

ÖT KONTINENS

**Az Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeli Tanszék
tudományos közleményei**



EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM

BUDAPEST

2008

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Krisztián Bene

***La 1^{ère} Brigade française libre dans la Bataille de Bir Hakeim.
La renaissance de l'armée française***

La Seconde Guerre mondiale a été un des événements les plus décisifs de l'histoire du 20^e siècle qui influença beaucoup notre monde d'aujourd'hui. Malgré le fait que la guerre et ses innombrables batailles ont déjà été analysées et évoquées plusieurs fois, j'ose aborder une des batailles décisives qui fût menée par des troupes françaises et qui est presque totalement inconnue du public international. Il faut avouer que même la participation des troupes françaises dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale est un domaine peu connu.

Malheureusement on ne consacre que quelques oeuvres dans ce domaine en Europe Centrale malgré le fait, qu'il y avait certains champs de batailles où la présence et l'activité des militaires français changèrent le destin des événements. Par cette étude, je voudrais changer un peu cette situation et présenter une partie des efforts des Français et de la France au cours de la deuxième grande guerre qui a changé le monde.

Je voudrais évoquer un épisode de la guerre de l'Afrique du Nord où les troupes germano-italiennes furent confronté aux troupes françaises. C'était la bataille de Bir Hakeim qui avait une influence très importante sur la campagne africaine, sur la participation française dans la Second Guerre mondiale et ainsi sur la fin de la guerre.

La colonisation française en Afrique

Si on veut connaître toutes les troupes militaires françaises qui participèrent dans la bataille susdite, il faut revenir au début de la colonisation française en Afrique. C'est un élément nécessaire étant donné que la majorité des unités de l'armée française servit aux rangs de l'armée coloniale française.

La colonisation française commença au 16^e siècle quand des explorateurs français prirent possession les côtes orientales du Canada. Ce processus continua aux siècles suivants : la France colonisa plusieurs îles sur la mer des Caraïbes ainsi que dans l'océan Indien et elle fonda plusieurs comptoirs sur les continents africain et indien. C'était le premier espace colonial français qui avait des caractéristiques spéciales : il était petit, homogène et lié au commerce. Ce premier empire n'a pas existé pendant longtemps étant donné que sa majorité était occupée par les Britanniques lors des guerres du 18^e siècle, ainsi les premiers efforts colonisateurs des Français connurent un échec.

Malgré ce fait, la France ne renonça pas à ses idées colonisatrices qui étaient argumentées par des intérêts politiques, économiques et civilisationnels. La colonisation fût relancée en 1830 par la prise d'Alger qui fût le début de la guerre algérienne et de l'expansion française en Afrique. Ce processus expansionniste connut un dynamisme extraordinaire à partir des années 80 du

19^e siècle qui était le résultat de la guerre franco-prussienne. Cette courte guerre humiliante eu pour résultat la naissance de l'unité allemande et une colonisation française accélérée. Ce dernier était le résultat du désir des milieux politiques français qui voulaient trouver une récompense dans la colonisation pour les territoires perdus dans la guerre contre la Prusse.

Cette récompense avait un énorme succès car la France réussit à construire le deuxième plus grand empire colonial après celui du Royaume-Uni. Ce second empire colonial s'étendait sur un territoire de plus de 12 millions de km² ce qui correspond à 8,6 % des territoires continentaux de la Terre.

L'empire colonial français en Afrique contenait le Maghreb (l'Algérie, la Tunisie, le Maroc), l'Afrique occidentale française (entre autres le Sénégal, le Mali, le Niger, la Côte d'Ivoire, la Mauritanie), l'Afrique équatoriale française (le Tchad, la République Centre africaine, le Gabon, le Congo) et au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale il obtenait une partie des anciennes colonies allemandes (le Togo, le Cameroun) comme territoire de mandat. Au début de la Seconde Guerre mondiale à peu près la moitié de la population africaine vivait sous la domination française.¹

Les forces armées françaises en Afrique

La construction et la défense de cet empire nécessitaient le maintien des forces armées nombreuses et bien instruites. Comme le temps passait et le territoire des colonies augmenta, on découvrit que l'armée coloniale issue de la métropole n'est pas suffisante pour ces missions. On avait besoin de l'établissement des unités ayant un caractère différent qui étaient capable d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre et éventuellement de participer dans les opérations militaires régulières. Par conséquent on commença à établir des unités issues africaines à partir du milieu du 19^e siècle sur les colonies françaises africaines.

C'était le corps des tirailleurs sénégalais qui était le plus connu parmi ces unités. Malgré leur nom, les tirailleurs sénégalais n'étaient pas nécessairement sénégalais, car ils étaient recrutés dans toute l'Afrique française. Ils participèrent à la Première et à la Seconde Guerre mondiale où plusieurs dizaines de milliers donnèrent leur vie sur les champs de bataille européens et africains pour la victoire de la France. Les autres unités africaines comme les tirailleurs algériens, ceux marocains ou les spahis sont moins connues, mais elles jouèrent elles aussi un rôle important dans les opérations militaires françaises en Afrique et en Europe.²

Et si on parle déjà des troupes françaises en Afrique, il faut mentionner une unité qui n'était pas une partie intégrante des troupes coloniales malgré ses

¹ LORMIER, Dominique: *C'est nous les Africains. L'épopée de l'armée française d'Afrique 1940-1945*, Paris 2006. 15-17.

² Idem. 20-23.

luttres innombrables sur les colonies dont le nom est connu partout dans le monde, c'est la Légion étrangère. Cette unité fût créé en 1831 par Louis Philippe et participa très activement dans tous les conflits militaires de la France jusqu'à nos jours, ainsi elle a la réputation d'être un corps d'élite incomparable de l'armée de terre française.³

L'effectif des forces armées françaises en Afrique était 400 mille en 1940. Ce nombre était considérable, mais en réalité cette force était divisée géographiquement et sa qualité était très variée. En plus cette force avait un problème important : elle devait assurer la protection des colonies françaises africaines et devait participer avec ses meilleures unités aux opérations européennes. Par conséquent les troupes restant en Afrique représentaient un niveau bien médiocre, elles souffraient de manque d'arme et de ravitaillement, leur instruction était faible. Dans cet état, ces troupes n'étaient pas aptes à l'engagement contre l'armée d'un pouvoir étranger.

Ce fait était évident pour les commandants de l'armée française en Afrique c'est pourquoi ils renoncèrent à l'idée de résister aux forces germano-italiennes après la défaite désastreuse de l'armée française dans la métropole. Au lieu de la résistance futile, ils s'adaptèrent à la nouvelle situation, ils acceptèrent les conditions de l'armistice et apparemment ils choisirent la voie de la collaboration. Cependant la réalité était bien différente. Les commandants des troupes africaines voulaient se venger sur les vainqueurs de 1940 et ils se préparèrent pour la lutte contre l'Axe. Pour le succès de la revanche, on avait besoin de deux facteurs essentiels: du matériel et du temps pour réorganiser et instruire les troupes souvent récemment établies. Ainsi on établit des unités motorisées et blindées jamais connues auparavant dans l'armée française africaine, bien que la qualité du matériel était inférieure à celui des troupes allemandes.⁴ Mais l'importance de ces troupes étaient secondaires car elles ne pouvaient pas et ne voulaient pas participer immédiatement dans la lutte contre les forces de l'Axe en Afrique étant donné que leurs commandants attendaient l'affaiblissement de ces dernières comme le signe de l'ascension des Alliés et ainsi des Français.

En même temps il y avait d'autres troupes françaises qui s'étaient engagées à la continuité de la guerre contre l'Allemagne. C'étaient les Forces françaises libres, les troupes armées de la France libre sous la direction du général Charles de Gaulle. Cette armée était constituée par les fragments de l'armée française coloniale et celle régulière qui décidèrent la continuité de la lutte armée contre les envahisseurs de leur pays. Cette force ne comptait plus que 30 mille hommes au total et ils étaient dispersés dans les quatre coins du monde. En plus c'était plutôt l'ensemble des individus au lieu de celui des unités militaires et à cause de cette hétérogénéité la qualité de cette armée était faible.⁵

³ PORCH, Douglas: *La légion étrangère. 1831-1962*, Paris 1994. 17-30.

⁴ LORMIER: 139-149.

⁵ Idem, 44-46.

Ainsi la réorganisation de ces unités était indispensable avant leur déploiement sur le champ de bataille. Ce travail fût effectué lors de la première moitié de 1941 et le résultat fût spectaculaire: on a établi la 1^{ère} et 2^e Brigade française libre ce qu'on a souvent appelé des divisions légères étant donné que leur armement était égal avec celui d'une division régulière, mais leur effectif était inférieur.⁶

La situation militaire au début de 1942

Du point de vue des Alliés, la situation militaire au début de 1942 était désastreuse: les forces de l'Axe étaient en pleine progression sur tous les fronts. Il semblait qu'on ne pouvait pas arrêter les troupes allemandes à l'Union soviétique et non plus celles japonaises sur l'Océan Pacifique et les Alliés étaient incapables de montrer la moindre victoire. Aujourd'hui on dit souvent que c'était évident que les Allemands et les Japonais ne pouvaient pas gagner la guerre, mais pendant cette période du conflit les Alliés étaient obligés de subir des défaites sérieuses, la fin de la guerre (victorieuse) semblait très lointaine.

Le théâtre des opérations en l'Afrique du Nord avait une importance secondaire pour la majorité des stratèges de l'état-major allemand car ils le considéraient comme un front secondaire où ils durent soutenir leurs alliés italiens qui n'étaient pas capables de se débrouiller seuls. Pour eux ce n'était qu'une opération défensive qui protégea le flanc méridional de l'Empire allemand.⁷ Mais il y en a eu certains parmi eux qui étaient plus audacieux et avaient des projets de plus grande envergure : ils voulaient occuper la totalité du Proche Orient après l'élimination des troupes britanniques en Afrique du Nord. La prise de ce territoire aurait permis l'attaque contre l'Union soviétique de la direction de Sud et l'occupation de l'Inde qui auraient eu une influence décisive sur l'issue de la guerre.⁸

En Afrique du Nord, la clef de la victoire était dans les mains du commandant des troupes germano-italiennes. Ce commandant était le général Rommel qui était bien connu et respecté par ses adversaires grâce à sa ruse et à ses attaques téméraires. Sa tâche était extrêmement difficile: il devait attaquer et vaincre un ennemi qui occupait des positions avantageuses, avait un ravitaillement abondant et qui était en supériorité numérique. Cette mission était difficile, mais pas impossible car Rommel avait déjà accompli des missions similaires plusieurs fois auparavant. Il y avait un facteur décisif en faveur du général allemand: c'était l'expérience et la fidélité de ses troupes aguerries qui familiarisèrent avec les conditions climatiques et avec le terrain.⁹

⁶ BROCHE, François: *L'Armée française sous l'Occupation. La métamorphose*, Párizs 2002. 128-130.

⁷ ROMMEL, Erwin: *Háború gyűlölet nélkül*, Kalocsa 2000. 304.

⁸ FRASER, David: *Rommel*, Szeged 2001. 204-206.

⁹ Idem, 277-281.

*Général Rommel*¹⁰

Il faut dissiper une légende qui est bien répandue dans le grand public: en réalité les troupes allemandes déployées en Afrique du Nord qui portèrent le nom de l'Afrika Korps, n'étaient pas des troupes spéciales, instruites pour la lutte dans le désert comme on le pense. C'étaient des troupes blindées et mécanisées tout à fait ordinaires de l'armée allemande qui n'ont reçu aucune instruction spéciale. En plus, la majorité des troupes de Rommel était constituée par des troupes italiennes qui n'étaient guère motorisées, ainsi elles étaient peu utilisables dans la guerre de désert. L'efficacité de l'Afrika Korps était le résultat de la coopération étroite parmi les troupes, du sens d'adaptation et de la bonne gestion et pas celui d'une instruction spéciale mystérieuse.¹¹

Des forces

Les forces de l'Axe représentaient une qualité très variée à la veille de leur grande attaque. Plus de la moitié des divisions avait été donnée par les Italiens et ces unités montrèrent une image hétérogène: on y trouve des unités excellentes et d'autres médiocres. Quatre divisions d'infanterie qui se situaient au bord de la mer, ne possédaient aucun véhicule de transport motorisé, ainsi elles étaient pratiquement inutilisables dans les luttes car la guerre dans le désert nécessitait des manoeuvres rapides ce qu'elles n'étaient pas capables de réaliser manquant de motorisation. Par conséquent ces unités étaient obligés de limiter leur activité pour des opérations défensives sur des lignes de défense fixes, mais même cette activité limitée causa des problèmes étant donné que les armes lourdes indispensables pour une défense réussie manquèrent aussi. Mais il y avait deux unités d'élite italienne aussi dans le théâtre des opérations: la division blindée Ariete et la division motorisée Trieste. Ces deux unités, déjà vétérans de la guerre dans le désert étaient réputées comme des excellents guerriers par leurs alliés allemands, mais leurs armements obsolètes ne leur permettront pas être des adversaires égaux des unités alliées.¹²

La partie la plus précieuse de l'armée du général Rommel était l'ensemble des divisions allemandes qui étaient les suivantes: la 15^e et la 21^e divisions blindées et la 90^e division motorisée. Ces unités luttèrent dans le désert depuis leur arrivée en l'Afrique du Nord et elles le firent avec un grand succès, ainsi on peut dire qu'elles devinrent incontestablement les maîtres de la guerre dans le désert.¹³

Les forces germano-italiennes comptèrent 64 mille soldats et 560 chars ce qui étaient des chiffres imposants, mais la majeure partie de cette armée était

¹⁰ www.topedge.com

¹¹ FRASER: 208-211.

¹² ROMMEL: 89.

¹³ FRASER: 289-290.

équipée par des armes italiennes qui étaient désespérément obsolètes, ainsi ces troupes ne pouvaient pas participer d'une manière efficace dans les luttes. Le nombre réel des chars de combat modernes était 280 sur le côté de l'Axe, les autres n'étaient pas capables de lutter contre les chars alliés avec une quelconque chance de survie.¹⁴

Ce qui renforça les troupes allemandes, c'était l'utilisation des canons antichars en grand nombre. On y trouve les fameux 88 mm, qui étaient capables de percer le blindage de n'importe quel char allié, et des canons antichars soviétiques récupérés sur le front de l'Est. Les unités allemandes utilisèrent déjà plusieurs fois ces armes avec un grand succès contre les Alliés, ainsi ils en avaient une grande confiance et ils voulaient équilibrer le manque des chars modernes avec l'utilisation de ces armes redoutables.¹⁵

Il y avait encore une arme qui pouvait avoir une influence décisive dans la bataille: c'était l'avion. La victoire dans les airs remportée par les armées de l'air pouvait changer l'aboutissement de la guerre sur la terre. Toutes les deux parties reconnaissaient cette importance, ainsi ils concentrèrent des unités aériennes très importantes de Luftwaffe et de l'armée de l'air britannique (RAF) en Afrique du Nord.¹⁶

Les forces britanniques contenaient quatre divisions d'infanterie motorisées et deux divisions blindées, mais ces grandes unités étaient renforcées par plusieurs unités indépendantes mobiles qui étaient capables de réagir très rapidement, ainsi théoriquement elles étaient idéales dans la guerre de désert où la mobilité était primordiale. On trouve parmi ces unités la 1^{ère} Brigade française libre ce qu'on va présenter en détail ci-dessous.

Cette armée comptait approximativement 100 mille soldats, 850 chars de combat et 1.000 pièces d'artillerie et elle était soutenue par les unités importantes de l'Armée de l'Air Royale. Ces dernières sont devenues tellement fortes au début de 1942 qu'elles avaient beaucoup de chance de dominer l'air au-dessus du champ de bataille pendant les prochaines opérations militaires.

Ce qui était encore plus important, c'était la supériorité numérique des chars britanniques par rapport à ceux de l'Axe: les Alliés pouvaient déployer 850 chars contre 560 chars de Rommel. En plus, les Britanniques avaient des réserves importantes (450 chars) dont on pouvait remplacer leurs pertes. Si on regarde la qualité des véhicules, on voit que l'avantage des Alliés n'était pas incontestable malgré le fait que la moitié des chars germano-italiens était obsolète car une bonne partie des chars britanniques n'étaient pas égaux avec les chars allemands. L'atout des Britanniques était le nouveau char de combat américain (Grant) qui était supérieur sur ses homologues britanniques, mais les Alliés n'en comptaient que 150.¹⁷

¹⁴ GREENE, Jack-Massignani, Alessandro: *Rommel észak-afrikai hadjárata*, Debrecen 2001, 120.

¹⁵ FRASER: 290.

¹⁶ ROMMEL: 84.

¹⁷ GREENE-MASSIGNANI: 122.

La majorité des chars britanniques avait été conçue avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale ainsi ils représentèrent un niveau technologique nettement inférieur aux chars allemands, mais ils étaient meilleurs que ceux des Italiens. Les chars de combat britanniques les plus faibles étaient les chars Matilda Mark II et Valentine qui durent accompagner et soutenir l'infanterie dans ses combats qui étaient inaptes pour le combat contre des chars. Par conséquent ces blindés étaient obligés de subir des pertes extrêmement importantes contre les chars allemands quand ils se sont rencontrés sur le champ de bataille.¹⁸

Malgré le fait que l'armée britannique était constituée par les soldats de différentes nations qui étaient venus de tous les coins de la Commonwealth britannique, cette force était homogène grâce à sa structure et à son armement communs. Toutes les unités servant dans l'armée britannique étaient motorisées et munies des chars et des pièces anti-char en nombre qui leur assura une puissance de feu importante. Mais ces troupes avaient aussi de graves manques qui auront des conséquences importantes dans les batailles de 1942. Le problème le plus grave était l'instruction démodée qui suivait les modèles de la Première Guerre mondiale et ne comptait pas l'évolution des blindés et ainsi elle ne prépara pas les fantassins pour la lutte contre ces armes redoutables. Le résultat de ce manque fut une série de défaites que les troupes britanniques subirent contre les troupes allemandes qui étaient souvent dans une infériorité en nombre. L'instruction lacunaire était accentuée par une hiérarchie rigide de commandement qui empêcha la coopération efficace parmi les différentes unités. Ces deux éléments résultèrent des défaites sérieuses et de lourdes pertes ce qu'on aurait pu éviter.¹⁹

L'offensive allemande

Général Rommel connaissait bien ces chiffres et les caractéristiques des troupes des deux côtés, ainsi il tenait compte des faiblesses des troupes britanniques (la lenteur des réactions, la coopération difficile, parfois la manque d'expérience) et des atouts de ses propres troupes (l'expérience dans le désert, la dynamisme et la coopération excellente entre les différentes armes) quand il élaborait son plan. Apparemment ce plan tactique était simple: les divisions d'infanterie italiennes réaliseraient une attaque d'apparence au bord de la mer contre les positions britanniques tandis que les forces principales de l'Axe contourneraient la défense britannique par le sud. Puis ces troupes blindées et motorisées détruiraient les unités alliées dans un combat manoeuvrier, occuperaient la forteresse de Tobruk et continueraient leur avancée jusqu'au canal de Suez. Si tout va bien, la 8^e armée britannique sera annihilée à la fin de l'opération, mais au moins elle devra reculer au Proche-Orient abandonnant l'Égypte qui tombera à la main des troupes de l'Axe.²⁰

¹⁸ FRASER: 290.

¹⁹ Idem, 307.

²⁰ GREENE-MASSIGNANI: 125.

Malgré la génie de Rommel ce qu'il avait déjà prouvée plusieurs fois lors de la campagne nord-africaine, ce plan avait quelques points faibles. Le premier était la manoeuvre des troupes italiennes : on ne pouvait pas garantir que l'opération mystificatrice menée par les troupes italiennes serait réussie et les Britanniques ne lancent pas une contre-attaque concentrée avant la fin du débordement. Une contre-attaque aurait été néfaste pour toute l'opération. Le deuxième était le temps: si les unités d'attaque arrivaient aux lieux désignés avec un retard, les Alliés pouvaient renforcer leur défense et leur attaque serait repoussée. Le troisième était le ravitaillement qui avait un souci éternel pour les troupes de l'Axe en Afrique du Nord. Il fallait livrer de l'essence, des munitions et de vivre de l'Europe pour les troupes qui réalisaient l'opération d'encerclement pendant toute la durée des combats. Ça voulait dire que les convois de ravitaillement auraient du traverser les positions de l'ennemi pour qu'ils puissent transporter les matières nécessaires pour les unités qui devaient remporter la victoire sur les Britanniques. Par conséquent la sécurité des convois était une question primordiale pour le succès de l'opération.²¹

Le plan de Rommel était hardi et il donna la possibilité d'une grande victoire jamais vue auparavant en Afrique. Mais il y avait un inconvénient très important: le succès du plan dépendait de tels facteurs ce que le général allemand ne pouvait ni contrôler ni influencer. C'était un danger réel, mais Rommel était persuadé que ses troupes aguerries, son talent militaire et les fautes de l'ennemi seraient suffisants pour qu'il puisse remporter la victoire. Ce qui était surprenant c'est qu'il avait raison, il vainquit les Britanniques, mais sa victoire n'était pas complète parce qu'il y avait un grain de sable qui enrayât son avance et ce grain de sable s'appelait Bir Hakeim.²²

L'importance de Bir Hakeim

Bir Hakeim n'était qu'un simple point d'eau désaffecté dans le désert de Lybie qui pouvait donner un peu d'eau pour les voyageurs qui passaient par là. Mais à la veille de l'attaque germano-italienne ce qu'on appela la bataille de Gazala plus tard, ce lieu eu une importance extraordinaire parce qu'il était le point de résistance le plus méridional des positions alliées. Dans le plan de Rommel ce point était extrêmement important car ses troupes motorisées et leur ravitaillement devaient passer par là pour que l'opération d'encerclement soit réussie. Par conséquent, la neutralisation rapide de la résistance française était fondamentale et théoriquement elle ne pouvait pas causer de problèmes pour les unités de l'Axe.²³

Toutes les unités de l'Afrika Korps et du 20^e Corps d'armée italien devaient passer par la zone dont la défense était assurée par le point de résistance de Bir

²¹ FRASER: 298-299.

²² www.birhakeim-association.org

²³ LORMIER: 114-115.

Hakeim. Ce qui a compliqué la situation, c'était le fait que les convois de ravitaillement étaient obligés de choisir le même trajet étant donné que les troupes italiennes n'étaient pas capables de percer les lignes britanniques plus au nord. Ainsi la prise de Bir Hakeim était essentielle car des défenseurs acharnés auraient été capable de retarder l'avance de toutes les troupes germano-italiennes. Rommel était parfaitement conscient du danger ce que Bir Hakeim représentait, mais il pensait que ces troupes allaient éliminer la résistance en une heure.²⁴

Il avait tort. Pour cette mission les forces de l'Axe avaient besoin de 15 jours et ce retard fut fatal. Rommel récupéra la victoire, mais il ne pouvait pas détruire les troupes britanniques qui pouvaient retirer et s'installer sur une ligne de défense plus solide à côté d'un petit village qu'on appela El Alamein. Mais qui et comment pouvait résister pour les forces germano-italiennes pendant 15 jours quand les troupes britanniques se replièrent? Pour y répondre, nous devons faire la connaissance avec les soldats qui défendirent Bir Hakeim.

Les défenseurs de Bir Hakeim

La défense de Bir Hakeim était assurée par la 1re Brigade française libre qui était une unité assez hétérogène car elle était formée par des bataillons d'origine tout à fait différente. La brigade était composée de six bataillons: deux de la Légion étrangère, deux des forces coloniales et deux de la Marine.

Les bataillons les plus forts, les plus expérimentés et ainsi les plus précieux étaient les 2^e et 3^e bataillons de la 13^e Demi-Brigade de la Légion étrangère commandés par le colonel Prince Amilakvari. Beaucoup de légionnaires étaient des républicains espagnols, connaisseurs de la guerre qui avaient participé dans la guerre civile espagnole et dans la bataille de Narvik. En plus, ils étaient motivés par la possibilité qu'ils puissent prendre leur revanche sur les Italiens et les Allemands.

Les troupes coloniales étaient les bataillons de l'Oubangui-Chari et du Pacifique qui composaient la Demi-Brigade de Marche du colonel Roux. Ces unités étaient composées par des soldats recrutés sur le continent africain et dans la région du Pacifique. L'effectif de ces deux bataillons était au complet, mais les soldats de ces unités ne possédèrent pas la même instruction et expérience que les légionnaires, ainsi ils étaient moins aptes aux combats durs que leurs camarades servant dans la Légion étrangère.

L'effectif des bataillons de la Marine – celui de fusiliers marins du commandant d'Amyot d'Inville et celui d'infanterie de marine du commandant Savey – n'était pas complet. Le bataillon d'infanterie de marine ne comptait que quelques centaines d'hommes, ainsi il n'était qu'un demi-bataillon qui fusionnerait plus tard avec le bataillon du Pacifique. L'autre bataillon, spécialisé pour la défense contre les avions et bien équipé par de canons de 40

²⁴ FRASER: 291.

mm automatiques Bofors, n'était pas déployé dans la première ligne de la défense, ils s'occupaient de la défense antiaérienne.

La brigade était appuyée par le 1^{er} régiment d'artillerie du colonel Laurent-Champrosay et plusieurs petites unités qui avaient un rôle important dans la fortification des positions.²⁵

L'effectif total de l'unité déployée à Bir Hakeim était 3.700 soldats. Normalement la brigade avait un effectif bien plus important, mais cette fois-ci une bonne partie des soldats non-combattants n'accompagna pas l'unité à cause du danger de l'encerclement qui aurait été fatal pour ces soldats. Le nombre des soldats français ne semble pas trop important, surtout si on le compare avec celui des soldats germano-italiens qui participaient à l'attaque, mais ils avaient deux atouts: les armes lourdes modernes en grand nombre et les positions de défense bien fortifiées.²⁶

Cet armement était hétéroclite étant donné qu'il avait une origine diverse. La majorité de l'artillerie était d'origine française, récupérée au Levant, elle avait servi auparavant dans l'armée de Vichy au Moyen-Orient. Une grande partie de l'équipement d'infanterie était aussi française comme les mortiers, les mitrailleuses et les fusils-mitrailleurs. Mais le reste de l'armement, les véhicules de transport et les blindés légers d'infanterie (Bren Carriers) furent donnés par les Britanniques. Ainsi la brigade disposait 86 canons (en partie utilisés comme pièces antichars), 86 fusils antichars, 18 canons antiaériens, 44 mortiers, 63 chenillettes Bren, plus de 400 mitrailleuses et fusils-mitrailleurs. Avec cet armement la puissance de feu de la brigade était supérieure à celle d'une division d'infanterie française de 1940. L'unité se prépara pour une défense durable : elle posséda 20 mille obus de 75 mm pour l'artillerie et dix jours de ravitaillement.²⁷

Il y avait beaucoup d'officiers dans la brigade qui avaient déjà servi dans la Première Guerre mondiale et ils connaissaient et appréciaient les positions fortifiées. C'est pourquoi malgré le fait que la terre était rocheuse, les soldats français préparèrent des positions de défense fortifiées qui contenaient des tranchées et des bunkers partout sur le territoire. Cette fortification jouera un rôle fondamental pendant les luttes parce qu'elle permettra la défense efficace et réduira les pertes.

La défense utilisa massivement des mines car cette position isolée était entourée par des champs de mines antichars. Ces champs de mines avaient un large de quelques dizaines de mètres, ils étaient continus et leur densité était forte. Sur ces champs il n'y avait que quelques passages appelés des portes qui permettaient la circulation pour entrer et sortir. Il y avait certains lieux devant les champs de mines où on constitua des marais de mines: ces marais étaient établis avec une densité de mines plus faible, mais ils pouvaient dépasser un

²⁵ LORMIER: 115-116.

²⁶ BROCHE: 137.

²⁷ LORMIER: 116.

kilomètre de longueur ou de largeur. Ils avaient une grande importance étant donné qu'ils étaient capables de freiner ou canaliser les attaques des chars. Au total, ces installations comptaient plus de 120 mille mines qui donna une force pour la défense.²⁸

Le rôle des commandants de l'unité était extrêmement important avant et pendant la bataille, ainsi il faut consacrer quelques mots à leur présentation. Le commandant de brigade était le général Koenig, ayant déjà servi pendant la Première Guerre mondiale comme militaire de carrière, insista pour que les postes de combat et de commandement soient enterrés et son exigence sera très utile pendant les bombardements de l'artillerie et d'aviation. L'adjoint du général Koenig, le commandant de la 13^e Demi-Brigade de la Légion étrangère, était le colonel Prince Amilakvari. Il gérait les troupes les plus fortes de toute la brigade qui avaient déjà participé dans une bataille perdue contre les Allemands et ils ne voulaient pas subir une autre défaite. Ces hommes résolus pouvaient changer l'issue de bataille.²⁹

La majorité des soldats appartenant à la brigade partagèrent ce sentiment car ils ne connaissaient auparavant que la défaite ou l'oisiveté. En plus ils perdirent leur patrie, même ils devinrent hors la loi pour le régime de Vichy. Pour eux, c'était une opportunité pour se venger sur les Allemands pour la défaite et pour prouver que le soldat français n'est pas inférieur à ceux d'autres armées.³⁰

La Bataille de Bir Hakeim

La bataille s'est tenue du 27 mai au 11 juin 1942 et elle a eu trois phases.³¹ La première phase commença le 27 juin quand les premiers blindés italiens apparurent devant les positions françaises. Mais les autres troupes germano-italiennes réalisèrent déjà le large mouvement de contournement prévu et attaquèrent les unités blindées britanniques leur infligeant des pertes considérables. A la nouvelle de ces événements, Koenig ordonna à ses hommes de prendre leurs postes de combat.

Les assaillants qui abordèrent les positions françaises vers 9h30 du matin étaient les unités de la division blindée italienne Ariete. Le 132^e régiment de chars, le 8^e régiment de bersagliers et le 132^e régiment d'artillerie participèrent dans l'attaque par le sud-est. Les fantassins italiens ne pouvaient pas débarquer de leurs camions pour soutenir l'attaque des chars dans le feu intense de l'artillerie française. Ainsi les blindés italiens étaient obligés de charger seuls à travers le marais de mines. L'idée du commandant italien – un vétéran de la guerre dans le désert – était une attaque à revers par le sud-est où les positions françaises étaient moins fortifiées selon lui. Mais il avait tort parce que Bir

²⁸ www.birhakeim-association.org: Conférence de Pierre Messmer

²⁹ BROCHE: 138-139.

³⁰ Idem, 156.

³¹ www.birhakeim-association.org: Conférence de Pierre Messmer

Hakeim était aussi bien défendu du côté est que du côté ouest. Malgré la défense, la charge des chars italiens était tellement acharnée que six d'entre eux réussirent à percer à l'intérieur de la position française où ils étaient finalement détruits et leurs équipages étaient capturés. Le bilan de l'attaque était catastrophique pour les Italiens: la force assaillante se regroupa et se replia laissant 32 blindés et 91 prisonniers dont le lieutenant-colonel Pasquale Prestisimone, commandant du 132^e régiment de chars et beaucoup de tués.³²

Cette journée porta un échec écrasant pour les forces de l'Axe à Bir Hakeim, mais plus au nord ils ont obtenu de grands succès: ils anéantirent la 3^e brigade indienne et repoussèrent la 4^e brigade blindée et la 7^e brigade motorisée britanniques. Le général Koenig envoya plusieurs détachements pour prendre contact avec les unités britanniques. Leur mission n'a pas réussie, mais ils détruisirent plusieurs automitrailleuses et blindés germaniques.

Les forces germano-italiennes cessèrent les attaques pendant 5 jours étant donné qu'ils s'occupaient de la destruction des forces mobiles blindées des Alliés. Cette opération avançait bien, mais la situation de ravitaillement des troupes de l'Afrika Korps devint critique, ainsi on devait sécuriser leur ravitaillement. La solution la plus rapide était la prise de Bir Hakeim qui donna le chemin le plus court vers les troupes de l'Axe. Ce qui était encore plus inquiétant, c'était l'activité de la garnison française qui lança plusieurs raids contre les colonnes de ravitaillement allemandes et italiennes. Ces raids eurent un succès considérable puisqu'ils causèrent de grandes pertes pour l'ennemi, capturèrent un grand nombre de prisonniers, même récupèrent des prisonniers alliés, notamment 620 soldats indiens, le reste d'une brigade qui était écrasée par les blindés allemands le premier jour de la bataille. Les soldats assoiffés furent capturés puis abandonnés par les Allemands qui n'avaient pas de temps de s'en occuper.³³

Le bilan des défenseurs français du 27 mai au 1^{er} juin était de 41 chars et un atelier allemand de réparation de blindés détruits, 98 prisonniers allemands et 145 prisonniers italiens pour deux morts et quatre blessés. En plus, les Français pouvaient évacuer les blessés, les Indiens et les prisonniers par un convoi de ravitaillement allié qui transportait de l'eau pour la garnison.³⁴

Cette activité inattendue a eu une conséquence importante: Rommel stoppa l'avancée de ces troupes parce qu'il ne pouvait pas risquer de laisser des troupes alliées si guerrières sur ses arrières. D'autant plus que la position de ces troupes menaçait toute l'opération de contournement puisque leur présence obligeait les convois de ravitaillement à prendre un trajet extrêmement long ce qui coûtait beaucoup en temps et en essence malgré le fait que tous les deux étaient précieux pour les belligérants. Le général allemand décida la prise de Bir Hakeim.³⁵

³² LORMIER: 118-121.

³³ Idem, 122.

³⁴ fr.wikipedia.org

³⁵ ROMMEL: 101-105.

La deuxième phase commença le 2 juin quand des officiers italiens se présentèrent devant les lignes françaises comme des parlementaires demandant la reddition de la garnison. Général Koenig rejeta l'ultimatum qui était envoyé par Rommel, ainsi c'était le début du siège.

Les unités de l'Axe participantes dans cette opération étaient la division motorisée Trieste, la 90^e division légère allemande et la division d'infanterie Pavia. A partir du 2 juin, les positions françaises étaient continuellement pilonnées par l'artillerie et l'aviation germano-italiennes. La garnison devait résister seule, elle ne pouvait pas compter sur l'aide des Britanniques qui étaient en plein repli. L'isolement de la brigade française était total.

Des attaques directes contre les points d'appui avaient déjà lieu le 3 juin, mais leur but n'était que de tâtonner pour trouver des points faibles de la défense. Toutes ces attaques étaient repoussées par les défenseurs dont la résistance était tellement acharnée qu'elle faisait l'admiration des assaillants. „*Sur le théâtre des opérations africaines, j'ai rarement vu combat plus acharné.*”³⁶

La charge décisive allemande était prévue pour le 6 juin dans laquelle ont participé les unités de la 90^e division motorisée et de la division motorisée Trieste. Malgré le fait que les champs de mines étaient percés à plusieurs endroits, la défense acharnée des soldats français empêcha l'avancé des forces de l'Axe. Après l'échec de cette tentative, Rommel modifia ses plans et concentra ses forces au nord et le 7 juin il mena personnellement l'attaque de ses unités. Il utilisa toutes ses armes possibles dans cette charge: l'artillerie, les blindés, l'aviation, l'infanterie.³⁷ Il avait absolument besoin de ce lieu fortifié, comme il a dit: „*Il me fallait Bir Hakeim, le sort de mon armée en dépendait.*”³⁸ Mais malgré tous les efforts des troupes de Rommel, on ne pouvait pas briser la résistance de la 1^{ère} Brigade française libre.

Le succès des défenseurs était le résultat de plusieurs éléments : des armes modernes, de l'excellent moral des troupes, des larges champs de mines et surtout des points d'appui bien fortifiés qui pouvaient résister aux bombardements d'artillerie et d'aviation. Grâce à ces derniers, les pertes des soldats français étaient minimales pendant le siège.³⁹

Le lendemain de ces combats, la brigade a eu de graves problèmes avec le ravitaillement puisqu'elle ne disposait plus suffisamment de munitions et les réserves d'eau étaient pratiquement épuisées. Pendant la première partie du siège quelques convois de ravitaillement réussissent à transporter des vivres et de l'eau, mais les troupes épuisèrent déjà les stocks. La situation commença à devenir intenable.

Ce qui compliqua la situation, c'était le fait que Rommel fit venir la 15^e Panzerdivision qui ne participait pas auparavant au siège. Avec l'arrivée de ce

³⁶ Idem, 106

³⁷ BROCHE: 149-161.

³⁸ ROMMEL: 110.

³⁹ Idem, 106.

renfort, l'attaque du 9 juin était critique, car les troupes allemandes avançaient au nord et elles enfoncèrent une partie de la défense des légionnaires. Une partie de la compagnie du capitaine Messmer, l'adjoint du colonel Prince Amilakvari, la section de l'aspirant Morvan se rendit quand elle perdit sa défense antichar et les chars allemands brisèrent sa résistance. La situation semblait perdue quand le général Koenig fit tirer le régiment d'artillerie sur la position des légionnaires ce qui était suivi par une contre-attaque des Bren Carriers avec laquelle on rétablit la situation.⁴⁰

A la fin de cette journée difficile, les troupes françaises reçurent l'ordre de l'évacuation de la part de l'état-major britannique. D'une part, c'était la reconnaissance de la défense réussie de la brigade française qui donna de temps pour les troupes britanniques pour se replier, d'autre part on admit que le déblocage des Français était impossible car les Alliés perdirent la bataille. C'était vraiment le dernier moment pour les soldats épuisés qui manquaient de munition et d'eau. La préparation de la sortie prévue au lendemain vers 23 heures était faite avec une grande attention : on demande la protection de la RAF et fixe un point de recueil au sud-ouest de Bir Hakeim où les troupes évacuées se rencontrent avec les véhicules britanniques qui les transportent vers l'est, derrière les lignes alliées récemment rétablies. Mais pour la réalisation de la sortie, la brigade assoiffée manquant de munitions devait encore tenir pendant un jour qui sera long et sanglant. Après le bombardement des avions germano-italiens, les chars et les grenadiers allemands lancèrent une nouvelle charge contre les positions françaises. Leur percée semblait imminente quand la contre-attaque des Bren Carriers et des légionnaires les repoussèrent. Au bout d'un combat de deux heures les forces de l'Axe abandonnaient le terrain.

La troisième phase de la bataille commença le 10 juin à 23 heures. Le principe de la manoeuvre était simple : briser l'encerclement et rencontrer la colonne des véhicules britanniques à 8 kilomètres des positions françaises. La réalisation était bien plus compliquée: on devait détruire le matériel lourd intransportable, effectuer le déminage et réaliser la sortie par un couloir étroit dissimulant leurs intentions devant les assiégeants.

La sortie organisée devint une sorte de ruée de petits groupes vers le sud-ouest après qu'une fusée éclairante allemande révéla l'opération. La mission des Français était très difficile dans le feu des mitrailleuses lourdes allemandes, mais les soldats français brisèrent les lignes de défense germano-italiennes. Malgré la situation confuse et les efforts de l'ennemi, la majorité de l'effectif de la brigade arriva à atteindre les véhicules alliés et ainsi les lignes britanniques.

On peut constater que la sortie fut un succès car l'attaque des forces de l'Axe lendemain matin ne trouva que des cadavres et quelques blessés dans la forteresse française. Tous les matériels de guerre étaient complètement détruits, les Allemands n'avaient pas de butin.⁴¹

⁴⁰ LORMIER: 129.

⁴¹ BROCHE: 162-164.

Les assiégés ont été stupéfiés par la défense et par la sortie des défenseurs: „*Une fois de plus, la preuve était faite qu'un chef français, décidé à ne pas jeter le fusil après la mire à la première occasion, peut réaliser des miracles, même si la situation est apparemment désespérée.*”⁴²

Le bilan de la bataille

Les pertes furent lourdes à tous les deux côtés. La 1^{ère} Brigade française libre perdit 30% de son effectif combattant, plus de la moitié de son matériel lourd et tous ses véhicules. La partie majeure de ces pertes fut subie pendant la sortie à cause du fait que les blessés et le matériel n'étaient pas transportables. Sur 3.700 soldats au début de la bataille à peu près 2.600 arrivèrent aux lignes britanniques et pouvaient continuer la lutte et participèrent dans la bataille d'El-Alamein. La plupart des absents (600 personnes) ont été fait prisonniers par les troupes germano-italiennes. Malheureusement un quart de ces soldats (147 exactement) n'arrivèrent jamais aux camps de prisonnier en Italie parce qu'un sous-marin britannique torpilla le bateau qui les transportaient de Benghazi en Italie et ils moururent tous. Mais les pertes de l'Axe étaient bien plus considérables: 3.300 hommes furent tués, blessés ou disparurent, 277 furent fait prisonniers. En plus, il y a eu un inventaire important des matériels détruits: 52 chars, 11 automitrailleuses, 5 canons automoteurs, 7 avions abattus par la DCA 42 bombardiers abattus par la RAF.

Mais dans cette opération ce n'était pas la perte des soldats ou des matériels qui étaient le plus important, mais c'était la perte du temps qui avait une importance primordiale. Le succès de l'opération était basé sur la surprise et sur la vitesse des troupes de l'Axe. La première condition était satisfaite, mais la deuxième échoua à cause d'un grain de sable qui paralysa la machine de guerre germano-italienne, c'était la garnison française de Bir Hakeim.

Cette petite force ne pouvait pas tourner la défaite des troupes alliées en une victoire, mais elle pouvait empêcher toute seule que les meilleures unités soient détruites par les forces de l'Axe. Si la garnison française n'avait pas résisté avec une ténacité incroyable et n'avait pas menacé les lignes de ravitaillement des troupes motorisées germano-italiennes qui nécessita leur recul pour éliminer cette position de défense, la plupart des unités britannique n'auraient pas pu se replier en Egypte pour occuper une nouvelle ligne de défense. Cette nouvelle position était El Alamein où les troupes alliées vaincraient l'Afrika Korps quelques mois plus tard avec la participation de la 1^{ère} Brigade française libre.

Les conséquences de la Bataille de Bir Hakeim

Ce fait d'armes eu des conséquences militaires et politiques très importants. Le soldat français dont le prestige était contesté depuis juin 1940 devint de

⁴² ROMMEL: 104.

nouveau un guerrier réputé, brave et courageux. C'était la base de la reconnaissance internationale des valeurs militaires française et ainsi de la renaissance militaire française. Les Français prouvèrent qu'ils étaient capables de lutter et de résister, même quand tout le monde s'évada, ainsi la France libre devint un frère d'armes réputé des pouvoirs alliés. Ce nouveau statut donna la possibilité pour le général de Gaulle de réaliser une politique résolue qui permit que la France puisse finir la guerre comme un des grands vainqueurs.

On peut conclure que la Bataille de Bir Hakeim eu une influence décisive sur l'histoire de la France pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale en modifiant l'accueil international de la participation du pays aux événements politiques et militaires. Il est assez de citer l'avis de quelques hommes d'État pour prouver cette thèse. De Gaulle adressa ce télégramme pour général Koenig: „*Sachez et dites à vos troupes que toute la France vous regarde et que vous êtes son orgueil.*”⁴³ Winston Churchill dit les suivants: „*En retardant de quinze jours l'offensive de Rommel, les Français libres de Bir Hakeim auront contribué à sauvegarder le sort de l'Égypte et du canal de Suez.*” Même Adolf Hitler parla des soldats français avec une certaine admiration: „*...les Français sont, après nous, les meilleurs soldats de toute l'Europe.*”

Peut-être l'importance de cette bataille n'était pas tellement grande, mais son écho fut considérable étant donné que ce dernier fut organisé et amplifié par les gouvernements alliés. Mais ce ne fut pas par hasard. Le tournant de la guerre n'arriva pas encore, les alliés étaient dans une situation désastreuse et ils avaient de l'espoir. La résistance et la sortie réussie de quelques milliers Français contre les troupes du général Rommel furent un événement qui donna de l'espoir pour tous les pays et unités alliés partout dans le monde. Ce fut l'impact réel de la Bataille de Bir Hakeim sur l'histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

⁴³ GAULLE, Charles de: *Háborús emlékiratok*, Budapest 1997. tome II. 229.

Erzsébet Bodnár

The Eastern Question in Russian Foreign Politics in the Early Nineteenth Century (1799-1806)

The Eastern Question was an important problem of Russian foreign politics of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Another opinion was also brought forward in historical scholarship that „it had a secondary importance in the period of the Napoleonic wars.”¹ The wars and defeats on the European continent suppressed the events concerning the Near East and the Balkans and these latter ones were judged to be „of secondary importance” by the makers of Russian foreign politics and were handled as such. These statements seem to be contravened by contemporary archive sources, Russian source publications² and the latest research in Russian foreign politics and the history of international relations.³ Research seems to prove convincingly that the Eastern Question continued to be an important and separate problem of Russian foreign policy in the early 19th century. Russo-French relations have also become more comprehensible through these works and the type, essence and course of these relations were formed by the disagreements in the Near East.

The Russian government did not have a final programme of handling and settling the Eastern Question at the end of the 18th century. The two trends that evolved during the reign of Catherine II continued their struggle to decide the principles and policies to be followed. The expansive policy of France in the East had a decisive effect on elaborating the new concept and on its final form. Certain representatives of the divided Russian diplomatic corps (F. V. Rostopchin, A. A. Bezborodko) were ready to co-operate with Napoleon in order to acquire the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government did not oppose participating in the partition of the European territories of the Turkish Empire and thus forming closer ties with France. Another group of Russian politicians (N. P. Panin, the Vorontsov brothers) were resolved to preserve the unity of the Turkish Empire and counted on its alliance in the struggle against Napoleon. Both ideas reflected the trend of official Russian government policy to solve the question of the Straits the most favourable way

¹ KINYAPINA, N. S.: *Vneshnaya politika Rossii pervoy polovini 19 veka*, Moskva, 1963. 5.

