant weitgehend widerspiegelte) wurden konstitutionelle Verfassungen in den Niederlanden und in den süd-west-deutschen Staaten verkündet.<sup>9</sup>

Die Veränderung der wirtschaftlichen Prozesse bestimmte vor allem die *Dominanz der Agrarwirtschaft*, welche die Entwicklung in Europa trotz der dominierenden Industrialisierungswelle (und mit der Ausnahme von England) weitgehend beeinflusste. Um die Krisensymptomen der agrarischen Struktur, die Folgen der Massenverarmung und des Pauperismus, das wachsende Elend des Landproletariats unter Kontrolle zu halten, sogar mäßigen zu können, hat man in England ein neues Armengesetz, auf dem Kontinent Agrarreformen, welche auf die Ablösung der feudalen Bindungen zielten, verabschiedet. Die Wirtschaft und sowohl die Gesellschaft blieb aber vor allem agrarisch bestimmt – im Osten herrschten die starren feudalistischen Formen unberührt weiter.<sup>10</sup>

Als strategischer Sektor der umfangreichen Modernisierung der Wirtschaft entfaltete sich die *Industrialisierung*. Die Unterstützung zur Schaffung günstiger

<sup>8</sup> LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 10-11. DIÓSZEGI (1994): 65.

<sup>9</sup> MEZEY Barna – SZENTE Zoltán: *Európai parlamentarizmus és alkotmánytörténet*. (Europäisches Parlamentarismus und europäische Verfassungsgeschichte.) Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2003. 266-267. PRICE (2001): 155. VADÁSZ (1998): 96. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 7.

<sup>10</sup> HOBBSAWM, Erich J.: *A forradalmak kora 1789-1848*. (Die Epoche der Revolutionen 1789-1848.) Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1988. 147-165. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 22. MEZEY-SZENTE (2003): 275. PRICE (2001): 142-143.



Voraussetzungen der industriellen Entwicklung bedeutete gleichfalls die Anregung der Wiedergeburt von Europa. Als unentbehrlicher, den stabilen Hintergrund sichernder Grundfaktor der Entfaltung wirkte die Rechtssicherheit der Eigentumsverhältnisse.<sup>11</sup>

Der Abschluss der Kriege zog in England schwere wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Folgen nach sich. Die Umstellungsprobleme der britischen Wirtschaft verursachten zwischen 1815-1822 eine tiefe ökonomische Depression, die Probleme der Jahre des Elends steigerten die Schwierigkeiten der Exportindustrie. Eine echte qualitative Wendung brachten nur die 30er Jahre, mit dem großen Eisenbahnbau, und in Zusammenhang damit mit der Aufschwung der sog. Schlüsselindustrie von Kohle, Eisen und Stahl. Auf dem Kontinent folgende Regionen bildeten die wichtigsten Entwicklungsräume der Nachkriegszeit: die Süd-Niederlanden, Nord-Frankreich, Rheinland-Westfalen, Teile der Schweiz, und als eine zweite Region Sachsen, Oberschlesien und Böhmen. Die Umwälzung beschleunigend entwickelten sich rasch die Bildungsförderung und der Ausbau des modernen Bankwesens (vor allem die Aktienbanken), in der Anregung und in der Realisierung der Modernisierungsbestrebungen der Regierungen spielte die Staatsbürokratie eine bestimmende Rolle.<sup>12</sup>

Die bestimmende Tendenz und das Leitmotiv der Nachkriegszeitepoche war die *Nationsbildung*. Sie stand als Leitbegriff von gesamteuropäischer Gestaltung im Zentrum der Forderungen der Liberalen und der Demokraten, sicherte eine starke innere Integrationskraft und eine besondere Dynamik der politischen Bestrebungen. Die einzelnen Bewegungen hatten zum Ziel die Gründung von Nationalstaaten, welche aber nur durch die Desintegration der bestehenden Staatsformationen entstehen konnten. Die Entfaltung der Prozesse entkräftete und grab die Gründe des Systems der Heiligen Allianz unter, drohte mit der Veränderung, sogar mit der Auflösung des Status quo. Demgegenüber wurde die Koalition der multiethnischen absolutistischen Großmächte und die Zusammenarbeit derjenigen Staaten, die das gemeinsame Interesse an der Erhaltung des Gleichgewichts hatten, verwirklicht.<sup>13</sup>

Im Prozess des Ausbaus der europäischen Neuordnung bildete die Bestimmung der *politischen Herrschaftsordnungen* der einzelnen Ländern ein vielfarbiges Element, wo die nationalen Charakterzüge am auffallendsten erschienen. Als Gravitationszentren funktionierten auf einer Seite die klassischen Verfassungsstaaten England und Frankreich, an dem östlichen Ende des Kontinents das autokratische russische Zarenreich. Und zwischen den beiden Polen entfaltete sich die Vielfalt der spezifischen Übergänge.

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<sup>11</sup> HOBBSAWM (1988): 166-179. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 23. PRICE (2001): 145-148. SZÁNTÓ (1999): 191-192.

<sup>12</sup> LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 54-55. ERDŐDY (2006): 62. VADÁSZ (1998): 131-140. SZÁNTÓ (1999): 186-187.

<sup>13</sup> LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 37-44. DIÓSZEGI (1994): 68-70.

### **Die nationalen und regionalen Charakterzüge der Krisenbehandlung**

Für die progressiven Kräfte und Denker bedeutete England das Musterland, welches die Entwicklungsalternative: „*der Weg der Reformen*“ verkörperte. Als die überlegene Wirtschaftsmacht der Welt beschäftigte sich Großbritannien vor allem damit, die dominierenden Voraussetzungen seiner Kolonialisierungspolitik zu schaffen und zu sichern. Diesem britischen Ziel diente die Definierung und die Schaffung der europäischen Gleichgewichtspolitik, der europäischen Pentarchie. Die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten der Nachkriegszeit provozierten eine radikale oppositionelle Aktivität und ausgespitzte soziale Volksbewegungen aus. Die Vorbedingungen der Konsolidierung schuf der wirtschaftliche Aufschwung der 20er Jahre. Die britische politische Elite hat die günstige Chance ergriffen und den Weg gewählt, die Probleme der großen Erschütterungen nach 1815 mit Reformen zu behandeln, die Gruppen der entstehenden Klassengesellschaft politisch zu integrieren. Der Druck der Massenbewegungen wurde durch die Erweiterung der politischen Rechte und mit Gesetze zugunsten der Gewerkschaften gemäßigt und abgewehrt. Die Umformung des Regierungssystems wurde ohne revolutionäre Brüche, durch die Wahlrechtsreform von 1832 realisiert, die umfangreiche Modernisierung entfaltete sich durch die Reformen auf dem Gebiet der Kommunalen, des Unterrichts, der Banken, vor allem auf dem der Aktiengesellschaften, und nicht zuletzt durch die katholische Emanzipation.<sup>14</sup>

Die Periode der französischen Geschichte zwischen 1815-1830 bekam den Namen: „*Zeit der Restauration*.“ Die Grundzüge ihrer politischen Herrschaft definierte die *Charte constitutionnelle* von 1814, welche die Bewegungsmöglichkeit der parlamentarischen Monarchie unter dem Rahmen der beschränkten Verfassungsmäßigkeit bestimmte, in der Rechtssphäre des Herrschers große Macht konzentrierte, aber auch bestimmte Verfassungsgarantien in das System eingebaut hatte. Der König, Ludwig XVIII. war kein Ultraroyalist, war kein Partner der ultramontanen Restauration, und mit seiner Politik konnte er Frankreich in kurzen Jahren als gleichrangiger Partner der Großmächte anerkennen lassen. Nach der ultramontanen Wende 1824 versuchte Karl X. die Rückkehr zum Ancien Regime in Gang zu bringen, seine Herrschaft führte aber zur Revolution 1830 und zum Bürgerkönigreich.<sup>15</sup>

Die strategische zentrale Region des Gleichgewichts, *der deutsche Raum* bewegte sich nach 1815 auf dem *Weg zwischen Reform und Erstarrung*. Der in Wien ins Leben gerufene Deutscher Bund war ein wichtiges Grundelement der neuen europäischen Ordnung, spielte eine bestimmende Funktion in diesem Mächtesystem. Seine Funktion richtete sich vor allem auf die Neutralisierung der französischen und russischen hegemonialen Bestrebungen. Diesem Hauptziel ordneten die

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<sup>14</sup> MEZEY-SZENTE (2003): 318. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 54-58. SZÁNTÓ (1999): 187-188.

<sup>15</sup> LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 45-47. VADÁSZ (1998): 95-97. PRICE (2001): 159-160.

Friedensgestalter die Aufgabe der Schaffung der inneren deutschen Ordnung unter, und lenkten gleichzeitig große Aufmerksamkeit darauf, auch Deutschland keine hegemoniale Position zu verschenken. Das neue überstaatliche Gebilde vollendete schließlich die Auflösung des Heiligen Römischen Reichs. Souveräne Einzelstaaten sind zu Stande gekommen, sofort mit deren Eingliederung in ein Staatenbündnissystem, so dass die beiden deutschen Vormächte die übrigen deutschen Staaten nicht majorisieren konnten. Die neue Situation nach 1815 wurde vor allem durch folgendes bestimmt: während das preußische Staatsgebiet nach Westen verlagert wurde und die höchstentwickelten deutschen Industrieregionen integrierte, wuchs Österreich in Richtung Osten und Süden aus Deutschland heraus. Der Schwerpunkt der Habsburger Monarchie verschob sich in Richtung außerdeutscher Gebiete, was ihren multiethnischen Charakter weiter stärkte.<sup>16</sup>

Die territoriale Zersplitterung Deutschlands bedeutete automatisch die Zersplitterung der deutschen bürgerlichen Interessenpolitik und schuf weitgehende Grenzen der bürgerlichen Reformchancen. Die Bundesakte von 1815 definierte den Zweck des Bundes in der „*Erhaltung der äußeren und inneren Sicherheit Deutschlands und der Unabhängigkeit und der Unverletzbarkeit der einzelnen deutschen Staaten.*“ Die Regelung behauptete innenpolitisch die Rolle der Bundesorganen gegen den eventuellen verfassungspolitischen Wandel, eine repressive Bundespolitik war aber durch die Bundesverfassung gar nicht determiniert, sie hatte keine restaurative Deutung mit der Gültigkeit auf die Einzelstaaten, aber wurde doch durch die Politik von Metternich das Instrument der *Status-quo-Erhalt*-Politik. Österreich übernahm die Leitung im Frankfurter Bundestag übernommen und bekam führte eine antilibérale und antinationale konservative Offensive von Metternich. Es hieß: das deutsche nationale Denken zurückzudrängen, die revolutionäre Bedrohung niederzudrücken, den Einfluss des monarchischen Prinzips zu stärken, einen freien Weg.<sup>17</sup>

Die Karlsbader Beschlüsse der deutschen Fürste von 1819 haben die Zensur verschärft, die Autonomie der Universitäten beschränkt, und die Tätigkeit der Burschenschaften verboten. Österreich hat auch in der Unterdrückung der italienischen konstitutionellen-nationalen Bewegungen der 20er Jahre eine führende Rolle angenommen. In Spanien erfüllte diese Funktion schon das rehabilitierte Frankreich.<sup>18</sup>

Die deutsche Entwicklung war doch durch die Vielfalt der Herrschaftsordnungen charakterisiert, sie produzierte eine ziemlich breite Skala politischer Einrichtungen. Staaten standen an einer Seite mit ungebrochenen altständischen Traditionen, und an der anderen bis zu modernen Formen staatsbürgerlicher Repräsentation. Im Vergleich zum Absolutismus von Österreich und von Preußen entwickelten sich die süddeutschen Mittel- und Kleinstaaten auf

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<sup>16</sup> LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 59. ERDŐDY (1993): 28-29. MEZEY-SZENTE (2003): 287. DIÓSZEGI (1994): 64. 161. GONDA – NIEDERHAUSER: 161.

<sup>17</sup> LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 60-61. ERDŐDY (1993): 51-52. VADÁSZ (1998): 183-184.

<sup>18</sup> DIÓSZEGI (1994): 68-69. GONDA – NIEDERHAUSER: 164.

der Grundlage napoleonischer Erbschaft, als Experimentierfeld des Frühkonstitutionalismus in die Richtung der Repräsentativverfassung. Diese Alternative schenkte ihrer Herrscher ein effektives Mittel im Dienst des Interesses der neuen staatlichen Integration und ihrer dynastischen Selbstbehauptung. Sie funktionierte gleichzeitig als ein Akt ihrer Souveränitätsbehauptung gegen die Machtbestrebungen der beiden deutschen Vormächte Österreich und Preußen.<sup>19</sup>

In der Formierung der europäischen Prozesse nach 1815 bildete das Osmanische Reich die höchst neuralgische Region. Die nationalen Bestrebungen der Balkan-Länder, die Behandlung der permanenten Krise der Türkei, die *Frage vom Osten* stellte die Großmächte vor eine verhängliche Herausforderung. Sie verpflichteten sich vor allem für die Bewahrung des Status quo und für die der Integrität. Die weitgehend widersprüchliche Komplexität der Erscheinung zeigte sich aber in dem griechischen Ringen für die Gründung des *griechischen Nationalstaates*. Die Freiheitskämpfer von 1821 vertrauten auf die Unterstützung Russlands. Der Zar hat aber den Gegenargumenten von Metternich, der großen Angst vor der Auflösung des Osmanischen Reiches hatte, nachgegeben und seine eigenes nationale Interesse dem Primat der konservativen Solidarität untergeordnet. Der neue russische Herrscher, Nicolas I. hat aber die Politik von Sankt-Peterburg verändert und schloss sich 1827 der englisch-französischen Zusammenarbeit an. Als Ergebnis der Koalition ist das unabhängige Griechenland im Frieden von Adrianopel 1829 geboren. Russland sicherte sich gleichzeitig die freie Durchfahrt durch den Bosphorus, sowie die Besetzung der Donaumündung, und die strategisch wichtigen Gebiete an der Schwarzmeerküste, welche einen günstigen Ausgangspunkt zum künftigen Kampf mit dem Osmanischen Reich, um das osmanische Erbe gesichert haben. Im Konflikt erschien der immanente Widerstreit zwischen den machtpolitischen Interessen und den legitimistischen Prinzipien, und die Großmächte entschieden sich diesmal für die ersten.<sup>20</sup>

### **Konklusion**

Die Arbeit des Wiener Kongresses um die revolutionäre und die napoleonische Epoche abzuschließen und die stabilen Grundlagen des neuen Europas zu schaffen erwiesen sich als erfolgreich. Im Zeichen der Krisenbehandlung entstand ein funktionsfähiges Machtsystem. Dieses war durch die eigenen immanenten Widersprüche belastet, seine Strukturen konnten aber die zukünftigen revolutionären Bewegungen, die Entstehung der Nationalstaaten, die Kriege zwischen den einzelnen Staaten nicht zerschlagen. Die Kriege sind unter lokalen Rahmen abgelaufen, ein neuer gesamteuropäischer Konflikt ist nur 100 Jahre später ausgebrochen. Die Konstruktion sicherte günstige Voraussetzungen für die bürgerliche Umwälzung, für die kapitalistische Entwicklung und für die Blüte der Kultur, der Bildung und der Wissenschaften in Europa.

<sup>19</sup> ERDŐDY (1993): 45-52. MEZEY-SZENTE (2003): 287-288. LANGEWIESCHE (1985): 62-64.

<sup>20</sup> DIÓSZEGI (1994): 73-75. URBÁN (1970): 21-22. VADÁSZ (1998): 457-458.

**Föglein Gizella**

***Purpose and reality  
About National Minorities in Hungary and Hungarian National  
Minorities after the World War II***

**Abstract**

The study deals with the overall nature of the national minorities issue in Hungary; more especially, it looks at the international and domestic aspects as well. The Prime Minister's Office analyzed the UN Charter. The Provisional Government also prepared a framework for a law on national minorities in Hungary. However both documents remained nothing more than conceptions and ideas. Following World War II leading government circles attempted to set up an international and regional system for the protection of minority rights. However the victorious powers looked for an alternative „*solution*”. They attempted to „*re-establish the balance*” of national-ethnic and state-territorial status quo by evictions and bilateral population exchanges. During the Peace Conference, none of the victorious powers was ready to support a settlement of minority issues in any form or with any guarantees.

*Keywords:* Definition, Proposals, Migrations, „*Minority Code*”, Illusion versus disillusionment.

**T**he study deals with the overall nature of the national minorities issue in Hungary; more especially, it looks at the international and domestic aspects which emerged after the World War II.

*„According to authoritative Hungarian political and scientific literature, Germans, Slovaks, Southern-Slavs (i.e. Serbs, Croatians, Slovenians) and Romanians are defined as nationalities. Today in Hungary the Roma population is considered to be an ethnic group, while Jews form a special group, defined primarily as a religious community.”<sup>1</sup>*

The above definition and terminology published in the 1980's was commonly accepted de jure and de facto from the close of World War II until the Constitutional Amendment of 1989 and Act 77 of 1993 on the rights of national and ethnic minorities.

The concepts of nationality and national minority as historic, political and sociological phenomena have not been accurately and conclusively defined to this day, although lack of the standard definition poses a number of problems in all disciplines.

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<sup>1</sup> JOÓ, Rudolf: *Nemzeti és nemzetiségi önrendelkezés, önkormányzat, egyenjogúság. [Self-determination by nations and nationalities; self-government and equal rights]*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1984. 161.

Following World War II, political and public discourse, even among social scientists, was practically limited to the concept of 'nationality', while in the years after World War I the same concept was denoted by 'minority'. When in Central and Southeastern Europe or in Hungary discussion turned to the issue of national identity, everyone was thinking of national minorities instead of nationality. When used in certain legal documents by states, international bodies or in political and scientific circles, these terms were not used interchangeably or arbitrarily, rather, they consistently and faithfully reflected a peculiar mindset and a way of thinking.

This restrictive use of the concept of nationality indicates that instead of thinking in terms of „the” nation, or the state and the nation as constituent parts of a whole, society is primarily concerned with the „dominant” founding nation itself. In fact, we find a theory with roots in the 19th century, gathering significant strength in the second half of 20th century, where the state is seen as a defining force in the life on nation, and vice versa. This approach based on the primacy of the state considers the „dominant” nationality as the sole representative of the nation, while members of its own „mother notion”, putting an artificial barrier between itself and others.

The fact that after World Wars I and II only the victorious nations were guaranteed the right to self-determination in Central and Southeastern Europe further contributed to a hardening of this attitude. Moreover – and as a consequence of superpower interests or the lack of thereof – the state-territorial boundaries virtually never followed national-ethnic populations. As a result, problems that go with minority status and nationality were not only perpetuated, but grew more and more acute. Regardless of place and time, size or ethnic composition, the political, economic, cultural and legal status of any national minority is a barometer of all political democracies.<sup>2</sup> Following World War II, competent bodies of defeated Hungary repeatedly initiated the international, regional and local settlement of minority issues. Due to its international status at that time, however, in number of cases Hungary's hands were tied and it was forced to follow a pre-set course of action.

## Proposals

### ***„The San Francisco Charter and the National Minority Question”***

Following the World War II., because the states boundaries of the Central and South-East-European states essentially remained unchanged; the problems of national minorities not only remained unchanged, but they also became more acute.

At that time in Hungary some proposals were made in relation to a

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<sup>2</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *Nemzetiség vagy kisebbség? A magyarországi horvátok, németek, románok, szerbek, szlovákok és szlovének státusáról 1945-1993*. [Nationality or Minority? About the Status of Croats, Germans, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks and Slovenians in Hungary 1945-1993]. ISTER Kiadó, Budapest, 2000. 6-7.

comprehensive policy for international and domestic laws for national minorities.

International legal relations worked out by the United Nations set the *universal* legal standard. The UN Charter, published in San Francisco June 26, 1945, declares the individual civil rights of minorities.

On August 2, 1945, the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office prepared an extensive memorandum about the United Nations' Charter, entitled „*The San Francisco Charter and the issue of National Minority Question*”.<sup>3</sup> This document prepared for an interdepartmental meeting, analyzed the United Nations' Charter.

After reviewing the situation of national minorities in the 20<sup>th</sup> century from the point of view of international law, it then made concrete suggestions for working out a system of legal protection for minorities after the war.

As the memorandum stated, „*It is inconceivable that in light of the experience over the past 30 years the newly established United Nations would allow deterioration in the light, treatment, legal standing and international status of minorities or, to use current terminology, nationalities*”.<sup>4</sup>

Analyzing the UN Charter, the memorandum came up two fundamental conclusions: „*a) Under the United Nations Charter, it is responsibilities include the guarantee of minority rights and equality under law. b) However, the Charter does not spell out regulatory mechanism in any detail.*”<sup>5</sup>

The proposal made several suggestions on shaping post-war minority policy. Accordingly: „*Nationalities be recognized as international legal bodies or entities with full legal power. Let it be stated clearly and unequivocally that national minorities are collective legal subjects.*”<sup>6</sup> ...

*It should be openly expressed that the questions relating to nationalities cannot be regarded as domestic affairs of the state, into which the 7th point of 2nd paragraph of the United Nations Charter cannot be allowed to interfere. On the contrary, the issue of nationalities, national minorities is of such international importance that it is organically related to the preservation of international peace and security.*”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> A *San Francisco-i alapokmány és a nemzetiségi kérdés*. [The San Francisco Charter and the National Minority Question]. *Magyar Országos Levéltár. Vallás és Közoktatásügyi Minisztérium. Elnöki Osztály*. [Hungarian National Archives. Ministry of Religion and Education. Bureau of Nationality Affairs]. XIX-I-1-s. 11 168/1945.

<sup>4</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *A magyarországi nemzeti kisebbségek helyzetének jogi szabályozása 1945-1993*. [Legal regulations of national minorities in Hungary 1945-1993]. *Regio*, 1997/1: 37.

<sup>5</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *Nemzetiség vagy kisebbség? A magyarországi horvátok, németek, románok, szerbek, szlovákok és szlovének státusáról 1945-1993*. [Nationality or Minority? About the Status of Croats, Germans, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks and Slovenians in Hungary 1945-1993]. ISTER Kiadó, Budapest, 2000. 11-16.

<sup>6</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *Az ENSZ és a nemzeti kisebbségek – 1945. A San Francisco-i alapokmány és a nemzetiségi kérdés*. [The UNO and national minorities – 1945. The San Francisco Charter and the National Minorities]. *Magyar Napló*, 1990/16: 8-9.

<sup>7</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella co-author: *A magyar állam és a nemzetiségek. A magyarországi nemzetiségi kérdés történetének jogforrásai 1848-1993*. [The Hungarian state and nationalities. The legal sources of Hungarian nationality question 1848-1993]. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 658-662, 661-662.

The necessary and urgent creation of a forum on nationality policy was pre-empted by the decision taken by Allied Powers on August 2, 1945 at the Potsdam Conference. Consequently, the text of the memorandum never reached the UN Headquarters. Clause 27<sup>th</sup> of the *UN Agreement on Civic and Political Rights* which, under international law as a minimum guarantee, granted national minorities „individual rights for the collective as a whole”, was published only in 1966, more than two decades after the Charters inception.<sup>8</sup>

Besides this, proposals the Provisional Government also prepared a framework for a law on national minorities in Hungary.

### ***Framework for a law on National Minorities in Hungary***

In the summer of 1945 the Provisional National Government also prepared a framework, presented a bill for a law on national minorities in Hungary.

The document<sup>9</sup> declared the fundamental principle, that „every Hungarian citizen regardless of their native language, race or religion is equal before the law. Hungarian citizen cannot suffer legal discrimination based religion, race, language or ethnic origin.”<sup>10</sup>

The proposed law declared: active and passive electoral rights for citizens belonging to minorities; the right to hold public office; and the right to move freely.

Among the collective rights for minorities, one of the most important was the declaration of the guarantee of the freedom to use one’s own language before administrative authorities, in offices and furthermore, before courts. The mother tongue could also be used in elementary and higher educational institutes,<sup>11</sup> and in the media and in cultural events. Moreover, „all minorities, are entitled to the right of democratic association” (e.g. establishment of national, cultural, economic organizations) and, „within the bounds of Hungarian laws, to public assembly, to hold national assemblies where they are free to use their own mother tongue.”

The main section of the document included the legal protection of national minorities as well.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> „Clause 27. In states with population of national, religious or linguistic minorities, members of these minorities cannot be denied the right to, with other members of their group, live according to their own cultural traditions, profess and follow their own religion and use their own language.” *Az emberi jogok dokumentumokban*. [Human rights in documents.]. Collected: KOVÁCS, István & SZABÓ, Imre. Second edition, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Budapest, 1980. 410.

<sup>9</sup> The framework’s original title: *A magyarországi nemzetiségek jogi helyzetét szabályozó rendelet alapelvei* [Legal Principles Regulating the Life of National Minorities in Hungary]. *Magyar Országos Levéltár. Belügyminisztérium. Törvényelőkészítő Osztály*. [Hungarian National Archives. Ministry of the Interior. Legislative Department.] XIX-B-1-c., 8. doboz, 34. tétel, 150 349/1945.

<sup>10</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *Törvénytervezet a magyarországi nemzeti kisebbségek jogi helyzetéről (1945)*. [Framework for a Law on National Minorities in Hungary (1945)]. *Jogtudományi Közlöny*, 1996/10: 425-428.

<sup>11</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *Etnikum és educatio* [Ethnicity and educatio]. *Napvilág Kiadó*, Budapest, 2006.

<sup>12</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *A magyarországi nemzeti kisebbségek helyzetének jogi szabályozása 1945-1993* [Legal regulations of National Minorities in Hungary 1945-1993]. *Regio*, 1997/1: 43.



One of the most important individual rights for national minorities was that every Hungarian citizens „according to his or her own choice, could legally use the Hungarian language or the language of his or her respective nationality”<sup>13</sup> in public or private documents.

However, this planned law – due to the circumstances of war – did not apply to the German minority resident in Hungary.

*„The basic principles main toned above dot apply to the German national minority resident in Hungary. Until the time of an international settlement with regard to the Germans, the existing legal regulations remain in force.”<sup>14</sup>*

This international „settlement” was the Potsdam Conference of the Allied Powers (17nd July – 2nd August, 1945). In Potsdam they decided the complete or partial eviction of German minorities from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary and also determined the manner of resettlement.<sup>15</sup>

However, the spirit of Potsdam left its mark on both Hungarian documents. In post-war Hungary – due to international circumstances and because of the armistice status of the state – the Memorandum regarding the San Francisco Charter as well as the prospective law on national minorities failed in all respects. They remained nothing more than proposals, conceptions and ideas.

### „ Migrations”

Following World War II leading Hungarian government circles attempted to set up an international and regional system for the protection of minority rights. The victorious powers, however, looked for an alternative „solution”: claiming the principle of collective responsibility and putting it into practice, they attempted to „re-establish the balance” of national-ethnic and state-territorial status quo by evictions and bilateral population exchanges.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella co-author: *A magyar állam és a nemzetiségek. A magyarországi nemzetiségi kérdés történetének jogforrásai 1848-1993.* [The Hungarian state and nationalities. The legal sources of Hungarian nationality question 1848-1993]. Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó, 2002. 663-667.

<sup>14</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *Törvénytervezet a magyarországi nemzeti kisebbségek jogi helyzetéről (1945).* [Framework for a Law on National Minorities in Hungary (1945)]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1996/10: 425-428.

<sup>15</sup> *Teherán, Jalta, Potsdam.* CIBULEVSKIJ, B. L. - SZANAKOJEV, S. P.(szerk.), Második kiadás. [Teherán, Jalta, Potsdam. TSIBULEVSKY, B. L. - SANAKOYEV, S. P. (Editors), Second Edition]. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1972. 418.

<sup>16</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *National Minorities: Rights and Legal Regulations in Hungary between 1945 – 1993.* Regio. A review of studies on minorities, communities and society 1998. CSEJDY, László - FEJŐS, Zoltán (Editors). Published by the Teleki László Foundation with the support of the Commission of the European Union. 69-94.,

TÓTH, Ágnes: *The relocation of Germans and the Slovakian-Hungarian Population Exchange.* IN: TÓTH, Ágnes (Edited): *National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary, 1920-2001.* Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 2005. 253-312.

### **Relocation of the Germans**

As part of the Provisional National Government program and in compliance with cease-fire agreements and other international treaties, a number of measures meant to deal with minority-civil and collective rights were introduced. In early 1945 a decree went into force ordering the internment<sup>17</sup> of German nationals, while in March rights regulating name changes were restricted.<sup>18</sup> The decree on distribution of land,<sup>19</sup> for instance, ordered the confiscation of all property and land holdings from those Hungarian citizens who „*attempted assume their German-sounding surnames.*” One of the obvious purposes of the decree was to increase the size of land and the number of households slated for confiscation. Otherwise, with the exception of German nationals, the land distribution program did not put minorities at a disadvantage because their national origin.

At the end of June 1945, the Provisional National Government – based on the principle of individual responsibility – ordered the review of the past political affiliations and activities of all German-Hungarians over the age of 16.<sup>20</sup> Announced after the Potsdam declaration, the electoral law concerning the compulsory eviction of German-Hungarians – following the spirit of Potsdam – denied both passive and active voting rights to any Hungarian citizen „*who had claimed German nationality*”. At the same time, these rights were upheld for citizens with South-Slavic, Romanians and Slovak origin.

The Allied Great Powers’ governments (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) recognized that „*the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will have to be undertaken*”. The Potsdam conference entrusted the matter of the expulsion of the Germans to Czechoslovak and Polish governments and, in the case of Hungary, to the Allied Control Commission (ACC). In this respect, therefore, the responsibilities of the Provisional National Government and successive governments were fulfilled by the ACC.<sup>21</sup>

In late November 1945 the ACC informed Prime Minister Zoltán Tildy that under the resolution of the ACC for Germany 500.000 ethnic Germans were to be expelled from Hungary and resettled in Germany in the U. S. zone of occupation. The enormous numbers of those who were to be expelled greatly surprised the Hungarian government, because according to the wartime figures the size of the German community in Hungary was considerably smaller.

The Prime Minister’s Decree<sup>22</sup> of December 29, 1945 ordering the dispatch of

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<sup>17</sup> 302/1945. M. E. sz. Magyar Közlöny, 1945/7.

<sup>18</sup> 5151/1945. B. M. sz. Magyar Közlöny, 1945/11.

<sup>19</sup> 600/1945. M. E. sz. Magyar Közlöny, 1945/10.

<sup>20</sup> 3820/1945. M. E. sz. Magyar Közlöny, 1945/65.

<sup>21</sup> The ACC (Allied Control Commission) was in essence called upon to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreement.

<sup>22</sup> 12 330/1945. M. E. sz. Magyar Közlöny, 1945/211.

ethnic German minority to Germany was dictated primarily by international pressure which, in a perverse twist, placed vanquished Hungary in the position of a quasi-victor over its German minority. The decree stated the following: „*Any Hungarian citizen who – at the last census – professed to being an ethnic German, or German native language speaker, or who was a member of the Volksbund or German armed forces (SS), must resettle in Germany*”.

The Decree, in accordance with Allied Control Commission regulations in theory ordered, in fact „*made possible*” without any significant limitation, the evacuation of all Hungarian citizens of German descent or those speaking German as a first language. Following World War II, some 200 thousand ethnic Germans were evicted from Hungary.<sup>23</sup>

### ***Slovak-Hungarian population exchange***

At the urging of the superpowers and following bilateral talks on February 27, 1946 a population exchange agreement was signed Hungary and Czechoslovakia.<sup>24</sup> Previously, the Czechoslovak request for the dispatch of its citizens of Hungarian descent as a part of a „*people exchange*” program had been rejected at the Potsdam Conference. In reality the agreement was not based on an equitable exchange. While Slovaks living in Hungary had the chance to apply voluntarily and individually, Hungarian families living in the territory of Czechoslovakia were selected by Czechoslovak authorities. The circumstances of its signing, as well as the word and spirit of the agreement, all point to the fact that it was made between two unequal partners, one on the side of the victorious, other on the side of the losing states.<sup>25</sup>

The Czechoslovak authorities – based on the decree of the Slovak Representative of the Interior of 17 June 1946 – began a campaign of so-called re-slovakization among the ethnic Hungarian population. The Hungarians were given a choice: if they would profess to be Slovaks, their citizenship would be returned. If they refused, then they would have to leave the country, they would be expelled from Czechoslovakia. In the course of the campaign, about 400 thousand Hungarians „*declared themselves*” to be Slovak. Even so, in several districts (Komárom, Párkány, Šturovo, etc.) a substantial share of the population refused to submit to the pressure.<sup>26</sup>

By April 1948, 73,273 Slovaks had voluntarily left Hungary, while 68,407

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<sup>23</sup> FEHÉR, István: *A magyarországi németek kitelepítése 1945-1950*. [The eviction of German-Hungarians between 1945 and 1950]. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1988. 163.

<sup>24</sup> The population exchange between Hungary and Czechoslovakia was carried out under Act 15 of 1946. *Magyar Törvénytár*. 1946. évi törvények. 64-71.

<sup>25</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *National Minorities: Rights and Legal Regulations in Hungary between 1945 – 1993*. Regio, A review of studies on minorities, communities and society 1998. CSEJDY, László - FEJŐS, Zoltán (Editors). Published by the Teleki László Foundation with the support of the Commission of the European Union. 75.

<sup>26</sup> IZSÁK, Lajos: *A Political History of Hungary 1944-1990*. Eötvös University Press, Budapest, 2000. 91.

Hungarians had been expelled from Czechoslovakia. In addition, there were many others who came across Hungary temporarily to stay with their relatives, but who then remained in Hungary and never back to Slovakia. The resettlement program was concluded only in 1949.

### **Other Migrations**

At the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, the delegation of the government of victorious Yugoslavia handed Hungary an ultimatum concerning an agreement on Hungarian-Yugoslav population exchange<sup>27</sup> and water rights. Were the Hungarians to reject their offer, they threatened to bring an amendment to the Hungarian Peace Treaty before the conference. The official meeting of the chairman and secretary general of the two peace delegations resulted in an agreement on principles. In an exchange of letters, the chairmen of two the two delegations laid out plans for the „voluntary and mutual” exchange of maximum 40 thousand people, to be carried out by the two states.<sup>28</sup> Eventually, terms of the agreement never actually come into force. Nevertheless, the circumstances and the tone of the agreement made the international standing and the foreign policies of the two partners abundantly clear.

The Hungarians of Czechoslovakia were not the only group of Hungarians to be forced to leave their native lands after the World War II. Hungarians were also expelled from other states. The Hungarian census of 1949 offers some indication of the numbers of people expelled from the neighboring states. In 1949, 376,173 of Hungary’s residents had been born in a foreign country before 1938. 133,563 had been born in Rumania, 118,582 in Czechoslovakia, and 65,877 in Yugoslavia.<sup>29</sup> All this meant that the number of people arriving in Hungary greatly exceeded the combined sum of expelled Germans and voluntarily resettled Slovaks.

### **Illusion versus disillusionment**

In the period of the peace preparations, on 7th of May, 1946, the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office called a meeting of the legal experts on minorities. This forum worked out a scheme of an international framework for the protections of minorities. The Peace Preparation Department of the Foreign Ministry referred to this plan as a „Minority Code”.<sup>30</sup>

The Code suggested that, with reference of the United Nations Charter,

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<sup>27</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *A magyar-jugoszláv népcseresegyezmény-tervezet – 1946*. [Hungarian-Yugoslav population exchange-framework - 1946]. *Századok*, 1996/6: 1553-1570.

<sup>28</sup> FÖGLEIN, Gizella: *Nemzetiség vagy kisebbség? A magyarországi horvátok, németek, románok, szerbek, szlovákok és szlovének státusáról 1945-1993*. [Nationality or Minority? About the Status of Croatians, Germans, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks and Slovenians in Hungary 1945-1993]. ISTER Kiadó, Budapest, 2000. 34-58.

<sup>29</sup> IZSÁK, Lajos: *A Political History of Hungary 1944-1990*. Eötvös University Press, Budapest, 2000. 93.

<sup>30</sup> FÜLÖP, Mihály: *A kisebbségi kódex* [The Minority Code]. *Külpolitika*, 1989/2: 102-145., 118-119.

provisions referring to defend on national minorities the protection of national minorities should be inserted into the peace treaties. Or, instead of this, the permanent members of the Security Council should arrange separate agreements with the Southeastern European states concerning the protection of national minorities. It pressed for the realization of complete regional and individual autonomy, with international supervision and international jurisdiction.

However, the victorious powers held that their plan for the guarantee of individual human rights was satisfactory.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, the proposals of the Hungarian peace delegation were not given attention at the Paris Peace Conference. None of the victorious powers was ready to support a settlement of minority issues in any form or with any guarantees. The Peace Treaty after World War II (in contrast to the one following World War I) regarded the national minority question as a domestic issue of those states in which the minorities were living.

Nevertheless, the significance lying behind the „*Minority Code*” was that it was a comprehensive attempt to codify the rights of minorities so as they would be in harmony with the United Nations’ Charter for solving regional national minority conflicts.<sup>32</sup>

The spirit of the United Nations’ Charter confined itself merely to the acknowledgement of the declarations of civil rights for individual members of minorities. The Allied Powers reasoned that, in those states which acknowledged individual rights for citizens, there was no need the regulated internationally the collective rights of national minorities.<sup>33</sup> In this way the national minorities were defenseless against the damaging tendencies of the majority’s endeavors to pursue its own interests.

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<sup>31</sup> FÜLÖP, Mihály: *A befejezetlen béke. A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés 1947.* [Unfinished peace. The Council of Foreign Ministers and the hungarian peace treaty], Héttorony Kiadó, Budapest, é. n. 130-131.

<sup>32</sup> FÜLÖP, Mihály: *A kisebbségi kódex.* [The Minority Code]. *Külpolitika*, 1989/2: 118-142.

<sup>33</sup> ROMSICS, Ignác: *Az 1947-es párizsi békeszerződés.* [The Paris peace treaty in 1947]. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 182.



**Gintli Tibor**

***False Wishing Dreams  
The Eroded Village by Dezső Szabó***

**Abstract**

Dezső Szabó's novel meeting such a remarkable popularity by the time of its publication declared a new start in the Hungarian social policy, in the national self-perception and in the Hungarian literature, respectively. The article seeks to present that the novel in fact varies the topos of both the theory of the romantic national character and the Romantic literature, the latter he criticized so sarcastically. While promising a social program he in fact creates an anachronistic, vitalistic national mythology.

*Keywords:* Vitalism, Voluntarism, mythology, Populism, social novel.

**D**ezső Szabó's novel, *The Eroded Village*, which was met with a loud response, was published in May 1919, yet in the period of the Republic of Councils. It had an influence particularly on the youth<sup>1</sup>, many of the folk-writers' movement just starting their careers recalled its reading as a decisive action of their intellectual orientation<sup>2</sup>. How could this book become such an important orientation point? What other reasons contributed to the cult around the novel besides the time of publication? I can not answer these questions in detail in the framework of such a short presentation. Therefore I am going to focus on one issue only: that is to analyze to what extent the novelty of the theory expressed in the novel, its inner coherence or rather the historical situation and the modality of narration contributed to such an unusual effect.

To put it in a more provocative way: could the ideological building comprising the centre of the novel be considered as a significant achievement owing to the expressed thoughts only and in lack of the shock of the war trauma and the agitative narration? Has the book fulfilled its author's intention of becoming the launch of a new approach, opening new perspectives for the Hungarian society and intellectual life, and could it meet the need stressed so much of providing a real social alternative after „*the age of false wishing dreams*”? Has the book

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<sup>1</sup> Two university newspapers – *Ifjak szava* and *Gondolat* – published enthusiastic and appraising articles on the novel. NAGY, Péter: *Szabó Dezső*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1964. 234.

<sup>2</sup> Géza Féja for example appraises enthusiastically the relative power of the book even in 1943. FÉJA, Géza: *Szabó Dezső*. IN: GRÓH, Gáspár (ed.): *Az elsodort író. In memoriam Szabó Dezső*. Nap Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 251. This relationship between the new writer generation and Dezső Szabó was not at all so uniform, in László Németh's reminiscences of 1928 it was characterized by rather dissonant elements: „*Between the age of 18 és 24 I can divide my life for for-Dezső Szabó and anti-Dezső Szabó periods.*” NÉMETH, László: *Szabó Dezső*. IN: GRÓH, Gáspár (ed.): *Az elsodort író. In memoriam Szabó Dezső*. Nap Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 166.

achieved the program expressed by János Böjtö in the novel: „*The war chased us and the Hungarians will catch up on their age.*”<sup>3</sup> Could the program expressed by the novel be considered as a modern conservatism in the 2<sup>nd</sup> decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century?

My position on these questions is evident and rather definite: the ideology expressed in the text of *The Eroded Village* is not a modern one, incoherent and is actually in contradiction with its own expectations<sup>4</sup>. The ideological centre of Dezső Szabó's novel is comprised of the doctrine of Vitalism. The theory of the metaphysical phenomenon of life adored with an almost religious enthusiasm might likely be due to the influence of Nietzsche however other well-known trends might have also affected it, such as Social Darwinism or the Decadent Movement.

Although the role of Vitalism can not be considered as evidently negative in Dezső Szabó's thinking because the definitive rejection of war is partly originated in it, the mythological characteristic of this theory has basically determined the perspective of the novel, which in itself makes it impossible to set up a real social program. According to this vitalistic approach, life and death are struggling with each other in the depth of the personality of the man and the nation. In this deep sphere, often referred to as instinctive, the fate of the intellectual and the nation is decided. It is only will that can intervene in the struggle between life and death in favor of life. This explains for the cult of will in the novel evoking again Nietzsche most of all. Eventually the elementary life will is embodied in action this is where the mystification of action and power stems from. Further elements of Dezső Szabó's theory can be easily placed in this scheme.

Hungarians are shown as a race dying out by the novel, while the world war is depicted as the most impressive phenomena of death lurking. In the background of the idea of decay we can recognize the topos of the vision of nation's death originating in the Hungarian Reform Age and the spirit of decay of the Decadent Movement. The sense of devastation is supported by the Social Darwinist idea of decline in the competition of species: Hungarians have become defenseless among ethnics thinking more vitally and pragmatically, and are close to lose in the competition for existence the „*dupe of history for ever*” is endangered in its existence by strangers. Dezső Szabó's most stubborn misbeliefs originate in this mechanic biological analogy, and this leads to the xenophobia and Anti-Semitism articulated in his works. The rejection of free competition and democracy considered as its synonym is the consequence of the same principle of *bellum omnium contra omnes*, as according to Dezső Szabó's diagnosis Hungarians are not strong enough yet for the struggle against the other races.

The hereditary taint of generations, the favorite cliché of naturalistic literature

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<sup>3</sup> Hereby and below I am referring to the following edition: SZABÓ, Dezső: *Az elsodort falu*. Csokonai Kiadó, Debrecen, 1989. 441.

<sup>4</sup> In his article referred to above, László Németh makes similar critical comments: „*He worked out only a few new and even peeled out the adopted ones from their individual guarantee: he simplified the green twigs to a bough and a hammer out of the metal.*” NÉMETH (2002): 175.



also appears in the eclectic catalogue of reasons for decline. The presentation of various forms of alcoholism, neurasthenia and hereditary taint plays an important role in the depiction of the declining village intellectuals.

As I have earlier mentioned surviving death is guaranteed by will according to the approach of *The Eroded Village*. The consequence of this belief is a strange solution in the novel: János Bőjtthe seems to be capable on his own to revitalize his race. If the gesture of will seems to be sufficient for opening a now horizon for Hungarians, then it is enough to show the example of how will can be enforced. This voluntarism is a key element of Dezső Szabó's perspective: will if strong enough can turn into actions, and this provides the basis for a new life. We can hardly doubt that psychological factors play an important role in the history of social changes however overemphasizing the significance of will to such an extent makes the social program of the novel still unreal. The novel does not niggle too much about the problem of what social program to set up. Following the example of János Bőjtthe, the whole race will be able to learn how to will and act, and this is actually sufficient for a „*new conquest*”. In the mythical character of the hero the genius of the race is realized and he revitalizes thus his nation. The epic hero embodying the nation is again an old topos belonging to the requisites of the Romantic literature however Hungarian Romantic literature never attempted to depict literary fiction as a real social program in a direct way. Nevertheless, Dezső Szabó's agitative epic assigns direct social function to literature by neglecting the metaphoric characteristics of literary texts, which means that they can have only indirect reference to world contrary to press or political speeches.

This acting type of literature by Dezső Szabó interprets itself as a social action, and as a consequence what may happen in the world of fiction could take place in the framework of social reality. From this perspective the novel may seem to govern János Bőjtthe's life so that the hero finds his way towards the new life, and eventually there seems to be no need for a program worked out in detail and clearly interpreted economically and sociologically. Do we not confront Dezső Szabó's novel with expectations unusual towards the genre if we ask for a more definitely designed action program? I do not think so, as a key component of the genre of *The Eroded Village* is the social novel attached with a strong agitative intention to make ideas expressed in the novel become actions. Considering the narrative role taken in the novel we could rightly expect a designed program the novel urges to implement. After finishing his studies abroad János Bőjtthe returns to his native village to farm and carry out a life program which is set in peasant environment. The novel definitely interprets peasantry as the real Hungarians while other social groups except for the Bőjtthe-type of farming gentries as the foreigners. In the background of this simplifying and excluding tendency of identification a romantic idea can be recognized although it is evident that the majority of bourgeoisie in Hungary was not of Hungarian ethnic either in the Middle Ages or during the industrial revolution. The recognition of identity in the folk is a cliché of Romantic literature, and so is expecting the guarantee of an

original culture in the development of national character, and the theory of the national character is also the consequence of Romantic cult of individual.

The novel sees the guarantee of the Hungarian future in the village, which is quite a dubious idea<sup>5</sup> considering that decreasing percentage of inhabitants in Europe's economically successful countries has been producing the increasing quantity of agricultural goods since the industrial revolution. It is also unclear how the village, farming lifestyle would prepare Hungarians for competition, how it would inspire the race for business to take over the lead over industry and trade. In this respect referring ideas in the text seem to be contradictory.

Miklós Farkas, the declining genius of the novel, János Bőjtő's friend says that democracy should be planted „*in this human anachronism [the Hungarian] so that he runs with life anger to become a tradesman, a banker, a journalist, a politician, a factory owner, a soldier, an artist, and if it must be, to become a usurer, a swindler, but he mustn't be abused and cheated.*” (SZABÓ, 1989: 112.) Hereby adaptation to free competition appears as a survival strategy. At another point the same Miklós Farkas sees the solution in the elimination of free competition: „*A crusade must be started against the damned and deadly democracy of free competition.*” (SZABÓ, 1989: 311.) At the same time he puts a claim towards the Jews that they “themselves must exterminate the jackal moral of free competition out of the race.” (SZABÓ, 1989: 311.) It is important to mention that in the case of *The Eroded Village* the narrative consideration distinguishing the focus of the narrator and the character does not seem to prevail. As many of his interpreters emphasized, Dezső Szabó speaks through his mythical characters<sup>6</sup>, and thus Miklós Farkas's perspective cannot be detached from either the narrator's perspective or the author's. Neither Miklós Farkas's perspective, nor the whole novel gives a definite answer to the question whether the great action elevating the Hungarians is to be considered as a withdrawal from free competition or on the contrary it is to be regarded as its conquest. The program of returning to the land refers to the first one, while some of János Bőjtő's seemingly coward actions to hinder Schönberger's mining company in its plans affecting the village, confirm the latter alternative.

A central issue of the novel, as I referred to it several times, is the relationship between literature and social „*reality*”. In line with this, the plot describes to the same extent the literary life in the capital in a pamphlet like way besides village happenings. The satirical depiction of modern literature is completed with the fierce criticism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century literary tradition. This latter one appears in the

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<sup>5</sup> This aspect was already raised by Gyula Juhász in his novel review published as an open letter back in 1919: „*My dear colleague, when fearing for the Hungarians downtrodden and wanting the future, the road of development does not lead to the village.*” JUHÁSZ, Gyula: *Szabó Dezsőhöz*. IN: GRÓH, Gáspár (ed.): *Az elsodort író. In memoriam Szabó Dezső*. Nap Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 111.

<sup>6</sup> Dezső Szabó's monographer, Gyula Gombos perceives this question alike: „*His novels are self-confessions without exception. They are full with lyrical and rhetoric outbursts, personal likes and dislikes; bitterness, mock, tensions, many times without any artistic transposition.*” GOMBOS, Gyula: *Szabó Dezső*. Püski Kiadó, New York, 1975. 164.

novel when characterizing declining and dying figures. The mentality of Reverend Farcády's family and village intellectuals generally is connected with their literary readings by the narrator.

Figures that are shown incapable of living are under the influence of Romantic literature which therefore appears as a major reason for decline in the novel. Particularly works by Jókai and Victor Hugo are presented negatively, but Petőfi's *The Apostle* belongs to the constantly recurring negative examples, moreover, though not so evidently, a similar shadow is cast to the works written by Vörösmarty and Madách. The emblematic oeuvres of Romantic literature are considered with an antipathy of the author because he regards them as the embodiment of the national self-approach which led to self-betrayal and eventually to destruction. The accusation of untruth against the determinative trend of the 19<sup>th</sup> century literature constantly emerges throughout the novel. When characterizing Farcády's mother for example, we can read the following: „*this woman is in need of infinite, absolute untruth*”, she took over the bombastic mythology of his political enthusiasm from him (from her husband) (SZABÓ, 1989: 33.), „*Victor Hugo and Jókai were the gospel connecting back to life, the retaining untruth*” or: „*she was the lunatic of romantic mythology.*” (SZABÓ, 1989: 34.) Farcády kept on imagining „*sickly Romantic epic*” (SZABÓ, 1989: 63.) and fantasizing about exalted tragic visions. Adoration, false idealism, embellished idealization and literature which feeds national self-approach pleasing itself in a grandiose destruction are seated at the bar of the accused, by evaluating these authors' oeuvres rather one-sidedly. Adoration and idealism on a metaphysical basis intensifies the national weaknesses. According to this stereotypical national character theory the Hungarians are originally passive sufferers of all happening to them and a sudden enthusiasm only can make them act. Dezső Szabó attributes the euphoria welcoming the outbreak of the war to this character: „*the folk fell on knees before the dark death*” (SZABÓ, 1989: 191.), and was caught up in the wave of tragic adoration, which spoke „*about the tragic vision of the killed prince*”. The criticism of adoration and false idealism may even imply the requirement for realistic policy and sobriety. Dezső Szabó is not however Zsigmond Kemény, and is not attached to the literary heredity of the author of *The Devotees*. Instead of the tragic devotion leading to death he rather suggests, moreover claims for an enthusiasm devoted to triumph by articulating the need for a „*new fanaticism*”. Instead of the old, invalid mythology he wants to create a mythology rooted in the reality of life. This new mythology can be differentiated from the old one in two aspects. On the one hand it shows current status of peasantry, the Hungarians respectively with a criticism in line with the schemes of the naturalist depiction. On the other hand it contrasts self-satisfaction tempting to passivity and tragic pathos with the myth of life, power and action. This myth is rooted in Vitalism, and as such it is a metaphysical construction itself despite the rejection of faith in the afterlife and the praise of existing body. The expression of „*whished untruth*” can be therefore referred to the contents of this myth in the same way as to the

criticized national self-approach of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Similarly to the characterization of Farcády in the novel which is also true for Dezső Szabó: „*he rode into the world of comforting untruth with wild neighing sentences*”. (SZABÓ, 1989: 419.) What reality cover is set up to support the myth by the novel? On the one hand it is the action of will which is embodied by János Bőjtthe. Although a positive effect may even be attributed to the perspective emphasizing the role of will, in case it refers to the responsibility of the addressed community for managing their own fate, their mythical enlargement and omnipotence will recreate the world of false illusions. Only could hardly be sufficient for influencing the fate of a community if a precise assessment of the situation and a real action program is lacking. In lack of these only emotional contents are given to the vision emphasizing the power of omnipotent will. It is a big paradox of the thinking behaviour of Dezső Szabó: his style and societal ideas are basically of emotional character and not governed by calm analysis but passionate emotional outbursts. His influence on his contemporary can be partly attributed to this.

It is impossible however to establish a real social program on the basis of ecstatic raptures and exalted angry blowups and the stressed anti-intellectualism will not enhance its setting up.

The novel chooses the stereotypical perspective of the national character again to confirm the heroic triumph myth. According to this, Hungarians are the hidden ancient power which suffers passively in lack of an aim, however as soon as it finds a reasonable purpose it is manifested in triumphant actions. As you can see Dezső Szabó's novel shares just the same characteristic of the criticized Romantic tradition that he disapproved the most which is the pathetic mythology getting rid of reality<sup>7</sup>. It is worth mentioning here that the novel is not consequent even in the respect of its representing the vitalistic metaphysics of will to live. János Bőjtthe in one of his monologues in indirect speech depicts the same apocalyptic vision of

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<sup>7</sup> *The Eroded Village* looks the anachronistic and eclectic continuation of the 19th century not only on the level of notions but also from a poetic perspective. Despite the expressionistic word formation, the narrative building elements are traditional in an outdated manner, they often work as spoiled versions of Hugo and Jókai's narrative solutions criticised a lot. Lajos Fülepe's review drew attention quite early to this characteristic: „*As the intention of the redeemer and the leading article tirade is attached to the vision of reality in contents, so are romantic and bombastic forms connected to naturalistic forms in its style. This is not an unusual combination. In Zola a great deal of Hugo resided. This sort of naturalistic-romantic mixture which is one of the most unfortunate mismatch prevails all through the style of The Eroded Village. It is a most unfortunate mismatch as it is not truly romantic or naturalistic, and what comes out the two is even less true. Downwards: the truth of the naturalism reaches only description, and upwards: the romanticism of this romanticism reaches only falsehood.*” FÜLEPE, Lajos: *Szabó Dezső regénye*. IN: <http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00022/nyugat.htm>. Gyula Gombos, considered as a monographer of an apologetic approach, describes impartially Dezső Szabó's outdated novel poetry despite the sarcasm of contemporary critic: „*Dezső Szabó, the novelist stepped hardly out of the 19th century as far as the characteristic, the form and style of the genre is concerned. [...] he was not interested in the real pioneers of the 20th century.*” When he started to write his novels, Proust's first volumes had already been published, Gide had also written some of his books by then, and some time later Joyce was already working too. However, he could the least get rid of the 19<sup>th</sup> century just in the field of novel infiltrated in him so much. GOMBOS (1975):163.

destruction as the narrator constantly criticizes in the novel: „*He will be the Hungarian Hercules of the new mythology [...] And if he cannot be, and land, material and people will turn away from his race, like a blind Samson he will press his power into a final revolution, he will shake off the holding columns, and let the robbed race and the others who share its heritage die.*” (SZABÓ, 1989: 434.)

Coming back to our original question: a possible reason for the outstanding contemporary popularity of the novel seems to me quite convincing, and this is the populist rhetoric<sup>8</sup> deeply shared by the agitator too. I think the essence of this is the following: this way of speaking often raises real problems, in this case the social status of peasantry. However, it does not give rational solutions to these social problems at all, but emotional answers which are shown as real alternatives. The most important elements of this type of emotional „*discussion of politics*” are contrasting extremes, polarization and simplification. It finally makes the reader believe that it has found the solution for every social problem in a single and simple form. Could there be a more attractive promise for all in the stunned country who were hoping for and expecting a miracle after the shocking social crisis? And this is made even more attractive by giving a stronger emphasis on the accusation of the responsibility of foreigners than on self-criticism. There is no doubt the role of the victim is the most favorite after big failures.

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<sup>8</sup> Many among the thinkers close to the folk writers also specified demagogy as the dominant element of Dezső Szabó's rhetoric. László Németh for example put it in this way: „*Where does this genius and prophet approach lead to? To literary demagogy. Dezső Szabó has dealt so much with the question of how a contemporary poet should accommodate the free competition demagogy that he himself ended up accommodating it. We do not have a writer more deliberate, organizing even his tensions more coolly than him. [...] He is a rigid mind, consequently an autocrat. However he even develops in himself this autocracy ready to act. He ends up with applying power in cases he ought to argue. He splashes gall where he ought to dispute. He makes tow dolls out of his opponents and stabs them like that. He is not impeded by taste and gallantry.*” NÉMETH (1928):173. Dezső Keresztury made similar observations in his article written in 1931: „*Dezső Szabó wanted the mass effect, the dictatorship of his acting emotions, and should his feverish fantasy have outlined the most suggestive new Hungarian concept of the world, his redeeming love slowly turned into demagogy, his combative consistency into megalomaniac fighting, and his richly floating, daring language into empty macho chugging of a turbulent temperament*”. KERESZTURY, Dezső: *Az új magyar irodalom útjai*. IN: GRÓH, Gáspár (ed.): *Az elsodort író. In memoriam Szabó Dezső*. Nap Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 191.



**Antero Holmila**

***Transition from war to peace and cultural history: The case of Finland, 1944-1948***

**Abstract**

Although cultural history has been an increasingly successful approach to history in general, it has been less utilized in attempts to understand the difficult transition from war to peace after WWII. This article discusses the uses and benefits of examining that period from 1944 to the early 1950s from the perspective of cultural history – concentrating on the Finnish case. In the first half of the article, a general discussion on the state of the art is offered. In the latter half, the article builds on insights central to cultural history to show how it can add to our understanding of the era. It argues that the culturally constructed and symbolically ordered narratives of ‘*survival*’, ‘*sacrifice*’ and ‘*self-control*’ made up a normative framework in which the meaning of Finland’s post-war transition from war to peace was given. In addition, the framework offered the Finns moral guidelines and lessons from the past as what to do in order to successfully return to peace. Exploring these perceptions from a theoretical framework in which narratives are placed into the core of cultural structure and practice, it is argued that the press created a homogenous meaning for the immediate postwar reconstruction which the majority of the society understood in a homogenous way.

*Keywords:* cultural history, narrative, World War Two, war to peace transition, Finland, the press.

**W**riting in 1948, Finnish left-wing journalist and cultural critic Matti Kurjensaari had the following to say about the transition from war-to-peace: *‘The political change happened overnight but the mental transformation is still going on...the war reparations are easy to carry out if contrasted to the mental burden.’*<sup>1</sup> In terms of the historiography on the postwar Finland, his words ring equally true. While we know much about the political machinations and the changes which took place after the war – the ascendancy of the extreme left into politics, war reparations and Finnish-Soviet as well as Anglo-Finnish relations – there is much less knowledge on the ‘*mental transformation*’, pace Kurjensaari, which examines cultural and social-psychological landscape of ‘*transformation*’.<sup>2</sup> In historiography, then, Kurjensaari’s ‘*mental transformation*’ is still going on.

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<sup>1</sup> KURJENSAARI, Matti: *Taistelu huomispäivästä. Isänmaan opissa 1918-1948*. Tammi, Helsinki, 1948, 203.

<sup>2</sup> For a recent assessment on the immediate postwar international relations and diplomacy, see AUNESLUOMA Juhana: *A Nordic Country with East European Problems: British views on post-war Finland, 1944-1948*, *Scandinavian Journal of History* 37, (2012) 230-245 and RENTOLA,

However, in Finland, as elsewhere, cultural history has been increasingly popular way to examine the past, including World War Two era. Indeed, the current academic approach to wartime Finland is often labeled as ‘new military history’ (*Uusi sotahistoria*).<sup>3</sup> In essence, ‘new military history’ takes its cue from cultural history and history of mentalities, as the Finnish pioneers of such practice explain: ‘More than other historical approaches, cultural history examines and deconstructs national myths. Precisely, the wars of 1939-1945 have been canonized as part of Finnish national mythology; to its core which defines Finnishness.’<sup>4</sup> As the title of the book ‘a human at war’ (*Ihminen sodassa*) illustrates, instead of the ‘traditional military history’ which concentrates on battles, generals, military strategy and weaponry used, the ‘new military history’ places individuals and collectives with their experiences and memories to the core of investigation. Naturally, this, too, fits well into the sphere of cultural history, which, according to Anna Green, means emphasizing the many ways and layers of human subjectivity.<sup>5</sup> If cultural history, then, puts the emphasis on the experiences and memories of individuals and groups, it becomes perhaps more understandable that the official end of the war after the Armistice agreement with the USSR in September 1944 was not the end of the war for most participants. Granted, their memories lingered on and war-related events such as demobilization and paying for the war reparations continued during the peacetime, latter until 1952. Further, if one takes into account the groups such as war disabled, war widows and war orphans, it becomes clear that war frames – and keeps framing – the rest of their lives. Thus, in order to understand the meanings of the peace which followed the war, it is useful to turn into cultural history.

### **What is cultural history?**

Since Clifford Geertz’s influential work, historians of culture have increasingly sought to explain culture as hidden practices and customs which exist in society but cannot be explained in any other way than through symbols, that is, as Dan Stone puts its ‘aspects of society which stand for something else and that provide focal points for the functioning of, and hence, understanding of that society.’<sup>6</sup> Most importantly, (new) cultural history examines how meanings in society are seen through power relations as expressed in class, gender, race or religious relations. Thus, beyond examining texts, also other forms of social practices – for example memories, remembrance and rituals are taken into consideration. American

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Kimmo: *Great Britain and the Soviet Threat in Finland, 1944-1951*, *Scandinavian Journal of History* 37, (2012), 171-184.

<sup>3</sup> For example, KINNUNEN, Tiina – KIVIMÄKI, Ville (eds.): *Ihminen sodassa. Suomalaisten kokemuksia talvi- ja jatkosodasta*, Minerva, Jyväskylä, 2006.

<sup>4</sup> KINNUNEN – KIVIMÄKI (2006): 13.

<sup>5</sup> GREEN, Anna: *Cultural History: Theory and History*. Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2008, 4-5.

<sup>6</sup> STONE, Dan: *Holocaust Historiography and Cultural History*, Dapim: Studies on the Shoah, 23, (2009) 53.



sociologist Anne Kane has argued, in turn, that the way in which different meanings are constructed in culture is perhaps the most important task of cultural history: *'meaning structure and meaning construction together form the basis for cultural explanation in historical processes.'*<sup>7</sup> According to her, the useful way to reveal meaning in cultural models is *'to study the 'active' component of culture structures, namely narrative', since cultural meanings serve as the guides or markers to which people turn when trying to interpret experience, that is to say that narratives are 'configurations of meaning, through which an individual and/or community comes to understand itself.'*<sup>8</sup> Indeed, cultural history is especially needed in order to deconstruct what could be called *'a memory conundrum'*. That is, on the one hand, the immediate postwar period was marked by unity and working together attitude, as the veterans and popular histories habitually argue while on the other, the basic social facts of the era certainly tell a story other than the national narrative of great unity: immediately after the war divorce rates as well as sexual offences rose sharply, rates of other forms of crime too, especially juvenile delinquency, skyrocketed, alcoholism was widely acknowledged problem, politics became more diversified than ever before. Thus, the task of cultural history – in this context – is to examine how such a dominant and nostalgic argument has been forged, starting with the transition from war to peace.

### ***Cultural history and the making of the meaning of war-to-peace transition***

According to Paul Connerton, the importance of examining collective memories through different manifestations of culture lies in the fact *'that a community is reminded of its identity as represented by and told in a master narrative.'*<sup>9</sup> Thus, by taking up Connerton's and Anne Kane's arguments, it is evident that in a historical explanation in which the constructive nature of culture is in focus, the ability to explain and analyze the process of meaning construction is necessary in order to understand the multilayered way in which societies operate. If we want to know more about how *'historical event'* such as the transition from war to peace has become to be understood in an idyllic and homogenous way in our modern culture, we need to return to the beginning of the process, to the early phase of the reconstruction, and examine it in its own contemporary context: how the meaning of the reconstruction started to take shape. By doing so, we will understand better why *'reconstruction era'* has become to mark a phase in the nation's history in which people's best qualities are shown and which is unified and coherent but which does not do justice to *'reality'* or experiences of the late 1940s.

Since 1944, the meaning of reconstruction in Finland has been produced and re-produced through cultural artifacts such as film, literature, exhibitions and

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<sup>7</sup> KANE, Anne: *Reconstructing Culture in Historical Explanation: Narratives as Cultural Structure and Practice*, History and Theory, 39 (2000) 314.

<sup>8</sup> KANE (2000): 315.

<sup>9</sup> CONNERTON, Paul: *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, 70.

political discourse to the point that the nostalgic vision of reconstruction is actually rather far from the lived past experience. One contemporary case serves to illustrate the point: in 2006, the leading Finnish newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat* reviewed an opera (*Metsäooppera*) which had a historical theme. When it came to war years and postwar years, the reviewer had this to say: *'the opera walks us through the nation's collective memory and experience...the war's horrors and the nation's reconstruction including the war reparations which all are experienced collectively...we are with the people, work is hard and bread is sacred...for today's rootless youth this could be a fine history lesson.'*<sup>10</sup> In fact, it is doubtful whether this would be a fine history lesson, but it is a fine lesson on how history is actively used in culture – or as Bessel and Schumann observed, *'perceptions of present-day political, social and cultural developments are conditioned by a remarkable image of golden age stability and normality...'*<sup>11</sup> An important task of cultural historian – or any historian – is to go beyond these simplistic assumptions and dig deeper, for the return to *'normality'* was *'anything but normal'*, simple or easy.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, the immediate postwar era is marked by increasing crime and divorce rates, juvenile delinquency, moral panic over alcoholism and sexual behavior, acute housing shortages and on-going rationing.<sup>13</sup> Yet, none of these themes make it into the dominant nostalgic vision despite the fact that the evidence is widely available, for example in the way of newspaper reporting or literature, forming the memory conundrum, mentioned above.

In the mainstream Finnish newspapers in 1944 the meaning of return to peace was given in three overlapping narratives which I have labeled as *'the narrative of survival'*, *'the narrative of sacrifice'* and *'the narrative of self-control.'* Taken together, these themes, when they entwined with people's everyday life and to certain extent structured it, constituted a normative framework of rules and guides how people were supposed to be – a master narrative of sorts and a tool for the construction *'collective autobiography'*.<sup>14</sup> In order to understand the significance of these narrative constructions when considering Finland's return to peace, it is useful to look at them in more detail. Although these narratives could be labeled in many different ways, I have chosen these terms as they were consistently used by newspapers, magazines and the radio – thus having a tangible rhetorical focus.

<sup>10</sup> Helsingin Sanomat, 11 January 2006.

<sup>11</sup> BESSEL, Richard – SCHAUMANN, Dirk (eds.): *Life After Death: Approaches to Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003: 13.

<sup>12</sup> BESSEL – SCHAUMANN (2003): 12.

<sup>13</sup> On the postwar crime, see TARJAMO, Kerttu: *Kansakunnan tulevaisuutta pelastamassa – viranomaisten keskustelu rikollisuudesta 1940- ja 1950-luvun Suomessa*. IN: KARONEN – TARJAMO (2006): 341–376. On the tense gender relations and sexuality, see NÄRE, Sari: *'Kuin viimeistä päivää' – sota-ajan sukupuolikulttuuri ja seksuaalinen väkivalta*. IN: NÄRE – KIRVES (2008). JUVONEN, Tuula: *Ruotsalaistaudin kourissa – Heteromaskuliinisuuden jälleenrakentaminen 1950-luvun Suomessa*. IN: KARONEN – TARJAMO (2006). On housing shortages, see MALINEN, Antti: *Korsuista kodittomuuteen. Rintamasotilaat asunnonhakijoina sodanjälkeisessä Helsingissä*, Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 2011, 62-73.

<sup>14</sup> CONNERTON (1989): 70.

### ***The Narrative of Survival***

First, the postwar narrative of survival was activated by the Armistice agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland on 19 September 1944. Despite the fact that Finland had managed to halt the Soviet offensive in summer 1944, the newly signed Armistice agreement gave a heightened sense of insecurity: the events in Romania and Bulgaria showed that the Soviet occupation – despite the agreement – was still possible. Thus, in this situation, surrounded by the volatile international politics, the Finnish press created a narrative of survival. The day after the agreement *Karjalan Sanomat* wrote that: *‘No matter what our burden shall be, we have to be able to carry it. It is not the first time that great hardships and trials occur...through centuries, there have been many, but the life has always moved on.’*<sup>15</sup> According to *Helsingin Sanomat*

*In this harsh period of our destiny, our consolation and reassurance is that many times in history Finnish people have had to experience tough ordeals and always survived. That is what is going to happen this time too, as long as we maintain unwavering faith in our future and will to live.*<sup>16</sup>

What is remarkable about the narrative of survival is its explicit utilization of the past. Importantly, the themes discussing *‘Finnish people’* and their past referred to something more or less unified and shared experiences, which meant that different readers, holding many different political opinions were drawn into collectively shared visions of the past and their lessons for the future. In terms of Paul Connerton, we could talk about *‘progressive narrowing of the focus’*, which was achieved by textually re-enacting the past.<sup>17</sup> According to Connerton, these commonly shared narratives help people to make sense of the past as *‘a kind of collective autobiography, with some explicitly cognitive components.’*<sup>18</sup> Thus, it seems hardly surprising, then, that these *‘explicitly cognitive components’* took up a life of their own which lives on in our current historical culture.

An example of what the functioning of Finland’s *‘collective autobiography’* and how the nation had overcome the challenges of peace, may mean in practice was offered by Professor Aulis J. Alanen in *Suomen Kuvalehti* in autumn 1944. In his view, *‘the answer’* to the question of what was the purpose of the fight [between 1941 and 1944] could be found in the past:

*Then and there none of our ancestors demanded explanations when it was the question of survival of our land and the people. We fought tooth and nail and after the battle those who had survived rebuild their dwellings out of ashes*

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<sup>15</sup> *Karjalan Sanomat*, 20 September 1944.

<sup>16</sup> *Helsingin Sanomat*, 20 September 1944.

<sup>17</sup> CONNERTON (1989): 4.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 70.

*like Paavo the crofter. How many times Finnish people have had to start from the beginning.*<sup>19</sup>

Paavo the Crofter was one of the best-known fictitious figures from Finnish literature, which symbolized the 'good spirit' of agrarian Finland; hard work, faith in God and love of one's neighbors. In the story, Paavo, like the Biblical Job, is tested with hardships. It is, thus, no accident that Finnish politicians and public commentators used the symbolism from Paavo the crofter in 1944, since the 'Paavo narrative' offered cultural meanings that were instantly recognized by the majority of people in 1944. When these symbolic codes were attached to the current crises, the era of re-construction began to be forged as a traditional folklore narrative in the spirit of Paavo.

### ***The Narrative of Sacrifice***

During the war and immediately afterwards, national survival required sacrifices from every citizen – as symbolized by Paavo the Crofter. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that underneath the new peace-oriented talk about the USSR and its newly installed good will, the public arena was also filled with the talk about sacrifice – an unspoken fact was that about 90 000 Finns had sacrificed their lives at war and now, in the new postwar situation, more sacrifices were needed in order to honor the sacrifices already made during the war. In this way, it is evident that war and peace did not have an easily distinguishable line but many wartime anxieties still continued and new ones arose. In other words, in terms of the press' narrative construction of the immediate postwar situation, the line between war and peace was not obvious.

There are two layers of sacrifice which become distinguished by examining the rhetorical strategies of the press. First, everyone had to make sacrifices in order to fulfill the demands set in the Armistice treaty. The second set of sacrifices related much more explicitly to the everyday life, essentially to postwar structuring of gender roles. This type of narrative was especially directed towards women: As *Helsingin Sanomat* wrote, 'men returning from the frontlines have had to bear the hardest personal burden and responsibility of this nation's destiny while sacrificing the most. Homefront knows and acknowledges this fact.'<sup>20</sup> Adding to that, leading women's magazine, *Kotiliesi* reminded women: 'It is your turn to endure.'<sup>21</sup> Typically for the dominant view, the point of departure was that men's masculine authority, embellished by war, should dictate the relationship between man and woman:

*How extensive the change will be in those men who for a long time have been outside the influence of home, in an environment totally different than home,*

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<sup>19</sup> Suomen Kuvalehti, 40/1944, 1136.

<sup>20</sup> Helsingin Sanomat, 30 September 1944.

<sup>21</sup> Kotiliesi, 9/1945.

*experiencing shocks undreamt of, but at the same time uplifting shared spirit, eager sacrificial comradeship, and undividedly offering their lives, work and hobbies only to one sole goal, to defend Finland.*<sup>22</sup>

When masculine authority was constructed in such clear terms, the question remains, how were the wives expected to behave? A conservative female writer, pen-name 'Grandmother' had the answer: 'we Finns do not have time to seek selfishly our own happiness'. In other words, the Finns' – especially women's – duty was unselfish sacrifice for common good. This also applied when the returning man had „forgotten his old love (meaning the wife) and he believes that he has found more enduring happiness with someone at work or someone he met randomly (...) I have received many letters from wives whose men have momentarily forgotten their homes and duties towards it. But they were brave women who did not get depressed. They tried to understand the temptations men had far away from home and by forgiving everything they found love in a totally new way”.<sup>23</sup>

Indeed, a letterbox section in the magazine, 'Grandmother's letterbox', was brimming to burst with this type of answers: Forgive and all will turn out good. They all shared the same basic tendency, holding that women had to sacrifice and suffer for men.

No doubt, many families followed this type of instruction. Yet, it is also clear that many did not as the postwar divorce rates testify. In fact, only recently have the legacies of such mental frameworks, and how they have been transmitted from one generation to the next, been taken under examination.<sup>24</sup> However, it can be argued that this type of normative narrative, designed to maintain the masculine hegemony, helped in the process of creating a very one-dimensional cultural atmosphere to which the whole master narrative of 'the miracle of reconstruction' could be built. This is further emphasized by the discourse about men's occasional infidelity. Overwhelmingly, it was accepted as a matter of nature, even if frowned upon. In May 1945, when divorce had made its way into public talk, a women's magazine *Eeva* conducted a mini-survey on women's attitude to divorce. Five well-known women were asked about their attitudes about men's adultery and all favored forgiveness over divorce: 'If man is unfaithful (...) let it pass with certain limits (...) vice woman will forgive little cheating. Making a mistake is human and there's no point in making a storm in a tea cup and think about divorce.'<sup>25</sup>

### **The Narrative of Self-Control**

Finally, it was clear that if the society was to operate within the frames of sacrifice and survival, both individuals and collectives were required to

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<sup>22</sup> Kotiliesi 20/1944, 588. Emphasis added

<sup>23</sup> Kotiliesi 20/1944, 588.

<sup>24</sup> KIRVES, Jenni - NÄRE, Sari and SILTALA, Juha (eds.): *Sodan kasvattamat*. Helsinki: WSOY, 2010 and KUJALA, Erkki: *Sodan pitkä varjo. Sota-ajan lasten pitkä elämä*. Helsinki: Kirjapaja, 2009.

<sup>25</sup> *Eeva* 5/1945, 4-5.

exhibit a great deal of self-control. Until now, Finnish historical research into newspapers has not dealt with self-control as a social-psychological or cultural process. Instead, the investigations into newspapers role in the immediate postwar years have almost exclusively dealt with the more institutional form of self-control, that is the press' self-censorship regarding matters relating to the Soviet Union and foreign politics.<sup>26</sup> Yet, in the press' rhetoric, the virtue of exercising self-control was not only implemented as a journalistic policy, but the press actively advocated that the private citizens do the same.

For example, the Minister for Interior Kaarlo Hillilä's radio speech on 20 September which was printed in verbatim in the press the following day, left no doubt about government's – and the press' – attitude. *Helsingin Sanomat* published the headline 'Absolute duty to retain self-control', according to which 'every citizen must whip itself with the knotted whip of self-control and make sure that as far as he is concerned, law and order is maintained.'<sup>27</sup> What is more, with an omnipresent authority, the Field marshal and the President Mannerheim reminded the soldiers in his Order of the Day, issued a few days after the Armistice agreement: '*My soldiers! [...] I am convinced that you take up these [peacetime] tasks with the same vigor, devotion and self-control which I have learnt to see in you in your warpath and which I have always admired in you.*'<sup>28</sup> In the same way, too, the importance of retaining self-control was discussed in the leading women's magazine *Kotiliesi*: '*healthy self-control is always needed, but especially when an individual, home or a nation is met by hard challenges...*' The writer, a well-known figure in Finnish education, continued, '*and we humble citizens who in our hearts grieve and worry about the future of our fatherland, let us learn in the difficult moment the noble, love-guided difficult skill of self-control...let us work and pray.*'<sup>29</sup> These examples could be multiplied many times over. For example, the *Helsingin Sanomat* columnist, pen-name 'Eero' (Lassi Hiekkala) repeatedly advocated 'patience and common sense' in his writings. Eero was keen to point out that even if the people felt that Finland had suffered great injustice at the war's end, the Finns were required to humbly recognize the realities of stately politics: '*we have been pushed now wiser, brisker, and with solemn minds to walk towards brighter future.*'<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> For example SALMINEN, Esko: *Aselevosta kaappaushankkeeseen. Sensuuri ja itsesensuuri Suomen lehdistössä 1944-1948*. Otava, Helsinki, 1979. SUISTOLA, Jouni: *Kylmä sota paleltaa: Kylmän sodan alku Suomen johtavassa sanomalehdistössä*. Pohjois-Suomen historiallinen yhdistys, Oulu and Rovaniemi, 1994; USKALI, Turo: '*Älä kirjoita itseäsi ulos: suomalaisen Moskovan-kirjeenvaihtajuuden alkutaival 1957-1975*'. Jyväskylän yliopisto, Jyväskylä, 2003.

<sup>27</sup> *Helsingin Sanomat*, 21 September, 1944.

<sup>28</sup> Mannerheim's the Order of the Day, N<sup>o</sup> 132 given on 22 September 1944. See [mannerheim.fi/pkaskyt/s\\_paiva.htm](http://mannerheim.fi/pkaskyt/s_paiva.htm) Accessed 17 December 2012.

<sup>29</sup> *Kotiliesi* 6/1945.

<sup>30</sup> *Helsingin Sanomat*, 28 September, 1944, 3.

### ***Conclusion***

If we put all these narratives together, it is possible to see how their overtly instructional tone, with demands of unity, self-control and sacrifice shaped the framework in which people were required to return to peace. This narrowly defined narrative and the process of making the meaning of postwar reconstruction was repeated over and over again with slight variations of these themes mentioned here. Although economic, political and military history provides very useful context in which return to peace was achieved, an insight central to cultural history, to look into the ways how people were offered meanings to the situation in which they found themselves, is also immensely important if we want to learn how, indeed, the Finns and Europeans got out the era of violence which was unprecedented in the history of mankind.





**Dariusz Jarosz**

***Poland 1944-1950: selected social problems of the reconstruction period after World War II***

**Abstract**

As a result of WW II, Poland's population shrank from over 35 m (in 1939) to just under 24 million in 1946. There was a glaring imbalance between men and women, especially noticeable in towns. The war also bequeathed a million-strong army of widows, orphans and invalids. Single women, mothers bringing up children in incomplete families, sought work. With the end of the war came a compensatory demographic cycle lasting more or less till 1952: in 1945-1947 there were presumably 14-15 marriages per thousand people. In consequence of war there was vast-scale destruction of housing stock to contend with. Cumulatively, in towns and rural areas, about 1.6 million residential properties had been destroyed which constituted 22 – 24 per cent of the 1939 housing stock figure in the territory of the state within its new borders. Another consequence of war was the change in the territorial shape of the country and the intensification of migration traffic. It is estimated that in 1945 -1950, over 1,600,000 people were repatriated from Germany, nearly 300,000 from other European countries, and 8,000 from beyond Europe. In total, this figure came close to 1,950,000 people.

The Poles at that time were a society on the move, literally living out of their suitcases. Their deracination from their traditional local environments had significant impact on their social behaviour. The phenomena of advancement from the rural to the urban environment, in conjunction with the inter-regional resettlement of people of varying social status, was conducive to conformising attitudes towards the authorities.

Seeking for acceptance, the Polish communists used different strategies and methods (anti-German propaganda and legislation, mechanisms of social advancement).

WW II had important ethnic consequence (the disappearance of the Germans from the western territories and Jews after Holocaust).

*Keywords:* Poland, communism and Polish society, rumors, legitimization, demographic losses

**T**he assertion that the economic and demographic losses of Poland in effect of World War II were among the severest in Europe at the time could hardly be classified as groundbreaking. Material losses are estimated to have stood at 38 percent of the nation's assets; losses in the industrial and agricultural sectors stood at about 50 percent which, in cash terms, corresponded to about 50 billion US dollars at the time.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> WIECZORKIEWICZ, Piotr: *Historia polityczna Polski 1935-1945*, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 2005. 513.

As a result, Poland's population shrank from over 35 m (in 1939) to just under 24 million in 1946. There was a glaring imbalance between men and women, especially noticeable in towns (for 100 men there were 128 women in 1945, and 122 women in 1946).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it was the younger generations that primarily fell victim to the war. The war also bequeathed a million-strong army of widows, orphans and invalids.<sup>3</sup> Single women, mothers bringing up children<sup>4</sup> in incomplete families, sought work.<sup>5</sup>

With the end of the war came a compensatory demographic cycle lasting more or less till 1952. It was characterized by a steep rise in the marriage rate, accompanied by baby boom. In Polish conditions this meant that – according to estimates of demographers – in Poland of 1945-1947 there were presumably 14-15 marriages per thousand people; for comparison, the highest indicator in the 1918-1939 period came to 12.7 percent (in 1919).<sup>6</sup> A similar rule was observed in the birthrate: its postwar high-point came in 1952 (30.2 births per 1000 people). This meant that at the apogee of its baby boom, Poland had – most probably apart from Albania – the highest birthrate in Europe.<sup>7</sup>

In consequence of war – besides economic losses – there was vast-scale destruction of housing stock to contend with. Cumulatively, in towns and rural areas, about 1.6 million residential properties had been destroyed which constituted 22 – 24 percent of the 1939 housing stock figure in the territory of the state within its new borders. These were the greatest losses suffered out of all the countries that participated in World War II. Strictly-defined war damage in the former German so-called *Recovered Lands* were greater than in the prewar Polish territory. This also applied to losses in buildings. At the same time, the quality of the housing stock in former German territories was considerably higher than in the prewar Polish territories.<sup>8</sup>

Another consequence of war that cannot be overestimated was the change in the territorial shape of the country and the intensification of migration traffic. The shift in Polish borders, as decreed at the Big Three Conference in Yalta and Potsdam, meant above all the need to transfer Poland's prewar citizens – Poles and Jews, who spent the war years in the USSR. Via this channel which, contrary to

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<sup>2</sup> LATUCH, Kazimierz: *Straty demograficzne Polski w latach 1939-1945* (z prac nad weryfikacją oficjalnych szacunków). IN: MATERSKI, Wojciech, SZAROTA, Tomasz (ed.): *Polska 1939-1945. Straty osobowe i ofiary represji pod dwiema okupacjami*, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa, 2009. 40-41.

<sup>3</sup> PIĄTKOWSKI, Marek: *Spoleczne ubezpieczenia rentowe w pierwszym dziesięcioleciu Polski Ludowej*, Studia i materiały z historii ubezpieczeń społecznych w Polsce, 3, 1985. 63.

<sup>4</sup> JĘDRUSZCZAK, Hanna: *Zatrudnienie a przemiany społeczne w Polsce w latach 1944-1960* Ossolineum, Wrocław-Warsaw-Kraków-Gdańsk, 1972. 108-109.

<sup>5</sup> See among others JAROSZ, Dariusz: *Polacy a stalinizm 1948-1956* Instytut Historii PAN, Warsaw, 2000. 120-123.

<sup>6</sup> ROSSET, Edward: *Oblicze demograficzne Polski Ludowej*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warsaw 1965. 14-15, 244-246.

<sup>7</sup> Ibidem: 15, 298.

<sup>8</sup> ANDRZEJEWSKI, Adam: *Polityka mieszkaniowa*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, Warsaw, 1987. 138-140.

the true meaning of the word was called 'repatriation' from the USSR, there arrived in 1944-1949 over 2.2 million people of whom over 1.5 million people migrated in an organized way, on the basis of agreements between the Polish authorities with the authorities of given Soviet republics. The Polish population figures for those who remained in the territories annexed by the USSR and, indeed, deeper in the USSR, are estimated to have ranged from 0.5 to 1.6 million.<sup>9</sup> Those Poles who left the so-called Eastern Marchlands of the Polish Commonwealth were resettled predominantly in the former German lands of the new Poland. The expulsion of the Germans inhabiting those regions embraced about three million people.<sup>10</sup> In accordance with agreements with the governments of the Soviet republics, repatriations in the opposite direction embraced about 500,000 Ukrainians in 1944-46, and about 34,000 Belarusians to the end of 1946. 140,000 of the 200,000 Ukrainians who remained in Poland after the completion of the organized resettlement to the USSR, lived in the south-eastern mountainous regions of the country, were subsequently forcibly resettled by the armed forces to the western and northern parts of the country.<sup>11</sup>

The resettlement movements embraced more than just the Poles from the east. It is estimated that in 1945 - 1950, over 1,600,000 people were repatriated from Germany, nearly 300,000 from other European countries, and 8,000 from beyond Europe. In total, this figure came close to 1,950,000 people.<sup>12</sup>

The Poles at that time were, therefore, a society on the move, literally living out of their suitcases. Their deracination from their traditional local environments had significant impact on their social behaviour, not least in their attitudes to governmental authorities.

The war also changed the ethnic structure of Polish society. The estimated losses among Polish Jews who perished during the war fluctuates between 2,975,000 and 3,150,000, of whom probably about 200,000 died or disappeared in territories controlled by the USSR<sup>13</sup>. Due to the war and postwar population movements (above all the intensified emigration of Jews after the Kielce pogrom of 4 July 1946) the ethnic structure of Poland in 1950 comprised 97.8 percent Poles (as compared with 65.5percent Poles in prewar Poland to 1939), 0.6 percent Ukrainians (15.7percent in 1939), 0.2 percent Jews (9.5percent in 1939), 0.6 percent Belarusians (6.1 percent), 0.7 percent Germans (2.3percent); other ethnic

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<sup>9</sup> RUCHNIEWICZ, Małgorzata: *Repatriacja ludności polskiej z ZSRR w latach 1955-1959*, Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, Warszawa, 2000. 36-56.

<sup>10</sup> MADAJCZYK, Piotr: *Niemcy*. IN: MADAJCZYK, Piotr (ed.): *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce: państwo i społeczeństwo polskie a mniejszości narodowe w okresach przełomów politycznych (1944-1989)*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warsaw, 1998. 66.

<sup>11</sup> FRISZKE, Andrzej: *Polska: losy państwa i narodu 1939-1989*, Iskry, Warsaw, 2003. 137. EBERHARDT, Piotr, *Migracje polityczne na ziemiach polskich (1939-1950)*, Instytut Zachodni, Poznań 2010. 173-177.

<sup>12</sup> EBERHARDT (2010): 164.

<sup>13</sup> BERENDT, Grzegorz: *Straty osobowe polskich Żydów w okresie II wojny światowej*. IN: MATERSKI, SZAROTA (2009): 75.

minorities – about 0.1percent (0.9percent in 1939).<sup>14</sup>

Great social and economic reforms planned by Polish communists, which were to be implemented in two stages, were superimposed on these processes and phenomena that came in train of the war.

The first stage, completed roundabout 1948-1949, aimed at taking control of the state which was primarily understood as establishing dominance over the supervisory structures of its various institutions. Offices, workplaces and organizations were to find themselves under the ruling party's control. From 1950, the struggle was no longer to gain control of the state but society, which was understood primarily as changing the mentality of the Poles. Of course, these aims were achieved in stages, but their tempo depended on the context of the situation, among which, the most important were the exigencies of the political struggle. It seems that the falsified elections of 19 January 1947, and the elimination of representatives of the opposition from the state's structures gave fresh impetus to the activities of communists striving to implement their own ideas (which, to a large extent, were borrowed from the USSR).

### ***World War II and the mentality, behavior and social postures of Poles***

Communist activities, especially immediately after the war, were to take into consideration the mentality and attitudes prevailing in society.

Research into this problem is made exceptionally difficult due to the lack of a suitably broad and full documentary source base. Censorship restrictions made the press of the time to be of little use for such analyses, and the topic was raised seldom and in passing in diaries. Moreover, to 1958 there were no public opinion poll research centres in Poland. Meanwhile there is no doubt that the 'cold war' was becoming a fact not only in terms of 'great policy', but also, in the way it influenced on the thinking and actions of the man in the street in communist Poland. Some chance of reconstructing that impact is afforded by the surviving archival documents that contain information on the hearsay that was in circulation in various social milieus and groups in the 1940s and 50s. Rumours which reflected both the fears and hopes of 'ordinary people' at the time, constituted an important part of this. They were their own 'commentary' of a kind on the surrounding reality, and their role grew commensurately with the intensification of Stalinisation of social life – given that access to credible sources of information was increasingly difficult. Due to the secret reports of the political police and communist party, which have been made widely available after 1989, it is known that information on the topic of this hearsay, treated as hostile propaganda, was scrupulously monitored, as were the reactions they elicited. From the point of view of the social historian, these documents are exceptionally important though they do not give, needless to say, precise answers to many questions, concerning

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<sup>14</sup> EBERHARDT (2010): 243.

the scale and intensity of the opinions and behaviour that they registered, their social and geographical distribution etc. Another important channel of transmission of such information were letters (frequently anonymous), addressed to party and state institutions of various levels<sup>15</sup>.

The common hearsay would give various - more or less precisely defined - dates of outbreak of war. In certain cases the designated deadlines were of a symbolic character, associated with anniversaries of important historical events in Poland and the world (the end of World War II in Europe). On occasion they were accompanied by broader justifications which were to serve the purpose of giving them credibility.

In Szczecin, in October 1947, the rumour was recorded that 'the Soviet Union possesses the secret of the atom bomb and has already commenced gathering uranium. Taking into consideration the six month period required to produce an atom bomb it should be assumed that the Anglo-Saxons (the American and British allies – ed.) will declare war within five months'<sup>16</sup>.

The dissemination of war rumours intensified in connection with important events of an international character. They were sparked off, *inter alia*, by the well-known speech of the American secretary of state James Byrnes, delivered in Stuttgart on 6 IX 1946. The assertion was then noted that this was a 'prelude' to imminent armed conflict.<sup>17</sup>

The sentence passed in the trial of the major Nazi criminals in Nuremberg on 1 X 1946 was commented upon in similar vein. In south-eastern Poland, not guilty verdicts found in relation to three of the accused (Hans Fritzsche, Franz von Papen and Hjalmar Schacht) brought forth the opinion that this was dictated by their usefulness in preparing Germany for a new war with the USSR. In certain provinces, the population did not believe that the sentences that had been passed had been executed. The anticipated participation of the Germans on the side of the Allies in the future armed conflict with the Soviet Union, was on occasion interpreted as a potential threat to Poland.

Especially many commentaries appeared in connection with the shaping of the new policy assumptions of the American administration of president Harry Truman with regard the Soviet bloc (the doctrine of containment) and the growing tension surrounding Greece and Turkey in 1947. Already in April 1947, the security

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<sup>15</sup> This part of article based on: JAROSZ, Dariusz, PASZTOR, Maria: *W krzywym zwierciadle. Polityka władz komunistycznych w Polsce w świetle plotek i pogłosek z lat 1949-1956*, Wydawnictwo FAKT, Warszawa, 1995. See also: JAROSZ, Dariusz: *Polacy wobec groźby wybuchu wojny w świetle przekazów potocznych z lat 1946-1956*, *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 2, 1997. 53-61. JAROSZ, Dariusz, *The Korean War, Poland and the Poles*. IN: BONWETSCH, Bernd, ULG, Matthias (ed.): *Korea-ein vergessener Krieg? Der Militärische Konflikt auf der koreanischen Halbinsel 1950-1953 im internationalen Kontext*. Oldenburg Verlag, München, 2012. 127-131.

<sup>16</sup> GRONEK, Bernadetta, MARCZAK, Irena (ed.): *Biuletyny Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego 1947*. Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 203.

<sup>17</sup> Archiwum Akt Nowych (National Archives), Ministry of Information and Propaganda (MiiP), 523 (Mfm 28425), Note of 4 X 1946, 51.

apparatus noted the circulation of rumours that America has closed off the Dardanelles to Russia, that it is sending arms to Turkey and Greece, which does not augur well for peace, and peasants in some districts were predicting the outbreak of a Soviet-Turkish war.

In connection with the tension surrounding Turkey and Greece, the rumours would doggedly persist, in various regions in the country, regarding Polish participation in this conflict. Most often they related to the enlistment of volunteers to help the communist partisans of the Greek gen. Vafijades Marcos. In the course of deliberations of the V Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow (10 March – 24 April 1947), it was anticipated in the Szczecin region that the conference would end in failure: that a conflict will follow which will lead to armed action of the Anglo-Saxons against Russia. that will be the appropriate moment to topple the current government in Poland, which will then achieve the territorial shape approximating to what it was before the war. In 1949, the anticipated flash-points of armed conflict were supposed to have been the Caucasus and Yugoslavia. However the biggest intensification of this type of rumour, which assumed the character of war psychosis, came in mid-1950, after the eruption of the Korean conflict.

The conviction, that war had already begun, that in Poland there are already western forces, appeared in 40th. In 1948, the security apparatus noticed that in Kielce news was being spread about an alleged American air drop. At the beginning of 1949, some peasants maintained that *'beyond the Vistula, there were strong partisan units supported by Britain'*, which, in connection with the progress in rural collectivisation, will strike to *'completely smash the present system'*.

War rumours also evoked important political events in Poland. Their intensification occurred at the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947 in connection with the falsified parliamentary election results.

As may be seen in the social mentality of the Poles in this period, there was a close relationship between the outbreak of armed conflict and the country's democratic political transformations. The hearsay that was doing the rounds did not make it clear what shape the future *'liberated'* Poland would take. Most often, it offered a very general vision of an affluent state, with revived *'private initiative'* and without communist parties. The peasants counted on the abolition of production cooperatives, and at least some of the autochthonous people counted on the western lands of Poland being attached to Germany, as reconstituted by the western allies. However, these hopes were accompanied by fears that their fulfilment was to come after a further world war. To reduce these fears, which were natural in a society that had direct first hand experience of the cruelties of World War II, quite fantastic ideas, aimed at minimising *'the human costs'* of future military struggles were put about.

In its most fantastic version, such a conviction appeared among the residents of one district of south-eastern Poland, who, in September 1949, believed that *'the revolution in Greece had been quashed with the use of bombs that put people to*

*sleep, which the Allies had invented as a better alternative to atom bombs and that the Allies will quickly bring to an end with that sleeping bomb... if only that war would come*'. Apart from these fears and hopes, the common hearsay on the topic of war evoked certain characteristic modes of behaviour which would manifest themselves throughout the whole period under consideration.

The most frequent effect of '*war propaganda*', was the buy out of goods from the shops and the hoarding of provisions. In rural areas it also evoked other, most variegated reactions such as, for example, the stoppage of work in the field, the mass slaughter of livestock and the hiding of meat or cereals or their sale, the reluctance to discharge financial obligations. It did occur that under the influence of the war psychosis, parents would send their children on summer camps or fetched them from schools situated in places beyond where they lived. Fears of commencement of armed operations between the western allies and the USSR were conducive to nurturing an aura of temporariness among the population resettled in the post-German western territories.

### ***Seeking acceptance from society***

The Polish communists in this period desperately sought to highlight anything that would give legitimacy in the eyes of society to the naked fact of having won power with the help of Soviet bayonets. It was no coincidence that the secretary general of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka, told his comrades in May 1947 that: 'The masses should regard us as a Polish party; let them attack us as Polish communists, and not as agents'<sup>18</sup>.

On the other hand, Polish society which emerged from the war, despite the mentioned resettlements and demographic changes, and the changed ethnic composition, reacted to the outside world in a way it had learnt through the experience of life in prewar and wartime Poland.

At the point of contact between the authorities and this social baggage of experience, gave rise to tension as well as attempts to find a *modus vivendi* or simply cooperation.

In the sphere of state ideology, this attempt at seeking acceptance, the threads of understanding were exploited by the authorities through the natural anti-Germanism of the Poles, which often took a cruel character. In its name, in the postwar popular commentaries, they sought pathological features in the national character of the Germans, the word German was written with a small g and the executions of concentration camp staff members were held publicly where the hanging was done by ex-prisoners and the public also composed of children and women<sup>19</sup>. A separate problem was the cruelty of prison staff (partly composed of

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<sup>18</sup> KOCHAŃSKI, Aleksander (ed.): *Protokół obrad KC PPR w maju 1945 roku*, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warsaw, 1992. 14.

<sup>19</sup> DMITRÓW, Edmund: *Niemcy i okupacja hitlerowska w oczach Polaków. Poglądy i opinie z lat 1945-1948*, Czytelnik, Warszawa, 1987.

Jewish officers) towards Germans held in Polish camps in that period<sup>20</sup>.

Mindful of the role of religion in the Polish national tradition, the governing communists did not immediately unleash an anti-Church campaign after the war. It's true that in September 1945 the Concordat was severed with the Vatican, but at the same time, state events in the years 1946-47 were held with the participation of priests. The swearing in ceremony of Bolesław Bierut in 1947, the then crypto-communist president of Poland, anticipated a mass in its programme, and the president-elect swore his allegiance to God. In the immediate postwar years, religious emblems were carried in May Day parades.<sup>21</sup>

The communists allowed organic social life in Poland to revive in forms which replicated prewar patterns. The state authorities allowed for the rebirth of traditional social care organisations such as the Church-run Caritas and other prewar lay social care institutions. The service sector was reviving, a network of private shops and warehouses was growing, private and cooperative publishing houses began to operate.<sup>22</sup>

Simultaneously with these concessions to social activism, an institutional framework was being put in place to control them, and whose scope could be modified in accordance with the political decisions of the central authorities. In the case of the publication movement, that was primarily the censor's office, and the system of paper quotas; in the case of trade and craft – the Special Commission for Combatting Abuses and Harmful Economic Activity was formed in 1945.

The communists tried to solve the earlier indicated problems arising from demographic-social and material changes engendered by war.

The surplus of the female population resulting from the war, especially those who reared children as single parents, forced women to seek work. The so-called 'productivisation' of women became an important component of the policy of the communist authorities as from 1950. Up to then, attempts were made to activate them professionally through the development of labour cooperatives thanks to which the number of women employed by them grew from 5,800 to 53,100 in the years 1946-1950. It is difficult to estimate the unemployment rate among women in this period; the official statistics speak of 63,000 job seekers in 1948, but at the same time, it is known that many of them (according to some specialists four times that number) did not register themselves with the appropriate offices.<sup>23</sup>

Another social effect of the war was connected with the extermination of the middle class and the intelligentsia. The communists, seeking cadres, created

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<sup>20</sup> KOCHANOWSKI, J.: *W polskiej niewoli: niemieccy jeńcy w Polsce 1945-1950*, Warszawa, 2001.

<sup>21</sup> For more see: SOWIŃSKI, Paweł: *Komunistyczne święto. Obchody 1 maja w latach 1948-1956*, TRIO, Warszawa, 2000.

<sup>22</sup> For more see: KRASUCCI, Eryk: *Międzynarodowy komunista Jerzy Borejsza. Biografia polityczna*, Czytelnik, Warszawa, 2009.

<sup>23</sup> JAROSZ, Dariusz: *Kobiety a praca zawodowa w Polsce w latach 1944-1956 (główne problemy w świetle nowych badań źródłowych)*. IN: ŻARNOWSKA, Maria, SZWARC, Andrzej (ed.): *Kobieta i praca. Wiek XIX i XX*. Wydawnictwo DiG, Warsaw 2000. 217-241.



mechanisms of social advancement to replace those who traditionally occupied by those groups. Those regarded as 'plebs' now advanced to assume those places, being at the same time built up image-wise in the propaganda of the new rulers, which reduced the deficit of legitimacy of the authorities<sup>24</sup>.

The ruling communists also had to square up to the effects of war on the ethnic structure of the new Poland.

The first of these were the social, painful consequences of the Holocaust. The war had sharpened Polish national consciousness. Even those Polish peasants who lacked it before the war came to realize that to be a Jew or a Pole could be a choice between life and death after 1939. Apart from that, after the Holocaust, a proprietorial revolution of sorts occurred, especially in the small towns of central Poland. Jewish homes, workshops and movable property was taken over by Polish families. Those are probably the most important factors which had to strengthen anti-Semitism and caused not only mass scale pogroms but also individual acts of violence against those who were returning to their native parts and tried to reclaim their property.<sup>25</sup> The attempts to set up densely-packed Jewish communities in the western parts of Poland that had been taken from the Germans, which were supported by the authorities, failed for these reasons; the Jews preferred to leave Poland and after July 1946, did so for a certain period of time with the consent of the authorities.

The second important ethnic consequence of the war was the disappearance of the Germans from the western territories. Their integration with the rest of the country, and the resettlement of the Polish element, was treated as a priority task from the viewpoint of the Polish *raison d'État*. This was an exceptionally painful process. The postwar migration movement was channelled into both town and country in this region. It was in the countryside that various conflicts erupted against the backdrop of cultural differences of the masses of settlers. Moreover, the different agrarian culture in the territories from which people emigrated voluntarily – or more frequently – forcibly, made the effects of their husbandry far removed from those known to these lands in German times. That, additionally, spawned frustration and intensified the mood of temporariness.

The wartime devastation of the housing stock, in conjunction with the beginning of the marriage and baby boom and the progressive migration from the countryside into the towns, put the necessity of solving the difficulty of ensuring roofs over peoples' heads on the agenda. In grappling with the housing crisis, regulations were introduced as from 1944, which enabled municipal authorities to assign additional lodgers to existing and insufficiently filled accommodation,

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<sup>24</sup> For more see: GROSS, Jan Tomasz: Geneza społeczna demokracji ludowych. IN: SZAROTA, Tomasz (ed.): *Komunizm. Ideologia, system, ludzie*. Wydawnictwo NERITON, Instytut Historii PAN, Warszawa, 2001. 46-47.

<sup>25</sup> See among others: TOMASZEWSKI, Jerzy (ed.): *Najnowsze dzieje Żydów w Polsce w zarysie (do 1950 roku)*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa, 1993. 388-399. B. SZAYNOK: *Pogrom Żydów w Kielcach 4 lipca 1946*. Bellona, Wrocław, 1992.

specifying the rent rates for these sub-tenants, and regulating the way of occupying residential accommodation. Owners of tenement houses were deprived of the right to let and set rent rates on the basis of contracts with lodgers. Rents were regulated by diktat of the housing administration.<sup>26</sup> Creating propitious conditions in order to engage private initiative in renovating and developing the housing stock, and on the other hand the enormity of the human losses during the war, and the involvement of the state in this sector together with the takeover of former German territories – albeit with devastated residential buildings but better equipped with installations – all of that together led to a reduction in the average density of residents per unit of space (in the towns, from 2.0 in 1931 to 1.7 per room in 1946), and an improvement in their average standard of housing in comparison with the prewar period.<sup>27</sup>

Did the fact that, as a result of war, Poland was made up of people living out of suitcases have any significant effect on social attitudes and behaviours in the workplace? Of course yes, though not all aspects of this issue have been researched. One of them, which was particularly important, was the attitude to the new order and the ruling class. The Polish example indicates that the phenomena of advancement from the rural to the urban environment, in conjunction with the inter-regional resettlement of people of varying social status, was conducive to conforming attitudes towards the authorities. Research shows that the readiness to strike in defence of their economic interests was far greater in traditional workers' districts which managed to survive the war. For this reason, the biggest and best organized strikes in the years 1945-1947 occurred in places where workforces were composed mainly of workers who worked in the same places before, during and after the war. That's how it was in Upper Silesia and Łódź in 1947 which were hit by the biggest waves of strikes in the history of postwar Poland until December 1970. Meanwhile, in the new industrial area – in the social sense – which was Wrocław, where the workforces were not only of rural origin but also made up of groups of settlers who moved there from various parts of Poland – in principle there were no strikes. Those new workers not only did not know how to strike but, apart from that, were enjoying the good fortune of advancement which could be jeopardized by strike action – as they thought.<sup>28</sup> It was precisely those workers of rural origin who swelled the ranks of the communist party – the PPR. Deracinated and atomized, they were particularly susceptible to authoritarianism.<sup>29</sup> This mass influx of new workers into the

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<sup>26</sup> JAROSZ, Dariusz: *Polaków drogi do mieszkania 1918-1989* (zarys problemu). IN: KOŚCIK, Elżbieta: *Między zacofaniem a modernizacją. Społeczno-gospodarcze problemy ziem polskich na przestrzeni wieków*, ed. by E. KOŚCIK and T. SŁOWIŃSKI, GAJT Wydawnictwo 1991 s.c, Wrocław, 2009. 279-295.

<sup>27</sup> D. JAROSZ: *Mieszkanie się należy... Studium z peerelowskich praktyk społecznych*, ASPRA Jr., Warszawa, 2010. 388.

<sup>28</sup> KENNEY, Padraic, *Rebuilding Poland, Workers and Communists, 1944-1950*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1996.

<sup>29</sup> CHUMIŃSKI, Jędrzej: *Autorytaryzm a wybory polityczne robotników polskich (1945-1948)*, *Dzieje Najnowsze*, 1, 2006. 89-106.

factories, reared in a different culture, was one of the reasons of the relatively low productivity rates. However, productivity also fell in places where workers with a long work record predominated. It seems that two factors played a part here: on the one hand, supply difficulties and under-nourishment, and on the other – a moral economy of a kind from the war period. Feigning work at that time grew to the rank of patriotic action: after the war that strategy was also adopted at times, though now it was aimed at someone else.

The attitude of the state to these social processes, the ways of resolving the tensions and conflicts that they generated, began to change clearly as from mid-1947. It was then that the struggle for trade commenced which, in the period 1948-1949, marginalised the network of private shops and warehouses. With the help of surtax, private publications were destroyed, and the network of private bookshops was taken over by the state. In the housing development sector, cooperative and private initiative was restricted in favour of the state investor who also gained a monopoly on decisions regarding the allocation of premises. The possibility to strike was quite effectively reduced by introducing political police structures into workplaces and the development of the apparatus of terror and repression. The activities of western institutions, charity and cultural ones included, was liquidated, suspended or drastically curtailed in the ever more heated atmosphere of the Cold War. Within the framework of the war for the soul of society, a religious war was sparked off and education was subjected to strong indoctrination. The peasants, so far enjoying relative independence in their private farmsteads, were subjected to collectivization pressures, to a system of obligatory supplies and ruinous taxes. Poland, in the period of reconstruction, was receding into the past, and with a changed team of people holding power, towards the end of 1948, moved full speed ahead along the Stalinist track.