² *Vneshnaya politika Rossii 19 i nachala 20 veka*, Dokumenti Rossiyskovo Ministerstva Inostrannih del, Seria I. t. 1. Moskva, 1960. t. 2. Moskva, 1961. t. 3. Moskva, 1963. – Arhiv vneshney politiki Rossii, fond MID; fond posolstv v Londone (1801-1807); v Konstantinopolye (1801-1806); v Parize (1801-1804). – Centralniy gosudarstvenniy Arhiv, (Stpb.)

³ *Istoriya vneshney politiki Rossii. Pervaya polovina 19. veka*, Moskva, 1995. – Alexandr I. Napoleon i Balkani, Balkanskiye issledovaniya. Vip. 18., Moskva, 1997. – SCHROEDER, Paul W.: *The Transformation of European Politics (1763-1848)*, Oxford, 1994. – SAUL, N.: *Russia and Mediterranean 1797-1807*, London, 1970. – KENNEDY GRIMSTED, Patricia: *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I*. Los Angeles, 1969. – JELAVICH, Barbara: *A Balkán története I.* (History of the Balkans), Budapest, 1996.

for Russia and to increase her influence on the Balkans, where the Danubian Principalities played the most important role for Russia.⁴

Thus the French expansion of the late 18th century accidentally brought into Russian foreign policy a new, temporary problem, namely that of the Mediterranean. In accordance with the Russo-Turkish alliance pact of 1799⁵ the Russian fleet sailed through the Straits under Admiral F. F. Ushakov's command and started military activity against the French in the Mediterranean. In co-operation with the Turks the Russians could oust the French from the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean and the Ionian Isles. The war ended with success: on 20th February, 1799 Corfu fell as well. Out of the occupied territories the Republic of the Seven Isles was formed under Turkish control and Russian protectorate.⁶

Ushakov's expedition was an important part of the second coalition's (Austria, England, Russia and Turkey) struggle against France. A. V. Suvorov's victories in Italy can also be linked to this period. The military successes of Ushakov and Suvorov decreased French influence in the Mediterranean and increased Russia's weight in the region, which also evoked the enmity of the allies. Austria tried to annul Russian gains in Italy while England tried the same in the Ionian Isles, as none of these powers wished the further strengthening of the Russians. The ungrateful conduct of his allies pushed Paul I to elaborate a new combination of foreign policy. He stopped military action in the Mediterranean and the Russian fleet returned to the Black Sea. With this Paul I declared the „*Mediterranean programme of Russian policy*”⁷ completed, where it stopped French progress. Russo-French opposition seemed to ease up, but the Russian, Austrian and English alliance was falling apart. By the end of the year 1800 Russo-English connections were severed as the English occupied Malta and did not fulfil their promises made to the Russians.

It was in this political situation that the famous plan by Count F. V. Rostopchin, head of the foreign council to partition the Ottoman Empire was born. Rostopchin summed up his ideas in a work entitled 'Notes' and presented it to the sovereign on the 2nd of October 1800. This plan that belonged to the new line of Russian foreign policy, in principle suggested the partition of the Ottoman Empire together with France, Austria and Prussia. According to

⁴ Vostochniy vopros vo vneshney politike Rossii, Moskva, 1978. 48-49.

⁵ On the circumstances of the formation of the Russo-Turkish alliance see in detail BODNÁR, Erzsébet: *Egy furcsa szövetség. Orosz-török közeledés és együttműködés a 18. század végén* (A Strange Alliance Russian-Turkish Approach and Co-operation at the End of the 18th Century) IN: *Hatalmi ideológiák a szláv népek körében, Kelet-Európa és Balkán tanulmányok 1.*, Pécs, 2001. 129-150.

⁶ Cf. STANISLAVSKAYA, A. M.: *Rossiya i Greciya v konce 18-nachale 19 veka*, Moskva, 1976.

⁷ STANISLAVSKAYA, A. M.: *Russko-angliyskiye otnosheniya i problemi Sredizemnomorya 1798-1807*, Moskva, 1962. 124.

Rostopchin's plan from Turkey, „*similar to a hopelessly sick man*”⁸, Russia would have acquired Bulgaria and Moldavia, Austria would have got Bosnia, Serbia and Wallachia, France would have gained possession of Egypt and a republic under Russian protectorate would have been organised out of Greece and the isles. Russia's territorial demands increased significantly compared to the first Russian plan of partition, to the „*Greek Project*”. Catherine II and A. A. Bezborodko drew up an idea that a friendly Greek Empire would have been organised and they did not openly formulate any Russian territorial demands.⁹ Rostopchin on the other hand counted with a significant part of the Balkans. As his concept did not coincide with the official trend of handling the Eastern Question as regards the Ottoman Empire, his plan remained one of the daydreams of Russian diplomacy. Rostopchin chose territories to be annexed by Russia randomly, he would have given Moldavia to Russia and Wallachia to Austria, whereas Russian influence was strongest in these principalities and they formed an important element in the Balkans politics of the Russian government. He did not even make mention of the Straits and Constantinople. Russian politicians received Rostopchin's work with doubt and the sovereign, Paul I summed up his view as follows: „*Having studied your proposal I desire that you start putting it into practice*”.¹⁰ The Russian government took steps contradicting Rostopchin's ideas. In 1800 S. A. Kolichev was sent to Paris to negotiate peace with the French. In the instruction prepared for him the strengthening of the alliance with Turkey is stressed. Kolichev urged France to preserve the unity of the Ottoman Empire and forwarded Paul I's offer to Napoleon to drive the English out of Egypt together and hand the regained territories over to the Sultan.¹¹ The instructions given to Kolichev demonstrate convincingly that the real politics of Russia differed completely from Rostopchin's proposal. If we take into consideration Russia's rapprochement to France then it can be stated that Paul I deemed the continuation of the 1799 Russo-Turkish agreement important and tried to strengthen and ensure the territorial integrity of his ally, Turkey, for example by returning Egypt to them.

Alexander I took over a difficult heritage from his father upon his accession to the throne in March 1801. After the radical change in foreign politics in 1800 and early 1801 performed by Paul I, there was a need to introduce a stable foreign policy. Thus the Russian government aimed to remain neutral in European issues, to stay outside the Anglo-French contest therefore it chose the policy of '*free hands*'. In the Eastern Question however, they remained faithful to a '*peaceful*' Turkish orientation initiated by Paul I, and they wished to further

⁸ Zapiska grafa F. V. Rostopchina o politicheskikh otnosheniyah Rossii v posledniye mesyaci pavlovskovo carstvovaniya, Russkiy Arhiv, 1878. 104.

⁹ STEGNIY, P. V.: *Yiso raz o grecheskoy proyekte Yekaterini II.*, Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoriya, 2002. 4. 105.

¹⁰ Vostochniy vopros (1978), 51.

¹¹ Ibid.

strengthen the Russo-Turkish alliance treaty of 1799.¹² In early 1801 the group was strengthened that advocated keeping the Ottoman Empire together. Its leaders were Nikita Petrovich Panin and Victor Kochubei. Panin in his note entitled „*On the Political System of the Russian Empire*” written in July 1801, stressed that Turkey and the Near East had a special place in Russian foreign policy and that upon looking for allies this fact had to serve as a starting point. In agreement with the Vorontsov brothers - who were in favour of a pro-English policy - they were convinced that Russia could come to an understanding with England concerning the Ottoman Empire. He summed up his view stating that „*France is the major threat to Russia which decides upon the question of appeasement towards England.*”¹³ Kochubei, still as foreign minister illustrated the advantages of an isolationist policy, but at the end of the year, on the 30th of December 1801 in his detailed notes on the Eastern Question for Alexander I, he pointed out that it was absolutely crucial to preserve the unity of the Ottoman Empire, as a weak neighbour was useful for Russia.¹⁴ He advised the sovereign to secure the Russian gains and to transform the Ionian Isles into a defensive base for Russia, to send there ships, artillery and troops.¹⁵ The State Council accepted Kochubey’s proposal in February 1802 and in August Count G. D. Mocenigo, ambassador extraordinary of Russia sailed with five vessels and an expeditionary army of 1600 men from Odessa to the Ionian Isles. Mocenigo was also commissioned to organise companies led by Russian officers consisting of Albanians, Montenegrins and Greeks. In March 1802 Alexander I ordered troops withdrawn from the Kingdom of Naples to the defence of the Ionian Isles. All this illustrates that Russian diplomats understood that progressing French gains in the East endangered the existence of the Ottoman Empire and in defence of the latter one’s existence the previous alliance with the Turks had to be renewed. The official view of the Russian government was summed up by Alexander I in his instructions sent to the ambassadors serving in Europe: „*The basic principle of my political system, for the preservation of which I shall work with all my strength, is to conserve the state the weakness and bad government of which are the valuable guarantees of our defence.*”¹⁶ Alexander I wished to consolidate the result achieved by Ushakov by primarily diplomatic means and to protect the Sultan's court from French influence and therefore offered Russia’s mediating role in the Franco-Turkish peace negotiations, to which he had a right ensured by the third article of the secret convention annexed to the Franco-Russian peace treaty signed on the 10th of October 1801 in Paris.

¹² SIROTKIN, V. G.: *Duel dvuh diplomatij. Rossiya i Franciya v 1801-1812*, Moskva, 1968. 10-15.

¹³ Vneshnaya politika Rossii 19 i nachala 20 veka, (VPR), Dokumenti Rossiyskovo Ministerstva Inostrannih Del, Ser. I. t. 1., Moskva, 1960. dok. 16. 72.

¹⁴ Vostochniy vopros (1978), 51-52.

¹⁵ VPR, Ser. I. t. 1., dok. 50., „*Zapiska o Semi Soedinonnih ostrovah*”, 157-159.

¹⁶ Ibid dok. 12. 54.

The peace treaty between France and Russia did not end the opposition between them in the Eastern Question in the Near East and did not result in the awaited appeasement, just caused a short interval in their fight. It was at this time that Napoleon first outlined his proposal to partition Turkey to the Russian ambassador to Paris, A. M. Morkov. This French idea resulted in uneasiness in the cabinet of St. Petersburg therefore he was prohibited to touch upon this question in his further talks. At the time of the Franco-Turkish peace negotiations Russian diplomacy conducted strong activities both in the Turkish court and in Paris. In his letter to V. S. Tomara, ambassador in Constantinople, Alexander I asked him to do everything possible to weaken French influence.¹⁷ Morkov on the other hand received an instruction to help the work of the Turkish delegation in Paris and to achieve the withdrawal of French troops from Egypt. After long negotiations with Russian mediation finally the Franco-Turkish agreement was signed on the 25th of July 1802.

After the peace treaty Russian diplomats changed tactics and saw the guarantee of decreasing French influence in the Turkish court in drawing Russo-Turkish ties closer together. In line with this they first strived to arrange the status of the Danubian Principalities that counted as a neuralgic point in Russo-Turkish relations and were also central to the Balkans policy of Russia. The Tsar's diplomacy intervened into the affairs of the Principalities based on its right of protector guaranteed by the peace treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja. They also hoped as a result for the growth of their influence among the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the Danubian Principalities were strategically important for Russia as well. They could not however bring forth the question of unification of Moldavia and Wallachia as long as the Russo-Turkish alliance was functioning well, but they could exercise pressure through diplomatic channels on the Sultan's court so that the Turkish government may ease somewhat the situation of the inhabitants of these regions. The new agreement signed in 1802 was a result of the wave of dissatisfaction in the Principalities. The Porte repeatedly violated the treaties concerning Moldavia and Wallachia and the situation of the Christian population dependant on the Sultan's administration deteriorated continuously. V. S. Tomara, the ambassador at Constantinople protested in writing several times in the name of the Russian government in early 1802, and demanded the restitution of the rights of the Principalities.¹⁸ Alexander I sent his letter to sultan Selim III with the same aim.¹⁹ The Russian government also threatened with the occupation of the principalities and achieved the signing of a new agreement on the status of Moldavia and Wallachia on the 24th of September 1802, in which the Sultan promised to add further articles to the *hatt-i-sherifs* issued in the 70s-90s of the

¹⁷ Ibid dok. 42. 145-146.

¹⁸ Ibid dok. 95-96. 250-254.

¹⁹ Ibid dok. 104. 276.

18th century. The convention settled the term of office of the princes as seven years and the Porte could not propose their removal without the consent of the Russian sovereign. Several articles concerned the amelioration of the economic and legal position of the peasants.²⁰

The convention concluded in 1802 meant the strengthening of Russian influence in the Danubian Principalities and the Balkans, but as its signing resulted in a division within the Turkish government it also contributed largely to the deterioration of Russo-Turkish relations later on. France was quick to exploit the enmity of the Porte towards the convention and aimed at tearing the Russo-Turkish alliance apart and at weakening Russian positions on the Balkans. Based on the Franco-Turkish treaty of 1802 Napoleon appeared as the protector of Turkey and achieved in a short period of time that the francophile line of the Diwan was strengthened. His extraordinary envoys in Constantinople were trying to convince the Sultan that France was the true friend, while „*Ipsilantis and Moruzzi - the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia - were the agents and servitors of Russia.*”²¹ Morkov reported from Paris and the new ambassador, A. Ya. Italinsky from Constantinople reported with terror that France was pushing Turkey towards a war against Russia.²²

Napoleon's „*Eastern plan*”, that is to acquire new territories from the Ottoman Empire, gained a more distinct form by 1803. French agents popularising the French system promised independence to the peoples of the Balkans in Moldavia, Wallachia, Albania, Morea, Greece. On Napoleon's commission General Sebastiani travelled to Syria, Egypt and the Ionian Isles where he established contacts with circles supporting France. The Turkish Porte sensed the two-level French politics, trusted Russia and valued the Russo-Turkish alliance. In response to Napoleon's „*new Eastern plan*” Alexander I continued to support the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Thus alongside European issues, problems of the Near East also motivated Anglo-Russian rapprochement and the formation of the third coalition.²³ Based on the report of Semyon Vorontsov, ambassador to London, his brother, Alexander Vorontsov, the Russian foreign minister in his report to the sovereign on the 6th of March 1803 noted that England wished the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire and was willing to co-operate with Russia to preserve it. He advised Alexander I to make an agreement to end in such a way with England.²⁴ The Russian sovereign however was still in favour of the „*policy of free hands*” at the time and did not want to align himself and did not accept Vorontsov's proposal but he offered to mediate in settling the Franco-English conflict. Negotiations between Napoleon and the English

²⁰ Ibid dok. 115. 301.

²¹ Vostochniy vopros (1978), 54.

²² VPR, Ser. I. t. 1. dok. 155. 382-383.

²³ Ibid dok. 161. 394-395. dok. 154. 381-382.

²⁴ Ibid dok. 159. 389. dok. 162. 396.

ambassador, Charles Whitworth on the disputed questions of the Amiens peace treaty in late 1802 and early 1803 ended without success in Paris. War between England and France started on the 18th of May 1803, and lasted to the end of Napoleon's reign. War speeded up Anglo-Russian rapprochement. In his letter of the 18th of October 1803, A. R. Vorontsov illustrated most spectacularly how expected French conquest in the Near East would result in the disintegration of the Turkish Empire. „*The course of events took a frightening turn in the South: the French government concentrated significant forces to the Kingdom of Naples at the shore of the Adriatic Sea ... it is no question that Bonaparte will soon land in Dalmatia and Greece.*”²⁵ Vorontsov probably „threatened” with this to push Alexander I towards an English alliance. He advised that Russia should prepare for war against France. A. R. Vorontsov was the first to formulate that Russia was unable to stop French expansion with just diplomatic means, for a war however they needed an ally, which in this case could be England. Adam Czartoryski was the other supporter of an alliance with England in the Russian cabinet, which he deemed necessary because of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.²⁶ He governed the Russian foreign office instead of the ill A. R. Vorontsov. The Russian government prepared their proposal for the English cabinet concerning the Eastern Question on the 29th of February 1804. They took their stand to maintain the Republic of the Seven Isles, to ameliorate the position of the Greek people, to preserve Russia's right of protectorate in the interest of Christians living in the Turkish Empire. England would have acquired Malta, this strategically important island in the Mediterranean.²⁷

Franco-Russian relations further deteriorated following the execution of the Duke of Enghien (21 March 1804) and opposition further deepened in the Eastern Question as well. Napoleon objected to the raising of the number of Russian troops in the Ionian Isles, which was ordered by Alexander I to counteract the presence of French forces in the Adriatic. On the 17th of April 1804 the State Council discussed the new international situation and the policy to be followed. As between 1801 and 1803, yet again two views collided in the question. Czartoryski, who was practically directing foreign affairs from January 1804, suggested that the Russian court should protest against the execution of the Duke at the same time expressing their grief. He also suggested to sever diplomatic ties with France and to overtly negotiate with England on forming an anti-French coalition. He appeased those opposing by saying that „*severing the ties does not mean the beginning of war,*” that this policy was not dangerous for Russia as it did not have a common border with France and was not threatened by direct attack.²⁸ Those in favour of war against

²⁵ Ibid dok. 222. 527.

²⁶ Ibid dok. 256. 624-627.

²⁷ Ibid dok. 259. 234-237. dok. 260. 639-640.

²⁸ Ibid dok. 278. 693.

France were happy to receive Czartoryski's proposal, those in favour of the policy of „*free hands*” however, were against it. They agreed with expressing grief, but they opposed Russia entering into war for the interest of other European states. In opposition to Czartoryski, Rumyantsev proposed just to „*share the grief and keep quiet about the rest.*” And if Alexander I wanted to express his outrage in a more pronounced form then let him „*suspend contacts with the French for a short period of time, but let him not be drawn into a war against Napoleon.*”²⁹ Even though no decision was made at the session of the State Council but it became evident that the policy of „*free hands*” could not be kept up for long and Russia needed England because of the Eastern Question as well as because she could not defend the long coastline in the Balkans against the French without the help of the English fleet. After such events came the break between Russia and France in 1804.

The disputed issues of the Eastern Question with the French speeded up Anglo-French rapprochement and led to a formation of an anti-French coalition. Russian diplomats felt the growing influence of the French in Constantinople from 1802 onwards and they had exact information concerning Napoleon's „*Eastern plan*” as well. By 1804 it had become clear that in case of the break-up of Franco-Russian ties the main theatre of war would be Europe and therefore Russian policies concerning European issues and the Eastern Question had to be reconsidered for the case of a war against Napoleon.³⁰ The second half of 1804 and the year 1805 were the „*golden period*” in Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations. Supporters of the Anglo-Russian alliance on the Russian side - Czartoryski, Novosiltsov and Stroganov in Petersburg, S. R. Vorontsov in London and Razumovski in Vienna - were all working on forming a strong anti-French coalition. Semyon Vorontsov, the ambassador to London started preliminary talks with the English cabinet and left further negotiations to the emperor's trusted man, N. Novosiltsov, who stayed in London from the 16th of November 1804 to the 7th of January 1805. During his secret mission he met English Prime Minister William Pitt, with whom he discussed the important questions of the proposed Anglo-Russian alliance based on the secret instructions prepared by the emperor on the 11th of November 1804.³¹ The Anglo-Russian alliance treaty was signed on the 11th of April 1805 and Austria joined it ten days later.

At the beginning of his war against England and Russia, Napoleon tried to achieve progress in the Eastern Question by diplomatic means and tried to exert pressure on Turkey. He demanded Selim III to recognise him as emperor. When the Sultan denied this with Russian and English support behind his back the French diplomatic corps left Constantinople in November 1804. Russian

²⁹ Ibid dok. 278. 696.

³⁰ Ibid dok. 240. 577. dok. 241. 581-584.

³¹ VPR, Ser. I. t. 2. Moskva, 1961. dok. 50. 146-151.

diplomacy was victorious with English help in this duel against French diplomats.³² Afraid of a French attack, the Porte immediately asked for Russian support and the confirmation of the alliance treaty of 1799. The Russian government achieved their goal as the „friendly neutrality and support” of the Porte was beneficial for St. Petersburg in case of a Franco-Russian war, thus both parties were interested in reaffirming the treaty of 1799. Besides, the question of closing the Straits for the French navy was already central to Russo-Turkish negotiations from January 1804 onwards. From December 1804 A. Ya. Italinsky, the Russian ambassador conducted negotiations with Turkish ministers on a new alliance treaty, which was signed after long talks on the 23rd of September 1805. The treaty consisting of 25 articles - out of which 10 were secret - regulated the complex relations of the Ottoman Empire and Russia.³³ The treaty was completely anti-French and articles one, two and six were concerned with mutual assistance in case of a war against Napoleon. Turkey confirmed Russia’s rights as protector and granted free use of the Straits to Russian warships. The Parties also agreed that they would provide for the defence of the Straits together. Several articles touched upon the situation of the peoples of the Balkans, the eighth secret article was on the Greeks, and the fourth one was about the Russian occupation of the Ionian Isles. A peculiar point of the treaty, the seventh secret one declared the Black Sea the inland sea of Russia and Turkey. „Both high contracting Parties regard the Black Sea a closed one and will not allow the appearance of any warship or any armed vessel of any power ... Therefore the warships and war supplies of the sovereign of the Russian Empire may pass through the channel of Constantinople to which the Sublime Porte will provide all the help and assistance.”³⁴ Thus the closed Straits secured the defence of Russia’s southern borders for a short period of time in the complicated international situation. According to the treaty Russian warships could get to the Mediterranean, which increased the field of movement in Russia’s war against France and enabled the defence of the Ionian Isles. A fleet sent for the defence of the Ionian islands this time under the command of Admiral D. N. Senavin re-appeared in the Mediterranean and Russian troops were sent to Naples as well.

The Russo-Turkish agreement of 1805 however, remained in force for a very short period of time. After the crushing of the third coalition at Austerlitz (2 December 1805), the forming of which took 16 months and which was destroyed by Napoleon in less than two and a half months, international relations left their trait on Russo-Turkish relations as well. In accordance with the peace treaty of Pozsony (6 December 1805) France acquired Venice and to

³² SHUPP, Paul F.: *The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question 1806-1807*, New York, 1931. 68.

³³ VPR, Ser. I. t. 2. 589-594.

³⁴ Ibid 593.

the dismay of the Russian government Austria surrendered her territories on the Balkans, Istria and Dalmatia. Thus the French got close to the important Russian naval base on the Ionian Isles.³⁵

After Austerlitz Russian diplomacy was divided yet again. The Russian government gathered to discuss the changed situation and the line of foreign policy to be followed in January 1806. In the session Czartoryski read out his note entitled „*The State of Political Affairs in Europe.*” Vivid discussions evolved concerning the policy to be followed by Russia and views were divided on the future of the Ottoman Empire as well. Some suggested its partitioning. At this point the foreign minister, A. Czartoryski was also of this view and he aimed at restoring Poland’s independence and wanted the southern Slav states to become independent of the Turkish Empire. Many agreed with Czartoryski’s plan, among them V. Kochubei, who had been advocating the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire.³⁶ The views of Russia’s leaders concerning the Eastern Question changed due to several reasons, but mainly as a consequence of the French expansion in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. The Tsar and his entourage were convinced that the Turkish Empire would fall apart in case of a French attack. The internal problems of Turkey seemed to prove this; the Turkish state was rendered increasingly unstable by the separatist aspirations of the pashas, the Serbian revolt of 1804 and the opposition of the court circles to Selim III’s attempts at reform. As a result it was not only in Russia but also all over Europe that plans were made to partition the Ottoman Empire. In early 1806 however, there was no final view yet on what kind of a policy Russia should follow in the Eastern Question. Although the Russian cabinet continued to support the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire and had vested interest in preserving and strengthening the alliance with Turkey and tried to reduce French influence in the Turkish court,³⁷ they also projected that in agreement with England and France and with the guarantees of the peace treaties closing the war of the third coalition a few independent Slav states could be formed in the Balkans under Russian protectorate. This idea would actually have resulted in the partial partition of the Turkish Empire and it was brought up in the Paris peace talks conducted by the Russian ambassador P. Ya. Ubri.³⁸ In exchange for the recognition of Napoleon’s title as emperor and most of his new conquests Russia demanded from him to give up his newly acquired territories in the Balkans and in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean. The Russians made the first attempt with this policy of compensation at negotiating with the French ruler on dividing Europe into spheres of interest. Napoleon’s plans however were opposite to Russian ideas at the time. During his talks with Ubri, Talleyrand did everything

³⁵ SIROTKIN, V. G.: op. cit. 25.

³⁶ VPR, Ser. I. t. 3. Moskva, 1963. dok. 1. 7-16.

³⁷ Ibid Primechaniya, 651.

³⁸ Ibid dok. 45. Prilozheniye No. 2, 136.

he could to reduce Russian influence in the Mediterranean. He achieved that in the peace treaty signed by the Russian ambassador Russia undertook to withdraw her troops from Cattaro and the region of Montenegro, Dalmatia and Ragusa, and to decrease the number of troops stationed in the Ionian Isles from 11 thousand in the autumn of 1804 to 4 thousand.³⁹ Alexander I however did not want to ratify the agreement, thus negotiations came to an end. The fourth anti-French coalition was formed and hostilities began at the end of September in East Prussia, the results of which also had an effect on the evolution of the Eastern Question. Napoleon crushed the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstadt and by late October Russian troops were facing the French army.

The Russian plan of forming independent Slav states in the Balkans was not supported either by the French or the English. The special mission to London of P. A. Stroganov in 1806 was also without success.⁴⁰ These controversies in Russia's policy concerning the Eastern Question may be explained by the fact that Alexander I, though opposed the complete partitioning of the Ottoman Empire referring to the interest of the Russian state (among others it was because of this that he got into disagreement with Czartoryski and dismissed him as foreign minister), could well imagine and support a partial partition. (Later on this view will serve as a basis for Russia's policies in the Balkans.)

In 1804 and 1805 Turks could still hover between England and Russia or France and could follow a foreign policy according to their security and defence. Turkey needed strong and trustworthy allies because of its grave internal problems, the movements of liberation of the peoples in the Balkans. After Austerlitz Napoleon's influence grew in Europe and in the Near East as well. This defined the alliance policies of the increasingly weak Turkish Empire, too. Those in favour of revanchism were strengthened in the Turkish government and received the news of the Russian defeat at Austerlitz with joy because they hoped that the territories acquired by Russia in the late 18th century could be regained. Already in January 1806 Selim III greeted Napoleon in a letter and recognised his title of emperor. At the same time the Turkish government aimed at decreasing the rights laid down in the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1805. In April 1806 with the pretext of being afraid of French retaliation, the Porte asked A. Ya. Italinsky to relay to the Russian government to reduce the number of warships passing through the Straits to the Mediterranean. Having been informed of the failure of the Franco-Russian negotiations in July 1806, they demanded the same and in the autumn of 1806 they finally closed the Straits to Russian warships. „*Thus our strong and exceptional influence has come to an end and we shall share it with France and this can happen in no other way,*”⁴¹ - summed up Italinsky the events bitterly.

³⁹ Ibid dok. 89. 229-231.

⁴⁰ Cf. in detail: Nikolay Mihaylovich, velikiy knaz: P. A. Stroganov, t. 3. Stpb. 1903. 9-11.

⁴¹ Vostochniy vopros (1978), 58.

From the spring of 1806 there was a serious diplomatic battle going on between the French and the Russians in Constantinople. General Horace Sebastiani, the new French ambassador arrived at Constantinople on the 20th of June 1806 with the instructions to form an anti-Russian alliance with Turkey. (General Gardane tried to achieve the same in Persia.) He used all means to achieve his goal. He got the support of the Turkish government with his promises that the Ottoman Empire could be restored to its borders before the peace of Kuchuk Kaynarja and the Sultan could get back the Crimea and the coast of the Black Sea.⁴² In the awakened spirit of revanchism the Turks prepared for war against Russia. The Russo-Turkish agreements including the one on the Straits and the one on Moldavia and Wallachia were not respected. Princes Constantin Ipsilantis and Alexander Moruzzi were removed from the government of the Danubian Principalities without Russia's consent. In response Alexander I ordered the occupation of the principalities in November 1806. At the end of December 1806, the Russian ambassador, A. Ya. Italinsky left Constantinople, on the 20th of December 1806 the Porte declared war and thus the next Russo-Turkish war started that would last for more than five years.⁴³

The events of the early 19th century in the Near East and the Balkans demonstrate that the resolution of several problems of the Eastern Question depended on the relations between Russia and Turkey. Russians handled the question of the Straits, of the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean and even that of the Balkans with success within the framework of the alliance with Turkey. Changes in international relations, above all Napoleon's successful campaigns in Europe, his increasing activity in the Eastern Question and his growing influence in the Turkish Empire led to the worsening of Russo-Turkish relations, then break-up and war. At the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war the Russian cabinet deemed it important to rethink their policies in the Near East and to elaborate a new programme, which could be achieved after the Franco-Russian peace treaty of Tilsit (25 June 1807).

⁴² SHUPP, Paul F.: op. cit. 75-76.

⁴³ JELAVICH, op. cit. I. 113-114.

Ramachandra Byrappa

Digesting Democracy - A Japanese recipe¹

There is no text-book definition of democracy. The democratic practice generally is cornered and constrained by institutional set-up and the whims and wishes of national elite, shrouded and entrenched in self-serving ideologies. Although Japan might not be the exception to the norm, there are signs that democratic practice in the Land of the Rising Sun, by its scope and depth, is far more mature and sophisticated than democracy practiced in some western countries. Speaking on the occasion of a Conference on Democracy, Market Economy and Development in Seoul, South Korea, February 1999, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (Master of Trinity College, in Cambridge, UK, and Lamont University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University) outlined a catalogue of conditions that a system should display in order to be called democracy and produce its effectiveness: „*First, it enriches individual lives through more freedom (involving political and civil rights). Second, it provides political incentives to the rulers to respond positively to the needs and demands of the people. Third, the process of open dialogues and debates that democracy allows and encourages helps in the formation of values and priorities, and this constructive function of democracy can be very important for equity and justice as well as efficiency.*”² Although there are occasional incidents to the contrary, Japan does seem to satisfy the prerequisites laid down by Mr. Sen. It would be interesting to investigate and put a historical perspective on the achievements of the Japanese democracy on the march, and ask ourselves if the Japanese administrative model has contributed to this success.

In a previous study on Japanese democracy I had the opportunity to show how the practice of democracy had entered the economic sphere and how industrial democracy had become predominant. In the present study what I would like to do is to go further, showing on the one hand how Japanese democracy tries to neutralize the negative effects of its exercise. And on the other hand I will try to show how the Japanese democracy has changed its priorities to produce social and economic efficiency. What we will realize is that Japanese democracy diverges from the European or American traditions in ‘democratizing’ the execution of government policy. It is not ‘the people decide through parliament, and the government executes’. In the Japanese context, it is more in the line of ‘the Government decides, with the participation

¹ This is an extended version of a paper delivered at a doctoral conference organized by the author and the Department of Modern and Contemporary History, 18-05-2007, ELTE (Loránd Eötvös University), Budapest.

² Amartya SEN: *The Value of Democracy*, published online by The World Bank, Washington, Summer 1999. URL: <http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/summer99/article.asp?id=3>

of the Parliament and the people, or the sub-national entities execute'. This process was not the result of the constitution but the result of more than fifty years of continuous adaptation and consolidation where Japan goes beyond the normative form of democracy to give it a true meaning.

The above mentioned change of roles unleashes many more questions on the nature of democracy in general and its practice in particular. The question that we have to ask ourselves is that: should one restrict democracy only to the political sphere for it to be considered as such? How are we to make democracy truly representative for it to be really effective? Is democracy about choosing a 'governing elite' or is it about making specific social and economic decisions, a survey of the peoples preferences? Or quite simply what is democracy? Should parliament be given total sovereignty? Does the principle of 'rule-by-consensus' generally practiced in Japan, corrupt the notion of parliamentary democracy? These are some of the very important questions the Japanese model of democratic practice provokes and tries to give answers to.

What I propose to do is to divide the present study into three parts. In the first part, I would like to focus on the way the Japanese approach to universal democracy has proceeded to neutralize the negative effects of democratization that one tends to witness in the initial stages of implementation, in a country that is not acquainted with a democratic tradition of government. In this part we will try to see how the Japanese tradition tries to weed out conflict from the political arena, to replace it with constructive debate to promote the social and economic welfare of the Japanese Nation. In the second part we will try see how the principle and essence of democracy is integrated into the daily life of the ordinary Japanese subject by the structure policy execution. In other words how policy implementation is democratized, how economic, social decisions and order is maintained by the 'subject' as opposed to the 'government'. In the third and final part I would like to demonstrate the fact that by giving democracy back to the people the Japanese model of democracy does indeed make it efficient and economically affordable by greatly reducing the costs of its overall functioning to the society. One should not forget that in some contexts and in some countries democracy induces such a high level of costs that it bankrupts the whole society.

Today modern Japan might be considered an ethnically homogenous society.³ But this does not remove us from the fact that civil war (more than 400 years of it), conflict and violence were endemic to Japan and Japanese society right up to the 1970s. Unfortunately ethnic uniformity does not always mean economic or social equality, not counting on the odd moments of irrational behavior that human kind is plagued with. The establishment of the Meiji constitution and the resulting „*Taisho democracy*” showed that the way

³ This statement is sometimes questioned by the inhabitants of Okinawa (island) which is scattered a thousand kilometres or more from the capital-Tokyo. But the overall sense of belonging to one Japanese nation is not questioned.

to plural democracy can be long and tedious, sometimes even hazardous, as it was in the case of Japan. The 1920s and 1930s showed the Japanese elite the deficiencies of democracy as the country was grappled with political intrigue, assassinations and un-bridled militarism.⁴ The problem with Japan's first experiment with liberal democracy was that power was still concentrated with the Emperor. You therefore have a situation where people are mistakenly led to believe that political parties can improve the livelihoods of the average Japanese. But as the Emperor's inner circle only allowed a limited space of action for the elected representatives, peoples high hopes could not be satisfied. Dissatisfaction and dismay lead to radicalism. The high season of the radicalism was marked by „*the famous incident*” of May 15, 1932, when a band of extremist young naval officers murdered the elderly Premier, Tsuyoshi Inukai, while a group of insurgent peasants made an abortive effort to cut off Tokyo's electric power supply as a demonstration against the sufferings in the rural districts.⁵ With this kind of a situation what we realize is that the advent of democracy, with its new expression of legitimacy, relegates previous structures of authority and responsibility to a lesser role in society. If democracy does not fulfill its objective role then society decomposes with unforeseeable consequences. The checks and balances provided by the Meiji Constitution proved inadequate and insufficient to shelve Japan away from war and consequent political turmoil, and even economic ruin. There were very few forums where political tension could be 'siphoned' off. The new post-war leadership needed to re-appraise the role of democracy and its adaptation to the Japanese context.

At the end of the Second World War for Japan, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoshida Shigeru sent a letter to his subordinate in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kurusu Saburo, in which he writes the following, „*That which had to pass, has at last come to pass,*” adding that Japan, free from militarism, would see „*transparency politics and an uplifting of the people's morals.*” Meanwhile, he also gives vent to his longstanding feelings toward the military and the gendarme (*kenpeitai*), writing, „*I can gloat a bit (over their downfall), and tell them, It serves you right!*”⁶ This concluding sentence shows how much Yoshida was relieved upon the end of the war and how he was hopeful for a different kind of future, a future without internal and external conflicts for his people.

The same vision dominated officers in the Japanese Navy. According to a study conducted by J.K.Galbraith for the American administration, „*Rear Adm.*

⁴ William Henry CHAMBERLIN: Japan over Asia, published by Duckworth, London, 1938, 214. Note the so called February 1926 events which lead to the assassination of the Finance Minister, Korekiyo Takahashi.

⁵ Ibid, 199.

⁶ Letter from Yoshida Shigeru to Kurusu Saburo: 27 August 1945 (Showa 20), Papers of HARADA Kumao, #54-14, National Diet Library, Tokyo. URL: <http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description01.html#c511> (2008-03-05)

Soichi Takagi, who was attached to the ministerial secretariat of the Naval General Staff, made a study between 20 September 1943 and February 1944, of the war's battle lesson up to that time. He concluded that Japan could not win and verbally presented his findings in March 1944 to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Vice Adm. Seibi Inouye. Takagi's study, interestingly enough, was undertaken at the end of the second year of the war--the time beyond which, the Japanese Navy's top command had estimated before hostilities, Japan could not fight a successful war."⁷ This was promptly relayed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which by autumn 1943 had also considered very probable that Japan would be defeated, and went on to preparing concrete plans of how Japan should be 're-engineered' as a country. This partly meant going back to the essential element of the Japanese political geography - the notion of community.

As the renowned American reporter, William Henry Chamberlin once put it: *„No country, it seems safe to say, has advanced so far into the twentieth century while retaining so much that belongs to the fifteenth, or to the tenth, or to even earlier periods of human history.*"⁸ Unlike some of the other modern nation-states, the Japanese political system has evolved by an outright recognition that *„community”* pre-exists the *„nation-state”*. And it is generally true that as one political scientist puts it: *„one of the most powerful sources of man's political loyalty and action has always been his sense of attachment to a region or a community. When he identifies himself very closely with the interests of a particular area or a particular group of people to the point where his life ceases to have any real importance other than within that context, then he may be prepared if necessary to die to defend those interests.*"⁹ For the reasons of economic viability and peaceful co-existence, at a point in history, communities willfully come together to build a nation-state, and this was the case of Japan as a nation-state, especially after the Second World War.

If one accepts the fundamental truth that socio-economic order is partly the result of tested tradition and morality, which developed over a long period, thus giving total sovereignty to one single body like the parliament becomes very anachronistic.¹⁰ My assertion is that, in the context that parliament or the national legislature do not have the monopoly on the generation of social and economic order, there is no reason why it (the national parliament) should enjoy a monopoly over the principle of sovereignty. The sooner one recognizes this fact the better one would be prepared to understand the Japanese 'particularity' in the development of democracy. The Japanese system seems to have taken a long advance on the rest of the so called 'modern' democracies.

⁷ J. K. GALBRAITH: *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey - Japan's Struggle to End the War*, published by U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 1946, 3.

⁸ CHAMBERLIN, 252.

⁹ M.J.C. VILE, *Politics in the USA* (Third Edition), Hutchinson, London, 1983, 24.

¹⁰ Michael H. HART, *Law, Liberty, and Morality*, Stanford University Press, (1 edition) 1963, 3-6.

The other related problem with parliamentary democracy, in its rudimentary form, is that it is instrumentalised by ‘nation-building’ movements. As such this might not be a catastrophe if it were not for the side effects. What nation-building does is to streamline local and individual sovereignty through a democratic process and fix national objectives. Historians sometimes make a mistake by over-emphasizing the possible ‘factor’ of disintegrating empires and break-up of monolithic kingdoms which led to the creation of the nation-states in Europe and later on in the rest of the world. One Scandinavian study came-up with the following statement: „Several scholars have analyzed the process of democratization of European countries as closely related to the emergence of nation-states. The replacement of traditional rule in empires by government by nation-states according to the principle of ‘one people-one state’ was conducive to victory of democracy, although both fascism and communism scored temporary successes when traditional rule was abandoned in Europe. ... In the new world, the demand for democracy went hand-in-hand with a growing national consciousness, as colonial power was dismantled.”¹¹ Historians sometimes inadvertently promote ideas that are in conformity with national endeavors but without historic foundations, since they fail to explain the reasons why in so many of these countries civil wars break-out almost immediately after the declaration of independence from their colonial masters.

As I had the opportunity to illustrate in a conference held Debrecen, Hungary, historians would serve the purpose of history better by assessing the real forces behind the use of democracy by the nation-building movements. Democracy begins as a system which heralds the advent of the „rule by the majority”. And for this reason initially it represented a form of revolutionary ideology, since it provided a chance for the oppressed under classes to attain political emancipation. But as soon as the „Westminster” style of aggregation and segregation begins, all hopes evaporated; because the so called „procedures” (political parties, selection of leaders, the factions and the arithmetic of coalition politics) weed-out popular will to transform democracy into a ‘dumb duck’ at the best. Since more than half a century of civil wars, uprisings, manmade economic and environmental disasters there is one thing that always pops to front – the struggle of the community against the nation-state. We all, layman, intellectual, historian etc. always forget or under-value the fact that democracy is about people - about real communities. As such, the farther away we take democracy from communities the more estranged it becomes, and thus less effective in solving social and economic problems.

This is a mistake that Japan could not commit again. During the first period, before the Second World War, nation-building was sucking the ham out of communities. One of the main characteristic of the „Taisho democracy” was

¹¹ Svante ERSSON, Jan-Erik LANE: *Democracy A Comparative Approach*, published by Routledge, London, 2003, 101.

politics for the sake of politics leading to a high level of instability which overflowed from parliament into the streets. What was worse was that this instability was taken to the factory floor,¹² risking the survival of whole sections of the population. As if to serve as a reminder, the initial years of rule under the Allied Forces, under the leadership of Supreme Commander Gen. MacArthur, was close to becoming a repeat of the „*Taisho democracy*”. According to Professor Fukutake, „*In the immediate postwar period Japan got of to a paradoxical start in its new career: democracy was taken as the voice of authority. ... Postwar Japan became a kind of test bed for democracy.*”¹³ With all it's good intentions the Occupation authorities pressed the Japanese government to legislate the Trade Union Law of December 1945, which guaranteed the right to organize and to bargain collectively and recognized the right to strike. The result of this legislation was an explosion of unionization and trade union activity. In February 1946 there were 675 unions registered with a total membership of 496,000. By July 1948 the number of unions had shot-up to 33,940 with a membership 6,637,710.¹⁴ Among this rise the public sector represented the lion share of union membership – 2,600,000 by the end of 1948. The stage was set for ideological brinkmanship.

This was accompanied by an explosion in political affiliation. Although from outside it might be perceived that the United States and its allies, by the ‘Potsdam declaration’, imposed a new democratic political system on Japan, it should be noted that a big chunk of the Japanese elite and the overwhelming majority of its people were persuaded by the necessity of democratizing the country. But at the same time those Japanese statesman that had travel to the West and had come into contact with the functioning of western democracies were aware of the dangers that it could instill in an economically fragile country like Japan. The introduction of this new wave of democratization meant that old and forgotten divisions in the Japanese society were bound to re-emerge and destabilize the country. Political and social instability was the last thing that Japan needed after a devastating war. To rebuild the country from the rubbles needed long-term planning. Sometimes introducing democracy can be relatively simple but managing the costs that democracy causes are not so easy, so Japan needed to take urgent and decisive steps to construct a political system that would not over-burden its economic structure. The end result was a democracy with the traditional Japanese preference for political stability.

The ingenuity of the Japanese political system is that both systems cohabit, and are used alternatively as best suited for the effective exercise of power. From a historian's perspective, tracking down the pattern of political power and

¹² CHAMBERLIN, 211.

¹³ Tadashi FUKUTAKE, *The Japanese Social Structure – Its Evolution in the Modern Century*, published by University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1982, 78.

¹⁴ Shigeto TSURU, *Japan's capitalism – creative defeat and beyond*, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, 24.

the way in which it is exercised, becomes complex, and traditional methods of studying government and parliamentary documents is insufficient to assess the whole picture. One of the reasons for this is not that the political institutions do not fully play their function; it is more that they are required to play a marginal role in the „*socio-economic*” system as whole. Who plays what role and to what extent, some historians concluded, was decided when the so called „*1955 System*” was put together. There seems to be some ground to this since very important, if not radical, changes took place in the year 1955.

The prelude to the 1955 system began in October 1955, when the left and the right wings of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) merged, and in the following month the two main conservative parties, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, also merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This marked the founding of the 1955 system. The rationale for the mergers was above all the desire for political power and control of the government. The Socialist Party which had splintered over the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, had increased its Diet strength in the successive elections of 1952, 1953, and 1955, and the advance of the left wing was particularly noteworthy. In the spring 1955 election, both wings campaigned on a platform promising a merger in the near future. The Diet strength of the conservatives on the other hand, kept shrinking in the election after election, and the Democratic Party that had organised the Hatoyama cabinet fell far short of a majority in 1955. The conservatives were resolved to merge in order to build a stable conservative government and in response to the Socialists’ merger. The mergers within the two camps, however, were also brought about by strong external pressures from both inside and outside. Sohyo, the labour federation created by the occupation authority, had turned sharply left and radical with the coming of the Korean War; at that time it was directing a large-scale labour campaign against „*rationalization*” both in the private and sector, including large-scale restructuring in bureaucratic apparatus of the country. Without Sohyo’s total endorsement and promise of its financial might, the socialist leftwing could not have expanded as it did. And as many believe without its negative pressure, the JSP would not have come together again.¹⁵

One of the main, if not the principle, reasons why the left gathered strength was that it started to promise a ‘progressive’ social democratic society in which individual freedoms would take a central place in the system. As Professor Shigeto Tsuru explains „*A propitious occasion came in 1947 through the coming into power of the Socialist Party although in coalition with two conservative parties. This government, headed by Tetsu Katayama, a socialist as well as a Christian, was fully supported by General MacArthur, and started its activities with a fair amount of ambition, publishing the First Economic*

¹⁵ Junnosuke MASUMI, *The 1955 System in Japan and Its Subsequent Development*, Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Mar., 1988), 286-306.