**Tibor Klestenitz**

## **Reformbestrebungen der katholischen Kirche nach dem ersten Weltkrieg in Ungarn<sup>1</sup>**

### **Abstrakt**

Nach dem ersten Weltkrieg musste sich die katholische Kirche – wie auch andere Institutionen der ungarischen Gesellschaft – mit einer komplizierten Krise konfrontieren. Die Erneuerung der existierenden katholischen Einrichtungen wurde in der Zwischenkriegszeit wichtig geworden, um das Vertrauen der Gläubigen zu sichern: die vorherigen Rahmen sollten mit Inhalt gefüllt werden, wirksame Vereine sollten gegründet werden, um die politischen Interessen der Kirche zu schützen. In dem Beitrag möchte ich vor allem mit der Analyse der Katholikentage darstellen, wie die ungarischen Katholiken ihre Lage beurteilten und welche praktische Maßnahmen sie für wichtig hielten, um die Erneuerung zu beschleunigen.

*Keywords:* Katholizismus in Ungarn, Katholikentage, Horthy-Regime, „Christlich-nationaler“ Kurs, Säkularisation

**N**ach dem ersten Weltkrieg musste sich die katholische Kirche – wie auch andere Institutionen der ungarischen Gesellschaft – mit einer komplizierten Krise konfrontieren. Die Ereignisse der „Asterrevolution“ und der Räterepublik zeigten, dass die Kirche, trotz der sporadischen Versuche der vorherigen Periode,<sup>2</sup> nicht imstande war, wirksame gesellschaftliche Vereine zu gründen, die die politischen Interessen der Katholiken hätten schützen können. Die Periode der Räterepublik war besonders kritisch: die Proletarierdiktatur nahm das Kirchenvermögen weg, verstaatlichte die katholischen Schulen und verbot den Religionsunterricht.<sup>3</sup> Die Erneuerung der existierenden katholischen Einrichtungen wurde in der Zwischenkriegszeit wichtig geworden, um das Vertrauen der Gläubigen zu sichern: die vorherigen Rahmen sollten mit Inhalt gefüllt werden, wirksame Vereine sollten gegründet werden, und die kirchlichen Institutionen und die Methoden der Seelsorge sollten modernisiert werden.

In dem Beitrag möchte ich vor allem mit der Analyse der Katholikentage darstellen, wie die ungarischen Katholiken ihre Lage beurteilten und welche praktische Maßnahmen sie für wichtig hielten, um die Erneuerung zu

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<sup>2</sup> CSÁKY, Moritz: *Die römisch-katholische Kirche in Ungarn*. IN: WANDRUSZKA, Adam – URBANITSCH, Peter (Hrsg.): *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*. Band IV. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 1985. 309.

<sup>3</sup> ADRIÁNYI, Gábor: *A katolikus egyház története a 20. században Kelet-, Közép-Kelet és Dél-Európában* [Geschichte der Kirche Osteuropas im 20. Jahrhundert]. Kairosz, Budapest, 2005. 178.

beschleunigen. Die Katholikentage, die seit 1900 fast jedes Jahr regelmäßig gehalten wurden, waren die wichtigsten Ereignisse des katholischen öffentlichen Lebens. Hier kamen nicht nur die Mitglieder der Hierarchie, sondern auch die Vertreter des niedrigen Klerus und die Leiter der katholischen Intelligenz zu Wort. An den Sitzungen wurden die aktuellen Probleme detailliert erörtert.<sup>4</sup>

**„Die Welt ist einem großen Friedhof gleich“.<sup>5</sup> Perspektiven nach dem Krieg**

Nach dem ersten Weltkrieg herrschte in Ungarn ein starkes allgemeines Krisengefühl. Zwischen 1918 und 1920 folgten traurige Ereignisse einander: der Krieg wurde verloren, Österreich-Ungarn zerfiel. Im März 1919 wurde die Räterepublik proklamiert, der rumänische militärische Angriff stürzte aber die Proletarierdiktatur schon im August, worauf der rechtsradikale weiße Terror und die Etablierung des Regierungssystems von Admiral Miklós Horthy folgten. Daneben entwickelte sich eine tiefe soziale und wirtschaftliche Krise. Die öffentliche Meinung wurde von der Sehnsucht nach traditionellen Werten, Ordnung und Autorität dominiert.<sup>6</sup> Die Politiker, die die Notwendigkeit der Toleranz und der Verzeihung betonten, galten wegen der allgemeinen politischen Irrationalität als unpopulär.<sup>7</sup>

Die Leiter der ungarischen Katholiken glaubten daran, dass der wichtigste Grund des Niederganges in der religiösen Gleichgültigkeit zu finden ist, und sie erwarteten die gesellschaftliche Erneuerung von den christlichen Werten. Der einflussreiche Jesuitenpater, Béla Bangha meinte, die große nationale Tragödie stehe mit dem Nachlass des religiösen Lebens im Zusammenhang.<sup>8</sup> Graf János Zichy als Präsident des Katholikentages sprach 1920 darüber, dass sich der Niedergang seit dem Ende des Weltkrieges fortsetzte, und *„alle Gesellschaften der ganzen Welt, deren Erwartungen den Materialismus zu dem höchsten Grad erhöhte, sind wegen der großen Mängel und Verluste des Weltkrieges, im engeren Sinne des Wortes, krank.“* Er verlangte dafür die Anerkennung den Vorrang der geistigen Werte.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Die wichtigste Fachliteratur bezüglich des Themas: ADRIÁNYI, Gabriel: *Fünfzig Jahre ungarischer Kirchengeschichte, 1895–1945*. Hase & Koehler Verlag, Mainz, 1974. 42-52. 81-90. GERGELY, Jenő: *A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon, 1919-1945* [Die Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Ungarn, 1919–1945]. ELTE BTK Új- és Legújabbkori Történeti Tanszék, Budapest, 1997. 124-130. SZÖGI, László: *A katolikus nagygyűlések Magyarországon* [Katholikentage in Ungarn]. IN: BÁRDOS, István – BEKE, Margit (Hrsg.): *Egyházak a változó világban*. Oktáv-Press Kft, Esztergom, 1992. 509-512.

<sup>5</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 25. Oktober 1920. 2.

<sup>6</sup> ROMSICS, Ignác: *Magyarország története a XX. században* [Die Geschichte Ungarns im XX. Jahrhundert]. Osiris, Budapest, 2003. 135.

<sup>7</sup> GRATZ, Gusztáv: *A forradalmak kora: Magyarország története 1918–1920* [Das Zeitalter der Revolutionen: Die Geschichte Ungarns 1918–1920]. Magyar Szemle Társaság, Budapest, 1935. 234.

<sup>8</sup> BANGHA Béla: *Magyarország újjáépítése és a kereszténység* [Die Reorganisation Ungarns und das Christentum]. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 1920. 130.

<sup>9</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 10. Oktober 1922. 3.

Nach dem Untergang der Räterepublik setzten viele Katholiken ihre Hoffnungen darauf, dass sich der Klerus und die Laien der kommunistischen Kirchenverfolgung zufolge nähern werden, was zu einer religiösen Aufschwung führt.<sup>10</sup> Diese Hoffnungen blieben aber unerfüllt. Eine Zeitschrift schrieb schon einige Monate später mit großer Enttäuschung: „*unsere christliche katholische Kirche war noch nie so leer, wie heutzutage*“.<sup>11</sup> Nach Edit Farkas, Leiterin der Sozialen Missionsgesellschaft „*nehmen die ungarischen Katholiken das religiöse Leben nicht ernst. Sie sind [...] gleichgültig bis zur Gesinnungslosigkeit*“.<sup>12</sup> Der Pfarrer von Puztazámor schrieb sogar, „*dass die Stimmung der Massen ausgesprochen kirchenfeindlich ist, und man muss gegen diese Massenstimmung eine Art Guerilla-Kampf führen*“.<sup>13</sup>

Ákos Mihályfi, Professor der Theologie schrieb 1919 ein Buch über diese Frage. Seiner Meinung nach „*je länger der Krieg dauerte, desto mehr ließ die religiöse Frömmigkeit nach*.“ Er meinte, die ganze Gesellschaft habe sich nur für materielle Fragen interessiert. Aber er gab selbstkritisch auch zu, die Fahrlässigkeit der Priester habe auch zur Verbreitung der Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber der Kirche beigetragen, weil sich ein bedeutender Teil des Klerus während der Monaten des Zusammenbruches nur um seine eigenen Interesse gekümmert habe, anstatt des Zusammenhaltens der kirchlichen Gesellschaften. Das wichtigste Organ der Kleriker während des Kampfes um ihre Interesse war vom Herbst 1918 ab der sogenannte Priesterrat,<sup>14</sup> dessen „*revolutionärer Charakter*“ nach Mihályfi „*bei den Massen des gläubigen Volkes zu Recht Anstoß erregte*“.<sup>15</sup> Es konnte zum kirchlichen Autoritätsverlust auch beitragen, dass der Episkopat mit den regierenden Klassen durch ihre Interessen sehr eng verbunden war, deswegen wurde er nach dem Krieg für die Verluste des gestürzten Regimes mitverantwortlich gehalten.<sup>16</sup>

Für die Bischöfe war also eine wichtige Aufgabe, die Autorität des Klerus zu bestärken. Der Episkopat wollte schon im August 1919 die Priester zu Exerzitien führen, um ihr Moral zu verbessern.<sup>17</sup> Die Bekräftigung des Ansehens der Priester

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<sup>10</sup> SPANNENBERGER, Norbert: *Die katholische Kirche in Ungarn 1918–1939. Positionierung im politischen System und „Katholische Renaissance“*. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2006. 39.

<sup>11</sup> Hírekről – hír [Eine Nachricht über die Nachrichten], *A Szív*, 21. (1920) 2.

<sup>12</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 14. Oktober 1924. 11.

<sup>13</sup> MÓZESSY, Gergely (Hrsg.): *Lelkipásztori jelentések, 1924–1926. Források a Székesfehérvári Egyházmegye történetéből III.* [Berichte der Seelsorger. Quellen über die Geschichte der Diözese Székesfehérvár III]. Székesfehérvári Püspöki és Székeskáptalani Levéltár, Székesfehérvár, 2008. 341.

<sup>14</sup> Die am 7. November in Budapest gegründete Organisation strebte vor allem nach der Verbesserung der finanziellen Lage des niedrigen Klerus. GERGELY, Jenő: *A Papi Tanács. A magyar katolikus alsópapság demokratikus szervezkedése 1918-1919-ben.* [Demokratische Organisation des katholischen niedrigen Klerus in Ungarn, 1918-1919], *Világosság*, 3. (1973) 169.

<sup>15</sup> MIHÁLYFI, Ákos: *Lélekmentés a nagy viláégés után.* [Seelenrettung nach dem großen Weltbrand]. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 1919. 5–13.

<sup>16</sup> Esztergom, Primatialarchiv (EPL) 712-1945. Brief des Jesuitenpaters József Jánosi im Mai 1945.

<sup>17</sup> BEKE, Margit (Hrsg.): *A magyar katolikus püspökkari tanácskozások története és jegyzőkönyvei*

war auch wegen anderer Gründe wichtig. Der Weltkrieg erzeugte eine bedeutende Nachfrage an Nachrichten,<sup>18</sup> und – wie ein Kleriker formulierte – „*jeder las Zeitungen*“.<sup>19</sup> Ákos Mihályfi meinte, dass diese Veränderung „*die Intelligenz der Massen verbesserte, sogar die Gedanken- und Ideenwelt des ländlichen Volkes erweiterte*“, worauf die Kirche „*bei allen seelsorgerischen Angelegenheiten*“ Rücksicht nehmen soll.<sup>20</sup>

Deshalb machte er – unter Hinweis auf einige ausländischen Muster – Vorschläge darüber, wie sich die Priester an die neuen Umstände anpassen sollen. Er hielt die Einführung der Hauspastoration für die wichtigste Aufgabe, in deren Rahmen die Pfarrer alle Gläubige, ohne Hinsicht auf ihre gesellschaftliche Stellung, in ihren Häusern aufsuchen sollten. Er empfahl auch die Einführung des „*Seelenkataloges*“, um die Leute besser kennenlernen zu können. In Deutschland wurden zum Beispiel auch registriert, wie intensiv religiöses Leben die Gläubigen hatten, an welchen Vereinen oder Parteien sie teilnahmen, welche Zeitungen sie lasen.<sup>21</sup>

Mihályfi fand so, dass der Verlust von persönlichen Beziehungen zahlreiche Probleme verursacht habe, vor allem in den Großstädten, deshalb schlug er den Pfarrern vor, Amtsblätter zu veröffentlichen, und diese jeden Familien gratis zu senden. Er machte darauf aufmerksam, dass man sich an die städtischen Lebensverhältnisse anpassen sollen, und die Kirche für die Erwartungen der Gesellschaft offen werden soll. Er drückte dies auch symbolisch mit dem Wunsch aus, dass die Kirchen immer geöffnet sein sollen: „*Die geschlossenen Kirchen bieten einen traurigen Anblick, vor allem im Gewimmel der Städte. Alles ist geöffnet: Geschäfte, Läden, Büros, Kneipen, Cafés, Lasterhöhlen, nur die Kirchen sind geschlossen, wie die Gefängnisse*“ – schrieb er.<sup>22</sup> Mihályfi erkannte also, dass sich die Kirche unter den Umständen der Säkularisierung den Verlust von keinen einzigen Gläubigen erlauben kann.

Der ungarische Episkopat betonte auch die Wichtigkeit der bewussten Religiosität. Der Bischof von Veszprém hielt es zum Beispiel für ein großes Problem, dass „*das Christentum breiter Schichten nicht selbstbewusst ist*“.<sup>23</sup> Die Verordnungen der Diözesanynoden in den 1920-er Jahren gaben Platz den neuen seelsorgerischen Methoden. Sie regelten, wie sich die Pfarrer gegenüber den Gläubigen verhalten sollten. Laut der Verordnung von Vác musste der Pfarrer „*die Gläubigen gern empfangen und vor Augen halten, dass*

1919-1944 közzét [Die Geschichte und die Protokolle von den Beratungen des ungarischen katholischen Episkopats], I. Band. Aurora, München-Budapest, 1992. 41.

<sup>18</sup> SIPOS, Balázs: *A politikai újságírás mint hivatás* [Der politische Journalismus als Beruf]. Napvilág, Budapest, 2004. 105.

<sup>19</sup> EPL Cat. 44/3156-1918. Blcha Marian an Fürstprimas Csernoch 1. Oktober 1915.

<sup>20</sup> MIHÁLYFI (1919): 31.

<sup>21</sup> Ebenda. 39, 41, 43.

<sup>22</sup> Ebenda. 94.

<sup>23</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 25. Oktober 1920. 7.



*er kein Beamter, sondern Seelsorger ist*“.<sup>24</sup>

### **Die Organisation des Vereinslebens**

Anfang des XX. Jahrhunderts entstanden zahlreiche katholische Vereine, die aber – nach der Meinung von ihren eigenen Leitern – nicht fähig waren, den nötigen Einfluss verschaffen. „*Die gegenseitige Eifersucht ist alltäglich, die verschiedenen Vereine sind unfähig, sich als Teil einer einheitlichen, nach einem gemeinsamen Ziel strebenden Aktion zu betrachten*“<sup>25</sup> – sagte der stellvertretende Präsident des Katholischen Pressvereines im Jahre 1916.

Nach dem Untergang der Räterepublik herrschte eine christliche Aufwallung, und viele Katholiken hofften auf die Wiederbelebung ihres Vereinlebens. Der frühere Ministerpräsident Károly Huszár behauptete aber am Katholikentag von 1922: „*wir leben in einer Periode der unleugbaren Verflachung, die Krise des Landes wurde auch zur Krise der katholischen Vereine*“. Den Grund dafür fand er in der Erscheinung, dass einige neue, sogenannte „*christliche*“ Organisationen, die nach der Etablierung des neuen politischen Regimes erschienen, den katholischen Vereinen eine unerwünschte Konkurrenz bildeten.<sup>26</sup> Der Verband der Hochschulstudenten machte auch das Überangebot an Vereinen für seine Erfolglosigkeit verantwortlich.<sup>27</sup> 1924 tadelte ein Publizist wegen des Rückfalls auch vor allem die „*durch den Staat favorisierten*“ nationalistischen Vereine.<sup>28</sup>

Nach 1919 unterstützte das neue politische Regime die gesellschaftliche Kooperation der christlichen Konfessionen, so dass es gegenüber der „*internationalen Destruktion*“ die Einheit „*des christlichen Ungarns*“ demonstrativ aufweisen kann. Der Reichsverweser Miklós Horthy betonte oft, das Wichtigste sei nicht die konfessionelle Zugehörigkeit, sondern der Glaube an Gott.<sup>29</sup> Die selbstbewussten Katholiken freuten sich aber nicht unbedingt über diese Initiative, weil sie davor fürchteten, dass die gemeinsamen, nicht konfessionellen Vereine zur Erlahmung des konfessionellen Selbstbewusstseins führen werden.<sup>30</sup>

Die Leiter der Katholiken strebten nach der Reorganisation von selbstständigen

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<sup>24</sup> *Decreta Synodalia. Az 1921. évben tartott váci egyházmegyei zsinaton hozott egyházmegyei törvények.* [Diözesangesetze der Diözesansynode von Vác, gehalten im Jahre 1921]. Pallas, Budapest, 1921. 23.

<sup>25</sup> *Jelentés a Katholikus Sajtóegyesület 1916. május 24-én megtartott nyolcadik rendes közgyűléséről* [Bericht über die achte Jahresversammlung des Katholischen Pressvereines, gehalten am 24. Mai, 1916]. Katholikus Sajtóegyesület, Budapest, 1916. 6.

<sup>26</sup> *Nemzeti Újság*, 8. Oktober 1922. 2.

<sup>27</sup> Ebenda. 3.

<sup>28</sup> CZÉKUS, Géza: *Madártávlatból* [Von der Vogelperspektive], *Egyházi Lapok Papok Közlönye*, 3–4. (1924) 17.

<sup>29</sup> SAKMYSTER, Thomas: *Admirális fehér lovon. Horthy Miklós, 1918–1944* [Admiral auf weißem Pferd. Miklós Horthy, 1918–1944], Helikon, [Budapest], 2004. 137.

<sup>30</sup> BANGHA, Béla: *Az egységes keresztény front és a katolicizmus* [Die einheitliche christliche Front und der Katholizismus], *Magyar Kultúra*, 2. (1921) 107–109.

katholischen Vereinen, um eine Antwort auf die Herausforderung zu geben. Gyula Glattfelder, Bischof von Csanád erklärte: „Wir müssen in die katholischen Vereine Leben bringen, und wir dürfen nicht dulden, dass diese nur nominell Organisationen der katholischen Gesellschaft sind.“<sup>31</sup>

Erste Schritt der Veränderung war, dass die Vorgesetzten der Vereine einsahen: wenn sie ihre Mitglieder bewahren möchten, sollen sie ihnen nützliche Dienstleistungen anbieten. Das erkannten auch die Leiter des im Jahre 1908 nach deutschem Muster organisierten Katholischen Volksbundes. Der Bund hatte vor dem Weltkrieg noch 300 000 Mitglieder, seine Aktivität ließ aber während des Krieges nach,<sup>32</sup> die Mitgliedzahl sank im Jahre 1924 auf 118 000. Der Volksbund reorganisierte danach seine rechtlichen und wirtschaftlichen Beratungsbüros, also er brachte seine vor dem Krieg gewährte Dienstleistungen wieder in Gang, um seine Anziehungskraft zu stärken.<sup>33</sup>

Der Verband von Katholischen Burschenvereinen, der eine Allianz von 53 Budapester und ländlichen Vereinen war,<sup>34</sup> schätzte seine Lage mit ähnlicher Selbstkritik an. „In dem Verein herrscht tödliche Stille“ – schrieben sie. Sie meinten, die Leiter werben aufdringlich um Mitglieder, und danach kümmern sie sich um sie überhaupt nicht. Man machte deshalb den folgenden Vorschlag: „wir sollen den Mitgliedern alles gewähren, was von dem katholischen Burschenverband zu erwarten ist, dann werden sie mit Freude [den Mitgliedsbeitrag] zahlen“.<sup>35</sup> Als erster Schritt organisierte der Verband verschiedene Lehrgänge für die Mitglieder.<sup>36</sup>

Viele erkannten, die Vereine sollten vereinheitlicht oder wenigstens aufeinander abgestimmt werden, um wirksamer zu arbeiten. Diese Idee brachte aber in der Wirklichkeit zahlreiche Probleme mit sich. Der Bischof von Szombathely meinte zum Beispiel, die Parole der Kooperation habe den Gegensatz zwischen der Hauptstadt und dem Land verschärft, weil viele die Vereinheitlichung mit der Zentralisierung verwechselt hätten.<sup>37</sup> Der Jesuitenpater Béla Bangha meinte, dass das Vereinsleben nur dann aufblühen könne, wenn die Vereine auffallende alltägliche Vorteile geboten hätten. Seiner Meinung nach sei das Ungarische „eine kämpferische Nation“, deshalb „können nur die kämpferischen Elemente in das gesellschaftliche Leben die größte Lebendigkeit einbringen“.<sup>38</sup> Bangha betrieb die Unterstützung der örtlichen Initiativen, die Kooperation unter den wirksamen Vereinen, und die

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<sup>31</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 10. Oktober 1923. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 9. Oktober 1923. 6.

<sup>33</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 14. Oktober 1924. 8.

<sup>34</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 15. Oktober 1924. 5.

<sup>35</sup> Tisztes Ipar, 1. (1924) 3.

<sup>36</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 15. Oktober 1924. 5.

<sup>37</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 25. Oktober 1920. 5.

<sup>38</sup> BANGHA Béla: *A magyar katolikus szervezkedés kérdése* [Die Frage der katholischen Organisation in Ungarn], Magyar Kultúra, 12. (1922) 713.

Ausarbeitung eines gemeinsamen Programms für die katholischen Vereine.<sup>39</sup>

Diese Bestrebungen erschienen parallel mit der Entwicklung der Weltkirche. Papst Pius XI. empfahl 1922 in seiner Enzyklika *Ubi Arcano* den Bischöfen der Welt die Gründung der Katholischen Aktion (*Actio Catholica*). Diese Organisation war als eine Rahmenorganisation zgedacht, die die gesellschaftliche Kooperation der Gläubigen führen sollte.<sup>40</sup> Bei der Entstehung der Katholischen Aktion konnte es auch eine Rolle spielen, dass das katholische Vereinsystem allein nicht imstande war, das wichtigste Ziel, also die Bestärkung und die Verteidigung der religiösen Identität zu erreichen.<sup>41</sup> Diese Initiative fand auch in Ungarn Anklang, zum Beispiel beim István Árpád Hanauer, Bischof von Vác.<sup>42</sup> Die Errichtung der ungarischen Katholischen Aktion begann aber nur im Jahre 1932.

Zur Bekräftigung der Loyalität gegenüber der Kirche konnten auch die autonomen Kirchengemeinden beitragen, mit deren Hilfe die Gläubigen in der Steuerung der Gemeinde eine Rolle bekommen konnten. János Csernoch schrieb schon im November 1918 die Errichtung der Kirchengemeinden in Budapest vor, um „*das katholische Selbstbewusstsein*“ zu bestärken.<sup>43</sup>

Die Einbeziehung der Gläubigen in die Gestaltung des Kirchenlebens konnte aber die Positionen der Priester gefährden, deshalb wollte der Klerus verständlicherweise seine Stellung bewahren.<sup>44</sup> Am Katholikentag von 1920 machte der Vertraute des Fürstprimas, Antal Lepold, darauf aufmerksam, dass irgendeine Reformen nur mit der Einwilligung des Papstes und der Hierarchie möglich seien. Er riet den Laien, anstatt die Demokratisierung der Kirche zu verlangen, „*ihre Hilfe zur Arbeit der Kirche anzubieten*.“<sup>45</sup>

Die Arbeit der Kirchengemeinden gewann in der Wirklichkeit aber nicht immer die volle Anerkennung des Klerus. Béla Bangha betrachtete zum Beispiel die Kirchengemeinden oft zu weltlich und protestantisch orientiert, da die Mitgliedschaft für sich nur Rechte kriegen wolle, und ständig „*meckere*“.<sup>46</sup> Die Berichte der Pfarrer von der Diözese Székesfehérvár untermauern dieses Bild. Dem

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<sup>39</sup> BANGHA Béla: *A katolikus szervezkedés kérdése* [Die Frage der katholischen Organisation], *Magyar Kultúra*, 4. (1923) 208-211.

<sup>40</sup> GIANONE András: *Az Actio Catholica története Magyarországon 1932–1948* [Die Geschichte der Katholischen Aktion in Ungarn 1932–1948]. ELTE BTK Történelemtudományok Doktori Iskola, Budapest, 2010. 10-11.

<sup>41</sup> LÖNNE, Karl-Egon: *Katholizismus-Forschung*, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 1. (2000) 154.

<sup>42</sup> LÉNÁR, Andor: *Az Actio Catholica működése a váci egyházmegyében a két világháború között* [Die Tätigkeit der Katholischen Aktion in der Diözese Vác in der Zwischenkriegszeit]. IN: GERGELY, Jenő (Hrsg.): *Vázlatok két évszázad magyar történelméből*. ELTE BTK Történelemtudományok Doktori Iskola, Budapest, 2010. 88.

<sup>43</sup> GERGELY, Jenő: *A katolikus egyházközség (autonómia) mint a civil társadalom szerveződési lehetősége (1919-1944)* [Die katholische Kirchengemeinde (Autonomie) als eine Organisationsmöglichkeit für die Zivilgesellschaft 1919-1944], *Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázlatok*, 3-4. (1997) 133.

<sup>44</sup> LÖNNE (2000): 152-156.

<sup>45</sup> *Nemzeti Újság*, 25. Oktober 1920. 5.

<sup>46</sup> BANGHA (1923): 514. GERGELY (1997): 134.

Pfarrer von Érd machte die Kirchengemeinde viele Probleme, die noch während der Zeit der Räterepublik gegründet wurde, und wegen der unzuverlässigen Mitglieder ihre Sitzungen in „*untolerierbarem Ton*“ verlaufen seien.<sup>47</sup> In Budafok kamen ähnliche Probleme vor, und man berichtete über den Mangel von Laienmitarbeitern.<sup>48</sup> Der Pfarrer von Baracs klagte darüber, es sei sehr schwierig, die Gläubigen zum Opfer zu bringen, und „*das Volk musste zur Unterstützung des Volksvereins sozusagen mit Gewalt gezwungen werden*“.<sup>49</sup> Der Pfarrer von Bia bat die Vertretungskörperschaft darum, im „*Seelenkatalog*“ auch die Zeitungen einzuschreiben, die die Gläubigen lesen. Die Anwesenden „*brachen im furchtbaren Lärm aus*“, und sie hätten erklärt, dass sie über dieses Thema niemand fragen werden.<sup>50</sup> Die Lösung dieser Lage erwarteten die Kleriker von der Ausbildung einer Elite von Gläubigen, wozu sie die Frömmigkeitsvereine, vor allem die Marienkongregationen in Anspruch nehmen wollten.<sup>51</sup>

### **Politik im Zeichen des „*allgemeinen Christentums*“**

Nach dem Untergang der Räterepublik unterstützte die Kirche ganz eindeutig das Regime von Miklós Horthy, das den antiklerikalen, „*destruktiven*“ politischen Mächten entgegentrat. Am Katholikentag von 1920 zeigte es am eindeutigsten die Rede von Ottokár Prohászka. Der Bischof von Székesfehérvár begrüßte „*das glorifizierte Licht des ungarischen Erwachens*“, „*den Säbel des Nationalarmes*“, Miklós Horthy. „*Wir können nie chauvinistisch genug sein! An dem christlich-nationalen Kurs soll das ganze Christentum: Katholiken und Protestanten teilnehmen*“<sup>52</sup> – sagte er. Der Bischof sprach über den Antisemitismus des Regimes auch mit Verständnis, den er ein Produkt der gesellschaftlichen Verbitterung, „*einen verständlichen Zug*“ nannte.<sup>53</sup> Ein anderer Redner lobte die „*Ergebnisse*“ des Regimes: die Nationalarmee, die christliche Presse, die öffentliche Ordnung und die christlich-sozialen Organisationen.<sup>54</sup>

In dem öffentlichen Leben der Katholiken hatten aber die Legitimisten bedeutenden Einfluss, die sich die Zukunft des Landes nur unter der Herrschaft der

<sup>47</sup> MÓZESSY (2008): 172.

<sup>48</sup> Ebenda. 73.

<sup>49</sup> Ebenda. 60.

<sup>50</sup> Ebenda. 66.

<sup>51</sup> Über die Beschreibung der Organisation siehe: BANGHA, Béla: *Mi a kongregáció? Rövid Kalauz a Mária-Kongregáció számára* [Was ist die Kongregation? Eine kurze Anleitung für die Marienkongregation]. Mária-kongregáció, Budapest, 1921.

<sup>52</sup> FAZEKAS, Csaba: *Prohászka Ottokár a XIII. katolikus nagygyűlésen, 1920. október* [Ottokár Prohászka am XIII. Katholikentag, Oktober 1920]. IN: BARÁTH, Magdolna – MOLNÁR, Antal (Hrsg.): *A történettudomány szolgálatában: Tanulmányok a 70 éves Geccényi Lajos tiszteletére*. Magyar Országos Levéltár, Budapest – Győr, 2012. 427-428.

<sup>53</sup> Ebenda. 426.

<sup>54</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 27. Oktober 1920. 3.

Habsburger-Dynastie vorstellen konnten.<sup>55</sup> Ihrer Meinung nach seien die ungarischen Katholiken die größten Verlierer des Krieges gewesen, weil sie „*die katholische Dynastie und mit ihr ihre bis heute nie in Frage gestellte führende Position im Leben des Landes verloren*“.<sup>56</sup>

Die Legitimisten konnten also Horthy nur als vorläufiges Staatsoberhaupt anerkennen. Der Reichsverweser verhinderte aber 1921 beide Versuche zur Wiederkehr von König Karl IV., und das Parlament entthronte die Habsburger-Dynastie. Nach diesen Ereignissen wurden viele Katholiken gegenüber dem Regime viel mehr zurückhaltend. Solche allgemeine Zielsetzungen wie die antiliberalen Maßnahmen oder die Revision des Friedensvertrages bejahten sie weiter, aber sie sprachen schon offen über ihre wahren politischen Präferenzen. Ein Vertrauter des Fürstprimas erklärte zum Beispiel, dass die Katholiken erhoffen, der König wird in kurzer Zeit wieder das Patronatsrecht über die Kirche ausüben.<sup>57</sup> An den Katholikentagen wurde der „*gekrönte König*“, Sohn des im Jahre 1922 verstorbenen Karl IV., „*Otto II.*“ gejubelt, und als Präsident des Katholikentages wirkte 1923 Erzherzog Albrecht.<sup>58</sup> Die Definition aus dem Jahre 1923, nach der „*Legitimismus und Katholizismus sind heute zwei verschmolzenen Ideen in den ungarischen Geistern*“, lag vielleicht nicht so fern von der Wahrheit.<sup>59</sup>

In der Legitimation des Horthy-Regimes spielte die Kooperation der christlichen Konfessionen eine wichtige Rolle. Dies wurde noch wichtiger ab 1921, nach der Ernennung vom Grafen István Bethlen zum Ministerpräsidenten. Dem reformierten Staatsoberhaupt und dem reformierten Regierungschef war es bewusst, dass ihr Regime mit protestantischem Übergewicht beklagt werden kann. Die Betonung des konfessionellen Frieden wurde deshalb ein obligatorisches Teil der politischen Kultur der Periode.<sup>60</sup>

Nach der Entthronung der Dynastie achteten aber die Katholiken weniger darauf, den Erwartungen der Regierung Genüge zu tun. Eine von den Jesuiten geleitete Zeitschrift schrieb zum Beispiel darüber, dass die Katholiken „*gegenüber der unverbesserlichen konfessionellen Gierigkeit der Protestanten zu nachgiebig waren*“, und es hätte ein protestantischer Kurs geherrscht.<sup>61</sup> János Zichy machte am Katholikentag von 1922 eindeutig, die katholische Kirche beanspruche die führende Position für sich. Seiner Meinung nach mussten dies auch das Staatsoberhaupt und der Ministerpräsident zur Kenntnis nehmen.<sup>62</sup>

Zahlreiche Katholiken waren wegen der Verbreitung des „*allgemeinen Christentums*“ besorgt, weil sie davor fürchteten, dass es zu religiöser

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<sup>55</sup> SPANNENBERGER (2006): 41.

<sup>56</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 9. Oktober 1923. 9.

<sup>57</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 14. Oktober 1924. 6.

<sup>58</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 29. Oktober 1923. 1.

<sup>59</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 10. Oktober 1923. 1.

<sup>60</sup> SPANNENBERGER (2006): 76.

<sup>61</sup> CZÉKUS Géza: „*Protestáns*“ kurzus? [Protestantischer Kurs?], Magyar Kultúra, 7. (1921) 386.

<sup>62</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 10. Oktober 1922. 3.

Gleichgültigkeit führt.<sup>63</sup> Der Episkopat lehnte zum Beispiel deshalb den Entwurf der Regierung über das gemeinsame Gebet von Schulkindern mit gemischter konfessioneller Zugehörigkeit in den staatlichen Schulen ab.<sup>64</sup> Die Katholiken wiesen zurück, an den Festen der Nationalarmee mit den anderen Konfessionen gemeinsam aufzutreten.<sup>65</sup> Der Nuntius selbst ermutigte das Publikum am Katholikentag von 1923: *„Auch die religiöse Parole der ungarischen Katholiken muss es sein: Nein, nein, nie. [Das war die bekannteste Parole der ungarischen Revisionalismus auch.] Der konfessionelle Friede kann nicht religiöse Gleichgültigkeit bedeuten, die von allein in der Seele des Volkes erscheint, wenn wir ihm gestatten, an solchen Zeremonien teilzunehmen, wo in einer bedauerlichen Mischung der heiligen Messe und dem Segen des katholischen Priesters die Rede und das Segen des protestantischen Pastors und das Lied des Talmuds und das Segen des Rabbis der Synagoge folgen“.*<sup>66</sup>

### **Gesellschaftsbild und Strategien**

An den Katholikentagen wurden oft die aktuellen gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Fragen besprochen, von denen die Fragen der Nationalitäten, der Frauen, der Jugend und der Presse besonders interessant sind.

Die Redner hoben oft irredentistische Parolen über jene Bevölkerung hervor, die nach dem Friedensvertrag von Trianon zu den Nachbarländern gerieten. Die Redner trösteten sich und das Publikum mit der Illusion, dass die nichtungarischen Katholiken der verlorenen Gebiete wegen der integrativen Kraft der Kirche die Anhänger der ungarischen Staatsidee geblieben seien. Militärbischof István Zadravecz meinte: *„solange die Kroaten Katholiken sind, werden sie den serbischen Staat immer gefährden, bis die Slowaken und Ruthenen Katholiken sind, können die Tschechen nicht ruhig schlafen [...] die Kroaten, Slowaken, Ungarndeutschen und Rumänen, auch wenn sie kein Ungarisch sprechen, sind nur Ungarn“.*<sup>67</sup> Das Schicksal der ins Ausland geratene Katholiken versuchte man auch für Propagandazwecke auszunutzen. Der Verband der Religionslehrer entschied sich, über die Beleidigungen des katholischen Klerus von den besetzten Gebieten ein Buch zu publizieren.<sup>68</sup>

Über die Lage der Nationalitäten in Ungarn vertraten die Katholiken aber schon selbstkritische Ansichten, obwohl sie es oft versuchten, die Verantwortung auf die Protestanten zu schieben. Graf József Károlyi meinte zum Beispiel, der *„von den*

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<sup>63</sup> BANGHA Béla: *Az egységes keresztény front és a katolicizmus* [Die einheitliche christliche Front und der Katholizismus], *Magyar Kultúra*, 2. (1921) 107-109.

<sup>64</sup> BEKE (1992): 55.

<sup>65</sup> *A pusztaszeri ünnep és a vegyes istentiszteletek* [Das Fest von Pusztaszer und die gemischten Gottesdienste], *Magyar Kultúra*, 10. (1922) 605.

<sup>66</sup> *Nemzeti Újság*, 9. Oktober 1923. 3.

<sup>67</sup> *Nemzeti Újság*, 11. Oktober 1922. 3.

<sup>68</sup> *Nemzeti Újság*, 27. Oktober 1920. 4.

*Protestanten geführte Staat*“ hätte keinen Sinn für die Nationalitäten gehabt, da zu den protestantischen Kirchen fast ausschließlich Ungarn gehört hätten. Er meinte, die gewaltige Magyarisierung im Zeitalter des Dualismus sei eine Folge von dieser Situation gewesen.<sup>69</sup> Immer mehr Katholiken hielten es für wichtig, die Rechte der Minderheiten zu akzeptieren. Ákos Mihályfi schlug zum Beispiel vor, dass in jenen Kirchen, „wo die Gläubigen aus mehreren Nationalitäten stammen, die Predigten auf mehrere Sprachen gehalten werden sollen. Auf diesem Gebiet begangen wir leider zahlreiche Fehler, für die wir jetzt büßen. Die Kanzel ist kein Platz für Magyarisierung.“<sup>70</sup> Die Synode von Veszprém schrieb vor, dass in den Ortschaften, wo die Predigten ständig in Deutsch gehalten wurden, wenigstens einmal pro Monat eine Predigt in ungarischer Sprache gehalten werden soll. Nach der Verordnung mussten aber die Seelsorger sogar den Anschein der Intoleranz vermeiden.<sup>71</sup>

Die gleiche langsame Öffnung spielte sich auch im Fall der Frauenarbeit ab. Am Katholikentag von 1920 sprach Professor Alajos Wolkenberg darüber, dass die Frauen jeden Beruf ausüben dürfen, falls sie dazu fähig sind. Er schlug aber vor, dass nur Frauen über ein bestimmtes Alter Arbeit nehmen dürfen, und er wollte wissenschaftliche Karriere von Frauen nur auf die begabtesten Kandidatinnen beschränken.<sup>72</sup> Der Nationalverband Katholischer Beamtinnen hielt fest daran, Frauen dürfen nur dann einen Job nehmen, wenn sie den nötigen Abschluss haben.<sup>73</sup>

Die Katholiken fanden aber die höchste Aufgabe der Frauen in der Berufung, mit ihrer Zärtlichkeit und Frömmigkeit die Männer zu beeinflussen und die religiöse Erneuerung zu begründen.<sup>74</sup> Für die Frauenorganisationen war also nach dem klassischen Muster die soziale Arbeit von großer Bedeutung. Die wichtigste Rolle spielte die Soziale Missionsgesellschaft, die im Jahre 1920 39 000 Leute in Budapest unterstützte. Während der Elendsperiode nach dem Krieg wertete sich die Rolle der Landwirtschaft auf, die zur Verschärfung der Gegensätze zwischen der Stadt und dem Dorf führte. Die Regierung sollte die Konflikte behandeln, und sie mochte auch die Hilfe der katholischen Organisationen in Anspruch nehmen. József Vass, Priester, Repräsentant der katholischen Politik, Minister für Lebensmittelversorgung betonte am Katholikentag 1920, die öffentliche Ordnung sei nur dann aufrechtzuerhalten, wenn die Produzenten die Preisen nicht mehr erhöhen und „die Konsumenten nicht mehr verlangen, was als Ration zu geben ist.“ Der Minister wusste darüber Bescheid, dass eine intensive Propagandaarbeit dazu nötig war, und er bat zu diesem Zweck auch die Soziale Missionsgesellschaft um Hilfe.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 9. Oktober 1923. 9.

<sup>70</sup> MIHÁLYFI (1919): 86.

<sup>71</sup> *Egyházmegyei határozatok és törvények. Decreta almae dioecesis Wespremiensis anno 1923. diebus 19-21. Junii in synodo dioecisana publicata et approbata* [Diözesanbeschlüsse und Gesetze]. Egyházmegyei Könyvnyomda, Veszprém, 1923. 61.

<sup>72</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 9. Oktober 1923. 8.

<sup>73</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 25. Oktober 1920. 5.

<sup>74</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 15. Oktober 1924. 6.

<sup>75</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 25. Oktober 1920. 6.

An den Katholikentagen behandelte man vielleicht die Fragen der Jugend und des Unterrichtes mit dem größten Interesse. István Haller beschrieb zum Beispiel die Jugend des Zeitalters als eine „egoistische, hedonistische“ Generation, die wegen der Unterrichtspolitik der dualistischen Periode „sich mit schamlosen Vergnügungslust füllte“. Haller meinte, dass man die folgenden Generationen der Kirche anvertrauen muss, denn „nur die Kirche kann einen echten staatsbürgerlichen Unterricht bieten“.<sup>76</sup> Der Präsident des Katholischen Unterrichtsrates hielt es auch für notwendig, an allen Ortschaften katholische Schulen zu gründen, und er verlangte, dass die katholischen Kinder ausschließlich katholische Schulen besuchen.<sup>77</sup>

Die Katholiken waren auch mit dem staatlichen Kinderschutz unzufrieden, der ihrer Meinung nach während des Weltkrieges versagte, weil er den Geist der Kirche nicht zur Geltung kommen ließ.<sup>78</sup> Die Versammlung der jungen christlichen Arbeiter beantragte, dass Jugendliche unter 18 Jahren kein Alkohol kaufen dürfen,<sup>79</sup> und die Versammlung der Lehrervereine schlug vor, die Gemeinden sollen so viele Klassenzimmer und Lehrer aufrechterhalten, wie viele Kneipen und Schenken sie haben.<sup>80</sup> Während des Katholikentages 1920 wurde die Nationale Katholische Kinderschutzzentrale gegründet, die Kurse für die vernachlässigten Kinder in acht Bezirken der Hauptstadt einleitete, aber es wurde auch geplant, in jeder Kirchengemeinde des Landes Kinderschutzkurse zu organisieren.<sup>81</sup>

Die Katholiken wollten daneben die intensive Pastoration der Jugend auch an den Universitäten weiterführen, die sie immer für den wichtigsten Vermittler des „destruktiven Geistes“ hielten.<sup>82</sup> Die Idee der katholischen philosophischen Lehrstühle wurde deshalb aufgeworfen.<sup>83</sup> Zur Organisation der Studenten wurde im November 1921 der Katholische Studentenverband gegründet, der 10 000 Mitglieder haben sollte. Die Führung der Organisation klagte sich aber darüber, dass sie von der katholischen Gesellschaft keine genügende Hilfe bekommt, und die anderen Studentenverbände sollten ihre Arbeit gehindert haben.<sup>84</sup>

### **Zusammenfassung**

Laut einer, in der ungarischen katholischen Gesichtsschreibung herrschende These sei nach 1919 eine beispiellose konfessionelle Aufschwung gekommen. „Nach dem einstimmigen Zeugnis der zeitgenössischen Augenzeugen wurden die

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<sup>76</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 11. Oktober 1922. 3.

<sup>77</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 10. Oktober 1923. 3

<sup>78</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 25. Oktober 1920. 3

<sup>79</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 9. Oktober 1923. 7.

<sup>80</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 9. Oktober 1923. 8.

<sup>81</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 10. Oktober 1922. 6.

<sup>82</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 9. Oktober 1923. 9.

<sup>83</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 12. Oktober 1924. 10.

<sup>84</sup> Nemzeti Újság, 7. Oktober 1923. 2.



*Religiosität und die Frömmigkeit nach den Revolutionen viel mehr tiefer, intensiver, als sie früher waren* – schrieb ein Historiker.<sup>85</sup> Die gezeigten Quellen lassen sich aber darauf schließen, dass das Bild in der Wirklichkeit komplizierter war. Obwohl im Herbst 1919 viele Leute die Zeichen des Aufschwunges fühlten, aber die Hoffnung übergab ihren Platz schnell der Gleichgültigkeit, und die Zeitgenossen berichteten über den Rückgang des katholischen Gesellschaftslebens. Im Hintergrund standen wahrscheinlich die Folgen des ersten Weltkrieges,<sup>86</sup> aber später konnte der Faktor auch eine wichtige Rolle spielen, dass der christliche Kurs, den die Kirche ausdrücklich unterstützte, unfähig war, die sozialen Krisen wirksam zu lösen.<sup>87</sup>

Wie auch die Beschlüsse der Katholikentage zeigen, die Leiter der Katholiken nahmen die Prozesse wahr, und sie machten Versuche, sich nach den Forderungen der Zeit zu richten. Als eine Antwort auf die massive Individualisierung der Gesellschaft, die Kirche wollte die mit den Einzelpersonen intensiv arbeitende westeuropäische Pastoralisationsmethoden übernehmen, und sie probierte auch, auf die speziellen Probleme verschiedener Gesellschaftsgruppen Rücksicht zu nehmen. Die Leiter der Katholiken wollten die traditionelle Religiosität zu einer persönlichen Religiosität umwandeln, da solche Situationen unter Umständen der Modernität, wie es auch die Zeit der Räterepublik zeigte, vorkommen konnten, wo die Kirche die Hilfe ihrer Gläubigen brauchte, und dies konnte nur von engagierten und selbstbewussten Gläubigen erhofft werden. Deshalb wurde der gesellschaftliche Zusammenschluss der Gläubigen zu einer wichtigen Aufgabe, die sich nach dem Krieg in Form der Reorganisation von existierenden Vereinen verwirklicht wurde, und man plante auch ihre Zentralisierung und Vereinheitlichung.

Zu den Bestrebungen der Kirche bedeutete eine wesentliche Unterstützung die Hilfe des sich für christlich erklärten Staates, die Medaille hatte aber auch eine Kehrseite. Miklós Horthy und die führenden Politiker des Regimes hielten die Religion nur im Zusammenhang mit ihren politischen Zielen für wichtig, und sie waren den speziellen konfessionellen Interessen gegenüber misstrauisch. Die von dem Staat erwartete konfessionelle Kooperation, das „*allgemeine Christentum*“ wurde von vielen Katholiken als ein Hindernis des katholischen Selbstbewusstseins betrachtet, und das protestantische Übergewicht im Kreis der führenden Politiker verstärkte ihr Misstrauen.

Die Geschichtsschreibung betrachtete die Periode zwischen 1890 und 1945 die Epoche der Erneuerung der katholischen Kirche, der „*katholischen Renaissance*“.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> LÁSZLÓ T. László: *Egyház és állam Magyarországon 1919–1945* [Kirche und Staat in Ungarn, 1919–1945]. Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2005. 145.

<sup>86</sup> MÁRTONFFY-PETRÁS, Éva: *Eine Alternative zum politischen Katholizismus. Die Rezeption der Soziallehre im Kreise der katholischen Intelligenz Ungarns in den dreißiger Jahren*. IN: MANER, Hans-Christian – SCHULZE WESSEL, Martin (Hrsg.): *Religion im Nationalstaat zwischen den Weltkriegen 1918–1939*. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2002. 205.

<sup>87</sup> CZÉKUS Géza: *Három veszélyes sebünk* [Unsere drei gefährliche Wunden], *Egyházi Lapok Papok Közlönye*, 11. (1924). 73.

<sup>88</sup> CSÍKY Balázs: *Bőség és hiányok. Néhány módszertani kérdés és kutatási lehetőségek Serédi*

Wie aber auch die Säkularisation kann nicht für einen einbahnigen Prozess gehalten werden, der ohne Rückenbewegung zu seinem Ziel fährt, sondern er ist eher als eine zyklische Wellenbewegung vorzustellen,<sup>89</sup> so kann man die gegen die Säkularisation auftretende „*katholische Renaissance*“ nicht als einen ungebrochenen Aufschwung beschreiben. Es scheint wahrscheinlicher zu sein, dass die öffentliche und religiöse Aktivität der katholischen Gläubigen oft fluktuierten, und am Anfang der Nachkriegszeit erfolgte einen bedeutenden Rückfall. Auf diese Erscheinung reagierten aber die Kleriker und die selbstbewussten Katholiken schnell. Sie antworteten auf die neue Situation mit der Verstärkung ihrer Aktivität, mit der Neuorganisation der kirchlichen Institutionen und der Vereine, die dazu beitrug, dass die Erneuerungsprozesse wieder in Gang kamen. Die Krisenperiode also führte nicht unmittelbar zu einer Verstärkung des Katholizismus, sondern auf eine indirekte Weise. Sie machte die Leiter und Mitglieder der Kirche auf die Instabilität ihrer Lage aufmerksam, und bewegte sie, neue Lösungen zu finden.

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*Jusztinián hercegprímási tevékenységének vizsgálatra kapcsán* [Reichlichkeit und Mängel. Einige methodologische Fragen und Forschungsmöglichkeiten bei der Erforschung der Arbeit von Jusztinián Serédi als Fürstprimas von Ungarn]. IN: BALOGH Margit (Hrsg.): *Alattad a föld, fölötted az ég...* Források, módszerek és útkeresések a történetírásban. ELTE BTK Történelemtudományok Doktori Iskola, Budapest, 2010. 257-268.

<sup>89</sup> ALTERMATT Urs: *Katholizismus: Antimodernismus mit modernen Mitteln?* IN: ALTERMATT, Urs (Hrsg.): *Moderne als Problem des Katholizismus*. (Eichstätter Beiträge 28) Verlag Friedrich Pustet, Regensburg, 1995. 43.

**Ernst Langthaler**

***Different Speeds, Similar Directions  
Agricultural Development in Great Britain and Austria after  
the Second World War***

**Abstract**

This essay compares the pathways British and Austrian agro-food systems took after the Second World War. Despite sharp structural differences – e.g. Great Britain as a large country with a small agrarian sector versus Austria as a small country with a large agrarian sector –, it is striking that both countries implemented similar agricultural and food policies after 1945. British and Austrian policies were framed by the concept of ‘*productivist*’ (i.e. capital-intensive, concentrated and specialized) agriculture, driven by the orientation towards national food security, income parity between agrarian and non-agrarian sectors and structural change from agrarian to industrial society. Though agricultural developments in Britain and Austria – as well as in other Western European countries – differed in speed, the direction towards labour and land productivity growth was quite similar.

*Keywords:* agriculture, productivism, food security, Great Britain, Austria

**A**griculture and food were global key issues of economic and political reconstruction after the Second World War. This is reflected in Karl Brandt’s famous book *The Reconstruction of World Agriculture: „This book concerns one important aspect of the great challenge of our time to the nations of the world and their statesmen: how shall a more durable and vital peace be built?”*<sup>1</sup> Not only from the prospective view of the contemporaries, but also from our retrospective view the years before and after 1945 mark a critical phase in European agricultural development which has been labeled the ‘*productivist transition*’.<sup>2</sup> This term refers to the concept of ‘*food regime*’ stressing the interaction between the *accumulations* of resources, i.e. the chain encompassing food production, distribution and consumption, and the *regulation* of the food chain by formal and informal institutions since the late nineteenth century. In the course of the ‘*productivist transition*’ the ‘*extensive*’ food regime (c. 1870-1929/45), characterized by low-input low-output agriculture regulated primarily at sub-national levels, was replaced by the ‘*intensive*’ food regime (1929/45-1973/89), characterized by high-input high-output agriculture regulated at the

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<sup>1</sup> BRANDT, Karl: *The Reconstruction of World Agriculture*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1945, VII.

<sup>2</sup> For a global overview see LANGTHALER, Ernst: *Landwirtschaft vor und in der Globalisierung*. In: SIEDER, Reinhard – LANGTHALER, Ernst (eds.): *Globalgeschichte 1800-2010*, Böhlau, Vienna – Cologne – Weimar, 2010. 135-169.

national level (*national farm*). Accordingly, the '*productivist transition*' redirected agricultural development along the pathway of capital intensification, farm concentration and product specialization.<sup>3</sup>

This essay sketches British and Austrian agricultural development in the post-war era.<sup>4</sup> This endeavor may appear like comparing apples and oranges, because the selected country cases show very different – if not to say, contrary – features: Great Britain was a member of the Allies during the Second World War; it represented a large country with a small farm sector; and it emphasized food imports in the pre-war era.<sup>5</sup> German-occupied Austria was part of the Axis Powers; after its liberation in 1945, it represented a small country with a large farm sector; and its focus lay on domestic food production before the war.<sup>6</sup> However, comparing apples and oranges does make sense to a certain degree in these cases. One would expect countries with different features to follow different paths of agricultural development. But if there was anything like a supra-national transition from an '*extensive*' to an '*intensive*' food regime in post-war Europe, different countries might have developed along similar – i.e. productivist – pathways. In order to assess the thesis of the '*productivist transition*' in Western Europe after 1945, the following experimental arrangement seems to be appropriate: take two very different – better, contrary – country cases and look for similar paths. Thus, the question this essay attempts to answer is: Do Britain and Austria represent two sorts of productivist agricultural development, like apples and oranges representing two sorts of fruit?

The performance of the agro-food system at the end of war and in the following years yielded quite different results in the two countries. In the wartime period Britain had made a shift towards high-input high-output farming: on the input side, the assignment of production factors had enormously increased by 1944-45 compared to the pre-war levels (arable land: 47 percent, labour: 9 percent, machinery: 90 percent); on the output side, the production volume had

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<sup>3</sup> See FRIEDMANN Harriet – MCMICHAEL, Philipp: *Agriculture and the State System: the Rise and Decline of National Agriculture, 1870 to present*, Sociologia Ruralis, 29 (1989). 93-117; ILBERY, Brian – BOWLER, Ian: *From Agricultural Productivism to Post-Productivism*. IN: ILBERY, Brian (ed.): *The Geography of Rural Change*, Longman, London, 1998. 57-84.