White Paper, which played an enlightening role in impressing upon public the need for progressive measures in the economic sphere. The government also proposed the nationalization of coal mines, and the enabling law was enacted subsequently in December 1947 with a three-year time limit."¹⁶ Translated into economic policy this would mean a welfare system that would make Japan an importing country than a predominantly exporting country that it needs to be. On the long-term, if applied, Katayama's economic policies would have created fiscal imbalances, making Japan a net borrowing country.

Although the 'First Economic White Paper' might have been a hot potato with the war stricken Japanese voter, it was not going to be popular with the Japanese businesses and the majority of the conservatives. It is also important to point out that outside Japan, the American authorities in Washington D.C., were worried that by creating a weak economy in the North-East corner of Asia they would facilitate the onslaught of communism. One should not forget that before 1949 (the emergence of a red PRC) the United States hoped that China would be its main ally but hopes were dashed by a victorious Mao Zedong. In spite of all the war time bitterness felt by both sides the fate of US foreign policy in North-East Pacific region hinged upon an economically beleaguered Japan. It was vitally important for the United States that Japan becomes a show case for both American-styled liberal democracy, accompanied invariably a capitalist economic system. What is more, the broth of the Korean conflict also pointed out the strategic importance of Japan in terms of logistical back-up.

The initial idealism displayed by General MacArthur was soon swept away by cold-war realism. The last years of the Occupational Authorities were marked by heavy-handedness against those democratic institutions which they earlier imposed on Japan. When MacArthur refused to comply with the directives of the (Ralph) Young report for economic stabilisation of Japan, the National Security Council directive of the so-called „*Nine-Point Programme*” of December 1948 was dispatched, along with Detroit banker Joseph Dodge in February 1949. He was given the rank of minister and as a personal representative of President Truman.¹⁷ Dodge distributed a report from the ACJ to his staff that denounced SCAP as a „*bureaucratic, inefficient, dictatorial, vindictive, and at times corrupt*” organization. It accused MacArthur and his staff of destroying the „*very individuals and classes*” who supported the United States in the cold war while giving Communists free rein.¹⁸ The Zaibatsu (monopolies) reform program was not only abruptly stopped but they were allowed to reconstitute themselves. The

¹⁶ Shigeto TSURU, op. cit. 16

¹⁷ Shigeto TSURU: *Japan's Capitalism: creative defeat and beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Canto Edition 1996, 46.

¹⁸ Michael SCHALLER, *Altered States, The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, Oxford University Press, 1997, chapter one, downloaded from: <http://72.14.207.104/search?q=cache:9k0vZgvc6HsJ:www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/schaller-states.html+James+Lee+Kauffman+and+Japan&hl=hu&gl=hu&ct=clnk&cd=23> (retrieved on 2006-03-10).

circumstances in which the „1955 System” came are very blurred and shrouded in mystery. Only now, almost 50 years after its creation, historians are coming to grips with what happened then. But the full picture why such diverse set of interests arrayed themselves and for what purpose.

The situation in 1955 was the remnants of the Meiji administration was landed with two very delicate challenges, both to which they would apply their own, well experimented methodology. On one side the ‘occupying’ authorities was asking the Japanese elite to bolster the ideology of ‘liberal democracy’ and on the other side produce an economic miracle to back-up the earlier mentioned ideological thrust. From the part of the Japanese, as I mentioned earlier, there was no doubt that democracy was the best thing for the Japanese people. But the question was how does one put together a modern and well functioning economy; without the hap hazards (referring to its earlier experiences) that democracy seems to produce. The Japanese, from the transition administration, come-up with a simple but genuine system of cellular development of democracy where ideological debate in one particular cell does not upset the rest of the cellular fabric of the Japanese society as a whole. Instead democracy is positively applied to reduce conflict in society and more importantly reduce economic inequalities.

Even the highest and the most important for the „polis” – political activity, was neatly tailored to become a ‘cellular community’. Professor Tadashi Fukutake, of the University of Tokyo, came up with the following explanation which serves our purpose well: *„Even if farming was mainly a system of private family production, the existence of resources over which the community had a monopoly made supplementation of individual by cooperative effort necessary. It is in that sense one can speak of Japanese villages, even in the modern period, as genuinely village „communities” of a corporate kind.”*¹⁹ After a period of enhanced industrialization and urbanization Japan was far from being an agrarian society, but the community concept of the Japanese society prevailed. It could not be considered „mass” society as in the western hemisphere. The reason for this is that the „community” concept was re-created where needed to avoid chaos and void.

In 1955 this community concept became a fundamental necessity to the rearrangement of the Japanese political landscape. Rather than become a dominant political party of an ordinary kind the newly formed Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) becomes the leading political community whose main purpose would be to provide the country with political stability, without which long term economic planning would be impossible. Simply put, this new community instrument called the LDP is entrusted by a mission to manage any political conflict that might arise.

¹⁹ Tadashi FUKUTAKE, *The Japanese Social Structure – Its Evolution in the Modern Century*, published by University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1982, 35.

The structure and organization of the LDP gives many clues that help us to understand the true mission it is burdened with. The most striking feature of the LDP is its 'faction' system. Within the party there are political formations and political interest groups which set themselves up as factions, with organizational and financial resources which are solely destined to the faction. Anywhere else in the world these factions would be termed as 'political parties', but not in Japan, and especially not in the LDP. This faction system is further enforced by an electoral system where 'multi-representative' constituencies exist. This means that the LDP can sometimes have five or more candidates (all from different factions) contesting along with all the other 'opposition' parties.

Once elected the debates and negotiations to elect a new leader of the LDP take place between these factions. Usually the leader of a faction that succeeds in amassing the support of other factions becomes the head of the LDP, and eventually the Prime Minister of the nation. In a country like Britain this would mean that the newly elected Prime Minister can freely choose the members of his cabinet and would be vested with powers to propose policy for approval by the national parliament and eventually implement the approved policy.

In the national Diet (the Japanese Parliament) every precious minute of a Prime Minister's movement or action is carefully observed and scrutinized by the Diet, and by default by the LDP to the point that executive power is eroded and left to a symbolic minimum. From outside and afar this might seem awkward and inefficient way of conducting the business of parliamentary democracy. But one should not forget that in Japan we are talking about cellular communities and not 'mass' citizenry. From this perspective, the political system in general and the LDP in particular fulfill the democratic function by conveying and consolidating particular community interests in the overall national interests that are put forward.

Conflict feeds upon embittered groups or communities that feel that they are left out or are failed to be integrated into the overall process. In Japan, it is the duty of the representatives to collect and collate these particularities to the highest legislative body, the Diet. The political career of ex-Prime Minister Tanaka is a good illustration of the process and fits well the illustration I would like to make. In 1947, at the age of 28 Tanaka became a member of the national Diet, under the banner of the Democratic Party headed by Hitoshi Ashida. *„As a new member of the House of Representatives, Tanaka's low stature was confirmed when he was given two very minor posts. One was on the Committee for Construction and the other was on the Committee to Research Unfair Property Transactions. He hoped to secure a mentor and break into the fraternity of elites by joining the sub-party faction of former Prime Minister Kijuro*

*Shidehara. Always in need of money, Shidehara accepted him.*²⁰ Tanaka consequently became responsible for the finances of Shidehara faction which called itself the Doshi Club. Two months after Ashida became Prime Minister, the Doshi Club joined the Yoshida-Hatoyama (Kodama) Liberal Party. It was a timely alliance. Along with other defectors, party chiefs decided to reorganize into the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) with Shigeru Yoshida as its president. Tanaka became manager for election campaigns of the party. Tanaka had caught Yoshida's attention by compiling a detailed district-by-district political map. The map impressed Yoshida because of its comprehensive compilation of each party member's connections, source of financial support and family ties. It was valuable intelligence that demonstrated Tanaka's talent for organization and political maneuvering.²¹ Yoshida rewarded Tanaka for his help by appointing him as the nation's youngest Vice Minister of Justice. But the „*Nagaoka Railroad*” incident in 1949 was soon to show Tanaka's political brilliance.

In the middle of 1949, the Santo area of Tanaka's Third District faced a crisis. The railway that linked the Santo area to the city of Nagaoka and to Tokyo was almost bankrupt. National inflation had made the cost of coal prohibitive and without coal they couldn't operate their steam train. Without the train, Santo farmers couldn't get their crops to market economically. If they couldn't profit from their crops, they couldn't purchase chemical fertilizers. If they couldn't get fertilizers, they couldn't farm, and if they couldn't farm, the entire Santo region faced ruin.²² By December 1951 Tanaka had succeeded in constructing a new electric line. He achieved this almost unachievable deed by mobilizing rail workers, farming community and banks that were willing to risk capital. By the successful completion of the rail road, Tanaka achieved the status of national hero and a young politician who could achieve miracles for common people.

Tanaka also increased the potential of local politicians who are in touch with the electoral base. In this context being elected or re-elected means solving problems and producing tangible results at the local level. „*In traditionally autocratic Japan, nobody had ever seen anything like it. Common people usually excluded from the normal course of backroom power-brokerage put together „Tanaka picnics,” „Tanaka Cup baseball games,” „Tanaka Cup fishing contests,” and other grassroots fund-raising activities unique to the political landscape. For Tanaka, the Nagaoka project was an eye-opening*

²⁰ Steven HUNZIKER and Ikuro KAMIMURA, *Kakuei Tanaka-A political biography of modern Japan*, Chapter 2. Downloaded from: <http://www.rcrinc.com/tanaka/ch5-4.html>, date of retrieval 2006-05-11

²¹ Ibid.

²² Steven HUNZIKER and Ikuro KAMIMURA, *Kakuei Tanaka-A political biography of modern Japan*, Chapter 3. Downloaded from: <http://www.rcrinc.com/tanaka/ch5-4.html>, date of retrieval 2006-05-11

experience. He easily won re-election to his third term, placing first above all others, garnering support from farmers, teachers, labor and business."²³ Tanaka succeeded in cutting across class and income based groups. Being working class and voting LDP was no longer abnormal, in short he was working for the interests of the entire community.

This was also financially self-supporting. Rural community in 1950s Japan meant infrastructure development and in many instances local support depended upon this. A good example of this procedure is the Tadami River Project. At the heart of the system is winning a project of considerable size with financial support coming from the central government. „*Once under way, the Tadami River Project gave birth to a vast array of construction and support industries that helped develop the eastern section of the Third District and provided a new source of supporters for Tanaka and Etsuzankai (Tanaka's political organisation).*"²⁴ Tanaka's personal companies dealing in transportation and gravel made huge profits. Grateful citizens of the region also provided donations and financial support to his political organisation – Etsuzanki. The Tadami River Project had other pitfalls down the line. „*Federal money for reclamation of unproductive terrain was allocated in an effort to decrease dependence on foreign goods and services. Tanaka's position on the Commerce and Industry Committee gave him an inside track on available funds. Etsuzankai found Tanaka a project along the Uono River. The project was 1,412 acres of unused land, perfect for conversion into rice fields. The work began at once and was finished in just five years. It was a bread-and-butter accomplishment that endeared him to the families along the river.*"²⁵ By bringing irrigation facilities to dried areas brought tangible, long term, benefits to the local community. And in exchange Tanaka could count on long term support of the community concerned. The Chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan, Tomiichi Murayama, crystallized Tanaka's impact on history when he said, „*Kakuei Tanaka represented postwar conservative politicians.*" „*He was the symbol of light and shade in postwar Japan.*"²⁶

For our purpose in defining the administrative and democratic system of Japan, Tanaka's impetus could mean two things. Whatever the national elite's designated purpose might have been immediately after the war – namely that of enhancing the livelihood of the Japanese population or laying the future foundations for the Japanese economic expansion – Tanaka made the idea of representative democracy look beneficial to both the voters and the ruling elite. Ex-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone said, „*Tanaka pioneered a new type of*

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Steven HUNZIKER and Ikuro KAMIMURA, *Kakuei Tanaka-A political biography of modern Japan*, Chapter 5. Downloaded from: <http://www.rcrinc.com/tanaka/ch5-4.html>, date of retrieval 2006-05-11.

politics for the nation. Although some of his approaches to politics drew criticism, Tanaka served as a link between the people and politics, which was a great achievement."²⁷ In an ever-centralizing political system, putting local politics at the heart of the system is indeed an achievement since the tendency of the bureaucratic machine was to centralize power and pull the economic allocation of resources to the centre. This was not the only challenge facing the nascent democracy in Japan.

One of the biggest challenges facing modern societies today is to cohabitate democracy, capitalist business environment, individual self-fulfillment and social equality. And given the highly integrated and ever complex and competitive international environment brought about by globalization this task can be pivotal to the success or failure of a society. What Japan has done is to adapt a cellular approach even in the economic sphere. This idea and its practice are not new to the Japanese situation. For centuries, in context of solely agrarian economy, the village acted primarily as an economic structure. This predominantly economic structure provided the central framework for socio-cultural activities of the community. „*In contrast to the European situation, researchers concerned with the postwar modernization of Japan's rural communities have invariably noted their relatively strong corporate character – although the local community no longer had any legal standing, it still maintained a formal system of self-government acted as a political unit in local elections, cooperated in economic endeavors, constituted an important socio-religious entity, and censored those who did not abide by community decisions.*"²⁸

Along with this inward organization of its economic fundamentals the village community displayed another very important characteristic. As Professor Tadashi Fukutake from the University of Tokyo explains: „*Even today these village boundaries, although they have lost all administrative significance whatever, are still something that villagers are usually aware of: some scholars speak of villages having their own „sovereign territory.” This is a particularly Japanese characteristic, not to be found in other Asian countries, such as China and India.*"²⁹ We can take issue with Professor Fukutake on the Chinese and India context, but what is key to our current discussion is that he is right in pointing out the truth that the Japanese system treats a ‘well defined and delimited’ organism or community as a ‘sovereign territory’. Compared with other countries this makes a big difference in the application of democracy.

In many respects the post-war Constitution maintains the notion ‘sovereign territory’ when it comes to industrial relations or the organization of the

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Peter H. PRINDLE, *Peasant-Worker Households and Community-Based Organizations in Rural Japan*, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1985), 279-297.

²⁹ Tadashi FUKUTAKE (University of Tokyo), *The Japanese Social Structure - Its Evolution in the Modern Century*, published by the University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1982, 34.

economy in general. „*Although the Labour Standards Law was enacted in 1946, the law defined only minimum criteria, and left it to the representative trade union (the right to unionize was guaranteed under the 1947 Constitution) to negotiate the actual working conditions. The law, which specified the right and duties of employee and employer if a labour contract did not exist, relied on the precedent of judicial adjudication in cases where the parties could not resolve their dispute on their own.*”³⁰ By giving only a loose and vague perimeter the law indirectly encourages the consolidation of democracy inside of an economic organization like a company and even lower at the level of a factory. Since the participants are invited to dialogue and resolve their particular problems by adopting rules and regulations particular to their needs.

In essence, democracy in Japan is taken for what it really should be – about debate and mutual persuasion, with the purpose of arriving at the appropriate decision, intended to serve and further the interests of the community. In the majority of the developed countries the relation between ‘work’ and ‘capital’ the prevailing perception is that of modern day slavery, the employer pays a salary and in exchange the worker does the designated job. In a sense private life and life at the work place more or less kept apart as belonging to two distinctive spheres. And within the workplace the management and the workers consider themselves as belonging to two quite separate ‘tribes’. The management feels no obligation to inform the workers of the overall company strategy. And as economic cycles deteriorate workers are laid-off as they were part of a ‘non-performing’ or ‘redundant’ material. In a way, cultural patterns are structurally inclined to push both parties towards conflict.

Learning past mistakes, and to give democracy a wider perspective than its narrow political function, Japanese government and corporate leaders are careful not to disturb or distort the community aspect of the ‘work place’. When international competition intensified the reaction of the Japanese companies was not to lay-off its workers and takes the production to cheaper manufacturing bases elsewhere in Asia. The reaction of Fujikazu Suzuki (Deputy Director General, RENGO-Research Institute for the Advancement of Living Standards -RENGO-RIALS) is very telling: „*External auditors and directors, however, are selected at meetings of general shareholders, and the “voices outside the company” are essentially the voices of shareholders and investors. Ensuring transparency in corporate management for those outside the company and safeguarding against tyrannical managers are certainly important. If the disclosure of information to shareholders and monitoring by shareholders are important, then disclosing information to employees, those most directly affected by management decisions, and ensuring that their*

³⁰ Wakana SHUTÔ (Yamagata University), *The Impact of Globalization on Trade Unions: The situation in Japan*, 11, published online at the following URL: [www.newunionism.net/library/internationalism/Japan%20-%20The%20Impact%20of%20Globalization%20on%20Unions%20\(2008-01-15\)](http://www.newunionism.net/library/internationalism/Japan%20-%20The%20Impact%20of%20Globalization%20on%20Unions%20(2008-01-15))

„voices” are reflected in corporate management seem even more important.”³¹ This points to the fact that in Japan, the company is not treated as a ‘colony’ of the capital; where ‘profits’ and ‘tributes’ profuse to the detriment of the worker and the community. Community spirit and dialogue at the work place it seems was a long tradition in Japan. In the words of a worker: „We don’t need any trade union. We are just one big family, working for the good of the enterprise.”³²

Democratic institutions at the national level might have different time patterns which might make the rights of the citizen ‘inactive’ since they have to wait for the next electoral cycle to renew or revise their decisions. In comparison, the work place and how it is organized is very important and has an impact on the everyday life of the working citizen. In the words of Liliane Jung of the International Labour Organization: „Collective agreements affect primarily those workers of the firm who are trade union members. According to custom, they tend to be put in writing only as far as is legally required. Further provisions of the agreement, which must of course be in line with the law, are often simply agreed to verbally. The written part of the agreements might therefore be simple or vague. This fact gives more importance to work rules, which stipulate common working conditions at the enterprise level. Any employer with more than 10 employees must draw them up in consultation with the trade union. Work rules must not infringe upon the applying collective agreement. Then, they fix the elements of the labour contracts within the company, independently of whether the individual worker is trade union member or not.”³³ What we witness in the process is that the worker exercising his democratic right to define, along with the rest of the immediate community, the rules and regulations which condition a big part of his life.

This democratic process of self-regulation restores the notion of ‘sovereign territory’ once enjoyed by the village community. And as in the case of the village, the dynamic exercise of democratic dialogue can lead to a high degree of autonomy since the scope for state intervention and arbitration is kept to a minimum. It very interesting to see that it is the trade unions and employer organizations that request that the government ‘put into’ law the ‘best practice’ that has evolved in their sphere of influence. In the words of the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training it is „Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation), which is the national center, and management organizations

³¹ Fujikazu SUZUKI (Deputy Director General, RENGO-Research Institute for the Advancement of Living Standards - RENGO-RIALS), *Corporate Governance Reform and Industrial Democracy in Japan*, published online at the following URL: www.jil.go.jp/english/documents/JLR05_fujikazu.pdf (2008-01-15)

³² William Henry CHAMBERLIN, *Japan over Asia*, published by Duckworth, London, 1938, 179.

³³ Liliane JUNG, *National Labour Law Profile: Japan*, published online by the International Labour Organisation at the following URL: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/national/jp.htm> (2008-02-28)

such as *Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation)* have established a venue for regular discussions, and for issues on which they share the same opinion, a joint policy proposal is duly submitted to the central government.”³⁴ In this way one can argue that the activity of the National Parliament is rearguard action, since it puts into law what has already been normalized by employers and workers – in short, by the community.

The delegation of democracy to areas of society where it produces tangible results has been the primordial advantage the Japanese system has gained over its main competitors. Capital, technology and skilled workforce can give a temporary advantage, but on the long term social and political stability can become more important as assets leading to a prosperous and harmonious society. Ross Mouer and Hirosuke Kawanishi came to the following conclusion: „*There is a common recognition that the Japanese model – with all its structural features, as an important component of the Japanese economy (indeed, of Japanese society) – contributed immensely to the economic achievements of the 1960s and 1970s.*”³⁵ When this model gets stretched the Japanese system of social engineering will find appropriate replacements. But the continuing preoccupation will always be „*how to neutralize conflict in society, by giving democracy a breathing space*”.

One might counter my argument by pointing out the fact that workplace does not constitute the entire society, and that most of the conflicts today happen outside the workplace. It is also argued that Japan is ‘lucky’ to have a homogenous society compared to Europe for example where multiculturalism has the upper hand. Once again I have to repeat myself by saying that Japan did not begin as a homogenous society, and that there was more than 400 years of civil war with periods of social tensions quite up to the 1970s. But by all standards, Japan enjoys less crime rate than most of the countries enjoying similar levels of living standards. One of the main reasons why Japan has a better success rate at maintaining social stability is that it has strived at ‘democratizing’ law-and-order enforcement, in the following section we will see how.

Journalists and academics constantly point out that social instability occurs in countries that do not have enough state maintained legal and law-and-order enforcement infrastructures. In many perspectives Japan can fall into such a category of countries. ‘Only about 2 percent of the approximately 25,000 persons who applied annually to the Ministry's Legal Training and Research Institute two-year required course were admitted in the late 1980s. The institute graduates only a few hundred new lawyers each year. Plagued by shortages of attorneys, judges, clerks, and other personnel, the court system is severely

³⁴ The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training: Labor Situation in Japan and Analysis: General Overview 2006/2007, November 2006, Tokyo, 64

³⁵ Ross MOUER and Hirosuke KAWANISHI, *A Sociology of Work in Japan*, published by Cambridge University Press, 2005, Cambridge, Page xv

overburdened. Presiding judges often strongly advise plaintiffs to seek out-of-court settlements. The progress of cases through even the lower courts is agonizingly slow, and appeals carried to the Supreme Court can take decades. Faced with such obstacles, most individuals choose not to seek legal remedies.³⁶ One enlightened legal professional in the United States sees it in the following lines: „*Let me begin with a caveat: I am an American lawyer and naturally tend to look at law in Japan with an American perspective. At the same time I am very conscious of the fact that our highly litigious country, with its nearly one million lawyer population, is at least as exceptional in its way as is Japan, with a mere 17,000 lawyers. Most countries of Europe have under a hundred thousand lawyers (Germany being the exception with 110,000) and are probably much better points of comparison for Japan. We should try to avoid thinking of ourselves as representing a norm.*”³⁷

Once again, what the framework of law enforcement does is to ‘communalize’ law-and-order maintenance by introducing democracy at the level of implementation. The structure of public administration is kept to a minimum so that the vacuum is filled with a ‘communal effort’. The idea behind this move is that it is impossible to put a policeman behind each subject or citizen. The main question is as following: can the community manage and resolve conflicts that arise within its boundaries? The Japanese administration thinks that the community is more than capable of having a positive effect on social conflicts within its ‘sovereign territory’, if it is allowed to exercise its democratic right to do so. It is another way of saying that the individual exercise of democracy confers him or her with the duty to see that social harmony is maintained in the community. A very good example of this is how the community reintegrates or rehabilitates offenders back into civic life.

As it has internationally been recognized it is very important that ‘first time offenders’ are successfully reintegrated into society. If not they become ‘serial offenders’ making it more difficult for them to be handled. Regarding effective crime prevention, the establishment and maintenance of social/community support for offenders’ rehabilitation can not be emphasized too much. There is a long tradition of volunteers’ participation in the community-based treatment of offenders in Japan. It was acknowledged by law in 1939, when the Judicial Rehabilitation Service Law was enacted which provided the basic framework for „*Rehabilitation Workers*” predecessors „*Volunteer Probation Officers*” (VPOs). After World War II there followed a discussion over whether or not probation and parole services should be established as a professional service

³⁶ The informations quoted in this passage were downloaded at the following website: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7257.html> (Date of retrieval 2006-08-16)

³⁷ Carl J. GREEN (Senior Representative Hitachi Corporate Office, DC): „*Japan: 'The Rule of Law Without Lawyers' Reconsidered*”, transcript from a speech delivered to the Asia Society, Washington D.C., March 14, 2001. This material can be downloaded from the following web sight: <http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/green.html> (Date of retrieval 2006-08-15)

and the new organization (current system) came into being in the form of a combined system that consisted of professional staff (PPOs) and volunteer citizens (VPOs). „*The VPOs carry out many forms of crime prevention activities in the community with the close collaboration of probation offices, the Ministry of Justice and other national/local government ministries and agencies, schools, police, other volunteers and voluntary organizations (NGOs) such as the Women’s Association for Rehabilitation Aid (WARA) and the Big Brothers and Sisters (BBS) Association.*”³⁸

The Volunteer Probation Officer Law (1950, the VPO Law) stipulates the purpose of the VPO system, the administration for VPOs such as appointment procedures, regulations for service, the maximum number of VPOs to be employed in the whole country (52,500 persons), their duties and other relevant factors. Legally, the VPOs are defined as non-permanent government officials. Therefore, VPOs are entitled to obtain national compensation benefit when any bodily injury is inflicted on VPOs in the performance of their duties. This section of the law is a move purely to give an insurance coverage to the VPO. However, they are not paid any remuneration for their services, which makes a big difference. The government may only pay the expenses incurred in discharging their duties, or a part thereof. In practice, the VPO is reimbursed a small amount of money for their expenses. From this we can see that money is not the main factor, the main motivation is the service to community.

The approach also reinforces the ‘role model’ in the community, since not everyone can become a VPO. The candidate’s commitment to the community is very important in the selection process. A VPO’s character and personality substantially affect their role. Therefore, VPO Law requires that a VPO should be; (1) evaluated highly with respect to their character and conduct in the community, (2) enthusiastic and sufficiently available to work, (3) financially stable and (4) healthy and active. To recruit VPOs, the CPO of a probation office prepares a list of candidates based on the information gathered from various sources in the community. In effect, the list reflects, to a great extent, the opinion of representatives of the VPO Association. Further screening is made by a VPO Screening Committee, an advisory committee to the Ministry of Justice that is established in 50 locations (scattered around the country) corresponding to each probation office. This committee consists of representatives of the court, prosecution, the bar association, correctional institutions, probation and parole services, other public commissions in the community and learned citizens. What is central to the process is that

³⁸ Kunihiro SAKAI (Director of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) Based in Tokyo), *Community Involvement And Crime Prevention in Japan*. This document can be downloaded from the official website of UNAFEI or at: http://www.unicri.it/wwk/related/pni/docs/2002/06_kunihiko_sakai.doc (Date of retrieval) 2006-08-16.

community dialogue and the participation of its members. In the process, the principle of democracy regained and enhanced.

And the community's conflict resolution abilities are rescued. Since VPOs and offenders live in the same community, they are able to contact each other not only on a weekly basis (at least twice a month – normally a part of the conditions for probation and parole) but also on a daily basis and anytime in case of emergency. As a result of this, offenders and their families look upon a VPO as a neighbor, rather than as a representative of the government, foreign to the local community. The VPO can provide the offender with various social resources and useful information about the community to help their rehabilitation in the community. „*While professional probation officers are involved in cases as specialists in the treatment of offenders, VPOs also work as neighbors to offenders, assisting them on behalf of the community. Further, some VPOs make use of their community network to secure employment for offenders.*”³⁹ Thus the VPOs find themselves in a more advantageous position in bringing about a change in the public attitude towards the offender and in mobilizing social resources, and the age criterion of the VPOs becomes very useful in this matter. The average age of VPOs tends to become older year after year and it has reached 63.4 years on average (as of 1 April 2001). On the other hand, approximately 70 percent of the delinquents/offenders under supervision are under 20 years of age.⁴⁰

Japan has made a deliberate effort to marry democratization with the effort of regenerating the scope for maintaining economically salient communities by making appropriate territorial adjustments, to take into consideration the evolutions in demographics. Rapid industrialization and modernization of the Japanese society meant that there was a ‘democratic dislocation’ between rural and urban areas. It was increasingly difficult for rural communities to provide public services similar to those available in the urban areas. And on the other side, due to earlier territorial division of electoral constituencies, the rural constituencies over-represented in the national parliament – the Diet. On the economic side rural democracy was costing too much for it to be really effective and for the community to take an autonomous role. To remedy these issues, the national government launched an amalgamation programme at the municipal level. It ordered prefectural governments to promote municipal amalgamation in their respective territories in January 1951. It also enacted the Law for Promotion of Amalgamation of Town and Village in 1953. As soon as this law expired in 1956, the government enacted a new law, entitled the Law for Promotion of Constructing New Municipality.

³⁹ Gary HILL, *Japan's volunteer probation officers play role in offender rehabilitation*, published by Corrections Compendium (Monthly Newsletter) published by American Correctional Association, Inc., Washington, Jun 2002 issue

⁴⁰ Kunihiko SAKAI, op.cit.

The Big Amalgamation of Showa was carried out to strengthen local autonomy. It meant, first, transferring functions previously performed by national or prefectural governments to municipal governments. The government concluded, however, that most of the existing municipalities were too small to conduct these activities both autonomously and efficiently. Amalgamation was considered as a necessary condition for decentralization and democratization of the lower strata of the Japanese political structure. Before the end of the war, a prefecture government was not a local public body but a field agency of the national government. As a result of the postwar reform, it became a public body. Governors who had previously been national officials, dispatched from the national government, were now elected directly by the residents.

From 1961 to 1992, there are 231 cases of amalgamation. Approximately 80 percent of them are classified as an annexation. A typical pattern is that a city with the pivotal function in a certain area as the location of prefectural offices or the central zone of economic activities merges peripheral towns and villages. About 75 percent of cases follow this pattern.⁴¹ The main purpose of these city-centered amalgamations was to facilitate economic activities by making the administrative boundaries consistent with social and economic activities. An example that demonstrates the relationship between amalgamation and economic activities is transportation service. A private railroad company, normally operating across several municipalities centering on cities, has to apply to all related municipal governments for permission when it rebuilds the track. It is tremendously time-consuming for the company to follow the necessary procedures, because the respective municipalities operate on different standards. Amalgamation permits a decline in the heavy transaction costs that are otherwise borne by businesses.⁴²

Amalgamation also played a big role in cutting down direct administrative costs such as compensation for elected local officials. In local assemblies with population under 2000 inhabitants the number of seats was limited to 12. And assemblies with a population more than 300 000 the number of seats was limited to 48.⁴³ This meant amalgamations presented an opportunity to cut down on the number of representatives paid by the local government. In this way the central government, by encouraging amalgamations, reduced the structural burden of local governments.

In terms of efficiency of local administrative apparatus and its response to local democracy „*municipal amalgamation*” is thought to have had a positive effect. „*Masayoshi Hayashi examined the correlation between per capita local expenditure and population to see if an optimal size for localities can be determined. His working hypothesis was that the cost curve would decline to a*

⁴¹ Masaru MABUCHI, op. cit. 4.

⁴² Masaru MABUCHI, op. cit. 4.

⁴³ Masaru MABUCHI, op. cit. 10.

certain point in size, and then starts to rise after hitting bottom at the optimal size. He analyzed the budgets and populations of 3,259 municipalities in 1991. Twenty three special wards of Tokyo were included. He did find an approximate U-shaped relationship confirming the notion of increasing efficiency up to a certain municipality size and declining efficiency beyond this size. His data suggest that the minimum value of per capita total expenditure is ¥289,657, and the corresponding optimal population is 115,109 persons. Given that the bulk of Japanese municipalities are smaller than this “optimal” size, we may conclude that there is much room for municipal amalgamation. At the same time, we may conclude that past amalgamations helped to increase administrative efficiency.”⁴⁴

Concerning democratization of local political structures, the common purpose that gave coherence to people driven by a variety of motives for municipal amalgamation was a desire to change the community power structure drastically through amalgamation, as shown in their slogans, such as „*Let’s release the village people from undemocratic control by the ruling class or pretended democracy*”.⁴⁵ Municipal amalgamations and the consequent urbanization brought in new impetus to democracy as the urban middle-classes took direct interest local issues relating to improving everyday life. Given the fact that progressive leftwing political parties fared better at the local level, the Democratic Party of Japan, along with the Communist Party of Japan, made inroads into building local power bases. This evolution helped to loosen near monopolistic control of power by the Liberal Democratic Party at the National level and thus establishing a fine balance between political forces in the country.

This balance power at the national level should be interpreted as the local community being subordinated to national interests. Since most amalgamations after 1961 were done voluntarily by municipalities. More than 90 percent of amalgamations were advocated by mayors, members of municipal assemblies, residents, and local economic organizations.⁴⁶ Although the national administration might have squeezed out an advantage or two, it was the local community that was the commanding force in the whole affair of municipal amalgamation.

The process of amalgamation and territorial re-assessments would not have been a complete success if it were not for local revenue and taxation that was progressively put in place. Democracy cannot be effective or named as such if there contrasting economic situation between regions. Political democracy cannot be effective or long lasting in the absence of ‘social democracy’, that citizens of a country feel that they fall under the national norm. Local community, where the bulk of the public services are provided, needs to be

⁴⁴ Masaru MABUCHI, op. cit. 12.

⁴⁵ Masaru MABUCHI, op. cit. 7.

⁴⁶ Masaru MABUCHI, op. cit. 9.

accompanied by appropriated taxation or subsidy system. The first regular scheme for equalizing local finance was the local distribution tax in 1940, which was carried out in connection with tax reform of central and local governments corresponding to the quasi-war situation.

A big change in the basic structure of the fiscal equalization system was brought about by the U.S. Occupation after World War II. Great stress was placed on the importance of local autonomy in a democratic nation, and the prewar system was completely restructured in order to encourage decentralization. In accordance with the Shoup Recommendation, the distribution tax was converted to the local finance equalization grant in 1950. „*Four years of experience revealed that it had not worked as well as had been hoped. The aggregate sum of the grant was not paid out of the general funds of national government as computed by the formula, but was determined every year, taking into consideration, among other things, the degree of stringency in national finance. So, every year it gave rise to friction between local and national officials in the determination of the total amount. In view of these considerations, the equalization grant was abolished in 1953, and in its place the local allocation tax (LAT) was introduced in 1954.*”⁴⁷ This meant back to basics and a return to home grown solutions, and back to fulfilling the basic necessities of a democracy.

The system of LAT is governed by the local allocation tax law. This law stipulates that LAT should be based on a uniform formula; the final authority to approve the distribution lies with the National Assembly. According to the law, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) is responsible for the operation (calculating the amount of LAT) of the transfer and for determining modification coefficients. Not granting MoHA the final authority to approve the formula and unit costs is an important mechanism to deter any attempt to manipulate the distribution of subsidies. A certain degree of flexibility is also given to MoHA, because it has the authority of determine modification coefficients, which marginally affect the distribution of LAT. This legal framework ensures that no single locality or senior official effectively influences the distribution of LAT in favor of a particular region without affecting many other regions. What in effect the LAT system does is to pump-up the revenues of those areas that are economically disadvantaged, so that the ‘standard’ provision of public services across the country is maintained.

What the Japanese system does is that it pays attention to details. While many ‘modern democracies’ destroy the community structures and leave the individual defenseless to the ills of „*democratic exploitation*”, Japan does the opposite. It reinforces the structures of the community in order to introduce equality into the democratic dialogue. At the end of the day, in Japan, in the name of democracy, sovereignty is given back to the community and its

⁴⁷ Nobuki MOCHIDA (University of Tokyo), 2001, World Bank Institute, Stock No. 37171, 14.

members. In turn transferring sovereignty back to the individual and structures binding his or hers immediate environment means giving back responsibility for number of thing – ranging from law-and-order maintenance to economic welfare. Which in due course reduce the structural burdens, both physical and financial, of democracy. Ultimately making it a very attractive ‘regime’ to operate, for the benefit of the community and country as whole. And we conclude by Mr Sens affirmation that „...*while democracy is important-indeed crucial-for development and for social justice, the success of democracy depends not only on the institutional forms that are adopted (important as they are), but also on the vigor of practice.*”⁴⁸ Japan fulfills all the conditions for it to be called a successful and dynamic democracy.

⁴⁸ Amartya SEN, *The Value of Democracy*, published online by The World Bank, Washington, Summer 1999. URL: <http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/summer99/article.asp?id=3>

Ramachandra Byrappa

***Mao's Economic Model and the Feasibility of its Administration.
A transition towards the Deng years***

China is a few sturdy steps away from becoming a Super Power in par with the United States of America. Such an enviable position could be pleasing to someone like Mao Zedong, but it is not sure that he would have been happy with inner mechanisms of this unparalleled power. Today's China is a mixture of the best and the worst of what modern industrialization can bring about. On the one side there is an enormous creation of wealth and on the other a 'floating cloud' of over 200 million unemployed peasants roaming the country and town struggling to make a living.¹ There are reports of widespread corruption and millions of peasants being dispossessed of their land² without any compensation.³ Assuredly the fate of some 800 million peasants has never been so precarious since the Great Leap Forward. This was not what Mao Zedong had dreamt-up for the people of China and the Chinese peasantry in particular. It is the humble purpose of the following study to provide a historical background to the events now unfolding in rural China. We will see how Mao Zedong tried to change the fate of millions of peasants for the better and how his dreams were reduced to dust by bourgeois disciples of Stalinist model of governance and a defiant bureaucracy.

Although on the world stage, and in particular inside the communist bloc itself, Mao professed strict communist orthodoxy; inside China however he was very pragmatic. He had a realistic approach to, and an understanding of the political and economic realities roaming through the troubled Chinese landscape. On the one hand he was confirmed in his opinions by the 30 odd years of guerilla warfare and by the experience gained by the administration of the areas under the control of the CPC (Communist Party of China). On the other hand, he was troubled by the forces outside his perimeter of control - he was constantly preoccupied by the urban, trading and bureaucratic classes that might ruffle and even overtake his ambitions of bringing relief to the millions of country folk. But being confronted on many fronts: scaling from the

¹ Sushil SETH (is a freelance writer based in Sydney): *The end of ideology in China*, Taipei Times, Tuesday, Oct 22, 2002, Page 9. URL: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2002/10/22/176671> (2007-12-10)

² Edward CODY: *China's Land Grabs Raise Specter of Popular Unrest Peasants Resist Developers, Local Officials*, Washington Post Foreign Service, Tuesday, October 5, 2004; Page A01. URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A6968-2004Oct4?language=printer> (2007-12-10)

³ Jean-Jacques MEVEL: *Les paysans chinois se battent pour garder «leur» terre*, the French daily «Le Figaro», 22/01/2008, Paris. See also, Esther PAN: *China's Angry Peasants*, published online by the Council On Foreign Relations, December 15, 2005, URL: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9425/http://www.cfr.org/publication/9425/> (2008-02-12).

Japanese occupation forces to the Kuomintang (and its American backers) to the practical problems of keeping the revolutionary forces united. Although quite early he knew that he was going to win the war on the mainland of China, he was constantly unsure of the success of the Political and Economic Agenda thereafter. As time went we realize that traditional administrative structures and heavy-handed bureaucracy re-emerge to halt Mao's policies. It is interesting to see how the growth in bureaucracy and bureaucratic practices are tributaries to the growth of heavy industry and urbanization. Which in turn increase the imbalances between city and country economic structures.

We will see how his life-long struggle against bureaucracy intensifies at the end of his reign. Mao Zedong was pertinent enough to see the weaknesses of the Soviet model. According to him ideology should not be bureaucratized, instead it should be replaced. Where ideology is strong enough he argued, there the scope for bureaucracy is limited. What happened in Russia was that a handful of „*ideologues*” tried to impose the Bolshevik ideology of proletarian dictatorship on a country which was overwhelmingly agrarian in a short period of time. To achieve their ideological goals, the Bolsheviks over-bureaucratized the Russian society. By contrast, the ‘Chinese Revolution’ or the ‘War of Liberation’ was protracted and involved millions. By the time the Peoples Republic of China came into being in 1949, the communist ideology had been widely accepted by the rural classes. This fact, Mao thought, would give the Chinese model a comparative advantage. More importantly this would become the basis for keeping the Chinese bureaucracy in check.

What I would like to demonstrate in this paper is that it was not Mao's revolutionary idealism that impeded his economic agenda. After being in the ranks of CPC and its administrative organs for almost 30 years Mao Zedong had a very strong grasp on the realities of formulating and executing his policies in due process. Unfortunately too often Mao is portrayed as being „*dogmatic*” in comparison with so called „*pragmatic*” Deng. It would be difficult to compare Mao's legacy with that of Deng's because their economic models were fundamentally different and were operated in two quite distinctly different international contexts which called for different economic priorities.

The differences and dichotomies between the two models and later the failures of Mao, leads us to question the logic of the overall strategy both political and economic. One has to ask oneself if „*community-building*” is compatible with „*nation-building*”. As we too often witness in such cases, the effort of building a nation requires enormous sacrifices on the part of the community which evidently predates the artificial super-structure - the nation. Here we realize that Mao might have been trapped into the Soviet model from which he has considerable difficulties in extracting himself. As we will witness, mistakes made in the 1950s are remedied with ever greater mistakes of „*The Great Leap Forward*”. And in turn these mistakes are corrected by the disasters of „*The Cultural Revolution*”. We will investigate the reason unto

why a man like Mao Zedong should abandon his initial model in favor of a Soviet model that he knew was doomed to fail.

To start with let us consider the so called „*The Agrarian Revolution*” and Mao’s realistic approach to the rural question. Young Mao Zedong was different from most of his immediate colleagues in the Communist Party of China. To begin with, he came from a peasant background. The problems of the peasantry ran deep in his blood since his native Hunan province bore the brunt of peasant oppression by Kuomintang and his predecessors. Although he might not have been educated as well as his comrades, and not so enlightened by Western ideas, he nonetheless had a gift of apprehending and analyzing complex situations. He had the foresight and could formulate ideas with clear insight. He was lonely among his companions to think that the situation in China demanded for a different revolutionary strategy. While his comrades were preoccupied with the industrial workers and their well-being, young Mao was more intrigued by the events taking place in the rural areas all over China. According to one western scholar of the time, in the spring of 1927, „*in Central China the struggle for land brought nearly ten million peasants into the orbit of new mass organizations in few short months.*”⁴ He was the first to realize the potential strength of the peasantry. His senior colleagues, strongly under the influence of the Communist International and Leon Trotsky were of the opinion that it was too early to include the peasants into the struggle.⁵

Despite reservations from his colleagues, Mao set-off to the countryside to have a closer look at the happenings in the rural districts and produce a study for the Central Committee of the CPC. Later this came to be known as the *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, March 1927*.⁶ Mao’s message is daunting and straight forward: „*All talk directed against the peasant movement must be speedily set right. All the wrong measures taken by the revolutionary authorities concerning the peasant movement must be speedily changed. Only thus can the future of the revolution be benefited. For the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back.*”⁷ In contrast with a few hundred thousand industrial workers in the coastal towns and cities, the momentum was far greater than any revolutionary

⁴ Harold R. ISSACS: *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, revised edition – 1951, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 222.

⁵ Ibid, 189.

⁶ MAO ZEDONG [Mao Tse-tung]: *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, March 1927, in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. I (3rd printing; Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), 23-29. URL: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1927mao.html> 2007-12-10.

⁷ MAO ZEDONG, 23.

movement could imagine. The *Hunan Report* is important in many ways because it contains the blue print of Chairman Mao's thinking, along with giving him a gut feeling that he is heading in the right direction. It is also important because with this he propelled himself into the upper echelons of the CPC, from where finally he takes the leadership of it.

Firstly, in this document young Mao outlines the importance of „*Village Associations*” not only as vital for the „*national revolution*” but definitely having the capacity to fulfill the consolidation of administrative functions even after the revolution: „*Even trifles such as a quarrel between husband and wife are brought to the peasant association. Nothing can be settled unless someone from the peasant association is present. The association actually dictates all rural affairs, and, quite literally, "whatever it says, goes."*⁸ He later goes on to saying, “*what was looked down upon four months ago as a "gang of peasants" has now become a most honourable institution.*”⁹ This objectiveness of Mao Zedong is confirmed by other scholars, writing about the same period. The spontaneous sprouting of Village Associations all over the country was an undeniable venue for the „*forces of rural democracy*” in its purest form. One cannot but avoid saying that the situation was markedly different from the Bolshevik Revolution in which the peasantry was subjugated to the whims of a „*revolutionary clique*” who had no understanding of the rural world.

The Chinese Communist Party was different because it was getting its legitimacy from the rural masses. In Mao's words: „*Essentially, the politics of New Democracy (that proposed by Mao Zedong) means giving the peasants their rights. The new and genuine Three People's Principles are essentially the principles of a peasant revolution.*”¹⁰ The statistical evolution of the CPC gives weight to this approach. In 1925-26 peasants composed only five percent of the party's membership. By the end of 1928, they made up 70 to 80 percent. And by 1930, Chou En-lai reported that out of a total party membership of 120,000, "the industrial worker-members only number a little more than 2,000."¹¹ Some of the reasons for such a low participation of industrial workers in CPC in the late 1920s might be that a lot of members were killed by the Nationalists during the Shanghai incidents of 1927. Another reason is that the motor of industrialization in China at the time was Japan. By the 1930 there was massive immigration from Japan to Manchuria, which reduced the requirement for local

⁸ Ibid, 23-29.

⁹ Ibid,

¹⁰ MAO ZEDONG, *On New Democracy* (January 1940), section: X. The Three People's Principles, Old and New, online at the following URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm (2007-12-08).

¹¹ Editorial Board of the International Committee of the Fourth International: *Deng Xiaoping and the fate of the Chinese Revolution*, 12 March 1997/12 March 1997, published online at the following URL: <http://www.wsws.org/history/1997/mar1997/dengx.shtml> (date of retrieval 2008-01-15).