<sup>4</sup> This essay draws a conclusion of two more elaborate articles which have been published recently: MARTIN, John – LANGTHALER, Ernst: *Paths to Productivism: Agricultural Regulation in the Second World War and its Aftermath in Great Britain and German-Annexed Austria*. IN: BRASSLEY, Paul – SEGERS, Yves – VAN MOLLE, Leen (eds.): *War, Agriculture, and Food: Rural Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s*, Routledge, London – New York, 2012. 55-74; LANGTHALER, Ernst: *English and Austrian Farming in the Second World War: 'Revolution' or Something Else?* IN: MOSER, Peter – VARLEY, Tony (eds.): *Integration Through Subordination. Agriculture and the Rural Population in European Industrial Societies*, Brepols Publishers, Turnhout, 2013 (a) (forthcoming).

<sup>5</sup> For an overview on British agricultural development in the twentieth century see MARTIN, John: *The Development of Modern Agriculture. British Farming since 1931*, St. Martin's Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke – New York, 2000.

<sup>6</sup> For an overview on Austrian agricultural development in the twentieth century see BRUCKMÜLLER, Ernst et al.: *Geschichte der österreichischen Land- und Forstwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert*, vol. 1: *Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft*, Ueberreuter, Vienna, 2002.

considerably increased by 8 percent.<sup>7</sup> German-occupied Austria had moved in the opposite direction: Despite the expansion of machinery in the initial phase of the German occupation, agricultural performance was far worse: both inputs (arable land: -6 percent, labour: -30 percent) and output (volume: -28 percent) had dramatically declined by 1944-45 compared to the pre-war levels.<sup>8</sup> Concerning food consumption, the two countries differed sharply as well: Though Britain experienced product-specific shortages after the end of war there was no mass starvation due to the increase of domestic food production and US food imports according to the Lend-Lease agreement.<sup>9</sup> Conversely, in Austria widespread starvation hit the lower and middle classes, especially in the large industrial towns; in Vienna the official daily ration in summer 1945 ranged at 800 calories. Everyday survival in the two years after the end of war heavily relied on international food aid by the Allied occupation troops and the United Nations (UNRRA) as well as food provision on the *'black market'* which especially women and children were burdened with. The destruction of transport facilities, the country's division into four occupation zones and the initial inefficiency of the federal administration hampered inter-regional food distribution.<sup>10</sup>

Despite the differences in the state of agricultural production and food consumption at the end of war, British and Austrian agricultural and food policies took similar directions in the post-war era which were somehow linked to wartime measures. In Britain „policy was framed around a *'productionist'* policy paradigm which emphasized the maximization of domestic production in the interests of food security, a goal that it was thought required and justified the payment of considerable subsidies to farmers”.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, several measures were set up: ploughing up subsidies and rationing were prolonged in order to boost agricultural production and direct consumption; farm management was still under control by the Country Agricultural Executive Committees which could evict *'failing farmers'*; guaranteed farm gate prices based upon annual price reviews set strong market incentives; the interests of producers and consumers were represented at the government level by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Food (1939–53); the state closely cooperated with the National Farmers Union in a corporatist framework; a National Agricultural Advisory Service was established in 1946 for the transfer of expert knowledge.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See BRASSLEY, Paul: *Wartime Productivity and Innovation, 1939-45*. In: SHORT, Brian – WATKINS, Charles – MARTIN, John (eds.): *The Front Line of Freedom. British farming in the Second World War*, British Agricultural History Society, Exeter, 2007. 36-54.

<sup>8</sup> See LANGTHALER (2013 a).

<sup>9</sup> See MARTIN (2000): 67-72.

<sup>10</sup> See KRÖGER, Melanie: *Die Modernisierung der Landwirtschaft. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Agrarpolitik Deutschlands und Österreichs nach 1945*, Logos, Berlin, 2006: 266-270.

<sup>11</sup> GRANT, Wyn: *Agricultural Policy*. In: DOREY, Peter (ed.): *Developments in British Public Policy*, Sage, London – Thousand Oaks – New Delhi, 2005. 7-23: 7.

<sup>12</sup> See MARTIN 2000: 67-93. GRANT (2005). BOWERS, J. K.: *British Agricultural Policy since the Second World War*, *Agricultural History Review*, 33 (1985). 66-76; INGERSENT, Ken A. – RAYNER, A. J.:

According to the double-aim of food self-sufficiency and farmers' income parity, Austrian decision-makers set up a series of measures quite similar to the British ones: forced delivery quotas and rationing still aimed at directing food to the official channels of distribution; public administration put farm management under control in order to limit farmers' engagement in the 'black market'; producer and consumer prices were negotiated between officials; fixed; producers' and consumers' interests were represented at the government level by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Food (1945-49); the state delegated the implementation of farm support measures to the Agricultural Chamber (*Landwirtschaftskammer*) as legal representative of the farming community; the Agricultural Chambers also offered public advisory services to their members.<sup>13</sup> In short, both countries preferred strict state regulation to *laissez-faire* globalization in the domain of agriculture and food after 1945. This reflected the supra-national policy trend in 1950s Western Europe towards the 'Agricultural Welfare State', institutionalized by the European Economic Community's (EEC) Common Agricultural Policy from the 1960s onwards. However, both countries initially were absent from the EEC; Britain joined in 1973, Austria in 1995.<sup>14</sup>

The post-war measures of agricultural and food policy were embedded in the development of state-led market regulation in both countries since the 1930s. At least five stages of development can be distinguished: First, from the early 1930s onwards, *anti-depression market interventions* were set in order to deal with the problem of 'over-production'. In 1931, Britain abandoned free trade policy and introduced marketing boards for arable and livestock crops. In the same year, Austria started to negotiate bi-lateral trade contracts and to introduce marketing orders for grain, meat and milk. Second, from the late 1930s onwards, the *direction of the war economy* treated food as a strategic commodity. In 1939, Britain introduced a decentralized system of state control of farm management by War Agricultural Executive Committees at county and district levels, designed to implement the directives of the central authorities and equipped with executive power. In 1938, immediately after Austria's occupation by the German Reich, the Reich Food Estate (*Reichsnährstand*), a huge corporation of food producers, processors and distributors at provincial, district and local levels, subordinated the farming community to the aims of the Nazi state. Third, at the end of war, the *prolongation of wartime regulation* was regarded as a means of national food security. In Britain domestic food production was centrally distributed and complemented by US food imports. In Austria forced delivery of farm products and international food aid prevailed. Fourth, the *reintroduction of pre-war regulations*

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*Agricultural Policy in Western Europe and the United States*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham – Northampton, MA, 1999. 130-142.

<sup>13</sup> See KRÖGER (2006): 264-292. HANISCH, Ernst: *Die Politik und die Landwirtschaft*. IN: BRUCKMÜLLER et al. (2002): 15-189: 154-164.

<sup>14</sup> See KNUDSEN, Ann-Christina L.: *Farmers on Welfare. The Making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca – London, 2009.

promoted further production expansion. Britain reinvented marketing boards for arable and livestock crops in the mid-1950s. Austria introduced marketing boards for grain, meat and milk in 1950. Fifth, the *institutionalization of the post-war regulation* promoted production expansion with increasing pressure on farmers to adjust to efficiency measures. In Britain the aim of both efficient farm management and equitable rural living standards was legally fixed under Labour (1947 Agriculture Act) and Conservative governments (1957 Agriculture Act). In Austria the concept of the high-performing 'peasant family farm' (*bäuerlicher Familienbetrieb*) was codified under the coalition of Catholic Conservatives and Social Democrats (1958 Market Order Act, 1960 Agriculture Act). Despite several differences, we can observe striking similarities of the stages of state-led market regulation from the 1930s to the 1950s in both countries.<sup>15</sup>

The common rationale of British and Austrian post-war regulation of agriculture and food is expressed by statements of leading decision-makers. According to Tom Williams from the Labour Party, British Minister of Agriculture 1945-51, the intention of the 1947 Agriculture Act was „to promote a healthy and efficient agriculture capable of producing that part of the nation's food which is required from home sources at the lowest price consistent with the provision of adequate remuneration and decent living conditions for farmers and workers, with a reasonable return on capital invested”.<sup>16</sup> In a similar vein, the Catholic Conservative politician Eduard Hartmann, Austrian Minister of Agriculture 1959-64, outlined the aim of the 1960 Agriculture Act: „Das einheitliche Ziel der modernen Agrargesetzgebung in der freien Welt ist es, der Landwirtschaft insbesondere den Absatz ihrer Produkte zu stabilen und angemessenen Preisen zu ermöglichen und dadurch gesunde und leistungsfähige landwirtschaftliche Betriebe zu erhalten, die die Volksernährung sichern sollen und durch ein stabiles ausgeglichenes Agrarpreisniveau auch entscheidend zur Erhaltung von Stabilität und Gleichgewicht der gesamten Volkswirtschaft beitragen”.<sup>17</sup> Despite their different national and ideological provenance, both statements were made up by the same set of political-economic orientations: agricultural efficiency, food security and income parity, directed to the vision of the welfare state.

Though very different in many respects, Britain and Austria followed similar post-war pathways of agricultural development which are characterized by the following features: price guarantees and state subsidies as incentives for production expansion to provide national food security and improve the balance of payments; the substitution of capital for land and labour by biological and

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<sup>15</sup> See MARTIN, 2000: 8-132; LANGTHALER, Ernst: *Varieties of Modernity: Fascism and Agricultural Development in Austria, 1934-1945*. In: CABO VILLAVARDE, Miguel – FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO, Lorenzo – PAN MONTOJO, Juan (eds.): *Agriculture in the Age of Fascism. Authoritarian Technocracy and Rural Modernization, 1922-1945*, Brepols Publishers, Turnhout, 2013 (b) (forthcoming); KRÖGER (2006): 264-292.

<sup>16</sup> WILLIAMS, Tom (Lord of Barnburgh), *Digging for Britain*, Hutchinson, London, 1965: 156.

<sup>17</sup> HAAS, Alexander: *Eduard Hartmann. Agrarpolitiker – Landesvater – Staatsmann*, Landesverlag, St. Pölten – Vienna – Linz, 2003: 211 f.

mechanical technology, delivered by upstream and downstream industries (*agribusiness*); increases in land and – above all – labour productivity to secure stable incomes for producers (*equity*’ goal) and cheap food for consumers (*efficiency*’ goal); the close cooperation between state authorities and farmers’ organizations (corporatism); public research and advisory services for expert knowledge transfer; a productivist mindset (*get big or get out*’) emphasizing on food and fiber production regardless of negative externalities.<sup>18</sup>

The convergence of the British and Austrian paths of agricultural development towards productivist agriculture was driven by several forces. First, the war-induced shortages had raised public concern about national food security even in Britain with its pre-war emphasis on food imports from overseas regions; thus, the state-led promotion of agricultural production and productivity growth was acknowledged beyond political boundaries.<sup>19</sup> Second, within the framework of the emerging post-war welfare state the living standard of the rural population, i.e. farmers, their families and farm-labourers, was to be raised up to the national average; thus subsidized producer prices boosting the farmers’ incomes met a broad consent.<sup>20</sup> Third, especially in Austria the transition from agrarian to industrial society was still under way in the mid-1940s; thus, the out-migration of rural labourers and even farming family members, previously denounced as *‘flight from the land’* (*Landflucht*) by romantic commentators, was widely accepted as a necessary step to *‘modernity’*, i.e. adjusting to the needs of industrial society.<sup>21</sup>

### ***Agricultural development in industrialized countries, 1930-80***

Source: design by the author, database: HAYAMI, Yujiro – RUTTAN, Vernon W., *Agricultural Development. An International Perspective*, second ed., John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore – London, 1985; O’BRIEN, Patrick K. – PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro: *Agricultural Productivity and European Industrialization, 1890-1980*, *The Economic History Review*, 45 (1992). 514-536; LANGTHALER, 2013 (a).

This is not to say that the two countries followed one and the same pathway. A comparison of land and labour productivity in industrialized countries 1930-80 shows both similarities and differences (see graph). Agricultural development in Britain and Austria – as well as in other countries – pointed to the same direction: the increase of both land and labour productivity through application of land- and

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<sup>18</sup> For a typology of productivism see ILBERY – BOWLER (1998): 58-70.


<sup>19</sup> See TRENTMANN, Frank: *Coping with Shortage: The Problem of Food Security and Global Visions of Coordination, c. 1890-1950*. IN: TRENTMANN, Frank – FLEMMING, Just (eds.): *Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke – New York, 2006. 13-48.

<sup>20</sup> See MILWARD, Alan: *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, second ed., Routledge, London – New York, 2000: 197-280; KNUDSEN (2009): 23-56.

<sup>21</sup> See LANGTHALER, Ernst: „Landflucht“, *Agrarsystem und Moderne: Deutschland 1933-1939*. In: OLTMER, Jochen (ed.): *Nationalsozialistisches Migrationsregime und „Volksgemeinschaft“*, Schöningh, Paderborn, 2012. 111-136.



labour-saving technology.<sup>22</sup> But a closer inspection reveals different speeds along the productivist pathway: Whereas the productivity of British agriculture grew rapidly already before 1950, Austrian productivity growth took off only afterwards. This reflects the *'state-led agricultural revolution'* Britain experienced during the Second World War on the one hand, the ambivalent modernization of Austrian agriculture under Nazi rule on the other hand.<sup>23</sup> To put it bluntly, Britain's path resembles a *'hurry ahead development'*, Austria's path appears as a *'catch up development'*. However, both development pathways were directed towards a productivist agriculture, according to Karl Brandt's 1945 prophecy: „Due to the relatively limited expandability of the consumption of food and the great technological reserves in all fields of agricultural production, the proportion of the people engaged in agriculture must necessarily shrink.”<sup>24</sup> Rather than being a hindrance, the Second World War and its post-war legacies in many respects acted as catalysts for the *'productivist transition'* of Western European agro-food systems.<sup>25</sup>



<sup>22</sup> See HAYAMI, Yujiro – RUTTAN, Vernon W., *Agricultural Development. An International Perspective*, second ed. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore – London, 1985; LANGTHALER (2010).

<sup>23</sup> See MARTIN – LANGTHALER, 2012; LANGTHALER, 2013 (a), 2013 (b).

<sup>24</sup> BRANDT (1945): 404.

<sup>25</sup> See BRASSLEY, Paul – SEGERS, Yves – VAN MOLLE, Leen: Conclusions. IN: BRASSLEY – SEGERS – VAN MOLLE (2012): 245-257.



**Ambrus Miskolczy**

## ***Krisenbehandlung durch Musik. Der Fall Bartók und die Cantata profana\****

### **Abstract**

The present article is a summary of a monography on the genesis of the *Cantata profana* which is one of the greatest composition of Béla Bartók. The Cantata is an answer to the crisis of the age between the two world wars. It is the most important myth of the Hungarian humanistic intellectuals. One of the greatest exegete of this myth, Károly Kerényi, has seen in this work of Bartók the most strong appeal to the spiritual and factual resistance against the world of lies and falsities. It is not by mere chance that some parts of the analysis of Kerényi were not published in Hungarian. Paradoxycally, György Lukács, the communist opponent of Kerényi translated the message of the *Cantata* in the same way, but he gave to it a revolutionary sense. According to him the art of Bartók was the only succesful intellectual revolution in Hungary. The events of 1956 gave a mighty affirmation of this statement, and this revolution gave the mightiest impetus to the crisis of the communism.

*Keywords:* Cantata profana, Bartók, Kerényi, Lukács, between two world wars, crisis of the stalinism, 1956

**K**önnte jemand das Wesen der Krisenserien des vergangenen Jahrhunderts und deren Behandlung besser als Ernst Jünger ergreifen? »Auf irgendeinem trüben Bahnhof muß man in den Zug einsteigen – als Nationalist oder als Bolschewik, als Revolutionär oder als Soldat, im Dienst obskurer Geister oder Theorien – es fragt sich nur, wie weit man mitfahren will.« Im Jahre 1919 war Béla Bartók auch ein Mitreisender im Dienst der unmöglichen Utopie der möglichen roten Reaktion, die der pazifistischen Revolution im militarisierten Europa folgte. Mit der Kraft der Notwendigkeit hat ihm die rote Republik die Möglichkeit der Durchführung der Reform des Musiklebens in Ungarn geboten. Zum Dienst verpflichtete ihn auch das ehemalige Tolstoi-Hemd und die Freundschaften mit einigen Mitgliedern des Sonntagskreises (Vasárnapi Kör), einer kleinen Konversationsgesellschaft, die in der Zweizimmerwohnung von Béla Balázs (dem späteren Verfasser des filmtheoretischen Werks *Der sichtbare Mensch*) regelmäßig zusammenkam und von György Lukács animiert wurde. Im Jahre 1919 stammte von ihm, als Volkskommissär für Kultur die Preisausschreibung für moderne Kindermärchen. Zwölf Jahre später dichtete Bartók seine *Cantata*

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\* Dieser Artikel ist eine Zusammenfassung einiger Ergebnissen meiner Monographie („*Tiszta forrás felé... Közelítések Bartók Béla és a Cantata profana világhoz*“ Budapest, Gondolat, 2011. 334 S.), die im Rahmen des Forschungsprojektes OTKA (85962) geschrieben worden war, und als Vortrag wurde präsentiert in der Konferenz über die Krisenbehandlung im 20. Jahrhundert - „*The 20<sup>th</sup> Century Post-War Crises in European Comparative Perspective*“ Universität Eötvös, Budapest, 04-20-2012.

*profana*, vielleicht auch in Erinnerung an das fatale Jahr. Dafür gibt es natürlich keinen Beweis. Die Märchen waren in Mode, die Nazis hatten dem Märchenkult eine spezielle Richtung gegeben. Was bedeutete die *Cantata profana* in diesem Kontext? Als alle Meisterwerke, war und ist sie für jede Spekulation offen. Für uns illustriert sie heute einige Probleme der Krisenbehandlung durch Musik, als Gegenstück der Krisenvertiefung durch Musik von *Doktor Faustus*, dessen Schöpfer, Thomas Mann Bartók gekannt hatte, und dem Károly Kerényi die bartóksche Perspektive zeigen wollte – ohne Erfolg. Was für eine Mythologie enthält die *Cantata profana* in einer Welt der gnostischen Mythologien, die aus Krisen stammten und so viele Krisen ausgelöst haben? Könnte man gar über Krisenbehandlung in diesem Falle sprechen?

Auf die erste Frage antwortet das Werk selbst, auf die zweite seine Perzeption.

Bartók hat den Text der *Cantata* zuerst in 1929 rumänisch geschrieben, besser gesagt, er hat aus zwei im Frühling 1914 gesammelten rumänischen Weihnachtliedern einen Text gemacht und mit dem Komponieren sofort angefangen. Dann verfasste er die ungarische Version, und das ist schon ein neues Gedicht, obwohl es nur drei solche ungarische Wörter enthält, die in den rumänischen Liedern nicht zu finden sind. Zwei Substantive und ein Adjektiv: Brücke, Zauberhirsch, klar. Die Handlung ist einfach. Ein alter Mann hatte neun Söhne, die er nur das Jagen lehrte. Sie jagten so lange, bis sie an eine Brücke gelangten, auf die Spur eines Zauberhirsches. Der Spur folgend, verirrteten sie sich, und verwandelten sich in schlanke Hirsche. Das Väterchen machte sich auf den Weg, um seine Söhne zu finden, und nach dem Überschreiten der Brücke fand er neun Hirsche bei einer Quelle. Ohne zu wissen, dass er seine Söhne gefunden hatte, wollte er auf sie schießen, und so entstand der Dialog. Der grösste Sohn, der liebste warnte ihn vor dem Schießen, und bedrohte ihn mit dem Tod. Das Väterchen rief sie nach Hause zu ihrer Mütterchen, die sie mit Speis und Trank aufwartete. Die Antwort ist ablehnend:

*„Lieber, guter Vater, [...] / Geh' zur guten, teuren Mutter. / Doch wir gehen nicht! [...] / Wir geh'n nimmer mit, / Denn unser Geweih / Die Türe fasst's nicht mehr, / Es findet wohl im Wald nur Raum; / Unser schlanken Körper / Mag nicht Kleider tragen, / Schmiegt sich nur ans grüne Laub; / Unser leichter Fuss tritt / Nicht des Herdes Asche, / Tritt nur des Waldes Moos; / Unser Mund leert nie mehr / Eure vollen Becher, / Trinkt nur aus klarem Quell.“*

Die von Bartók eingeführten Wörter erleichterten die Mythologisierung. Die Brücke trennt zwei Welten, die der Zivilisation und der Natur. Eigentlich ist das Wort das Ergebnis eines Missverständnisses: Bartók hat das rumänische Lied fehlgehört, später hat er den Fehler verbessert, aber in den meisten rumänischen Publikationen finden wir auch heute das fehlgehörte Wort. Der Irrtum war genial, das Wort hat eine symbolische Bedeutung, der Weg führt zum Freudismus, wenn

man so will. In den rumänischen Liedern gibt es nur großen Hirsch, der Zauberhirsch ist eine Figur der ungarischen Nationalmythologie. Das Epitheton der Quelle war der Haupttreffer. „*Nur aus klarem Quell!*“ – ist ein geflügeltes Wort unserer modernen Mythologie.

Paradoxerweise hat die Mythologisierung schon vor der Publikation der *Cantata profana* begonnen. Bartók ließ nämlich seinen rumänischen Text József Erdélyi, einen ungarischen Dichter halbrumänischer Herkunft übersetzen. Das Ergebnis war nicht ausgezeichnet, seine Publikation mobilisierte aber die Phantasie. Um den Faden vor dem Eintritt in den Labyrinth der Mythologiesierung nicht zu verlieren, sei mir erlaubt eine kleine Chronologie zu erstellen. Die Übersetzung des rumänischen Textes erschien zu Beginn des Jahres 1930. Danach schrieb Bartók sein Gedicht, und im selben Jahr war er mit dem Komponieren fertig. In deutscher Übersetzung ist die Partitur im Jahre 1934 in Wien erschienen. Im selben Jahr hat die Uraufführung in London stattgefunden, zwei Jahre später wurde die *Cantata profana* auch in Budapest aufgeführt, im Jahre 1938 ein weiteres Mal, und im Jahre 1940 hat Bartók den Preis der Ungarischen Akademie gewonnen. Inzwischen hat Mihály Babits, der Dichterstürm im Jahre 1932 die schlechte Übersetzung von Erdélyi noch einmal veröffentlicht und verhimmelt. Er stellte die Hirsche als Könige vor, als souveräne Wesen, die ins Reich der Freiheit und Keuschheit zurückgekehrt sind. Der Vater ist zum Symbol des Staates geworden, eines Staates, der die Dichter verfolgt. Die Andeutung ist klar: Babits war im Auge der Gewalt zumindest verdächtig, weil er während der roten Revolution einen Lehrstuhl an der Universität angenommen hatte, er wurde sogar von seinem Schriftstellerkameraden und Freund Zsigmond Móricz als verfolgter Zauberhirsch charakterisiert. Nach der Budapester Aufführung von *Cantata profana* wurde die Meinung von Babits, in einer noch radikaleren Form, von den Kritikern bestätigt. Aladár Tóth schrieb über die ewige Revolution der Jugend gegen die Väter. Emil Haraszti, der früher Bartók wegen seiner Sammlung der Folklore der Nicht-Magyaren in Ungarn scharf angegriffen hatte, stellte den aufständischen Hirschensohn, als den ewigen Wanderer vor, der die Gemeinschaft der Sterblichen verlassen hat. In den 30er Jahren handelte es sich um die innere Emigration, später um die wirkliche, und die bartóksche Brücke ist in Dissidentenkreisen zu einer Metapher der Auswanderung geworden. Inzwischen hat Bartók im Jahre 1940 Ungarn verlassen, und 5 Jahre später in den Vereinigten Staaten gestorben, ohne auf die Möglichkeit der Rückkehr in seine Heimat verzichtet zu haben. Es ist kein Zufall, dass der Übersetzer des bartókschen Textes kaum die treffenden Wörter finden konnte. Der Komponist – schrieb Bence Szabolcsi im Jahre 1941 – konnte den Mythos der *Cantata* „*nur in dem gesanglosen Gesang des Chors, in Gewieher und in Brausen erzählen*“ konnte. Bartók's Interesse für den Urmenschen ist vielleicht ein Irrtum – argumentiert der Kritiker – , aber das sei „*eines des fruchtbarsten Irrtümer des Jahrhunderts. Urmensch und Natur, Instinkt und menschliches Phänomen lehrten ihn nur die Ordnung seiner inneren Gesetze anzunehmen.*“ So „*dachte er mit dem Problem der Zeit und der Freiheit,*

des Wandels und des Todes den geheimsten Gedanken der Musiker von Europa aus, und äusserte ihn, bevor sie es mit Worten ausgedrückt hätten". Jeder Leser konnte bemerken, dass diese Konfession in einer Zeit der Unfreiheit geschrieben wurde, wo die modernen rote, braune, grüne Urmenschen unmenschlich regierten. Darum hat Bartók als erster „die Gemeinschaft verkündet, ... die Herrschaft der Gemeinschaften verleugnet, um die wahre Seele von Europa retten zu können in einer neuen Welt, die die Trümmer der alten Welt fortkehren wird.“ Es war nicht die Armee der freien Welt, die Ungarn befreit hatte, und anstatt das Haus der modernen Demokratie zu bauen, baute man die Bude der Volksdemokratie.

Es ist äußerst fraglich, inwieweit das kommunistische Regime die Tätigkeit des zurückgekehrten Bartók geduldet hätte. Seine Tanzpantomime *Der wunderbare Mandarin*, die schon gleich nach ihrer Uraufführung im Jahre 1926 in Köln vom damaligen Oberbürgermeister Konrad Adenauer verboten worden war, wurde später auch von der ungarischen stalinistischen Führung verboten. Und seinem Freund und Verehrer, dem Religionswissenschaftler Károly Kerényi, der der angesehenste Exeget der *Cantata profana* geworden ist, wurde selbst die Rückwanderung nach Ungarn verboten. Die Kulturpolitiker hatten Angst vor seiner intellektuellen Überlegenheit, und es war auch unangenehm, dass er im Jahre 1943 von dem pro-westlichen Ministerpräsidenten in die Schweiz geschickt wurde, um die antinazistische Orientierung der Regierung zu vertreten. In einigen Fällen, wie auch in diesem Fall, bevorzugten die Kommunistenführer die kompromittierten Persönlichkeiten, deren Vergangenheit ihre Gehorsamkeit garantierte. Kerényi war vom Anfang bis zum Ende ungehorsam. Anfang 1945 gab er ein Interview, das man auch heute gern vergisst. Wenn er den Geist gegen den Ungeist vertrat, bedeutete für ihn Demokratie die Verachtung der „verhängnisvollen Dreiheit: Kirchenfürst, Grossgrundbesitzer, Grossbankier oder Grossindustrieller“, deren verschiedene transfigurierte und institutionalisierte Varianten in unserer Welt auch da sind. Als Vertreter des zwischenkriegszeitlichen „geheimen Humanismus“ erklärte er: „Es ist kein Wunder, es ist aber so, dass, ungeachtet der drei charakteristischen Symptome der Neobarockmentalität – Angst vor freiem Denken, Furcht vor dem Bolschewismus und Besessenheit durch eine nationale Wunde –, eine innerlich unabhängige Geistigkeit in Ungarn während dieser fünfundsiebenzig Jahre sich doch erhalten konnte. Und dennoch hat auch das seine natürliche Erklärung“ – fügte er seiner Diagnose hinzu. Er wurde marginalisiert, war aber als Universitätsprofessor an der neubegründeten Szegediner Universität tätig, die eben von dem Neobarockminister Kuno Klebelsberg begünstigt wurde. Trotzdem konnte er sich als Inselmenschen betrachten, und nicht nur sich selbst, sondern auch den Komponisten der *Cantata profana*. Damit hat Kerényi einen weiteren Schritt auf dem Weg zur Exegese der *Cantata* gemacht. Einige Jahre zuvor wollte er eine Auswahl aus der rumänischen Folklore zusammenstellen, und darin hätten auch die von Bartók gesammelten Weihnachtslieder ihren Platz gefunden. Im Jahre 1946 erschien die Exegese der *Cantata*, nach 1956 ihre französische und in München ihre ungarische Variante, die später auch in Ungarn publiziert wurde, natürlich in veränderter Form.

Man hat solche Sätze ausgelassen, wie die folgenden: „*Es ist auch heute nicht sicher, dass es viele gibt, die in den freien Ländern ihren Sinn begreifen.*“ Und: „*...sie ist wie kein anderes Musikwerk unserer Zeit das Bekenntnis zur Freiheit.*“ Für Kerényi handelt es sich um „*ein Gesang des Auszugs, des Exodus*“ und um „*eine geistige Absonderung,*“ ein „*Neinsagen*“, was „*hohe Kunst*“ ist. Um die Symbolhaftigkeit der Cantata zu erklären, zitierte er solche alten chinesischen Philosophen, die die Parallelität zwischen den verschiedenen politischen, bzw. gesellschaftlichen Daseinsformen und den Musikformen bemerkt hatten, und kam zur Folgerung: „*Den höchsten Sinn der letzten Freiheit – den sprechen uns nicht mehr Worte, sondern nur die Musik aus.*“ Kerényi war überzeugt davon, dass der Hirsch-Symbol seine Bedeutung für die Menschen des reinen Geistes nicht verlieren wird. Die Cantata profana blieb für ihn eine Lösung der Problematik „*des Durchbruchs oder Ausbruchs als Heilung*“, und damit wollte er die alte Kooperation für die Zurücknahme der Mythen gegen den Faschismus mit Thomas Mann erneuern. Aber „*Dr. Fausti Weheklag*“ ist in Roman „*zum Lamento und zum »Lasciate mi morire«*“ geworden, wie es Thomas Mann seinem Freund schrieb, und er zitierte noch in seinen Briefen Blake, demnach ist die Natur des Teufels, und fügte persönlich hinzu: „*Es ist alles in allem eine scheussliche Schweinerei*“. Adorno machte einen weiteren Schritt, als er in der Musik von Bartók völkisch-faschistische Züge entdeckt hat. Dagegen trat György Lukács auf. Bartóks Hirsche seien Bauern – betonte Lukács – sie seien Bauern ohne Nationalität. Die Ablehnung der Söhne drücke eine wahrhaftere vox humana aus als der Wunsch der Eltern. Damit legitimierte der Bankiersohn seinen Aufstand gegen die Welt der Eltern, und danach führte er das öffentliche Leben der Ideologen, und der siebzigjährige Philosoph erklärte seinen höchst guten guten physischen Zustand mit dem Mangel des inneren Lebens. War die Musik ein Ersatzleben für ihn, das das Vakuum ausfüllte? Die Antwort wäre: Ja, wenn er nicht vergaß, was er einmal in der Studie von Rousseau über die Herkunft der Sprachen unterstrich:

*„C'est un des grands avantages du musicien, de pouvoir peindre les choses qu'on ne saurait entendre, tandis qu'il est impossible au peintre de représenter celles qu'on ne saurait voir; et le plus grand prodige d'un art qui n'agit que par le mouvement est d'en pouvoir former jusqu'à l'image du repos. Le sommeil, le calme de la nuit, la solitude et le silence même, entrent dans les tableaux de la musique. On sait que le bruit peut produire l'effet du silence, et le silence l'effet du bruit, comme quand on s'endort à une lecture égale et monotone, et qu'on s'éveille à l'instant qu'elle cesse. Mais la musique agit plus intimement sur nous, en excitant par un sens des affections semblables à celles qu'on peut exciter par un autre; et comme le rapport ne peut être sensible que l'impression ne soit forte, la peinture, dénuée de cette force, ne peut rendre à la musique les imitations que celle-ci tire d'elle.“*

Lukács hat seine musikalische Inkompetenz nie geleugnet, doch äusserte er

sich wie der chinesische Philosoph von Kerényi. Wenn er Musik höre, erkenne er die Atmosphäre des Zeitalters, in dem die Musik entstand. Durch Brahms drücke sich die Enttäuschung aus – meinte er. Höre er Bartók, verjünge er sich: „... jetzt spüre ich noch einmal den Aufstieg. Es gibt Versprechen und ein starkes Jugendgefühl in dieser Musik, als ob alles noch einmal von Anfang an begänne, und man alles, was verloren gegangen ist, noch einmal gutmachen könnte.“ Viele fühlten ähnlich, als der später weltberühmt gewordene György Cziffra am 22. Oktober 1956 das 2. Klavierkonzert spielte. (Einige Jahre zuvor hatten die Geheimpolizisten seine Finger zerschlagen.) Am nächsten Tag der Klavierkonzert, 23. Oktober 1956, brach die Revolution aus. Die Krise des Stalinismus fand ihr Ende. Wie eine Revolution oder ein Aufstand zur Krisenbehandlung beitragen, bleibt eine offene Frage der endlosen Geschichte. Als man einmal ein Interview mit der Frau von Bartók machte, und sie darüber sprach, dass ihr Mann alles liest, ohne Politik zu machen, rief der Komponist durch die Tür: „Nicht sprechen, musizieren!“ Hatte er nicht recht? Was für eine elende Melodie des Lebens die Krisenbehandlungsrhetorik ist!

Ifj. BARTÓK Béla: *Apám életének krónikája*. Budapest, 1981.

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**Ilkka Nummela**

## ***Economy and Society in Finnish Historiography of the World War II***

### **Abstract**

About two generations have passed away since the end of the World War II. Finnish historiography has analyzed the war many times and from many angles. Writing of history has changed as much as any form of human activity. It has been affected, among other things, by the changes in society and in historical research. This article examines how Finnish historiography of the World War II has dealt with issues of economy and society. The central finding concerns the change of the nature of research after its initial stages from the 1960s on towards a more scientific and socially-oriented approach as well as (the shift towards) studies which are based on individual experiences from the 1990s onwards.

*Keywords:* World War II, Finnish historiography, economic and social history

**D**uring the Presidency of Urho Kekkonen the term ‘*Second Republic*’ became a catchword to describe the idea of World War II as a political and social watershed. Two to (or) three generations have passed since the beginning of that war. When the war broke out, in comparison to Western Europe, Finland was still a deeply agricultural country, which had become independent at the end of the Great War. After the World War II Finnish society and its scientific perception has changed dramatically. In what follows, Finnish historiography, and to some extent, other studies in humanities of the war are analyzed. The starting point here is in economic history and in the author’s previous studies into the economic burden the war caused to Finland.<sup>1</sup> The time-span runs from the 1940s to the beginning of the new millennium.

Already the title of the war, World War II, tells that when studying it one should study also the World War because both were total wars in which besides armies also material, mental and other resources were at stake. Both made deep impact in the society and greatly consumed the resources of the fighting nations. The American Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Division of Economics and History) launched after World War I a general elaboration into the impact of the war on economy and society all over the world. The project published altogether 150 works in which the war was, according to the notions of the era, seen as a waste and disturbance in fluctuations. It was assumed that there would be a return to pre-1914 conditions. The part concerning Finland had been written

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<sup>1</sup> NUMMELA, Ilkka: *Inter arma silent revisores rationum, Toisen maailmansodan aiheuttama taloudellinen rasisitus Suomessa vuosina 1939-1952*. *Studia historica Jyväskyläläensia* 46, Jyväskylä 1993.

by Leo Harmaja and it was published in English in 1933 and in Finnish and in German in 1940.<sup>2</sup>

After World War II such a project was not launched due to the different perception of the events stating that these have not always had a negative impact. Likewise, one has to bear in mind that wars are not always culpable to all the changes that happen during them. This is the case in particular with the modern welfare society which developed quite fast during and after the war. This conclusion has been brought out in Finland by Risto Eräsaari, in particular.<sup>3</sup>

One of the lessons of the war in terms of (war) economy was that economic potential to wage the war can't be created during the war. Therefore economic planning (of the war) became an essential part of defense during the interwar period in Finland, too. This took place in three fields: ensuring of the needs of the military forces and civilians and the efficacy of the national economy, and in the generalization of holistic economic thinking and calculations of the GNP. Planning was comprehensive in Finland in the 1920s but later it concentrated on military preparation.<sup>4</sup>

Finland with its 3.7 million inhabitants could be called a Nordic democracy although not as liberal as Sweden. In the economic fields Finland was a small, open, market-oriented country that was highly dependent on world markets. This meant that had Finland not participated in the war its economy stayed vulnerable.

A lot has been written in Finland about World War II as it has for a long time been part of the 'great national narrative', the enhancement of which has been in social demand. World War II together with World War I and the era of autonomy (1809-1917) belongs to the themes that have invited new interpretations from Finnish historians. Many of them have dealt with it and books about these topics are doing still well before Christmas and Fathers' Day, since the ratio of mobilization to the war was high and the father, grandfather or grand-grandfather of many served in the front.

First and foremost, Ville Kivimäki and Silvo Hietanen have written about the historiography of World War II. Both of them have paid attention to social studies

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<sup>2</sup> HARMAJA, Leo: *Effects of the war on economic and social life in Finland*. Economic and social history of the World War. Yale University Press, New Haven 1993. HARMAJA Leo: *Die Einwirkung des Weltkrieges auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Finnlands*. Helsinki, 1940.

<sup>3</sup> ERÄSAARI, Risto: *Taloudellinen jälleenrakentaminen ja 'sosiaalivaltio' Suomessa toisen maailmansodan jälkeen*. Suomi toisessa maailmansodassa projektin julkaisu 3, Helsinki 1978. NUMMELA, Ilkka: *Sotainen Suomi - sosiaalivaltion ytimiä*. Sosiaaliviesti 1986:4. Cf. TITMUS, Richard M.: *Essays on Welfare State*. London, 1964.

<sup>4</sup> LANTER, Max: *Die Finanzierung des Krieges*. Luzern, 1950. KNORR, Klaus: *The war potential of nations*. Princeton, 1956. SOIKKANEN, Hannu: *Die Mobilisierung der Kraftreserven Finnlands während des Zweiten Weltkrieges*. Suomi toisessa maailmansodassa -projektin julkaisu 2. Helsinki, 1977. NUMMELA, Ilkka: *Taloudellisen puolustusvalmiuden suunnittelu Suomessa 1920- ja 1930-luvuilla*. IN: *Historijoitsija – taaksepäin katsova profetta*, Mauno Jokipiille omistettu juhla- ja muistokirja. Studia Historica Jyväskylänse 30. Saarijärvi, 1984.

into the war and to how socio-economic issues have been dealt with in different periods. One can say that these are neglected fields, since the studies into World War II have concentrated on actual warfare and international politics. This holds largely true, one can even say that at times analysis of socio-economic aspects has dominated the research. Our analysis proceeds according to the general chronology divided into three periods, but at first, it would be appropriate to describe the position of Finland in the war and the three most important factors that influenced the Finnish point of view of the war itself.

### ***Finland and the World War II***

The Finns usually divide the war into three parts and talk about the Winter War, the Continuation War and the Lapland War according to the military situation at hand. By the time the image of the war as an enduring period has, following international models, become more popular. However, because of the Finnish periodization has dominated Finnish studies of the war, it is appropriate to disentangle the position of Finland in them. In the beginning of September 1939 Finland declared neutrality but it had to experience warfare after a week when the iron ship *Olivebank* collided with a mine in the North Sea. Finland was not involved in the war without preparation for the matters of supply and economic regulation had been planned based on the experiences of the World War I and because of the preparedness of the defense system had been improved. Rationing had been started instantly in the beginning of September.

In the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact Finland had been placed in the Soviet sphere of interest with the Baltic countries. In October negotiations of territorial questions ensued. At the time general mobilization was called under the guise of 'practice'. The Soviet Union attacked on the 30<sup>th</sup> of November and was dismissed from the League of Nations. In the Winter War in which the Finns were defeated, 337.000 men were in arms, but it did not cause great problems to agriculture.<sup>5</sup> After the peace treaty of Moscow Finland kept 100.000 men in arms, i.e. much more than in times of peace in general. In 1940-1941 a huge number of conscripts conducted their military service and Finland invested a lot in defense.<sup>6</sup>

Since summer 1941 Finland was again waging war, this time with Germany against the Soviets. The Finns called it the Continuation War – formally it was Finland's own war – and it lasted until September 1944. Over half a million men

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<sup>5</sup> TERVASMÄKI, Vilho & VUORENMAA, Anssi & JUUTILAINEN, Antti: *Ylimääräiset kertausharjoitukset – liikekannallepano, joukkojen keskittäminen ja sotavalmius*. IN: *Talvisodan historia 1*. Suomi joutuu talvisotaan. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja XVI:1. Porvoo, 1977. 96ff. KRONLUND, Jarl: *Suomen puolustuslaitos 1918-1939*. Puolustusvoimien rauhan ajan historia. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja XXIV. Porvoo, 1988. 529. 533. 541.

<sup>6</sup> JOKIPII, Mauno: *Jatkosodan synty*. Tutkimuksia Saksan ja Suomen sotilaallisesta yhteistyöstä 1940-41. Keuruu, 1987.

were in arms. Out of the Allied Powers, Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941 what the United States never did. The war ended with an armistice on the 4<sup>th</sup> of September and the interim peace of Moscow of the 19<sup>th</sup> of September 1944. The Finns were forced to drive Germans out of the country; thus the term '*the Lapland War*' stems from the chain of battles which lasted until April 1945. In March 1945 Finnish Government stated that it had been at war with the Third Reich from the middle of September 1944 and in March 1945 that the war with it was over. Formally the Continuation War ended with the ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty.<sup>7</sup> The rest of the war reparations dictated in the peace treaties were paid by September 1952. Rationing was abolished gradually and regulation of foreign trade ended in 1957.

### ***The three cornerstones of the World War II to the Finns***

To a professional historian it is a commonplace that the image of history held by the public is not easy to change and that popular views die hard in spite the opposite proof. The popular image of the World War II was very strongly based on two studies and one movie, i.e. the memoirs of Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim, the novel *Unknown Soldier* by Väinö Linna and the film by the same title directed by Edwin Laine.

The two-volume memoirs of Mannerheim were published posthumously and they found their way in the bookshelves of many Finnish homes. They were not directly written by Mannerheim himself but are based on texts written by many aides, for example, Colonel Aladár Paasonen, Emerik Olson, M.A., and General Erik Heinrichs. Mannerheim only checked and edited them. The decision to publish the memoirs was made after the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of spring 1948 and they were written in order to gain political support from the West. In his memoirs Mannerheim emphasized not only the meaning of unanimity and will to defend the country but also the necessity to arm. Also national unity and achievements were at the fore. Even before Mannerheim started to work on his memoirs, the Finnish defense forces had started to write a history of the continuation war.

The novel by Linna published in 1954 describes the experiences of one company from the perspective of ordinary soldiers. It is one of most famous war novels ever published in Finland. According to the back-sleeve it is „*a critique of war and a monument for the Finnish soldier*”. At the time of its publication it raised indignation because it showed how Finnish soldiers consumed alcohol. The various figures of the novel speaking different dialects of the Finnish language have grown to become archetypes of the Finnish cultural heritage.

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<sup>7</sup> SUONTAUSTA, Tauno: *Piirteitä Suomen oikeusasemasta sodan jälkeen*. Lakimies 1953. SUONTAUSTA, Tauno: *Suomen ja Saksan oikeudellisten suhteiden taustaa*. Lakimies 1954. HYVÄMÄKI, Lauri: *Valtioneuvosto 2. maailmansodan jälkeen vuoteen 1957*. IN: *Valtioneuvoston historia 1917-1966 II*. Helsinki, 1977. 405-406. POLVINEN, Tuomo: *Jaltasta Pariisiin rauhaan. Suomi kansainvälisessä politiikassa III*. Juva, 1981, 62-63.

Two movies and many a theater play have been made of Linna's novel, the foremost of them being the version shown in an outdoors summer theatre (Pyynikki) years on end in Linna's hometown, Tampere. The movie directed by Edwin Laine in 1955 is regarded by many a Finn as the one and only 'right' 'Unknown Soldier'. Rauli Mollberg's newer and more realistic version, produced three decades later, has not been able to overcome it. Laine's version has for many years been the stable film to watch on TV on the Independence Day (6<sup>th</sup> of December).

### **Concentration on concrete matters**

In its time Winter War was a remarkable international media event that made Finland and Finns well-known to the outer world. The War that lasted 105 days did not cause any particular worry about shortage of work in the agriculture contrary to the Continuation War. As to the Winter War journalists and writers were the first to describe the conditions whereas the soldiers themselves depicted the war itself. At large one can say that the war was written down by the ones who experienced it. If one takes a look at the collections of the National Library to find out which aspects of the early phases of the war were best-covered, the outcome is supplies for the people, i.e. ordinary daily matters. Censorship dictated that only very few socio-political issues could be discussed publicly, one of the exceptions being the supplies from the point of view of the people, not from the *national* dimension.

The research into wartime economy was for a long time hampered by two problems concerning reporting on economy. The first related to the public accounts system of the state which was based on the decisions of the use of revenues, not on the actual use of them. Heikki Valvanne has described the revenue and expenditure by clearing the accounts from administrative costs like advance payments and estimated budgetary expenditure<sup>8</sup>. The second problem concerned the accounts of national economy of which a relatively reliable time-series of the wartime data started to be published from the year 1988 (10). Also the state of research changed for the better in the 1970s with the studies published by Heikki Oksanen and Erkki Pihkala.<sup>9</sup>

Comprehensive studies into wartime economy were rare and the point of comparison was rather state than national economy. Besides this, foreign trade and prices dominated the subject. *Ekonomiska Samfundet* representing the Swedish-

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<sup>8</sup> VALVANNE, Heikki: *Valtion tulot ja menot sekä kassaliike*. Suomen Pankin taloudellisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisu B:10. Helsinki, 1949. VALVANNE, Heikki: *Valtiontalous vuosina 1938-1951*. IN: *Taloudellisia selvityksiä 1952*. Suomen Pankin taloustieteellisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisu A:13. Helsinki, 1952. VALVANNE Heikki: *Mitä sotakorvaukset maksoivat valtiolle*. Kansamme talous 30/1952. VALVANNE, Heikki: *Valtiontalous vuosina 1951-1954*. IN: *Taloudellisia selvityksiä 1955*. Suomen Pankin taloustieteellisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisu A:16, Helsinki 1955.

<sup>9</sup> OKSANEN, Heikki & PIHKALA, Erkki: *Suomen ulkomaankauppa 1919-1949*. Suomen Pankin julkaisu. Kasvututkimuksia VI. Helsinki, 1975; HEIKKINEN, Sakari: *Suomeen ja maailmalle*. Tullilaitoksen historia. Helsinki, 1994.

speaking economists published in 1944 a work titled *Vårt näringsliv och kriget* in which several interesting articles about the impact of the war on the Finnish economy and society were included. They largely belonged to the earlier liberal thinking.<sup>10</sup> In this connection, one should notice Raoul Brummert's article on taxation.<sup>11</sup>

The first scholar who tried to estimate the long-term impact of war to Finland was Bruno Suviranta who was interested in the reparations Finland had to pay to Soviet Union according to the articles of the Moscow Treaty of 1944.<sup>12</sup> This amounted to 300 million dollars and has raised a long-standing debate and several Ph.D.-theses have been written about them.<sup>13</sup>

World War II was the first in Finland which killed more men than women; 94.000 men and 1.000 women lost their lives, which was more than the normal death-rate. There were 30.000 war widows and 50.000 war orphans, and about 90.000 persons became permanently disabled. The war orphans have been active in recollecting the war in interviews conducted in the new millennium.<sup>14</sup>

Because of territorial losses to the Soviet Union great many Finns from Karelia, Kuusamo, Salla, Petsamo, Hanko, Porkkala and islands of the Gulf of Finland had to find new home in postwar Finland. Every 9<sup>th</sup> Finn or 400.000 people had to move. Immediately after the war a lot was written about the reparations to those who had lost property and about how to finance them. Many local history books were also published of the lost municipalities and the focus has been on migrants from agricultural areas and their resettlement. One big issue was the status of the re-settlers and their services, for example, in the work of Heikki Varis and his research group from the year 1952.<sup>15</sup> K.U. Pihkala wrote of the economic side of the resettlement.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>10</sup> *Vårt näringsliv och kriget*. Helsingfors, 1944.

<sup>11</sup> BRUMMERT, Raoul: *Statsbeskattningen som medel för krigsfinansieringen in Finland åren 1939–1945*. Bidrag till kännedom af Finlands folk och natur, h. 99. Helsingfors, 1956.

<sup>12</sup> SUVIRANTA, Br.: *Suomen sotakorvaukset ja sen taloudelliset seuraukset*. IN: *Taloudellisia selvityksiä 1945:II*. Suomen Pankin taloustieteellisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja, A:5. Helsinki, 1945. SUVIRANTA, Br.: *Suomen sotakorvaukset ja maksukyky*. Helsinki, 1948. SUVIRANTA, Br.: *The Way to war indemnities in kind*. Acta Forestalia Fennica 61. Helsinki, 1954. SUVIRANTA, Br.: *Sotakorvaus 1944-1952 ja sen vaikutukset*. Itsenäisen Suomen taloushistoriaa 1919-50. Porvoo, 1967.

<sup>13</sup> AUER, Jaakko: *Suomen sotakorvaustoimitukset Neuvostoliitolle*. Porvoo, 1956. HEIKKILÄ, Hannu: *Liittoutuneet ja kysymys Suomen sotakorvauksista 1943-1947*. Historiallisia tutkimuksia 121. Helsinki, 1983. HEIKKILÄ, Hannu: *The Question of European reparations in Allied Policy 1943-1947*. Studia Historica 27. Jyväskylä, 1989.

<sup>14</sup> KASTARI, Irma: *Sotasiirtolaisten laitoshuolto*. Sosiaalipoliittisen yhdistyksen julkaisuja 12. Porvoo, 1965; RANTA-KNUUTTILA, Jaakko: *Sotavammaisten huolto Suomessa*. Porvoo, 1967. SALONEN, Torsti, *Muistot elävät*. Sotalesket ja kaatuneitten omaiset 50 vuotta 1995. Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, 1995; Kaatuneiden omaisten liitto (<http://www.kolry.fi/content/kirjallisuutta>).

<sup>15</sup> VIROLAINEN, Johannes: *Karjalan taloudelliset arvot*. Helsinki, 1941. MÄKI, Antti: *Maanhankintalain toimeenpanon kansantaloudelliset vaikutukset*. Kansantaloudellinen Aikakauskirja 1946. WARIS, Heikki & Jyrkilä, Vieno & RAITASUO, Kyllikki & SIIPI, Jouko: *Siirtoväen sopeutuminen*. Tutkimus Suomen karjalaisen siirtoväen sopeutumisesta. Helsinki, 1952. ILVESSALO, Mikko: *Suomen vuosien 1939-40 ja 1941-44 sotien jälkeisen asutustoiminta metsätalouden kannalta*. Metsäntutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja 56:4. Helsinki, 1963. KULHA, Keijo: *Karjalaisen siirtoväen*

The armed forces initiated the writing of the official history of the war already in the 1940s. The series published in 1951–1965 represented very well the conventional military history in which very little attention was paid to war in a more general sense. National economy and society were not central elements in it. Actually only one volume dealt with home front and supplies. The series was complemented by Eino Tirronen's study (vol. 11, 1975) in which he examined wartime economy from the point of view of defense forces.<sup>17</sup> The volume on service written by military officers from the year 1988 nicely fitted in with the thematic of the series.

### ***The breakthrough of scientific history***

Finnish historiography on World War II went through a turning-point in the beginning of the 1960s, in times when migration from the countryside to the urban areas and the increase of suburban settlements were everyday experience in the country. Social sciences flourished and interest in contemporary political history grew. One can also point out that a new generation – children of the people who waged the war – took the lead, although quite a few of the most renowned historians belonged to the generation which had seen the war in his youth.

It was crucial for the progress of historical studies of World War II that the archives were opened; now it was possible to consult the formerly unknown sources. In this context historical studies became more scientific and the focus was shifted to the background factors of the Continuation War, i.e. the part Finland played in Hitler's Barbarossa Plan. The discussion was begun by Arvi Korhonen in his *Barbarossa -suunnitelma ja Suomi* (1961) and concluded by Mauno Jokipii's *Jatkosodan synty* (1987).

For a long time only very little was written of the national economy, in the descriptions of which one can see the division of the debate on economy between basic production in the countryside and the industrial production in towns. Remarkable studies in this spirit were written by Kari Nars and Artturi Lehtinen at

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*asuttamisesta käyty julkinen keskustelu vuosina 1944-1948.* Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia 7. Jyväskylä, 1969. JOKINEN, Marita: *Karjalaisen siirtoväen korvauskysymys.* Suomi toisessa maailmansodassa - projektin julkaisuja 6. Helsinki, 1982. VIROLAINEN, Johannes: *Siirtoväen asuttaminen sodan jälkeisinä vuosina.* Rakentamisen aika. Asutus ja maanhankinta, Maanhankintalain 40-vuotisjuhlajulkaisu (Toim. Marja Naskila). Rauma, 1984.

<sup>16</sup> PIHKALA, K. U.: *Arviointia asutusohjelmamme taloudellisista vaikutuksista.* Kansantaloudellinen Aikakauskirja 1954. PIHKALA, K. U.: *Det finska kolonisationsprogrammets kostnader och finansiering.* Nordisk Landbruksekonomisk Tidskrift 1952. PIHKALA, K. U.: *Siirtoväen ja rintamamiesten asuttaminen.* Itsenäisen Suomen taloushistoriaa 1919-1950. Porvoo, 1967.

<sup>17</sup> TIRRONEN, Eino: *Puolustuslaitos taloudellisena tekijänä.* Sotilasaikakauslehti 1966. TIRRONEN, Eino: *Sotatalous.* Suomen sota 1941-1945, XI. Sotatieteen laitoksen sotahistorian toimiston julkaisuja IX:11. Helsinki, 1975. TIRRONEN, Eino: *Sotatalous.* Talvisodan historia 4. Sodasta rauhaan, puolustushaarat ja eräät erityisalut. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja XVI:4. Porvoo, 1979.

the end of the 1960s. Nars, who worked in the Bank of Finland, produced a work in 1966 in which he tried in the view of published sources to present a picture of Finnish national economy and its effectiveness in 1939-1945.<sup>18</sup> Lehtinen's article on the short history of Finnish economic history can be regarded as fundamental about Finnish economy in the war years. Its significance is highlighted by the fact that Lehtinen had worked in the Ministry of Supply and in committees planning the economic readiness to defend the country.<sup>19</sup>

The new wave of historians did not at first concern economic and social matters. For comparison, in Sweden the Stockholm University launched in 1966 a big project titled *Sverige under andra världskriget* (SUAV) which dealt with the impact of war on a society that had stayed out of the war. Altogether 21 doctoral theses were defended in two decades. The Swedish project gave boost to a similar Finnish project to study Finland in World War II, titled *SUOMA*. It was started as a joint venture by several Universities in 1975. The aim was to have produced 15 doctoral theses financed by the Academy of Finland but not all of them were published because the financing of the project was halted. Only five doctoral theses and two licentiate theses were born out of it. The end-product was a three-volume work in which the main results were published and a comprehensive picture of the Finnish society mobilized for the war was given.<sup>20</sup>

Among the studies of *SUOMA* dealing with economy and society one may mention Silvo Hietanen's work on emergency settlement and Ilkka Seppinen's book on preconditions of Finnish foreign trade.<sup>21</sup> Both of them are rather political than economic history works. The same emphasis can be detected from the works of Hans Peter Crosby and Esko Vuorisjärvi who studied Petsamo nickel industry.<sup>22</sup> Economic history at its purest was represented by Nummela's calculations of war expenses.<sup>23</sup>

When it comes to the studies into Finnish national economy in World War II, one should mention Erkki Pihkala's many remarkable studies. He was involved in the *SUOMA*-project as a member of the board. It is very characteristic of Pihkala's perspective is to combine studies into national economy with studies into social life.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> NARS, Kari: *Suomen sodanaikainen talous ja talouspolitiikka*. Suomen Pankin taloustieteellisen tutkimuslaitoksen julkaisuja, Sarja A. Taloudellisia selvityksiä. Helsinki, 1966.

<sup>19</sup> LEHTINEN, Artturi: *Sotatalous 1939–1945*. In: *Itsenäisen Suomen taloushistoriaa 1919–1950*. Porvoo, 1967.

<sup>20</sup> HIETANEN, Silvo (toim.): *Kansakunta sodassa 1-3*. Valtion painatuskeskus 1989, 1990 & 1992; LESKINEN, Jari & JUUTILAINEN, Antti (toim.): *Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen*. Porvoo, 1999; LESKINEN, Jari & JUUTILAINEN, Antti (toim.): *Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen*. Porvoo, 2005.

<sup>21</sup> SEPPINEN, Ilkka: *Suomen ulkomaankaupan ehdot 1939-1944*. Historiallisia tutkimuksia 124. Tammisaari, 1983.

<sup>22</sup> KROSBY, Peter: *Finland, Germany, and Soviet Union 1940-1941, The Petsamo Dispute*. Madison, 1968; VUORISJÄRVI, Esko: *Petsamon nikkeli kansainvälisessä politiikassa 1939-1944*, Suomalainen todellisuus vastaan ulkomaiset myytit. Keuruu, 1990.

<sup>23</sup> NUMMELA, 1993.

<sup>24</sup> PIHKALA, Erkki: *Kuinka jatkosota kestettiin taloudellisesti*. Jatkosodan kujanjuoksu (toim. Olli Vehviläinen), Juva, 1982. PIHKALA, Erkki: *Sopeutuminen rauhaan*. Suomen taloushistoria 2. Teollistuva



The new, more scientific orientation could be seen also in the defense forces. The Institute of Military Science launched before the *SUOMA* a project to study the Winter War. The end-result was a four-volume history of the war, published in 1977-1979. If compared with the history of the Continuation War, this new series approaches the war from a wider perspective. Partly this was possible because many historians who took part in it were trained as officers by their military service.<sup>25</sup> Inspired by the Winter War-series the Institute revised the series of *Suomen sota 1941-1945* which was published as a six-volume history of the Continuation War.

National economy and its social impact has been a surprisingly neglected field. The Ministry of Supply which functioned in 1939-1949 published its 5-year history in 1945 and in 1950 a memo-history type of work by Onni Toivonen. In the next decade Kari Nars systematically surveyed the relation of regulated consumption and black market and Jaakko Keto studied later the price-levels taking into account the prices in the black market. In 1977 Kari Salovaara published a popularized study on economic regulation. Credit for writing a comprehensive study of wartime economic distress goes to Heikki Rantatupa who studies the grave supply situation during the World War I.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Studies in War Experience***

In comparison to earlier times, Finland had become a more individualistic country in the end of the 1980s, where people live in the so-called casino-capitalism and there was a lot of discussion going on structural change until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deep economic crisis forced the country to repair its structures and allot more money into research. This and the opening of the country more to Western Europe can be seen at least in studies into World War II, on which nowadays many studies are written both by professional and non-professional historians. Maybe the crucial factor in this development is the change

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Suomi (toim. Jorma Ahvenainen, Erkki Pihkala & Viljo Rasila. Helsinki, 1982. PIHKALA, Erkki: *Sotatalous 1939-1944*. Suomen taloushistoria 2. Teollistuva Suomi (toim. Jorma Ahvenainen, Erkki Pihkala & Viljo Rasila, Helsinki, 1982. PIHKALA, Erkki: *Suomen kauppapolitiikka vuosina 1918-1944*. Suomen ulkomaankauppapolitiikka (toim. Lauri Haataja). Keuruu, 1978. PIHKALA, Erkki: *Taloudellinen kasvu ja yhteiskuntamurros*. Suomen historia 8. Espoo, 1988. PIHKALA, Erkki: *Toisen maailmansodan aikaisesta huoltotasosta Suomessa ja analogioista 1980-luvun alun tilanteeseen*. Puolustustalouden suunnittelukeskus, Selvityksiä ja raportteja n:o 5. s.l. 1986.

<sup>25</sup> *Talvisodan historia 1-4*. Sotatieteen laitoksen julkaisuja 16, 1-4. Porvoo, 1977-1979.

<sup>26</sup> RANTATUPA, Heikki: *Elintarvikehuolto ja -säännöstely Suomessa vuosina 1914-1921*. Studia Historica Jyväskyläläisiä 17. Tampere, 1979. RANTATUPA, Heikki: *Elintarvikehuolto ensimmäisen maailmansodan aikana*. In. *Suomen maatalouden historia 2*. SKS, Helsinki, 2004. 265-329. RANTATUPA, Heikki: *Kansanhuolto toisen maailmansodan aikana 1939-1949*. Suomen maatalouden historia 2. SKS, Helsinki, 2004. 265-329. SALOVAARA, Karli: *Säännöstellen selvittiin: kansanhuoltoa 1939-1949*. Helsinki, 1977; TOIVONEN, Onni; *Kymmenen vuotta kansanhuoltajana*. Turku, 1950; *Viisi vuotta kansanhuoltoa*. Toim. Untamo Utrio. Helsinki, 1945.

of perspectives and seeking for influences from among several sciences. Formerly the studying of the World War II was dominated by men but the new many-sidedness/multilateralism and the change of the point of view towards individualism has brought more women to the group of historians writing on it. In many ways path-breaking was the study titled *Naisten aseet* edited by Riikka Raitis and Elina Haavio-Mannila.<sup>27</sup>

The turn in studies of World War II in the 1990s was meant that many earlier vantage-points have been questioned. The grand-children of the wartime adults have grown in a more international environment than their predecessors, a fact that affects their approach to the problems and the way they leave the often solid national(ist) standpoint. Good examples of this new genre are the series *Sodassa koettua* edited by Sari Näre and Martti Turtola and *Ihmisiä sodassa* edited by Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki.<sup>28</sup>

Younger historians have dared to challenge many national myths. In Finland there had been a lot of talk about 'the model Cajander', a saying which was meant to emphasize how poorly Finns prepared themselves for the possible war in the 1930s. By comparing the Finnish situation with other European countries Jari Eloranta with his calculations of GDP has proved that this myth is false.<sup>29</sup> The same holds true of the reparations Germany was to pay to Finland – the Finns tended to explain them in a more positive light than they really were.<sup>30</sup>

The question of rationality of resettlement caught public eye in the end of the 20th century when some observers argued that forceful and rapid resettlement (e.g. of Karelian from the territory ceded to the Soviet Union) had been economically unwise. The rationale behind this argument has been rural depopulation which began to increase in the 1960s. Erkki Laitinen's *Rintamalta raivioille* helps us to understand the real meaning of resettlement of some 700.000 people.<sup>31</sup>

In the last decades quite a lot has been published on World War II in Finland but most of it either deals with very concrete matters or confines to memoirs. Locally, and in the countryside in particular, many publications tell of the warpath of veterans or the stories of others who took part in the war effort. During the last

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<sup>27</sup> RAITIS, Riikka & HAAVIO-MANILA, Elina (toim.): *Naisten aseet*. Suomalaisena naisena talvi- ja jatkosodassa. Helsinki, 1993.

<sup>28</sup> See KIVIMÄKI (2011).

<sup>29</sup> ELORANTA, Jari: *'External Security by Domestic Choices: Military Spending as an Impure Public Good among Eleven European States, 1920-1938'*. Diss., European University Institute, 2002. ELORANTA, Jari: *Paljonko on paljon? Perspektiivejä Suomen sotilasmenojen kehitykselle maailmansotien välisellä ajalla*. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 4, 437-452. ELORANTA, Jari: *Military Spending Patterns in History*. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. September 27, 2005. URL: <http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/eloranta.military>.

<sup>30</sup> NUMMELA (1993).

<sup>31</sup> Asutushallituksen - maatalousministeriön asutusasiainosaston 40-vuotisjuhlajulkaisu. Helsinki, 1957; *Rintamalta raivioille. Sodanjälkeinen asutustoiminta 50 vuotta*. Toim. Laitinen, Erkki. Jyväskylä, 1995. ROIKO-JOKELA, Heikki *Asutustoiminnalla sodasta arkeen*. Suomen maatalouden historia. III. SKS, Helsinki, 2004.

two decades professional historians have also written local or parish histories in which remembrance and experiences of war have been recorded.

### **Conclusion**

Finns returned to peace relatively calmly if one compares it with the events happened, for example, in Central Europe. One can conclude that Finns returned to peacetimes in their own way. Usually, as with many other great changes in Finnish society, the transition process has been late and radical but have rose only very little opposition or rebellious moods. In postwar Finland it seemed as if the wheel of history had been turning backwards; large-scale resettlement strengthened country's agrarian character for several decades and extreme right-wing politics was prohibited and left-wing politics was allowed. This problematic return to peace has been examined in a project by Petri Karonen at the University of Jyväskylä.<sup>32</sup>

All in all, Finnish historiography of World War II has greatly developed in last the two decades. If the first, '*agrarian*' generation of historians depicted the war very concretely and from the point of view of the ones who fought in it, the next '*urban*' generation of historians introduced a more critical and comprehensive approach to it. The third, '*Europeanized*' generation is no longer closely tied with the story of concrete warfare or the tradition of nationalistic explanation.

There is also a negative side of the development of Finnish historiography of the war; once historians have learnt something new, they have also lost quite a lot of 'good old' in the research of the wartimes. When historians have been taught by social sciences and other related fields, it has lost some of its own strengths. To a historian who was schooled in the spirit of the 1960s, the way how structural wholes have recently been passed over seems rather odd. Obviously the value of publicity is in play when marginal matters have been emphasized at the expense of holism. Uncritical approach which formerly dominated research can still be seen in such studies into the wartime economy which appeal rather to the state control than to the national economy. Furthermore, some historians calculate with budget numbers which could during the wartime be budgetary estimations only and thus only fraction of the real costs in the accounts.

Someone, like the author of this paper, who was a child during the war cannot but wonder how little society and national economy meant for the Finnish postwar historiography. However, the '*new history*' of the war has wonderfully displayed its powers to pose new questions and find answers to them from the point of view of individuals. Nevertheless, all development is not progress because '*individualization*' of the war experiences has jettisoned something essential of the wartimes and of the lives of people in societies and communities, in *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*.

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<sup>32</sup> KARONEN, Petri & TARJAMO, Kerttu: *Kun sota on ohi*. Sodista selviytymisen ongelmia ja niiden ratkaisumalleja 1900-luvulla. Historiallinen arkisto 124. Helsinki, 2006.



**Pál Pritz**

## ***Ungarisches Schicksal im 20. Jahrhundert im Spiegel der zwei Weltkriege***

### **Abstract**

The main points of the paper: 1. As regards demography, the 20<sup>th</sup> century brought a moderate demographic increase while the population of neighbouring countries tripled. 2. As for economy, whereas Hungary stood at 60% of West-European averages in 1913, figures were below 40% in 2005. The key factor in political history is that the primary reason for the Treaty of Trianon was our defeat in the Great War. Consequently, Hungarians lost the significance they had enjoyed earlier, as Hungary had been a major factor in European history for 900 years. The consequences of the World War II are even graver than those of the first war. The people could play a decisive role only in the uprising and war of independence of 1956. Although this fight could not triumph, eventually it greatly contributed to the fact that the Kádár regime (after brutal retaliations) provided the people with life which was of higher standards than in other sovietised countries.

*Keywords:* Demography, regards economy, the Treaty of Trianon, World War II, war of independence of 1956, brutal retaliations, the Kádár regime.

**E**s kann versucht werden, aber zu gut fundierten Kenntnissen gelangen zu können ist äußerst schwer, wenn wir die Geschichte auf emotioneller, ja was noch mehr ist, lyrischer Basis betrachten. Während auch vor dem Historiker ist es bekannt, dass die Geschichte sich durch die Tätigkeit von Menschen gestaltet, die in zahlreichen Fällen nicht unter der Kontrolle der Rationalität handeln.

Also wenn wir das ungarische Schicksal im 20. Jahrhundert auszufragen versuchen, müssen wir aus den historischen Fakten ausgehen, die die Grundtendenzen der Demographie und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im Umriss entwerfen.

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1. An den demographischen Indikatoren des Ungartums herrscht eine riesige Unsicherheit. Es steht aber zu keiner Diskussion, dass die Bevölkerungszahl des Ungartums auf Grund der Volkszählung des Jahres 1910 54,6% betrug. Diese Vermehrung ist in nicht geringem Maße der in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts abgelaufenen Assimilation zu verdanken.

Aber der Weltkrieg und später die ihm folgende Niederlage diesen Bevölkerungszuwachs verhängnisvoll unterbricht. Im Großen und Ganzen brachte das 20. Jahrhundert für das Ungartum eine recht bescheidene demographische Konjunktur, während unseren Nachbarn gelang es, ihre Bevölkerungszahl zu verdreifachen. Nicht nur das Traumbild des Schriftstellers Jenő Rákosi über ein Magyarentum von 30 Millionen erwies sich als eine Fata Morgana, sondern das 15-Millionen-Magyarentum von József Antall (Ministerpräsident 1990-1993) existierte nie. Das Magyarentum des Karpatenbeckens vermehrte sich bis zum Anbeginn des

21. Jahrhunderts auf insgesamt 11,8 Millionen (ausgegangen von einer Basis von 8,8 Millionen vor hundert Jahren).

Bis zu dieser Zeit ist der demographische Schwung auch bei den benachbarten Völkern zurückgewichen, aber ungeachtet ihrer heutigen „benachteiligten“ Lage sind sie trotzdem 30,4 Millionen. Dieses hervorragende Ergebnis haben sie während nicht ganz 100 Jahre von knapp 9,5 Millionen hochgehoben.

Also mit Schmerzen, aber sachlich muß der Referent feststellen: das 20. Jahrhundert hat dem Magyarentum ein beträchtliches demographisches Abrutschen mit sich gebracht.

Die Zahlen sind nämlich nur dann sinnvoll, wenn wir sie miteinander vergleichen.

2. Wirtschaftlich – begleitet von Schwankungsperioden – kann man die Entwicklung an und für sich als imposant bewerten. Und es gab keine Zeitperiode, keine regierende Gewalt, die sich nicht in die Brust geworfen hätte, wie große Erfolge sie hätte verzeichnen können. Aber falls man auch diesbezüglich authentische Zahlen sehen will, müssen wir das Zählmaß in der umliegenden Welt suchen. Und das Maß in diesem Falle ist eindeutig das westeuropäische Mittelmaß.

Nun also kurz und bündig: das Ergebnis besteht in internationalem Vergleich darin, solange Ungarn sich im Grunde genommen schön entwickelte, erzielte die Außenwelt noch mehr durchschlagende wirtschaftliche Erfolge. Betrachtet die Sache aus diesem Blickwinkel müssen wir behaupten: der Schmerz mag die Tatsache eines erheblichen Abrutschens nicht verschleiern.

Im Spiegel von Belegen von 100 Jahren spricht der Historiker lakonisch und elegisch aus, dass wir uns dem westeuropäischen Durchschnitt im Jahre 1913 am meisten näherten.

Das bedeutet konkret ein Ergebnis von 60,3%. Dann sind wir bis zum Jahre der politischen Wende von 1990 auf 33,6% hinabgerutscht. In der letzten ein bisschen längerer Zeit als zwei Dezennien gab es ja gegenüber der Meinungen der nur die Misserfolge wahrnehmenden Pessimisten eine gewisse Wiedererholung.

Das Jahr 2005 zeigt ein Ergebnis von 38,9%.

Aber vergessen wir nicht: 1913 standen wir bei 60,3%.<sup>1</sup>

Also unsere verhältnismäßige Lage von heute ist um etwa ein Drittel schlimmer.

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Den Erfolg, der zur Spitze des Jahres 1913 führte, hat der Ausgleich von 1867 begründet. Die zeitgenössische Elite hat mit diesem Schatz dennoch nicht ökonomisch umgegangen. So steckt im Verhängnis von Trianon auch die schwache Leistung der Elite. Im Zeichen der realen Geschichtsbetrachtung ist es unmöglich, diese Erbärmlichkeit nicht zu bemerken. Darin die ungeheure Wortdrescherei der öffentlich-rechtlichen Diskussionen. Während die *panacea*, das zweckdienliche

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<sup>1</sup>TOMKA, Béla: *Gazdasági változások és a fogyasztás alakulása a huszadik századi Magyarországon.* (Wirtschaftliche Veränderungen und die Tendenzen der Konsumation in Ungarn im 20. Jahrhundert) IN: GYÁNI, Gábor - PRITZ, Pál - ROMSICS, Ignác - SZARKA, László - TOMKA, Béla: *A mi 20. századunk.* (Unser 20. Jahrhundert) Komp-Press, Korunk, Kolozsvár, Cluj-Napoca 2011. 101-179. Die Stelle der Zahlen: 168.

Heilmittel die Bekräftigung des dualistischen Systems gewesen wäre, sowie die Einfügung des Volkes in die Nation.

Zur selben Zeit müssen wir sehen, dass die internationalen Verhältnisse erbarmungslos gegen uns wirkten. Gegenüber dem nach der Weltherrschaftsposition trachtenden Deutschtum wurde die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie nicht nur abgewertet, sondern sie konnte gleichzeitig der tödlichen Umklammerung Deutschlands auch nicht entgehen.

Als erregende Ursache der Tragödie (hier müssen wir Gyula Szekfű<sup>2</sup> und anderen Historikern widersprechen) gilt demzufolge nicht eine Reihe der inneren Versäumnisse. Der entscheidende Grund für sie besteht darin, dass wir den Krieg verloren haben.

Mit diesem Akt wurde Ungarn aus der Welt endgültig verbannt, in der es 900 Jahre lang ein wichtiger Faktor in der europäischen Geschichte war.

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Die gespielte Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg führte zu noch schlechteren Erträgen. Aus dem Grund der geopolitischen Begebenheiten konnte man der Teilnahme am Krieg auch nicht entweichen, aber die tatsächlich eingetretene Tragödie war bestimmt keine historische Notwendigkeit.

Die erbärmliche Leistung der Elite ist auch diesmal auszuweisen.

István Bethlen, ein Politiker staatsmännlicher Qualität schuf ein neues Land auf den Ruinen von Trianon<sup>3</sup>, zugleich verzichtete er darauf, eine starke Nation zu schaffen. Ein Ungarn, in dem sich auch die breiten Volksmassen daheim fühlen.

Mit dem Programm der Volksschulen ist ein hervorragendes Werk auf die Welt gekommen, aber dieser Plan konnte die Aufhebung des Volkes und seine Integrierung in die Nation nicht herbeiführen.

István Bethlen hatte einen triftigen Grund, sich vor dem Volk zu fürchten. Am Anfang November des Jahres 1918 fehlte es wenig, dass er von einigen „Vertreter“ des Volkes beinahe niedergemetzelt wurde. Deshalb schien es ihm genügend zu sein, ein starkes politisches System zu Grunde zu bringen und am Leben zu halten. Alle beide gelangen ihm. Sein Werk konnte ja später auch dem Experiment von Gömbös mit Erfolg Widerstand leisten, und das Bethlen'sche System mochte – obwohl gesprenkelt von nicht geringen Verzerrungen – bis auf die Besatzung Ungarns von den deutschen Truppen wirklich fortbestehen.

István Bethlen und sein Kreis war auch im Klaren dessen, dass sie eine so starke Nation nicht errichten können, die im Stande wäre, das Land aus dem Käfig von Trianon aus eigener Kraft zu befreien. Dazu verlangten sie die

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<sup>2</sup> SZEKFŰ, Gyula: *Három nemzedék* (Drei Generationen) Budapest, 1920. Dem Verfasser nach war die ungarische Geschichte vom Liberalismus verhängnisvoll beeinflusst, das Zeitalter der drei Generationen war ein Untergangsgeschichte. Szekfű beschäftigte sich beinahe ausgeschlossen mit den innerlichen Aspekten. Die ausserordentlich grosse Wirkung des Werkes ist sichtbar darin, dass das Buch von 1920 bis 1942 sieben Editionen hatte.

<sup>3</sup> ROMSICS Ignác: *István Bethlen: A Great Conservative Statesman of Hungary, 1874-1946*, Highland Lakes: Social Science Monographs, 1995. Series: Atlantic studies on society in change; East European monographs.

Unterstützung der deutsch-italienischen Achse.

Nicht ohne Erfolg. Territorial hat sich das Land nämlich beinahe um das Doppelte vergrößert. Es ist ein wahrhaftig angesehenes Resultat – wenn es sich als dauerhaft erweist.

Aber es ist nicht so vorgefallen. Was sich ereignet hat, ist für uns alle bekannt. Die Ursachen dagegen, die Zusammenhänge viel weniger. Deswegen müssen wir (gegenüber den heutigen Trommelschlägern) immer und erneut betonen, dass es eine unzerreißbare Verbindung zwischen Trianon und 1945 nicht gibt. Zugleich besteht allerdings zwischen 1945 und der Übernahme der territorialen Veränderungen aus den Händen Hitlers als Geschenk ein wirklich unzerreißbarer Zusammenhang.<sup>4</sup>

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Dezső Szabó, ein wenig der Vater der ungarischen populären Bewegung schrieb missbilligend die Annahme des Wiener Schiedsspruches an den Ministerpräsidenten Béla Imrédy im Januar 1939, als die oben erwähnten geschulten Machthaber ihre Lotto-Spielerei mit den Gebietsrückeroberungen auf Konto des Volkes und der Nation trieben: „(...) eher sollte Siebenbürgen in seinem heutigen Zustand bleiben, als dass wir es so wiedergewinnen, wie Oberungarn, insbesondere um den Preis ungarisches Blutes! Wir haben keinen einzigen Tropfen ungarisches Blutes mehr aufzuopfern (...) Wir sind nur dazu verpflichtet, das ungarische Blut in jedem Fall zu sparen, trotz aller Schwierigkeiten, auch dann, wenn uns vorübergehend Leiden heimsuchen: neutral, neutral, neutral bleiben: darin besteht die einzige ungarische Pflicht.“<sup>5</sup> Diese Pflicht war für die leitende Schicht – ausgenommen den Kreis um Pál Teleki – völlig unbekannt. Und auch er entbehrte der nötigen Kraft, um der Annahme des ersten Wiener Schiedsspruches, der Rückkehr von Nord-Siebenbürgen ausweichen zu können. Und auch im April 1941, als die Verkehrsampel mit dem Signal „Sackgasse“ zu blinken begann<sup>6</sup>, hatte er keine Kraft, das Land auf dem Weg zur Rückkehr aufzufordern.

Aber sein Leben – als eine verzweifelte Warnung – opferte er auf.

Der Reichsverweser, Miklós Horthy sowie László Bárdossy haben die Nachricht verstanden. Doch eilten sie sich in das blinde Verhängnis hin. Natürlich wäre es unrecht, die Rolle des Individuums zu überbetonen. Eher waren die sich in mehreren Situationen verbergenden Zwangsmäßigkeiten von bestimmender Bedeutung. Aber während es in der Sache der Aktion für Südungarn dem Wesen nach keinen Rückweg mehr gab, hätte man bezüglich der *dann* und so vorgeführten Kriegserklärung gegen die Sowjetunion anderswie handeln können.

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<sup>4</sup> Siehe das ausführlicher: PRITZ, Pál: *The National Interest. Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century*. Hungarian Quarterly. 2010 Summer, 52-66.

<sup>5</sup> Zitiert von PÉTERFI, Gábor: *Szabó Dezső és Féja Géza Trianon-reflexiója és külpolitikai nézetei* (Die Trianon-Reflexion und die aussenpolitischen Ansichten von Szabó, Dezső und Féja, Géza), L'Harmattan, Budapest, 2011. 73.

<sup>6</sup> Man muss daran das folgende verstehen: Das mit Nazi-Deutschland Todeskampf führende Gross-Britannien war nicht bereit irgendeine ungarischen Schritte zu tolerieren, die Deutschen bekräftigt hätten.



Denn es war kein unmittelbarer, nur ein *atmosphärischer* deutscher Druck vorhanden. Erster Linie handelte das Staatsoberhaupt unverantwortlich, der selbst die gesetzlichen Vorschriften nicht ordnungsgemäss beachtete. Und der Ministerpräsident war nicht weniger unverantwortlich, der eine gesetzlich zugeteilte Möglichkeit für das verantwortliche Benehmen besaß.<sup>7</sup>

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Obwohl die ungarische Katastrophe im Zweiten Weltkrieg „nur“ zur Wiederherstellung der Grenzen von Trianon führte, ist es eine unbestrittene Tatsache, dass der Abbau des Horthy-Regimes nicht nur dem Volk sondern auch der Nation viel nutzte. Trotz alledem ging es mit der Verschmerzung der Kriegsschäden viel schwerer.

Die Kriegszerstörungen an Menschenleben und materiellen Gütern betrug ein viel höheres Maß, als das im ersten Weltkrieg. Bis die ungarische Wirtschaft das Niveau der Vorkriegszeit schon 1924 erreichte, erfolgte es nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg erst im Jahre 1954.<sup>8</sup>

Jedoch hat die Gesellschaft jene namhafte Tatsache immer mehr zu Grunde gerichtet, dass die Welt im Schatten von Jalta viel drückender war, als die im Käfig des Versailler Friedenssystems.

Die Formel kann bei Weitem nicht mit den bekannten Sachen der Sowjetunion erklärt werden. Wesentlich gehört dazu auch die Transfiguration der ungarischen kommunistischen Elite nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.

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In der Mitte der 1930er Jahre, als der Kampf gegen den Faschismus die Änderung der kommunistischen Politik erzwang, machten sich die ungarischen Kommunisten auf den Weg *ungarische Kommunisten zu werden*, aber diese Handvoll Menschen waren 1945 mit Abstand nicht geeignet, einen Staat fachgemäß zu lenken. 1945 gibt es im Lande eine Revolution, in vielen Menschen, sogar in den Kommunisten glüht die Feuer, die Begeisterung, aus der verkrusteten gesellschaftlich-politischen Welt der Horthy-Ära ein modernes Ungarn zu schaffen. In der längeren Periode der Koalitionsregierung hätten alle die Gelegenheit gehabt, Staatslenkung zu lernen.

Uns interessieren nun in erster Stelle die späteren, exklusiven Machthaber. Sie haben nicht das getan, vielmehr machinierten sie in der Machtergreifung. Wir können es auch als eine Profession auffassen, aber es ist der Qualität nach nicht mit der richtigen Staatskunst vergleichbar. Insbesondere nicht in *dem* Falle, wenn sie zu ihren groben, ungeschliffenen Aktionen aus der Anwesenheit einer Besatzungsarmee Mut schöpften. In dieser Beleuchtung dienten die Kommunisten nur als blinde Werkzeuge jener stalinistischen Sowjetunion, deren Ziel in erster Linie nicht in der Befreiung, sondern in der Okkupation des Landes gesetzt war.

Die Führer der Sowjetunion haben selbstverständlich nicht auf die Nase der

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<sup>7</sup> Siehe ausführlicher: *The War Crimes. Trial of Hungarian Prime Minister László Bárdossy*. Columbia University Press, New York, 2004. <http://mek.oszk.hu/06100/06153>

<sup>8</sup> Siehe die in der 1. Note zitierte Studie von Tomka, Miklós.

ungarischen Kommunisten gebunden, welche Entscheidungen sie über ihr Verhältnis zu Ungarn getroffen haben. „Die Sowjetunion ist nicht fürs Zustandekommen eines starken Ungarns interessiert – stellte der stellvertretende Volkskommissar für Äußern Iwan Majski schon in seiner Aufzeichnung von Januar 1944 fest – (...) die Politik der Sowjetunion muss sich darauf beschränken, dass sie den ungarischen Staat erhält, aber möglichst durch eine Verschmälerung seines Staatsgebietes den ethnischen Prinzipien entsprechend. Falls bezüglich der Wahrnehmung dieser Prinzipien irgendwelche Probleme auftauchen, muss die Frage zu Schaden Ungarns gelöst werden. Die Frage Siebenbürgens muss gemäß dem Nationalitätsprinzip überprüft werden, aber gewisse Vorteile müssen wir Rumänien zukommen lassen (...). Ungarn muss, zumindest in den Jahren unmittelbar nach dem Krieg, international isoliert gehalten werden.“<sup>9</sup>

Als die USA ihr Wiederaufbauprogramm von Westeuropa mittels ihres unter dem Namen Marshall-Hilfe berühmt gewordenen Programms mit dem Zurückdrängen des sowjetischen Kommunismus verknüpften, sind die ungarischen Kommunisten wieder zu „ungarländischen Kommunisten“ (Kommunisten in Ungarn) geworden. Im Zeichen dessen hat József Révai am Anfang von 1945 dem Soziologen Ferenc Erdei in Szeged verraten, was sie mit dem ungarischen Bauerntum machen werden: Sie werden die Bauern um ihre Ackerlandbesitze bringen, sie als Kulaken beschimpfen, in Kolchosen zwingen.<sup>10</sup>

Am Kern der Frage ändert es nicht, dass während der Zeit die von Erzsébet Andics und Aladár Mód propagierte Gesichtsanschauung sowohl die Vergangenheit als auch die Gegenwart und Zukunft mit einem patriotischen Anstrich verdeckten, indem sie die Parabel des patriotischen Bauern und des das Vaterland verratenden Herrn geschaffen haben.<sup>11</sup>

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Nur einmal in der ungarischen Geschichte wurde dem Volk eine entscheidende Rolle zuteil geworden: im Volksaufstand und Freiheitskrieg des Jahres 1956. Und obwohl auch dieser Kampf keinesfalls zum Sieg gelangen konnte, war aber er mit entscheidender Wirkung darauf, dass das Kádár-Regime (nach einer Reihe von brutalen Vergeltungen) ein der Qualität nach besseres Leben seinem Volk sichern konnte.

Die von dem Namen János Kádár verzeichnete Konsolidation schafft natürlich ein legitimes System, aber diese Legitimität war mit dem ständig steigenden Lebensniveau, mit der Bewilligung der sich immer mehr erweiternden Kreisen der Freiheit eine *angekaufte* Legitimität, unter der die objektiven Verhältnisse sowie die subjektiven Schwächen gerade jene Basis abwischen, mit deren Hilfe man ein

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<sup>9</sup> Külpolitika (Aussenpolitik) 1996. 3 -4. sz. 157-184.

<sup>10</sup> VARGA Gyula (szerk.): *Tudományos emlékülés Erdei Ferenc születésének centenáriumán.* (Wissenschaftliche Gedenktagung zur Ehre Ferenc Erdei), Bába, Makó, 2011. 20-21.

<sup>11</sup> ROMSICS Ignác: *Clio bővületében: Magyar történetírás a 19-20. században – nemzetközi kitekintéssel* (Im Clio' Zauberkreis. Ungarische Geschichtsschreibung in den 19-20. Jahrhunderten – mit internationalem Ausblick), Osiris, Budapest, 2011.

auch in seinen Perspektiven wettbewerbsfähiges politisches System hätte ausbauen können. (Subjektive Schwäche= Unfähigkeit sich von den als progressiv deklarierten, aber in der Wirklichkeit reaktionären ideologischen Thesen frei zu machen.) János Kádár verbrachte seit 1972 seinen (am vorsichtigsten formuliert) „*sich in die Länge ziehend untergehenden*“ Lebensabschnitt.

Seine Politik erntet immer attraktivere aussenpolitische Erfolge, und die Mitglieder des Apparats des Regimes (selbstverständlich in nicht geringem Maß Kinder der Mittelklasse von ehemals) verwalten die Angelegenheiten immer kompetenter. Aber dass sie (unabhängig davon, ob jemand von ihnen Parteibuch hätte oder nicht) verpflichtete Anhänger des Regimes gewesen wäre, kann keiner ernsthaft behaupten. (Törichte Gläubiger, Fußvolk sind natürlicherweise von Zeit zu Zeit kontinuierlich angeworben worden.)

Da das System nach 1973 aus seinem ideologischen Käfig nicht ausbrechen konnte, und da der Raum von Moskau aufgegeben wurde, kehrt das Land nach 1989 auf den kapitalistischen Weg zurück.<sup>12</sup>

So sind wir zu einer nicht abgeschlossenen Epoche gelangt, über die wir kein historisch relevantes Bild darstellen können.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ausführlicher siehe das in der 1. Note zitierte Buch.

<sup>13</sup> Der Text wurde von Zoltán TEFFNER übersetzt.



Ilya Solomeshch

## ***Soviet Periphery vis-à-vis Post-War Crises: Discrepant Historiographical Discourses on Karelia***

### **Abstract**

The article seeks to scrutinise dominating Russian historiographical patterns for Karelia as a specific border region in the North-West Russia, the political status and socio-economic developments on which were determined predominantly by „*greater*” policy, both on national and international levels. Throughout the entire Soviet era, the formal status of Karelia as a statehood formation was changed for several times. It might be argued that every change was determined mainly by external factors, such as geopolitical shifts, military and security-based strategy, and changes in Soviet-Finnish relations. An attempt is made to analyse main historiographical paradigms in describing „*local*” history and framing it into „*wider*” narrative(s) of the Soviet history. Finally, the article addresses cases of political, or politicised, exploitation of historical knowledge, introducing the notion of an „*outpost syndrome*” in history writing and political rhetoric.

*Keywords:* Soviet Karelia, historiography, Centre – Periphery relations, Red Finns, border studies.

**T**he Republic of Karelia (RK), located in the north-western part of Russian Federation, shares the border with Finland. The entire history of Karelia is stigmatised by the symbolic and literal presence of the border, in its state and administrative, cultural, confessional and ethnic manifestations. At the same time, in terms of history, Karelia’s ethnicity and culture could be described as a much more vast and ambiguous spatial entity, trans-border one by its nature and comprising of relevant territories currently on both Finnish and Russian sides of the border.

Current ethnic composition of the RK is a result of decades long immense migration processes, shifts of national borders and premeditated measures of the state Centre, mostly during the Soviet period. The Finno-Ugric ethnic group, i.e. Karelians, Finns and Vepsians makes, according to the 2010 census, only ca. 9.3 %<sup>1</sup> of the total population of the republic, and recent situation is marked by rapid fading of respective languages in everyday life. However, historically, during certain periods the Finnish and Karelian factor was playing a key role in local politics and culture.

In 1920, based on the agreement between the Bolshevik leadership and the so called Red Finns, i.e. the Finnish socialists who had fled from Finland to Russia after their unsuccessful revolution attempt in 1918, the Karelian Labour Commune

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<sup>1</sup> Korennye narody Karelii [Indigenous Peoples of Karelia] - <http://knk.karelia.ru/demografija/> - visited 10.05.2013.

was established on the territories of two North-Western provinces of the former Russian empire, populated mostly by Karelians. Originally, one of the main missions of this new formation was to serve as a springboard and „*site of arms*” for the expansion of revolution on Scandinavian direction. Till mid-1930s, the Red Finns were dominating on all levels of public life in Soviet Karelia, holding almost all significant positions not only in party and administrative bodies, but also in culture and education. In the beginning of the 1930s, the Finnish population of Soviet Karelia increased considerably as a result of immigration of North American Finns<sup>2</sup>.

The so called Finnish era of Soviet Karelia ended in mid-1930s with an „*antinationalist campaign*” and repressions against those blamed of bourgeois nationalism.

At the first stage of the World War II, in accordance with the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the USSR attempted to subdue Finland in the Winter War 1939-40. For Soviet Karelia, this venture signified and was accompanied by an *ad hoc* renewed interest of the Centre towards the Finnishness of Soviet Karelian statehood. Established almost immediately after the Winter War, Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (KFSSR) was clearly envisaged to include Finland proper and thus to become a real Soviet republic of the Finnish and Karelian peoples<sup>3</sup>. These plans, however, were doomed to failure. In 1941, Finland started the so called Continuation War against the Soviet Union, not only regaining previously lost territories, but also occupying a considerable part of Karelia, which had never been a part of Finland before<sup>4</sup>.

After the WWII, political and socio-economic conditions in the peripheral areas of the USSR have in many cases faced dramatic changes. In addition to common postwar troubles, the Soviet peripheries had to adjust themselves to the newly-drawn state borders, as it was in the case of Karelian-Finnish Soviet socialist republic. The KFSSR had to economically incorporate former Finnish territories, to „*repopulate*” them and to maintain Finno-Ugric profile of the whole territory. In view of postwar economic shortages, it was not the easiest of tasks, since the new inhabitants of the former Finnish territories were brought to Karelia mostly from other parts of the Soviet Union, Belorussia, and central Russian provinces.

Among the most effective measures undertaken by the local leadership and sanctioned by the Centre was resettlement to Karelia of more than 20.000 of Ingrian Finns, who originally lived on the territories nearby Saint Petersburg, but had to leave during the war. The aim was to improve the economy with qualified

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. TAKALA, Irina-SOLOMESHCH, Ilya (eds.): *North American Finns in Soviet Karelia in the 1930s*. Petrozavodsk State University Press, Petrozavodsk, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> For a comprehensive post-Soviet account on Karelian interwar history, see: KILIN, Yuri: *Karelia v politike sovetского gosudarstva 1920-1941*. Petrozavodsk State University Press, Petrozavodsk, 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Developments in and around Karelia have been recently studied in: VERIGIN, Sergey: *Karelia v gody ispytaniy: politicheskoe i socialno-economicheskoe polozhenie Sovetskoi Karelii v period Vtoroi mirovoi voyny, 1939 – 1945 gg.* Petrozavodsk State University Press, Petrozavodsk, 2009.

labour, especially for timber industry. However, at the same time, by this mechanical increase of the Finnish population, the local leaders also safeguarded the national status of the republic. Admittedly, for security reasons imposed by the Centre, the newcomers were originally not allowed to settle in the frontier zone along the border with Finland. Karelia was also fully exposed to the major waves of Stalin's post-war political repressions of the all-Union scale, like the so called Leningrad case and the campaign against cosmopolitans.

In 1956, in face of general improvement of Soviet-Finnish relations, sometimes labelled as *Finlandisation*, Moscow decided to downgrade the status of the republic from the union one to the Karelian autonomous republic (KASSR) as a part of Russian Federation, and to remove the Finnish part out from its name. This status was replaced by the current one – the Republic of Karelia – only in 1991.

This cursory survey proves that all formal and substantial developments and changes were predominantly determined by external factors, such as geopolitical shifts, military and security-based strategy, and changes in Soviet-Finnish relations. The entire history of Karelian research and education seems also to be overshadowed by these external trends.

Two facts should be mentioned regarding the Red Finns in this context. In 1925, Lauri Letonmäki, one of the leading figures of the Communist movement in Finland and later a member of the Finnish elite in Soviet Karelia, published a book in Finnish under the title *Features of the History of Finland and Karelia*<sup>5</sup>. This was the first attempt to give a historical survey from a Marxist point of view – crucially important task for the new ruling ideology as well as for the reshaping ethno-political landscape of Soviet Karelia. The book covered the period from the ancient times till the 1920s and stressed the fact of the long-term historical record of contacts of Karelian and Finnish peoples. The book's mission was to provide Soviet Karelia with an ideologically relevant school textbook, and as such it was officially approved for Karelian schools with the instruction in Finnish.

In 1930, the Karelian Research Institute of Culture was established in Petrozavodsk. It was not only an episode in the nation-wide process of institutionalisation of research in the Soviet Union. It was marked by its obvious '*Finnishness*', though indeed researchers from different ethnic background have been working at this institution from its very beginning. Edvard Gylling, the founding father of the Karelian Labour Commune, with his academic background and merits from his previous career in Finland and now as one of the key persons in the new hierarchy in Soviet Karelia, became the first director of this newly established institution. In 1931, Lauri Letonmäki, also working for the institute, came up with the book *The History of Karelia*, published in Finnish<sup>6</sup>. With its ideologically appropriate Marxist-Leninist approach, this book made its

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<sup>5</sup> LETONMÄKI, Lauri: *Piirteitä Suomen ja Karjalan historiasta*. Central'noe izdatel'stvo narodov SSSR, Moskva, 1925.

<sup>6</sup> LETONMÄKI, Lauri: *Karjalan historia*. Valtion kustannusliike Kirja, Leningradin osasto, Leningrad, 1931.

contribution to the centuries-old tradition of ordinary Karelians' class struggle against their oppressors, both the internal, i.e. Russian feudal lords and bourgeoisie, and the external ones, i.e. the western invaders. According to Letonmäki, what united Karelians and Finns is their joint class struggle against common class enemies. What disunited was the clash of interests of the ruling classes – a fundamental source of all wars and international conflicts.

When evaluating the role of Letonmäki's books in the later course of historiography development, it should be noted that not only the *'foreign'*, i.e. Finnish language of these publications limited their further influence. In the second half of 1930s, with the general shift in Stalin's policies, most of the leading Red Finns were at first dismissed from their positions and later physically eliminated in Stalin's purges. Their publications have been blacklisted and withdrawn from the libraries. Consequently, they were usually either ignored, or at least not referred to in later Soviet research.

Immediately after the war, Karelian-Finnish State University and the Research Institute affiliated to the USSR Academy of Sciences resumed their work, also in the field of humanities. Their main mission, both in education and research, was to contribute to the great task of postwar recovery and to provide the Soviet Karelian population with a clear and positive motivation for dedicated work in „*one united family of the Soviet peoples*”.

It sounds like grim humour, but peripheral Karelian research community has at least once benefited from Stalin's repressive policies. In the late 1940s, during the odious anti-cosmopolitanism campaign, anti-Semitic as such, and the so called Leningrad case, many scholars from Moscow and Leningrad found relatively safe refuge in provincial universities and research institutes. One of them was Igor Shaskolsky, a Leningradian, who not only seriously stimulated historical research and Nordic studies in Petrozavodsk, but also afterwards, already safely back in Leningrad, welcomed young Karelian researchers as post-graduate and doctoral students till late 1980s.

Starting from 1920s, Karelian historians had first of all to create a Karelian historical narrative and then to framework it within the new Soviet system of values and ideology. In terms of historiography within centre-peripheries paradigm, the Karelian case seems to follow mainstream developments of Russian history writing. This was especially transparent during the Soviet period. On one hand, it was quite natural that Karelian and Finnish studies were developing in Petrozavodsk. On the other hand, by 1930s, with the establishing of a monolith and homogeneous Soviet ideology, methodological and ideological frames for further research had already been provided by the Centre, and local historians had no other option than just to adjust their narratives to the Soviet grand narrative of the history of the centuries old joint class struggle of the peoples of Russia under the guidance of Russian people. Emphasizing the task of writing a totally new history they, however, quite surprisingly relied upon several old historical paradigms, though indeed, they reshaped in new Soviet phraseology. Therefore



one could find clear signs of substantial continuity in pre-Soviet and Soviet history writing, whereas signs of novelty very often merely by refer to verbal and rhetoric constructions.

We would like to outline two basic types of such long lines or paradigms.

1.) In Russian historiographical tradition, in case of the early history of Karelians, their realm was usually limited to Karelian Isthmus and territories on the Western and Northern shores of Ladoga Lake. It is also mentioned that in the beginning of the second millennium Karelians came into contact with the Vepsians on the territories between Ladoga and Onega Lakes, and that Karelian colonisation of the territories of today's Russian Karelia coincided with the Russian one. Therefore, Karelians and Vepsians belonged to the ancient Russian state from its very beginning. This statement should be regarded as one of the most articulated in Russian/Soviet historiography<sup>7</sup>.

2.) The second most evident '*long continuum*' refers to the factor of external invasion. Starting from the mid-12<sup>th</sup> century, territories populated by Karelians faced „*devastating invasions of the Swedish feudal lords*”. Therefore, regional history creates a picture of centuries-old joint struggle of Karelian and Russian peoples against Swedish and later Finnish invaders<sup>8</sup>. This line in interpreting the history of the region has culminated in the Soviet historiography in a series of writings by Igor Shaskolsky, one of the leading specialists in the field<sup>9</sup>.

This '*East-West*' constellation has its roots in earlier Russian historiographical tradition of the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, according to which Karelia's importance in construction of the Russian state was limited to its role in the history of resistance against Swedish expansion. Later in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, this elucidation was elaborated into its more articulated shape. Karelian relationship with Novgorod gained confessional, and consequently, cultural features (the Orthodox world as an object of Catholic, and later Lutheran, urge for expansion): the Karelians had joined the Novgorod [mostly] because of common enemies, i.e. the Swedes. Later in Soviet historiography it was repeatedly highlighted that military co-operation between Karelians and Novgorod had much more deep roots, resting upon solid economic and cultural links<sup>10</sup>. In accordance with the Soviet interpretation of the historiographical situation, a conclusion was reached that both Russian and Finnish reactionary historians strove „*to inflame hatred*”

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<sup>7</sup> For a discussion on long continuum in history writing regarding Karelia, see: SOLOMESHCH, Ilya: Karelia as an object of overlapping history writing? National historiographies vis-à-vis state policies IN: ELENUS, Lars (ed.): *Minority policies, culture and science*. Studies in Northern European histories I, Luleå University of Technology, Luleå, 2006. 188-197.

<sup>8</sup> BALAGUROV, Yakov A.: Svedeniya o proshlom i nastoyashchem Karelii v dorevol'yutsionnoi istoricheskoi literatute, *Voprosy istorii Karelii. Trudy Karel'skogo filiala Akademii nauk SSSR*, XXII (1959) 87-109.

<sup>9</sup> SHASKOLSKY, Igor' P.: *Bor'ba Rusi protiv krestonosnoi agressii na beregah Baltiki v XII-XIII vv.* Izdatel'stvo Nauka, Leningrad, 1978; SHASKOLSKY, Igor' P.: *Bor'ba Rusi protiv shvedskoi ekspansii v Karelii, konets XIII – nachalo XIV v.* Izdatel'stvo Karelia, Petrozavodsk, 1987.

<sup>10</sup> BALAGUROV (1959): 95.

between Russian, Finnish and Karelian peoples.<sup>11</sup>

In Russia the territory of Karelia is still studied mostly within a traditional centre-oriented (in practice, *state-oriented*) pattern, both in history writing<sup>12</sup> and in political discourse. Actually, one can find only rare publications of Russian scholars, in which Karelia is dealt with as a considerably larger ethnical, geographical and historical landscape than today's Republic of Karelia and its administrative predecessors<sup>13</sup>. In contradiction with the Finnish tradition<sup>14</sup>, the role of the border in Karelian history still waits for a comprehensive research.

Though considerable research has been conducted in the course of decades spotlighting non-military forms of contacts on the border, like trans-border peasant pedlar trade, matrimonial contacts and cultural influence, one can still recognise the predominant presence of discursive practices implying enemy image and external threat.

Still prevailing state-, or centre-oriented pattern of regional history writing in combination with dominating security based public discourse, with its strong emphasis on such mobilizing notions, as the border, frontier and menace, leads to a situation, in which these issues are foregrounded from time to time in history writing and in political rhetoric as well as in the new media, gaining the shape of what could be described as an *outpost syndrome*, including such metaphorological and semantic connotations, as in the phrase „*Karelia is an outpost of Russia*” on billboard in Petrozavodsk in 2009<sup>15</sup>.

And, again, this actualisation has very little, or almost nothing to do with developments on regional level. Each peak of this trend more likely coincides with „*great politics*”, either with growing international tensions (not necessarily between Finland and Russia), or with internal Russian ones.

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<sup>11</sup> BALAGUROV (1959): 108.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. for example, the latest research publication in Russian, with a general survey of the history of Karelia from the ancient times till today written by Karelian historians: KORABLEV, Aleksandr N. et al (eds.): *Istoriya Karelii s drevneishih vremyon do nashih dnei*. Izdatel'stvo Periodika, Petrozavodsk, 2002. The previous survey of this kind was written several decades ago: BERNADSKY, Viktor N. et al. (eds.): *Ocherki istroii Karelii*. T. 1. Gosizdat KASSR, Petrozavodsk. MASHEZERSKY, Victor I. et al. (eds.): *Ocherki istroii Karelii*. T. 2. Karelskoye knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, Petrozavodsk, 1964.

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, a joint Russian-Finnish project publication: HÄMYNEN, Tapio & PASHKOV, Aleksandr (eds.): *A nation split by the border. Changes in the ethnic identity, religion and language of the Karelians from 1809 to 2009*. University of Eastern Finland, HAI-kustannus, Joensuu, 2012.

<sup>14</sup> Cf., LIIKANEN, Ilkka: Origins of the Eastern Border as the Grand Controversy of Finnish National History Writing. IN: FRANK, Tibor & HADLER, Frank (eds.): *Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts: Overlapping National Histories in Modern Europe. Writing the Nation Series* Vol. 5. Palgrave, London 2011. 177-199.

<sup>15</sup> For a more comprehensive discussion of „*the outpost syndrome*”, see: SOLOMESHCH, Ilya: Rajamaa, etuvartio, käytävä, portti – eli missä kasvaa ruočiheinä? IN: JUNKKARINEN, Marko et al. (eds.): *Ajan Valtimolla – mukana muutoksessa. Professori Tapio Hämysen 60-vuotisjuhlakirja*. Itä-Suomen yliopisto, Joensuu, 2011. 127-134.

**Niklas Stenlås**

***Arms Industry and Civil Defence  
The Experience of War in Swedish post-war Society***

**Abstract**

Sweden was never drawn into the Second World War. In contrast to most of Europe's countries, Sweden escaped the world conflict almost unharmed. Nevertheless, the war made a deep impression on the Swedes which in many ways shaped the build-up of Sweden's post war society.

The aim of this article is to identify and trace the development of two major institutional complexes that both have their roots in the Second World War experiences and both have had a central but at the same time neglected position in Sweden's post-war history. First, the defence industry that was built up during the War but never dismantled afterwards. Instead, foreign policy, military doctrines, as well as public support and even the mentality of the Swedes were reformed in order to incorporate a strong defence industry in the post-war society. Sweden is still today manufactures a disproportional amount of the world's weapons. Second, a civil defence was built up that eventually turned out to be one of the strongest and most well organized in the world. Both these institutional complexes in many ways mirrored the welfare state. But as both these complexes represented Warfare – the anti-thesis of Welfare – their existence have not been regarded as representative of the welfare society built after the Second World War. The role, and even the existence, of the institutional complexes of military industry and civil defence had thus been suppressed in Sweden's 20<sup>th</sup> century historiography.

*Keywords:* Sweden, Second World War, military industry, civil defence

Sweden was one of few countries in Europe that was not an aggressor, not attacked by Nazi-Germany or the Soviet Union or otherwise drawn into the war. When Norway and Denmark were occupied in 1940 and Finland joined in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Sweden was completely isolated and surrounded by belligerents. Up until 1943 the threat of being attacked by Nazi-Germany was believed to be imminent. Sweden reacted by proclaiming neutrality but at the same time concessions, such as trade with crucial strategic resources and transition of troops were granted Germany.

The experience of neutrality and non-participation in the Second World War was an extremely important element in the Swedish '*crisis management*' and, as such, was institutionalized in the non-alliance policy pursued during the Cold War and, more or less, up until today. The war experiences served to create two different but interrelated institutional complexes that both have their roots in the Second World War but that both have been almost entirely neglected in the historiography of the post-war period. These are the armaments industry which

has survived up until today as the world's strongest weapons industry counted per capita and the civil defence which was a thoroughly well-organized mirror of the welfare state aiming to protect the citizens from the vagaries of war just as effectively as the welfare state would protect them from the vagaries of poverty.