Chinese labour. Nonetheless these factors paved the way for a CPC which became predominantly a party dominated by the peasantry. From this point onwards the fate of the peasantry becomes central to the Communist struggle. All the more because the autonomy of the peasant movements meant that the CPC was dependant upon the peasantry to overthrow the nationalists. For Mao, rather than subjugate the „village” one should „befriend” it. For a change, why not see things from the perspective of the village. From it’s point of view, as he goes on to argue, „*the patriarchal-feudal class of local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords has formed the basis of autocratic government for thousands of years and is the cornerstone of imperialism, warlordism and corrupt officialdom.*”¹² One soon comes to realize that every layer of power as being an extra burden on the village economy and thus an extension of oppression. True revolution, he argues, can only be successful, or be tangible for that matter, if one-by-one these evil layers are torn-down, or at the very least kept in check.

Revolutionary and radical as he might have been, Mao accepted the fact that the Chinese society is stratified with classes and forces which were feeding upon each other. „*The politics and the economy of this society are predominantly colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal, and the predominant culture, reflecting the politics and economy, is also colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal.*”¹³ By this formulation he realized that it would be a difficult task to bring change. In his writings one realizes that he constantly feared that the whole of the Chinese society cannot be brought under Communist rule. Tradition and countless factors of oppression were so deeply embedded into society that it would prove an uphill task to bring about change or uproot tradition and replace it with socially acceptable behavior. Nonetheless he saw the necessity to canalize and evacuate the negative elements away from his „*peasant constituency*” which was constantly under danger. What in effect he proposed to do, and eventually did do in the initial years, was to insulate the rural under-classes from: the urban excesses, abuses by the Party and the bureaucratic nomenclature.

Mao Zedong was not always against the market and never saw autarchy as something which would entirely ensure the Chinese peoples needs. But pertaining from his knowledge of the rural world and the economic mechanisms surrounding it he could confidently say that the village model could assure a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. That is, as long as no further burdens are imposed upon it by outside forces. For the sake of the discussion if we exclude the burdens placed by imperial occupation and

¹² MAO ZEDONG: *On New Democracy*, op. cit.

¹³ MAO ZEDONG: *On New Democracy* – section III China's Historical Characteristics (January 1940), in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. I (3rd printing; Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975). For the purpose of publication the online version is used at URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm (2007-12-08).

subjugation, we are left with three forces working against the productive energies of the village. These are namely: the landlord, the taxman, and the urban trader (supposing that he engages in unfair manipulation of prices and continued to act as agent of imperial powers). The communist revolution succeeded in eliminating the immediate danger - the landlord. And this indeed was a revolution.

The situation before the intervention of the communists was indeed very unfavorable to the peasantry. Analyzing the statistics and official estimates collected in 1927, Harold R. Isaacs paints the following gloomy picture of the situation in which the Chinese peasants found themselves: „*In one district of Chekiang province, investigators found that 3 percent of the population owned 80 percent of the land. ... This extreme concentration of land came about partially through the gradual alienation of the once considerable state, temple, or community lands and the conversion of large collective holdings of the rural clans into the virtual private property of small groups of powerful clan leaders. The steady decline in agricultural production and the increasing weight of the burden placed on the peasant's shoulders soon lost him what land he had left.*”¹⁴ Progressively, as the communist forces recaptured the territories, land was given back to the peasants. Peasants and villages regained their former degree of self-sufficiency and independence. The benefits of this redistribution of land brought positive changes to individual families as well as the wider economy.

*This leaves us with the trader and the bureaucrat, two dangers according to Mao which have to be tamed in order to consolidate the aims of communist revolution in China - that of empowering the rural people. Lets us first see how the trader's activity became the ruin of the rural world. As Harold R. Isaacs rightly puts it: “the invasion of the village by commercial capital and cheap manufactured commodities put an end to the peasant's old self-sufficiency.”*¹⁵ Land partly owned and partly leased in most cases was not enough to pay for the land lord, the taxman and accessorially feed a poor farmers family. So to stay afloat a farmer was obliged firstly to improve his agricultural productivity through the use of fertilizers and secondly engage in cottage industry to generate extra cash. The urban trader, the agent of foreign colonial powers, was playing the devil on both fronts. The villager did not have access to the same logistics and rotation capital as the trader could. Having difficulties in accessing distant markets the villager's crops were freely cornered and prices manipulated at the village level by the merchants.¹⁶ The merchant also acted as lender to the peasants who were in need to buy seeds and fertilizers. Quite

¹⁴ Harold R. ISAACS: *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, Oxford University Press, London, 1951, 26-27.

¹⁵ Ibid, 27.

¹⁶ Ibid, 27.

often the peasant ended up mortgaging his crops and even his land. And since the merchant could manipulate the prices and interest rates (varying from 30 to 70 percent per annum), he made sure that the farmer could no longer pay back his debts and eventually took control of the land as well; with a strong possibility that he will lease it back to the peasant at oppressing conditions.

After the revolution the CPC engaged in a process aimed at serving the villagers namely that of decapitating the „*landlord*” system by giving back the land to those who tilled it. But more importantly, in exchange for the above mentioned favor, „*Communist party officials took the pre-revolutionary strategy of insinuating themselves into village life a step further after the revolution. Virtually every Chinese village had its party operatives or cadres working closely with peasant associations (in most areas these were formed after the revolution as a first step in organizing rural direct producers). The government used these foot soldiers of the 1949 Revolution to encourage greater cooperation among farmers, including the formation of mutual aid teams, marketing cooperatives, tool-making and handicraft enterprises, new irrigation systems....*”¹⁷ In effect what this meant was that the CPC was exchanging economic control for political control. By this, the aim of Chairman Mao was to impress on the peasants that the CPC was the leading political force in China. One has to remember that he was the first to realize that the CPC was a political minority in comparison with the brut force of the peasantry. By introducing party activists into the village, Mao wanted to harness the political power of the peasants. This is one of the reasons why confusion is made between the so called „*party bureaucracy*” and „*bureaucracy of the State*”.

Mao hated the idea of introducing any form of bureaucracy into the village perimeters. A good illustration of this distrust was his movement against the "three evils": the struggle against corruption, waste and bureaucracy; launched at the end of 1951 among the personnel of government departments and state enterprises.¹⁸ Mao's strategy to protect the rural world from the bureaucratic malpractices also shaped his vision of the public administration for modern China. Watching the aftermaths of the Russian revolution from a distance Mao saw the dangers of over bureaucratization of the in-coming communist administration which would sooner or later bog-down the productive forces of the very world which they set out to build.

¹⁷ Satya J. GABRIEL: *The Structure of a Post-Revolutionary Economic Transformation - The Chinese Economy from the 1949 Revolution to the Great Leap Forward*, September 1998, this online publication can be found at the following URL: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/sgabriel/economics/china-essays/3.html> (2008-01-03).

¹⁸ MAO ZEDONG: *On the Struggle Against the "Three Evils" and the "Five Evils"*, November 1951--March 1952, Important directives drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_17.htm (2008-01-23).

The cost of public administration to the peasant can be limited to its minimum by its form and function. Firstly, concerning the form, Mao envisioned an administration which was partly self-sufficient in resources. Mao's philosophy of public administration comes close to the fundamentals established by Jean Bodin, an 18th century French legalist-political philosopher. Jean-Bodin's advice to future princes and rulers was that to maintain an administration which the „*public domain*” can afford.¹⁹ Here, by public domain he means property and estates at the disposal of the state. Bodin alerted the future generations to the fact that recourse to over taxation to support encumbering bureaucracies could surely lead to hardship of the subjects, and potentially lead them to revolt. Mao need not have read the texts of Jean Bodin on good governance, since he only had to turn to 4000 years of Chinese tradition which guided him to pertinent thinking. As Tai Ming Cheung puts it, „...*a defining characteristic of traditional Chinese military culture stretching from pre-imperial times and ultimately to the Communist era was that armies had to be wholly or partially self-sufficient. They received only limited fiscal support from their civilian masters and had to forge to meet their own needs*”.²⁰ During the Qin and Han Dynasties (221BC – AD 220) a complex system of self-sufficiency came into place called *Tuntian* (meaning military habitation). Under this system, troops opened up wasteland in border regions for grain production. It was during the ascendancy of the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368) that *Tuntian* came to be refined further. During this period the *Tuntian* was divided into three types: civilian farming land known as Mintun, dedicated military farming land called Juntun, and joint military – civilian farming land.²¹ During the communist era the Juntun system was re-introduced. In the words of Tai Ming Cheung: „*Mao Zedong was the leading advocate of the military's involvement in production activities and paid particular attention to this issue from his early days as a guerrilla leader to the twilight years of his reign. He regarded self-sufficiency as not only an essential means of survival for the Red Army but also politically virtuous as the military would not burden on the civilian population: To win popular support for their fledgling cause, Mao and the Communist leadership had to show that they were fundamentally different from the Nationalist regime, whose armies had a reputation for looting and exploitation of the local populations. The Communist leadership issued strict instructions to troops that they should not engage in such activities.*”²² Mao's

¹⁹ Jean BODIN: *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (Abridged and translated by M. J. TOOLEY), published by Basil Blackwell Oxford, 1955. See Book IV - Chapter I, and Book VI – Chapter II. Bodin's works are also available online at the following URL: http://www.constitution.org/bodin/bodin_.htm (2008-01-23).

²⁰ Tai Ming CHEUNG: *China's Entrepreneurial Army*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, 12.

²¹ Ibid, 14.

²² Ibid, 17.

Long March is an illustration and a tribute to this system since his fighters were asked to reclaim and cultivate waste lands of the ragged Jiangxi province of North-West China.

The case of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is very important in the study of Chinese administrative model in the twentieth century because it was the first unified administration that China experienced after the collapse of the imperial bureaucracy in 1911. For some 30 odd years preceding the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China, the PLA not only fought a civil war but it also administered territories under its control. The code of conduct was exemplary, with a high degree of discipline. At this stage rendering „true” service in all practical sense to the peasantry was highly prized. As such, the PLA’s administrative model played a pivotal role in keeping the loyalty of the peasantry late into the 1950s.

What was more attractive about the PLA’s model of administration was that of its resource management. As mentioned earlier, Mao saw the bureaucratic burden as one of the main ills plaguing the countryside. To avoid the perpetuation of these abominations the PLA had to gain self-sufficiency to maintain its fighting capabilities and its administrative responsibilities. In other words it had to produce resources to meet its necessities. During countless Central Committee meetings of the CPC, Mao Zedong repeated time and again that to be efficient the ranks of the Party and the PLA should fold-up their sleeves and get involved in production activities. He refused to discuss any plan or scheme that might, even vaguely, consider levying taxes from the peasantry. He argued that the peasants should not be victims of slackness of Party „officials”. As Tai Ming Chueng masterfully demonstrates the PLA managed to keep this model right up to the 1990s. It depended very little on the central budget. In fact it generated the necessary resources from a vast industrial empire. Although after the proclamation of the PRC, the PLA ceased to be the central administrative organ, Mao Zedong believed that the example of the PLA should become the leading light in the revolutionary administration of the Chinese State. Although taxation was inevitable and unavoidable Mao affirmed that this should be kept to a minimum. Mao bases his arguments on facts and statistics available to him at that time: *„As a whole the undertakings of the public Sector of the economy consist of the following three kinds: (1) the salt industry, industry and commerce run by the government; (2) the agriculture, industry and commerce run by the army; and (3) the agriculture, industry and commerce of the official organization of the Party and government. These all directly ensure the supply of the living and other expenses of the Party, government and army personnel. According to accounts for 1942 and the budget for 1943, the amount supplied in this way exceeds the amount handed over by the people in the form of taxes (including the grain tax). Therefore publicly-run economic undertakings have become the greater of*

*the two large sources ensuring financial supplies. Their importance cannot be overstated.*²³

This leads us to the second point, concerning the function of administration. Given that the Chinese society and the economy will be divided into self-governing and self-sufficient units, the scope for administrative action can be limited and thus the cost of it. From the early 1930s onwards Mao thought of the villages as partners and not as administered. Public administration need not go beyond the boundary of the village. Given Mao's assertion that the rural world beholds 80% of China's population, the above logic theoretically reduces the administrative burden by as much. This does not mean that the administrative authorities cannot or should not enter the village. What in essence this means is that a villager will heed to good advice and might be willing to pay for it. But what ever is superficial and self-serving will be seen with suspicion and the peasant will be reluctant to pay for it. Mao's experience during the civil-war showed him these realities of the countryside. But these realities were progressively trampled by realities in the international picture, especially after the Korean War. The international reality pushes Mao to accelerate the „*nation-building*” process which diametrically reduces the economic consolidation at the village-level.

The change of priorities is widely felt in the first Five Year Plan. The main tenets of the first Five Year Plan are to a large extent constrained and influenced by the Korean War and Mao's ambivalent friendship with Joseph Stalin. The Korean War had showed Mao Zedong that a large-scale and prolonged war cannot be fought without a modernized industrial back ground. When the communists came to power in 1949, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was decades behind the other industrial nations of the world. Whatever modern industry the occupying Japanese forces might have left in Manchuria was retrieved by the Russian forces. China was totally dependant on the Soviet Union for supply of industrial goods. There was a constant exchange of telegrams, between Mao Zedong and Stalin, the first seeking more arms supplies and the later constantly pointing to delays due to Soviet industrial planning.²⁴ Consolidation of communist power and nation-building meant that Mao had to make a temporary compromise in favor of heavy industry and the nascent urban proletariat, at the expense of the rural many.

²³ MAO ZEDONG: *Economic and Financial Problems in the Anti-Japanese War*, Section 7. On the Development of Self-Supporting Industry, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_35_7.htm (2008-01-23).

²⁴ Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong. Stalin's response to Mao's 21 June telegram, turning down his request for further arms and discussing the possibility of armistice. 24 June 1951 No. 635177, Ciphred Telegram Beijing - Comrade Krasovsky. This source can be found at Cold War International History Project http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.browse&sort=Subject&item=Korea%2C%20DPRK%2C%20United%20Nations.

By wanting to attain industrial independence the Peoples Republic of China was further pushed into a relationship of dependence with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Russia. This „*special friendship*” was a dilemma to Mao Zedong. One has to remember that Soviet Russia's „*China Policy*” initially focused on Sun-Yat-Sen and later continued with Chiang Kai-shek. Let us not forget the statement made by Joseph Stalin, who rose on April 5, 1927, before a meeting of three thousand functionaries in the Hall of Columns in Moscow on the issue of peasant rebellions against Kuomintang forces: „*Chiang Kai-shek is submitting to discipline. The Kuomintang is a bloc, a sort of revolutionary parliament, with the Right, the Left, and the Communists. Why make a coup d'état? Why drive away the Right when we have the majority and the Right listens to us? The peasant needs a worn-out jade as long as she is necessary. ... Chiang Kai-shek has perhaps no sympathy for the revolution but he is leading the army and cannot do otherwise than lead it against the imperialists.*” Following this, Russian operatives (namely Michael Borodin) in China are directed not to provide any support for the peasants. This results in the massacres of Hupeh, Central China, of peasants and pro-peasant communist partisans. An estimated 5000 peasants, women and children were slaughtered with unimaginable brutality by Chiang Kai-shek's regulars.²⁵ Right up to the end of the Chinese civil-war Soviet Russia maintains this ambiguity unto whom it supports. Although Mao Zedong and the CPC were thoroughly aware of this fact, they nonetheless needed allies. A bad ally was better than no allies, so keeping a blind eye to the past, Mao makes a rapid rapprochement with Stalin.

At the time, the only country that wanted to have a treaty with Mao's China was the Soviet Union. In December 1949, Mao met Stalin in Moscow. They signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.²⁶ This treaty gave China money and technical assistance to modernize her industry. Though the money received from Russia was minimal (\$300 million over five years), Russia did provide 10,000 engineers to boost China's industry and therefore her economy.²⁷ The influence of the Russian engineers and the Soviet model meant that there would be an initial revival in fortunes of the Chinese industrial capacity but would later be dragged by the hurdles of targeting and central planning objectives similar to those practiced in Soviet Russia.

Influenced by the Russian engineers, and also by the success of Stalin's Five Year Plans, China introduced her own Five Year Plan in 1952. As in the

²⁵ ISAACS: 227-229.

²⁶ United Nations – Treaty Series 1956 (no. 3103), Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Signed in Moscow, on 14 February 1950. This document can be found online at the following URL: untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/6/27/00011314.pdf

²⁷ *The First Five-Year Plan, 1953-57*, Country Studies, Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., provided online at the following URL: <http://countrystudies.us/china/87.htm> (2007-12-27).

USSR, heavy industry was targeted as being in need of major reform. The Five Year Plan attempted to tackle steel, coal and iron production. As in the Russian model, each factory or mine was given a target to achieve. Failure to meet a target was the equivalent of failing the nation. Although Mao tried to stay true to his principles there are signs that he was pushed by his pro-Moscow colleagues to change direction. In the Eight National Congress of the CPC he makes this change of heart clear: First, *our country is industrially backward. In order to build a socialist society, we must develop socialist industry, above all, heavy industry, so as to transform China from a backward agricultural country into an advanced industrial country. ...* Second, *in our country the allies of the working class consist not only of the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeoisie, but also of the national bourgeoisie. For this reason, in order to transform our old economy, we must use peaceful means of transformation not only in the case of agriculture and handicrafts, but also in the case of capitalist industry and commerce. This needs to be done step by step; this too needs time. On the basis of the actual conditions of our country, the Central Committee has thus defined the Party's general line in the period of transition: to bring about, step by step, socialist industrialization and to accomplish, step by step, the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a fairly long period.*²⁸ What is interesting to note in his statement is that he stresses several times that the „*industrial transformation*” should be implemented over a long period of time. He also notes that it should be done step by step. He wished to gain time to solidify the rural economy in time to head off the emerging dominance by the industry. But in reality, although this meant a solid industrial foundation for China in the coming years, it also meant disintegration in other areas of the economy, especially in the rural economy; with successive ambitions adding ever-increasing burdens on the village.

Mao Zedong wished that ideology would act as a catalyzing force to reduce administrative burden and keep control and command to a minimum. But these hopes soon evaporated. As the first Five Year Plan preceded a strong and sometimes despotic chain of bureaucratic control and command started to sink into place. In rural areas, production decisions are shifted from households to „*mutual aid teams*,” and then to cooperatives where a cadre makes key decisions. Ownership is redefined in the form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collectivized farms.²⁹ According to the Peterson International

²⁸ The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (authored by Liu Shao-Chi), delivered on Sept' 15, 1956. This online document is provided by: http://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/8th_congress.htm (2007-12-27).

²⁹ Gautam JAGGI, Mary RUNDLE, Daniel ROSEN, and Yuichi TAKAHASHI: *China's Economic Reforms-Chronology and Statistics*, Working Paper 96-5, 1996, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C; URL: <http://search.petersoninstitute.org/search?>

Economics Institute what came into place was a three-tiered system where households were organized into production teams, which were in turn grouped into brigades, and were ultimately organized into communes of 4,000 to 5,000 households.³⁰ The process of re-industrialization also meant that rural areas had to be re-organized (or collectivized) in the Soviet fashion to pool and re-divert resources from agriculture to industry. The administrative consequences of this collectivization would push Mao away from his commitments to giving the rurality its full freedom. Again, at least in principle Mao tries to maintain partial freedom to the peasantry: „As regards a good deal of the work of the state, such as agriculture, small and "medium industries, local transport, local commerce, primary and secondary education, local health services, local finance, and so forth, the central authority should only put forward general principles and policies and map out general plans, while the actual work should be referred to the local authorities for them to make arrangements for carrying it out in a manner suitable to a particular place and a particular time. Some of the cadres working in the central organs should also be sent to work in the localities. The provinces, municipalities, counties and townships should be given a definite range of administrative powers and functions.”³¹ In theory this sounds to be a very modern idea in terms of good governance and public administration. But in practice, these changes paved the way forward for an ever submissive role for the peasantry. By avoiding specific administrative guidance from the Center Mao was giving more freedom to local bureaucracy and Party barons, which might not have always acted in the interest of the peasants. This change of heart would be detrimental to rural productivity and social cohesion of the Chinese society as a whole. As we will see, Mao Zedong converts a short-term weakness of under-industrialization into a permanent handicap on managing the rural population, from which he never recovers. The PLA model of administration is gradually bypassed. Even the market, a fabulous instrument of resource allocation, was neglected in favor of Soviet-type economic planning and distribution of resources.

What this meant in terms of financial structure was that bureaucrats, and not the market, place binding constraints on households and enterprises through abundant use of coupons, authorizations, and orders to deliver. These instruments rather than money were to determine production and consumption outcomes; prices therefore became of secondary importance. It is interesting even in this perspective Mao should retract from his initial declarations in favor of the market, and its usefulness in bringing about social justice. As mentioned earlier, he was rightfully against the middleman or the merchant, but had no

site=default_collection&client=default_frontend&proxystylesheet=default_frontend&output=xm
l_no_dtd&filter=p&q=CHINA%27S+ECONOMIC+REFORMS&btnG.x=11&btnG.y=9

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Sept' 15, 1956): op. cit.

objection leveled against the market. It is difficult to believe that this change of heart came solely from his desires. The intensity of the Russian involvement at the time looks to have strengthened the pro-Moscow lobby in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. His was cornered into believing that Stalin's Soviet Russia would support a Communist China which was willing to struggle it out with „imperialists”, notably the Americans. And he believed that this support would mainly be of economic in nature. For this reason Chairman Mao stepped-up his ideological rhetoric to show likewise communist leaders that he truly believed in the triumph of communism across the globe.

The Korean War was a good example of this sentiment. In a precious collection of documents and analysis, Professor Michael M. Sheng describes the situation quite adequately: „*First of all, on the global level, just as the Americans saw a worldwide Communist plot for expansion, Beijing was convinced that there was a U.S.-led worldwide reactionary camp which aimed at the destruction of the new regime in China as one step toward the destruction of the socialist world, i.e., what Mao called the "revolutionary front" of the world. Thus, the events taking place in Korea were not perceived as a localized phenomenon, but an integral part of the global struggle.*”³² And at that, this supposed that world revolution could only succeed if China were to be strengthened economically.

It was already evident, even during the last days of Stalin, that Mao's „hyper” communism would sooner or later endanger the „realpolitik” of the US-Soviet relations.³³ With the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 tolerance for Mao's brand of communism soon evaporated. With Nikita Khrushchev at command in the Kremlin, Mao Zedong felt betrayed ideologically and economically. Ideologically, because of Khrushchev's friendly overtures towards the United States were seen as threatening the security and territorial integrity of the Peoples Republic of China.³⁴ Economically, because China was in the preliminary phase of its industrialization and needed Soviet Unions continued help to successfully complete this modernization. As J.C. Bartlett puts it: „*Mao had gone to Moscow in November 1957 in the hope of extra support for both his domestic and foreign policies. China was suffering from many internal problems. An effort to accelerate economic growth had encountered many obstacles, including a poor harvest, heavy debt repayments to Russia and the strength of discontent revealed in the brief period of Chinese*

³² Michael M. SHENG (Professor of History, Southwest Missouri State University) *China's Decision to Enter the Korean - War Reappraisal and New Documentation*, Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XIX , No. 2, Summer 1995, published by the Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, URL: <http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/cn-korea.htm> (2008-01-26).

³³ C.J.BARTLETT: *The Global Conflict 1880-1970 – The International Rivalry of the Great Powers*, published by Longman Group UK Ltd, Essex, 1984, 325.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 329.

*liberalization – the period of ‘a hundred flower’. ... The repression which followed the ‘hundred flowers’ also meant that China was even shorter of the professionals and experts of all kinds needed to implement a Russian-style modernization programme.”*³⁵ Initially he was encouraged to adopt the Soviet model and now he was abandoned to himself, to pick-up the broken pieces as it were. Mao was forced to support a model of development against his gut feelings and now he had to manage the negative consequences before things got out of control.

From an administrative point of view, namely that of organizing people and resources to achieve social well-being, there were limits to the above mentioned modernization. Communization of the village economy was evidently not enough to meet the livelihood of the increases in rural population. The priority given to heavy industry meant that resources were diverted away from the development of light industries which would have absorbed the excesses in rural labor supply and given supplementary income to those engaged in agriculture. But the rural areas had neither the necessary resources nor the power to decide to follow the path of development that Young Mao had traced for them. Mao’s vision for the development of the villages and China at a wider level was that of an incremental process. The first step should be taken to develop the Agriculture. As he wrote in February 27, 1957: *„In discussing our path to industrialization, I am here concerned principally with the relationship between the growth of heavy industry, light industry and agriculture. It must be affirmed that heavy industry is the core of China’s economic construction. At the same time, full attention must be paid to the development of agriculture and light industry.”*³⁶ This goes well with his affirmation that Chinese Communist revolution was brought about by the Peasantry and it should be the objective of the CPC to better the lives of the peasantry.

From here, the next logical step would be to develop light industries, centered on processing agricultural produce and bringing industrial techniques to traditional handicrafts. For example Mao Zedong sent the following communiqué to the State Council on March 5, 1956: *„You are contemplating an average annual increase of 10.9 per cent in the total value of handicraft production over a period of three five-year plans; that seems a bit too small. ... The highest labour productivity in mechanized and semi-mechanized production is over thirty times the lowest in handicraft production. ... Compare the differences in labour productivity and it becomes clear that the handicrafts must develop in the direction of semi-mechanization and mechanization and that labour productivity must be raised.”* And he goes on to protesting against

³⁵ Ibid, 327.

³⁶ MAO ZEDONG: *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People - Four Essays on Philosophy*, published by Foreign Languages Press, 1968, Chapter 12: *China’s Path to Industrialization*. URL: <http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/wim/onhandling.html> (2008-01-30).

*the uncooperative behaviour of the Party cadre in this branch of economic activity: "In some places the Party committees are so occupied with other tasks that they don't put handicrafts on the agenda; this is not good. Why are some cadres rather unwilling to undertake this work? I myself would very much like to do it, as it is very important."*³⁷ He had pressing needs to emphasize this point in economic planning for two main reasons.

The first reason was that there was an upward surge in rural population which meant that productive efficiency in agriculture would sooner or later prove insufficient to cope with this excess in rural labour supply. As a consequence revenues in rural areas failed to keep in pace with revenues in the urban areas. One has to remember that after the 'big bang' of land redistribution in 1952 there was a sense of relative prosperity among the rural population. As Satyananda J. Gabriel (Professor of Economics Mount Holyoke College) puts it: „*The redistribution of wealth after the 1949 Revolution stimulated a significant increase in aggregate output. There was a boom in agricultural output (agricultural output grew 25% in real terms from 1952 to 1957) and, due to both the output increase and to a sharp drop in corruption, a dramatic increase in revenues available for the provision of public goods and services. The multiplier effect of the increase in rural output and income and the increased government provisions for public goods and services resulted in a substantial improvement in per capita income in China. Thus, in the early years of the post-revolutionary regime, economic growth and a reduction in income disparities were completely compatible objectives.*”³⁸ Mao Zedong and his immediate entourage were encouraged by these quick results and thought it necessary to push forward with more ambitious reforms to achieve even greater equality between the urban and rural populations. And the introduction of light industry to the rural economy would be one way to do this.

Another reason why Mao Zedong was very keen to introduce mechanization to the rural economy was that there was a problem of skilled labour. We are talking about the 1950s, an époque where the Chinese educational system was just coming together. With very few educational qualifications farmers were not be able to handle sophisticated technologies. Semi-mechanization and light industries seemed an appropriate solution for filling this gap in education and technical training. In this way, Mao thought, greater productivity can be

³⁷ MAO ZEDONG: *Speed up the Socialist Transformation of Handicrafts*, March 5, 1956, part of Mao Zedong's instructions when the departments concerned under the State Council reported their work on handicrafts. Source found at the following URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_50.htm (2008-01-28).

³⁸ Satyananda J. GABRIEL: *Income Inequality in China's Post-Great Leap Forward Era*, China Essay Series – Number 6, October 1998, URL: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/courses/sgabriel/economics/china-essays/6.html> (2008-01-29). Professor Gabriel is also the author of „*Chinese Capitalism and the Modernist Vision*”, published by Taylor and Francis Group, 2006.

squeezed out from the existing set of local skills and know-how. And this will go a long way to reducing productivity differentials between rural and urban workers that he earlier spoke of. In the same note Mao goes on to argue that this move would enhance and reinstate China's position among the people of the world. He also remarks that supporting rural industries can have a positive impact on public finances.

Mao's lucidity and apprehension of priorities is intact and astounding. Whatever wrong decisions Mao had taken during his long leadership of PRC, does not mean that we can avoid accepting his clairvoyance. Knowingly or not, Mao was preparing China for the economic conquest of the world. Unmistakably he has to be credited for the resiliency of his 'long-term' economic visions for Communist China. Harish Anand, in The Hindu Business Online, not so long ago wrote the following: „*This outward-oriented manufacturing sector-led growth has made China one of the largest globally integrated economies, as is evident from the fact that trade in goods and services jointly account for about 75 per cent of the country's GDP, against 25-30 per cent for India, Japan, Brazil and the US.*”³⁹ One should never forget all this started with 'Mikado' sticks! Handicrafts and light industry, as Chairman Mao had argued time and again, paved the way forward into export markets.

Although Deng might have been the one who let 'loose' China's industrial capacities, let us not forget that it was Mao Zedong that nurtured the future economic model to come. And the rural economy, with its extraordinary reserves of labour and tradition of cottage industries, that was going to be at the centre of this monumental economic design. Jin Hehui and Du Zhixiong from the University of Adelaide, Australia, analyse the issue as follows: „*Rural industry in China in the 1980s grew at the high annual rate of 28 percent, contributing 34 percent to national industrial output growth. By the end of 1990, the output value of the rural industry and the employment in this sector accounted for 30 and 57 percent of China's total industrial sector, respectively, and its export volume maintained a share of 23.7 percent of the national total. As the "leading sector" in market-oriented reforms, rural industry has played a key role in China's economic growth.*”⁴⁰ What this goes to say is that Deng Xiaoping, although equally able and emblematic, could not have created the industrial and professional infrastructures to ignite an overnight upsurge in economic performance in a such short period of time. The process was initiated much earlier. What Deng Xiaoping did do, apart from unbinding China's true potential, was that he accelerated political and economic normalization with the

³⁹ Harish ANAND: *Manufacturing excellence in India — Implications for a rapidly integrating economy*, published in The Hindu Online, Friday, Sep 09, 2005, URL: <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2005/09/09/stories/2005090901131000.htm> (2008-01-29).

⁴⁰ Jin HEHUI & Du ZHIXIONG, "undated". *"Productivity Of China'S Rural Industry In The 1980'S,"* Working Papers 97_6, CERC, University of Adelaide, Australia. URL: <http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/china/>.

western world, especially with the United States.⁴¹ As a goodwill gesture Deng Xiaoping went as far as invading Vietnam, before his historic visit to the United States.⁴² But lets keep that for another day.

To return to the economic path paved by Mao Zedong, the development of light industries would be followed up by a third level of development which would be heavy industry and national infra-structures. For this stage of development Mao had two concerns. On the one side the re-building of the Chinese nation-state and its reinforcement made the development of heavy industry a non-negligible issue. But on the other side, by pushing ahead with the development of heavy industry on the Soviet model would privilege the urban proletariat and the city 'bureaucratic' officialdom. Nation-building and its consolidation led Mao to over-weigh heavy industry. This probably was a mistake, or at least should have been done on a much longer period, with some of the resources going to the development other sectors of the economy.

By 1955 Mao and his colleagues come to the realization that maybe the adoption of a Soviet Model of economic development might have been a mistake, and might need a drastical correction. „*That year, Mao and the secretaries of provincial and regional Party committees discussed and drafted Seventeen Regulations on Agriculture (the first draft for Outline of Forty Regulations on Agricultural Development), and wrote in the introduction to The Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside that all trades and industries should criticize the right-leaning mentality in order to hasten the development of socialism. However, it was after the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union in February 1956 that an overall consideration of the Chinese socialist construction road started.*”⁴³ (In the Soviet Union Khrushchev was moving away from the Stalinist tradition as well.)

Logically resource management and the administrative responsibility would follow a similar pattern of development. It was thought that the main responsibility for developing the agriculture would be given to the „households” with wider cooperation spilling onto the village level for purposes like building small reservoirs, organizing harvesting, building health and educational infra-structures to mention but a few examples. This would be stepped-up by inter-communal cooperation in larger infra-structure projects. The resulting effect would be to keep hierarchical bureaucracy to a bare minimum. But the 10 000 Soviet „advisors” and central planning were short-cutting this Maoist administrative set-up.

⁴¹ University of Maryland (Department of History): study project on The People's Republic of China, chapter 4. URL: <http://www-chaos.umd.edu/history/prc4.html> (2008-01-29)

⁴² Xiaoming ZHANG: *China's 1979 War with Vietnam – A Reassessment*, appeared in *The China Quarterly* (2005) 184: 851-874, published by Cambridge University Press, U.K.

⁴³ Lin YUNHUI: *The 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong's Tortuous Path*, part of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw – Pact - *The Cold War History of Sino-Soviet Relations*, first published in *Social Sciences in China* (English Edition), Spring 2005, Beijing, 1-2.

In essence what happens is that two tendencies converged to produce an explosive situation. The Maoist principle of decentralized autonomy in terms of power of decision and resource allocation meant that the communes became 'islands' in national bureaucratic echelons, without any defined chains of 'command and control'. This evolution was combined with practices borrowed from the Soviet Union, in which the end result was privileged, with eyes set on short-term objectives rather than the long-term ones. Looking at this period of China's history, Kenneth G. Lieberthal explains it as follows: „*Structurally, China's bureaucratic ranking system combines with the functional division of authority among various bureaucracies to produce a situation in which it is often necessary to achieve agreement among an array of bodies, where no single body has authority over the others. In addition, the reforms' decentralization of budgetary authority enabled many locales and bureaucratic units to acquire funds outside of those allocated through the central budget, which they could use to pursue their own policy preferences. This cushion of "extra-budgetary" funds in turn permitted many locales to become less sensitive to the policy demands from higher levels.*”⁴⁴

As long as the communes and provinces achieved their quota of production in terms of centrally planned allocation, there were no questions asked unto the methodology. As long as goods flowed upward there was no need for information to flow up. An un-harnessed decentralization meant that there emerged bureaucratic devices that permitted localities effectively to block upward flows of information and blunt higher-level initiatives that cascade down on local leaders. The extra-budgetary possibilities meant that local party and administrative leaders need not be transparent on the entirety of their dealings. They were only accountable for financial aid that they received from the central authority, knowing clearly that central authority itself was a three-way splinter: The Party, The Peoples Liberation Army and The Central State Organs. Given the competition between the central 'triumvirate' for power and influence over the lower echelons, it was not difficult for local cadre to evade control by playing one against the other.

As a logical consequence, at the national level, what happened was that decisions were taken in the absence of appropriate information and without the feedback to judge and fine-tune public policy. Overtime, isolation from what really happens can lead to a kind of 'castration' of central authority. Mao Zedong has to be given the credit for realizing quite early the nature and extent of the problem. On the 5th of January 1953, he had this warning to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: „... *the problem of the following kind of bureaucracy has not been basically solved in many areas, departments and fields of work. Some leading cadres are ignorant of the people's hardships,*

⁴⁴ Kenneth G. LIEBERTHAL and David M. LAMPTON (editors): *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1992, 9.

of the conditions in subordinate units only a short distance from their offices, and of the fact that among the cadres at the county, district and township levels there are many bad people guilty of commandism and violations of the law and of discipline. Or they may have some knowledge of such bad people and bad deeds, but turn a blind eye to them, feel no indignation, are not aware of the seriousness of the matter and so take no positive measure to back up good people and punish the bad or to encourage good deeds and stop bad ones."⁴⁵ It is interesting to note that Mao Zedong sees the problem but fails to envisage durable structures of administrative control or independent structures of legal enforcement.

His remedy for the ills of bureaucracy are as follows: „...*if we strengthen and improve our role and methods of leadership, then bureaucracy and commandism, which are harmful to the people, will gradually diminish and many of our Party and government organizations will be able to break away sooner from this Kuomintang style of work. And the sooner will the many bad people who have infiltrated our Party and government organizations be combed out and the many bad deeds still evident today be eliminated.*"⁴⁶ One soon realizes that the fear of over-bureaucratization pushed Mao Zedong away from envisaging any permanent institutional structure other than the succinct apparatus that existed at the top of the state. From the above statement one is inclined to believe that he wanted to substitute 'institutional set-up' by 'official ideology'. On the other side he was equally cautious not to upset the three-way division of power. Increasing the power of the central administration could be done only at the expense of the PLA or the Communist Party of China, two entities in which his confidence was intact; compared with the central bureaucracies, in which he never trusted. He once declared: „*The struggle against corruption, waste and bureaucracy should be stressed as much as the struggle to suppress counter-revolutionaries.*"⁴⁷ He considered bureaucracy to be cancerous, that given a chance to impose itself, will overwhelm the nascent Communist culture that can do away with bureaucracy.

So ideology and in particular the Communist dogma of Marxism-Leninism were the only options available to Mao Zedong. John C. Oliga, an authority on social control and social organization in general well illustrates the role played by ideology: „... *the concept of control is not only pervasive but also is perhaps the most powerful and ideological concept in human and social*

⁴⁵ MAO ZEDONG: *Combat Bureaucracy, Commandism and Violations of the Law and of Discipline*, January 5, 1953, Inner-Party directive drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_24.htm (2008-01-26).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ MAO ZEDONG: *On the Struggle against the "Three Evils" and the "Five Evils"* (Nov 1951-March 1952), Important directives drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, (quote from a draft dated Nov 30, 1951). Source found at the following URL: www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_17.htm (2008-01-28).

relations. At the same time, power and ideology themselves have the most controlling influence on the kind of social order under which we live."⁴⁸ Mao thought that if one can fix a nation's priority through ideology and get the adherence to it by the people in question, the need for physical control can be kept to a minimum. Value consensus can basically reduce the need of the political leadership to develop additional resources to assure fidelity to their priorities and compliance with their policies.⁴⁹ But in a 'fragmented authoritarianism' model proposed by some authors to describe post-war Chinese bureaucracy, the assumption is that although there might have been a single overall ideology, local declination might give way to a different value system in any given cellule. The overall picture that emerges is that the structure of bureaucratic authority is gained by endless negotiations and compromises in which central policy has difficulty gaining the upper hand.⁵⁰ There are endless wheeling and dealing processes in which the lower level officials and Party cadre can amalgamate their control over information to give superficial representation of local realities; thus insulating the local public activities from central interferences.

With the above described administrative dysfunction one would have thought that Chairman Mao could have used the command structures of the Chinese Communist Party, supposedly more loyal to him than the inheritance of the Kuomintang administrative organs with which he has difficulties in handling. Unfortunately for Mao Zedong the Party also seems to escape from his grip. As mentioned earlier, Chairman Mao thought he was riding a „*Three Horse Golden Chariot*”- the PLA, the Communist Party of China and the Central Administrative Organ. Nominally he was an Omnipotent leader with all the powers at his will. But the reality of the situation was slightly different- he ignored the fact that on each of these horses was sitting an ambitious lieutenant who had his own origins and conceptions on how to transform China into a world power. Sooner or later the Golden Chariot will find itself in the middle of the road with no horse to pull it.

Deng Xiaoping becomes the main actor to the enfolding of this dramatic change in who controls what of the PRC. While Mao legitimately felt that he is a man of the people he nonetheless could not say the same thing concerning the Party, since the nitty-gritty of running the Party was in the hands of Deng Xiaoping. As Patrick E. Tyler from the New York Times puts it: „(*Deng*) was appointed secretary general of the Central Committee in June 1954 and, by 1956, secretary general of the Communist Party. With Yang Shangkun as his deputy, Mr. Deng virtually controlled the party personnel apparatus, placing

⁴⁸ John C. OLIGA: *Power, Ideology, and Control*, published by Plenum Press, New York, 1996, 3-4.

⁴⁹ Kenneth G. LIEBERTHAL and David M. LAMPTON (editors): *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1992, 8.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 12.

thousands of cadres in jobs and building a party network that became the foundation of his power."⁵¹ Although, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were close collaborators they were fundamentally different in their political strategies. Mao coming from a peasant family and possessing home-made political ideology was inherently against „systems” or „structures”. At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (April 25, 1956) he bewildered his colleagues with following statement: „*The Communist Party and the democratic parties are all products of history. What emerges in history disappears in history. Therefore, the Communist Party will disappear one day, and so will the democratic parties. Is this disappearance so unpleasant? In my opinion, it will be very pleasant. I think it is just fine that one day we will be able to do away with the Communist Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our task is to hasten their extinction.*”⁵² His coherence continues to be intact and enjoys solid ideological foundations: the historical mission of the Communist Party is to build the ‘commune’, not to run it. Its existence should not live beyond its purpose. From this affirmation he draws the following conclusion: If one builds the Party in ‘granite’ or solid foundations then the programmed disappearance ... would be difficult if not impossible. To give ideological ‘impulses’, the Communist Party need not be a super-structure.

Deng Xiaoping’s political strategies might not have coincided with those of Mao Zedong. For his part, he was a man who came from an upper-class family. In 1926 he escaped from France to Moscow. After 11 months of (intensive) ideological and military training in Moscow, Mr. Deng began taking orders from the Communist International. He returned to China as the chief political adviser to one of the powerful warlords who had carved up northern China.⁵³ This training and links with Communist International inevitable pushed him towards a more conventional and ‘Soviet-induced structures’ of control and command.

This contrast between these two able leaders structurally makes communication difficult. Mao Zedong was known to have complained that the party leadership was treating him like a „*dead ancestor*” and he singled out Mr. Deng for making decisions like an „*emperor*.” Given a dose of ambition from the later meant that Mao’s ‘desires’ were deemed difficult to

⁵¹ Patrick E. TYLER: *Deng Xiaoping: A Political Wizard Who Put China on the Capitalist Road*, published in the New York Times, February 20, 1997. URL: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401EEDE143EF933A15751C0A961958260> (2008-01-31).

⁵² MAO ZEDONG: On the Ten Major Relationships, April 25, 1956, [Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_51.htm (2008-01-31).

⁵³ TYLER: op. cit.

implement. As Patrick E. Tyler goes on to explaining: „*In the early stages of the political campaigns, Mr. Deng was the instrument of Mao's revenge, sending thousands of Chinese intellectuals to manual labor camps and prisons. Mao was not satisfied. He wanted to propel China forward with agricultural communes and steel production.*”⁵⁴ Even Mao Zedong was appalled by the over zealotness of Deng Xiaoping, which made him give a speech in support of the „90%” of intellectuals who have nothing to blame for, and the remaining 5% of the intellectuals should be given time to follow suit. At every step and move of his subordinates Mao Zedong constantly reminded them that they should abstain from committing the same atrocities as the ‘Kuomintang regime’.

Grappling with this stark reality confronts Mao Zedong with the following dilemma at the end of the 1950s: reverse the structural tendencies of an ever independent Communist Party or accelerate his personal objectives of strengthening his constituency – the Peasantry against the moves of what he calls „*the bureaucratic-capitalists*”⁵⁵. The Chinese peasant had saved the Middle Kingdom from destitution and hunger, liberate he is capable of extraordinary deeds, thought Mao Zedong. In fact the Peasantry was the only organ he could use to keep the Communist Party and the central bureaucracy in check. But of course his favored method of giving ideological impulses without the means of execution, without the firm control of the Party and the administration could be a big gamble. Mao is persuaded that it is worth risking his credibility, at the end of 1957 he is ready to launch a new economic strategy that he hopes would translate the spirit of the Chinese Revolution into reality.

But with the heavy industry still its infancy, taking the great leap forward meant that the resources for leaping forward would mainly come from an already disoriented peasantry. Building light-industry at the speed of lightening, as Chairman Mao desired it to be, was beyond the reach of the peasantry and the villages. Technological know-how and industrial organization was still a novelty in the 1950s, as well as being a rarity to the newly formed communes. This meant abandoning a local frame of economic development in favour of a bigger structure than itself. This, if not handled properly, could automatically result in the total submission of the peasantry to the needs of the urban proletariat.

So it was that with ‘Great Expectations’ the Great Leap Forward (GLF) was launched on January 1, 1958. In the name of economic rationality the first action of the government was to amalgamate smaller cooperatives into 26,500

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ MAO ZEDONG: *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* (February 27, 1957), op.cit.

people's communes, with each encompassing thousands of households.⁵⁶ The peasants hardly had time to adjust themselves to the notion of collective ownership before they were bundled-up into a bigger cauldron. It was as if their control on their economic fate was being dilute as the administrative perimeter was constantly widened, and as whirlwind of the 'slogan economy' descended upon them. As Professor Lin Yunhui (from the National Defense University-Beijing) puts it: „*It went even further than Stalin's framework because it practiced a rapid transition from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people, of "taking steel as a key link," made the ratio of heavy industry higher than before, set blowing the "communist wind" that made the peasants even poorer than the Soviet's surplus grain collection system did, and opened the "two account books" of the central and the local authorities which not only hindered initiative at the central and the local level but led to the practice of making false, exaggerated and empty claims. Consequently, the new tendency to search for China's own road to socialism initiated through On the Ten Major Relationships and the 8th Party congress was swept away and turned into its opposite.*"⁵⁷ What happened was that even the peasants' courtyards with their pigs and fruit trees were made communal property. Whenever the State enters a peasant's courtyard it leaves death and misery behind. For what Fernand Braudel has attested is that a peasant not always makes a living with his work in the landlord's field, what really feeds him and his family is what he grows in his courtyard.⁵⁸ So it was with the Chinese peasants during the period of collectivization. And now the system, hungry for ever more resources, was entering this last patch of peasant salvation.

While Mao Zedong encouraged the Communist Party to give a hand to the peasant, quoting examples from the days of the civil war, Deng Xiaoping's local party cadres in fact did the only thing they knew best – they carried the Stalinist command economy right into the heart of the rural world. The commune, quite against the original concept, was made a single vast domain of agricultural exploitation. The well-to-do villages were forced to invest for the benefit of less-well-off villages swept into the same commune. As would have been expected the peasants felt cheated and were bitterly resentful of the happenings. Party officials, wishing to meet target deadlines, were taking things into their own hands and confiscating everything from poultry to cooking pans. Farmers were forced to go and tend steel furnaces, leaving

⁵⁶ WEI LI, (Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Virginia): *The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning Disaster*, March 2005, page5. The study was part of an extensive research project conducted by Professor Wei Li.

⁵⁷ Lin YUNHUI (Professor at the National Defense University-Beijing): *The 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong's Tortuous Path*, study first published in Social Sciences in China (English Edition), Spring 2005.

⁵⁸ Fernand BRAUDEL: *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme (XV-XVIII siècle) – 3. Le temps du monde*, Librairie Armond Collin, 1979, Paris, 746-748.

agricultural work to women and children. Mao Zedong was aware of the crimes committed in the name of his policies. In a secret speech at Lushan in 1959, he discussed the need to go slower during the Great Leap Forward: „*One can't be rash. There must be a step-by-step process. In eating meat, one can only consume one piece at a time. One can never hope to become a fatso at one stroke.*”⁵⁹ But Mao Zedong's power of persuasion was too late to prevent the 'rape of the rural China' by Deng Xiaoping's Party cadre and urban officialdom. This political and bureaucratic arbitrariness was combined with one of the worst draughts that swept through Asia for over a century. As a result millions died of starvation and millions more had to cope with permanent economic dislocation.

Although the catastrophic consequences of the Great Leap Forward were all too real, the reasons that lead China to this fateful period are still to be clearly understood by the academic world. To Professor Wei Li of the University of Virginia, few studies have assessed the relative quantitative effects of these and other possible factors on grain output in a systematic manner, leaving a significant gap in our understanding of the GLF (Great Leap Forward) crisis.⁶⁰ But he goes on to proving that arbitrary actions by the government and the Communist Party of China were the principle authors of this disaster: „*Our findings suggest that the most important causal factor is the diversion of resources from agriculture, which was responsible for 33 percent of the output collapse between 1958 and 1961. Excessive procurement of grain, which decimated the physical strength of the peasantry, is the next largest contributor, accounting for 28.3 percent of the output decline. Bad weather did play a role, contributing to 12.9 percent of the production collapse. The crisis thus had the marks of a perfect storm.*”⁶¹ It is impossible to think that Party cadre at the local and provincial level had no hierarchical relations with Party central offices in Beijing. How is that so little information of malpractice and widespread abuse not reach the top stratum of the Party leadership? If one is to follow the argument that local Party bosses prevented information from flowing, then this would also mean that political information also stopped flowing upwards. It is not easy to believe that Deng Xiaoping, as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, would have tolerated such loosening of control within the Party ranks. Quite possibly something else was at issue. As I mentioned earlier, the peasantry was the strongest asset that Mao Zedong had in his possession, even since 1927. To weaken Mao politically one had first to proceed by weakening the peasantry economically, thus erode their support to the 'Great Leader'. Some of the close collaborators of Mao Zedong

⁵⁹ Mao Zedong quoted in the Time magazine (USA): *The Mao Papers: A New View of China's Chairman*, Friday, Dec. 12, 1969. URL: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,840470-1,00.html>.

⁶⁰ WEI LI: 1.

⁶¹ Ibid, 3.

might have been influenced by events taking place in the Soviet Union, especially the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union in February 1956. The 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Union was the first congress convened after Stalin's death in 1953. The political report addressed to the congress by Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Party Central Committee of the Soviet Union, and speeches given by other delegates revealed the contradictions in Soviet society and Stalin's mistakes.⁶² Open criticism of Stalin could have paved the way for some in the Chinese Communist Party to think same of Mao Zedong.

One can also point to the souring of relations between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The prospect of losing the only ally who was politically and economically potent might have encouraged some circles to undermine Mao Zedong's leadership, at least temporarily to figure well with the Soviet leadership. As C.J. Bartlett explains: „*The collapse of the 'Great Leap Forward' and the temporary eclipse of Mao himself in the first half of 1959 brought a temporary improvement in relations. Khrushchev offered more aid, evidently in the hope that this might strengthen the 'pragmatists' among the Chinese leaders. P'eng Te-huai, the Minister of Defence, was pro-Russian and was anxious to secure Russian equipment to modernize the Chinese armed forces.*”⁶³ The Time weekly magazine reported that P'eng Te-huai tried to initiate a rebellion against Mao during a secret meeting held in Lushan (1959), which failed to produce a coup d'état.⁶⁴ The wide gap between what Mao Zedong announces, in terms of economic and social engineering and what is implemented can partly be explained by these background maneuvers.

In retrospective, it looks as if; every move of Mao Zedong to up-lift the rural population was used by the Party, the PLA and the Bureaucracy to do the opposite, and as such, all in his name. There seems to be a great deal of factional in-fighting among the top ranks which resulted in economic policy being under the regime of 'Musical Chairs', a rotation of policy according to who has the upper-hand. As Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton argue: „*In China, for example, the government ministries exercised considerable power over the economy during the First Five-Year Plan of the mid 1950s, the Communist Party expanded its relative influence over the economy during the Great Leap Forward of 1958–61, and the military became a key decision-maker regarding the economy during the late 1960s. The reforms of the 1980s brought a significant devolution of budget-making authority (a process that had actually begun in earnest in 1971), with Party and government officials in major municipalities gaining greatly increased*

⁶² Lin YUNHUI: Op.cit.

⁶³ BARTLETT: 329.

⁶⁴ Time magazine: Op.cit.

influence over economic decision making."⁶⁵ One is forced to admit that, along with Chairman Mao, the peasant families are the main losers in the process.

Admitting that he has lost his battle against the bureaucracy in all its forms Mao Zedong undertook to analyze the nature of bureaucracy in China for the sake of prosperity: „*At the highest level there is very little knowledge; they do not understand the opinion of the masses; they do not investigate and study; they do not grasp specific policies; they do not conduct political and ideological work; they are divorced from reality, from the masses, and from the leadership of the party; they always issue orders, and the orders are usually wrong, they certainly mislead the country and the people; at the least they obstruct the consistent adherence to the party line and policies; and they cannot meet with the people.*”⁶⁶ Indeed, in his *Twenty Manifestations Of Bureaucracy* an embittered Mao Zedong enumerates in detail the ills of bureaucratic tendencies and practices. He draws no distinction between the bureaucracy of the Communist Party and the bureaucracy of the State apparatus. Simply put, for him, bureaucracy is the earthly manifestation of the darkness's of an evil force beyond human control. Mao should have heeded to the advice of Harold R. Isaacs when he wrote the following with, a good dose of fatality, in 1938: „*The productive techniques and the inherently vital democratic ideas and institutions have limitless capacity for growth; but this growth is stifled and stunted within the persistently surviving national economic structure. The result has been a continuous state of crisis and frustration.*”⁶⁷ The travails of Mao Zedong have followed this fateful pattern.

Thus one can conclude, with the teachings of history to support us that political power and even charisma of an overwhelmingly good intentioned leader cannot bring about a transformation of a country or a people without a prior reorganization of the necessary administrative structures. Mao Zedong thought that he could bypass this necessity by giving economic power to the base – the peasantry. Maybe another time and in another context he might have succeeded, but the economic and geo-political situation of the 1950s was such that Mao had all the odds against him. Too much of his energy was put into regional issues ranging from the Korean War to Indo-China. Perhaps Mao over-estimated the immediate dangers posed by the United States to mainland China. This not only meant diverting resources from the rural world to industries supporting the armed forces, it also meant making compromises to a Soviet Union which never wanted to witness the emergence of a strong and independent China. Coupled with the intrigues of the international situation, Mao Zedong had difficulties in

⁶⁵ Kenneth G. LIEBERTHAL and David M. LAMPTON: *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China*, published by the University of California Press, 1992, 7-8.

⁶⁶ MAO ZEDONG: *Twenty Manifestations Of Bureaucracy*, Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, DC), February, 1970. URL: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv9_85.htm .

⁶⁷ ISAACS: 323.

dominating the Communist Party of China – he was always considered as an outsider whose interests were deeply embedded in the rural world. With modest beginnings in 1927 Mao Zedong single-handedly reoriented the party towards issues concerning the peasantry and the need to build an egalitarian society in the countryside. This was never whole-heartedly accepted by his bourgeois colleagues who believed in an urban proletarian revolution along the lines of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. And there are good reasons to believe that his belief in delegation of power and orientation towards consensual leadership were used by his colleagues to engineer his demise.

Mao Zedong knew quite well that this ‘bourgeois revanche’ would never have happened if he had transferred sufficient power of ‘self-determination’ to the peasantry, which would have had the political legitimacy to oppose the party cadre. But he was halted and haunted by two prospects. Firstly, he considered utter most important that the economic situation of the peasantry be mended before the transfer of political power. Secondly, he felt it important to carry out a parallel consolidation of the ‘Chinese nation’, since he partly attribute the economic burdens of the peasantry as originating from a progressive weakening of the Chinese nation; leading to foreign imperialism over China and the loss of its self-confidence. But tragically for Chairman Mao, with the PLA, the CPC and the Central bureaucracy all pulling in different directions, he lacked a coherent administrative instrument to translate his well-thought plans into a concrete reality. Even today, the absence of Maoist commitment is felt by millions of peasant families all over China, who rightly feel let down by the current economic model.

Dombovári Ádám

Az 1820-as spanyol forradalom visszhangja a The Times lapjain

A konzervatív hatalmak védnökségével és Anglia beleegyezésével Napóleon waterloo-i veresége után és a Bécsi Kongresszus lezárásával 1815 végére a „régí rend” nagyjából helyreállt Európában.¹ Nagyjából, mert a társadalom haladó rétegei – titkos társaságok, katonai szervezkedések, emigráció, stb. útján – az abszolutista kormányok megtorló intézkedései ellenére is ébren maradtak. A Szent Szövetségi rendszer megbontásának igazi jeladása és előjátéka – a német tartományok inkább belpolitikai problémaként jelentkező egyetemi szervezkedéseit követően – a spanyol Rafael del Riego tábornok és Cádizban állomásozó, a dél-amerikai gyarmatokra irányított 45 ezer fős seregének 1820. január 1-jén kirobbantott felkelése² volt. A felkelésnek a restauráció Európájában olyan visszhangja támadt, mint majd az 1830-as francia forradalomnak.³

Az alábbiakban a Riego-féle mozgalom angol sajtóvisszhangjának bemutatására és elemzésére teszünk kísérletet. A sajtó alapvetően egy reagens műfaj, s ez adja forrásértékét. Az elemzés során módszertanilag Klaus Krippendorff munkáját tekintettük mérvadónak.⁴ A 19. század első felének angol sajtótermékei közül a The Times kiemelését indokolja, hogy mind politikailag (a kormány „hivatalos” lapja volt), mind társadalmilag, a közvéleményt formáló szerepét tekintve (példányszáma ekkor 55 ezer körüli volt, ami közel háromszorosa az öt másik vezető londoni napilapnak együtt) meghatározó, sőt abszolút domináns súllyal bírt az angol közéletben.⁵

Az 1820-as években a lap négy oldalon jelent meg, hétfőtől szombatig mindennap. A szerkezetét tekintve néhány jól elkülöníthető rovattípusra oszlott: hírek (news), szerkesztőségi vezércikkek és kommentárok (editorials and leaders), udvari és kormányzati hírek (court and official), parlamenti hírek (parliamentary intelligence), rövid hírek (news in brief), jog és igazságszolgáltatás (law), üzlet és gazdaság (business and finance), személyi portrék (people), „színesek” (features), hirdetések (advertising). Egy-egy oldal hat hasábból állt. Az említett rovatok elhelyezésében szigorúan vett rendszer

¹ ORMOS Mária-MAJOROS István: *Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtérén. Felemelkedés és hanyatlás 1814–1945*, Osiris, Budapest 1999. (MAJOROS-ORMOS) 29-31.

² A hivatalos spanyol terminológia szerint: pronunciamiento.

³ SEMSEY Viktória: *A polgári átalakulás Spanyolországban 1808–1868*, L'Harmattan, Budapest 2005. (SEMSEY) 54.

⁴ KRIPPENDORFF, Klaus: *Content analysis. An introduction to its methodology*, Sage, Beverly Hills 1980. (Magyarul KRIPPENDORFF, Klaus: *A tartalomelemzés módszertanának alapjai*, Balassi, Budapest 1995.). További módszertani segédletekre lásd az id. mű bibliográfiáját: 181-189.

⁵ BURY, J. P. T. (ed.): *The zenith of European power 1830–1870*, The new Cambridge modern history. vol. 10. University Press, Cambridge 1979. (1964.) 122.

nem érvényesült: az első és negyedik oldalakon szerepeltek a hirdetések, halálozások, születések, házasságok, kereskedelmi és üzleti információk, a második és harmadik oldalakon helyezték el többnyire a „*tartalmi*” híreket és kommentárokat. Ezek sorrendje is rendre változott, de általában a parlamenti tudósítások nyitották a sort, s ezt követték a külföldi hírek, majd a szerkesztőségi cikkek és kommentárok. A belpolitikai tudósítások mögött a harmadik oldalt nagyrészt a kisebb belföldi hírek és az aktuálisan folyó perek tették ki. Mindezeket sokszor a szerkesztőnek címzett olvasói levelek, vélemények egészítették ki.

A külföldi hírek recepciója öt formában történt: az esetek többségében külföldi lapok információit vették át (francia, amerikai, német, holland, spanyol, olasz stb.).⁶ Ezeket vagy közvetlenül (francia, amerikai, német, holland lapok esetében), vagy közvetetten idézték (például spanyol lapokra ritkán hivatkoztak közvetlenül, inkább a francia lapok által idézett spanyol orgánumok információit közvetítették másod- vagy harmadkézből). Ennek egyik oka az lehetett, hogy a francia lapok hamarabb jutottak el a lap szerkesztőségéhez, s ezzel a módszerrel gyorsabban tudták a legfrissebb híreket közölni. Alkalmanként a *The Times* saját riportere tudósított a helyszínről (from our own correspondent), vagy egy helyi személy küldött beszámolót (private correspondence). Ha egyszerre sok anyag futott be egy adott térség fontosnak ítélt eseményeiről, akkor a vegyes külföldi hírek rovatából kiemelve, külön cím alatt, általában másik hasábon, hosszabban számoltak be a történetekről (pl. „*Insurrection in Spain*”).

Szempontunkból a legnagyobb jelentőséggel mégis a szerkesztőségi vezércikkek és kommentárok bírnak. Amíg ugyanis a fentebbi típusok többnyire faktográf, tényközlő megállapításokat közölnek, s általában megmaradnak az események pusztá, de annál részletesebb deskriptív leírásánál, addig a szerkesztőségi kommentárok további elemzésre is alkalmat nyújtanak: kijelölik a főbb csomópontokat, rámutatnak arra, hogy az angol politikai közvélemény szempontjából hol keresendők a hangsúlyok, mi az, amit fontosnak tartottak, azt hogyan látták, s milyen – gyakran markáns – véleményt fogalmaztak meg mindezzel kapcsolatban. Továbbá: mennyiben illeszkedik ez a kép általában is a hagyományos angol külpolitikai gondolkodásba? Az elemzés középpontjában tehát a vezércikkek és kommentárok állnak, s az egyéb tudósításokra csak ott, és annyiban utalunk, ahol értékelő mozzanat, személyes vélemény is megjelenik.

Az 1820-as esztendő első négy hónapjában, a spanyol forradalom katonailag aktív szakaszában az Ibér-félsziget hírei uralták a lapot. Nem volt ritka, hogy egy lapszámon belül három helyen is foglalkoztak a dél-európai eseményekkel:

⁶ Pl. *Moniteur*, *Gazette de France*, *Journal des Debats* (ultra-royalista), *Journal de Paris*, *Constitutionnel* (liberális), *Toulouse Journal*, *Renommees*, *Quotidienne*, *Indicateur*, *Gazette de Madrid*, *Gazette of Munich*. Az angol lapok közül: *Courier*, *Hampshire Telegraph*, *Lincoln Mercury*, *The York Herald*, *The York Gazette*, *London Gazette*, *Independent*.

külföldi lapok tudósításai, vezércikk és kommentár, ill. saját tudósítás keretében, egymásra történő keresztutalásokkal (egy cikk több hasábot is jelenthetett).⁷ A beszámolók a katonai megmozdulások és a politikai mozzanatok, személyi tényezők legapróbb részleteiről is tudósítanak, sőt gyakran hivatalos dokumentumok teljes angol fordításait is közlik (pl. kiáltványok, nyílt levelek, királyi dekrétumok, alkotmánytervek, stb.).⁸ Az angol lap tematikájában a külföldi hírek között mindössze a német tartományok zavargásainak utóélete, a dél-amerikai függetlenségi mozgalmak, a Sierra-Leone körüli problémák, s a Florida körül kialakult spanyol-amerikai ellentét reprezentálták magukat a spanyol eseményeket megközelítő mértékben. A „spanyol ügy” a vizsgált időszakban csak egyszer szorult tartósan második helyre a külpolitikai hírek sorában, akkor is mindössze néhány napra: Berry hercegének merénylete idején.⁹ A belpolitikában pedig III. György halála, a Cato street-i összeesküvés és a parlamenti képviselőválasztások megreformálásának kérdése tudta átmenetileg háttérbe szorítani a spanyolországi fejleményeket.¹⁰

Cádizi hírek a forradalom kitörését közvetlenül megelőzően is szerepeltek a The Times hasábjain. 1819. decemberi spanyol lapok a városban pusztító sárgaláz veszteségeiről cikkeztek.¹¹ December 24–25-i lapinformációk szerint a cádizi egységeket január 21-i vagy februári indulással a spanyol kormány expedíciós seregként Dél-Amerikába küldené, a venezuelai La Plata vidékére, Morillo tábornok megsegítésére.¹² A forradalomtól való félelem eközben továbbra is napirenden volt, nem csak Spanyolországban: a francia hadügyminiszter az állami helyőrségek tábornokainak és ezredeseinek küldött körlevelet, mert információkat kapott arról, hogy egyes francia ezredekben lázadást, tiszti felkelést szervezhetnek, ami „a közrend felforgatásával fenyeget”.¹³

⁷ Lásd pl. The Times, London, 1820. január 25., 1820. január 29., 1820. január 31., 1820. február 1., 1820. február 8., stb.

⁸ Lásd pl. Don Manuel Freyre hadseregszereplését (The Times, London, 1820. február 1.) és a cádizi kormányzó, Alonso Rodríguez Valdes kiáltványa (The Times, London, 1820. február 5.), Antonio Quiroga kiáltványa az andalúziai katonákhoz (The Times, London, 1820. február 16.), Quiroga üzenete a királyhoz (The Times, London, 1820. február 29.), stb.

⁹ Berry herceget 1820. február 13-án a párizsi Opera előtt gyilkolták meg. ORMOS-MAJOROS: 35.

¹⁰ III. György 1820. január 29-én halt meg.

¹¹ The Times, London, 1820. január 3., 1820. január 7. November végéig 4537 áldozatot követelt a kór, ebből 2849 férfi, 694 nő, 994 gyermek. Decemberre a betegség visszaszorult. A sárgaláz lélektani hatása és a forradalom kitörése közötti kapcsolat még feltáratlan.

¹² The Times, London, 1820. január 4. 1820. január 14.

¹³ The Times, London, 1820. január 3. A tudósítás 1819. december 29-i francia lapokra hivatkozik.

A szűkebb európai angol érdekszférán belül a Jón-szigetek¹⁴ és Málta mutatták az instabilitás jeleit: egy 1819. november 20-ára datált máltai levél panaszkodik a kalózkodás felhalmozódott, de mindeddig a kormányzó távolléte miatt le nem folytatott pereiről, amelyeknek mihamarabbi elrendezését sürgeti. Sir Thomas Maitland kormányzó még korábban Santa Maura szigetére távozott egy – a túlzott adóterhek miatt kitért – felkelés elfojtására. A hírek szerint a szigetet megszállták a katonaság egységei és szükségállapotot vezettek be. Néhány embert – köztük két papot – kivégeztek, a püspököt pedig börtönbe zárták. A lakosságot és a területet teljesen demilitarizálták, s a többi szigeten is hasonló intézkedéseket fogantatosítottak. Többen a kontinensre emigráltak. A kommentár szerint nem ez volt az egyedüli térség a brit érdekszférán belül, ahol meggondolatlan adóterheket rótt a lakosokra a kormányzat.¹⁵

A spanyolországi forradalomról szóló első, szórványos hírek három hetes késéssel, az 1820. január 22-i számban jelentek meg. A január 8-i Moniteur-ra hivatkozva tudósítanak arról, hogy az „amerikai lázadók” ügynökeinek állítólagos felbujtására katonai zendülés tört ki a cádizi, granadai és sevillai expedíciós hadtesteknél. A lázadók megpróbálták a helyi lőszerraktárakat elfoglalni, a polgárőrség megjelenését követően azonban vezéreik a környező hegységeken keresztül elmenekültek. A Don Manuel Freyre parancsnoksága alatt álló egységek január 5-ére helyreállították a rendet.¹⁶ A beszámoló mindössze néhány sort tett ki a többi külföldi hír között, ráadásul a felkelők átmeneti visszavonulását később francia forrásokra hivatkozva cáfolták.¹⁷ A zendülés jelentőségét – főleg nemzetközi hatásait tekintve – a szerkesztők ekkor tehát még közel sem becsülték túl, ami nem meglepő, hiszen korábban (és később) is számos hasonló zavargásról érkeztek hírek a Pireneusi-félszigetről.¹⁸

A január 24-i szám egy újabb cádizi felkelésről számolt be, amelyet ismét a tervezett dél-amerikai expedíció tisztjei hajtottak végre.¹⁹ A vezércikk az akkori legfontosabb hírként kommentálta a spanyol eseményeket, „amennyiben azok hitelt érdemlőek”.²⁰ A katonák ezúttal a megerősített központi lőszerraktárat, a

¹⁴ A Jón-szigetek ekkor angol fennhatóság alatt álltak, s hét szigetet foglaltak magukba („*Hét Sziget Köztársaság*”): Korfu, Paxo, Santa Maura, Keffalonia, Ithaka, Zakynthosz, Kithira. ORMOS-MAJOROS: 42.

¹⁵ The Times, London, 1820. január 6. 1820. január 10. Maitland-et végül menesztették, a máltai és a Jón-szigetek kormányzatát pedig különválasztották egymástól. Lord William Bentinck lett Málta kormányzója, Sir John Oswald a Jón-szigeteken töltötte be ezt a tisztséget.

¹⁶ The Times, London, 1820. január 22.

¹⁷ The Times, London, 1820. január 29.

¹⁸ A század során mintegy 2 ezer forradalom, felkelés, lázadás, és puccs játszódott le a Spanyol Királyságban. ORMOS-MAJOROS: 78.

¹⁹ The Times, London, 1820. január 24. Feltételezések szerint a Dél-Amerikába küldendő csapatok között a várakozás tétlensége (azaz a „*munkanélküliség*”), a túlzásfoltosság, az amerikai küldetés ellenzése, és általában a rossz szálláskörülmények nagy szerepet játszottak az elégedetlenség kialakulásában. Lásd még The Times, London, 1820. január 27.

²⁰ „*A private letter from Cadiz [...] brings intelligence, which, if true, is most important.*”

Trocadero-t vették ostrom alá, s közben Madrid felé készülődtek. A tudósítás szerint a fővároson általános megdöbbenés lett úrrá, és a készültség minden újabb híradással csak fokozódott. A *The Times* kommentárja szerint szükségszerűen hasonló a végzete minden kormánynak, amely népe érdekeinek figyelembe vétele helyett „*fegyveres janicsárok szuronyaitól vár támogatást*”.²¹ Azaz a felkelést továbbra is tisztán belpolitikai problémaként tárgyalták. A szerkesztő cinikusan feltette azt a kérdést is, vajon a népszerűségében magabiztos VII. Ferdinánd hajlandó lenne-e magát a nép karjaiba vetni, hogy ők védjék meg az ellenséges csapatoktól? A spanyol forradalom eseményei mindenesetre majdnem egy hónapos késéssel, a január 24-i számban sorakoztak csak fel a vezércikkek közé. Feltehetően a spanyol sajtó kezdetben maga is korlátozni igyekezte a hírek terjedését, ahogy erre az angolok is tettek utalásokat.²²

A spanyolországi hírek ezután mindennaposakká váltak a lapban. Egy január 10-re datált madridi magánlevél szerint a Sierra de Ronda lábainál fekvő Las Cabezas, Espere és Villa Martin falvaiban elszállásolt csapatok egyesültek egymással Rafael del Riego vezetésével, és robbantották ki a felkelést, majd foglalták el hamarosan Isla de Leon-t és az öböl térségét.²³ A január 25-i szám már a felkelés expandálásáról, San Fernando városában Cisneros tengerészeti miniszter fogságba vételéről, Arcos de le Frontera-ban Calderon főparancsnok kivégzéséről, az 1812-es alkotmány újbóli cádizi proklamálásáról és az udvar Madridból való távozásának szándékáról tudósított. A felkelő csapatokat 15 és 23 ezer fő közöttire becsülték.²⁴ A hírszerkesztő ugyanakkor hangot adott annak a reményének, hogy a felkelés a korábbiak mintájára viszonylag gyorsan zárul majd le. Az angol kommentár szerint „*könnyű félrevezetni a spanyol katonákat egy perc erejéig*”, de mivel a királyt mindennél jobban tisztelik, hamar vissza is térnek kötelességeik teljesítéséhez. Valószínűtlennek tartja továbbá, hogy a felkelőkhöz a lakosság szélesebb tömegei csatlakoznának, de azt is, hogy a nyugtalanságot és a zűrzavart a kormány akár átmenetileg is el tudná fojtani. A lap tehát a spanyol kormányzat közeli bukásával számol, amennyiben az nem módosítja a politikáját.²⁵

²¹ „*Such is and such will ever be the fate of Governments who, instead of founding their power on the good opinion and interests of their people, seek support from the bayonets of armed Janissaries.*”

²² *The Times*, London, 1820. január 25. A tudósító szerint például a január 11-ig bezárólag megjelent madridi lapok egyáltalán nem tettek említést a felkelésről, s az információikat ők maguk is egy január 9-én Madridból Párizsba „szökött” futártól szereztek be. Az angol szerint ezen nincs mit csodálkozni, mert a korábbi – azóta bizonyossá vált – puccskísérletekről sem számolt be hitelesen soha a spanyol sajtó. A spanyol postát pedig általában felbontva és késve kapták kézhez, már amikor egyáltalán kézhez kapták.

²³ *The Times*, London, 1820. január 29.

²⁴ *The Times*, London, 1820. január 25.

²⁵ „*But still we think we state no more than the general opinion and conviction, when we say, that the existing Government of Spain is approaching to its end. It cannot last, for we fear it will not mend [!].*” VII. Ferdinánd helyzetét nehezíti a portugálokkal Uruguay és Montevideo körül

A január 27-i lapszámban arról cikkeztek, hogy a felkelők Antonio Quiroga Miranda ezredes vezetésével a cádizi alkotmány visszaállításának ígéretével a lakosság körében egyre nagyobb népszerűsége tesznek szert. Az alkotmány „helyreállítására” és ideiglenes junta alakítására a hírek szerint ekkor már Sevillában, Xeres-ben, San Lucar-ban, Chiclana-ban és Port St. Mary-ben is sor került.²⁶ Az angolok szerint az alkotmány visszaállításának ígérete volt a legerősebb fegyver a lázadók kezében, mivel ez a spanyol közvélemény nagy részének az egyetértésével találkozott.²⁷ A január 29-i számban található az első utalások arra nézve, hogy a spanyol forradalom komolyabb nemzetközi kérdéssé válhat: francia ellenzéki lapokra és lisszaboni forrásokra hivatkozva a The Times arról tudósít, hogy a madridi udvar állítólag felvette a kapcsolatot a francia kormánnyal, s 25 ezer fős katonai támogatást kért.²⁸

Az 1820. január 31-i lapszám a dezertálások miatt 24 ezer főre duzzadt felkelő csapatok totális cádizi győzelméről tudósított. A kereskedőváros lakossága lelkesen fogadta az „alkotmány barátait”, s bankettet is rendeztek a számukra. A tudósító szerint ennél is fontosabb volt az a fordulat, ami az udvar magatartásában állt be. VII. Ferdinánd a hírek szerint felismerte, hogy nem tudja leszerelni a nemzet fegyverekkel megtámogatott alkotmányos törekvéseit, ezért minisztereinek menesztése és a cortes összehívása mellett döntött. A forrongás ekkor már átterjedt Madridra is: Ferdinánd állítólag bele akart lövetni az ellene tüntető tömegbe, de végül az ő testőreit mészárolták le. A szerkesztő ugyanakkor azt is fontosnak tartotta hangsúlyozni, hogy forrásaik, a francia lapok párhovatarozásuktól függően, egymásnak ellentmondóan számoltak be egy-egy fordulatról. A kormánypárti Journal de Paris például az ellenzéki Journal des Debats információihoz képest a madridi hangulatról is másképp tudósít: szerintük Freyre győzelme már olyannyira biztosnak tűnik, hogy Madridban „tökéletes nyugalom” uralkodik. Az angol lap munkatársai – más forrásokra is támaszkodva – az első verziót tekintették hitelesnek, s az angol közvélemény felé is azt kommunikálták, hogy „a spanyol kormány olyan események passzív szemlélője lett, amelyeket nem tud irányítani.”²⁹

A lap február 1-jén ellentmondó információkra hivatkozva először bizonytalanra tette a híreket Cádiz elfoglalásáról, majd február 2-án hivatalosan cáfolta azokat.³⁰ A legfontosabb viszont talán, hogy a spanyol forradalom európai ügyé vált: francia lapértésülések szerint orosz részről

kialakult ellentétek függő helyzete is. Az angolok szerint a jelen körülmények között a spanyol királyi udvar Franciaországba vagy Dél-Amerikába „menekülése” az országot anarchiába sodorná. Lásd The Times, London, 1820. január 25.

²⁶ The Times, London, 1820. január 27.

²⁷ „It is an important fact, that the renewal of the Cortes was so well understood to be an object of desire with the Spaniards, that it was the first bribe which suggested itself to the policy of those who were anxious to excite the people to rebellion against Ferdinand VII.”

²⁸ The Times, London, 1820. január 29.

²⁹ The Times, London, 1820. január 31.

³⁰ The Times, London, 1820. február 1., 1820. február 2.

felmerült a Szent Szövetség beavatkozásának a reális lehetősége és egyúttal igénye.³¹ De Cazes francia elnök január 29-i, szintén francia lapértesülések szerint – többek között a spanyolországi események miatt – soron kívüli tanácskozást hívott össze minisztereivel.³²

A következő napokban Freyre és a lázadók Cádiz körüli hadmozdulatai adnak tág teret a The Times riportereinek különböző spekulációkra. Miközben Freyre Sevilában állomásozik erősítésre várva, és tábornoktársa, O'Donnell állítólag vereséget szenvedett, a felkelők hatalmas fegyvertényt könyvelhettek el: január 11-én sikerült elfoglalniuk a Caracca és a St. Julien nevű hadihajókat, más kisebb tüzérségi egységekkel együtt. Mások arról beszéltek, hogy a forradalmi hangulat a királyi alakulatokat is rohamosan fertőzi meg.³³

A lap a tudósításokkal párhuzamosan többször is hangot adott annak a nehézségnek, ami az információk hitelességének a megállapításából fakadt. A francia, portugál és gibraltári forrásokat fogadták el leginkább mérvadónak, s szkeptikusabbak voltak a „hivatalos” spanyol, és a spanyol postán keresztül érkező hírekkel szemben. Ennek ellenére lehetőség szerint a lap hasábjain mindet közölték. Február 9-én a Journal des Debats állásfoglalását is idézték, amely a felkelés mielőbbi elfojtását, és a félsziget békéjének a helyreállítását reméli, aminek alapja „a hadsereg és a spanyol alattvalók hűsége legitim uralkodójuk felé.”³⁴

A francia mozgósításról szóló információk kerültek a spanyol hírek élére a február 10-i számban. A lap 20 ezer francia felsorakozásáról tud d'Angoulême herceg vezetésével, miközben Cádiz január 20-i „eleste” is hivatalossá vált. Az Independent beszámolója szerint az alkotmányt vér nélkül sikerült helyreállítani, sőt, Sevilla is átállt a felkelőkhöz. A lap hírei szerint már Spanyolország egész déli része a lázadók oldalára állt, Freyre csapatait szétszórták, a cortest pedig január 30-ára hívták össze. A Journal de Paris mind a négy hírt cáfolta. A portugál tudósítások szintén cáfolják Cádiz elestét, s általában a spanyol felkelést komolytalan és csekély jelentőségű zavargásként prezentálják, amelyet hamarosan ügyis levernek. A Conservateur egy hosszabb eszmefuttatást is közölt Chateaubriand tollából, amelynek főbb tételeit a The Times is közölte. Chateaubriand tudni vélte, hogy 1819 novemberében a francia demokraták, a bonapartisták és az angol radikálisok pénz, valamint küldöttek segítségével tervszerűen (egy végrehajtó bizottság koordinálásával) készültek a spanyolok felbujtására: Madridban, Cádizban, Valenciában, Katalóniában, Galíciában, és legfőképp a Pireneusok lábánál egyszerre

³¹ „The Holy Alliance will doubtless [...] exert itself to stop the revolutionary conflagration. It is at any rate the interest of France to see Spain flourishing and tranquil; and it is a sacred duty, on the principle of legitimacy, to protect the throne of Spain, no less than that of France.” Idézi a lap a Journal des Debats-t.

³² The Times, London, 1820. február 2.

³³ The Times, London, 1820. február 8.

³⁴ The Times, London, 1820. február 9.

készültek forradalmat kirobbantani, amelynek közvetett célja az anarchikus állapotok előidézése volt Franciaországban is.³⁵

A francia intervenció jogalapjának a megteremtése ezzel és ily módon is kibontakozóban volt, hiszen Chateaubriand gyakorlatilag a royalisták egységfrontját kívánta elősegíteni. A szerkesztőségi kommentár - érthetően - az angolok elleni vádat emelte ki és cáfolta határozottan. A szerkesztő szerint az egyébként zseniális Chateaubriand ezzel a váddal nevetségessé tette magát. Az angolok szerint Chateaubriand cikke pusztán egy kortesbeszéd VII. Ferdinánd abszolút monarchiája, s azon keresztül a legitimitás elvének a fenntartása mellett. A kommentár a be nem avatkozás elvét fogalmazza meg: sem a spanyolok szabadságának a biztosítására, sem a kivívott szabadságok megszüntetésére nem támogat egy a környező államok által indított „*keresztes hadjáratot*”. Chateaubriand-t Rousseau-hoz hasonlítja, mondván úgy tűnik mindkettőn - az angolok szerint természetesen alaptalanul - úgy érzik magukat, mint akik ellen az egész világ összefogott.³⁶

A felkelés kitörését követően január 21-i dátummal kapott a szerkesztőség először hivatalos levelet Cádizból, amely megerősítette, hogy a várost még nem szállták meg, sőt, a lázadók visszavonultak az Isla de Leon szigetre.³⁷ A királpárti tudósítások voltak általában is többségben: egyes hírek szerint a lázadók között széthúzás figyelhető meg, s két vezérük párbajra hívta ki egymást. A január 24-i cádizi összeesküvés egyik szervezőjét, Santiago ezredest pedig állítólag a kormány emberei megölték.³⁸ Pár nappal később a hírt tartalmazó francia lapok kritikája mellett ezt is cáfolták: az ezredesnek sikerült Isla de Leon-ra szöknie.³⁹ A Quotidienne Ferdinánd-párti megállapítása is a vezércikkbe került, amely szerint a felkelés „*az utolsókat leheli*”.⁴⁰ Ennek cáfolataként néhány nappal később már arról cikkeznek, hogy a levelek hangvétele a korábbiakban feltételezettnél erősebb ellenállásra utalnak.⁴¹ Láthatjuk, hogy a felkelés kimenetelét tekintve politikailag fontosabb hírek többsége továbbra is rendkívül ellentmondásos maradt, a tudósítások így nagyrészt az egymással szemben álló csapatok hadmozdulatairól tudósítanak.

Február 19-étől változtak meg szignifikánsan az arányok, s került a vezető hírekben domináns pozícióba Berry hercegének halálos merénylete.⁴² Sőt, a herceg utolsó napjairól szóló híradások mellett egészen február 22-ig nem jelent meg

³⁵ The Times, London, 1820. február 10.

³⁶ The Times, London, 1820. február 10.

³⁷ The Times, London, 1820. február 11.

³⁸ The Times, London, 1820. február 12.

³⁹ The Times, London, 1820. február 15.

⁴⁰ The Times, London, 1820. február 14.

⁴¹ „*The general tone of the letters indicates the probability of a stronger resistance on the part of the Insurgents, and greater difficulty and delay to the royalist troops in accomplishing their reduction, than the preceding accounts had led us to expect.*” Lásd The Times, London, 1820. február 18.

⁴² The Times, London, 1820. február 19.

semmilyen más külföldi tárgyú tudósítás, a spanyol események is csak ekkor kerülnek majd vissza a vezető hírek közé. Freyre kiáltványát idézik, amely királyi amnesztiát ígért a felkelőknek.⁴³ A kommentár szerint se katonai eredménye, se más hozadéka ennek nem lett, mert a lapok minderről hallgatnak.⁴⁴ Egy február 7-i madridi magántudósítás arról számolt be, hogy „ismeretlen okok” miatt Don Juan Lozano de Torres államtanácsos, Don José Villanfrontin kincstári tanácsos és Don Antonio Ugarte kereskedelmi ügynök elhagyták a fővárost.⁴⁵

A hónap végére a helyreigazítások maradtak: egy február 3-i gibraltári levél hitelességének elfogadásával az angol lap tudatos félrevezetéssel vádolta meg a spanyol királyi hatóságok cádizi és madridi tudósításait. A felkelés elfojtása a korábbi hírekkel ellentétben még nem várható a közeljövőben, sőt, például Algeciras városából is komoly erősítéssel távoztak a lázadó csapatok, s a város lakói egyúttal az alkotmányra is felesküdtek. Az angolok szerint ezek a vállalkozások és a királyi amnesztia ignorálása mind arra utalnak, hogy a felkelők magabiztosak a saját túlerejükben, s a királyi csapatok elégedetlenségében is. A lap megállapítása szerint általában a gyalogság rokonszenvezik a lázadókkal, a lovasság viszont továbbra is kormányhű. O'Donnell tábornok Ceutából kért a királyi csapatoknak erősítést, de az érkező egységek a lázadókhöz csatlakoztak. A dezertálásokkal február 5-re már 14 ezerre nőtt az „Alkotmányos Hadsereg” létszáma.⁴⁶ A felkelők közben vámállomások alapításával fokozatosan az állami szuverenitás egyes fontosabb elemeit is elkezdték gyakorolni.⁴⁷

Az angol kommentár szerint politikailag hasznos volt a lázadók azon lépése is, hogy kiáltványban deklarálták: tartózkodnak minden erőszakos cselekedettől honfitársaikkal szemben, s pusztán önvédelemre szorítkoznak. A felkelők az angolok forrásai szerint négy hadihajóval, tizennégy őrhajóval, egy évnyi élelemmel és „fél évszázadra” elegendő lőszerrel rendelkeznek. Cádiztól 100 mérföldre Granada keleti részén, Almeria-ban pedig egy újabb forradalom tört ki. A zavargások bár továbbra is egy földrajzilag jól behatárolható területre, Cádizra és környékére korlátozódtak, az elégedetlenség jelei már a fővárosban, Madridban is megmutatkoztak. Az angol lap szerint VII. Ferdinándot, aki a zavargások kezdete óta először lépett a város utcájára, füttyülés és morajlás fogadta.⁴⁸ A kommentár mindezek alapján értetlenkedik: mit nyert a spanyol kormány azzal, hogy folyamatosan félretájékoztatta a közvéleményt a forradalom valódi méretéről?⁴⁹

⁴³ The Times, London, 1820. február 22.

⁴⁴ The Times, London, 1820. február 24.

⁴⁵ The Times, London, 1820. február 23.

⁴⁶ The Times, London, 1820. február 26., 1820. február 29.

⁴⁷ The Times, London, 1820. február 26.

⁴⁸ The Times, London, 1820. február 29.

⁴⁹ „What then, it will be asked, have the Spanish authorities gained by their multiplied misrepresentations of the character and power of this very formidable rebellion? [!]”

A március 1-i vezércikk is a felkelők ügyének a sikerét hangsúlyozta,⁵⁰ valamint Freyre állítólagos lemondásáról tudósítottak.⁵¹ A másnapi lap a Journal des Debats és a Quotidienne eszmefuttatását idézi. A két francia sajtóorgánom a Cato-street-i összeesküvés kapcsán egy egész Európát behálózó összeesküvést sejtett. A különböző forradalmi csoportok, úgy vélték, kapcsolatban állnak egymással, s a társadalmi rend soha nem forgott nagyobb veszélyben.⁵² Az angol lap viszont határozottan elveti ezt a nézetet, s kétségbe vonja, hogy az angol összeesküvést párhuzamba kell – és egyáltalán lehet – hozni a kontinens forradalmi mozgalmával. A Cato-street-i összeesküvést sajtós belpolitikai anomáliaként értékelték, amelynek célkitűzéseit és módszereit minden józan angol állampolgár elutasítja.⁵³

A tudósítások ezután újra napokig a felkelők és a királyi csapatok hadmozdulatainak a leírására szorítkoztak, jelentősebb kommentárok nélkül. Riego tábornok a környező városok megszerzésére törekedett Algeciras-ból kiindulva. Február 18-a estjén érkezett Malaga-ba, majd Granada felé haladt tovább.⁵⁴ La Corunában február 20-án vérontás nélkül megdöntötték VII. Ferdinánd hatalmát, a galíciai kormányzót pedig letartóztatták. Navarrában Espoz y Mina, Valenciában Nebot vezetésével alakultak gerillacsapatok a királyságiak ellen.

Az angol lap a spanyol felkelés diadaláról ír, s – először – nyíltan állást foglal annak céljai mellett. A forradalmat pedig egyenesen a spanyol történelemnek az egység óta előállt legjelentősebb és legérdekesebb eseményeként tárgyalja.⁵⁵ VII. Ferdinánd a felkelés sikere miatt alkotmány kibocsátását helyezte kilátásba, de ennek hitelességével kapcsolatban az angol kommentár szerint a lakosság szkeptikus lesz.⁵⁶ Annál is inkább, mert a király

⁵⁰ „The acconuts from Spain are every day more encouraging to the hopes of those who favour the cause of the Insurgents.”

⁵¹ The Times, London, 1820. március 1.

⁵² „Thus from end to end of Europe crimes extend and correspond with each other: thus the Secret Societies of Germany, the Liberales of Spain, the Carbonari of Italy, and the Radicals of England and of France, are all agitated--all prepared--and never was social order placed in greater peril.”

⁵³ The Times, London, 1820. március 2.

⁵⁴ The Times, London, 1820. március 7. 1820. március 8.

⁵⁵ „Thus we have made nearly the circuit of Spain, and we see that in every quarter of the Peninsula this cause assumes a truly popular and victorious aspect. There are few insurrections like it on record - nothing more honourable than its progress to the professional and moral character of those by whom it was undertaken. It seems a national enterprise, provoked by intolerable injuries, and the agent of it is a military force: yet its general characteristics are providence, mildness and moderation; nor has a single movement of vengeance in the Spanish soldiery, or of unworthy ambitions in their Chiefs, drawn an expression of regret from the friends of humanity, or caused a feeling of shame among those of freedom. [...] Even after all that this generation has witnessed, the present appears to us the most interesting moment to be found in the records of the Spanish nation, since the union of the different provinces of that great monarchy under one imperial crown.” [!]

⁵⁶ The Times, London, 1820. március 14.

lépéseinek koordinálására alakult juntát szerintük a „szent inkvizíció” és a „diktatórikus junta” nevekkel lehetne jellemezni.⁵⁷

Az igazi fordulatról szóló első hírek a március 20-i számban kerültek az angol közvélemény elé. A Madrid Gazette március 7-i számába közölte VII. Ferdinánd királyi dekrétumát, amely szerint az uralkodó azonnal összehívja a cortest. VII. Ferdinánd március 8-án újabb üzenetet kommunikált a madridi lapban a spanyol lakosság felé: eltökélt szándéka, hogy felesküdjön az 1812-es alkotmányra.⁵⁸ A The Times másnap több hasábon keresztül idézte az 1812-es spanyol alkotmány paragrafusait.⁵⁹ Ugyanaznap egy március 20-án datált olvasói levelet is közöltek, „*A friend to real liberty*” aláírással. A levél írója üdvözölte a spanyol forradalom sikerét, és méltatta a The Times szerkesztőségét, mert az a felkelők céljaival mutat szolidaritást.⁶⁰

Március 8-án a politikai okok vagy szabadkőművesség miatt börtönben lévő elitélteket az új kormány szabadon engedte, és egyúttal országszerte kihirdették az új választások megtartásának szükségességét. Az angol lap elemzés alá vette VII. Ferdinánd nyilvános „*apológiáját*” is. A kommentár szerint forradalmak és válságok idején soha nem a királyé az egyedüli felelősség, hanem sokkal inkább a minisztereké. A királyt emiatt „*mentelmi jog*” illeti meg a felelősségre vonás alól. Nem vonja kétségbe az angol lap VII. Ferdinándnak azt a vallomását sem, amelyben arról szól, pusztán népe kívánságának próbált megfelelni, amikor restaurálta az abszolút hatalmat; annak a népnek, amely ragaszkodik a hagyományaihoz.⁶¹

A The Times március 29-i lapszáma a spanyol forradalmat az alkotmányos rend bevezetésére fogatosított intézkedések megindításával befejezettnek tekintette.⁶² A lap az ezt követő konszolidációs folyamatról, az ideiglenes junta tevékenységéről, miniszteriális cseréről, és a cortes összehívásáról is rendre részletesen tudósított.