Although these institutions have been extremely important they have not fitted the '*Swedish self-image*' as a neutral, peace-loving country with the world's most extensive welfare state, and hence, the institutions of the arms industry and the Civil Defence have, with few exceptions, been ignored both by academic research and by popular accounts of Sweden's 20<sup>th</sup> century history.

### ***The arms industry***

Sweden's arms industry was built up immediately before and during the Second World War. The country's military forces were totally inadequate in 1939, and six years of isolation left Sweden no other choice than to provide for itself. Concentrated efforts during these years meant that Sweden at War's end possessed an arms industry capable of supplying its armed forces with everything except the most advanced modern technologies.<sup>1</sup>

The isolation had taught the Swedes to rely on themselves. New conflicts might well lead to new periods of isolation, and an adequate defence needed to be backed up by industrial resources. The war had weakened the anti-militarist sentiments of the 1930s, and the country's leading political force, the social democratic party, was now divided between pro-militarists and anti-militarists. While the war experience remained fresh in memory, pro-militarists and military establishment succeeded in manoeuvring the defence issue in such a way as to make it a non-political issue.

The build-up of Sweden's military capability continued during the 1950s, but the motives for keeping a strong defence shifted. As the war experience waned in memory, a new conflict loomed into the foreground. The Cold War acted as a powerful catalyst in shaping the Swedish nation state. Sweden needed to justify its non-participation in the Second World War. Especially the fact that Sweden had not contributed to the war effort or to the victory over Nazi-Germany needed to be justified. Past experiences had thus to be arranged in a positive tradition.<sup>2</sup> Neutrality became not just a lucky outcome, but a norm and an objective in itself.

The assertion of a credible non-alignment, it was argued, necessitated a visual display of independence and capability. Perhaps the most important arena to do so has been within the field of military technology. Consequently, Sweden has invested disproportional amounts of resources in building '*neutral*' weapons of

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<sup>1</sup> OLSSON, Ulf: *The Creation of a Modern Arms Industry: Sweden 1939-1974*, Göteborgs Universitet, Göteborg, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> STRÅTH, Bo: *Poverty, Neutrality and Welfare: Three Key Concepts in the Modern Foundation Myth of Sweden*, IN: STRÅTH, Bo (ed.): *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond*, Brussels, 2000, 375.

own design. Sweden's independence in security policy matters was physically visible in aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, naval vessels and small arms invented and constructed by Swedish engineers.

Between the end of the Second World War and the end of the 1960s, Sweden's armed forces grew steadily in strength and in technological refinement. The development was never contested politically but carried out under unanimity. Military experts provided the estimates on which the defence decisions were built, and such estimates were accepted more or less without question. The members of parliament involved in defence issues were often chosen because of their reliability and long experience in defence matters. The costs were considered necessary for the assertion of a trustworthy policy of neutrality. The corporatist organisation of Swedish society meant that public support for the 'armed neutrality' was provided by voluntary organisations, trade unions, and political youth associations who organised themselves to support official policy. The most dominant corporate interests in the country – trade unions and industry – were both interested in a viable defence industry. During the 1950s Sweden possessed the fourth largest air force in the world, it pursued a nuclear research programme capable of producing nuclear weapons and, over 50 per cent of public research funds went to military research.

Industrial companies such as Bofors, Saab, Volvo, and Ericson were to various extents engaged in the production of arms, primarily for the Swedish Armed Forces but to an increasing degree for export. These companies were the technological edge of Swedish industry. Arms production was profitable, the development costs were largely covered by the buyer who was also a very reliable customer and there was virtually no competition. Technological capacity thus was built in close cooperation between state and private industry. When Sweden's third technical university was built in the end of the 1960s, it was located in Linköping next to Saab's research and manufacturing departments. The purpose was to supply the country's technologically most advanced industry – the military aircraft industry – with engineers.<sup>3</sup>

The growth of Sweden's arms industry during the Second World War formed the industrial fundament for exceptionally strong armed forces but it was not until the early post-war years that a Military-Industrial Complex was institutionalised. Three factors have been particularly important for this institutionalisation. First, the Cold War shaped the identity of the Swedes. Sweden was neutral, free from the superpower alliances and this provided a need for neutral technology, visibly free from superpower allegiances. Second, the corporative political culture of

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<sup>3</sup> STENLÅS, Niklas: *Military Technology, National Identity and the State. The Rise and Decline of a Small State's Military-Industrial Complex*. IN: LUNDIN, Per, STENLÅS, Niklas and GRIBBE, Johan (eds.): *Science for Welfare and Warfare. Technology and State Initiative in cold War Sweden*. Science History Publications, Sagamore Beach, 2010: 61-84; HOLMSTRÖM, Per and OLSSON, Ulf: *Sweden*. IN: BALL, Nicole and LEITENBERG, Milton (eds.): *The Structure of the Defence Industry: an International Survey*. Croon Helm, London 1983.

Sweden provided possibilities for an interest alliance between the government, the military, the industry and the unions around the defence issue. Third, the corporative interest alliance succeeded, at an early stage, to elevate the defence issue over the political agenda, where it was up to military and scientific experts to determine the level of the country's military needs.

A combination of factors, such as the *détente* between the superpowers, the anti-militarist sentiments following the Vietnam War, the economic setback in the beginning of the 1970s, and the ever increasing costs of the military forces eventually put an end to Sweden's military industrial complex. Starting with the defence decision of 1968 the autonomy of the military expertise was checked. Political control over military expenditures was reasserted. The political concord over the defence policy was at first dissolved, but eventually it was clear that the military forces were regarded as too costly by all political parties.

The 1970s and 1980s saw successive cutbacks of the military defence but at the same time new weapon systems, technologically more advanced than ever, were developed such as the JAS-39 Gripen fighter-bomber by Saab, conventional submarines by Kockums, artillery pieces and guided missiles by Bofors and armoured vehicles by Hägglunds. Paradoxically increasingly more components in these weapons were of foreign manufacture at the same time as the need to develop and buy weapons of domestic origin was legitimised with Sweden's non-alliance policy that made it essential not to be dependent on any of the superpower alliances.

The early 1990s was somewhat of a watershed for Sweden's arms industry. In 1990 a government commission asserted that it was necessary to cooperate with arms industries in other, mainly European, countries.<sup>4</sup> The government took the lead in the restructuring of the state owned arms industries, which, a few years later was privatised and eventually acquired by Saab. In 1991 Sweden entered the European Union and, as a consequence, had to adapt its procurement regulations to European standard. Over the two decades after 1990 the Swedish arms industry have been restructured through foreign acquisitions, mergers and cross-ownerships so that it is no longer possible to speak of a national Swedish arms industry. Contemporary observers are still in disagreement whether the state have abandoned the previously effective responsibility it had assumed in the development of new arms technology or if the structures of the military-industrial complex remains, leading to over-spending, excessive arms production and over-sophistication of arms technology.<sup>5</sup>

However, the alliance to shape public policy around the defence issue has lost its regime status. That is a process that begun already in the late 1960s and early

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<sup>4</sup> *Fem rapporter från 1988 års försvarskommitté*, SOU 1990:108, The Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, 1990.

<sup>5</sup> Gunnar Eliasson, Stefan Lövéén, Alf Svensson och Göran Persson, *Början till slutet för den svenska försvarsindustrin*, *Dagens Nyheter* 26 October 2009; Anna Dahlberg, *Bryt romansen med försvarsindustrin*, *Expressen* 1 November 2009.

1970s, and the consequences of which have been increasingly obvious since the end of the Cold War.

If the US military-industrial complex has been associated with a row of wars such as the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Gulf wars and, of course, the Cold War and the nuclear arms race as well as been morally connected death, corruption and profit, Sweden's military-industrial complex has succeeded in building its legitimacy on neutrality, non-alignment, peace keeping and national pride in advanced technology. A broad interest alliance composed of all political parties (except the rather marginalised communist party), strong social actors such the interest organisations of industry and the unions as well a wide range of voluntary organisation have formed a regime which has, almost unchallenged, promoted the domestic arms industry from the Second World War at least up until the mid-1970s. Remnants of this regime remain today but from 1990 it has been unable to prevent a thorough restructuring of foreign policy, armed forces and arms industry.<sup>6</sup>

### ***The civil defence***

The need for a civil defense followed logically from the fact that civil society had become a more frequent and even legitimate target in war during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The civil sphere supported the war effort both materially and morally and a basic assumption during the Second World War had been that terror bombing of civilian targets could have a decisive effect on the enemy's willingness to continue fighting. In the fully industrialized society the border between civilian and military targets was erased. A main problem for governments became how to protect their citizens. This problem would be even more acute with the advent of the atomic bomb.

The first attempts to organize civil defense in Sweden were made during the 1930s. An Air Protection Authority (Luftskyddsinspektionen) was instituted in 1937 and the regional state authorities (länsstyrelserna) were charged with the task of organizing air protection on the regional level. A volunteer air protection organization (Riksluftskyddsförbundet) was simultaneously built up.<sup>7</sup>

Even though Sweden was not directly involved in the war the Swedish government closely monitored the war developments. Just as the Armed Forces

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<sup>6</sup> Perhaps the decline of the military-industrial complex should not be overemphasized and it could be argued that it is only the forms and mechanisms of the military-industrial complex that have changed since the Cold War and that the arms industry has found strategies to survive. Although Sweden does not acknowledge any military threats in its neighbourhood and despite the fact that Sweden has almost dissolved its military forces the parliament recently decided to procure a new generation of Swedish-manufactured fighter-bombers to a cost of SEK 90 billion (approximately EUR 10 billion). It can thus be argued that the military forces have collapsed under the weight of a military-industrial complex that they can no longer support.

<sup>7</sup> NYBERG, Marie: *Luftskydd i Göteborgs och Bohus län 1937-1945 ...det civila försvarets framväxt före och under andra världskriget*, Länsstyrelsen i Göteborgs och Bohus län, Göteborg, 1985, 3.

after the Battle of Britain concluded that air power was essential in modern war other authorities drew the conclusion that bomb shelters for the protection of civilians were necessary on an entirely different scale than previously understood. While the Armed Forces after the atomic bombs over Japan concluded that extensive investments in nuclear research were necessary in order to understand and develop modern weapons, other authorities drew the conclusion that the bomb shelters built up until then were completely inadequate.<sup>8</sup>

The civil defense is somewhat of a blind spot in the history of 20th century Sweden.<sup>9</sup> This is remarkable considering the tremendous importance the military defense and its civil counterpart were assigned during the Cold War. All citizens were in one way or another taken into account in the civil defense planning, either as service personnel or as in need of protection.

A consequence of the war was that a government commission was assigned to review the need of civil defence measures. The Commission proposed a thorough reorganization and in 1944 a Civil Defence Act was passed by the parliament requiring all citizens between 16 and 65 years of age who were not doing military service to perform civil defense service. The Air protection authority was reformed and had its name changed to the Board of Civil Defense. It was now a civilian authority in which the tasks of city evacuation and forest fire prevention were also included.<sup>10</sup>

The war also spurred a frenzied expansion of bomb shelter construction. The Civil Defence Act of 1944 distinguished between common and private bomb shelters. Common bomb shelters were the responsibility of the municipalities and were supposed to protect civil defence personnel, civilians who had lost their home, travelers etc. Private bomb shelters were the responsibility of each and every owner of a building if the civil defence planning so required, which it did in all urban areas of more than 200 inhabitants. Shelter space should be calculated so that all people that could be expected to stay in the building also had place in the shelter.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The question of adapting the bomb shelter construction planning to nuclear threats was dealt with by the 1948 Governmental Commission on bomb shelters: *Skyddsrum åt civilbefolkningen: betänkande avgivet av 1948 års skyddsrumsutredning*. Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm 1950. SOU 1950:13. Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1950.

<sup>9</sup> The only scholarly literature that exists is a few articles dealing with the cultural aspects and the history of mentality of the Cold War. CRONQVIST, Marie: *Utrymning i folkhemmet. Kalla kriget, välfärdsdyllen och den svenska civilförsvarskulturen 1961* IN: *Historisk tidskrift* 2008:3 (2008a); CRONQVIST, Marie: *Vi går under jorden. Kalla kriget möter folkhemmet i svensk civilförsvarsfilm* IN: HEDLING, Erik and JÖNSSON, Mats (eds.): *Välfärdsbilder. Svensk film utanför biografen*, Statens ljud- och bildarkiv, Stockholm, 2008, 166-181; CRONQVIST, Marie: *Det befästa folkhemmet. Kallt krig och varm välfärd i svensk civilförsvarskultur* IN: JERNEK, Magnus (ed.): *Fred i realpolitikens skugga*, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2009: 169-197; CRONQVIST, Marie: *Om kriget kommer till Ditt hem* IN: *Ikaros: Flygvapenmusei årsbok 2009*, Flygvapenmuseum, Linköping, 2010, 91-103.

<sup>10</sup> *Skyddsrum. Betänkande avgivet av 1969 års skyddsrumsutredning*, SOU 1972: 50. Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm, 1972: 44.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* 45.



The act was not repealed at the end of the war. Even if the building of bomb shelters were no longer enforced, the act became a norm for the development of civil defence for the future. Shelters no longer had to be constructed in already existing buildings but the regulations of the Act were incorporated into subsequent building statutes.<sup>12</sup> A nation-wide bomb shelter system capable of protecting most of the country's 7-8 million inhabitants was thus integrated into civilian planning and built up during peace time.

The nuclear attacks against Japan prompted the government to rethink not only the nation's military planning but also the civil defence measures undertaken so far. A new government commission was appointed in 1948 with the purpose to review the question of how the appearance of the new weapons would affect the civil defence preparedness. The commission concluded that the shelters built so far were totally inadequate for the protection of citizens in the nuclear age. What had previously been labeled '*normal shelters*' were re-categorized as 'house shelters' and the few shelters that had up until then been categorized as 'full protection shelters' were re-labeled '*normal shelters*'. In order to provide full protection, shelters needed to be built in rock below ground. For economic reasons such shelters had to be relatively large with an ability to shelter between 2,300 and 1,000 persons. Shelters should not only be able to protect people during an ongoing attack but should also house them for longer periods, to store provisions and to filtrate air and water. In targetable areas no one should have a longer distance than 400 meters to the nearest shelter.<sup>13</sup>

The 1951 revision of the Civil Defence Act was based on the findings of the commission but recommendations of the commission were so far-reaching that they were economically impossible to follow. Full protection shelters were prioritized but were mainly directed to the central parts of the bigger cities. The main responsibility was placed on the municipalities and on the property owners. The civil defense requirements were simply integrated into building plans and building regulations and as the public buildings and residential blocks of the welfare state were erected, so were the bomb shelter system of the '*warfare state*'.<sup>14</sup>

However, the bomb shelter system envisioned by the 1948 bomb shelter commission was never fully realized. The early planning was based upon limited experiences of nuclear warfare from the end of the Second World War. In the mid 1950s the development of nuclear weapons made it necessary to reassess the strategies of the civil defence. Protecting citizens within nuclear targetable urban centers was deemed impossible. Emphasis was instead placed on evacuation and relocation. In 1972 roughly 4,5 million bomb shelter places existed for a population of c. eight million. Only 57,000 of them were full protection rock shelters and these were located in the centers of the largest cities where they

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 46.

<sup>13</sup> *Skyddsrum för civilbefolkningen: betänkande avgivet av 1948 års skyddsrumsutredning*, SOU (1950):13, Norstedt, Stockholm, 1950.

<sup>14</sup> SOU (1972): 50: 46-50.

were planned to house personnel with strategic duties that could not be relocated.<sup>15</sup>

The Civil Defence was not just a question of bomb shelters. On the central level there was the Civil Defense Board that acted under the Government. On the regional level civil defense issues were handled by the county councils and on the local level the municipalities were charged with the defense task. In the latter half of the 1950s the organization of the Civil defence was thoroughly reviewed by two governmental committees. Their results were published in 1958 and based on their proposals the Civil Defence was profoundly reorganized in the following years.<sup>16</sup> The number of 352 civil defence areas was reduced to 114. A local civil defence organization was instituted within every such area, composed of six different service branches. On the regional level 22 mobile civil defense support corps' were formed. A permanent civil defence education center was established for higher civil defence officers who were supposed to be educated for 60 days. Lower officers were to be educated locally and were required 30 days of education.<sup>17</sup> The organization for home protection was considered obsolete in the new, well organized and well exercised civil defence, and was abolished. The previous duties of espionage and sabotage control were transmitted to the police. The new civil defence was to have strictly civilian duties. The new organization was estimated to cost SEK 76 million per year for the next ten years out of which more than half was allocated to the construction of bomb protection shelters.<sup>18</sup>

The six branches of the Civil Defence that were present in every local civil defence area were the Command Corps (ledningskåren), whose purpose was to coordinate the civil defence and which amounted to 44,800 persons in 1968; the Rescue Corps which was composed of mechanized units with the purpose of clearing wreckage (31,000); the Fire Corps which was composed of peace-time fire departments reinforced by volunteers and civil defence personnel (53,400); the Medical Corps whose task it was to build provisional hospitals and to transport injured to regular hospitals (39,000); the Protections Corps which was charged with the task of nuclear decontamination and to assist in evacuation (20,000); and the Guard Corps which was an armed branch with police duties (36,000). All in all the Civil Defence of the 1960's amounted to between 200,000 and 300,000 persons organized locally and in mobile corps units.<sup>19</sup>

It has been argued that civil defense plans were paperwork (fortunately) never to leave the desks on which they were written.<sup>20</sup> While there might be some truth

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid. 50.

<sup>16</sup> *Civilförsvarsutbildningen. Avgivet av särskilt tillkallad sakkunnig*, SOU 1958:12, Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1958; *Civilförsvarets organisation. Huvudbetänkande avgivet av 1953 års civilförsvarsutredning*, SOU 1958:13, Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1958.

<sup>17</sup> EK, Kurt: *Civilförsvaret. Att skydda och rädda liv*. Civilförsvarsstyrelsen, Stockholm, 1968: 7, 11-13.

<sup>18</sup> SOU (1958): 13: 80.

<sup>19</sup> EK, Kurt: *Civilförsvaret. Att skydda och rädda liv*, Civilförsvarsstyrelsen, Stockholm 1968: 18-30.

<sup>20</sup> CRONQVIST (2008a): 456. GARRISON, Dee: *Bracing for Armageddon. Why civil defence never*

in such a statement – at least for countries that did not spend much on their civil defence such as the U.S. and the U.K. – Swedish authorities made their utmost in order to test and put into practice the new organization they had built. Every year the National Defence College held exercises during which top level civilian organization leaders and political decision-makers were prepared for their war-time tasks by way of role playing.<sup>21</sup> Starting in 1958 a row of evacuation exercises were held in different Swedish cities. The purpose was to test the evacuation organization and to prepare both the population and the civil defence personnel for their tasks. Trollhättan/Vänersborg was evacuated in 1958, Västerås in 1960, Stockholm in 1961 and Malmö in 1962. Stockholm evacuation April 23, 1961 was hailed as the most ambitious evacuation exercise ever undertaken. Some 225,000 citizens were indirectly involved but probably not more than 30,000 actually evacuated the city to a number of reception points around Stockholm where they were greeted by civil defence workers and volunteers. The exercise was regarded by contemporary observers alternatively as a fiasco or as a great success. While critical media regarded it as too much of a Sunday pick-nick without any sense of impending disaster, military authorities criticized it because a high degree of the male participants had war-time military duties and would most likely be absent from the capital in case of a real emergency.<sup>22</sup>

Parallel to the national civil defense organization, a volunteer civil defense organization was built up. In 1937 a state commission suggested that local civil defence units should be united to form a national organization in order to achieve efficient coordination. The original purpose of the organization was air protection but in 1945 it was renamed the Civil Defense Union (Civilförsvarsförbundet). By then it had 0.6 million members (out of a population of little more than seven million). The tasks of the Civil Defence Union were popularly labeled: „*the bucket, the shovel, the sponge and the sand box*”. Focus was placed on the duties of fire-fighting, rescue, black-out, and evacuation. In peace time the most important activities were to inform and educate the population.<sup>23</sup>

From 1945 onwards the membership figures of the Union dwindled. The state's increased responsibility for the civil defence and the institutionalisation of national civil authorities and erection of the state civil defence organisation during the 1950 made the volunteer civil defence somewhat superfluous. The realization that fire-fighting and blackouts would not be sufficient in a nuclear war and the strategic shift from protection to evacuation added to this process. During the 1960s the Civil Defence Union found a new *raison d'être* under the label '*self-protection*'. Citizens were now educated to protect themselves from all havocs, not only in times of war. Even if a renewed interest for self-defence was evident

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worked, New York 2006.

<sup>21</sup> GRIBBE, Johan: *En inre angelägenhet för fritt tankeutbyte: synen på västsamverkan i Försvarshögskolans krigsspel 1952-1979*, Kungliga Tekniska högskolan, Stockholm, 2003.

<sup>22</sup> CRONQVIST (2008a): 451-476.

<sup>23</sup> Civilförsvarsförbundet 1977.

during Cold War tensions of the 1980s and the state actively encouraged the Union with regular funding, it is clear that the organization has found it difficult to formulate a sufficiently urgent role in the state led civil defence organization of the Cold War.

### **Conclusions**

Both the arms industry and the Civil Defence were built up as reactions to the Second World War, a war which Sweden was never drawn into. Both can be regarded as forms of crisis management in a small neutral state. It was, however, during the Cold War – another anticipated crisis – that these two institutional complexes became central and well-integrated parts in Swedish society.

The Swedish Civil Defense can be regarded as a mirror image of the welfare state in the same way as the military defense has been.<sup>24</sup> The welfare state went to great lengths in the ambition to protect its citizens from vagaries of poverty, unemployment, disease and also saw as its duty to provide for education and elderly care. In the same way it sought to protect them in the event of war and physical destruction from foreign powers. The welfare state needed to be protected (both in military and civil senses) and the Swedish non-alliance policy in the Cold War meant that the Swedes had to do this themselves. Thus, during the Cold War Sweden did not just have one of the strongest (per capita) military defenses in the world but also one of the most well developed civil defences.<sup>25</sup> In this sense the Swedish 'civil defense state' distinguished itself from other 'civil defense states' in the same way as the Swedish welfare state has been regarded as distinct from other welfare states.

The connection between civil defence and welfare has been made before as has the connection between civil defence and neutrality. Lawrence J. Vale has asserted that the Swiss developed the world's most extensive civil defence programme (comparable only to that of Sweden) because in a non-nuclear armed state civil defence issues were politically uncontroversial and a demonstration from „a state that is determined to be able to counter any threat to its sovereign existence”.<sup>26</sup> Marie Cronqvist has, in several articles dealing with Cold War culture in Sweden, pointed to the interrelatedness of what she calls 'the story of the people's home' or 'the story of welfare' with that of 'the story of the cold war'. In her Swedish variety of the cultural history of the Cold War the dull threat of

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<sup>24</sup> LUNDIN, Per and STENLÅS, Niklas: *Technology, State Initiative and National Myths in Cold War Sweden: An Introduction* IN: LUNDIN, Per, STENLÅS, Niklas and GRIBBE, Johan (eds.): *Science for Welfare and Warfare. Technology and State Initiative in cold War Sweden*, Science History Publications, Sagamore Beach, 2010: 1-34.

<sup>25</sup> In 1983 only Switzerland spent more resources per capita than Sweden on civil defence measures. VALE, Lawrence J.: *The Limits of Civil Defence in the USA, Switzerland, Britain and the Soviet Union. The Evolution of Policies since 1945*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills and London, 1987: 9.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. 122.

nuclear destruction could be dealt with by way of incorporating it into the idyllic welfare state self-image of the Swedes'.<sup>27</sup>

The connection between civil defence and welfare, thus, seem to be a close parallel to the connection between warfare state (military defence and arms industry) and welfare state, which has also been made by several authors. In this case it has been argued that powerful 'myths' – in the sense of shared truths – were needed to shape and provide sanctions for collective action. The myths of modernity and neutrality were such 'collective truths' which made it possible to rally the entire nation behind the national projects of welfare and warfare.<sup>28</sup> Ann-Katrin Hatje has made a similar connection between welfare state and defence and points to the fact that military concerns were much more prominent than commonly understood and that Sweden underwent a form of militarization in which all sectors of society were affected by military planning so that Sweden became a society under armed peace.<sup>29</sup> It should be added, however, that the 'myth' of modernity or of the rationally planned welfare state has made this militarization invisible to contemporary observers and historians of the 20<sup>th</sup> century alike.

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<sup>27</sup> CRONQUIST (2008a): 474. CRONQUIST (2008b): 166-181. CRONQUIST (2009): 169-197. CRONQUIST (2010): 91-103.

<sup>28</sup> LUNDIN and STENLÅS (2010): 4-6.

<sup>29</sup> HATJE, Ann-Katrin: *Svensk välfärd, genus och social rationalism under 1900-talet*, Umeå Universitet, Umeå 2009: 30-31.



**Nigel Swain- Zsuzsanna Varga**

## ***Postwar land reforms in comparative perspective***

### **Abstract**

In our present paper, we have endeavoured to rethink an element of agrarian history, the postwar land reforms, from a comparative perspective. We have transcended national narratives and compared the Hungarian with Poland on the one hand, and East Germany on the other. In the first half of our paper we compared the competing land reform visions of different parties in Poland and Hungary, in the second we compared the mechanics of distributing the feudal large estates in the Soviet Occupation Zone and Hungary.

*Keywords:* land reform, World WAR II, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, comparative research

**T**he agrarian structure of Europe changed significantly after the First World War. Land reform, widely defined to mean anything changing property rights for rural land, such as changes in landownership and tenure and attempts to deal with the fragmentation of land holdings, affected almost every European country after the First World War. „*The emergence of the peasant as an active factor in the political and social life of Europe was perhaps the most telling and certainly the least expected effect of the First World War and a striking phenomenon in the social history of the Continent between the two wars.*”<sup>1</sup>

The crisis released long run forces of change, and in two decades the ownership of large areas of farmland changed, especially in Eastern Europe. Politically this period can be identified as the one that saw the end of the big rural landowners in Europe, or, if not the final end, at least the beginning of the end. Culturally it was the one that established peasant farming as the symbol of traditional values. Whether it had any great economic effect is more questionable, although it might be argued that the income and wealth distribution impacts of the changes were seen as more important than the production effects, but in social terms it seems clear that this was the period in which the ideal of the family farm was established across Europe, and that become a model for land reform after the Second World War.<sup>2</sup>

### ***The Reforms in Outline***

Although land reforms were implemented almost everywhere in Eastern Europe after the First World War (the Junker estates of eastern Germany being the

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<sup>1</sup> MITRANY, David: *Marx Against the Peasant. A Study in Social Dogmatism.* (Second edition.) New York, Collier Books, 1961. 31.

<sup>2</sup> TRACY, Michael: *Agriculture in western Europe: Challenge and response 1880-1980.* St. Albans, Granada, 1982.

major exception), they were not pursued with equal vigour.<sup>3</sup> The most radical reform took place in Romania, the most radical policies being pursued in the newly acquired territories of Transylvania and Bessarabia, where the majority of the large owners were not ethnic Romanians. In Bulgaria and the Serbian part of the country that was to become Yugoslavia, land reform was scarcely necessary because the majority of the land was already in small peasant holdings. In Bulgaria reform was introduced nevertheless under the radical agrarian rule of Alexander Stamboliiski, while reform in Yugoslavia was necessary in Croatia (to the detriment of Hungarian aristocrats) and Bosnia and Hercegovina. In Hungary very modest measures were implemented in the 1920s when Hungary's Old Right were securely in power, although Károly's 1918 republican government had begun more radical measures, and the Soviet Republic had attempted full collectivisation in 1919. The Polish and Czechoslovak governments passed quite radical laws, but their implementation was patchy. After his coup in 1926 Piłsudski came to an understanding with the aristocracy which slowed the reform, while in Czechoslovakia the Ministry of Agriculture was consistently in the hands of the Agrarian Party which, despite its ideological commitment to the 'peasant' appeared in its (in)actions to favour those with large holdings. As a consequence, with the ending of the Second World War many felt that the first round of reforms was unfinished; this was explicit in Czechoslovakia where the 1947 measures were conceived as being the completion of the earlier, unsuccessful reform.<sup>4</sup>

The Second World War land reforms were all conceived within the framework of the Popular Front politics that characterised the Allies' vision of the post-war world. It figured in: Manifesto of Polish Committee of National Liberation, July 1944; Szeged Programme of National Independence Front, December 1944; and Košice Programme of Czechoslovak National Front, April 1945. And, as with the post-World War One reforms, there was a strong nationalist component to many of the reforms in that German land in particular was a major source of land (as the following table suggests). The focus on national rather than class land in Czechoslovakia proved to be grounds for tension between the Czechoslovak Communist Party (which favoured an anti-German policy) and the Slovak Communist Party (which, faced with little German land and much less Hungarian land than there was German land in Bohemia and Moravia, favoured a class-based approach to satisfy the land-hunger of its larger number of poorer peasants). German land was an important source of land too in Romania and Yugoslavia (where the title of the key act was *The Law on Agricultural*

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<sup>3</sup> BEREND, Iván T. – RÁNKI, György: *Economic development in East-Central Europe in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries*. Columbia University Press, New York, London, 1974. 186-195. BRASSLEY, Paul: *Land reform and reallocation in interwar Europe*. IN: CONGOST, Rosa –SANTOS, Rui (eds.): *Contexts of Property in Europe. The Social Embeddedness of Property Rights in Land in Historical Perspective*. Brepols, Turnhout, 2010. 145-164. MATHIJS, Erik: *An historical overview of Central and Eastern European land reform*. IN: SWINNEN, Johan F. M. (ed.): *Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Central and Eastern Europe*. Ashgate Publ. Comp. 1997. 33-54.

<sup>4</sup> CRAMPTON, Richard J.: *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – and After*. (Second edition.) London – New York, Routledge, 1997. 39-143.



*Reform and Colonisation*), and, of course in Poland where the resettlement of the 'Regained Territories' that had previously been part of Germany was also a process of colonisation.<sup>5</sup>

<i>Post WWII Land Reforms: Summary</i>			
<i>Country</i>	<i>Date of Reform</i>	<i>Upper Limit (hectares)</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Bulgaria	12/3/46	20	30 hectares in S. Dobrudzha. 15/4/45 already decree on 'lower type' labour coop farms
Czechoslovakia	21/6/45	50	German/Hungarian land only in 1945. 250 hectares limit in July 1947, 50ha limit March 1948
Hungary	17/3/45	115.1	57.55 hectares limit for landed gentry
Poland	6/9/44	100	Ave 7 hectares distributed in former German territories, 76% in total from German land
Romania	22/3/45	50	24% German land. Royal lands taken 1948. 1949 remaining land of 50 hectares taken
Yugoslavia	23/8/45	45	25-35 hectares cultivable land. 41% German land. Law on Agric Reform and Colonisation. End 1945 committed to Peasant Work Coops
East Germany	3/9/45	100	The Junker landlords were dispossessed and expelled.

### ***The Post-Land Reform Visions and Contrasting Approaches to Reform***

Although the subject of whether or not Stalin had a blueprint for Eastern Europe from the start which envisaged incorporation of all of Eastern Europe into the Soviet sphere of influence and the introduction of fully fledged socialist planning and collectivisation remains a question of perennial interest, most recent historiography inclines towards the view that there were significant national differences and that popular front policies such as land reform were not introduced cynically as a stepping stone to collectivisation. The reforms were in fact relatively modest. As the Polish examples below reveal, the communist parties were in most countries at pains to hold back the radicals who did not want propertied peasants to benefit. Only in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were there early attempts to move directly to collectivisation, and these were frowned on by Moscow.<sup>6</sup>

But, in fact, there was a good argument to say that the reforms were not a lasting solution. Doreen Warriner, a development economist, expert on land reform in Central Europe and the developing world, and an academic at London's School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies from 1947 to 1966, made the following comment:

<sup>5</sup> SWAIN, Geoffrey – SWAIN, Nigel: *Eastern Europe since 1945*. (Fourth edition) Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> SWAIN, Nigel: Eastern European Collectivisations Compared, 1945-62. IN: BAUERKÄMPER, Arndt – IORDACHI, Constantin (eds.): *The Collectivization of Agriculture in Communist Eastern Europe: Comparison and Entanglements*. Central European University Press, Budapest, 2013. (forthcoming)

„No one who knew what east European farming was like before can doubt that it was necessary to reorganise the farm system. The problem was the great number of small farms ... The new land reform had done nothing to tackle this problem; on the contrary, it created more small farms than before ... the next step necessarily had to be towards combining small farms into bigger units.”<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, Warriner predicted more rather than less conflict in villages: „The result of the reform has not been to equalise peasant property, but to increase the potential conflict between the interests of large and small peasants. ... The root of the problem, too much labour on the land, cannot be solved only in terms of redistribution of property. ... Clearly the reforms were the preliminary to further change; they were not the final solution, though they were a necessary step towards it”.<sup>8</sup>

By removing the landed aristocracy from the scene, the very real conflicts of interest between richer and poorer peasants were placed in sharper relief. The idea of peasant harmony on which much peasant politics relied would be exposed to even sharper scrutiny; and some further change was inevitable.

The dilemma was the same as everywhere: do you place a ‘wager on the strong’ as Stolypin tried to do in pre-revolutionary Russia, create a prosperous, efficient agriculture and hope that rapid industrialisation and urbanisation siphons the agrarian poor into industry and the city (and if not, to slums on the outskirts of the cities), or do you favour justice rather than efficiency, give land to all who have a valid claim, encourage co-operation (but not necessarily collectivisation) and also hope that industrialisation and urbanisation will siphon off the agrarian poor?

Proponents of the first vision favour more prosperous farmers, see it as important to establish unambiguous property rights to ease the future land market, and therefore favour the use of experts in organising the parcellisation of land. Proponents of the second vision see no need for experts, see the restrictions on future sale of land as permanent and therefore not requiring the intervention of experts. For justice, speed and the intervention of those affected supported by ‘activists’ is the key.

These contrasting visions of the post-land reform future are reflected to some extent in the policies of the Peasant Parties which were active within the Popular Front governments. Where they remained in the political spectrum (and the Agrarians were excluded from Czechoslovak politics because of their compromised pre-war and wartime past), they very soon became ‘catch-all’ parties of the political Right, usually because they were the only parties within the Popular Front spectrum that unambiguously supported private property.<sup>9</sup> Before this catch-all phase, their agrarian policies had reflected the ‘wager on the strong’ approach, in

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<sup>7</sup> WARRINER, Doreen: *Revolution in Eastern Europe*. London, Turnstile, 1950. 142.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. 140-1.

<sup>9</sup> SWAIN, Nigel: *The Fate of Peasant Parties during Socialist Transformation*. IN: HARRE, Angela – SCHULTZ, Helga (eds.): *Bauerngesellschaften auf dem Weg in die Moderne: Agrarismus in Ostmitteleuropa 1880 bis 1960*. Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2010. 163-176.

contrast to communist parties which favoured the alternative vision. Their commitment to capitalism was more ambiguous. The Smallholder's 1930 programme talked of abolishing the oppression of circulating capital on the Hungarian people,<sup>10</sup> while the land reform proposal, discussed more fully below, made it clear that banks, shareholder companies and other enterprises could not own land.<sup>11</sup> The question of the agrarian vision of those involved in land reforms, and the agricultural policies of the peasant parties is something that has disappeared from the historical agenda. Economic and social historians focus on the measures themselves and their economic and social consequences; political historians focus on the political struggle between the communist and peasant parties. Krystyna Kersten's long study of the establishment of communism in Poland scarcely mentions the land reform.<sup>12</sup> Korbonski's book, which informs much of our discussion of Poland, was published in 1965.<sup>13</sup>

### ***Competing Visions in Poland and in Hungary***

Poland and Hungary are appropriate countries for interrogating competing visions of land reform because in these two countries the reform debates were introduced in the context of competing parties with more or less public agrarian programmes (communists *versus* the Peasant Party in Poland, and communists in association with the National Peasant Party (NPP) *versus* the Smallholders' Party in Hungary).

In Poland, alternative visions of the future for agriculture impinged on two occasions. First, there were disagreements early on about the mechanics of the reform. Under the leadership of A. Witos, younger brother of the famous inter-war Polish peasant politician Wincenty Witos, *Wola Ludu* (a grouping of communist-friendly Peasant Party members who participated in the Polish Committee of National Liberation and illegally took the name Peasant Party in September 1944) favoured a reform model under which Land Offices and their staff would be used to supervise the land reform.<sup>14</sup> The communists had reservations about this idea, but in the spirit of Popular Front politics decided to accept it. Preparations for reform had begun in the summer of 1944 in response to two political rather than military imperatives: the need for the Moscow-backed representatives of Poland to have a policy more radical than anything Mikołajczyk in London might offer, and diverting attention from Soviet failure to support the Warsaw rising.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> NAGY, Ferenc: *Küzdelem a vasfüggöny mögött*. Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1990. 31.

<sup>11</sup> DONÁTH, Ferenc: *Demokratikus földreform Magyarországon 1945-47*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1969. 284.

<sup>12</sup> KERSTEN, Krystyna: *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943-1948*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991.

<sup>13</sup> KORBONSKI, Andrzej: *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960*. Columbia University Press, New York - London 1965.

<sup>14</sup> KORBONSKI (1965): 74-77.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* 72-73.

But things did not go according to the communists' expectations. Peasants and agricultural labourers were initially hesitant to claim their land, perhaps because of the greater general uncertainty at the time: the future borders of the country were still unclear; and there was an alternative government in London which opposed the reform. It did not take long for the communists to explain this hesitancy in terms of sabotage on the part of the Land Offices and their staff. Pressure built up over the course of September 1944 and on 10 October 1944 Witos was obliged to resign.<sup>16</sup>

The Communist Party had set itself a somewhat contradictory agenda. It was obliged to question the *Wola Luda* vision and the role of experts which was in danger of slowing down reform and restricting its 'revolutionary' nature. Yet the principles of the reform had been agreed within the Front government; landed peasants were to be included amongst its beneficiaries, despite the more radical vision of grassroots activists. The national party had to remind the local activists that they could not privilege agricultural labourers at the expense of wealthier landed peasants. They had to conform to the spirit of Popular Front government while at the same time rejecting a 'wager on the strong' vision of the agrarian future.

At a Central Committee meeting of 9 October 1944, Gomułka (referred to by his pseudonym) invoked Stalin to criticise their failure to use revolutionary techniques, while other members were critical of the role of Land Offices in slowing down reform.

Gomułka: *'Stalin considers that the slow pace of land reform will give our opponents a chance to organise. [He] does not think we are using revolutionary techniques. The abolition of a whole class is not a reform but a revolution and cannot be executed with the full majesty of the law.'*<sup>17</sup>

Zawadzki: *'The function of the Land Offices should be limited to technical matters, whereas the Peasants' Committees should be bolstered. We should arrest every single landowner and farm manager. Then the peasants will stop vacillating.'*<sup>18</sup>

Zambrowski: *'80% of the staff of the Land Offices are ex-officers. Using them it will take three years to measure out the land.'*<sup>19</sup>

Criticisms of the Land Offices were repeated at an activists' conference in Lublin held on 10-11 October 1944.

Białystok region secretary: *'I was very relieved and happy when I heard that Witos had been dismissed. The reactionary influences at the top of the Agriculture and Land Reform Department were very visible initially in Białystok. At the second briefing for the brigades, on 15 September, the director of the provincial Land*

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<sup>16</sup> KORBONSKI (1965): 74-80.

<sup>17</sup> POLONSKY, Antony – DRUKIER, Bolesław: *The Beginnings of Communist Rule in Poland*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Henly, 1980. 300.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> POLONSKY – DRUKIER (1980): 301.

*Office was very critical of the decree, saying that the land reform had been devised by politicians and not by the experts and that it could only be carried out after a year, because there were no surveyors etc. We made it clear that this kind of attitude was sabotage, the land could be measured out by foot or with wooden fathom measures so that the peasants would get their land in the prescribed time. The reactionaries in the Land Office desisted in their attacks for a time, but this lasted only until Majer, Witos's delegate arrived.*<sup>20</sup>

At the same conference, Gomulka felt obliged to warn them of the danger of extreme radicalism.

*„I would like to point out one error of the Białystok PPR. They decided to allocate two-thirds of the land on one farm to agricultural labourers, leaving only one third for the peasants. This is wrong because peasants have the same rights as agricultural labourers. They cannot get less than the labourers. ... We must never forget that the sooner the land is redistributed, the weaker Mikołajczyk's position will be.*”<sup>21</sup>

Similar views were expressed at the party's National Conference 12-13 November 1944 in a speech by Zambrowski on the land reform.

*„It is the intention of the PKWN ... that all the basic categories of peasants are eligible to receive land. This has not been the case in practice. There has been a universal trend to favour agricultural labourers at the expense of peasants. [Also] a tendency to exclude the middle peasants, even those with large families, from the subdivision.*”<sup>22</sup>

By February 1945, the Communist Party narrative of Poland's land reform was becoming clear, as Zambrowski elaborated in a speech to that month's party plenum.

*„The land reform in the formerly liberated territories took place in the face of the determined resistance of Polish reaction, of the landowners who ... terrorised the peasantry spreading rumours that the London émigrés would return to power and that those who took land would be punished.*

*The land reform was carried out, breaking the sabotage of the Land Offices ... which were penetrated by reactionary elements.*

*There were hesitations in the part of the Peasant Party where a small group proposed a theory of a land reform which would create 'productive' rural holdings, a theory whereby a land reform .... would give land to the peasant possessing more than 10 hectares but in which the landless, the small and medium peasants with less than 10 hectares would not receive land.*

*[T]here was a failure to understand that land reform could not be carried out if matters were not handed over to the mass of peasants themselves, to the hands of bodies elected by the peasantry, which would decide who was to benefit from the*

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<sup>20</sup> POLONSKY – DRUKIER (1980): 327-328.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. 349.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 369.

*land reform and how much land in a given place was to be given to every peasant.*<sup>23</sup>

It was clear who the enemies of the communist vision of land reform were: ‘experts’ who slowed the process down and de-radicalised it, and the proponents of a vision of a future agriculture based on prosperous family farms.

Some months later, in July 1945, Mikołajczyk returned to Poland from London as head of the Polish Peasant Party and was made Minister of Agriculture. He called for a peasant Poland based on strong independent farms, hoping that overpopulation would be solved ‘in some unspecified way’.<sup>24</sup> Encouraged by this, some landowners, who felt that the activist-led land reform that followed Witos’s removal had treated them unjustly, tried to go to court to get some of their land back. This prompted an immediate counterattack on the part of the communists, focusing on both Mikołajczyk himself and the Land Offices. In September 1945 police were instructed that all attempts to remove peasants from their newly acquired land should be resisted and those that already been dispossessed should be moved back. *‘This measure apparently proved decisive and there is no indication of any further questioning of the legality of the reforms.’*<sup>25</sup>

In Hungary where, as is discussed more fully below, Soviet pressure was for an extremely rapid reform, there were similarly competing visions regarding the role of experts and the pace of reform; but Soviet pressure in the winter and spring of 1945 accelerated even the most radical of domestic proposals.<sup>26</sup> National Peasant Party and Communist Party documentation referred to completion by October.<sup>27</sup> Following Soviet pressure, this was brought forward to so that the aim became having the reform 75% completed by the end of April 1945.<sup>28</sup>

In the „suitcase” of the Communist leaders returning from emigration in Moscow there was already a detailed programme for land reform which had been elaborated by Imre Nagy, their agricultural expert, who had written extensively in the interwar years on the need for such reform.<sup>29</sup> Rather than impose this vision directly, the Communist Party felt, in December 1944, that it would be politically more acceptable if the initial proposal were to come from the National Peasant

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<sup>23</sup> POLONSKY – DRUKIER (1980): 413-414.

<sup>24</sup> KORBONSKI (1965): 47-48. 84.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. 85.

<sup>26</sup> SOMLYAI, Magda M.: *Földreform 1945. Tanulmány és dokumentumgyűjtemény*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1965. 57. KENEZ, Peter: *Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets: the Establishment of the Communist Regime in Hungary, 1944-48*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.110.

<sup>27</sup> IZSÁK, Lajos – KUN, Miklós (eds.): *Moszkvának jelentjük... Titkos dokumentumok 1944-1948*. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 1994. 33-36. SZAKÁCS, Kálmán (ed.): *Marxizmus és Agrárkérdés: Szöveggyűjtemény a Tudományos Szocializmus szakos hallgatók részére*. Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Bölcsészettudományi Kar – Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 1974. 163.

<sup>28</sup> HORVÁTH, Julianna – SZABÓ, Éva – SZÚCS, László – ZALAI, Katalin (eds.): *Pártközi értekezletek. Politikai érdekegyeztetés, politikai konfrontáció 1944-1948*. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2003. 29-30.

<sup>29</sup> RAINER, János M.: *Nagy Imre 1896-1953. Politikai életrajz. I.* 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 1996. 161-82. 267-281.

Party which was seen as the representative of poorer sections of the peasantry. This decision was ratified by the central leadership on 5 January 1945.<sup>30</sup> During the war the Communist Party had talked of a 172.65 hectare (300 katasztralis hold) upper limit, rather than the 287.75 hectare (500 katasztralis hold) limit of the left-wing intellectuals who had made up the New March Front of 15 March 1937.<sup>31</sup> In October 1944, in an unpublished document, an upper limit of 115.1 hectares (200 katasztralis hold) was set, although no upper limit figured in the party proposal that appeared in November or the December programme of the Hungarian National Independence Front.<sup>32</sup> But by the time that the Communist Party was discussing the final version of the plan with the NPP prior to its launch, it had persuaded itself that the time was not opportune to 'open a front against large-scale peasant farmers'.<sup>33</sup> The NPP, which had considered lowering the limit to 28.76 hectares (50 katasztralis hold),<sup>34</sup> had to be persuaded of the merits of a differentiated, 'gentry holdings one hundred [katasztralis hold (57.55 ha)], peasant holdings two hundred [katasztralis hold (151.1 ha)]' policy, which, according to Ferenc Erdei who was in charge of drafting the NPP proposal, had never entered their minds since gentry and rich peasants alike acted against the interests of their small peasant supporters.<sup>35</sup> As soon as the land reform proposals had been published, delegations of poor peasants and estate workers, mobilised by the communists, the NPP, local organisations of the Smallholders and the Trade Union of Land Labourers, approached the Provisional Government demanding the implementation of the reform;<sup>36</sup> and by February the communists were calling for the immediate formation of land claimants' committees.<sup>37</sup>

An inter-party meeting was held on 15 March 1945 to discuss the land reform proposal; the plan was accepted by the provisional Council of Ministers on 17<sup>th</sup> and published on the 18<sup>th</sup>.<sup>38</sup> The discussion was hastily convened, or Ferenc Nagy of the Smallholders was invited as an afterthought; he was working on the party's latest reform proposal in Budapest when he was hurried into a car and driven overnight to Debrecen to participate.<sup>39</sup> The communists were insistent that the decree should be published on 15 March, Hungary's national day and anniversary of the 1848 revolution, and arrived with a ready-made decree with that date already on it.<sup>40</sup> Embittered as he was that three key proposals from his plan were ignored,

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<sup>30</sup> IZSÁK – KUN (1994): 11-16. 33-36. SZAKÁCS (1974): 161-162.

<sup>31</sup> ORBÁN, Sándor: *Két agrárforradalom Magyarországon*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1972. 24.; KOVÁCS, Imre: *Magyarország megszállása*. Katalizátor Iroda, Budapest, 1990. 235. SZAKÁCS (1974): 157-158.

<sup>32</sup> ORBÁN (1972): 24-25.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. 26.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> SZAKÁCS, Sándor: *Földosztás és agrárfejlődés a magyar népi demokráciában 1945-1948*. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1964. 21-23. SOMLYAI (1965): 43.

<sup>37</sup> SZAKÁCS (1964): 24-25.

<sup>38</sup> SOMLYAI (1965): 44. RAINER (1996): 272.

<sup>39</sup> NAGY (1948): 142.

<sup>40</sup> KOVÁCS (1990): 235.

Ferenc Nagy was able to insist that recipients receive a written document identifying their land.<sup>41</sup> Imre Kovács of the NPP reported that the meeting was equally hostile to his proposals which, as well as a suggestion of a two-stage reform, questioned the different upper limits for peasants and the landed gentry, a distinction which he felt was unjust and stupid. Overall, he felt that they were present simply to rubber stamp a decision that had already been taken.<sup>42</sup>

As in Poland, the central leadership had to rein in the enthusiasm of local cadres. At the end of March Rákosi wrote to Gerő complaining that the land reform was dominated too much by the communists, that other parties should be involved, and that it would be good to give land to a priest and make sure that the media covered it.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless the party leadership also stressed that the other parties should not be allowed to put the brakes on the tempo of reform.<sup>44</sup>

Although the Smallholders' Party did not judge it politic to submit its programme at the time of the debate on 15 March (Donáth speculates that it was intended for a 'full' session of the government once the whole of Hungary had been liberated),<sup>45</sup> a version that was finally published after the completion of collectivisation reveals a radically different vision. The plan was more large-scale-farmer-friendly in a number of ways, such as allowing all except war criminals 57.55 hectares (100 katasztralis hold) of land, suggesting that there should be at least one 230.2-287.75 hectare (4-500 katasztralis hold) farm per district to serve as a model, and in specifying compensation amounts. But the key difference was in the conception: land was to be awarded on the basis of providing a holding that could support a family of eight, a formulation akin to the Polish Peasant Party's vision of the 10 hectare farm referred to by Zambrowski above. 'Dwarf' landholders should disappear from the village and not reappear.<sup>46</sup> Many would lose out, of course, but, in a vision scarcely better specified than Mikołajczyk's, it assumed there would be land available elsewhere in the country and that the poor would just have to move. Yet one of the problems with the reform was simply that there was insufficient land to go round. As it was, former agricultural servants resident in barracks outside villages felt the village-based claimants committees excluded them unfairly.<sup>47</sup> Under the Smallholder proposal, these would remain landless, with the hope that industrialisation would eventually siphon them off the land.

The second big difference related to the organisation of the reform. The communist-NPP proposal called for committees of beneficiaries in every village – the land claimants' committees – who would, and did, operate without assistance from experts. The Smallholder reform, by contrast, proposed a district-level

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<sup>41</sup> NAGY (1948): 143-45.

<sup>42</sup> KOVÁCS (1990): 235.

<sup>43</sup> HORVÁTH – SZABÓ – SZŰCS – ZALAI (2003): 29-30.

<sup>44</sup> ORBÁN (1972): 32.

<sup>45</sup> DONÁTH, Ferenc: *Egy elkésett program*. *Agrártörténeti Szemle*, 1-2. (1962) 282. NAGY (1948): 143-144.

<sup>46</sup> DONÁTH (1962): 286.

<sup>47</sup> SOMLYAI (1965): 62.



committee made up of two claimants and two disinterested smallholder peasants, to work in tandem with the district court which would provide specialist advice.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, there would be an additional committee charged with assessing what size of farm was necessary for a family of eight, whose chair would be a '*certified farmer*' appointed by the district or county economic supervision organisation.<sup>49</sup> The Smallholder Plan further insisted that in fruit or vegetable-growing areas beneficiaries would have had to have completed a training course in the relevant branch of agriculture.<sup>50</sup> As in Poland, then, the differences related to the role of expertise and its possible negative impact on a fast and equitable solution. To the Communist mindset, expertise and '*neutral*' assessors were unnecessary complications, if not delaying tactics and sabotage, which would slow down reform as had briefly happened in Poland (although no explicit reference was made to Poland); to the Smallholders, experts were necessary in order to award viable farms and implement their vision of prosperous family farming.

After its electoral victory of 4 November 1945, the Smallholder vision briefly gained political traction, and to a greater degree than its Polish equivalent had when Mikołajczyk was Minister of Agriculture, although the parallels are striking. The communists had retained the Ministry of Agriculture as an '*institutional guarantee of the completion of the land reform*',<sup>51</sup> but at the grassroots level communist authority was challenged. All accounts agree that the speed of the land reform and the overall shortage of available land had resulted in some infringements of the regulations, particularly regarding the distinction between '*gentry*' and '*peasant*' holdings, and hence in what could be perceived as injustices.<sup>52</sup> Ferenc Nagy raised the issue of such injustices in parliament on 1 August 1945; Imre Nagy did not dispute the facts, merely noting that such '*excesses*' did not vitiate the value of the reform.<sup>53</sup> Following the elections, and perhaps inspired by Cardinal Mindszenty's pastoral letter of 18 October 1945, some landowners, as in Poland, went to court in order to gain redress and reverse such perceived injustices, with the support of some Smallholder politicians. In January 1946 Mihály Kerék, Smallholder head of the National Land Office, even called for revision of the land reform on a legal basis.<sup>54</sup> Such measures prompted a backlash from those who had newly received land. The land claimants' committees appealed to their national organisation; demonstrations (spontaneous and orchestrated) took place; and slogans such as '*we will not give back land*' contributed to the tense political situation which resulted in the establishment of

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<sup>48</sup> DONÁTH (1962): 285.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 285.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. 286.

<sup>51</sup> RAINER (1996): 304.

<sup>52</sup> SOMLYAI (1965): 77-78. SZAKÁCS (1964): 50. ORBÁN (1972): 36. This is even true of Ferenc Donáth's account who worked with Imre Nagy throughout. DONÁTH (1969): 63.

<sup>53</sup> RAINER (1996): 278-279.

<sup>54</sup> ESTÓK, János – FEHÉR, György – GUNST, Péter – VARGA, Zsuzsanna: *Agrárvilág Magyarországon 1848-2002*. Argumentum Kiadó – Magyar Mezőgazdasági Múzeum, Budapest, 2003. 271.

the Left-Wing Block on 7 March 1946.<sup>55</sup> The latter gave the Smallholders an ultimatum to back nationalisation, complete the land reform and decrease the number of civil servants. A few days later they demanded the exclusion of around eight Smallholder members of parliament: Rákosi's famous salami tactics had begun.<sup>56</sup> The struggle of the communists against the major party representing peasant interests subsequently became a matter of power politics rather than competing agrarian visions, as it had in Poland once the land reform had been placed beyond question.

### ***East Germany and Hungary in comparison***

As is clear from the analysis so far, the Soviet Union has to be included in any discussion on the land reforms following World War II, Yet the Soviet Union is a participant that is hardly ever mentioned in papers published prior to 1989 in Central-Eastern-Europe. The disclosure of party archives provided access to sources that may meet a long felt need.

As is well known, large estates made up the dominant part of landed property in Hungary as well as Eastern Germany up to 1945. In the interwar period Hungary became Europe's large estate country in the most extreme sense of the word. Nearly half of the country's arable land was owned by a few dozen of aristocratic families, yet the proportion of non-aristocratic large estates was high.<sup>57</sup> The proportion of estates larger than 100 ha in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) was somewhat smaller at close to 30 % of all arable land.<sup>58</sup>

It is also well known that both countries had closed World War II on the side of the defeated and experienced Soviet occupation as a result. In the following section we attempt to give an overview of the similarities and differences in the ways in which the Soviet Union exerted influence and pressure on Hungary and Eastern Germany respectively concerning the reform of landed property.

As we have seen, the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP) had returned from their exile in Moscow with an elaborate plan of the reform of landed property. They were aware that the peasantry had been distrustful to them due to the Soviet Republic's nationalization of landed property back in 1919, and this had been part of their motivation for concluding an agreement with members of the NPP that had been representing the poor peasants. As a result, the NPP was the first organization to publicly undertake a concept that was in accordance with the plan the communists had brought along from Moscow.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> ORBÁN (1972): 47-49.

<sup>56</sup> PALASIK, Mária: *Chess Game for Democracy: Hungary between East and West, 1944-1947*. McGill-Queen's University Press – Ithaca, Montreal & Kingston, London, 2011. 64-65.

<sup>57</sup> BEREND – RÁNKI (1974): 191-195.

<sup>58</sup> WEBER, Adolf: *Umgestaltung der Eigentumsverhältnisse und der Produktionsstruktur in der Landwirtschaft der DDR*. IN: *Materialien der Enquete-Kommission "Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland"*. Bd. II/4. Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995. 2837-2838.

<sup>59</sup> IZSÁK – KUN (1994): 59-61.

Politicians of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) living in exile in Moscow – Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht and the agrarian expert Edwin Hoernle – had also concretized their idea of the reform of landed property in the autumn of 1944.<sup>60</sup> Even though the KPD planned the reform to be a facilitating force behind a massive anti-Nazi movement on the home front in areas yet to be liberated, by early 1945, this plan proved illusory.

In Hungary, however, where the leaders of the MKP returned simultaneously with the advance of the Red Army, the military interest of the Soviet Union did play an important role. Voroshilov, the president of the Allied Control Commission, had informed the Hungarian leaders that the land reform was to be executed without delay. His reasoning was based on military interests — that is, a rapid distribution of land could bring about the dissolution of the Hungarian Army still fighting in Transdanubia (in western Hungary), and thus lessen Red Army losses.<sup>61</sup>

Soviet pressure did not only affect timing but also the fact that the reform of landed property took effect not as an act of parliament but as a government decree.<sup>62</sup> This happened in spite of the fact that the MKP itself had planned to pass the act following the full liberation of the country after the Provisional National Assembly had moved from the eastern part of the country back to the capital. What happened in fact, though, was that by the beginning of the spring working season, the land distribution had already been completed in most areas of Hungary.

In keeping with the decree on land reform issued on 17 March 1945, estates over 575.5 hectares (1000 katasztralis hold) in Hungary were expropriated, as were large leaseholds, the estates of big companies, and the lands of war criminals, the leaders of the Arrow Cross and far-right organisations. That part of peasant estates over 115.1 hectares (200 katasztralis hold), and that part of noble estates over 57.55 hectares (100 katasztralis hold), were expropriated in return for nominal compensation. The two categories were distinguished on the basis of the owner's birth. The only exception was made in the case of those who had participated in the anti-Fascist resistance, who were allowed to retain 172.65 hectares (300 katasztralis hold).<sup>63</sup>

The Soviet leadership interfered with the timing of the German reform process, too. The leaders of the KPD returned in the belief that their land reform plan had

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<sup>60</sup> In late 1944, the plans was that the parts of large estates exceeding 150 ha should be expropriated. SCHERSTJANOI, Elke: *SED-Agrarpolitik unter sowjetischer Kontrolle, 1949-53*. München, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007. 47-57.

<sup>61</sup> BARÁTH, Magdolna – CSEH, Gergő Bendegúz: *A SZEB első három hónapja 1945 tavaszán*. Társadalmi Szemle, 11. (1995) 83-94.

<sup>62</sup> On 17 March 1945 the Provisional National Government issued decree 600/1945 on land reform. SZÚCS, László (szerk.): *Dálnoki Miklós Béla kormányának (Ideiglenes Nemzeti Kormány) minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvei. 1944. december 23.-1945. november 15.* A. kötet Budapest, Magyar Országos Levéltár, 1997. 282-287.

<sup>63</sup> SZAKÁCS, Sándor: *From Land Reform to Collectivization (1945-1956)* IN: GUNST, Péter (ed.), *Hungarian Agrarian Society from the Emancipation of Serfs (1848) to the Re-privatization of Land (1998)* New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 258-259.

been postponed. Stalin, however made its importance clear to them, justifying it in terms of safety policy and public supply.<sup>64</sup> On 11 June 1945, the KPD was the first among the parties to publicly announce its program which identified the elimination of large estates along with all livestock, farm implements and buildings as one of the most urgent tasks.<sup>65</sup> The other three parties — the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the liberal LDP — did not have such elaborate plans concerning the reform of landed property; but, like the Peasant Party in Poland and the Smallholders in Hungary, they did not agree with waiving compensation and also raised issues of economic efficiency.<sup>66</sup>

At the conference in Potsdam, Stalin was disappointed to find that he did not manage to assert sufficiently Soviet reparation claims.<sup>67</sup> Even though land reform in Germany was not an issue at the conference, Stalin came to the decision to put the reform through without further delay and without negotiations with the western powers. This was part a demonstration of power and part a test of the strength of the anti-Fascist coalition. As a result of the decision made by the Soviet Union, the leaders of the KPD held several talks with representatives of the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD).<sup>68</sup> Latest archival research has enabled us to follow Soviet interference concerning estate boundaries. In the summer of 1945, the leaders of the KPD made a suggestion that the upper limit of estates in the case of wealthy peasants should be 50 hectares. This was explicitly rejected by the Soviet authorities.<sup>69</sup> It has even been suggested that it was Stalin himself who made the decision on the 100-hectare upper limit, reasoning that this way the German communists would acquire only half as many enemies.<sup>70</sup>

At the same time as these background talks, the land reform was highlighted in the press. By late August, it was even reported that: „*Large estates remain virtually untouched, while other democratic countries like Poland, Hungary, Rumania or Bulgaria have gone energetically ahead with the reform of landed property. What is it that we are waiting for?*”<sup>71</sup> Newspapers under the supervision of the KPD emphasized that the land reform was the expression of the demand of

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<sup>64</sup> LAUFER, Jochen: *Die UdSSR und die Einleitung der Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone*. IN: BAUERKÄMPER, Arnd (Hrsg.): *"Junkerland in Bauernhand"? Durchführung, Auswirkungen und Stellenwert der Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone*. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996. 21-36.

<sup>65</sup> BENSER, Günter – KRUSCH, Hans-Joachim (Hrsg): *Dokumente zur Geschichte der kommunistischen Bewegung in Deutschlands. Reihe 1945/1946*. Bd. 1. München, 1993. 227-233.

<sup>66</sup> WEBER (1995): 2827-2831.

<sup>67</sup> FULBROOK, Mary: *The Divided Nation. Fontana History of Germany, 1918-1990*. London, Fontana Press, 1991. 132-134.

<sup>68</sup> BAUERKÄMPER, Arnd: *Die verlorene Antifaschismus. Die Enteignung der Gutsbesitzer und der Umgang mit dem 20. Juli 1944 bei der Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone*. Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 42. (1994) 627.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. 623-634.

<sup>70</sup> SEMJONOW, Wladimir, S: *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission, 1939-1991*. Nicolai, Berlin, 1995. 237-239.

<sup>71</sup> *Berliner Zeitung*, 29. August 1945.

German people. It was at this time that the catchphrase „*Junkerland in Bauernhand*” the slogan of the KPD’s countryside campaign.

The ‘*democratic land reform*’ of 1945 was initiated not in the whole of the Soviet Occupation Zone, but in the Prussian Province of Saxony (Halle). This implied a local decision, but it was followed by almost identical measures in the other *Länder* and *Provinzen*. The decree of September announced the ‘*liquidation of feudal-Junker large landed property and of the lordship of the Junker and large estate owners in the village*’, and specified the terms of expropriation. All land and property was to be confiscated without compensation from war criminals and ‘*war guilty*’, from National Socialist leaders and from active proponents of the NSDAP.<sup>72</sup>

Comparing the concrete regulations of the reform in Eastern Germany and Hungary, we can see that while Hungarian estate size limits were below the German ones, proprietors in Hungary were allowed to keep estates smaller than 57.5 hectares. Furthermore, proprietors able to prove their anti-Fascist activities during the war were allowed to keep as much as 172.65 hectares. The Junker landlords were left with nothing in the Soviet Occupation Zone; and in most cases they were also displaced from their homes. Backed by the Soviet military, instructions were given for evacuation of manor houses and estates within 24 or 48 hours. Soviet advisors held the opinion from the beginning that this group should be isolated. Following screening procedures they were taken to reception camps and later to former concentration camps. A common justification for such measures was their sabotaging of the harvest, etc. Male family heads faced arrest and transportation to the Baltic island of Rügen, where an unknown number perished.<sup>73</sup>

Interestingly, in Hungary, the most radical measure of confiscation without compensation was directed at the Catholic church which had been the largest landowner in the country, possessing 16% of cultivated land.<sup>74</sup> In Eastern Germany, however, church lands remained largely untouched.<sup>75</sup>

Both communist parties paid special attention to the pacification of peasant groups with ownership. To this end, in Hungary the upper limit for exemption was 115.1 hectares (200 katasztralis hold) for peasant-owned land, while at the same time it was 57.55 hectares (100 katasztralis hold) for land owned by the so-called gentry. As another measure to win the trust of the peasants in Hungary, it was emphasized right from the beginning that land was given to beneficiaries as

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<sup>72</sup> WEBER (1995): 2837-2843.

<sup>73</sup> HOLZ, Martin: *Evakuerte, Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene auf der Insel Rügen 1943-1961*. Köln, Böhlau Verlag, 2003.193-213.

<sup>74</sup> While some compensation was offered for the expropriation of secular estates, 440,257 hectares of the 496,081 hectares of landed estates belonging to the Catholic Church were distributed without compensation. KENEZ (2006): 112-113. SZAKÁCS (1998): 260-261.

<sup>75</sup> OSMOND, Jonathan: *From Junker estate to co-operative farm: East German agrarian society 1945-1961*. IN: MAJOR, Patrick – OSMOND, Jonathan (eds.): *The workers' and peasants' state: communism and society in east Germany under Ulbricht, 1945-1971*. Manchester, New York, Manchester University Press, 2002. 135-139.

private property registered in the land register. New owners were awarded an ornate certificate by the communist minister of agriculture.

Although the KPD too awarded land to German peasants, it was on a radically different basis. The confiscated large estates were united in a state-owned land fund. Those claiming land received it from this fund for their private use. But even though it was registered in the land register, this did not mean that they gained full ownership.<sup>76</sup> The land distributed could not be inherited; rather it could be conveyed to descendants on the condition that they accepted to continue working it (so-called *vererbbares Eigentum*). Similarly, the redistributed land could not be sold or leased, nor could it be mortgaged. It could be alienated only on condition that the original beneficiary found a new owner who would take it over.<sup>77</sup>

German communists emphasized that long-term leasehold rights granted by the distribution of land provided a more secure basis for private farming than regular proprietorship. As a major advantage they pointed out that the leasehold could not be taken away from new owners against their will.<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, the new farms were not charged the high redemption price and new owners did not have to worry later about raised farm rents either.<sup>79</sup>

The Hungarian land reform of 1945, expropriating more than one-third of the whole territory and distributing about a quarter, was the most radical land reform following World War II. Almost 60 per cent of the 3,222,800 hectares of expropriated land was distributed among 642,342 claimants—predominantly agricultural workers, farmhands and the owners of dwarf estates—while the remaining 40 per cent (mainly forests and pastureland) became the property of the state, villages or co-operatives.<sup>80</sup>

Similar radicalism characterized the East German land reform in 1945. One-third of agricultural land was redistributed in a matter of months. The land was to be distributed to land-impooverished peasants (those with under 5 hectares), landless labourers, 'resettlers' (*Umsiedler*), and refugees (*Flüchtlinge*) from the East, municipal authorities and urban workers and employees. The parcels were generally to be no more than 5 hectares.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> This practice shows a close connection to the Soviet land nationalization in 1917. NOVE, Alec: *An Economic History of the U.S.S.R.* Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd. 1972. 48-49.

<sup>77</sup> SCHERSTJANOI (2007): 69-72.

<sup>78</sup> This came to cause some difficulties because, for example, neglecting farming duties in itself was not a sufficient reason to lose one's land. New owners could only be stripped of their land for the following reasons: receipt of a penalty which involved full confiscation of property; leaving the land and moving elsewhere; or if it was later discovered that the recipient had not been entitled to claim land because of, for instance, being a member of the Nazi party. *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> New owners who were given land had to pay a concessionary purchase price: they had to pay the price of one year of rye crop per hectare which meant an amount between 200 and 300 Reich Marks. Poorer peasants had the opportunity to pay by instalments over ten years, agricultural workers were given a period of twenty years.

<sup>80</sup> SZAKÁCS (1998): 260-264.

<sup>81</sup> BAUERKÄMPER, Arnd: *Ländliche Gesellschaft in der kommunistischen Diktatur. Zwangsmodernisierung und Tradition in Brandenburg 1945-1963.* Köln/Weimar/Wien, Böhlau Verlag, 2002. 68-122.

The mechanism used to carve out the holdings was the Commission for the Implementation of the Land Reform, established at community (Gemeinde), area (Kreis) and district (Bezirk) level. In each community the Commission of five-seven persons was elected by those who stood to be recipients of land. The system was similar in Hungary where, as noted above, the land reform was implemented by land claim commissions made up of claimants, who expropriated and distributed land after the gathering of data.<sup>82</sup>

As even such a brief review demonstrates, a systematic comparison of the reforms of landed property in these two countries could be continued to great effect. Furthermore, while there has been extensive research in this area on the local (micro-) as well as the regional-level in Germany, in Hungary, research on the land reform has been a curiously neglected topic since the political transition.<sup>83</sup>

### ***Concluding remarks***

Agrarian history remains an unfashionable area of historical research, but taking history beyond the national narrative is not. In our present paper, we have endeavoured to rethink an element of agrarian history, the postwar land reforms, from a comparative perspective. We have transcended national narratives and compared the Hungarian with Poland on the one hand, and East Germany on the other. In the first half of our paper we compared the competing land reform visions of different parties in Poland and Hungary, in the second we compared the mechanics of distributing the feudal large estates in the Soviet Occupation Zone and Hungary.

The focus of our examination in the two cases was different, however, it became clear that Soviet influence merits particular attention in both cases. Studying the aims and channels of Soviet influence suggests overwhelming concern for the pattern of development in both cases but not the existence of a Soviet blueprint for the region. Soviet decision-makers paid detailed attention to the specifics of the countries that they occupied, not only to the social and economic differences between them, but to the different degrees to which their allies the communist parties were socially embedded.

It is well known, that this differentiation did not last long. In 1948, with the growing tension within the antifascist coalition, copying the Soviet model became the only acceptable way for the Communist parties of the Eastern region. However, the inheritance of the post-war land reforms lingered long, and impeded the new Soviet vision of collectivising the millions of individual peasant farms of Central-Eastern-Europe.

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<sup>82</sup> WEBER (1995): 2831-2839. SZAKÁCS (1998): 259-261.

<sup>83</sup> VARGA, Zsuzsanna: *Agrárgazdaság és vidéki társadalom az NDK-ban.* (Historiográfiai áttekintés) IN: *Redite ad cor. Tanulmányok Sahin-Tóth Péter emlékére.* Budapest, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2008. 597-607.





László Szalai

## ***The Great Fatherland War and the patriotic idea in the Soviet propaganda***

### **Abstract**

In Soviet ideology, the influence of patriotism had already formed before the Great Patriotic War. Beside historiography, evidence can be found in novels, dramas, movies and in partyleaders' speeches. The promoting propaganda brochures' favorite themes were Aleksandr Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dmitry Pozharsky, Suvorov and Kutuzov. Beside Russians, they emphasized other nations' heroic traditions too, but after the favourable turn in the war, this was overshadowed by the one sided praising of Russians. The ideological apparat's position wasn't unified: historians divided into the internationalist and Russian patriotic schools.

*Keywords:* soviet propaganda, soviet historiography, Great Fatherland War, social mobilization, Stalin,

In the Soviet Union patriotism manifested in the era of civil war and intervention, and it meant the socialist nation's defense against the capitalists (military officers, landlords).<sup>1</sup> In the years of 1920 M.N Pokrovsky's sociological, class-centric school was the most influential in historiography. In the 1930's a certain change can be noticed in Soviet historiography: the nation-builder rulers, as Ivan III, IV and Peter I were shown progressive and patriotic. Earlier they were seen as tyrants. Beside historiography, the new approach appeared in novels, dramas and movies too. This way they tried to promote the new concept to the whole public. Peter The Great was the theme of Aleksey Tolstoy's many novels and dramas.<sup>2</sup> Alexandr Nevsky defeated the livonian knights near the lake Peipus. Eizenstein's movie premiered in 1938, but because of its openly anti-German views, after the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in September 1939, it was removed from the theaters.<sup>3</sup> On 7 November, 1941, when the nazi soldiers were only a few kilometers away from Moscow, to inspire the soldiers, Stalin in his speech on the Red Square recited the name of Nevsky beside of Dmitry Donskoy, Minin and Pozharsky, Suvorov and Kutuzov as a heroic example. In 1942 Nevsky, Suvorov and Kutuzov honours were found, to award the military officers.<sup>4</sup> These names mark the aforementioned turn in the

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<sup>1</sup> E. A. REES: *Stalin and Russian nationalism*. IN: Geoffrey HOSKING - Robert SERVICE (ed.): *Russian Nationalism Past and Present*. London, 1998. 81.

<sup>2</sup> Maureen PERRIE: *Nationalism and History: The Cult of Ivan zhe Terrible in Stalin's Russia*. IN: Geoffrey HOSKING - Robert SERVICE( ed.): *Russian Nationalism Past and Present*. London, 1998. 107-109.

<sup>3</sup> Richard OVERY: *Russia's War*. London, 2010. 162.

<sup>4</sup> OVERY: 115. and Geoffrey ROBERTS: *Stalin's Wars*. New Haven-London, 2008. 133.

ideology. Minin and Pozharsky were left out from the pre-war „hero making”. Pudovkin’s movie premiered in 1939, the same year, V. I. Kostylev’s novel published, Kuzma Minin. While creating Minin’s and Pozharsky’s patriotic cult, they built upon earlier models, like Glinka’s opera, „*A Life for the Tzar*”, which was revised and premiered again in the Great Theater, in 1939 under the title Ivan Susanin.<sup>5</sup>

After 22 June, 1941 Soviet propaganda materials’ main goal was to calm the public, that the Soviet government can manage the situation. In his speech, Molotov alluded to the Russian nation’s earlier great victory over the attacking enemies: Mihail Kutuzov’s victory over Napoleon in 1812.<sup>6</sup> The Soviet government helped naming the fight as Great Patriotic War, referring to the nation defending war in 1812. Heroizing the old systems’ representatives were dangerous, because it was about making examples of the czar systems’ defenders, but still: the military leaders’ portraits were the most widespread forms of war propaganda.

Some historians sought after different examples of inspiration in other nations. The propaganda wanted to address the workers and peasants beside the soldiers. Traditional themes of Soviet propaganda (socialism, personal cult) had lost from their importance, family and words about defending the nation proved more effective.<sup>7</sup> Stalin spent a lot of time working on his speech on 3 July 1941, like Molotov, he wanted to calm the people, emphasizing, that Hitler’s army isn’t invincible. He made an example of Napoleon’s and Wilhelm II German emperor’s army, which were also believed invincible. He also pointed out the Soviet nations’ friendship and warned the nations, that Hitler wants to enslave them, take their sovereignty and destroy their culture.<sup>8</sup> Emphasizing the nations’ friendship was typical in the first months of the war, but later the Russian thematic became the dominant. The conflict between highlighting the nations’ equality and raising the Russian nation was a result of the pre-war Russian centric views and the restricted usability of the non-Russian people’s propaganda. The propagandists waited for higher orders, but in the meantime the propaganda needed to be continued for saving the nation, so the old clichés were mixed with war themes.<sup>9</sup> Stalin’s speech on 7 November, 1941, clarified the situation. He listed the names of previous, pre-revolution figures, who were painted as patriots in the years of war: Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dmitry Pozharsky, Aleksandr Suvorov and Mihail Kutuzov. Despite these persons were defenders of the czarist system, they

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<sup>5</sup> PERRIE: 111.

<sup>6</sup> Molotov’s speech on the radio. 22. June 1941. [http://www.history-of-war.ru/41-g-vistuplenie\\_v.m.\\_molotova\\_po\\_radio\\_22\\_iyna\\_1941\\_g.\\_gazeta\\_mo.html](http://www.history-of-war.ru/41-g-vistuplenie_v.m._molotova_po_radio_22_iyna_1941_g._gazeta_mo.html) (08 Feb. 2013.)

<sup>7</sup> David BRANDENBERGER: „. . . It Is Imperative to Advance Russian Nationalism as the First Priority” *Debates within the Stalinist Ideological Establishment, 1941-1945*. IN: Ronald Grigor SUNY and Terry MARTIN (ed.): *The State of Nations. Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*. New York. 2001. 277.

<sup>8</sup> STALIN: *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. Radio Address. July 3, 1941. <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/GPW46.html> (08 Feb. 2013.)

<sup>9</sup> BRANDENBERGER: 278-279.

became the main figures of the Soviet propaganda.

Stalin in his speech on 3 July, 1941, addressed the people not as comrades, but as brothers, strengthening the feeling of fellowship. According to the party and police reports, the speech boosted the patriotic feelings mainly in Moscow.<sup>10</sup> In Stalin's speech on 6 November, 1941, at Mayakovsky metro station, the idea of patriotism advanced.<sup>11</sup> He was alluding to the Germans' waiting for feud between the Soviet nations. However Stalin thought, the failures had brought together the working-peasant union and the Soviet nations' friendship. In his speech he separated nationalism and imperialism: „*Can hitlerists be called nationalists? No, because hitlerists aren't nationalists, but imperialists.*” By nationalism Stalin meant the effort to unite the German territories. There wasn't anymore a judging, secondary meaning of nationalism, like earlier.<sup>12</sup> When he reviewed the nazis' general ideas about war, he quoted Hitler's thoughts about exterminating the Slavic nations. „*And these animalistic, uscrupulous and dishonest people are so audacious, that they call upon the destruction of the great Russian nation of Plekhanov and Lenin, Belinsky and Chernyshevsky, Pushkin and Tolstoy, Glinka and Tchaikovsky, Gorky and Chekhov, Sechenov and Pavlov, Repin and Surikov, Suvorov and Kutuzov.*” Henceforth Stalin was telling about the inevitable defeat of the nazi army and referred Hitler in parallel to Napoleon. Stalin stated, that although Hitler also wanted a new system and conquer Europe, „*Hitler isn't more similar to Napoleon, than a cat to a lion, because Napoleon fought against the reaction forces with progressive forces, but Hitler rely on reaction forces and fight against progressive forces.*” In the part where Stalin stated the tasks ahead, he went back to Molotov's speech's ending line, that the Soviet Union and its allies are waging war to liberate Europe's and the Soviet Union's conquered nations.<sup>13</sup>

On 7<sup>th</sup> November, in his speech on the Red Square he paralleled the current situation with the one in 1918, when the situation was more grim, still they could defeat the enemy. The army is more advanced, the nation's industry and food supply is better, and the whole country supports the fight against the nazis.<sup>14</sup> These speeches were motivated by the war efforts' overwhelming needs. Stalin was careful about balancing his patriotic statements with mentioning Lenin's name and the worker-peasant unity.<sup>15</sup> The morale reports from the days after the speech showed increasing faith in victory and the Soviet system.<sup>16</sup> On 10 August, 1941, a Pan-Slavic meeting were made in the Soviet Union, and in October a Pan-

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<sup>10</sup> ROBERTS: 95.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 109.

<sup>12</sup> REES: 88.

<sup>13</sup> STALIN: *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. 24th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. November 6, 1941. <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/GPW46.html> (08 Feb. 2013.)

<sup>14</sup> STALIN: *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. Speech Delivered at the Red Army Parade on the Red Square. November 7, 1941. <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/GPW46.html> (08 Febr 2013.)

<sup>15</sup> REES: 89.

<sup>16</sup> ROBERTS: 110-111.

Slav Committee were founded. It was represented by names such as Aleksey Tolstoy, Alexandr Fadeyev, Nikolai Tikhonov and Dmitry Schostakowitsch. On the congresses of the committee they emphasized the Slavic nations' togetherness, the peaceful and free progress and the proudness of being Slav. From January, 1943 the „*Slavyane*” magazine were published monthly.<sup>17</sup> On 24 May, 1945, on the reception held for the leaders of the Red Army in the Kreml, he emphasized the merits of the Russian nation in war.<sup>18</sup>

Beyond patriotism, they tried to earn the support of the church for the fight. In 1943 the Russian orthodox church and the state came to terms, but Sergei metropolitan, the head of the pravoslav church, already called up on defending the nation in the service of the atheist state.<sup>19</sup>

Yaroslavsky, the head historian of the party, published an article in the Pravda. In this article he states, that the Bolsheviks are the great and honorable Russian past's rightful successors and paralleled the leading role of the party and the leading role of the Russian nation. The head of the Soviet ideological apparatus, A. S. Scherbakov made a similar state a week later: the Russian nation became the first of the equals of the Soviet nations family and they bear the largest part of the fight against the German oppressors. These statements bear witnesses to the overshadowing of the other nations. In relation to the Soviet war propaganda we must note that the Russian centric view was only one aspect beside the showing of the heroic war efforts and the works of the homefront. Non-Russian centric articles were also published in the propaganda with increasing number, for example an article in magazine, Propagandist (in 1942), where the author blamed the republican magazines for the lack of national hero images. This also shows the central policy's irregularities, which was mainly Russian centric, but tried to involve the non-Russian nations in the war agitation. With the patriotic normatives, amateur historians considered tsarist generals even such as Yermolov or Skobelev patriotic. This fitted into the great power mentality.<sup>20</sup> Stalin's notes about Engels' article of the Russian foreign politics in the 19th century, were served as a base.<sup>21</sup> S. K. Bushuev in his M. D. Gorchakov's monography reviewed the tsarist foreign politics under Aleksandr I and Nicholas I with positive value, unlike the earlier canon. Yakovlev and Tarle asked for the review of the tsarist colonialism, and the changing of such fundamental historiographic theses about the Russian empire, like „*Europe's gendarme*”, or „*nations' prison*”. Their reasoning: the other great powers were reactionists too, and the tsarist empire didn't stick out of them. Nevertheless this view considered unique in the historiography of the era.

<sup>17</sup> GECSE Géza: *Bizáncról Bizáncig. Az orosz birodalmi gondolat*. Budapest, 2007. 227.

<sup>18</sup> STALIN: *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. Speech at the Reception in the Kremlin in Honour of the Commanders of the Red Army. May 24, 1945. <http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/GPW46.html> (08 Feb. 2013.)

<sup>19</sup> OVERY: 162.

<sup>20</sup> BRANDENBERGER: 278-279.

<sup>21</sup> YURGANOV: *Russkoe natsionalnoe gosudarstvo: Zhiznenny mir istorikov epohu stalinizma*. Moscow, 2011.

Internationalists didn't accept the Russians' ethnic domination, nor did they wanted to leave the class centric analysis behind. They did everything for the progression of non-Russian historiography. The conflict between the historians' two school can be seen in the book, titled „*History of the Kazakh SSR.*”.<sup>22</sup> When it came out, there was a wide argument about the nationstate/centralistic nationstate/centralistic state ideas, and their birth.<sup>23</sup> The book, which came out in 1943, commends the non-Russian nations' war history and emphasizes the tsarist system's oppressive nature, which quelled the uprisings. This view was criticized by A. I. Yakovlev and he described the tsarist oppression as a defensive act against Hiva and Kokand emirates' attacks. Pankratove, the book's editor was protested against the judgement, reasoning with various Lenin and Stalin quotes and boosting the Kazakh nation's war morale.<sup>24</sup>

Yakovlev's reasoning (that the tsarist empire's expansion was needed because of the Russian nation's defense) were confronted by Pankratova with Lenin's repulsive views about the colonization. In relation with the uprisings, Pankratova emphasizes, that the Kazakhs took role in the Pugachev uprising, and similarly the Russians took role in the Kazakh uprisings.<sup>25</sup> Historians divided into two groups: Pankratova and his followers, and E. V. Tarle, Yakovlev and their associates. Pankratova blamed his opponents for renewing the idea of state above classes, but he didn't forget to emphasize that he recognizes the Russian nation's dominant role. He admitted, that in the times of Ivan III and Ivan IV the national state took a progressive direction, but under Nicholas I the reactionist traits were strengthened and Russia became the „*nations' prison*”. The other group talked about Russia's interests.<sup>26</sup> In the beginning of 1944 P. N. Fedoseev criticized the book for his anti-Russianism and for not admitting the fact, that Russians lifted the Kazakhs to the nations of history. Pankratova furiously objected at Zhdanov. He didn't understood why non-Russian nations' bravery against the oppressive tsarist regime wasn't accepted. He pointed out again, that the non-Russian nations are also fighting for liberty and independence and he referred to the Red Army's heroic and brave traditions and its national unity. Pankratova wrote a letter to the party's leaders (Stalin, Zhdanov, Malenkov and Scherbakov) and criticized the Agitation Department, and historians as well, as artists like A. N. Tolstoy and S.M. Eizenstein. The latter was found by him too populist because his image of Ivan IV. Pankratova urged a call of a conference, to settle the disputes. This conference have never been summoned, but in March and April of 1944, the leader of the Agitation Department, G. F. Aleksandrov criticized both internationalists and the nationalists. The criticism concerned mostly Pankratov, not only blaming him for unpatriotism but stigmatizing him as a member of Pokrovsky's school. The Central

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<sup>22</sup> BRANDENBERGER: 280-281.

<sup>23</sup> YURGANOV: 686-692.

<sup>24</sup> BRANDENBERGER: 281-282.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 282-283.

<sup>26</sup> YURGANOV: 693-694.

Comittee wanted to settle the divide between historians on a conference in the early summer of 1944. The main goal of the conference would have been to answer the quarrels by making a common ground involving leading historians. The conference couldn't accomplish its goals, so the Central Comittee wanted to clarify the situation in an announcement, but Aleksandrov just repeated his earlier statements from spring, which dissatisfied Scherbakov.<sup>27</sup>

Zhdanov took the statements' fate in his own hands. In his decree he named two heretic movements amongst the historians: the bourgeois-monarchist Milyukovist (Yefimov, Yakovlev, Tarle) movement, and the sociologist Pokrovsky's school (Pankratova, etc.). They criticized the mashing of the tzarist and Soviet past. The dispute was settled with this decree, and as the Soviet troops liberated the territories of the Soviet Union, it became unnessecary to refer to the heroic traditions of the non-Russian nations. This confirmed by that the Central Comittee criticized the war propaganda in Kazakhstan, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, because they appreciated the uprisings against the Russian tzars. They wrote about the mongolian conquer, as an era of ruling against the Russians, and about the national heroes fighting against Russians. After the war, numerous decree criticized those aspects.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> BRANDENBERGER: 283-286.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 286-288.

Gábor Székely

## ***Deutschland. Reparations- und Krisenmanagement 1924-1929. Die politischen Wirkungen des Dawes- und des Young-Plans***

### **Ein gescheitertes Krisenmanagement – die Weimarer Republik**

#### **Abstract**

Albeit Germany lost the Great War, its geopolitical position was strengthened. The great powers such as Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire disappeared from its country boundaries, and France was seriously weakened. Germany still had the highest economic potential of continental Europe. What Germany had to solve was the financing of the economy, which was hindered by Brand's increase of public debt from the pre-war 5 billion to 100 billion as well as by the reparation payments. The former was largely eliminated by the super-inflation in 1923 while the latter was solved by the end of the 1920s through the help of the Dawes- and Young-plans. The reason for the collapse of the Weimar Republic was not the economic crisis, but the incorrect management of the political crisis in 1930-1932. This incorrect management shaped the President's governments from 1930, whose failure led to Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor.

*Keywords:* Germany between the two WW, geopolitical position of Germany, Dawes- and Young-plans, economic and political crisis in Germany, appointing Hitler's as Chancellor

#### ***Die Ursachen***

In den Historikerdebatten und Stellungnahmen über die Ursachen des Scheiterns der Weimarer Republik können wir zwei Hauptmotive finden: den „Schandfrieden“ von Versailles mit Reparationen und die Tätigkeit der extreme Rechten und Linken. Ich bin der Meinung, dass beides eine Rolle gespielt hat, aber keineswegs die wichtigste.

Beginnen wir mit der zweiten Ursache. Als 1992 im ungarischen Parlament die extremen Rechten wieder erschienen, sprach der damalige Ministerpräsident, József Antall, mit für ihn ungewöhnlich leidenschaftlichen Worten von einer Gefahr der „Weimarisierung“. Mit einem bemerkenswerten Satz beendete er seine Rede: *„Ich hoffe, dass wir nicht in Gefängnissen Freunde werden wie 1947 und zu anderen Zeiten die Politiker verschiedenster Parteien.“*<sup>1</sup>

Mit dem Schlagwort „Weimarisierung“ wiederholte Ministerpräsident Antall die auch in der Geschichtsschreibung sehr verbreitete Auffassung, wonach für die Krise, sogar für die Vernichtung der Weimarer Republik, die gegen die Parteien der

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<sup>1</sup> „...remélem, hogy nem a börtönökben fogunk összebarátkozni, mint 1947 és egyéb esztendőkből annyi különböző párti politikus.” <http://www.parlament.hu/naplo34/219/2190040.html>

Weimarer Koalition (SPD, Zentrum, DDP) kämpfende extreme Rechte und Linke verantwortlich war. In der Literatur ist allgemein anerkannt, dass diese Kräfte eine wichtige Rolle in der Krisensituation spielten, besonders 1919-1923 und später in den Jahren 1929-1932. Aber – es handelt sich hierbei um eine Streitfrage – diese Akteure des deutschen politischen Lebens waren keineswegs die Verursacher, sondern nur die Nutznießer der Krise.

Wie oben gesagt, obwohl der **Versailler Vertrag** eine wichtige Ursache der Krise war, muss man eindeutig feststellen, dass die geopolitische Position des Deutschen Reiches, trotz des Vertrages, trotz der verlorenen Gebiete und Bevölkerung, viel besser war, als vor dem Kriege. Frankreich war sehr geschwächt ebenso wie der Hauptgegner, die Großmacht Russland, die dann als Sowjetunion marginalisiert und von der deutschen Grenzen entfernt war. Aus den ehemaligen Kronländern der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie wurden kleine Staaten gegründet, die für das Reich keine Gefahr darstellten. Sie erwiesen sich darüber hinaus als leichte Beute.

### ***Die Kriegsfinanzierung als die wichtigste Ursache der monetären Krise***

Vor dem Krieg hatte das Reich 5 Mrd. Mark Verbindlichkeiten. Um die *Rüstungsausgaben* finanzieren zu können, wurde Geld in Höhe von 47 Mrd. Mark gedruckt. Später wurden auch Anleihen im Wert von 100 Mrd. Mark veräußert. Die Folgen: langsame, dann immer schneller werdende Inflation, damit einhergehend eine große Arbeitslosigkeit und Verarmung; auch die Mittelschichten verloren alle ihre Reserven.

### ***Die Reparationen***

Die Reparationen waren auch wichtige Faktoren der Krise. Nach dem Londoner Ultimatum der Entente vom 5. Mai 1921 akzeptierte die Joseph Wirth Regierung am 11. Mai die Forderungen. Die sog. „*Erfüllungspolitik*“, besonders die Vereinbarung mit Frankreich, wurde sofort von den Rechten heftig kritisiert, sogar waren die sogenannten Erfüllungspolitiker ermordet. Damit verbunden war, außerdem, dass im Ultimatum, die noch im Versailler Vertrag festgeschriebene Auslieferung von Kriegsverbrechern und die Demilitarisierung wiederholt mit Regierungsbehörden verhindern. Zweifelhafte Ergebnis für Deutschland des politischen Krisenmanagements war, dass schließlich *nie auch nur ein Kriegsverbrecher ausgeliefert oder in Deutschland verurteilt wurde*.

*Die Reparationsleistungen selbst bedeuteten kein wirkliches Problem für eine Wiederherstellung der deutschen Wirtschaft*. Abgesehen von der Ruhr-Krise im Jahr 1923, wurden sie mit kleinen Unregelmäßigkeiten bis 1930 erfüllt. Doch die Reparationen standen im Zentrum der politischen Kriegsschulddebatte, und so waren sie auch eine fortwährende politische Belastung für die deutsche Demokratie und trugen so zur politischen Instabilität bei.



### ***Das wirtschaftliche und politische Krisenmanagement***

Die Reparationszahlungen und die Finanzierung des Haushaltsbudgets hingen sehr eng mit den Plänen der beiden amerikanischen Finanzpolitikern, Charles J. Dawes und Owen D. Young zusammen.

Der Dawes-Plan wurde auch von deutscher Seite durch die Politik von Gustav Stresemann unterstützt und nach der Hyperinflation von der Öffentlichkeit allgemein gut geheißen. Nach Angaben des ungarischen Ökonomen Jenő (Eugen) Varga, der damals der Leiter des Statistik- und Informationsbüros bei der sowjetischen Handelsvertretung in Berlin war: *„wurden die Jahresreparationsleistungen reduziert und dazu ein finanzieller Hintergrund mit einer Anleihe von 800 Millionen Goldmark gegeben. Gleichzeitig wurde durch den Plan die Souveränität des Landes begrenzt.“* Aus den Berichten der sogenannten Reparationsagenten zitierte Varga: *„Unbestreitbar hat er (Anm. der Plan) jedoch das Reparationsproblem auf eine vernünftige Grundlage gestellt...“* Und noch ein Zeichen des erfolgreichen Krisenmanagements: *„In diesem Sinne war das erste Jahr nicht so sehr eine Bewährungsprobe für die deutsche Zahlungsfähigkeit, sondern für die Fähigkeit der deutschen Wirtschaft, sich den neuen, stabilen Verhältnissen anzupassen.“*<sup>2</sup>

Mit der Anleihen war Deutschland in der Lage, die Reparationen zu finanzieren. Damit konnten Frankreich, England, Italien usw. ihre Kredite an die USA zurückzahlen. Die ersten Jahre des Dawes-Plans waren auch Jahre des Erfolges der Außenpolitik von Stresemann. Aber schon ab 1927 erschien auf allen Seiten das Unbehagen. Es drohte eine Überschuldung: bis Ende des Jahres waren ausländische Kredite im Wert von über 10 Milliarden Reichsmark nach Deutschland geflossen. Aber ein großer Teil der Anleihen wurde nicht für Produktionsinvestitionen aufgewendet, sondern für den kommunalen Bereich wie beispielsweise für den Wohnungsbau oder die Errichtung von Parkanlagen. Das führte zu einer niedrigeren Arbeitslosigkeit und zu größerem Wohlstand – zu einem *„Schein der Normalität“*.<sup>3</sup>

Im Jahre 1928 wurde die aufgrund des Wohlstandsindex und der Konjunktur beeinflusste Zahlungsannuität auf 2,5 Milliarden Reichsmark angehoben. Dies entsprach 12,4% der Staatsausgaben und 3,3 % des Volkseinkommens. (BIP) und bedeutete eine größere Belastung. Daneben bekam auch die französische Regierung zunehmend Probleme mit der Rückzahlung ihrer Kriegsschulden an die USA, und forderte von Deutschland mehr Geld. Dies schwächte die Stellung des Hauptakteurs der Reparationsbesprechungen, Stresemann, und damit begannen die Angriffe von rechts, einschließlich des Kreises um Hindenburg.

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<sup>2</sup> *Jahrbuch für Politik-Wirtschaft, Arbeiterbewegung. 1925-1926.* Verlag Carl Hoym Nachf. Louis Cahnbley, Hamburg-Berlin, 136.

<sup>3</sup> Der Titel des zweiten Bandes von Heinrich August Winklers Trilogie. Dietz, Berlin/Bonn 1984 ff.

### ***Die letzte Chance - das Krisenmanagement der „mittelgroßen“ Koalition***

Nach dem großen Wahlsieg der Linken im Sommer 1928 nahm sich die sozialdemokratische Regierung unter Hermann Müller auch dieser Probleme an. Der innenpolitische Druck seitens der Rechten wuchs. Auch um die Angriffe zu beruhigen, initiierte Müller beim Völkerbund im Gegenzug für eine Neuregelung der Reparationszahlungen die volle Räumung des Rheinlands, sowie - nach Bechprechungen mit den Franzosen - ein Ende der Souveränitätsbeschränkungen (Kontrolle) über Reichsbank und Reichsbahn. Stresemann verlangte auch den Abzug der französischen Truppen (die Engländer hatten ihre Truppen schon 1926 abgezogen).

Der französische Außenminister, Aristide Briand, schien gesprächsbereit und schlug zum Zweck der Neuregelung von Reparationen Konsultationen mit den folgenden sechs Mächten vor: Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Belgien, Italien und Japan. Am 16. September 1928 einigten sich diese Staaten auf einen endgültigen Reparationsplan sowie auf Verhandlungen über die Räumung und die Militärkontrolle des Rheinlands. Bereits bei der Völkerbundtagung im September 1928 wurde die Gründung einer internationalen Sachverständigenkommission zur Regelung der Reparationsfrage unter dem amerikanischen Bankier Owen D. Young beschlossen.

Der erste Konflikt wurde von den Konservativen heraufbeschworen. (Die einzige Großpartei, die keine Regierungsverantwortung in der Koalition übernehmen wollte, war die DNVP, die NSDAP hatte damals weniger als 3%.) Die Bankiers Hjalmar Schacht und Albert Vögler wollten weiter zwischen Briten und Franzosen manövrieren bis zum Abbruch der Verhandlungen. Sie wurden aber enttäuscht: Briten und Franzosen teilten zusammen mit, dass sie eine Annuität von 2 bis 2,5 Milliarden Reichsmark erwarteten. Schacht bot 1,37 Milliarden pro Jahr, aber nur unter den Bedingungen, dass Deutschland seine früheren Kolonien zurückbekäme und die Alliierten bei der Lösung des Danzig-Problems und des polnischen Korridors behilflich sein würden. Aber alle diese Ansprüche wurden zurückgewiesen. Und die Gläubiger begannen sofort ihre kurzfristigen Kredite aus Deutschland abzuziehen. Die Regierung hatte das Glück, dass während der Konferenz, die vom 6. bis zum 31. August 1929 in Den Haag, in den Niederlanden tagte, die britisch-französische Solidarität in der Reparationsfrage zerbrach. Der konservative Nachfolger Churchills als Schatzkanzler, der Labour-Politiker Philip Snowden, verlangte nur eine Erhöhung der jährlichen britischen Reparationseinnahmen um 48 Millionen Reichsmark. Finanzminister Rudolf Hilferding sofort teilte mit: *„Wenn der Young-Plan platzte, würde das nicht nur eine Finanzkrise mit sich bringen, sondern das Reich in sofortige Zahlungsschwierigkeiten stürzen.“*<sup>4</sup> Danach brachen allerdings die Dämme der deutschen Innenpolitik zusammen.

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<sup>4</sup> [http://www.wurzelzieher.de/Young-Plan/Entstehung/Die\\_Haager\\_Konferenzen.aspx](http://www.wurzelzieher.de/Young-Plan/Entstehung/Die_Haager_Konferenzen.aspx)

Die extreme Rechte und die konservativen Kreise züchten das Schwert. Laut der „*offiziellen*“ Chronologie der Geschichte der NSDAP (verfasst von Dr. Hans Voilz, Berlin-Leipzig, 16. Dezember 1938. Genehmigung: Vorsitzende der Parteiamtlichen Prüfungskommission zum Schutze des NS-Schrifttums, Amt Schrifttumspflege bei dem Beauftragten des Führers für die gesamte Geistige und weltanschauliche Erziehung der NSDAP) wurde der folgende kurze Artikel unter dem Titel: „*Kampf gegen den Youngplan 1929-1930*“ mitgeteilt:

Die vereinigte Rechtsparteien und Organisationen – von der NSDAP (Hitler) bis DNVP (Alfred Hugenberg), von Stahlhelm (Franz Seldte)<sup>5</sup> bis Alldeutscher Verband (Heinrich Claß) organisierten gegen den Young-Plan noch am 9 Juli einen „*Reichsausschuß für das deutsche Volksbegehren*“. Hugenberg nannte den Young-Plan eine „*Maschinerie des Hochkapitalismus zur Unterjochung Deutschlands*“, in der Agitation und auf den Plakaten konnte man hören und lesen: „*Bis in die dritte Generation müsst ihr fronen!*“ Bei dem Volksentscheid wurden am 22. Dezember für den „*Entwurf eines Gesetzes gegen die Versklavung des Deutschen Volkes*“ nur 13.81% Ja-Stimmen abgeben, obwohl die Zustimmung von 50 Prozent aller Wahlberechtigten nötig gewesen wäre. So konnten die Abgeordneten den Young-Plan im Reichstag am 12. März mit 224 gegen 206 („*u.a. der Nationalsozialisten*“) Stimmen annehmen und wurde dieser „*am 13. März von Hindenburg unterzeichnet*“.<sup>6</sup>

Nachdem der Reichstag am 14. Dezember zum letzten Mal in der Geschichte der Weimarer Republik einem Kabinett das Vertrauen ausgesprochen hatte, trat am 17. Mai 1930 der Young-Plan, als letzte parlamentarische Krisenmanagementmaßnahme in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik - rückwirkend zum 1. September 1929 - in Kraft. Das Kabinett Müller war bereits zwei Monate nicht mehr im Amt und damit war auch das parlamentarische Regierungssystem in Deutschland vorbei.

### **Schlussfolgerungen**

Nach diesem Überblick über die meistgenannten Ursachen der politischen Krise der Weimarer Republik, ist es möglich eine vielleicht umstrittene, aber sicher interessante Schlussfolgerung zu ziehen: die Elemente der Krise mit internationalem Charakter (Versailles, Reparationen) waren nur von zweitrangiger Bedeutung; die Rolle der extreme Rechte und Linke war auch nicht entscheidend – im Grunde waren sie lediglich die politische Opposition; sie waren nicht die politischen Entscheidungsträger im Reich. Die wirklichen Entscheidungsträger waren bis 1933 Januar die hinter den verschiedenen Regierungsparteien stehenden Kräfte, nach 1930, in der Zeit der Präsidialkabinette (Brünning, Papen, Schleicher), die konservativen Politiker um Reichspräsident Hindenburg, mit seinen immer ungeeigneteren Lösungsansätzen: von einer Beteiligung der Nazis in einer

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<sup>5</sup> Die größte Freikorps-Vereinigung im Jahr 1929 war der neben der DNVP existierenden „*Stahlhelm*“, der zählte etwa halbe Million Mitglieder.

<sup>6</sup> Daten der Geschichte der NSDAP von Dr. Hans Voilz, Verlag A.G. Ploetz, Berlin-Leipzig, 1938. 27. o.

konservativen Regierung (Schleicher und Papen), bis zur Errichtung eine gegen Nazis gerichteten Militärdiktatur (Schleicher). In diesen vier Jahren haben die konservativen Parteien ihren Einfluss und ihre Wähler zugunsten der NSDAP verloren – während das politische Zentrum (Zentrumspartei, BFP, DDP gemeinsam) und die linken Parteien (die SPD und KPD) im Wesentlichen stabil geblieben sind. Dies zeigt sich deutlich in den Ergebnissen der Reichstagswahlen von 1928, 1930 und 1932, und besonders interessant bei den zwei Wahlgängen der Reichspräsidentenwahl in 1932.

***Hitler und die Rechte – 1928 – 1933***

	<b>1928</b>	<b>1930</b>	<b>1932 július</b>	<b>1932 november</b>	<b>1933 március 5</b>
<b>Rechte Parteien zusammen:</b> DNVP, DVP, NSDAP	<b>39.6</b>	<b>44.15</b>	<b>47.1</b>	<b>46.7</b>	<b>54.6</b>
<b>NSDAP</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>37.4</b>	<b>33.1</b>	<b>43.9</b>
<b>Centrum Parteien zusammen:</b> Centrum, BFP, DDP	<b>20.0</b>	<b>18.1</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>14.8</b>
<b>Linke Parteien zusammen:</b> SPD, KPD	<b>40.4</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>37.3</b>	<b>30.6</b>
<b>KPD</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>12.3</b>

Ágnes Judit Szilágyi

***Revista Atlântida (1915-1920): From the Luso-Brazilian Rapprochement to the New Lusitânia***

**Abstract**

The journal *Atlântida*, as a kind of mouthpiece of the Portuguese and Brazilian official line, is a very interesting object of historical analysis, reflecting certain cultural and political aspects of the two new republics in the turbulent years of the First World War and immediately following period as well as manifesting the wish for an intensification of transatlantic amity — a wish that extended beyond the life of the journal. This way of thinking made use of the Luso-Brazilian rapprochement as a strategy toward resolving the ongoing sense of crisis in Portugal by working toward an expanded awareness of a new kind of Latin brotherhood.

*Keywords:* First World War and immediately following period; Luso-Brazilian rapprochement; Revista Atlântida; João de Barros; João do Rio.

I

Once, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there lived two literati. They were close friends, were born in the same year of 1881, and went by the same first name: João. The Portuguese was João de Barros,<sup>1</sup> and the Brazilian who was first known as João do Rio,<sup>2</sup> in his hometown of Rio de Janeiro and later on became famous under this name. Their personal contact began in the winter of 1908-1909 when João do Rio was visiting Europe. They met in literary company and immediately took to one another, each recognizing a future ally in a special project; namely, the launching of a Luso-Brazilian journal called *Atlântida* (*Atlantis*).

The title indicates a very definite intellectual stance. That fabulous continent, sunk in the Atlantic, is synonymous with a lost golden age of peace and beauty based on a highly developed civilization. The founders and editors of *Atlântida* intended to rediscover and rebuild a virtual cultural-Atlantis between Portugal and Brazil. Despite the two nations' common language, cultural traditions and historical bonds, as of the mid-nineteenth century relations between these Portuguese-speaking countries – both on the level the two states and on that of

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<sup>1</sup> João de Barros (1881-1960) poet, writer and theorist of republican pedagogy. On his life, see FERNANDES, Rogério: *João de Barros—Educador Republicano*. Livros Horizonte, LDA, Lisbon, n.d.

<sup>2</sup> His real name was Paulo Barreto (1881-1921), writer, eminent journalist, playwright and extravagant figure of the Carioca *belle-époque*, being considered one of Rio de Janeiro's great dandies. On his life, see MAGALHÃES Júnior, Raimundo: *A vida vertiginosa de João do Rio*. Civilização Brasília: INL, Rio de Janeiro, 1978; and RODRIGUES, João Carlos: *João do Rio: uma Biografia*. Topbooks, Rio de Janeiro, 1996.

the two peoples - were rather chilly as illustrated by the following cultural-anthropological observation:

*‘When life is going well, it is common to hear Brazilians say: “God is Brazilian.” However, when misfortune reigns, they say: “God is Portuguese.” The latter saying, with all its negative overtones, is indicative of the unfavorable impression many Brazilians have of the Portuguese, particularly the immigrant. [...]*

*As the years passed, these Portuguese immigrants found themselves the object of ridicule, particularly as Brazil became more nationalistic, with many of her radical elements rejecting the cultural link between the old kingdom of Portugal and the newly-declared albeit flashy and presumptuous “Empire” of Brazil. This revolt against the tradition of Portugal is widespread in newspapers, journals, literary criticism, and histories of literature that started to emerge in the 1870s.<sup>3</sup>*

Thus the primary aim of the *Atlântida* was to encourage and popularize the rapprochement of the two Portuguese-speaking countries. The joint undertaking — financed in Lisbon by Pedro Bordalo Pinheiro<sup>4</sup> — was relatively successful, extending from November 1915 to March 1920, a period in which forty-eight issues were published.<sup>5</sup> The journal’s more than four-year existence as well as its high production quality were doubtless due to the backing of Portuguese and Brazilian political circles. Not only did the spirit of the articles conform with official political positions (e.g. favoring Portuguese participation in the war) but among the journal’s contributors were also high government officials. And even though the collaborators belonged to divergent circles of public life, the oppositional standpoint was absent from the monthly. Its ideological content was dominated by republicanism and a special combination of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and it glossed over such delicate questions as the dictatorship of Sidónio Pias, the Portuguese monarchist revolt of 1919, and the manifestations of Lusophobia in Brazil.