A francia intervencióról és a spanyol ancien régime helyreállításáról az 1822. október 20-i kezdettel Veronában összegyűlt nagyhatalmak döntöttek. Az orosz, osztrák, porosz és francia résztvevőkkel szemben ellenvéleményt az angolokat képviselő Wellington herceg fogalmazott meg.⁶³ A korábbi angol külügyminiszter, Castlereagh (külügyminiszter: 1812–1822) nem sokkal a kongresszus határozata előtt követett el öngyilkosságot. A miniszteri székben George Canning (külügyminiszter: 1822–1827) követte, s a grófhoz képest

⁵⁷ The Times, London, 1820. március 17.

⁵⁸ The Times, London, 1820. március 20.

⁵⁹ The Times, London, 1820. március 21.

⁶⁰ Uo.

⁶¹ The Times, London, 1820. március 28.

⁶² „*The revolution, therefore, is now complete: the Grandees and Priesthood must equally bend before the storm. The nation has vindicated her right courageously, and, we trust, will preserve them wisely.*” Lásd The Times, London, 1820. március 29.

⁶³ A „*Kongresszusok korának*” legjobb történeti feldolgozását lásd KISSINGER, H. A.: *A world restored. Metternich, Castlereagh and the problems of piece 1812-1822*, H. n. 1957.

egyúttal egy új stílusú angol külpolitika is. Castlereagh politikáját a tradicionális „*splendid isolation*” elvéhez képest egy aktív, és mindenekelőtt a kontinentális Európa felé forduló irányvonal jellemzett. Angol földön ez a szemlélet sorozatos kritikákat és alacsony népszerűséget hozott a számára: a politika és a sajtó is gyakran támadta.⁶⁴ Ha az 1820-as eseményeket próbáljuk meg röviden ezen a két síkon megvizsgálni és összefoglalni, akkor szintén ezt a kettősséget tapasztaljuk. A *The Times* kommentárjai – láttuk – rokonszenvvel fogadták a spanyol forradalom célkitűzéseit, de egy közvetlen, nem spanyol katonai beavatkozást mind az alkotmányos, mind a restaurációra törekvő csoportok oldalán határozottan elvetettek. 1822-ben Canning-gel ez a külpolitikai gondolkodás és gyakorlat tér vissza a Foreign Office falai közé is, amely változás egyben a Szent Szövetség rendszerének az első repedését is jelenti.

⁶⁴ Castlereagh külpolitikájáról részletesebben lásd WEBSTER, C. K.: *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822. Britain and the European Alliance*, London, Bell, 1963. Canning külpolitikájáról részletesebben lásd TEMPERLEY, H.: *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827. England, The Neo-Holy Alliance and the New World*. Archon, London 1966.

Геза Гече

**Панславизм в русской и советской внешней политике
1914–1991**

Панславизм — это родившаяся в XIX в. доктрина, целью которой являлась политическая реорганизация Европы в интересах славянских народов. По мнению большинства представителей этого политического движения эта реорганизация должна была осуществиться в форме федерации под руководством России. Эта парадигма, родившаяся в Средней Европе, стала во второй половине XIX в. определяющим элементом русского национализма. Панслависты хотели сделать столицей славянской федерации Царьград, т.е. Константинополь,¹ овладение которым входило в планы царя Николая II, вовлекшего Россию в I мировую войну². Историческое развитие последних десятилетий XIX в. поляризовало российские правительственные круги, часть которых симпатизировала немцам, а другая часть скорее была дружественно настроена к французам. Первая мировая война началась с объявления войны Габсбургской монархией Сербии 28 июля 1914 г.³ Безусловно, в российском правительстве министр иностранных дел Сазонов⁴

¹ Стимулом этой доктрины были итальянское и немецкое движения за единство. Конкретные территориальные планы появились во второй половине 1860-ых годов в трудах Ивана Аксакова, Николая Данилевского, Александра Стронина, генерала Александра Киреева, Константина Леонтьева и Федора Достоевского. Эта доктрина оказала сильное влияние на царскую внешнюю политику периода русско-турецкой войны 1877 - 78 годов.

² Николай II надеялся овладеть Константинополем и морскими проливами в результате победного конца I-ой мировой войны. России удалось в марте 1915-го года „наконец” заключить с союзниками Великобританией и Францией так называемый „Константинопольский договор”. По этому договору в случае победы Антанты Россия получила бы Константинополь, западное побережье Босфора, Дарданеллы и Южную Фракию. Хотя военные планы пока не конкретизировались, было ясно, что Россия получила бы части Австро-Венгерской Монархии и Германии. KOHN, Hans: *Pan-Slavism. Its History and Ideology*, 2. ed., Revised. Vintage Books, New York 1960. (в дальнейшем: KOHN 1960), 257-258. Подробно о заключении договора о Константинополе. SZAZONOV, Sz. D.: *Végzetes évek*. Genius Kiadás, 1919. (В дальнейшем: SZAZONOV (1919) 358-366, об этом же: LENGYEL István: *Oroszország-Szovjetunió 1917-1939*, IKVA, Budapest 1991. (в дальнейшем: LENGYEL (1991) 28-29.

³ Непосредственной причиной войны послужило убийство сербскими террористами наследника трона Франца Фердинанда 28 июня 1914 г. в Сараеве. 5-го августа Монархия объявила войну и России. 1 августа Германия вступила в войну с Россией, а через 2 дня – с Францией и Бельгией. PALOTÁS Emil: *Kelet-Európa története a XX. század első felében*, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2003. 69.

⁴ Самым верным способом нанести чувствительный удар Германии и провалить ее стремления к мировому господству является разрушение шатающегося здания Габсбургской Монархии, которой уже давно грозил развал, но до последних дней своего существования она оставалась главным очагом европейского разлада. SZAZONOV (1919), 314.

первоначально был враждебен к немцам,⁵ но он и его сторонники к 1914-ому году не скрывали, что в их планы входило уничтожение Австро-Венгерской монархии.⁶

Однако к концу войны не России, а Германии и ее союзнице, Австро-Венгрии удалось взять под свой контроль не только балканские государства, но и принадлежавшие России территории.

Несмотря на истощение России к 3-ему году войны все политические силы в Петрограде хотели продолжать войну до победоносного конца, что оказалось самоубийственной политикой, так как способствовало победе большевиков, партии выступающей против войны. Ленин и его товарищи сразу после прихода к власти в ноябре 1917 года провозгласили декрет о мире.

Поражение российской имперской политики сыграло немалую роль в том, что в период между двумя мировыми войнами в русской эмиграции получило развитие евразийское движение, которое порвало с панславизмом.⁷

Ленин и его соратники заключили в декабре 1917 г. перемирие с центральными державами и приступили к мирным переговорам. К 3-ему марта 1918 г. им удалось подписать мирный договор с Германией. В

⁵ Символично, что российская столица Санкт – Петербург через несколько недель после объявления Германией войны России, 1 сентября 1914 г. была переименована царским правительством в Петроград, т.е. русифицирована. PALÉOLOGUE, Maurice: *A cárok Oroszországa az első világháború alatt*, Eötvös Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1982. 62.

⁶ Министр иностранных дел Сазонов 14 сентября 1914 г. в объявленном «плане мира» наметил реорганизацию Габсбургской монархии в триединое государство, состоящего из Австрии, Чехословакии и Венгрии. Босния, Герцеговина, Далмация, а также Северная Албания, по его плану, должны были перейти к Сербии, а польские территории, относящиеся к Германии и Монархии – к России. Разговаривая с Палеологом, он все же подчеркивал: «Австро-Венгрию надо раздробить (1 января, 1915 г.)». И осенью 1914 г. в Москве появилась карта будущей Европы, на которой Чехия и Венгрия были самостоятельными государствами; Сербия в дополнение получала также и Хорватию, Болгарию – Македонию, как награду за то, что примкнет к Антанте. К России должны были относиться Буковина, Восточная Пруссия, а также Польша, дополненная немецкими и австрийскими территориями, с польским населением. По интерпретации газеты «Русское слово» воззвания великого князя Николая Николаевича от 15 сентября 1914 г. к национальностям Австро-Венгрии, Трансильвания и Южная Буковина объединятся с Румынией, а Истрия и Южный Тироль с Италией. По мнению газеты, задачей независимой Австрии будет изоляция Германии от Ближнего Востока. Создание независимого Чешского государства невозможно, потому что в своих исторических и этнографических границах выход страны к морю неразрешим. При этом он подчеркивал необходимость поддержки независимости Венгрии, чем русская внешняя политика исправила бы свою ошибку, допущенную в 1849 году. MAJOROS István: *Vereségtől a győzelemig. Franciaország a nemzetközi kapcsolatok rendszerében (1871-1920)*, Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest 2004. 216.

⁷ После предшествующих событий XIX в. евразийская школа или «классические» представители евроазиатского империализма, такие, как князь Николай Трубецкой, Петр Савицкий, решающим фактором в российской истории считали не славянский характер, а территорию, геополитический фактор.

брестском мирном соглашении они отказались не только от Прибалтики, но и от славянских территорий, в том числе Польши и значительных частей Украины.⁸ Для российских коммунистов это не являлось «принципиальным вопросом», так как они делали ставку в осуществлении своей миссии не на славянские народы, а на мировую революцию.⁹ Для ее организации в марте 1919 г. был создан специальный орган – Коммунистический интернационал. Коминтерн был создан в качестве мировой партии.¹⁰ Во время мирных переговоров в Европе в России полыхала гражданская война, таким образом, новый европейский порядок рождался в 1919-20 годах независимо от панславистов, хотя частично в соответствии с (западно)славянскими и румынскими национальными интересами.

В континентальной Европе самым крупным народом был немецкий. Немцы были более значительным фактором, чем балканские и средневропейские славянские нации вместе взятые.¹¹ Версальский договор о переустройстве Европы рано показал свою ущербность. Впервые – в 1922-ом году, когда потерпевшие в войне поражение Германия и Советский Союз договорились в итальянском городе Рапалло об отказе от репарационных требований и о восстановлении дипломатических отношений.¹²

К концу 1923-го года развитие мирового коммунистического движения застопорилось,¹³ поэтому для советского руководства стала важной Азия, особенно Китай.

⁸ KOHN (1960): 279-282.

⁹ Между прочим, как только Германия, проиграв войну, 11 ноября 1918 г. капитулировала перед западными державами, Всероссийский Центральный Исполнительный Комитет 13 ноября 1918 г. аннулировал Брестский мирный договор со всеми его предписаниями LÉNGYEL (1991): 46.

¹⁰ *A Kommunista Internacionálé válogatott dokumentumai* (Избранные документы Коминтерна), Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1975. (в дальнейшем: *Internacionálé dokumentumai* 1975), 13-20; Устав 1920-го г. там же 53-57.

¹¹ Нельзя оставить без внимания тот факт, что у Коминтерна были в этом регионе хорошие связи со славянскими национальностями. Таким образом, уже на учредительном конгрессе в члены президиума мировой организации были выбраны представители Болгарии, Чехословакии, Польши и Сербско-Хорватско-Словенского Королевства. (Тому, что среди членов президиума были представители Венгрии, Германии и Швейцарии, была другая причина). *A Kommunista Internacionálé története*, Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1971. (далее: *Internacionálé* 1971), 50.

¹² Раньше такой договор Советский Союз заключил только с Турцией в 1920 г. Эмиль Нидерхаузер отмечает:– «Сотрудничество довольно быстро распространилось и на военные отношения, немецкая армия могла вооружаться только на советской территории, так как это было запрещено внутри страны по мирному договору, в то же время оно помогало организации советской армии. Тайные в основном связи не оборвались полностью и после прихода к власти Гитлера.» См.: NIEDERHAUSER Emil: *Kelet-Európa története*, História-MTA Történettudományi Intézete, Budapest 2001. (далее: NIEDERHAUSER 2001), 247.

¹³ *Internacionálé* 1971, 101, 197. К 1924-му году США согласно плану Дауеса освободили Германию от выплаты значительной доли контрибуции. Она получила также

Но в Пекине буржуазное правительство Гоминдана учинило кровавую расправу с китайскими коммунистами, и перспектива успеха мировой революции, таким образом, стала спорной темой в Москве.¹⁴

Спор о возможностях построения «социализма в одной стране» в конце концов закончился в пользу Сталина. Полемизируя с Троцким, Сталин доказывал, что социализм можно построить и в относительно неразвитом Советском Союзе.

Формирование советского государственного национализма

После дискуссии руководители Советского Союза стремились уже в первую очередь не к распространению мировой революции, а к укреплению своей страны как государства. Это требовало приспособления страны к системе межгосударственных отношений, оформившейся в международной политике, и соблюдения дипломатических правил.

В 1932 г. Япония напала на Китай, оккупировала Северную Маньчжурию. В январе 1933 г. в Германии к власти пришел Гитлер.

С этими событиями совпало решение советского руководства о создании новых учебников по истории. На первый план вышла концепция «самобытного характера» России. Если до этого поношение русского прошлого было нормой советской политики в области культуры, то теперь в печати вновь можно было прославлять деяния героев русского народного эпоса.¹⁵

В то время как в 20-ые годы у Советского Союза особенно плохими были отношения с вновь образовавшимися славянскими государствами, ведь они симпатизировали не большевикам, а белым эмигрантам, то теперь положение резко изменилось. Правда, даже вопреки этому изменить отношения с поляками не удалось. Советская политика Народного фронта 1935 г. настаивала на примирении с западными демократическими государствами и объявляла войну «наиболее реакционной, открыто террористической форме диктатуры финансового капитала»: фашизму.

Начиная с этого времени советская внешняя политика вопреки прежней точке зрения стала отстаивать *status-quo*.

большой английско-американский заем. Internacionálé 1971, 194.

¹⁴ «Поворот к Востоку» провозгласили на пятом конгрессе Коминтерна (17 июня – 8 июля, 1924 г.) См.: Internacionálé dokumentumai 1975, 189-190. Оценка изменившегося положения в Китае на VIII-ом пленуме исполкома Коминтерна (18-30 мая, 1927 г.). Цит. там же, 268-273.

¹⁵ В учебнике Шестакова «Краткая история советских народов», опубликованном в 1937 г., идет речь о «Советском Союзе, как о родине социализма, чудесную историю которого мы должны хорошо знать». КОHN (1960): 285-286.

В этой ситуации было логичным, что в мае 1935 г. Советский Союз подписал пакт об оказании взаимной помощи не только с Францией, но и с Чехословакией, более того, советские власти начали с 1935 г. превращать Чехословакию в свою военную базу.¹⁶ Казалось, что при помощи Праги Москва может усилить свое влияние во всей Средней Европе.¹⁷ Это было необходимо и потому, что советские власти уже в 1934 г. считали неизбежной войну с нацистской Германией.¹⁸

Советское партийное руководство незадолго до августа 1939 г. реабилитировало панславизм, а с 1941 г. «актуализировало» его как «идеологию антиимпериалистического характера».¹⁹

Осенью 1938 г. после удара Германии по Чехословакии жертвой агрессии стала славянская страна. В марте 1939 г. Чехословакия была стерта с географической карты. Словакия, как славянское государство,

¹⁶ С 5 по 13 октября состоялась двухнедельная поездка советских журналистов в Чехословакию, во время которой их приняло и чешское правительство. Словакия в руках чехов «является для Красной Армии входом в Европу». Об этом заявил Рипка, журналист, друг президента Бенеша, который попрощался с советскими коллегами следующими словами: «Мы можем заверить вас, что Чехословакия, окруженная враждебными антибольшевистскими режимами, с этого времени будет входными воротами для Советов в Западную и Среднюю Европу». MAJOROS István: *Franciaország a nemzetközi kapcsolatok rendszerében (1871-1940)*. (Докторская диссертация, на правах рукописи, Венг. Ак. Наук), Budapest, 2003. (Дальше: MAJOROS (203), 304-305.

¹⁷ Например, из Чехословакии хотели при случае нанести удар по Берлину. 8-го апреля 1935 г. в Прагу прибыла делегация советских офицеров-летчиков для изучения чешской авиационной промышленности. С 30 мая по 5 июня чешское авиазвено гостило в Москве. На переговорах обсуждались проблемы передачи чешских аэродромов в распоряжение Советского Союза. С 13 по 23 августа делегация во главе с бывшим начальником советского генерального штаба присутствовала на чешских военных маневрах. А 5-27 сентября начальник чешского генштаба наблюдал за военными маневрами в окрестностях Киева. С осени 1935 г. чешские офицеры систематически посещали Советский Союз. В феврале 1936 г. в Прагу прибыл главный редактор «Известий» Бухарин. В феврале-марте 1936 г. советские специалисты приняли участие в реконструкции словацких аэродромов. См.: MAJOROS (2003): 304.

¹⁸ В аналитическом материале 1933 г. о Советском Союзе французский генеральный штаб пришел к выводу, что страна из-за внутривосточных проблем не очень-то может строить агрессивные планы. Через 4 года, в сообщении, которое основывается на беседе с советским старшим офицером 23-го февраля 1937 г., отмечается, что советское руководство убеждено в неизбежности войны с Германией. В этом случае оно использует литовский и чехословацкий коридоры в качестве плацдарма против Германии. Этот документ ссылается и на высказывание Ворошилова о том, что Советский Союз в случае войны защитит себя таким образом, что разобьет противника на его же территорию. Это свидетельствует о намерении советского генерального штаба вести наступательные операции вне границ Советского Союза. См: MAJOROS (2003): 3007.

¹⁹ См. В.В. МАРЬИНА: *Славянская идея в годы Второй мировой войны*. (К вопросу о политической функции). IN: *Славянский вопрос*. Вехи истории. Институт славяноведения и балканистики РАН. Ред. Е.П. Аксенова, А.Н. Горяинов, М.Ю. Досталь., Москва 1997. (в дальнейшем: АКСЕНОВА, ДОСТАЛЬ, ГОРЯИНОВ.1997), 172. (Полное исследование там же, 169-181).

правда, уцелела, но только ценой строгого подчинения немцам, а Чехия, сначала в качестве самостоятельного государства, а потом как протекторат, стала экономическим придатком Германии.

Большевики, заключая 23 августа 1939 г. пакт Молотова – Риббентропа, имели в виду прежде всего государственные интересы Советского Союза и даже думать забыли о самостоятельности западных славянских государств.

В московской партийной печати советско-немецкое соглашение было преподнесено так: *«немецкий и советский народы больше всех пострадали от Версальского мирного договора»* и из этого логически следовало, что они *«объединились против англо-французского империализма»*.

Более того, вскоре свершилось то, что во время подписания договора мало кто мог предвидеть: в сентябре 1939 г. общее немецко-советское нападение на Польшу стерло ее с карты Европы. Советская сторона объясняла эту совместную акцию тем, что она следовала этническому принципу, ведь в восточной Польше между двумя мировыми войнами жило огромное число белоруссов и украинцев. Но Советский Союз в период с 1939 г. по сентябрь 1940 г. захватил кроме этих славянских территорий еще восточную часть Финляндии, потом оккупировал Литву, Латвию и Эстонию. Без сомнения, эта судьба могла постигнуть и всю Финляндию, не окажи финны столь ожесточенное сопротивление Красной Армии между ноябрем 1939 г. и 13-ым марта 1940 г. При этом десятки, а возможно, и сотни тысяч советских солдат²⁰ погибли в финских озерах, лесах и болотах.²¹

В случае с этими территориями, а также с присоединенными Буковиной и Бессарабией уже нельзя было серьезно ссылаться на этнический принцип. Многие русские думали, что Советскому Союзу необходимо было сделать эти шаги в интересах безопасности и экономики. Но стоит задуматься и над тем фактом, что между 1939 и 1940 гг. Кремль проявлял доброжелательный нейтралитет по отношению к странам оси.

После оккупации Нидерландов, Франции и Скандинавии²² осенью 1940 г. стало ясно: от договора о ненападении Гитлер выиграл больше, чем

²⁰ *«Потери финнов зимой в войне составляли приблизительно 23 000 человек убитыми и 44 000 ранеными. Число погибших советских солдат по приблизительной оценке колеблется между 50 000 и 200 000».* *Finnország története.* HALMESVIRTA, Anssi (szerk), Debrecen 2002, 278. По воспоминаниям маршала Маннергейма, руководившего финской армией в зимней войне 1939/1940 гг., потери финнов составляли: убитыми 24 923 человека и 43 557 человек было ранено. СССР же, по приблизительным оценкам, потерял убитыми от 50 000 до 200 000 человек. MANNERHEIM, G.: *A Téli háború (1939-1940)*, Püski, Budapest 1997. 80-81.

²¹ Советское руководство уже основало Карело-Финскую Советскую Республику в надежде на то, что финны присоединятся к ней. Финнский коммунист-ветеран О. Куусинен даже создал правительство. Из-за нападения на Финляндию Советский Союз был исключён из Лиги Наций. NIEDERHAUSER (2001): 255-256.

²² LENGYEL (1991): 139.

Сталин.²³ Чтобы восстановить равновесие, Москва в первые месяцы 1941 г. пробовала укрепить позиции на Балканах, но болгарский властитель – царь Борис, ужаснувшись советизации прибалтийских стран 1940 г., принял решение в пользу Германии. Для немцев Болгария стала «важной» из-за появления в Греции англичан, ведь из Болгарии можно было легче всего начать войну с Британией.²⁴ Однако немецкое вторжение 22 июня 1941 г. в один день изменило «дружеское» отношение к Германии.²⁵

Парадоксально, но факт, что в войне против Советского Союза значительная часть «славянского мира восточной Европы» оказалась в одном стане с немцами. Болгары, словаки, хорваты дружно маршировали под сенью свастики, что раньше не привлекало внимания, ведь все, в том числе и Советский Союз были союзниками III-го рейха. Данное положение вызвало усиление русского направлена в московском руководстве.²⁶

Войну с Германией, начиная с августа 1941 г., стали организовывать не исключительно в духе «пролетарского интернационализма», т.е. «русско-советского государственного национализма», но уже в духе идей славянства, точнее «панславизма».

Панславизм в советской внешней политике

В годы войны советское руководство предприняло любопытную попытку интегрировать традиционный панславизм, разграничив новый «демократический» его вариант и старый, «реакционный».²⁷

²³ DAVIES, Norman: *Európa története*, 2. Kiadás, Osiris Kiadó-2000, Budapest 2002. (DAVIES), 948.

²⁴ Немцы появились в Болгарии для того, чтобы «преградить путь» британскому влиянию в Греции. 28 февраля 1941 г. немецкий посол в Москве Шуленбург посетил народного комиссара иностранных дел Молотова и сообщил ему, что на следующий день немцы войдут в Болгарию, на что Молотов днем позже отреагировал так, что «немецкое правительство открыто пренебрегло советскими интересами.» См.: CZETLER, Antal: *A II. világháború rejtett erővonalai*, Kairosz Kiadó, Budapest 2006. (См.: CZETLER 206), 110-111.

²⁵ Немцы в первые два месяца войны уничтожили в 3 раза больше советских танков, чем у них самих было в начале наступления 22 июня 1941 г. Несмотря на то, что к концу года они уничтожили более чем 20 000 советских самолетов, с середины 1942 г. воздушное превосходство снова было у русских, что доказывало «подавляющее превосходство советской военной промышленности». CZETLER (2006): 124-125.

²⁶ В это время у мусульманских наций Советского Союза азбуки на базе латиницы, введенные на начальном этапе ленинизма, были заменены на кириллицу. Немцы, поселенные в низовьях Волги в XVIII в., которые первыми на территории Российской Федерации получили политический статус автономии, в одно мгновение потеряли ее. Сталин, минуя всякие формальности, уже в следующие за немецким нападением дни принял решение о ликвидации не только их автономии, но и о их рассеянии по всему Советскому Союзу. В низовьях Волги началась жестокая русификация, которая не пощадила и названия населенных пунктов. Не помешало и то, что некоторые населенные пункты носил фамилию Маркса и Энгельса. KOHN (1960): 291.

²⁷ В цитированной статье Марьиной приведена записка Жданова Молотову,

Как войну 1812 г. против Наполеона, так и эту войну с Германией окрестили Отечественной.²⁸

В сталинском руководстве в ходе войны все сильнее становилось убеждение, что единственный народ, на который можно положиться – это русский.²⁹ Имперские амбиции этого народа были удовлетворены больше всего территориями, присоединенными с согласия немцев в 1939-1941 годы. Под знаком этой политики в 1943-44 годы Сталин и его сообщники стерли с карты четыре мусульманские советские автономные административные единицы.³⁰

Не прошло еще и двух месяцев с начала немецкой агрессии, как 10-го августа 1941-го года под председательством генерала Гундорова состоялась всеславянская встреча, а в начале октября 1941 г. в Москве был организован общеславянский комитет.³¹ Хотя в его составе не фигурировали «официальные» советские политики, его все же характеризовало то, что в нем участвовали такие представители элиты советской интеллигенции, как писатели Николай Тихонов, Александр Фадеев и Алексей Толстой, композитор Дмитрий Шостакович. Эту организацию отличало от московского славянского комитета в основном

подготовленная В.П. Золотовым, по которой можно судить об официальной позиции советов. Эта записка от 29 июня отвергает традиционный панславизм как Бакунина, так и Константина Аксакова. См.: АКСЕНОВА – ДОСТАЛЬ – ГОРЯИНОВ (1997): 171.

²⁸ 8 ноября 1941 г. Сталин воодушевлял солдат Красной Армии примером « наших великих предков – Александра Невского, Дмитрия Донского, Кузьмы Минина, Дмитрия Пожарского, Александра Суворова и Михаила Кутузова». «*Интернациональной и революционной*» Красной Армии поставили в пример святых православной церкви наряду с русскими генералами, служивших «*царской реакции*». В годы войны прославление «*родины-матери*» полностью вытеснило лозунг «*за советскую родину*». Чувством национальной гордости нерусских пренебрегали. Графа Александра Суворова (1729–1800), который при Екатерине Великой с исключительной жестокостью расправился с крестьянским восстанием под руководством Пугачева, а потом в 1795 г. с поляками, из-за его удачных европейских походов против Наполеона, начиная с 1941 г. сделали одним из самых важных героев советской коммунистической молодежи. Даже Алексей Брусилов, назначенный начальником генштаба в мае 1917 г., попал в список героев, хотя в свое время большевики сделали все для того, чтобы его провалить. КОHN (1960): 293.

²⁹ В связи с этим чаще всего приводят тост Сталина в его речи 24 мая 1945 г., в котором он восхваляет «*великую русскую нацию*», сыгравшую важнейшую роль в достижении победы над немецкими фашистами». Речь прозвучала на банкете командного состава Красной Армии в Кремле. КОHN (1960): 297.

³⁰ Были ликвидированы Калмыцкая АССР, Крымская Татарская АССР, а также Чечено-Ингушская и Карачаевская АО на Северном Кавказе. Их население было депортировано в совершенно незнакомые для них края Средней Азии. Населенные пункты их родины были почти полностью переименованы и заселены русскими и другими нациями. В связи с этим никакого объяснения советское руководство не дало. «*Основанием ссылки была коллективная ответственность, точнее «коллективная вина»*. КОHN (1960): 296.

³¹ Марьина о создании общеславянского комитета: АКСЕНОВА-ДОСТАЛЬ-ГОРЯИНОВ (1997): 173.

то, что в ней присутствовали и поляки. Их представляла Ванда Василевская, жена украинского писателя-коммуниста Александра Корнейчука. Со стороны чехов участвовали профессор Пражского университета Зденек Неудлы и Ян Шверма. Алексей Толстой в своей вступительной речи осудил старый реакционный панславизм и, подчеркивая необходимость мирного, свободного развития, объявил мобилизацию объединенных сил славянства на борьбу с фашистами.

Намного лучше был подготовлен второй конгресс комитета 4-5 апреля 1942 г. Несколько лет назад национал-патриотизм Шостаковича и Алексея Толстого³² нельзя было и представить в Советском Союзе.

После немецкого нападения политика Коминтерна видоизменилась в том плане, что эта организация вернулась к линии, принятой на VII конгрессе в 1935-ом году, то есть к антифашистской политике Народного фронта. Но 10 июня 1943 г. Коминтерн был распущен, что имело и символическое значение, ведь с этого момента Советский Союз признал на международном уровне первенство национального принципа в политике.³³

(Пан)славистская пропаганда была распространена на граждан славянского происхождения, эмигрировавших в Великобританию, Канаду, Латинскую Америку и США. На детройтском Американском Славянском конгрессе 25-26 апреля 1942 г. попытались уговорить 10 миллионов американцев славянского происхождения поддержать борьбу против Гитлера, а также политику Советского Союза.³⁴

Тот самый Сталин, который во время русско-японской войны 1904-1905 гг. (*«этой позорной империалистической войны»*) в одной из своих брошюр высказал желание, чтобы *«эта война была еще большим ударом для царизма, чем крымская»*,³⁵ нарушив заключенный в 1941-ом г.

³² Шостакович задал основной тон конгресса следующим образом : *«Я горжусь тем, что я русский, славянин. Славная, благородная семья славянских народов смело осуществит миссию, порученную ей историей!»* Алексей Толстой в *«Правде»* писал о славофильском взгляде на историю так: *«Мы должны пересмотреть историю славянских наций. В течение тысячелетия наша молодая славянская кровь освежала Византию. Благодаря славянам Византии удалось сохранить свою исконную цивилизацию и передать ее феодальной Европе. Старательных, свободолюбивых, мирных и культурных славян с востока хотели завоевать империи кочевников, желающих покорить весь мир, а с запада старались их поработить императоры средневековья. Их потуги оказались тщетными. Эти восточные агрессоры наткнулись на смелое сопротивление славянского мира. Роль славянских наций в создании европейского гуманизма по сей день не оценена по заслугам»*. То, чего не удалось добиться ни одному славянскому конгрессу, благодаря официальной поддержке, теперь осуществилось. С января 1943 г. стал выходить ежемесячник *«Славяне»*. КОHN (1960): 300-301.

³³ Internacionálé 1971, 471-473.

³⁴ На конгрессе славянских наций 25 мая 1944 г. под председательством Р.В. Сетон-Ватсона в основном принимали участие славяне, находящиеся во временной эмиграции в Англии. КОHN (1960): 301.

³⁵ *«Ведь крымская война покончила с крепостничеством. На этот раз, посредством войны мы похоронили детище крепостничества – царский режим вместе с ее тайной»*

договор о дружбе с Японией, в 1945 г. напал на страну восходящего солнца. После быстрой победы 2-го сентября 1945 г. Сталин в своей речи по радио высказался следующим образом: *«Поражение русских войск в русско-японской войне в 1904-ом г. оставило глубокий след в памяти нашего народа. Черное пятно позора осталось на нашей родине. Народ наш все-таки верил... и пришел день, когда это пятно удалось смыть»*.³⁶

Победы Красной Армии в 1944 – 1945 годах совершенно изменили положение в мире. Хотя Советский Союз вначале вступил в войну не за освобождение братьев-славян, Красную Армию, появившуюся в Средней Европе многие из славян встречали как свою освободительницу. К ним относился югославский *«крал Петар»*, который 11 января 1945 г. заявил: *«Братский союз с Россией – одно из самых глубоких чаяний славянских народов»*.

Болгарский историк Христо Гандев в 1945-ом г. писал об этом следующим образом: *«Сто пятьдесят лет славянская мысль служила интересам двух паразитирующих классов; служила частным интересам помещиков и буржуазии. Эту идею использоали для эксплуатации самих славянских наций. Сегодня, впервые за 1300 лет, славянство переживает особый момент, который навеки будет способен гарантировать его безопасность»*.

Немецкой опасности больше не существует. Свергнуты правительства, которые разжигали распри между славянскими народами... Славянские нации в интересах панславистского сотрудничества должны выработать такую политическую систему, которая обеспечит полное равноправие малых и больших наций. Это славянское содружество должен организовать и вести Советский Союз».³⁷

Если с 1939 по 1941 гг. советское руководство только укрощало, демократизировало панславизм, то с августа 1941-го г. укрепило его в организационном плане и постаралось использовать в своей международной политике. Московские политики, организуя

полицией и жандармерией». Цит. и брошюры Сталина 1905 г. KOHN (1960): 298.

³⁶ Речь Сталина 2 сентября 1945 г. цитирует Kohn 1960, 297; также и SZILÁGYI Ákos: *A negyedik Oroszország. Az orosz nacionalizmus családfája*, Szabad Tér Kiadó. (Четвертая Россия. Родословная русского национализма. (В дальнейшем: SZILÁGYI 1989, 118. По нему дата выступления Сталина с речью 3 сентября).

³⁷ *«Для славян открылась возможность построить свое общество. Какова должна быть их программа? Славяне составляют общность по расовому, языковому и культурному признаку. Это такой геополитический и экономический блок, который является решающим фактором в сохранении мира в Европе. В интересах своего освобождения из-под гнета немецкого капитализма славянские нации должны создать технически развитую национальную экономику, способную обеспечить их независимость. Их внутренняя структура должна быть демократической, свободной и социально справедливой»*. Цитирует: KOHN (1960): 303.

восточноевропейскую «санитарную зону», целью которой были гарантии безопасности Советского Союза, собирались опираться на эти славянские страны. Между 1939 и 1941 годами эта зона скорее мыслилась как защита от империалистов, главным образом британских, а позднее, после 1941-го г., она должна была служить борьбе против немцев, служить интересам советской внешней политики так, чтобы это не противоречило коммунистической идеологии.

Летом 1942 г. было решено полностью восстановить государственность Чехословакии³⁸ после второй мировой войны. После этого из средневропейских стран стали считаться самыми важными Болгария и Чехословакия, только за ними следовали славянские нации Балкан. Польша была, конечно, важнее двух вышеназванных, но в то же время для советского руководства было ясно, что здесь у них нет шансов на серьезный успех.³⁹

После встречи Сталина и Черчилля в октябре 1944 г. комиссия Литвинова, работавшая в системе Народного комиссариата иностранных дел над планом территориального переустройства после войны, сочла, что ближайшими соседями Советского Союза «в лучшем случае» будут: Финляндия, Швеция, Польша, Венгрия, Чехословакия, Румыния, славянские страны Балканского полуострова и Турция. Эту систему предполагалось оформить двусторонними договорами.⁴⁰

28 марта 1945 г. на обеде в честь президента Э. Бенеша Сталин назвал старых славянофилов «реакционерами за то, что они выступали за объединение всех славянских народов в одном государстве под эгидой русского народа».

«Новые славянофилы» же, к которым Сталин причислял и самого себя, «стоят за союз независимых славянских государств».⁴¹

³⁸ Чехословацкий президент Бенеш в эмиграции в 1942 г. несколько раз предлагал СССР Подкарпатскую Русь, а также проявил готовность принять идею Чехословацко-Польской унии. ZSELICZKY Béla: *Kárpátalja a cseh és a szovjet politika érdekében 1920-1945*, Politikatörténeti Füzetek 10. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. (в дальнейшем: ZSELICZKY 1998), 66-67.

³⁹ В 1942 г. возникла мысль об общем польско-чехословацком государстве. А далее и план создания болгаро-югославской унии, но в основном советские лидеры были сторонниками «независимости». По запискам Корнейчука, присутствовавшего на встрече с чехословацким президентом Бенешем, относительно много можно узнать о новой (декабрь, 1943) славянской политике. См. статью МАРЬИНОЙ. АКСЕНОВА – ДОСТАЛЬ – ГОРЯИНОВ (1997): 175.

⁴⁰ Осуществление болгаро-югославской федерации сначала затормозилось на обсуждении структуры устройства федерации, а потом и англичане запротестовали против нее. Сталин исходно соглашался с этим планом, но отсрочил осуществление его. АКСЕНОВА – ДОСТАЛЬ – ГОРЯИНОВ (1997): 178-197.

⁴¹ Сталин с уважением говорил о немцах, которые, по его мнению, через 15 лет попытаются взять реванш. Чтобы для этого у них не было возможности, чтобы они не смогли начать новую войну, необходим союз славянских наций. «Мы, новые

В конце II-ой мировой войны уже не было сомнения в том, что после ликвидации Вермахта на европейском континенте не останется сухопутных военных сил, способных противостоять Красной Армии.

В Венгрии известен всего один «план», подытоживший внешнеполитические представления Советского Союза об устройстве послевоенной Европы. Его составитель – Иван Майский, бывший советский посол в Лондоне, в 1944 г. заместитель народного комиссара иностранных дел. 11 января 1944 г. он изложил свои мысли в памятной записке народному комиссару иностранных дел Молотову. Документ носил гриф «строго секретно».⁴²

В соответствии с положениями меморандума в послевоенной Европе должна было остаться только одна великая сухопутная держава – Советский Союз и одно сильное морское государство – Англия. Польшу предполагалось восстановить как самостоятельное и жизнеспособное государство, но, по возможности, в минимальных границах. Чехословакию следовало укрепить – территориально, политически и экономически. Это государство должно было стать передовым постом советского влияния в средней и юго-восточной Европе.⁴³

Еще не закончилась осада Будапешта советскими войсками, когда Уинстон Черчилль, Франклин Делано Рузвельт и Иосиф Сталин

славофилы, коммунисты, большевики, если хотите. О нас думают, что мы хотим ввести повсюду советскую систему. Это неправда...Мы хотим, чтобы у всех народов была такая система, какую он заслуживает. Мы не собираемся вводить советскую систему в Чехословакию»- говорил Сталин. Цит.: АКСЕНОВА – ДОСТАЛЬ – ГОРЯИНОВ (1997): 180.

⁴² Впервые опубликован в 3-4 номере журнала „Külpolitika” (Внешняя политика) за 1996 г. Публикацию подготовила и вводную статью написала Магдолна Барат (Baráth Magdolna). В плане И.М. Майского от 11 января, 1944 г. пишется, что Советский Союз и Чехословакия должны иметь общую границу. С одной стороны между Советским Союзом, с другой стороны между Финляндией и Румынией нужно заключить договоры об оказании взаимной помощи, на территории названных государств СССР должен получить военные, воздушные и морские базы. Германию после войны хотя бы на 10 лет нужно оккупировать союзникам, ее надо раздробить на несколько мелких независимых государств. NÉMETH István: *Európa 1945-2000. A megosztástól az egységig*. Aula Kiadó. 2004 (От раздробления к единству. В дальнейшем: NÉMETH 2004), 46.

⁴³ Венгрию, в связи с Трансильванией территориально надо уменьшить с учетом этнографического принципа. Ее надо обложить контрибуцией и в первые годы после войны держать в международной изоляции. Все возможное надо использовать для ослабления Турции в исполнении ею роли «стража проливов». Майский считал также, что было бы хорошо, если СССР получил бы от Японии без войны Южный Сахалин и Курильские острова. В то же время он был уверен в том, что после войны 5-10 лет Советскому Союзу нужна будет помощь Англии и США. Немного дополнив меморандум, можно прийти к выводу, что план Майского на послевоенный период определил 4 приоритета. Во-первых, обеспечение безопасности СССР на 30-50 лет мирного времени. Во-вторых – расширение границ страны. В-третьих – сохранение антифашистской коалиции. В-четвертых - демократическое изменение внутреннего строя государств, оккупированных Красной Армией. NÉMETH (2004): 43-45.

встретились в курортном городе Ялте, на Крымском полуострове (4-12 февраля 1945 г.). Здесь они приняли декларацию об «освобожденной Европе». Они согласились в том, что на территории Восточной Европы надо провести «демократические выборы», а лиц, ответственных за войну, привлечь к суду.

Союзникам удалось также договориться о так называемых «оккупационных зонах», о том, кто какие территории займет в Германии, а также о том, что до подписания мирного договора Берлин будет оккупирован четырьмя государствами.⁴⁴ Это означало, что речь шла о временных мерах, т.е. о сроке, пока с Германией не будет заключен мирный договор. Но заключение мирного договора с Германией откладывалось, и таким образом положение, которое по ялтинским договоренностям считалось временным, превратилось в долговременное.⁴⁵

Через полгода после Ялты «великие» уже вели переговоры в резиденции прусских королей в Потсдаме.⁴⁶ Здесь в июле 1945 г. польскому и чехословацкому правительству удалось получить международное одобрение выселения с территории их стран немецкого населения.⁴⁷ Выселение неславянского населения было реакцией на нацистскую идеологию расовой исключительности. Как таковое, оно не было «классической» большевистской идеей, а скорее было сродни славянскому антигерманскому национализму, который тогда принял панславистские черты. Если говорить о «малых союзниках», то чехословацкое правительство хотело бы выселить не только немцев, но

⁴⁴ DIÓSZEGI ISTVÁN: *XX. századi egyetemes történet* (Общая история XX в.) 1997/1. IN: DIÓSZEGI István - HARSÁNYI Iván - KRAUSZ Tamás - NÉMETH István (szerk): *XX. századi egyetemes történet*, I. kötet, 2. kiadás, Korona Kiadó, Budapest 1997. (В дальнейшем: DIÓSZEGI 1997/I): 524-525.

⁴⁵ В Ялте говорили о новых, «сдвинутых на запад» польских границах, но о других европейских границах здесь еще не было речи. Однако положение с Азией было другим. В Ялте же тайный протокол уполномочил СССР на то, что он может занять так называемые Курильские острова, если нападет на Японию. DAVIES (2002): 981, также BÜKY Barna: *Visszapillantás a hidegháborúra*, Balassi Kiadó, Budapest 2001. (в дальнейшем: BÜKY 2001), 38.

⁴⁶ Потсдамская конференция проходила с 17 июля по 2 августа 1945 г. Оценку ее итогов см.: DIÓSZEGI (1997/I): 525.

⁴⁷ Считается спорным вопрос о том, насколько великие державы, в том числе и советское правительство, согласились тогда с принципом «коллективной ответственности» и «коллективной вины». Из Чехословакии и Польши выселили более 8 млн. немцев. Шандор Балог в своей книге, в главе «Депортация населения немецкой национальности», подводит краткий и точный итог этой темы. В частности, он подчеркивает: «нельзя доказать, что в немецком вопросе союзнические великие державы в Потсдаме однозначно согласились с принципом коллективной ответственности, но однозначно утверждать и противоположное». BALOGH Sándor: *A népi demokratikus Magyarország külpolitikája 1945-1947. A fegyverszünetől a békeszerződésig*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1982. (в дальнейшем: BALOGH 1982), 77-78. В ссылках автор приводит собранный им материалы о позиции союзников по этому вопросу. BALOGH (1982): 302-303.

и венгров. Оно старалось получить на это согласие великих держав.⁴⁸ Но пражскому руководству на потсдамской конференции удалось получить согласие на депортацию только немцев, по отношению же к венграм это не удалось даже несмотря на то, что на основе высказываний некоторых ведущих советских политиков чехи на это могли надеяться.⁴⁹

Советскую политику подталкивала к этому не только панславистская логика, но и просто великодержавный интерес. Следуя правилам сделок властимущих девятнадцатого столетия, советское руководство пошло на «компенсацию» Польше потерянных восточных территорий за счет значительных немецких земель, т.к. тем самым оно убивало одним выстрелом сразу двух зайцев: с одной стороны, «продвигало» Польшу на запад, чем уменьшило враждебность польских националистов к русским. С другой стороны, этим шагом оно подпитывало враждебность между поляками и немцами, чем значительно уменьшило возможность их примирения, т.е. вероятность польско-немецкого объединения против Советского Союза.

С точки зрения политики безопасности Советского Союза Чехословакия казалась отличным «выдвинутым вперед клином», и выселение судетских немцев Сталин и его окружение считали таким же полезным шагом для обеспечения постоянной враждебности между чехами, словаками и немцами, как депортацию поляками силезских и померанских немцев.

За самой организацией ООН скрывалось идеалистические американские представления о том, что после окончания II-ой мировой войны будет возможно руководить миром, исходя из единых демократических принципов, уважая право наций на самоопределение, с учетом свободы личности.

Для американского президента Трумана, занявшего место умершего в апреле 1945 г. Рузвельта, этот оптимизм не был столь характерен, однако западному общественному мнению все же нужно было время для того, чтобы увидеть истинное лицо сталинского режима. Тем более, что Сталин

⁴⁸ Наряду со многими другими источниками стоит привести из «Правды» за 12 мая 1945 г. слова президента республики Бенеша: «После наказания всех виновных большинству немцев и венгров нужно уйти из этого государства». Цит.: FÜLÖP Mihály: *A befejezetlen béke. A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947)*. Héttorony Kiadó, Budapest, é.n. 1994. (в дальнейшем: FÜLÖP 1994), 33.

⁴⁹ Советское правительство считает – пишет народный комиссар иностранных дел Молотов, - что за ту вооруженную помощь, которую Венгрия оказала Германии, а также за убийства и агрессивные действия, грабеж и безобразия, совершенные на оккупированных территориях, ответственность нести должно не только венгерское правительство, но в большей или меньшей степени и венгерский народ – выдержка из письма Молотова от 7-го июня 1943-го г. британскому послу в Москве С. Керр. BALOGH (1982): 303-304.