The journal *Atlântida*, as a kind of mouthpiece of the Portuguese and Brazilian official line, is a very interesting object of historical analysis, reflecting certain cultural and political aspects of the two new republics in the turbulent years of the

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<sup>3</sup> VIEIRA, Nelson H.: *The Luso-Brazilian Joke*, *Western Folklore* 39:1 (1980) 53 and 52.

<sup>4</sup> Nephew of Rafael Bordalo Pinheiro, a famous cartoonist. See CORREIA, Rita: *Atlântida: Mensário Artístico, Literário e Social para Portugal e Brasil (1915-1920)*, Newsletter, 28 February 2008; Hemeroteca Municipal de Lisboa; 10 May 2008 <[http://hemerotecadigital.cm-lisboa.pt/Arquivo\\_Newsletter/41/Newsletter41.htm](http://hemerotecadigital.cm-lisboa.pt/Arquivo_Newsletter/41/Newsletter41.htm)>

<sup>5</sup> For a list of other akin but fugitive journals of the period, see CONCEIÇÃO, Cecília Dias de Carvalho Henriques da: *A revista Atlântida: documento socio-cultural e literário de uma época: um abraço mental entre Portugal e Brasil*. Master’s thesis, Universidade Nova, Lisbon, 1997. 13-17. and see also the chapter *As revistas luso-brasileiras*. IN: SARAIVA, Arnaldo: *Modernismo brasileiro e Modernismo português: subsídios para o seu estudo e para a história das suas relações*. UNICAMP, Campinas, 2004, 89-138.

First World War as well as manifesting the wish for an intensification of transatlantic amity — a wish that extended beyond the life of the journal and was visible in Salazar's Portugal, in its propaganda and foreign policy as well as being evident in expectations of the formation of a neutral '*Latin bloc*' in the early 1940s<sup>6</sup>; and in Brazil, starting in the 1930s, with Gilberto Freyre's Luso-tropical theory, or later in the 1950s with the concept of the '*Third*' (Luso-) America as summarized by Nestor Luis dos Santos Lima.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, the cosmopolitanism of authors in *Atlântida* substantially enlarged the joint project. As João do Rio declared in a 1914 lecture in Buenos Aires, he was above all Brazilian but simultaneously South American, and he believed strongly in South America's marvelous future.<sup>8</sup> This was in accord with the notion that the Atlantis project not only serve Luso-Brazilian rapprochement but that it be the medium of '*o grande abraço mental enter a Europa e a America*'<sup>9</sup> — meaning a big mental embrace of both Europe and America.

## II

From the point of view of its artistic content *Atlântida* was, well, quite *one-sided*. Though its motto was *aberta a todos* — open to all — the modernists were, in essence, not to be found among its authors. The journal's poetry and prose was imbued with neo-romanticism and *saudosismo* — longing for the past<sup>10</sup> — as could also be witnessed in the conservatism of its art illustrations.

On the Brazilian side, the years of *Atlântida*'s existence are marked by a kind of literary vacuum. (The general specialized works sometimes politely skip over this period.)<sup>11</sup> Although in the 1910s in São Paulo some of the painters already embraced Modernism, the symbolic inauguration of Brazilian Modernism was the opening of São Paulo's *Semana de Arte Moderna* in the week of 11-18 February 1922. By this time the *Atlântida* had been '*suspended*' (actually terminated) for almost two years, and its Brazilian editor João do Rio had died eight months before.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> On the problems related to the '*Latin bloc*', see also SZILÁGYI, Ágnes Judit: *Salazars Reichsgedanke und die portugiesische-brasilianische Annäherung 1940-1941*, Lusorama (Frankfurt am Main), 73-74 (May 2008) 184-191.

<sup>7</sup> SANTOS LIMA, Nestor Luis dos: *La Tercera América: tentativa de individualización de la América Luso-Brasileña*, Revista de Historia de América (Mexico) 43 (1957), 51-106.

<sup>8</sup> '*Sou brasileiro. Mas, depois de ser brasileiro, sou sul-americano, crente no ideal do maravilhoso futuro da América Ibérica...*' João do Rio, quoted in MAGALHÃES Júnior, 1978: 228.

<sup>9</sup> RIO, João do: O sonho de Atlântida, *Atlântida*, 1 (November 1915) 15.

<sup>10</sup> See CONCEIÇÃO, (1997): 28, 30, 34-36.

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, SMITH, Verity (ed.): *Encyclopedia of Latin American Literature*. Fitzroy, London; Dearborn, Chicago, 1997. and the chapters in it: chapter by ZILBERMAN, Regina: *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Prose and Poetry, which ends with the 1890s*, and the subsequent chapter by LOBO, Luiza: *20<sup>th</sup>-Century Prose and Poetry, which begins with the Modernism of 1920s*.

<sup>12</sup> BATCHELOR, C. Malcom: *João do Rio: O Esboço de um Retrato e Espelhos de Ilusão*, Hispania, 68 (1985), 700.

*'The year [1922] between the premature deaths of two Cariocas, João do Rio and Lima Baretto, a new era began, that of Brazil's Modernismo ... The new era washed over the old port capital at Rio de Janeiro from beyond the Serra do Mar. It was an age born in São Paulo.'*<sup>13</sup>

But during the period of *Atlântida's* publication the modernist wave departing from Europe had not yet reached the Brazilian coast.

The connection between Portuguese Modernism and the *Atlântida* was completely different. And it raises not only aesthetic but historical questions, too, for Portuguese modernists joined their theory of art with political ambitions. From 1910 to 1926, Portugal saw a 'brief and abortive experiment in parliamentary democracy' and 'the key year of 1915' not only saw the establishment of *Atlântida* but was the year 'when the „honeymoon" era of the Republic ended.'<sup>14</sup> The extremely bad economic situation, the adverse budget, and the illegal actions of opposing political forces all gave rise to internal instability and a hopeless situation in Portugal. Internationally, Portugal was occupied in defending her colonial possessions, fighting the Germans in Angola and Mozambique. Later on the Portuguese government sent troops to Belgium as well giving up its previous neutral position. The reason for this was grounded in the fear of loosening of the traditional Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

*'Churchill always maintained and disseminated the view that Spain was more important to Britain strategically and militarily than Portugal and her possessions. He was convinced, as was most military and naval opinion, that it would now [in the 1910s] be impossible for Britain to be on good terms with both nations at the same time and that therefore Britain's choice had better be Spain, who could then be allowed or even encouraged to absorb her neighbor. The Foreign Office was annoyed by his insistence on "the absurd nightmare that rapprochement with Portugal implies friction with Spain"; but the issue was never properly joined until early in 1916, when the cabinet overruled the objections of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, to Portugal's entry into the war because of the consequences in Spain. By that time British toleration of Spanish attitudes towards Portugal, which essentially consisted of waiting for or actually fomenting counter-revolution, had gravely damaged the republic.'*<sup>15</sup>

On the whole, the First Portuguese Republic remained merely a legal framework, lacking legitimacy, and it was never really consolidated. All this was accurately perceived by intellectuals of the epoch, yet the modernists on the one

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<sup>13</sup> NEEDED, Jeffrey D.: *A Tropical Belle Époque: Elite Culture and Society in Turn-of-the-Century Rio de Janeiro*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. 233.

<sup>14</sup> WHEELER, Douglas L.: Review: [untitled], *Luso-Brazilian Review* 11:1 (1974), 124.

<sup>15</sup> VINCENT-SMITH, J. D.: *The Portuguese Republic and Britain, 1910-1914*, *Journal of Contemporary History* 10:4 (1975), 711.



hand and the editors and authors of *Atlântida* on the other had radically different ideas of how to get out of this impasse. An important group of the modernists, among them Fernando Pessoa and contributors to the journal *Orpheu*<sup>16</sup>, established an elitist, anti-liberal and anti-democratic program for inevitable social and economic modernization. They were advocating the formation of a government, or even better the emergence of a strong leader, someone who could unify all of the nation's forces, and they felt that this project should be supported by modern art.

It was about this time that Fernando Pessoa formulated his devastating criticism about the current political situation: *'To be revolutionary would be to serve the enemy. To be liberal would be to hate the homeland. Modern democracy is an orgy of the traitorous.'*<sup>17</sup> Still, João de Barros defended the notion of democracy, and — as a state official and organizer of the new educational policy — helped to operate the republican machinery.<sup>18</sup> As a mouthpiece for republican pedagogy, he could obviously not agree with Pessoa's bombastic and elitist statements, such as, *'There is a smaller difference between a worker and a monkey than between a worker and a truly cultured man.'*<sup>19</sup>

The spiritual Atlantis concept — Barros's suggestion for bettering Portugal's fortunes — did not offer a radical program for turning everything upside-down. Instead it sought modest and functional benefits: first of all, Brazil's support in the international arena; extension of Portuguese economic possibilities; and on the one hand creating a larger market for the intellectual products of Lusophone culture and searching for new inspiration on the other, believing that the Brazilian *'is the American nation, where the Portuguese culture obtains a more accelerated and vivid rhythm.'*<sup>20</sup>

The *Atlântida* was published by old-fashioned<sup>21</sup> (pre-modernist) but professional literati, mostly mainstream academic figures who did not want to overthrow the prevailing literary (and political) structures; quite the contrary, in

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<sup>16</sup> *Orpheu* had first been published in March 1915 shortly before *Atlântida*'s first issue appeared. It only had three issues, all published still in the same year. See SARAIVA (2004): 94.

<sup>17</sup> *'Ser revolucionário é servir o inimigo. Ser liberal é odiar a pátria. A democracia moderna é uma orgia de traidores.'* As quoted in VILLAVERDE CABRAL, Manuel: *The Aesthetics of Nationalism: Modernism and Authoritarianism in Early Twentieth-Century Portugal*, *Luso-Brazilian Review* 26:1 (1989), 29.

<sup>18</sup> In 1910, right after proclamation of the republic in Portugal, João de Barros was appointed director-general of public education in the Ministry of the Interior (*Director-General da Instrução Pública do Ministério da Interior*). In 1913 the republican regime created the new, independent Ministry of Education, and subsequently Barros held several high posts in it. For a few months (23 November 1914-14 February 1915) he was foreign minister in the government of José Domingues dos Santos. See FERNANDES, n.d.: passim.

<sup>19</sup> *'...entre um operário e um macaco há menos diferença que entre um operário e um homem realmente culto.'* As quoted in VILLAVERDE CABRAL (1989): 29.

<sup>20</sup> *'...nação americana onde a cultura portuguesa obteve um ritmo mais acelerado e vivaz.'* See GRAÇA ARANHA, José Pereira de: *A Nação*, *Atlântida*, 37 (April 1919) 10.

<sup>21</sup> According to Arnaldo Saraiva, they were simply mediocre: *'o espaço reservado a colaboradores mediócras também foi sempre excessivo.'* See SARAIVA (2004): 129.

fact: they wished to consolidate these structures. They along with the modernists thought it necessary to inject new rhythms into Portuguese culture; but instead of searching for enemies against which to redefine their culture and their nation, they sought friends overseas who would reflect the traditional Portuguese nationalism. In perusing the content of the *Atlântida*, three basic ideas emerge: the Luso-Brazilian confraternity being based on shared Latin origins; a kinship existing between the Portuguese and the Brazilian mentality; and the wish for closer relations between the two countries based on mutual understanding and respect. All of these are upheld and transmitted by the two countries' common language and civilization (above all, through the elements of Catholicism and folklore) and by means of the shared ethnic base and a common racial heritage (*raça*). João do Rio, speaking from the Brazilian standpoint, felt: *'There is a race and it is ours: the Portuguese. There is a past that links us with Greek legends and Phoenician voyages: the Portuguese. There is a life that is shared by the two peoples, as branches of a single trunk: Portugal!'*<sup>22</sup> In this ideal confraternity, Portugal was the firstborn, to whom the younger brother owed a great deal. And it was precisely this *analytic nationalism* that the Portuguese modernists wanted to deconstruct fiercely, and which gave rise in 1915 to Almada Negreiros's attack on a leading mainstream writer: *'If Dantas is Portuguese, I want to be a Spaniard.'*<sup>23</sup>

It is clear that in this virtual Atlantis, dominated by the academics, there was no place — in either an aesthetic or political-ideological sense — for the Portuguese modernists (who didn't desire a place there anyhow).

### III

The craving for a mental Atlantis was not a prime modernist idea, but in a certain way it did indeed seem to be *'modern'*; that is, a new answer for old problems. The political reality at the turn of the century was that the distance (and not only geographically) between Portugal and Brazil, in spite of the common cultural-historical heritage, was immense. The former Portuguese colony had gained its independence from the mother country in 1822, and the hostility between the two nations was maintained subsequently for several decades. In addition, there was the worsening economic-financial situation in both countries. While first the Portuguese monarchy and then the First Republic was trying to deal with the chaotic internal crisis and threatened colonies, the Brazilian Republic (proclaimed in 1889, but hardly consolidated) was trying to implement a strongly

<sup>22</sup> *'Há uma raça que é a nossa: a portuguesa. Há um passado que nos liga às lendas gregas e aos périplos fenícios: o português. Há uma vida que é comum aos dois povos, ramos do mesmo tronco: - Portugal!'* See TEIXEIRA, Luis – BARROS, João de: *Homenagem a João do Rio*, Revista Ocidente 39 (1950), 9.

<sup>23</sup> *'Se o Dantas é português eu quero ser hespanhol!'* From the *Manifesto anti-Dantas e por Extenso* against Júlio Dantas (1876-1962), in which Almada Negreiros vigorously attacked not only the academic poet and playwright Júlio Dantas but all 'those gentleman who have earned Portugal the reputation of Europe's and the world's most backward country.' See VILLAVERDE CABRAL (1989): 25.

nationalist economic-recovery program. After the financial crisis of 1900 and the industrial-commercial crisis in 1905-1906, in Brazil foreign economic interests became 'Public Enemy Number 1.' The climate of opinion was not as hostile toward the most important investors (British, French, and North-American) and the most populous immigrant group (Italians) as it was toward those sons of kindred Portugal.

*'In a closer examination of commerce and industry, it can be seen that the Portuguese were disproportionately important in comparison to their numbers and were highly significant in these leading sectors. As a community, the Portuguese were unusually self-conscious and were reasonably well organized with important voluntary associations, much like the Italians and Japanese. But where the Portuguese differed from all other Brazilian-bound immigrants was in their unusual demographic makeup and their extraordinary length of time in migration.'*<sup>24</sup>

The strong Portuguese communities, mainly in the cities (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Pelotas, Recife, Belém, Manaus, Porto Alegre, Santos and Salvador) were a thorn in the side of Brazilian nationalists. The breaking off of the diplomatic relations between Brazil and Portugal in May 1894 only added fuel to the fire and increased the Lusophobia.<sup>25</sup> (A year later, in May 1895, mutual diplomatic representation was reestablished, first at the level of minister-plenipotentiary and then, in 1913, attaining embassy status.) In 1922 Portuguese president António José de Almeida paid an official visit to Brazil and the two governments contracted first bilateral agreement<sup>26</sup> namely the mutual legal protection of copyright, and negotiated on dual citizenship connected with compulsory military service, regulation of immigration and the issuing of work permits. These were some causes that *Atlântida* had long advocated, as well. In comparison with the previously cold relations between the two states this agreement seemed to be a huge achievement, but compared to the ambitions of the direction and upholders of *Atlântida*, or virtual Atlantis, this seemed to be a moderate success.

Certainly, intellectuals are always one step ahead of the pragmatism of everyday politics. Not much later *Atlântida* ceased to exist as an advocate of a culturally based analytic nationalism and raised the stakes in propagating the voluntary institutional unification of the two republics,<sup>27</sup> taking their basic concept

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<sup>24</sup> KLEIN, Herbert S.: *The Social and Economic Integration of Portuguese Immigrants in Brazil in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23 (1991), 337.

<sup>25</sup> This was owing to the 1893 naval revolt in Rio de Janeiro, when Brazilian government troops scuttled Portuguese boats lying at anchor in Guanabara Bay; they had been harboring one of the monarchist leaders of the revolt, Admiral Saldanha da Gama (1846-1895) and his associates.

<sup>26</sup> Concerning the bilateral agreements see CERVO, Amado Luis - MAGALHÃES, José Calvet de: *Depois das Caravelas—As relações entre Portugal e o Brasil 1808-2000*. Instituto Camões, Lisbon, 2000, 203-204.

<sup>27</sup> The form of government is especially important in this context, and the timing of the publication

to its logical conclusion. The editors put the notion of a Luso-Brazilian Confederacy into play in 1917 when several articles on the topic were published in *Atlântida*—and the idea returns again and again throughout the life of the journal.<sup>28</sup> The first of these articles, in June 1917, - which can be taken as the political program of the journal too - is an interview by João de Barros with Dr. Bettencourt Rodrigues,<sup>29</sup> the committed unionist, physician, writer and respected public figure of the Portuguese community in São Paulo who says:

*'Look, there is an idea that your journal should propagate and defend, a crucial idea to the future of Brazil and our own—the necessity of creating and organizing the Luso-Brazilian Confederacy.'*<sup>30</sup>

In the opinion of supporters, were this plan to be realized, the Portuguese and Brazilian United Republics (*Repúblicas Unidas de Portugal e Brasil*) would bring mutual economic benefits. Yet the Confederacy would have had even more important political and moral advantages: create a great power in world politics, and would make Brazil a partly European country while at the same time realizing the dream of Portuguese nationalists by (re-)creating the new and enlarged Lusitânia.

Both a part of the Portuguese intellectual-political elite (which seemed to so easily relinquish the overseas colony in 1822) and a part of the Brazilian elite (which had originally yearned for independence) cherished illusions of a „nostalgic” empire. *Atlântida* reflected this illusion, a seemingly modern idea, but one which would soon be exposed as a basically outdated if not ruinous concept.

The journal *Atlântida*, as a kind of mouthpiece of the Portuguese and Brazilian official line, reflecting certain cultural and political aspects of the two new republics in the turbulent years of the First World War and immediately following period as well as manifesting the wish for an intensification of transatlantic amity — a wish that extended beyond the life of the journal. This way of thinking made use of the Luso-Brazilian rapprochement as a strategy toward resolving the ongoing sense of crisis in Portugal by working toward an expanded awareness of a new kind of Latin brotherhood.

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of *Atlântida*'s first issue (15 November 1915) is significant, the date of the Brazilian national day commemorating the proclamation of the republic. See CONCEIÇÃO, 1997: 20.

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, GRAÇA ARANHA (1919): 10-11. More in SZILÁGYI, Ágnes Judit: *A alteração do programa da revista Atlântida na primavera de 1919*. IN: FISCHER, Ferenc - LILÓN, Domingo (ed.): *Iberoamericana Quinqueeclesiensis 9*, PTE Centro Iberoamericano, Pécs, 2011. 365-370.

<sup>29</sup> Dr. António Maria de Bettencourt Rodrigues (1854-1933), Portuguese ambassador to France, and Portuguese foreign minister from 1926 to 1928.

<sup>30</sup> *'Olhe, há uma ideia que a sua revista devia expor e defender, ideia que muito interessa o futuro do Brasil, e o nosso: - a necessidade de criar e organizar a confederação luso-brasileira.'* See *Uma ideia a defender — A Confederação Luso-Brasileira — Será possível uma nova e grande Lusitânia?* *Atlântida*, 20 (April 1917), 659.

**Heikki Roiko-Jokela**

## ***Social conditions in Estonia after the Second World War***

### **Abstract**

Estonia was forced to become an integral part of the USSR already in 1940. The aim of this paper to reconstruct the main stages of the Sovietization process in the field of economic, political and social life of Estonia. The examination covers the period from the 1940s to the 1980s which enables to explore the long-term consequences of the Sovietization.

*Keywords:* Estonia, World WAR II, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Sovietization, resistance

**T**his article is an overview of the social conditions in Estonia after World War II. I focus on the introduction of the Soviet system in Estonia under Stalin's rule in the period from 1945 to 1953. The article covers the consolidation of the system in administration, politics, the economy, culture and everyday life, including who implemented the changes, how the new social system affected the lives of the Estonian people, and attitudes towards the reform. In the epilogue, I summarise the social developments in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) from the 1960s to the 1980s.

This article is based on information obtained from Finnish and Estonian academic research and articles. The information has been critically evaluated and cross-checked. The article summarises prior research and developments identified in prior studies and draws conclusions based on these. My most important source is Seppo Zetterberg's *Viron historia ('A history of Estonia')*, published in 2007. The book is based on the latest research on Estonia and held in high esteem by the Finnish and Estonian academic communities. My main sourcebook for comparison is Toivo U. Raun's *Viron historia* (1989; first published in English as *Estonia and the Estonians* in 1987, second edition published in English in 2001). The book provides a good overview of the era of Soviet rule in Estonia, particularly the introduction of the Soviet system, and is partly based on primary sources. Raun discusses the post-Second World War resistance movement known as the '*Forest Brothers*', the deportations of Estonians, agricultural collectivisation and the emergence of active dissent. Raun did not adopt a judgemental or defensive approach. He focused on reconstructing an era about which no real basic research had yet been conducted.

### ***The status of Estonia during and after the Second World War***

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939) placed Estonia into the USSR's sphere of interest. The USSR established a puppet government in Estonia and eventually officially declared the country a Soviet Socialist Republic. Estonia was annexed to the

USSR on 6 August 1940. This marked the beginning of social Sovietisation and the elimination of the Estonian social elite. When Germany occupied Estonia in 1941, the locals were attributed nearly second class status in their own country. Germany received thanks for liberating Estonia from under the boot of Soviet oppression. Estonians expected and hoped that Germany would then restore their country's independence. This goal did not suit the Germans' plans, however. They meant to germanise Estonia and annex it to Greater Germany. However, the Soviet system was reintroduced in the Estonian SSR in 1944 after the Red Army regained the territory. The Western superpowers were resigned to the Soviet Union's uncompromising interpretation of the Baltic states as 'Soviet Empire' territory.<sup>1</sup>

The USSR wanted to establish its position in Estonia as quickly as possible. To this end, it arranged a reliable workforce that served the communist party and the various bodies of administration. The source for this workforce were Russian Estonians who had returned to the Estonian SSR. Estonians who had fled the German occupation to the USSR and then returned to Estonia were also utilised as tools for Soviet administration. People loyal to the Soviet system were given key government offices and industrial and agricultural positions. This served to establish Soviet party nomenclature in Estonia: certain posts were defined as preferential and were filled according to rank in the communist party.<sup>2</sup>

State security agencies played a key role in the Sovietisation of Estonia. Internal security fell under the responsibility of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). Both agencies became ministries in 1946 and committed extreme actions. They resorted to all measures to secure the Soviet system, even oppression, and controlled all areas of life. Approximately 10,000 people were arrested for 'anti-Sovietism' in the period from 1944 to 1945. By 1953, 25,000 to 30,000 people had been taken into custody or to forced labour camps. A considerable number of the arrests and deportations were implemented in connection with the agricultural collectivisation process. The majority of the deported population were women and children. Harsh and primitive conditions contributed to considerable mortality rates. An estimated 11,000 people never returned to Estonia.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> RAUN, Toivo U.: *Viron historia*. Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, Keuruu, 1989. 187-211. In detail ZETTERBERG, Seppo: *Viron historia*. Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran Toimituksia 118, Hämeenlinna, 2007. 605-663. ROIKO-JOKELA, Heikki: *Unelma vapaudesta. Virolaisten pako Saksan sarron alta Suomeen. Elämää Suomessa. Salamatkustusta Ruotsiin. Luovutuksia Neuvostoliittoon noin 1942-1955*. Kopijyvä Oy, Jyväskylä, 2001. 269-270. ALENIUS, Kari: *Viron, Latvian ja Liettuan historia*. Atena Kustannus Oy, Jyväskylä, 2000. 236-250. LAURISTIM, Marju – VIHALEMM, Peeter – RUUTSOO, Rein: *Viron vapauden tuulet*. Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä, 1989. 39-63.

<sup>2</sup> RAUN (1989): 212. ZETTERBERG (2007): 663-664. ALENIUS (2000): 251. PENNAR, Jaan: *Soviet Nationality Policy and the Estonian Communist Elite*. IN: PARMING, Tõnu – JÄRVESOO, Elmar (Eds.): *A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1978. 114-115, 118, 121. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 65-66, 78.

<sup>3</sup> RAUN (1989): 215, 223. ZETTERBERG (2007): 664. According to some sources up to 80,000 people were taken to the prison and forced labor camps. RAUN (1989): 223. ALENIUS (2000): 251-252. PURRE, Arnold: *Teine punane okupatsioon Eestis: Aastad 1944–1950*. IN: *Eesti saatusaastad 1945-1960*, I-VI.

### ***National territory and regional administration***

The territory of the Estonian SSR was slightly smaller than that of the former Republic of Estonia, because five percent of the former territory was ceded to other Soviet Republics. Such cessions were formally instigated by the regional administrative bodies of the areas in question and were implemented '*at the request of the residents*'. In reality, Moscow organised the transfers. For example, approximately 75% of the region of Petseri County, located in South-Eastern Estonia, was ceded to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in 1944. The area was annexed to the new Pskov *oblast*. Likewise, the eastern sections of the Narva region were annexed to the Leningrad *oblast*. As a result of the cessions of territory, approximately 75,000 Estonians '*changed*' nationality<sup>4</sup>.

Regional administration was also modified and harmonised in accordance with the Soviet model. In rural administration, the number of municipal village councils was first increased (1945). Villages, however, were subsequently abolished. The number of counties (administrative units from the republic era) was increased by three in the late 1940s. Towards the end of Stalin's rule, in 1950, the counties were divided into 39 administrative units, or *raions*, in accordance with the Soviet model. The biggest Estonian cities – Tallinn, Tartu, Narva, Kohtla-Järve and Pärnu – were placed under the direct control of the USSR Council of Ministers.<sup>5</sup> The regional administration reform was problematic in terms of Estonian identity in the sense that the *raions* were established purely on the basis of the Soviet administration's plans, with no regard for the historical traditions or geographic starting points of the regions. The reform shattered local unity and identity.<sup>6</sup>

### ***State system and politics***

The communist party was the key exerciser of power in the Soviet Union and the Estonian SSR. The mother party in Moscow strictly controlled the Communist Party of Estonia, or *Eestimaa Kommunistlik (bolsevike) Partei*. It did not permit national or unprompted activities.<sup>7</sup>

The communist party reinforced its position in the Estonian SSR directly after World War II and saw a rapid increase in members. However, the percentage of native Estonian party members simultaneously radically decreased. The party had additionally lost members in the war, including executive members. Moscow began recruiting new members partly because it was suspicious of native Estonians. We can also reasonably presume that the Estonians felt no desire to

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EMP, Stockholm, 1963-1972. II. 10-11. PURRE, Arnold: *Teine punane okupatsioon Eestis: Aastad 1952-1964*. IN: *Eesti saatusaastad 1945-1960*, I-VI. EMP, Stockholm, 1963-1972. III. 8-9.

<sup>4</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 665.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 666.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 666.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 666.

contribute to the entrenching of the Soviet system in their homeland. A considerable percentage of the new Estonian members in the Communist Party of Estonia were so-called Russian Estonians who had been born in Estonia but had lived practically their entire lives in the Soviet Union. In the late 1940s, the majority of the party members were already either Russian Estonian or Russian. This helped to reinforce Soviet thinking and administration in the Estonian SSR.<sup>8</sup>

Karl Säre, a leading member of the Communist Party of Estonia, had ended up in the hands of the Germans in the turmoil of war. The Estonian Nikolai Karotamm was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee in his place in 1944. The Russian Sergei Sazonov was appointed Second Secretary. In the early 1950s, the party carried out extensive purges, the effects of which were substantially felt in the affairs of the state and society at large in the Estonian SSR. Karotamm was replaced by Ivan Käbin during the purges. The Communist Party of Estonia was simultaneously placed under the strict control of Moscow<sup>9</sup> and remained in the command of non – Estonians for a long time. In practice, ‘non – Estonian’ also covered Russian Estonians who had no experience or knowledge of national opinions or culture. The party consequently remained distant from the general public. It implemented decisions and solutions on Moscow’s behalf and served as a tool for Sovietisation.<sup>10</sup>

The activities implemented by Moscow in Estonia were extremely propagandistic. They were intended to quickly Sovietise the new Estonian SSR, including commensurate agitation. The fight against bourgeois nationalism began in autumn 1944. The state saw unwanted nationalist activity everywhere. Sovietisation peaked towards the end of the decade, starting in spring 1949 when numerous Estonians holding key positions were replaced with people who were more loyal to the USSR. The people who were dismissed included Karotamm, Nigol Andresen (Deputy of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), Boris Kumm (Minister for Security), Johannes Semper (President of the Estonian Writers’ Union) and Hans Kruus (President of the Academy of Sciences).<sup>11</sup>

The class struggle grew more intense. Some 400 people were dismissed from their posts and offices. Many ‘enemies of the state’ were also arrested and imprisoned, but they were released after a few years. By the 1951 Congress of the Communist Party, the Bureau of the Central Committee had been all but completely reformed.<sup>12</sup>

### ***Legislative power and execution of party decisions***

The Council of People’s Commissars was founded in 1940 to execute the decisions of the communist party. The People’s Commissariat for External Affairs

<sup>8</sup> RAUN (1989): 212-213. PENNAR (1978): 114-115, 118, 121.

<sup>9</sup> RAUN (1989): 213-214. MISIUNAS, Romuald J. –TAAGEPERA, Rein: *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940-1980*. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983. 74, 79-80. PURRE (1963–1972): II. 53-54, 59-60. PURRE (1963-1972): III. 8-9.

<sup>10</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 666-667.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 667–669.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 670.



and the People's Commissariat of Defence were founded in 1946, but remained of secondary practical importance. The party, and above all Moscow, kept everything under tight control. For example, the completely Estonian Arnold Veimer had served as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars since 1944, but became the victim of 'systematic persecution' by party leader Ivan Käbin and was dismissed from office in 1951. The Russian Estonian Aleksei Müürisepp was appointed Chairman in his place. Veimer was not alone in being cast aside: by 1952, the Council of Ministers did not have a single completely Estonian member while the majority of the members had still been fully Estonian in autumn 1944.<sup>13</sup>

The Supreme Soviet was ostensibly in charge of legislation and of approving the annual budgets in the Estonian SSR. The reality was different, however. The Supreme Soviet was entirely subordinate to Moscow and only had the right to validate decisions made by the party. A prime example of the significance of the Supreme Soviet were the first Supreme Soviet elections held in 1947. The Central Committee of the Communist Party had published candidate lists comprising a single candidate. According to Zetterberg, people grimly concluded that they had only the choice between communists and Siberia.<sup>14</sup>

### ***The Forest Brothers***

Soviet action against nationalist Estonians provoked a strong reaction. Not everyone was content to stand aside and watch. Some took the path of active resistance, the guerrilla movement. Some of the Estonians who had served in the German army stayed in Estonia and hid in the forests in fear of Soviet troops. They were later joined by people escaping mobilisations and deportation. The group became jointly known as the 'Forest Brothers' and comprised an estimated 5,000 to 30,000 people. The Forest Brothers continued the fight for Estonia. They obtained their arms from the Germans or by stealing them from USSR troops. Local farmers provisioned them with food and maintenance. However, they were organised only on a local scale and did not unify their forces sufficiently.<sup>15</sup>

The Forest Brothers were most active in the counties of Virumaa, Pärnumaa and Võrumaa. They attacked garrisons, security authorities, prisoner and soldier convoys and the communists. They aimed to maintain and promote the Estonian national and fighting spirit against the Russians. The guerrilla fighters nevertheless knew they did not stand a chance at liberating Estonia. They were hoping for an intervention by the Western Allies to restore independence in Estonia.<sup>16</sup>

Casualties and exhaustion, combined with agricultural collectivisation, gradually reduced guerrilla numbers and the movement was discontinued in the

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<sup>13</sup>ZETTERBERG, (2007): 670.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid, 670-671.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, 671. LAAR, Mart: *Metsavennad*. AS Helmet Raja & Co, Tallinn, 1993. passim. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 64, 66.

<sup>16</sup>ZETTERBERG (2007): 672. LAAR (1993): passim. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 66.

mid – 1950s. The general amnesty granted in 1955 contributed to the discontinuation.<sup>17</sup>

### ***Industry and agriculture***

The battles fought in Estonian territory, including bombings, led to the collapse of national production. The production capacity of the national industry fell nearly by half, and considerably more in some branches. Reconstruction and the revival of production were key priorities after the war. The Soviet authorities focused on developing heavy industry in particular.<sup>18</sup>

Moscow saw the Estonian SSR as part of the community of Soviet nations and required the close connection of the country to the USSR system. Union – wide plans failed to account for local needs and implemented planned economy purely on the basis of Moscow’s specific interests. Production in the Estonian SSR was integrated into the planned economy of the USSR. Moscow instructed and controlled all aspects of production. Failing to meet set production goals was unacceptable. Not meeting specified standards constituted sabotage at the worst and was severely punished.<sup>19</sup>

Estonia had suffered considerable damage in World War II. Countless arrests and deportations took place under Stalin’s rule, causing an actual labour shortage. The labour problem grew more pronounced particularly during the gradual revival of heavy industry. Soviet authorities solved the problem by importing workforce from the other republics. For instance, in the period from 1945 to 1947, an overall 180,000 non – Estonians entered the Estonian SSR. This significantly changed the local demographic structure. To further ease the labour problem, the Soviet authorities also sent German war prisoners to the Estonian SSR to help with the reconstruction.<sup>20</sup>

The Soviet authorities had particularly high expectations concerning the relaunch of the oil shale industry. Large amounts of capital were allocated to the industry and it was rendered operational in 1946. Subsequently, oil shale production nearly doubled. The revival also helped to launch other production in the Estonian SSR.<sup>21</sup>

Agriculture was collectivised after the war. However, operations were slow to start and primarily launched through taxation methods. The sluggishness of the collectivisation was a result of the Soviet authorities’ failure to complete the

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<sup>17</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 671-672. LAAR (1993): passim. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 66.

<sup>18</sup> RAUN (1989): 218. ZETTERBERG (2007): 675. JÄRVESOO, Elmar: *The Postwar Economic Transformation*. In PARMING, Tõnu –JÄRVESOO, Elmar: *Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR*. Westview Press, Boulder Colo, 1978, 133-134.

<sup>19</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 675. ALENIUS (2000): 257-258.

<sup>20</sup> RAUN (1989): 219. ZETTERBERG (2007): 675.

<sup>21</sup> RAUN (1989): 218-219. ZETTERBERG (2007): 675. PURRE (1963-1972): II. 41-43. PURRE, Arnold: *Tööstus okupeeritud Eestis*. IN: *Eesti saatusaastad III*. 114. JÄRVESOO (1978): 71-72.

Sovietisation process in the period between 1940 and 1941. Then again, the Soviet administration had somewhat less of a foothold in rural areas than it did in the cities.<sup>22</sup>

An extensive land reform was implemented in Estonia between 1944 and 1947. Soviet authorities had decided on the reform during the first period of occupation in 1940, but had been unable to implement their plans at that time. The Soviet administration claimed numerous land areas, often by expropriation. The size of the state territory gradually increased and land was distributed to the part of the population that owned none. Land sections were primarily allocated to soldiers who had served in the Red Army and to extremely small farms. Sovkhozos (state-owned farms), machine and tractor stations and horse and machine rentals also received land areas. Some land was retained as state land reserves.<sup>23</sup>

The land reform increased the number of small farms. Once the reform had been completed, the number of small farms in the Estonian SSR totalled 136,000. In practice, the new farms were too small to be viable and the former large estates forced to surrender land were left weakened, sometimes to the point of non-profitability. The state increased farm productivity with strict tax obligations. Farmers were also supposed to sell their products exclusively to the state, which set the prices extremely low. The Soviet authorities did not want to support the farmers' livelihood or social position, but rather they aimed to weaken small farm profitability as much as possible in order to create a foundation for the impending collectivisation of agriculture.<sup>24</sup>

Change was on the way. In May 1947, the political bureau in Moscow instructed the party organisations in the Baltic countries to initiate collectivisation. Measures were very quickly taken and the first collective farm or *kolkhoz* was established in the Estonian SSR in September 1947. The overall collectivisation process nevertheless progressed reasonably slowly. Propaganda against the large estate owners (known as *kulaks*) and their registration, together with stricter taxation, individual deportations and voluntary collectivisation, proved futile. The slow progress of the collectivisation process was partially thanks to the efforts of Karotamm, the leader of the Communist Party of Estonia, to avoid violent collectivisation. His efforts can be seen in how in 1948, only two percent of Estonian SSR farms were *kolkhozos*. In early 1949, the corresponding figure was eight percent.<sup>25</sup>

Collectivisation clearly gained momentum starting in March 1949. In one month's time, over half of the farms in the Estonian SSR had been collectivised. By the end of Stalin's rule, the process had been completed. The quickened progress

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<sup>22</sup> RAUN (1989): 220. ZETTERBERG (2007): 672. ALENIUS (2000): 260. TAAGEPERA, Rein: *Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Taxation Phase*. Journal of Baltic Studies X, 1979. 266.

<sup>23</sup> RAUN (1989): 220. ZETTERBERG (2007): 673. ALENIUS 2(000): 260. RUUSMAN, Ants: *Nõukogude maareformi taastamine pärast Eesti NSV vabastamist Saksa fasistlikest okupanditest*. SPANE, 47-48, 52, 57, 59-61. TÖNURIST, Edgar: *Sotsialistliku põllumajanduse arengust Nõukokude Eestis*. SPANE, 12-13.

<sup>24</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 673-674.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 674.

was a result of the extensive mass deportations preceding the collectivisation process: the Estonians thought it best to join the kolkhozes so as to not risk deportation. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of people were deported to Novosibirsk, Omsk, Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk in Siberia.<sup>26</sup>

The kolkhoz became the basic agricultural unit in the Estonian SSR. The kolkhozes were additionally amalgamated in 1950 when the Soviet authorities decided that large kolkhozes would be more productive. However, the kolkhoz system proved fatal to Estonian agriculture, and overall production collapsed. The collapse was partially caused by the production costs of agricultural products (grain, potatoes, vegetables, milk, meat and eggs) exceeding the selling prices. Production difficulties also contributed to the crash, including machinery and equipment shortage and low motivation among poorly paid farm workers. Agricultural production was unable to satisfy even local needs. Another factor aggravating the situation was the considerable loss of agricultural expertise the country had suffered.<sup>27</sup>

### **Demographic development**

The years following World War II were a difficult time in terms of demographic development in Estonia. The population had decreased by an estimated 200,000 during the war alone. After the war, the country had additionally lost the population living in ceded territory and the population who had been taken into custody and deported. However, Soviet statistics paint a different picture, showing an increase in population. This development can be explained by active immigration. Tens of thousands of Russian Estonians moved to the Estonian SSR after the war. The Soviet government additionally helped up to approximately 180,000 non-Estonians enter the ESSR in the late 1940s. Most of the immigrants came from the Pskov and Leningrad regions and from Belarus. The immigration peak abated in the 1950s.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> RAUN (1989): 222-223. ZETTERBERG (2007): 672. ALENIUS (2000): 260-261. TAAGEPERA, Rein: *Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Taxation Phase*. Journal of Baltic Studies X, 1979. 265. PARMING, Tõnu: *Population Changes and Processes*. IN: PARMING, Tõnu – JÄRVESOO, Elmar: *Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colo, 1978. 26-27. JÄRVESOO (1978): 134. TAAGEPERA, Rein: *Soviet Collectivization of Estonian Agriculture: The Deportation Phase*. Soviet Studies 32, 1980. 390-393. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 76-77.

<sup>27</sup> RAUN (1989): 224-225. ZETTERBERG (2007): 675. ALENIUS (2000): 260-261. JÄRVESOO (1978): 135-136. JÄRVESOO, Elmar: *Progress Despite Collectivization*. IN: ZIEDONIS Jr., Arvids – TAAGEPERA, Rein – VALGEMÄE, Mardi (Eds.): *Problems of Mininations: Baltic Perspectives*. Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, San Jose California, 1973. 142, 147.

<sup>28</sup> RAUN (1989): 225-226. PURRE, Arnold: *Eesti rahvastik okupeeritud Eestis*. In *Eesti saatusaastad V. 22*. PULLAT, Raimo – SIILIVASK, Karl: *Nõukokude Eesti sotsiaalne struktuur*, ENSVTA, Toimetised 26, 1977. 20. PARMING, Tõnu: *Population Changes in Estonia 1937-1970*. Population Studies 26, 1972. 56, 58, 60. TAAGEPERA, Rein: *Baltic Population Changes 1950-1980*. Journal of Baltic Studies 12, 1981. 47. ALENIUS, Kari: *Baltia toisen neuvostomiehityksen aikana. Väestölliset ja kulttuuriset muutokset*. IN: HAVIA Jari P.: *Viro vuosikirja 2001*. Tallinn Kustannus Oy, Helsinki, 2001. 83-84.

High birth rates also contributed to the increase in population, especially among the immigrants. In the period from 1945 to 1949, for example, the Estonian SSR had some of the highest national birth rates in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>29</sup>

Immigrants quickly compensated for the labour shortage of the newly relaunched industry in the Estonian SSR. Industrial development accelerated urbanisation. While approximately 33.6% of the population lived in cities in 1940, the corresponding figure in 1953 was 52.5%. The dramatic urbanisation subsequently slowed down in the 1950s. It had been speeded up by substantial immigration within and into the country, but also by recently built cities and the expansion of existing urban areas.<sup>30</sup>

### **Culture**

The Sovietisation of Estonian culture began with the creation of a new Soviet school system. The initial phase proved challenging as school buildings had been destroyed in the war, competent teachers were in short supply and student numbers increased constantly. However, basic education was free of charge under Stalin's rule. Secondary school and higher education were fee-based.<sup>31</sup> A key change in the higher education sector was the weakened status of the University of Tartu, including the transfer of teaching to other educational institutions. Some of the receiving institutions had been recently founded by the Soviet authorities (the Academy of Sciences of the Estonian SSR in 1946, the Estonian Agricultural Academy in 1951 and the Tallinn Pedagogical Institute in 1952), but some were traditional and established (Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn State Conservatory.)<sup>32</sup>

Especially the latter half of Stalin's rule marked a cultural recession in Estonia. All culture had to abide by the rules of socialist realism. Ideological purity was a constant objective and no bourgeois or national characteristics were permitted. The Soviet authorities had the most obvious impact on literature, which became stagnant in quantity and quality. This was due to ideological requirements and the immigration of many Estonian writers (e.g., Johannes Semper, Friedebert Tuglas and Mait Metsanurk) along with other key cultural figures. Some of the remaining writers were expelled from the Writers' Union. Expulsion meant they were unable to publish any of their work. Additionally, only members of the communist party were allowed to publish their writing. Some writers were also arrested, including Heiti Talvik and Hugo Raudsepp, who both later died in prison.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>29</sup> RAUN (1989): 226. PARMING (1972): 58, 60.

<sup>30</sup> RAUN (1989): 227-228. TAAGEPERA (1981): 40. PARMING (1972): 66-67. ALENIUS (2001): 84.

<sup>31</sup> RAUN (1989): 229-230. PURRE, Arnold: *Haridosolud N. Eestis*. IN: Eesti saatusaastad VI. 32, 44. Eesti NSV Ajalugu III. 617-620. KAREDA, Endel: *Estonia in the Soviet Grip: Life and Conditions Under Soviet Occupation 1947-1949*. East and West VI. Boreas, London, 1947. 48. *Nõukokude Eesti Saavutusi 20 aasta jooksul: Statistiline kogumik*. Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, Tallinn, 1960. 93.

<sup>32</sup> RAUN (1989): 230. SURVEL, Jaak: *Estonia today*. East and West I. Boreas, London, 1947. 38-39. Eesti NSV Ajalugu III. 622-625. KAREDA (1947): 51-54. REINOP, H.: *Education in Soviet Estonia*. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn, 1967. 34. *Nõukokude Eesti Saavutusi*: 94. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 74-75.

<sup>33</sup> RAUN (1989): 230-232. MÄGI, Arvo: *Kodumaine kirjanduselu*. IN: Eesti Saatusaastad 1945-1960. I-VI. EMP, Stockholm, 1963-1972. VI. 87.89. SLONIM, Marc: *Soviet Russian Literature*. University Press,

Estonian theatre experienced a similar fate. Unreliable staff members were dismissed and theatre production was subordinated to ideological purposes. All theatre buildings had been destroyed in the war and actors had gone into exile. By the 1940s, the country had three functional theatres, the state-owned Estonian Drama Theatre, the Estonia Theatre in Tallinn, and the Vanemuine in Tartu. The 1950s presented a small chance to break loose from the iron grip of socialist ideology and incorporate older Estonian theatre pieces into programmes.<sup>34</sup>

Soviet officials made no exceptions in the fields of visual art and music. Both were subjected to equally strict surveillance and control. The leaders in the fields were native Estonians who had lived in the USSR during World War II, had adapted the communist ideology and were willing to conform and produce art that served socialism.<sup>35</sup>

Music was nevertheless beyond the total control of the party and the Soviet authorities. Estonia had a strong tradition of song festivals. The Soviet administration presumed it would be able to harness such a tradition to serve the objectives of the communist party. Different mass events complied with the Soviet ideology and the party expected song festivals to be a good method of implementing socialist ideology in a nationally appropriate manner. But the song festival tradition proved too strong and too closely tied to Estonian national identity for the party to harness it for its purposes. A prime example of this failure was the performance of the melody composed by Gustav Ernesaks to the lyrics of Lyldia Koidula's poem *Mu isamaa on minu arm* at a song festival in 1947. The song became the unofficial national anthem of Estonia. Song festivals remained a link to the past days of Estonian independence.<sup>36</sup>

### **Everyday life**

The Estonian SSR was fully Sovietised under Stalin's rule. In 1953, Moscow announced that the ESSR had converted to socialism. The new social elite comprised the members of the communist party, supported by a loyal workforce, scientists and artists.<sup>37</sup>

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Oxford, 1967: 278-284. NIRK, Endel: *Estonian Literature*. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn, 1970. 287. TAAGEPERA, Rein: *A Portrait of the „Historical ap” in Estonian Literature*. Lituanius 26, III. 1980. 73-74. 81. *Eesti kirjanduse biraafine leksikon*. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn, 1975. 305. 387. KURMAN, George: *Literary Censorship in General and in Soviet Estonia*. Journal of Baltic Studies VIII, 1977. 8. ALENIUS (2001): 85-86. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 72-74.

<sup>34</sup> RAUN (1989): 232-233. *Eesti NSV ajalugu* III. 649-655. KAREDA (1947): 55. *Nõukokude Eesti: Entsüklopeediline teatmeteos*. Valgus, Tallinn, 1978. 296-298.

<sup>35</sup> RAUN (1989): 233. *Eesti NSV ajalugu* III. 655, 657, 659-660. KAREDA (1947): 57. *Nõukokude Eesti: Entsüklopeediline teatmeteos*, 1978. 267-271. 279-281.

<sup>36</sup> RAUN (1989): 233. Eesti NSV, 1975. a. Üldlaulu- ja tantsupeo teatmik. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn, 1975. 34. MESIKÄPP, Aarne et al. (Ed.): *Laulusajand 1869-1969*. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn, 1969. passim. *Nõukokude Eesti: Entsüklopeediline teatmeteos*. 1978. 280. ALENIUS (2001): 87.

<sup>37</sup> RAUN (1989): 228. *Eesti NSV ajalugu* III: 450; *Nõukokude Eesti: Entsüklopeediline teatmeteos*, 1978. 105.

The Stalinist endeavour to favour heavy industry and state-controlled agriculture soon began to affect the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Heavy industry workers enjoyed 'government protection' and made a decent living. In rural areas, the agricultural worker elite comprised the workers of the state-owned farms known as sovkhoses. The state-controlled, investment-based production policy gradually grew unbearable for the ordinary citizen.<sup>38</sup>

Securing a livelihood in Estonia grew more difficult by the year. The state did not permit private entrepreneurship, investment activities were non-existent, and salaries remained on an extremely low level, merely sufficing to secure basic survival. Citizens' livelihood and life quality were further eroded by a lack of consumer goods and the unreasonable prices of those goods that were available. Additionally, many products were rationed for a long time.<sup>39</sup>

The newly immigrated workforce had launched a vigorous urbanisation process in the Estonian SSR. This was reflected in an increasingly extensive housing shortage among the general public. Housing production simply failed to meet the population growth rate. Living expenses were relatively low, since the Soviet administration considered basic housing to be a general right. However, the housing was extremely basic: living density and the level of commodities had clearly deteriorated compared with the era of independence.<sup>40</sup>

### ***Epilogue***

Stalin's death in 1953 was a turning point in the history of the USSR, and particularly in the history of the Estonian SSR. The Khrushchev Thaw, named after Stalin's successor Nikita Khrushchev, and initiatives by the Lavrenti Berija, the Minister for Internal Affairs, to improve the status of national languages and to strengthen the position of Soviet republics, combined with the release of prisoners, inspired hope of a more independent Estonian SSR. Such hope shortly proved futile. The Soviet troops' violent suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and Khrushchev's dismissal from office in 1964 were a painful reality check. Estonia was a part of the USSR, and Moscow would strictly dictate any activities therein. The USSR was headed towards the 'Era of Stagnation' under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, the newly appointed First Secretary of the Communist Party (General Secretary starting in 1966).<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> RAUN (1989): 229.

<sup>39</sup> RAUN (1989): 228-229. ALENIUS (2000): 261. KAREDA (1947): 60-66. SURVEL (1947): 27-30. PURRE, Arnold: *Ehitustegevus ja korteriolud*. IN: Eesti saatusaastad 1945-1960, I-VI. EMP, Stockholm, 1963-1972. VI. 43.

<sup>40</sup> RAUN (1989): 227-229. ALENIUS (2000): 261. TAAGEPERA (1981): 40. KAREDA (1947): 60-66. SURVEL (1947): 27-30. PURRE (1963-1972): V. 43. MISIUNAS – TAAGEPERA (1983): 290.

<sup>41</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 678-680. See also RAUN (1989): 235, 239-240. Rahva Hääl, 25 September.1956. 3. *Nõukokude Eesti: Entsüklopeediline teatmeteos*. 1978. 165-166. KLESMENT, Johannes: *The Forms of Baltic Resistance to the Communists*, The Baltic Review VIII, 1956. 25. VARDYS, V. Stanley: *The Role of the Baltic Peoples in Soviet Society*. IN: SZPORK (Ed.): *The Influence of East*

The citizens began to adjust to the prevailing social system and life in the Estonian SSR. Hopes and visions of Estonian independence nevertheless survived, sometimes surfacing more vigorously than at other times. The academic youth, in particular, kept the Estonian dream of freedom alive in the 1960s and 1970s. The first signs of dissent surfaced in the late 1960s and grew more systematic in the 1970s. The personal lust for power of Johannes Käbin, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Estonia, improved the position of the Estonians to a certain extent. Käbin wanted to hold on to his leading position in the ESSR and succeeded in doing so until 1978 through the skilful balancing of Moscow's and local interests. Käbin undeniably served Moscow's interest, but he also understood that he needed to pay heed to local wishes in order to stay in power. The Estonians wanted to reinforce Estonian identity, even if within the strict framework dictated by the Soviet Union. Käbin was able to fend off the sharpest edge of Moscow's demands.<sup>42</sup>

After a fierce political fight for power, Käbin was succeeded as the leader of the Estonian SSR by the Russian Estonian Karl Vaino in 1978. Vaino's election marked the beginning of a period of rigorous Sovietisation in Estonia. The general interest of the Soviet Union preceded all national interests without exception. A practical manifestation of this renewed focus on Sovietisation was the highlighted status of the Russian language. The new wave of Russification provoked protests among Estonians. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, began the economic reform known as *perestroika*. The reform presented the Estonian SSR with better chances for social dialogue. Such dialogue gradually expanded to demands for the democratisation of the entire society. Estonia was on the path toward regaining independence.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 679, 681, 713. About dissidents see also: RAUN (1989): 242-244. TAAGEPERA, Rein: *Nationalism, Collaborationism and New Leftism*. IN: PARMING Tõnu – JÄRVESOO, Elmar (Ed.): *A Case Study of a Soviet Republic: The Estonian SSR*. Westview Press, Boulder Colo. 1978. 78, 83. Baltic Events 46, 1974. 7. *Teataja*, 17 September 1977. 3. *Teataja*, 2 October 1982. 6-8. VARDYS, Stanley V.: *Human Right Issues in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*. Journal of Baltic Studies XII, 1981. 280-281, 283-284, 292-296. TAAGEPERA, Rein: *Softening Without Liberalization in the Soviet Union: The Case of Jüri Kukk*. University Press of America, Lanham Md. 1984. 115-116, 185-193. Baltic Forum 1, 1, 1984. 91-93. LAURISTIN – VIHALEMM – RUUTSOO (1989): 79-113.

<sup>43</sup> ZETTERBERG (2007): 683-684, 714. In detail ZETTERBERG (2007): 718-739.



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