и его коллеги следили за тем, чтобы непосредственно не затрагивать интересы западноевропейских стран, а также США.⁵⁰

В период после 1945-го г. советских лидеров в основном интересовали материальные ценности, которые можно было получить в виде контрибуции, и несомненно, что после войны, которая для страны была сопряжена с огромными жертвами, в них не было сочувствия к проблемам населения оккупированных стран.⁵¹

У американцев же к июлю 1946 г. рузвельтовскую «концепцию единого мира» заметно вытеснила «теория двух миров», иначе говоря стратегия атлантизма: Вашингтон стал все больше интересоваться не всей Европой, а только западной ее частью.

Сталинское же руководство интересовало, кроме Германии, и так называемая «промежуточная Европа» – т.е. страны между Германией и СССР – территория, которую после 1945 г. называли Центрально-Восточной, или Восточной, Европой.

В 1945 г. советские войска стояли в Кенигсберге, Будапеште, Вене, Берлине. В 1946 г. СССР контролировал всю Восточную Европу. В соответствии с классическими (пан)славистскими представлениями к этой территории принадлежали и не славяне – венгры, албанцы и румыны. Несмотря на то, что границы, установленные после II-ой мировой войны, в основном соответствовали считавшимся классическими представлениям панславистов, надо признать, что на самом деле ни русские панслависты, ни советские руководители не думали, что Кенигсберг под названием Калининград будет частью России, как не рассчитывали и на то, что восточная часть Германии будет относиться к сфере интересов СССР.

Советский Союз после 1945 г. сохранил за собой все гарантированные ему в пакте Молотова-Риббентропа приобретения, и в июне 1945 г., согласно договору с Чехословакией,⁵² «как исконно украинскую землю»⁵³ присоединил к себе Прикарпатье —

⁵⁰ Советская угроза разворачивалась постепенно. В общем ее нельзя характеризовать открытой жестокостью нацистов и она не была направлена непосредственно ни против США, ни против Западной Европы. ВÜKY (2001): 47.

⁵¹ В Ялте Сталин требовал контрибуцию в 20 млрд. долларов от Германии, на половину которой он предъявил претензию. Британский министр иностранных дел Эден сделал замечание, что его страна не хочет попасть в такое положение, чтобы «она должна была из-за требований контрибуции финансировать и обеспечивать продуктами Германию».... В действительности в конце 1945 г. наступило еще худшее: в то время как англичане и американцы привозили в западную часть Германии продукты питания и энергоносители, советские власти еще в большем темпе вывозили все через восточные границы страны....

⁵² Конкретно о том, что произошло за кулисами – см. ZSELICZKY (1998): 127-151.

⁵³ Карпатская Украина (по чехословацкой конституции: Подкарпатская Русь) в соответствии с желанием населения и дружеской договоренностью высоких сторон, воссоединяется со своей исконной родиной – Украиной и поэтому станет частью УССР.

Подкарпатскую Русь.⁵⁴ В Южной Добрудже между Болгарией и Румынией осталась в силе граница, установленная договором, заключенным в 1940 г. в Крайове.⁵⁵ В этом, кроме славянской симпатии, сыграло, наверное, роль и то, что болгары во II-ой мировой войне не вевали против Советов, в отличие от румын.

Для Советского Союза в «*восточноевропейском регионе*», наряду с Польшей, Югославией, Румынией⁵⁶ и Болгарией, «*по-настоящему важна*» была Чехословакия. Это было связано отчасти с немецкой проблематикой, отчасти – с геополитическими соображениями. Наряду с этим, советское руководство намеренно искало факторы, приводившие к возникновению напряжения между странами, чтобы они были вынуждены были обращаться со своими обидами непосредственно к Москве, и из-за этого их зависимость от Москвы становилась бы все сильнее.⁵⁷

Сталин и его окружение уделяли особое внимание не только славянским государствам, но и (пан)славистскому движению.

Договор между Союзом Советских Социалистических Республик и Чехословацкой Республикой о Закарпатской Украине (29 июня 1945 г. См.: НЕМЕТН (2004): 49. Полный текст договора: там же, 49-51.)

⁵⁴ О территориальных изменениях 29 июня 1945 г. и об отношении к ним венгерской дипломатии и общественного мнения хороший материал можно найти у Михая Фюлепа. FÜLÖP (1994): 37-38.

⁵⁵ Переданную в 1913 г. Румынии Южную Добруджу по договору 1940 г., заключенному в Крайове, присоединили к Болгарии, и по парижскому мирному договору она осталась за Болгарией и донныне является ее частью. Граница 1940 г. между двумя потерпевшими поражение странами (Болгарией и Румынией) остались неизменной.

⁵⁶ Перенастройку внутривнутриполитической жизни в Румынии осуществил лично, как уполномоченный Сталина, Вышинский, который в это время являлся заместителем министра иностранных дел. Он появлялся в Бухаресте в самые критические моменты. Его строго секретные записи о переговорах были опубликованы в России в 1998 г.: *Три визита А.Я. Вышинского в Бухарест (1944-46 гг.). Документы российских архивов.* Т.В. ЦАРЕВСКАЯ, Д.А. ЕРМАКОВА, Т.П. МУРАШКО, А.Ф. НОСКОВА, А.Ф. ПОКИВАЙЛОВА, Т.В. ВОЛОКТИНА, (ред.), «РОСПЭН», Москва, 1998.

⁵⁷ Сталин с этой целью в румынско-венгерском отношении использовал проблему Трансильвании, т.е. румынско-венгерский территориальный спор. Однако достаточно ли этого объяснения для того, чтобы понять, почему Венгрия не смогла сохранить за собой или получить обратно после II-ой мировой войны по парижскому миру если и не 22 000 кв. км., то хотя бы 11000 кв. км. от Румынии? Ведь в таком случае при желании Сталина напряжение между Румынией и Венгрией можно было бы нагнетать с еще большим успехом. FÜLÖP Mihály-VINCZE Gábor: *Vasfüggöny keleten. Iratok a magyar-román kapcsolatokról (1948-1955).* Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, Debrecen 2007, 14 («Железный занавес» на востоке. Документы о венгеро-румынских связях, 1948-1955). Вводная статья знакомит нас не только с результатами новых исследований по теме, но и с материалами переговоров венгерского и румынского партийного руководства, обстоятельствами организации в Румынии Венгерской Автономной Области с учетом новейших российских, румынских и венгерских исследований. Там же: 7-48.

8 декабря 1946 г. продолжавшийся 8 дней всеславянский конгресс⁵⁸ начался в Белграде,⁵⁹ т. к. в «Восточной Европе» после победы над Гитлером Югославия считалась второй самого высокого ранга страной.

Впервые в истории панславизма такое мероприятие состоялось не по частной инициативе, а при поддержке государства. Также впервые оно имело мировой размах: приехали славянские делегаты из США, Канады, Южной Америки, Австралии и Новой Зеландии. Славянские делегаты представляли свои народы по принадлежности к государствам, такой была советская делегация, в которой, кроме русских, были белоруссы и украинцы; югославская делегация включала сербов, хорватов, словенцев и македонцев; чехословацкая – чешских и словацких представителей, присутствовали также делегаты Польши и Болгарии.

Собравшиеся с восторгом встретили маршала Федора Толбухина, «освободителя» Румынии, Болгарии, Белграда и Вены, и долго аплодировали Тито, державшему вступительную речь, в которой он оценил заслуги Сталина.⁶⁰ За Тито следовал Милован Джилас, потом выступил профессор Московского университета академик Борис Греков.⁶¹

Таким образом, (пан)славистское движение Москва постаралась использовать и в международной политике. Но в течение 1948 г. относительно Югославии выяснилось, что хотя Сталин и его окружение рассчитывали на неё как на самую надежную опору, они просчитались: на югославских товарищей «ставку делать было нельзя».

В феврале 1946 г. Сталин выступил с речью о силе Красной Армии и о более прогрессивном характере советского общественного строя по сравнению с капитализмом. Эту речь на западе оценили как объявление

⁵⁸ На повестке дня панславистского конгресса в декабре 1946 г. было 3 пункта: 1. Роль славянских наций в мировой борьбе за демократию и мир. 2. Содействие славянских наций мировой культуре. 3. Организационные вопросы сотрудничества славян.

⁵⁹ М.Ю. ДОСТАЛЬ: *Белградский славянский конгресс победителей фашизма (1946). Славянское движение XIX- XX вв.: Съезды, конгрессы, совещания, манифесты, обращения.* Институт славяноведения и балканистики РАН. Ред. Г.А. БОГАТОВА, А.Н. ГОРЯИНОВ, М.Ю. ДОСТАЛЬ, Москва 1998. 226–240.

⁶⁰ Цит.: КОHN (1960): 306.

⁶¹ Джилас анализировал борьбу славян за мир и демократию, а Греков говорил об участии славян в развитии мировой культуры. В конце конгресса избрали комитет, в который вошли 5 человек из пяти стран. Председателем комитета стал югославский генерал-майор Машларич. Одного русского, поляка, чеха и болгарина избрали заместителями председателя. Не Москва, а Белград стал резиденцией комитета. После конгресса, в марте 1947 г., прежний Славянский комитет реорганизовали в Советский Славянский комитет под председательством генерала Гундорова. Его заместителями стали: Александр Вознесенский – ректор ленинградского университета, Александр Палладин – президент Академии Наук УССР и поэт Якуб Колас – заместитель президента Академии Наук БССР. Ежемесячник «Славяне», который до этих пор выпускался как журнал Московского Славянского комитета, начиная с 1947 г. стал выходит как журнал Советского Славянского комитета.

войны капиталистическому миру.⁶² Знаменитая речь Черчилля в Фултоне прозвучала только после речи Сталина – в марте 1946 г.⁶³

Впрочем, Сталин старался точно выполнять договоренности, достигнутые с западными державами. Поэтому он не поддержал гражданскую войну в Греции, начатую коммунистами, избегая конфликта с Великобританией и США.⁶⁴

Вслед за Великобританией поддержать правительственные силы оказались готовыми и США. Мартовскую речь президента США Трумэна 1947 г.⁶⁵ принято считать настоящим началом холодной войны, т.к. именно в ней была сформулирована «доктрина сдерживания». Согласно этой доктрине, США должны были помогать борьбе тех свободных народов, которые оказывали сопротивление попыткам вооруженных меньшинств или внешних сил покорить их.⁶⁶

Но важнее этого было заявление, сделанное в июне 1947 г. госсекретарем США Дж.Маршаллом о программе помощи странам, пострадавшим в войне, для восстановления их экономики.⁶⁷ По его имени эта программа стала носить название «плана Маршалла». Советский Союз и все страны, находившиеся под его влиянием, от программы помощи в конце концов отказались. Помощь обещала экономическую

⁶² В этой речи Сталина 9 февраля 1946 г. говорилось о том, что «прежде всего, что победил наш советский общественный строй». См.: <http://www.oldgazette.ru/lib/stalin2/02.html> Необходимо отметить, что начиная с 1941 г. Сталин не выступал так резко. См.: *Európa kettészakítása és a kétpólusú rend születése (1945-1949)*. MEZEI Géza (ред.), Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, Budapest 2001. (в дальнейшем: MEZEI 2001), 170-171.

⁶³ В ней прозвучали известные слова о «железном занавесе», опустившемся на континент от Щецина на Балтике до Триеста на Адриатике, за которым «не существует никакой подлинной демократии» и «превалируют полицейские правительства» (Полностью речь см.: *Nemzetközi szerződések 1945-1982. A második világháború utáni korszak legfontosabb külpolitikai szerződésai*. HALMOSY Dénes (ред.). Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1985. (в дальнейшем: HALMOSY 1985), 60-69. Выступление состоялось 5 марта 1946 г. При этом надо иметь в виду, что Черчилль уже год находился в отставке, однако присутствие на его выступлении в Фултоне президента США Гарри Трумэна придавало его словам вес. Трумэн в то время еще не проявлял активности, между тем британское министерство иностранных дел весной 1946 г. пришло к выводу, что «восточная часть Германии и Восточная Европа окончательно... оказались под властью России».

⁶⁴ Оценка ситуации дается в работе Барбары Елавич, которая приводит следующие данные: в ходе восстания и гражданской войны в Греции погибло больше людей, чем во время II-ой мировой войне. Распри Тито и Сталина вредили греческим мятежникам: в то время как югославцы и болгары оказывали им помощь, Советский Союз им в этом отказывал. См.: JELAVICH, Barbara: *A Balkán története 2. kötet. XX. század*, Osiris Kiadó - 2000, Budapest, 1996. (в дальнейшем: JELAVICH 1996. 2), 273-276.

⁶⁵ Это прозвучало 12 марта 1947 г. в форме послания конгрессу. Полный текст его можно прочитать в хрестоматии Халмоши: „Truman üzenete a kongresszushoz”. См.: HALMOSY (1985): 120-125.

⁶⁶ См.: DAVIES (2002): 1002; также NÉMETH (2004): 7.

⁶⁷ Речь государственного секретаря Маршалла в Гарвардском университете 5 июня 1947 г. Цит: NÉMETH (2004): 79-80.

консолидацию, но была сопряжена с обязанностью для восточноевропейских стран отчитываться о ее использовании. А это означало «двойную связь (с Советами и Америкой)», что для сталинского руководства было неприемлемо.

В конце сентября 1947 г. Москва создала Информационное бюро коммунистических партий – Коминформ.⁶⁸ Название говорило о том, что речь идет о консультативном коллективном органе, тогда когда на самом деле организация претендовала на руководство всем коммунистическим движением.⁶⁹ Одним из мест издания журнала Коминформа стал Белград, что свидетельствовало о доверии Советского Союза к Югославии. Однако не прошло и года, как положение изменилось.

28 июня 1948 г. Тито был поставлен вне закона,⁷⁰ и после исключения Югославии из Коминформа партии-участницы в своей июльской резолюции призвали югославских коммунистов избавиться от своих руководителей. Тито и его ближайшее окружение действовали без промедления, арестовав всех, кого подозревали в нелояльности. СССР и страны восточноевропейского блока в сентябре 1949 г. аннулировали договоры с Югославией,⁷¹ а потом в ходе пропагандистских кампаний и инсценированных процессов за связи с югославами в лучшем случае клеймили позором, а в худшем приговаривали к смертной казни.⁷²

Кроме этого, причиной оттеснения панславизма на задний план могло быть и то, что использовать его можно было только в Европе и только для

⁶⁸ 22-27 сентября 1947 г. представители коммунистических партий Советского Союза и шести стран европейских народных демократий, а также французской и итальянской коммунистической партии в местечке недалеко от Вроцлава приняли резолюцию, о том, что «в мире сформировались два лагеря: антиимпериалистический демократический и империалистический». Учебник для вузов, изданный в 1986 г. отмечает, что «этим оставили без внимания значение китайской революции и национальные освободительные движения колониальных народов». О Коминформе же в нем пишется, что он не располагал правом принимать решения, постановления, обязательные для всех, более того, формально не имел даже совещательного права. Участники организации не определили и то, каких областей деятельности касается «согласование». BALOGH Sándor - GERGELY Jenő - IZSÁK Lajos - FÖGLEIN Gizella: *Magyarország története 1918-1975*. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest 1986. (в дальнейшем: BALOGH-GERGELY-IZSÁK-FÖGLEIN 1986), 184. Употребляемые названия организации: Информационное бюро коммунистических партий, Информбюро компартий, Коминформ.

⁶⁹ *XX. századi egyetemes történet*, 1. kötet, *Európa*. NÉMETH István (szerk.), Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2006. (в дальнейшем: NÉMETH 2006 I), 406.

⁷⁰ На встрече участников Коминформа в Бухаресте, куда югославы не явились, присутствующие участники исключили Югославию из организации и в связи с этим приняли заявление весьма жесткого тона. JELAVICH (1996): 2, 286.

⁷¹ JELAVICH (1996): 2, 287.

⁷² *Magyar-jugoszláv kapcsolatok, 1956. Az állami és pártkapcsolatok rendezése, az októberi felkelés és a Nagy Imre-csoport sorsa*. Dokumentumok. KISS József - RIPP Zoltán - VIDA István (ред.). MTA Jelenkorkutató Bizottság, Budapest 1995. (в дальнейшем: KISS-RIPP-VIDA 1995, 5-6.)

решения конфликтов между славянскими нациями. Таковыми были споры о принадлежности Тешина между чехами и поляками, Македонии – между сербами и болгарами, да и проблема самостоятельности Украины.

Между тем гражданская война в Греции окончилась в 1949 г. победой правительства, в переносном смысле – победой американцев.⁷³

К 1949 году были организованы классические институты холодной войны, из которых одним из самых эффективных позже оказалось НАТО.

В Европе консервация немецкого вопроса в духе Ялты привело в 1949 г. к расширению «*восточноевропейского блока*» за счет нового неславянского государства – Германской Демократической Республики. Начиная с этого времени, «*глобальной миссии*» Советского Союза все более резко противоречила применяемая в регионе (пан)славистская политика, ведь так же, как у албанцев и венгров, у немцев не было ничего общего со славянами (неславяне румыны из-за своей принадлежности к православию были «*переходным*» явлением, а поляки из-за своей антирусской настроенности уже и раньше не считались членами панславистского лагеря, не говоря о подробно охарактеризированной выше титовской Югославии).

Проще говоря, важность этих стран «*для Советского Союза определяло то, что они составляли с самого начала зону безопасности, обеспечивающую стратегическую оборону для центра социализма*».⁷⁴

Начиная с 1948 г. советско-американское противостояние было ярко выражено и в Корее. Свое влияние Москва хотела распространить не только на европейские, но и на все остальные народы.

В соответствии с этим, место славянского братства все больше стал занимать вдалбливаемый в головы «*советский патриотизм*», в котором трудно было различить русское и советское.

Таким образом, после окончания II-ой мировой войны и в результате холодной войны в Европе возникли наднациональные организации. В это время московское руководство сначала, до 1947 г., вело политику, гарантирующую безопасность страны, а потом перешло к наступательной «*революционной*» политике, но только в пределах зоны оккупации, установленной для него в Ялте. В этом «*самоограничении*», кроме исключительной монополии Америки на атомное оружие до 1949 г., немалую роль играло и то, что Сталин мыслил в основном территориальными категориями XIX в.⁷⁵ Результатом этой установки в

⁷³ Гражданская война в Греции окончилась в сентябре 1949 г. JELAVICH (1996): 2, 276.

⁷⁴ BARÁTH Magdolna - RAINER M. János (ред.): *Gorbacsov tárgyalásai magyar vezetőikkel. Dokumentumok az egykori SZKP és MSZMP archivumaiból 1985-1991, 1956-os Intézet*, Budapest 2000. (BARÁTH-RAINER 2000).

⁷⁵ Ференц Фейтё весьма остроумно отмечает: «*Сталин и иже с ним... прежде всего хотели обменять свою победу на наличные. Они хотели продвинуть вперед свою линию обороны против Германии или любой другой державы западной Европы, которая*

ряде случаев было то, что он получал диаметрально противоположное тому, чего хотел добиться.⁷⁶

Тем, что в августе 1949 г. в западной зоне возникла Федеративная Республика Германии, а после этого в октябре в советской оккупационной зоне – Германская Демократическая Республика, дело объединения немцев, казалось, было окончательно снято с повестки дня.

Претензии советского руководства на всемирное первенство

Сталин считал Югославию ключевой страной восточноевропейского блока по нескольким причинам. Путь через нее к теплым морям был короче, чем через Дарданеллы или Константинополь. Она была придунайским государством, поэтому через нее можно было контролировать движение судов стран средневропейского региона. Она была одной из самых значительных славянских стран в Европе и, после Советского Союза, располагала второй самой сильной коммунистической партией.

В восстановлении ее государственности решающую роль сыграло коммунистическое партизанское движение. Как с панславистской, так и с коммунистической точки зрения отношение с ней касалось престижа Советского Союза. Однако, хотя югославские товарищи считались «лучшими учениками Сталина», с весны до лета 1948 г. между советским и югославским руководством резко обострились противоречия.⁷⁷ На

*унаследует роль Германии как доминирующей силы... Советский Союз, удовлетворившись непосредственными преимуществами, проиграл дружбу крупнейшей державы.... Сталин мыслил «земными» категориями в такой исторический момент, когда местом решающих битв стало небо; заострил внимание на правительствах..., когда решающим фактором стала промышленная мощь». FEJTŐ Ferenc: *A népi demokráciák története* 1-2. Magyar Füzetek, Budapest-Párizs 1991. (В дальнейшем: FEJTŐ 1991, I. 9.)*

⁷⁶ *«Поведение СССР между 1947 и 1950 годами скорее подстегивало, нежели тормозило европейскую интеграцию, происходившую под эгидой и при поддержке Вашингтона. Сталин не очень понимал, насколько его действия в Праге, Берлине, а потом в Корее способствовали формировавшемуся западноевропейскому единству, насколько осложняли проблемы безопасности Москвы». MEZEI (2000): 18.*

⁷⁷ На заднем плане играла роль и принадлежность нескольких территорий. Тито и его товарищи оспаривали правомерность присоединения Триеста к Италии, Южной Каринтии к Австрии и части Македонии к Греции. Кроме того, Тито размышлял о создании балканской федерации, которая вначале состояла бы из Югославии и Болгарии. С присоединением к ней других стран открылась бы действительная возможность для Тито стать общепризнанным руководителем этого союза государств. В конце 1947 г. Тито и Димитров в г. Блед сделали заявление, что они приняли решение о постепенном строительстве союза государств. 28 января 1948 г. в «Правде» появилась статья о том, что упомянутые страны «не нуждаются ни в каком искусственном или ошибочном союзе государств». Вопреки этому 10 февраля 1948 г. в рамках советско-югославо-болгарских переговоров Сталин высказался за то, что все-таки есть нужда в болгаро-югославской федерации, бесспорно рассчитывая на то, что с помощью более покладистых болгар у него

втором бухарестском совещании Коминформа в июне 1948 г. основной темой уже был югославо-советский конфликт. Здесь главный советский идеолог Жданов сообщил: он располагает доказательствами, что «Тито – агент империалистов». После августа 1949 г. Сталин заявил, что югославским правительством «руководит агент-гитлерист-троцкист». 25 октября 1949 г. СССР прервал дипломатические отношения с Югославией.⁷⁸ На совещании Коминформа в ноябре 1949 г. в Венгрии была принята декларация «КПЮ в руках убийц и шпионов».⁷⁹

В 1949 году Советскому Союзу удалось поразить США тем, что вблизи полярного круга была испытана советская атомная бомба. Не меньшее изумление вызвала Москва своими достижениями в области реактивной техники.⁸⁰

С 1949-го г. с приходом к власти Мао Цзедунa Китай усилил «братскую семью социалистических народов».⁸¹ На Дальнем Востоке между 1950 и 1953 годами СССР поддерживал Северную Корею и Китай в корейской войне.⁸² Напряженность советско-югославских отношений в это время, в 1952 г., достигла своего апогея. Все предвещало войну между двумя соцстранами.⁸³

Москва претендовала на единоначалие в руководстве коммунистическим движением во всем мире, а Югославия не была согласна подчиняться в такой же степени, как остальные страны

будет возможность контролировать шаги Белграда. После этого 1 марта 1948 г. уже Югославия отклоняет мысль о федерации с болгарями. DEUTSCHER, Isaach: *Sztálin. Politikai életrajz*. Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1990. 575-576; также ВЕРТ, Н.: *История Советского государства 1900-1991*. Второе исправленное издание. Перевод с французского. (В оригинале: WERTH, Nicolas: *Histoire de L'Union Soviétique. 1900-1991*. Presses Universitaires de France). Прогресс-Академия, Москва, 1994. (В дальнейшем: ВЕРТ 1994), 360-362.

⁷⁸ ВЕРТ (1994): 361.

⁷⁹ NÉMETH (2006 I): 406., также MEZEI (2001): 361-364.

⁸⁰ Первую советскую баллистическую ракету дальнего действия А-4 сконструировали по образцу V-2. Но на вооружение в 1950 г. была принята не она, а ракета дальнего действия Р – 1. На рубеже 40-50 годов шла доработка бомбардировщиков (ИЛ – 28) и истребителей (МИГ – 15) с реактивным двигателем, которые были использованы в Корейской войне. Изобретением 50-х годов был и бомбардировщик дальнего действия с реактивным двигателем, способный доставить ядерную бомбу (ТУ16). «История России в новейшее время» (1955-2001). А. В. БЕЗБОРОДОВ (ред.), Учебник для студентов высших учебных заведений. Олимп, Издательство АСТ, Москва 2001. (в дальнейшем: БЕЗБОРОДОВ 2001), 43-44.

⁸¹ HARENBERG, Bodo: *Az emberiség krónikája*. Officina Nova, Copyright Dortmund, 1984, Budapest 1990. 983. 987.

⁸² См. обобщающую работу о корейской войне Барны Бюки. BÜKY (2001): 79-83.

⁸³ В Министерстве государственной безопасности в это время приступили к подготовке покушения на Тито. Но Сталин в марте 1953 г. умер, и из этого ничего не вышло. См. Сталинский план ликвидации Тито. Его разыскал российский военный историк Дмитрий Волконогов в архиве МГБ. Смотри об этом публикацию MEZEI (2001): 360-361.

«народные демократии». Этот случай казался Сталину опасным, потому что грозил стать прецедентом. Белградское руководство показывало «дурной пример» коммунистическим странам, что задевало претензию Москвы на монополию. В декабре 1948 г. в издании Коминформа появилось рассуждение о том, что «отношение к Советскому Союзу показывает, кто остается верным делу пролетарского интернационализма». Значит, «пролетарский интернационализм» стал тайным синонимом верности СССР.⁸⁴ В этом пролетарском интернационализме, хотя он и был для русских трудно отличим от советского «национального сознания», с этого времени акцент делался уже не на славяно-панславистских признаках.

Никита Сергеевич Хрущев, сменивший Сталина в 1953 г., располагая атомным оружием, а также межконтинентальными баллистическими ракетами, сделал другие выводы из изменившегося международно-положения, чем его предшественник.⁸⁵

Правда, заключенное уже 27 июля 1953 г. перемирие в Корее можно было оценить как отказ от сталинского наследства. Отношения между СССР и Югославией тоже улучшались, хотя и не в той мере, в какой хотели бы этого советские руководители, но в этом играли роль и субъективные факторы.⁸⁶

После присоединения ФРГ к НАТО, заключения с Австрией государственного договора и создания Варшавского договора в 1955 г., важной вехой в советской внешней политике стал XX-ый съезд, начавшийся 25 февраля 1956-го г. Никита Сергеевич Хрущев в свем

⁸⁴ JELAVICH (1996 II): 286-287.

⁸⁵ Положение Хрущева облегчило то, что к 1955 г. Советскому Союзу удалось создать ракету среднего радиуса действия, потом к 1957-му г. межконтинентальную баллистическую ракету, раньше, чем это сделали США. «В 1955 г. СССР был готов к массовому производству баллистических ракет среднего радиуса действия (SS-3). В 1957 г. СССР запустил межконтинентальную баллистическую ракету дальностью действия 8 тыс. километров. В ракете был использован тот же реактивный двигатель, которым вывел на околоземную орбиту первый искусственный спутник, запущенный в октябре 1957 года». «Вашингтон был потрясен... тем, что равновесие качнулось в сторону Советов», - пишет Пол Кеннеди в своей книге. KENNEDY, Paul: *A nagy hatalmak túndöklése és bukása. Gazdasági változások és katonai konfliktusok 1500—2000.* (Блеск и падение великих держав. Изменения в экономике и военные конфликты.) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1992. 365.

⁸⁶ Обе страны восстановили дипломатические отношения на уровне послов летом 1953 г. Но существенных изменений пришлось ждать еще год, ибо Молотов, вновь назначенный министром иностранных дел в 1953 г., был против дальнейшего сближения. Немало времени требовало и то, что впервые после длительного периода советская партия проводила предварительные консультации с заинтересованными в решении проблемы восточными и западноевропейскими коммунистическими партиями. Вслед за этим Хрущев от имени ЦК КПСС 22 июня 1954 г. обратился с письмом к ЦК Союза коммунистов Югославии, предлагая восстановить государственные и партийные связи между двумя странами. KISS-RIPP-VIDA (1995): 5-6.

закрытом докладе⁸⁷ поставил фундаментальный вопрос, который не мог фигурировать в трудах классиков марксизма-ленинизма: можно ли говорить о победе социализма во всемирном масштабе ценой гибели советской цивилизации?⁸⁸ Точка зрения Хрущева в этом была диаметрально противоположна сталинской: военное столкновение с капиталистическим миром не является необходимостью, значит, мировой войны можно избежать.

Провозгласив политику «мирного сосуществования», Хрущев подверг ревизию или, как это было принято говорить, «творчески развил» ленинизм.⁸⁹

Кроме этого «новшества» важным положением речи Хрущева было признание, что «к социализму ведут разные пути». Из этого вытекает, что Хрущев обещал признать различные самостоятельные пути развития социализма, то, что рабочий класс не обязательно может взять власть в свои руки исключительно посредством вооруженного восстания, он может осуществить это и мирным, парламентским путем.⁹⁰

Оставалось, однако, противоречие, ведь и дальше неизменно пропагандировалась «необходимость победы социализма в мировом масштабе».

Что касается Югославии, то тут следовало и в дальнейшем стремиться к нормализации отношений. Югославы ответили на письмо Хрущева от 22 июня 1954 г., в котором наряду с многими другими вопросами, была поднята проблема возобновления межпартийных и государственных связей. В своем ответе подчеркивалась необходимость уважения независимости и суверенитета Югославии, а также соблюдения основных правил международного сосуществования.⁹¹

В январе 1955 г. обе страны, впервые после 5 лет, подписали договор о торговле, потом Хрущев с 26 мая до 2 июня 1955 г. посетил Югославию вместе с Булганиным и в речи в белградском аэропорту принес извинения за «грубые ошибки», допущенные при Сталине в отношении Югославии.

⁸⁷ <http://lib.ru/memuary/hrushew/kult.txt>

⁸⁸ ВУКУ (2001): 104.

⁸⁹ В словаре Ленина категория «мирное сосуществование» отсутствует. С империалистическими державами Ленин мог представить исключительно краткосрочный мир. Вечный мир, по его мнению, возможен только в мире без империалистов, его может обеспечить только союз социалистических республик.

⁹⁰ АВТОРХАНОВ, Абдурахман: *Сила и бессилие Брежнева. Политические этюды*. Possev Verlag, Frankfurt/Main 1979. 189. На практике это означало то же самое, что в первой половине века несколько раз уже высказали западноевропейские политики – социал-демократы II Интернационала, которые за это получили от коммунистов ярлык «ревизионистов»; в большинстве случаев коммунисты за эту мысль клеймили их «оппортунистами».

⁹¹ Они подчеркивали также, что советско-югославское сближение «не может мешать западным экономическим связям Югославии». KISS-RIPP-VIDA (1995): 6.

Тито в письме от 29 июня 1955 г. просил распустить Коминформ. Эту просьбу Хрущев с соратниками выполнили в апреле 1956 г.⁹²

Летом 1956 г. в восточноевропейском блоке, в Польше и Венгрии, началось политическое брожение, которое в Польше удалось разрешить мирным путем, в Венгрии – нет.

Недовольство в Польше удалось погасить, восстановив на посту главы партии бывшего ортодоксального, в свое время заклеенного за национализм, руководителя В.Гомулку. Иначе равнялись события в Венгрии.⁹³

Поначалу советским лидерам казалось, что точка зрения югославов на события в Венгрии совпадает с их собственной.⁹⁴ Но «советский метод» решения венгерского кризиса снова отдалил Югославию от Советского Союза. Югославское партийное руководство, открыто поддерживая советскую военную интервенцию и правительство Кадара, вместе с тем предоставило Имре Надю и его сподвижникам убежище в югославском посольстве и склонялось к тому, чтобы предоставить его и на территории Югославии.⁹⁵

Венгерские события 1956 г. доказали, что объявленный на XX партийном съезде тезис о «многообразии путей, ведущих к социализму», не подразумевает многопартийности и хотя бы частичной независимости от СССР или нейтралитета, не говоря уже о возможности вооруженного сопротивления.⁹⁶ Более того, из венгерских событий 1956 г. советское руководство могло сделать вывод, что признание «многообразных путей к социализму», может привести к отрицанию социализма, т.е. к капитализму.

Вопреки «решительному шагу» Москвы, т.е. советской военной интервенции, объявленный на XX-ом съезде курс в конечном счете привел к ослаблению советского влияния.

⁹² KISS-RIPP-VIDA (1995): 8-10.

⁹³ В конце 1992 г. из разных российских архивов были извлечены неизвестные до тех пор советские документы, относящиеся к 1956 г., и опубликованы не только на венгерском, но и на русском языках. Наиболее полное издание документов по этой теме: *Советский Союз и венгерский кризис 1956 г. Документы*. Е.Д. Орехова, В.Т. Середя, А.С.СЫКАЛИН (ред.), РОСПЭН, Москва 1998.

⁹⁴ Хрущев и Маленков 2 ноября 1956 г. вылетели в Югославию. Там на острове Бриони они провели переговоры с Тито. В письме Союза коммунистов Югославии ЦК КПСС от 6 -го ноября говорится о том, что они «были согласны с тем, что правительство Имре Надя расчистило дорогу для контрреволюции». А. С. СЫКАЛИН: *Прерванная революция. Венгерский кризис 1956 г. и политика Москвы*. Новый Хронограф, Москва 2003. (в дальнейшем: СЫКАЛИН 2003), 194-195.

⁹⁵ 22 ноября 1956 г. пребыванию Имре Надя и его соратников в будапештском посольстве Югославии был положен конец, и югославское руководство освободилось тем самым от неприятного бремени, но отношения между Белградом и Москвой после этого оставались весьма напряженными. KISS-RIPP-VIDA (1995): 19-27.

⁹⁶ СЫКАЛИН (2003): 223.

Вернуть Югославию в восточноевропейский блок Хрущеву не удалось.⁹⁷ Отношения СССР с Китаем испортились после венгерских событий, в конце 1956 и в 1957 гг.⁹⁸ 14 – 16 ноября 1957 г. в Москве, перед совещанием представителей коммунистических и рабочих партий, проходило совещание представителей коммунистических партий 12 социалистических стран, на котором постановили, что «*основой взаимоотношений между социалистическими государствами является братская взаимопомощь*», уточнив, что недопустимо мириться с тем, чтобы достигнутые результаты ставились под угрозу.⁹⁹ Узнав о предполагаемых решениях совещания, югославы, несмотря на прежнее обещание, не приняли в нем участия.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Похищение 22 ноября 1956 г. группы Имре Надя при выходе из югославского посольства еще больше обострило советско-югославские отношения. Советские и югославские цели были противоположными. Хрущевское руководство на практике хотело путем включения Югославии в социалистический лагерь вновь поставить ее под советский политический и экономический контроль и заставить ослабить свои связи с Западом. Но белградское руководство хотело нормализовать связи с Москвой и с социалистическими государствами, сохранив при этом хорошие отношения с западными государствами. Критикуя сталинскую систему, Белград противопоставлял ей свою модель. Надежду на благоприятный поворот летом 1957 г. принес провал путча антипартийной группы Маленкова – Молотова – Кагановича. В начале августа 1957 г. Хрущев и Тито встретились в Снагове. Тито обещал признать правительство Кадара и просил, чтобы Имре Надя и его соратников не судили. Но на своём запланированном на ноябрь совещании некоторые коммунистические партии, в угоду китайским товарищам, хотели принять постановление в сталинском духе. К этому склонялись и советские руководители. Поэтому югославы не приняли участия международном совещании компартий. (Программа совещания была составлена с учётом мнения китайцев). Весной 1958 г., с подачи Китая, в «*международном рабочем движении*» победило антиюгославское направление. (Это также сыграло роль в казни Имре Надя 16 июня 1958 г.). Однако Хрущев не в полной мере поддался китайскому давлению. Таким образом, хотя Югославия и отделилась от блока, но в эти годы уже не отождествлялась с западными империалистами, как во время Сталина. *Magyar - jugoszláv kapcsolatok. 1956 december—1959 február*. KISS József-RIPP Zoltán-VIDA István, 5-14.

⁹⁸ Китай осмелел после позволения Югославии идти своей дорогой, а на Албанию и Румынию подействовало соперничество СССР и Китая. NÉMETH (2006 I): 419.

⁹⁹ Подчеркивалось, что при построении социализма в каждом государстве имеются «*общие закономерности*». Среди них имеет смысл отметить некоторые: «*руководящую роль коммунистической партии, установление общественной собственности на основные средства производства, социалистическое преобразование сельского хозяйства, защита завоеваний социализма от покушений, осуществление принципа пролетарского интернационализма*». Подробнее см.: NÉMETH (2006 I): 417.

¹⁰⁰ В 1958 г. между СССР и Югославией развернулась дипломатическая война, но Хрущев не допустил, чтобы в конце концов, подобно прежним годам, совсем испортились бы югославо-советские отношения, т.к. «*дальнейшее ухудшение отношений с Югославией не согласовалось с основным направлением советской внешней политики ни в отношении Запада, ни в отношении третьего мира*». «*Главный интерес...Хрущева состоял в том, чтобы восстановленное единство социалистического лагеря основывалось не на политике ресталинизации, как того требовали китайцы, а на собственных представлениях. В конце концов, Советский Союз вынужден был принять к сведению особый путь*

Советские успехи в ракетной технике настолько воодушевили Хрущева, что в 1962 г. во время кубинского кризиса он позволил себе поиграть на нервах американцев, имевших тогда 17-кратное превосходство в атомной ударной силе. Его провал 15 октября 1964 г. в основном стал результатом именно этой акции.

После испытания советской атомной бомбы в 1949 г. СССР получил возможность вести себя как супердержава. Хрущев отдавал себе отчет об опасностях и возможностях нового положения. Во внешней политике это означало, кроме декларирования мирного сосуществования и различных путей в строительстве социализма, также провозглашение глобальной роли СССР. Из внутренних конфликтов восточноевропейского содружества самым поучительным для Москвы был конфликт с югославами, но взятые на себя СССР дальневосточные обязательства побуждали русских коммунистических руководителей рассматривать глобальную миссию московского государства как первостепенную, оттеснив панславизм в научную жизнь. Стратегическое опьянение Хрущева, которое в 1962 г. во время кубинского ракетного кризиса чуть не привело к началу атомной войны между США и СССР, уже и для Кремля казалось крайностью. Но в основном с пути, намеченного им, не свернули и его наследники, в том числе и Леонид Ильич Брежнев.

Через год после того как Брежнев стал первым секретарем, в Чехословакии был провален третий пятилетний план. Чехословацкое руководство разработало проект экономических реформ, но это не помогло. Положение Чехословакии было другим, чем Венгрии. Чехословакия после II-ой мировой войны считалась победившим государством, поэтому до 1968 г. на ее территории не было советских войск. Как в силу происхождения, так и по историческому опыту славянские народы Чехословакии с симпатией относились к Советскому Союзу.

В Праге учитывали опыт венгерской революции и стремились обойти все, что могло дать повод Советскому Союзу для вмешательства. Формально все оставалось неизменным: и членство Чехословакии в Варшавском пакте, и участие в СЭВе, равно как и *«руководящая роль коммунистической партии»*. Остался и социализм – *«только»* он начал приобретать человеческие черты.

Дубчек и его товарищи гарантировали некоторые права, среди них и свободу слова. Но советские руководители хорошо видели опасность, исходившую от Пражской весны, ведь *«обеспечение свободы мнений, слова и*

Югославии, то, что югославы снова на несколько лет вышли из круга политики блока. Интерес Москвы все больше обращался к 3-му миру. Поэтому она не могла позволить себе продолжать жесткую, порой грубую политику противостояния с Югославией, которая претендовала на руководящую роль в движении неприсоединившихся стран – и к тому же была социалистической страной вне блока». KISS-RIPP-VIDA (1997): 15.

собраний обязательно ведет к свободным, демократическим выборам и многопартийной системе». А такие выборы означают конец государственному социализму, т.к. большинство избирателей может решить, что не хочет никакого социализма или под словом «социализм» будет подразумевать нечто совершенно иное, чем то, что было построено.¹⁰¹

Исходя из этого «оказание интернациональной помощи» советским режимом в августе 1968 г. было совершенно логичным, ведь на основе родившейся тогда доктрины Брежнева Москва не могла выбрать другой путь.¹⁰²

1968 год однозначно доказал, что во внешней политике «старший брат» – славянская страна с центром в Москве – в основном руководствуется не (пан)славистскими симпатиями, а совсем другими принципами. Это была пощечина прежде всего чешской интеллигенции, которая до тех пор не предполагала со стороны «великого славянского брата» готовности огнем и мечом разделаться с инициативой родственной славянской нации.

Спустя 12 лет, в 1980 г., когда советские войска уже больше полугода воевали в Афганистане, в Польше, на гданьской судостроительной верфи, развернулось и начало свое победное шествие альтернативное профсоюзное движение. Его деятели критиковали, в частности, и механизм государственной системы Советского Союза. Целью Солидарности была организация профсоюзов, независимых от государства и партии. Исходя из доктрины Брежнева, это движение надо было разгромить вооруженной силой, однако, до этого очередь все же не дошла. В декабре 1981 г. генерал Ярузельский объявил военное положение, но ликвидировать независимое профсоюзное движение ему не удалось. Солидарность осталась до конца 80-х годов решающим политическим фактором.

В это же время радикальным образом изменилось внешнеполитическое положение СССР. Если раньше Москва была еще второй сверхдержавой, то во времена Горбачева между 1985 и 1991 годами мы стали свидетелями ее распада.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ ВҮКУ (2001): 232-233.

¹⁰² Западные аналитики впервые заговорили об этой доктрине после вторжения 21 августа 1968 г. Советского Союза и его союзников в Чехословакию. На самом деле уже с начала холодной войны осуществлялся принцип вмешательства Советского Союза во внутренние дела тех социалистических стран, в которых возникала угроза существованию социализма, или которые подозревались в намерении выйти из Варшавского пакта, руководимого СССР. В этом смысле «доктрина Брежнева» существовала еще до Брежнева и применялась уже в 1953 г. в Восточной Германии, а также в 1956 г. в Венгрии. BARÁTH - RAJNER (2000): 288.

¹⁰³ Во времена Советского Союза достижения системы измеряли результативностью ее международной политики. «В соответствии с имперской логикой советской системы по сути единственным средством максимализации власти стали внешнеполитические успехи в широком смысле»...Стратегическое положение Советского Союза в мире никогда не ценилось так высоко, как на заре горбачевских реформ...К концу 80-ых годов

Деятельность Солидарности не в малой мере способствовала развалу системы советской диктатуры. Хотя Польша является государством славянским, панславизм, исключая начало XIX в., никогда не был здесь популярным. Создатели русского панславизма уже во второй половине XIX в. однозначно изображали поляков предателями славянского дела, поэтому им не пришлось разочаровываться друг в друге и в 1980-ые годы.

После 1945 г. в Восточной Европе, в сфере советского влияния, кроме неславянских восточной Германии и Венгрии, оказали сопротивление и славянские государства – Чехословакия и Польша. Однако из всего этого нельзя сделать вывод, что у панславизма в рассматриваемом регионе теперь уже нет перспектив. Ведь во время югославской войны можно было наблюдать признаки, указывающие на существование этой доктрины. В наши дни при оценке сербами, словаками и русскими положения в Косово можно наблюдать возрождение, хотя бы и на словах, некоторых элементов панславизма.

это положение кардинально изменилось... внешняя политика в поздний горбачевский период сошла с верхушки пирамиды власти. Советская элита к 1989 г. считала возможным пожертвовать определенными позициями... В системе причинно-следственных связей внешняя и внутренняя политика поменялись местами». DEÁK András: *Az orosz külpolitikai gondolkodás története (1992-1997)*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 2005. 30-31.

Tamás Goreczky

***Diplomaten- und Konsularausbildung in der Österreichisch-
Ungarischen Monarchie.
Ein Beitrag zur Institutionsgeschichte des Habsburgerreiches***

Bis nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg gliederten sich in allen Staaten die für die zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen zuständigen Dienste in drei Bereiche: in den Ministerialdienst, den diplomatischen Dienst und den Konsulardienst. Der diplomatische Dienst war zunächst dem Adel vorbehalten, und zwar aus zwei Gründen: Die adelige Herkunft garantierte einerseits die auch für das Amt nötige Bildung, andererseits die Ausstattung der Amtsträger mit den erforderlichen eigenen materiellen Mitteln.¹

Was den konsularischen Dienst betrifft, ist sein Ursprung seit dem Mittelalter mit der Entwicklung von Handel und Verkehr eng verbunden. Formen der Selbstverwaltung und Vertretung ausländischer Kaufleute und Bankiers entwickelten sich ihren geschäftlichen Bindungen entsprechend an den Orten ihres Aufenthalts. Sie erforderten detaillierte Kenntnisse nicht nur der wirtschaftlichen Gegebenheiten, sondern auch der rechtlichen Voraussetzungen. So wurden diese Funktionen zunächst fast ausschließlich und später überwiegend von ortsansässigen Personen in ehrenamtlicher Stellung ausgeübt. Erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts begannen die Staaten infolge der Zunahme von Handel und Verkehr auch die konsularische Vertretung in den wirtschaftlich wichtigsten Orten eigenen Berufskonsulaten oder Konsularabteilungen an den diplomatischen Vertretungsbehörden zu übertragen.²

Handel, Kapitalverkehr, Auslandsreisen, und Wanderungsbewegungen erweiterten im 19. Jahrhundert die Aufgaben der Konsulate. Diese Aufgaben spielten sich in unterschiedlichen Milieus ab, für die die Kenntnis der diplomatischen Sprache, des Französischen nicht ausreichte. Der Konsul musste nicht nur die lokale Sprache beherrschen, sondern im Falle Österreich-Ungarns, zusätzlich zu der Amtssprache Deutsch, Italienisch und – wenn möglich – auch Ungarisch sprechen. Nach dem Ausgleich von 1867 wurde vor allem um die Jahrhundertwende das Ungarische in der Amtspraxis zunehmend als gleichberechtigte zweite Staatssprache obligatorisch. Bürger beider Reichshälften erwarteten aber auch die Kenntnis ihrer meist slawischen Landessprache. Im Mittelmeerraum war weiterhin Italienisch unumgänglich.

¹ PFUSTERSCHMID-HARDTENSTEIN, Heinrich: *Die Orientalische- und spätere Konsularakademie 1848-1918. Eine frühe Fachhochschule im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung, 250 Jahre – Von der Orientalischen zur Diplomatischen Akademie* in Wien, Hg. von Oliver Rathkolb, Innsbruck-Wien-München-Bozen 2006. 77-78.

² MALFATTI DI MONTETRETTO, Josef Ritter von: *Handbuch des österreichisch-ungarischen Konsularwesens*, Wien 1904. 4.

Da in allen den Bürger und seine Aktivitäten betreffenden Angelegenheiten jeweils einer der zwei Staaten, die österreichische Reichshälfte oder Ungarn zuständig war, musste der Beamte in der Lage sein, zwei Rechtssysteme anzuwenden.³

Die Sprache der Diplomatie war bis 1918 Französisch und zwar ein möglichst perfektes, an den Regeln der Académie Française gemessenes Französisch. Dies war die Hochsprache des europäischen Adels und meistens nur von denen beherrscht, die sie im Elternhaus gelernt hatten. Die Repräsentanten des höheren Adels hatten auch den Vorteil, dass sie abgesehen von der deutschen Sprache wenigstens für den täglichen Umgang meistens eine der anderen Landessprachen aus ihrer Jugendzeit kannten, da sie von Böhmen bis Kroatien oder von Galizien bis Trentino ihre Güter hatten, und beginnend mit der Kinderfrau im Haushalt unter Bediensteten aus der lokalen Bevölkerung aufgewachsen waren. Das war auch ein Grund für die Dominanz dieser Familien im diplomatischen Dienst.⁴

Für den Konsulardienst hingegen war die Sprache der oberen Schichten an der Adria, aber auch der Seeleute und Handelsleute, das Italienische von Bedeutung. Es war die eigentliche Konsularsprache. In der zweiten Jahrhunderthälfte wird aber Englisch entsprechend der zunehmenden Dominanz der angloamerikanischen Völker in Industrie und Handel nach und nach zu Weltsprache. Auch die Völker um das östliche Mittelmeer und am Balkan waren für die Außenpolitik der Monarchie von erstrangiger Bedeutung. Von den orientalischen Sprachen war das Türkische politisch die wichtigste; Persisch und Arabisch waren so genannte Hilfssprachen. Dahinter tauchen Russisch und Serbokroatisch, dank dem zunehmenden Einfluss ihrer Mutterländer auf das politische Geschehen, auf. Deswegen musste bei der Wahl der Vertreter für einen Konsularposten auf die Sprachkenntnisse der Aspiranten besondere Rücksicht genommen werden. Auch diese sprachlichen Voraussetzungen, die ein k. u. k. Konsularbeamte erfüllen musste, weisen auf die Wichtigkeit der Frage der Sprachausbildung in der Monarchie, die auf höchstem Niveau im Rahmen der Orientalischen Akademie verwirklicht wurde.⁵

³ PFUSTERSCHMID-HARDTENSTEIN, Heinrich: *Die Orientalische- und spätere Konsularakademie 1848-1918. Eine frühe Fachhochschule im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung*, 79. Vgl. MORDECHAI, Eliav: *Österreich und das Heilige Land, Ausgewählte Konsulatsdokumente aus Jerusalem 1849-1917*, Wien 2000.

⁴ PFUSTERSCHMID-HARDTENSTEIN, Heinrich: *Die Orientalische - und spätere Konsularakademie 1848-1918. Eine frühe Fachhochschule im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung*, 92-93. Vgl. GODSEY, William D. Jr.: *Aristocratic Redoubt – The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War*, West Lafayette, Indiana 1999.

⁵ PFUSTERSCHMID-HARDTENSTEIN, Heinrich: *Die Orientalische- und spätere Konsularakademie 1848-1918. Eine frühe Fachhochschule im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung*, 93.

Die Geschichte dieser altherwürdigen Einrichtung der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie reicht bis in die Türkenzeit zurück. Die lange Grenze und die ständigen Kontakte zwischen Österreich und dem Osmanischen Reich ergaben die Notwendigkeit der Ausbildung von Dolmetschen für den Verkehr der kaiserlichen Behörden mit den Türken. So wurde Österreich zu einer Beschäftigung mit der Sprache und Kultur der Osmanen gezwungen, die von den bescheidenen Anfängen im Dolmetsch- und Konsularwesen bis zur Gründung einer Spezialschule zur Ausbildung österreichischer Beamte für den Dienst im Orient reichte.⁶

Die Friedensschlüsse mit dem Osmanischen Reich machten eine permanente Vertretung in Konstantinopel notwendig, die so genannte k. k. Internuntiat.⁷ Bis dahin waren bei besonderen Anlässen außerordentliche Missionen in den Orient geschickt worden. Bei Verhandlungen mit der Pforte war man auf der Hilfe fremder Dolmetscher angewiesen, in erster Linie auf Levantiner, eingeborene oder eingewanderte Christen der osmanischen Hauptstadt. Die Schwierigkeiten, ergaben sich daraus, dass eine Geheimhaltung der besprochenen Dinge bei dieser Art der Verhandlungen praktisch unmöglich war, da bei einer Verhandlung oft drei Dolmetscher in mehreren Sprachen hinzugezogen wurden. Die Vertreter der europäischen Mächte bei der Pforte machten sehr wohl auf die Notwendigkeit aufmerksam, diese Vermittler durch Personen aus dem eigenen Land zu ersetzen. Diese mussten allerdings für die neue Aufgabe erst herangebildet werden.⁸

Als der österreichische Gesandte, Karl Rym van Estbeck im Jahre 1569 in Konstantinopel ankam, bemerkte er sofort diese Nachteile im Dolmetschwesen, und wies auf die Notwendigkeit hin, Inländer für den Übersetzungsdienst auszubilden. Als Folge davon wurden den in die Türkei reisenden Gesandten junge Männer mitgegeben, die während ihres Aufenthaltes in der Türkei die osmanische Sprache erlernen und nach ihrer Rückkehr auch andere darin unterweisen konnten.⁹

Erst am Anfang des 18. Jahrhunderts wurde ein ständiges Institut für türkische Sprachausbildung gegründet, das so genannte Sprachknaben-Institut in Konstantinopel, um junge Männer zu Dolmetschdiensten auszubilden. 8 bis

⁶ BARB, Heinrich: *Über die Zwecke der k. u. k. Orientalische Akademie, Vortrag gehalten am 22. März 1876*, Wien 1876. 8. GOŁUCHOWSKI, von Agenor Graf (Hrsg.): *Die k. u. k. Konsularakademie von 1754 bis 1904, Festschrift zur Feier des 150-jährigen Bestandes der Akademie und der Eröffnung ihres neuen Gebäudes*, Wien 1904. 3. MATSCH, Erwin: *Geschichte des Auswärtigen Dienstes von Österreich (-Ungarn) 1720-1920*, Wien-Köln-Graz 1980. 78.

⁷ Den Titel „Internuntius“ führte Ursprünglich der polnische Gesandte bei der Hohen Pforte. 1627 wurde der Titel zum ersten Mal für den österreichischen Gesandten Stephan Balogh verwendet, als er die Ratifikation des Friedens von Szöny durch Kaiser Ferdinand III. überbrachte. ERLACH, Daniela: *Die Orientalische Akademie in Wien*, Wien 1988. 2, 118.

⁸ BARB, Heinrich: *Über die Zwecke der k. u. k. Orientalische Akademie*. 8.

⁹ ERLACH, Daniela: *Die Orientalische Akademie in Wien*. 4.

12 solcher Sprachknaben befanden sich in Konstantinopel, sie lebten im Haus des Internuntius, wurden von einheimischen Lehrern unterrichtet und konnten ihre Sprachkenntnisse durch den Verkehr mit der osmanischen Bevölkerung und durch den Besuch von Gerichten, Märkten und ähnlichen verbessern. Sobald sie über ausreichende Kenntnisse der türkischen Sprache verfügten, wurden sie zu Dolmetschdiensten bei der Pforte eingesetzt. Auch andere Staaten wie Frankreich, Russland und Venedig ließen Sprachknaben in Konstantinopel ausbilden.¹⁰

Diese Institution konnte aber die Erwartungen nicht erfüllen. Schon bald mehrten sich die Beschwerden über Mangel an Organisation und Leitung. Die große Entfernung vom Vaterland führte dazu, dass sich die Zöglinge von den heimatlichen Sitten, Gebräuchen und Interessen entfremdeten.¹¹ Die schädlichen Einflüsse der türkischen Hauptstadt wurden ebenfalls als Grund für das Scheitern dieser Einrichtung angeführt.¹²

Der Hofkriegsrat sendete schließlich am 20. April 1753 an den kaiserlichen Internuntius in Konstantinopel, Heinrich Freiherr von Penckler eine Weisung, die im Namen Maria Theresias erklärte, dass „*Unsere gnädigste Willensmeinung dahin gehet, für das künftige keine Sprachknaben mehr in Konstantinopel zu halten, sondern acht derenselben vor beständig allhier in einem Seminario beisammen unterrichten und verpflegen zu lassen*“.¹³

Die fünf Sprachknaben, die sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch in der türkischen Hauptstadt aufhielten, reisten bis zum nächsten Sommer wieder nach Wien. Statt des Sprachknaben-Instituts in Konstantinopel wurde in Wien eine Schule gegründet, um Dolmetsche für den Dienst an der Pforte sowie für die Grenzstationen an der türkischen Grenze auszubilden. Diese Institution war die berühmte Orientalische Akademie.¹⁴

Die Gründung einer Orientalischen Akademie wurde vom Leiter der Geheimen Haus-, Hof- und Staatskanzlei, Fürst Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz angeregt, der vermutlich während seines Aufenthaltes von 1750 bis 1753 als Botschafter in Paris von der „*Ecole des Langues Orientales*“ inspiriert wurde.¹⁵ Er machte Maria Theresia den Vorschlag, eine Akademie in Wien zu

¹⁰ MATSCH, Erwin: *Geschichte des Auswärtigen Dienstes von Österreich (-Ungarn) 1720-1920*. 78.

¹¹ *Zur 1. Säkularfeier der k. k. Akademie der orientalischen Sprachen im Jänner 1854*, Wien 1854. 4.

¹² BARB, Heinrich: *Über die Zwecke der k. u. k. Orientalische Akademie*. 12.

¹³ Haus, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Türkei II, Kart. 25, Konv. Weisungen 1753, fol. 37.; Auszug daraus: HHStA, Staatskanzlei Interiora, Kart. 55, Konv. alt. 67a/B, fol. 11.

¹⁴ PETRISCH, Ernst Dieter: *Erziehung in guten Sitten, Andacht und Gehorsam. Die 1754 gegründete Orientalische Akademie in Wien*, Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie. Akten des internationalen Kongresses zum 150-jährigen Bestehen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung Wien, 22-25. September 2004, Hrsg. von Marlene Kurz, Martin Scheutz, Karl Vocelka und Thomas Winkelbauer, Wien-München 2005. 494.

¹⁵ JOUKOVA, Alexandra: *Dolmetscher- und Sprachausbildung an der Orientalischen bzw. Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien*, Wien 2002. 30.

gründen. Mit der Ausarbeitung wurde der Jesuitenpater Josef Franz, der ehemalige Erzieher des späteren Kaiser Joseph II., beauftragt. Pater Franz hatte einige Zeit als Sekretär des österreichischen Gesandten, Anton Graf Uhlefeld in Konstantinopel verbracht. Während dieses Aufenthaltes konnte er die türkische Sprache erlernen und einen Einblick in die Verhältnisse des Osmanischen Reiches gewinnen.¹⁶

In seinen Vorschlägen vom April und Juni 1753 beschrieb Pater Franz die Organisation der zu errichtenden Lehranstalt. Seiner Meinung nach wäre die Ausbildung in Wien in einem Seminar mit angeschlossenem Internat die beste Variante, weil „*die türkische Sprache ebenso wohl außer Konstantinopel, als die französische außer Paris vollkommen kann erlernt werden*“. Aufgrund seines Vorschlages sollten die Zöglinge der Akademie „*nicht zerstreut in denen Häusern deren befreunden sondern in einem Haus, und etwelchen gemieteten Zimmern gleich einer Stiftung oder kleinen Seminarii gemeinschaftlich beisammen wohnten.*“¹⁷

Der Unterricht in diesem Seminar sollte unter der Leitung eines Direktors und zwei Präfekten stehen. Durch jährliche Prüfungen wurde der Lernerfolg kontrolliert.¹⁸ Im Curriculum der Orientalischen Akademie sollte laut Pater Franz neben dem Sprachunterricht auch ein Auslandsaufenthalt für die besten Schüler vorgesehen werden. Sie sollten in Konstantinopel die k. k. Dolmetschen begleiten, um „*die Türkische Landesart, das Hofzeremoniell und die allda gewöhnlichen Höflichkeits- und Besuchs-Gebräuche begreifen*“ zu können.¹⁹

Maria Theresia war mit den Vorschlägen von Pater Franz einverstanden, und unterzeichnete im September 1753 eine k. k. Resolution über die Gründung der Orientalischen Akademie in Wien. Am 1. Jänner 1754 wurde die „*k. k. Akademie der Orientalischen Sprachen*“ – oder „*k. k. Akademie der morgenländischen Sprachen*“ – unter dem ersten Direktor, Pater Franz eröffnet. Die äußere Stellung der Akademie blieb über lange Jahre hin unverändert, nur die Organisation wurde durch oftmalige Modifikationen und Reformen verbessert.²⁰

Anders als die französische l'Ecole de Langues orientales, die als reine Sprachschule konzipiert war, stand den Absolventen nicht nur eine Karriere als

¹⁶ ERLACH, Daniela: *Die Orientalische Akademie in Wien*. 7.

¹⁷ *Allerunterthänigste Anmerkung und Allerunterthänigste ohnmaßgeblicher Fürschlag Josephi Franz Soc. Jesu, wie die Erziehung und Belehrung deren Türkischen Sprach-Knaben zu Wien fürzunehmen wäre*, HHStA, StK Interiora, Kart. 55, Konv. 1753, fol. 12-21.

siehe auch: WEIß EDLER VON STARKENFELS, Victor: *Die k. k. Orientalische Akademie zu Wien. Ihre Gründung, Fortbildung und gegenwärtige Einrichtung*, Wien 1839. 6.

¹⁸ *Festschrift*. 6.

¹⁹ zitiert nach: PETRISCH, Ernst Dieter: *Erziehung in guten Sitten, Andacht und Gehorsam. Die 1754 gegründete Orientalische Akademie in Wien*. 494.

²⁰ *Festschrift*. 6. *Zur 1. Säcularfeier der k. k. Akademie der orientalischen Sprachen im Jänner 1854*. 6.

Dolmetsch offen, sondern, wie die Zukunft zeigte, ergab sich für sie auch die Möglichkeit, Führungspositionen im diplomatischen und im Staatsdienst zu bekleiden.²¹

Die weitere Entwicklung der Orientalischen Akademie wurde von den folgenden Ereignissen geprägt: 1812 wurde die Ausbildung durch die allerhöchste Resolution vom 25. September in fünf Jahrgänge eingeteilt, 1833 zerfiel der Lehrkurs mit Erlass des Staatskanzlers Metternich vom 11. Mai in juristisch-diplomatische und Sprachstudien, 1883 rückte die Akademie in räumliche und ökonomisch-administrative Verbindung mit der Theresianischen Akademie. Schließlich ereignete sich 1898 die Reorganisation der Orientalischen Akademie zur k. u. k. Konsularakademie und die Zweiteilung der Institution in „westländische“ und orientalische Sektion.²²

Als Maria Theresia die Gründung der Orientalischen Akademie bewilligte, wollte sie damit eine Institution schaffen, in der künftige Dolmetscher zur Assistenz der diplomatischen Vertreter in der Türkei gründlich, würdig und vielseitig auf diese Aufgabe vorbereitet werden sollten.²³ Laut Formulierung der Disziplinargesetzen für die Zöglinge der k. k. Akademie der morgenländischen Sprachen: *„Die Zöglinge sollen... zu Männer erzogen werden, in welchen sich gründliche Kenntnisse, Geschäftsgewandtheit und feine Sitten mit tadelloser, auf wahre Religiosität gegründeter Sittlichkeit vereinigen.“*²⁴

Also war die Orientalische Akademie ursprünglich im Wesentlichen eine Sprachschule für orientalische Sprachen. Dennoch hatte die Akademie im Gegensatz zum Sprachknabeninstitut einen umfassenden Studienplan und vermittelte nicht bloße Sprachkenntnisse, sondern auch eine gewisse allgemeine Vorbildung für den Staatsdienst. Mit der Zeit entwickelte sich die Akademie zu einer Vorbereitungsanstalt für künftige Vertreter der Monarchie im Orient.²⁵

Die bereits oben mehrmals erwähnte Festschrift stellte 1904 die Aufgabe der zu dieser Zeit *„Konsularakademie genannten Institut so dar: „Ihren Hörern eine allen modernen Anforderungen entsprechende Bildung in den historischen, juristischen und speziell in den ökonomischen Disziplinen, ferner die erforderlichen linguistischen Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten zu vermitteln, durch Erhaltung eines hohen wissenschaftlichen Niveaus in ihrem Lehrgange den traditionellen Charakter einer Spezialhochschule zu bewahren und*

²¹ ERLACH, Daniela: *Die Orientalische Akademie in Wien*. 9.

²² PLECHL, Pia Maria: *Diplomatische Akademie Wien*, Wien 1968. 3, 5, 7. JOUKOVA, Alexandra: *Dolmetscher- und Sprachausbildung an der Orientalischen bzw. Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien*. 35.

²³ PLECHL, Pia Maria: *Diplomatische Akademie Wien*. 3.

²⁴ zitiert nach: WEIß EDLER VON STARKENFELS, Victor: *Die k. k. Orientalische Akademie zu Wien. Ihre Gründung, Fortbildung und gegenwärtige Einrichtung*. 6.

²⁵ *Festschrift*. 1,7. BARB, Heinrich: *Über die Zwecke der k. u. k. Orientalische Akademie*. 13.

*zugleich der Anforderung einer praktischen Ausbildung der Kandidaten des Konsulardienstes zu genügen.*²⁶

Die zu der Zeit der dualistischen Monarchie gültigen Aufnahmebedingungen an der Orientalischen Akademie wurden zwischen 1952 und 1861 in mehreren Phasen eingeführt. Die Aufnahmeprüfung umfasste die folgenden Fächer: Staatengeschichte der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, Übersetzung aus dem Lateinischen ins Deutsche, Übersetzung aus dem Französischen ins Deutsche und Übersetzung aus dem Deutschen ins Französische. Alle diese Prüfungen waren schriftlich. Mit der Ausgestaltung des Ungarischunterrichtes im Studienjahr 1892/1893 wurde auch vorgeschrieben, dass Bewerber um die Aufnahme an die Akademie aus den Ländern der ungarischen Krone die Kenntnis der ungarischen Sprache nachweisen müssen.²⁷

Der seit 1754 mehrmals umgestaltete und erweiterte Lehrplan bekam 1833 mit der Teilung des akademischen Lehrkurses in juristisch-diplomatische und Sprachstudien eine deutlichere Struktur. Bei juristischen-diplomatischen Studien wurde genau angegeben, welcher Gegenstand in welchem Halbjahr auf dem Programm stehen sollte. Der Lehrplan für Sprachstudien umfasste die folgenden Gegenstände: im 1. Jahrgang türkische Sprachlehre, Übersetzung aus dem Türkischen, Lesen und Übersetzen türkischer Geschäftsbriefe, Französisch; im 2. Jahrgang arabische Sprachlehre, Übersetzung aus dem Türkischen, Lesen und Übersetzen türkischer Geschäftsbriefe, Französisch, Italienisch; im 3. Jahrgang arabische Sprachlehre, Übersetzung aus dem Türkischen, Übersetzung aus dem Arabischen, Lesen und Übersetzen türkischer Geschäftsbriefe, Französisch, Italienisch; im 4. Jahrgang arabische Sprachlehre, Übersetzung aus dem Türkischen, Übersetzung aus dem Arabischen, Lesen und Übersetzen türkischer Geschäftsbriefe, Französisch, Italienisch, Neugriechisch; im 5. Jahrgang persische Sprachlehre, Übersetzung aus dem Persischen, Übersetzung aus dem Türkischen, Lesen und Übersetzen türkischer Geschäftsbriefe, Französisch, Italienisch, Neugriechisch.²⁸

Im Studienjahr 1849/1850 wurde dieser Lehrplan durch den später wesentlich intensivierten Sprachunterricht in Englisch erweitert.²⁹ 1861 erfolgte die Errichtung von Lehrkanzeln für persische und vulgärarabische Sprachen.³⁰ 1880/1881 erweiterte sich der Studienplan um zwei slawischen Sprachen, nämlich Russisch und Serbisch. Die Zöglinge mussten eine dieser Sprachen als Pflichtfach erlernen. Dasselbe galt auch für die ungarische

²⁶ *Festschrift*. 2.

²⁷ *Festschrift*. 24, 34.

²⁸ JOUKOVA, Alexandra: *Dolmetscher- und Sprachausbildung an der Orientalischen bzw. Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien*. 43-45.

²⁹ *Festschrift*. 24.

³⁰ JOUKOVA, Alexandra: *Dolmetscher- und Sprachausbildung an der Orientalischen bzw. Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien*. 46.

Sprache, die infolge der dualistischen Umgestaltung der Monarchie in den Studienplan aufgenommen wurden. Gleichzeitig erfolgte eine Einschränkung des Studiums der orientalischen Sprachen: Arabisch und Persisch geriet in den Hintergrund. 1884/1885 wurde ein Lehrkurs für deutsche Stilistik eingeführt.³¹

Das Studienjahr 1897/1898 brachte wieder mehrere Neuerungen im Studienplan: Es wurde ein propädeutischer Unterricht in der chinesischen Sprache für Hörer des vierten und fünften Jahrgangs eingeführt. Dieses Studienjahr verzeichnete sich auch einen Schwerpunktwechsel: Der Englischunterricht gewann immer mehr an Bedeutung und wurde als Pflichtfach auf die vier letzten Jahrgänge erweitert. Andererseits wurde aber Neugriechisch und Serbisch aus dem Lehrplan gestrichen. Außerdem wurde der Italienischunterricht eingeschränkt.³²

Trotz dieser Veränderungen und Reduktion des Sprachunterrichtes hatte der Studienplan 1897/1898 immer noch die alte Struktur und umfasste folgende Pflichtfächer: Türkisch sowie Arabisch und Persisch als seine Hilfssprachen; Ungarisch, Französisch, Englisch, Italienisch, Russisch sowie Deutsch und Chinesisch; 7 juristische, 11 historisch-politische und staatswissenschaftlich-kommerzielle Fächer. Es ist festzustellen, dass die Zöglinge insgesamt etwa sieben Pflichtsprachen lernten und dass ungefähr 70 Prozent der wöchentlichen Stundenzahl auf den Sprachunterricht entfielen. Dies war – sogar nach Meinung der Akademieleitung – eine große Anforderung und überschritt den ursprünglichen Rahmen der akademischen Studien im hohen Maße.³³

Im Jahre 1898, mit allerhöchster EntschlieÙung vom 7. Juli, erfolgte die Neuorganisation der Orientalischen Akademie, um die Anstalt den Bedürfnissen des modernen Staatsdienstes anzupassen. Die neue Institution nahm den Namen „*K. u. k. Konsularakademie*“ an.³⁴

Sie wurde linguistisch in eine westliche (allgemeine) Sektion, in der die Ausbildung für den Konsulardienst außerhalb des Orients erfolgte, und eine orientalische Sektion zur Ausbildung für den Dienst in der Levante, geteilt. Mit der Reorganisation verringerte sich nicht nur die Anzahl der zu erlernenden Sprachen, sondern auch die Zahl der wöchentlichen Lehrstunden für den Sprachunterricht.³⁵ Andererseits wurde aber den politischen und den volkswirtschaftlichen Fächern ein breiterer Raum gegeben, und neue pädagogische Methoden wie der Seminarbetrieb wurden eingeführt. Die Ausbildung umfasste die Bereiche juristischer Fächer, historisch-politische und militärische Fächer, wirtschaftliche Fächer, kommerzielle Fächer, Sprachen und körperliche Übungen. Der Internatsbetrieb, der sich schon in der

³¹ *Festschrift*. 30, 34.

³² JOUKOVA, Alexandra: *Dolmetscher- und Sprachausbildung an der Orientalischen bzw. Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien*. 47.

³³ *Festschrift*. 41.

³⁴ ERLACH, Daniela: *Die Orientalische Akademie in Wien*. 92.

³⁵ *Festschrift*. 45, 55.

Orientalischen Akademie bewährt hatte, wurde beibehalten. Auch eine Prüfung war weiterhin Bedingung für die Aufnahme. Die Entscheidung über die Aufnahme von Kandidaten behielt sich das Ministerium des Äußeren vor. Für weniger bemittelte Kandidaten bestand die Möglichkeit, sich um einen der 25 Stiftungsplätze zu bewerben. Für den Eintritt waren ein abgeschlossenes Gymnasiumsstudium und ein Reifezeugnis eines österreichischen oder ungarischen Gymnasiums erforderlich.³⁶

Die Multinationalität der Monarchie war für die Konsularakademie besonders vorteilhaft. Wenn zum Beispiel ein Knabe mit ungarischer Muttersprache aufgenommen wurde, hatte er es beim Ungarischunterricht, der in allen fünf Jahrgängen obligatorisch war, wesentlich leichter und konnte so von den Ungarischstunden befreit werden. Wenn dieser Knabe in der orientalischen Sektion studierte, konnte er sich mehr auf das Türkische konzentrieren. Falls er die allgemeine Sektion besuchte, so konnte er seine geringere Belastung durch Erlernen einer zusätzlichen Sprache ausgleichen.³⁷

Die fakultativen Sprachen waren Russisch und Chinesisch, die im fünften Jahrgang angeboten wurden. Der 1880/1881 eingeführte Russischunterricht wurde aufgrund der zunehmenden Bedeutung der russischen Sprache für die Monarchie nicht aus dem Lehrplan gestrichen, konnte aber auch nicht weiter als Pflichtfach beibehalten werden, weil dies die Zöglinge sicherlich überlastet hätte. Deswegen wurden zum Russischunterricht nur solche Knaben herangezogen, die weniger beansprucht schienen, zum Beispiel die Zöglinge mit ungarischer oder italienischer Muttersprache, die vom Ungarisch- oder Italienischunterricht befreit waren. Aber auch die slawischen Zöglinge waren mögliche Kandidaten für den Russischunterricht, da ihre Muttersprache zum Russischen ähnlich war. Auch bei der Belegung des Chinesischunterrichts ging die Akademieleitung von der Belastung einzelner Zöglinge aus. Es ist festzustellen, dass im Zuge der Reorganisation der Akademie der Lehrplan für die Sprachunterricht neu gestaltet und an einzelne Zöglinge angepasst wurde. Die Neuigkeit besteht nicht nur in der Entlastung der Schüler durch die Reduktion des Sprachunterrichts, sondern auch in der flexiblen Sprachenkombination.³⁸

Zwischen 1754, als die k. k. Orientalische Akademie in der Philosophischen Stube der Alten Universität ihre Tätigkeit begann, und 1941, als die seit 1904 in einem prachtvollen, neubarocken Gebäude in der Boltzmanngasse 16. etablierte Konsularakademie kriegsbedingt ihre Pforten schloss, studierten an diesen beiden Institutionen 1491 Hörer und Hörerinnen. Während zu der Zeit der Monarchie, d. h. bis 1918 die Orientalische bzw. k. u. k. Konsularakademie

³⁶ ERLACH, Daniela: *Die Orientalische Akademie in Wien*. 92.

³⁷ JOUKOVA, Alexandra: *Dolmetscher- und Sprachausbildung an der Orientalischen bzw. Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien*. 54.

³⁸ JOUKOVA, Alexandra: *Dolmetscher- und Sprachausbildung an der Orientalischen bzw. Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien*. 55.

insgesamt nur 725 Hörer hatte, entfallen auf die zwei Jahrzehnte danach 766 Hörer und Hörerinnen.³⁹

Obwohl die Zahl der Hörer dem am Ballhausplatz erwarteten Personalbedarf an Konsuln entsprach, weder alle Absolventen der Orientalischen bzw. Konsularakademie in den Konsulardienst aufgenommen wurden, noch der Ballhausplatz seinen eigenen Personalbedarf ausschließlich aus Konsularakademikern rekrutierte. In vielen Fällen wurden Staatsbeamte aus Österreich und Ungarn oder Offiziere der k. u. k. Marine in die diplomatische oder konsularische Laufbahn übernommen. Wenn ein Hörer das Studium an der Orientalischen Akademie abgeschlossen hatte, folgte in der Regel die Entsendung entweder an die k. k. Internuntiat in Konstantinopel, oder an die Agentien in Jassy oder Bukarest. In der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts waren auch die Generalkonsulate in Sarajewo (bis 1878), Saloniki, Beirut und Alexandrien mögliche Dienstposten für junge Konsulareleven und Konsularattachés. Von 1879 an eröffnete sich für Absolventen der Orientalischen Akademie eine neue berufliche Perspektive im Inland: eine Tätigkeit bei der Landesregierung von Bosnien-Herzegowina.⁴⁰

Das Ministerium des k. u. k. Hauses und des Äußeren gliederte sich in drei Dienstzweige: den diplomatischen, den konsularischen und den Ministerialdienst, d. h. die Zentrale am Ballhausplatz. Diese drei Dienste waren in Österreich-Ungarn, so wie anderswo zwar durch unterschiedliche Eintrittsbedingungen voneinander getrennt, aber die Trennung war nie absolut. Bei besonderer Tüchtigkeit oder bei Bedarf an speziell für einen Problemkreis ausgebildeten und erfahrenen Beamten war eine Übernahme in jeden der drei Dienste jederzeit vorstellbar. Absolventen der Orientalischen Akademie bzw. der ab 1898 als k. u. k. Konsularakademie bezeichnete Institution begannen ihre Karriere im konsularischen Dienst. Da das Auslandsvertretungssystem der Monarchie ziemlich flexibel war – zumindest im Vergleich zum heutigen Auswärtigen Dienst der Republik Österreich –, wurden viele Konsuln aus der konsularischen Laufbahn in den diplomatischen Dienst übernommen. Viele Absolventen der Orientalischen Akademie und nachmaligen Konsularbeamten brachten es zu Spitzenfunktionen, z. B. Heinrich Freiherr von Haymerle und Stefan Graf Burián von Rajecz – beide waren Zöglinge der Orientalischen Akademie und bekleideten später den Ministerposten des k. u. k. Hauses und des Äußeren.⁴¹

³⁹ AGSTNER, Rudolf: *Die Direktoren, Hörer und Hörerinnen der Orientalische Akademie und der Konsularakademie 1754-1941*, 250 Jahre – Von der Orientalischen zur Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien, Hg. von Oliver Rathkolb, Innsbruck-Wien-München-Bozen 2006, 405.

⁴⁰ AGSTNER, Rudolf: *Die Direktoren, Hörer und Hörerinnen der Orientalische Akademie und der Konsularakademie 1754-1941*, 405-406.

⁴¹ PFUSTERSCHMID-HARDTENSTEIN, Heinrich: *Die Orientalische- und spätere Konsularakademie 1848-1918. Eine frühe Fachhochschule im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung*, 79. AGSTNER, Rudolf: *Die Direktoren, Hörer und Hörerinnen der Orientalische Akademie und der Konsularakademie 1754-1941*, 406.

Während der k. u. k. diplomatische Dienst vor dem 1. Weltkrieg ein Hort der Aristokratie war, wurde das demokratische Element des k. u. k. Auswärtigen Dienstes gewissermaßen vom konsularischen Dienst gebildet. Da keiner der meist der Hocharistokratie entstammenden k. u. k. Diplomaten bereit war, der Republik Österreich oder einem der Nachfolgestaaten zu dienen, erfolgte im Frühjahr 1919 deren Pensionierung durch das liquidierende österreichisch-ungarische Ministerium des Äußern. Bei den Konsuln sah aber die Situation ganz anders aus. Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Habsburgerreiches fanden viele Absolventen der Orientalischen bzw. der Konsularakademie, die im k. u. k. konsularischen Dienst gestanden waren, Aufnahme in die Auswärtigen Dienste der Nachfolgestaaten, und setzten ihre nunmehr diplomatische Laufbahn fort. In der Regel schafften viele früheren k. u. k. Konsularbeamten in kürzester Zeit den Sprung vom Vizekonsul zum Gesandten von Wien, Budapest, Prag, Warschau oder Rom. Die Tätigkeit dieser Beamten führte dazu, dass die Traditionen des k. u. k. Beamtentums und das auf der Konsularakademie erworbene Fachwissen in den Auswärtigen Diensten der Nachfolgestaaten noch bis zum 2. Weltkrieg, in Ungarn bis 1945 bewahrt wurden. Der letzte Absolvent der k. u. k. Konsularakademie (Jahrgang 1908-1913), Alois Vollgruber war österreichischer Botschafter in Paris, und ging im Jahre 1958 in Pension.⁴²

⁴² AGSTNER, Rudolf: *Die Direktoren, Hörer und Hörerinnen der Orientalische Akademie und der Konsularakademie 1754-1941*, 407-408.

László Gulyás

The first concept of Edvard Beneš

Beneš had a long political career. During his career worked out four concepts, or frameworks, for the organization of Central Europe, three of which he tried to implement. Thus, I shall try to present his career alongside these notions.

Concept 1: „*If Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to invent her.*”¹ This Monarchy-friendly position was published in 1908 in Dijon as part of his doctoral thesis, „*Le probleme autrichien et la question tchèque*”, and essentially represented his views until 1914.

Concept 2: „*Smash Austria-Hungary.*” This view was arrived at during his first émigré period, published in Paris in 1916. Essentially, this was the guiding principle of all his refugee political activities, moreover, it was the course of Czechoslovak foreign affairs, headed by him, from Versailles to Munich.

Concept 3: „*Poland and Czechoslovakia ... resolved: after the conclusion of this war, some manner of closer political and economic alliance will be created.*” He published this view in January 1942 in the American Foreign Affairs magazine, in an article titled „*The organization of postwar Europe*”. This determined his course of action during the first part of his second exile (1938 – 1943).

Concept 4: „*We feel it important that Russia acquire decisive influence in Europe, Central Europe and Eastern Europe.*” This concept was born sometime during 1943 and essentially defined the last five years (1943-1948) of his political direction.

This paper dealing with the the first concept of Edvard Beneš.

The major highlights in the life of Benes before 1914

Edouard Beneš was born in Kožlany, Moravia, on May 28, 1884, where he completed his elementary schooling, going to Prague for his high school years. After graduation, he enrolls in 1904 in the Karolus (Charles) University's School of Philosophy – intending to obtain a degree as a high school teacher – taking courses in philosophy, Latin and German. After the second semester, he decided to continue his studies at the Sorbonne in Paris and to this end he traveled to France in the fall of 1905. Of this decision, he writes: „*I went abroad with the intention to devote myself to philology and prepare myself for a career as a university lecturer in this subject.*”² At the Sorbonne, he studied philosophy and sociology, as well as political science at the Paris Academy of

¹ The quote is from Palacky.

² Edouard BENEŠ: *A nemzetek forradalma* I-III [The revolution of nations]. Bratislava 1936, vol. I, 11.

Social Sciences.³ In 1906, he spent a few months in London, followed by a year in Berlin. In 1907, he is back in France, reading law in Dijon.

In his memoirs, he paints a picture of a diligent student: „*I studied sixteen, eighteen hours a day, devouring any material I could lay my hands on, so that I could absorb all the faster the modern thoughts, as well as to acquire a well rounded education, to lay the solid technical foundation for my philosophical studies.*”⁴ On the other hand, Magda Ádám posits that Beneš did not study sociology and that, in fact, he decidedly neglected his university studies but, on returning to Prague, he was careful to have his French semesters accredited, although they were never accredited anywhere else.⁵ Close to a century after the French student activities of Benes, it is difficult to come to a definitive answer in this question. Quite probably, we shall never know exactly what he studies and which examinations he took. One thing is certain, – and in this we side with Magda Ádám’s view – that he spent most of his time raising the monies necessary for his everyday needs, sending newspaper articles home (published in the *Rovnost* and *Právo Lidu*) and writing for various French magazines on the problems of the Monarchy and the Czechs.⁶

As well, he made tentative forays into active politics, regularly meeting with the émigrés of the 1905 Russian revolution. Of this, he confesses: „*In 1906 and 1907, I spent time in the company of the revolutionaries, I was a member of their associations, visited their free universities, regularly corresponded with revolutionary students, professors and newspaper reporters. I began to study Russia diligently, its classical and revolutionary literature.*”⁷ Also, he establishes a relationship with the French Left, socialists and the syndicatist movement.

In 1907, he went to the University of Dijon to study law – in this all his biographers agree – where, a year later, he obtains a degree, although we may have some reservations with this doctorate degree. Magda Ádám points out that foreign student of the Dijon university were able to obtain a law degree, without taking the courses, by defending high quality dissertations. Beneš also obtained his law degree in such manner. This circumstance is tangential to our topic; of much more importance is the content of the dissertation. In his work, „*The Austrian problem and the Czech question*”, Beneš deals with the question of federalization of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We consider the chain of ideas expressed in this doctoral dissertation as his, so called, first concept.

³ Josef HANZAL: *Edvard Beneš. Arcképek kettős tükörben* [Edouard Beneš. Portraits in a dual mirror]. Nap Kiadó, Dunaszerdahely, 1997, 18.

⁴ BENEŠ: *A nemzetek ...* op. cit. vol I, 20.

⁵ ÁDÁM, Magda: *Edvard Beneš. Arcképek kettős tükörben* [Edouard Beneš. Portraits in a dual mirror]. Nap Kiadó, Dunaszerdahely, 1997, 92.

⁶ Zbyeněk ZEMAN – Antonín KLÍMA: *The life of Edvard Benes*. Oxford, 1997, 10-11.

⁷ BENEŠ: *A nemzetek ...* op. cit. vol I, 20.

After defending his dissertation, he returns to Prague,⁸ where his law studies were not accepted, his degree not accredited, in fact, he failed to complete the necessary examinations for his middle school teaching position. Hence, he could only find employment in the commerce academy – teaching French and economics – as a part-time teacher. In 1910, at the age of 26, he marries Hana Vlčková, whom he met in Paris. His studies were considerably aided by a 1911 one-year grant from the Ministry of Education in Vienna, allowing him to travel to France and England.⁹ On his return, he could make an attempt at obtaining a valid degree, spending 1912 at the Karolus University's sociology faculty. His dissertation was titled „*Party-mindedness.*” In his essay, he explores the roles and functions of political parties in a modern society. After successfully completing the term, he obtains a diploma from the university's philology faculty. In the years before the beginning of the first world war, he publishes numerous studies in the *Náše doba*, the *Česka mysl* and the *Česká revue*, writing on timely societal, social and ethnic questions.¹⁰ These studies were well written, well documented and well crafted – with little original content. The summary style, with well written conclusions, articles can be found in his writings, titled „*The Nationality Question*” and „*Social democracy in England.*”¹¹ The magazine *Právó Lidu*, at the time, declared itself as a social democratic publication and he, while submitting smaller political articles, hoped to become its chief editor. As well, he also takes a tentative part in the political life of Czechoslovakia. He makes an acquaintance with the ideas of T.G. Masaryk and slowly succumbs to his influence – although no personal relationship develops – and thus, by degrees, distances himself from the social democratic beliefs.

The first concept of Beneš

Beneš' dissertation appeared in book form in 1908 in Paris.¹² As we noted above, this can be considered as his first concept, or theory. The 312 page book, after a short „*Introduction*”, is broken into eight chapters, followed by a bibliography.

In the introduction,¹³ Beneš defines the topic of his dissertation, according to which he undertakes to expose the ‘Austrian problem’. He stresses that he does not wish to deal with Hungary because, in his opinion, since the Compromise between Austria and Hungary, public opinion in both Austria and

⁸ HANZAL: *Edvard ...* op. cit. 19-21; ÁDÁM: *Edvard ...* op. cit. 93-94; ZEMAN-KLIMA: *The life of ...* op. cit. 11-15.

⁹ ZEMAN-KLIMA, 13.

¹⁰ Boris JAKOVENKÓ: *Bibliografie Edvarda Beneše*. Praha, 1936, 3-4, 7-21.

¹¹ ÁDÁM: *Edvard ...* op. cit. 94. HANZAL: *Edvard ...* op. cit. 20. ZEMAN- KLIMA: *The life of ...* op. cit. 12-13.

¹² Edvard BENEŠ: *Le problème autrichien et la question tchèque*. Paris 1908.

¹³ Ibid, 1-5 in the original.

Czechoslovakia deems Hungary to be a more or less foreign state and that Hungary's influence on the present day internal conflict within Austria is, at best, minimal. On top of it all, Hungary's position was always unique within the Empire, and thus, the struggles of the Austrian half of the Empire proceeded independently. It was only in the period between 1848 and 1867 that the Austrian, Hungarian and Czech problems became closely intertwined. Here we must note that, in spite of this statement of topic focus and restriction, Hungary and Hungarians regularly appear on the pages of the dissertation. Beneš takes the viewpoint that the so called 'Austrian question' is, in actuality, the 'Czech question' and interprets it as the Czech's struggles when he comments on the 'Germans against the dynasty.' He writes: „*The struggles between the Czechs and the Germans have, for the past half century, paralyzed all political development in Austria and is a direct cause that parliamentary government could not genuinely occur there. As a result, a series of disastrous consequences took place, both for the entire state and the two combatant nations. Today, the situation has become untenable for all concerned. We must make serious attempts, both on the hypothetical and practical levels, to put an end to this eternal question.*”¹⁴

The eight chapters of the dissertation can be divided into two groups. The larger first portion, made up of chapters one to seven, is used by Beneš to show the historical precedents of the 'Czech question', introducing the histories of the Czechs and the Habsburgs, or rather the relationship of the Czechs and the Germans of the Czech lands, from 1526 to the 20th century. This, we can view as the historical introduction to the first concept. The second part, chapter eight by itself, is devoted to laying out his suggestion to the 'Czech question'.

It must be pointed out that Beneš, in his dissertation, makes extremely inconsistent use of the names of the member states of the Empire. From a legal perspective, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was born in May of 1867, the symbolic date of birth is taken as June 8, 1867, when Francis Joseph was crowned as King of Hungary. Subsequently, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is made up of two component parts: the Hungary of King Saint Stephen (Kingdom of Hungary) and the Austrian Empire (commonly called Austria, occasionally referred to as Transleithania). When Beneš refers to the Austrian portion of the Monarchy, he most often uses the expression 'Austria' but occasionally he uses the same term to refer to the whole of the Monarchy. On occasion, to compound the error, in some instances Beneš calls the pre-1867 state as the Monarchy.

It is time to become familiar with the train-of-thought of the first concept. The period from 1526 to 1906 is divided by Beneš into 3 separate eras.¹⁵ The first period starts with the ascension of the Habsburgs to the Czech and Hungarian thrones and ends with the death, in 1740, of Charles III. In this

¹⁴ Ibid, 3.

¹⁵ Ibid, 25.

period, the Habsburg Empire is a confederation of feudal and independent states. The next period opens with Maria Theresa coming to the throne and lasts until 1848. This is the age of centralized absolutism, giving rise to the modern bureaucratic state and the Habsburgs instituted a policy of unification to strengthen it. The last period begins with the revolution of 1848, through the constitutional centralism, to end with the emergence of Dualism.

In chapters one and two, Beneš reviews the history of the first period, from 1526 to 1740.¹⁶ He paints the following picture of the newly created Habsburg empire along the Danube¹⁷: „*The three parts of the Austrian monarchy were completely separate, merely united by the person of the ruler. In the perpetual Austrian provinces, the Habsburgs exercised absolute power, governing functions being the exclusive realm of the ruler. The case of Hungary is completely different, as the legitimate ruler must obey the laws passed by Diet. The powers of the Czech rulers were only curbed by the law enacted in 1500 by Vladislaus.*”¹⁸ In practical terms, Beneš interprets the just-born Habsburg Empire as a confederation. In his reasoning, he omits that Ferdinand I was striving to reduce both the Czech and the Hungarians to the level of the perpetual Austrian provinces. To this end, he did all he could to break both countries but his endeavors were only partly successful. In Hungary, he could not break the opposition of the Estates. Among the Czech, he succeeded in trimming the rights of the autonomous cities – thus taking the first step towards absolutism – but he could not completely subjugate the Czech nobility, or contain their rights. In fact, he was forced to grant new privileges. On summary, Ferdinand’s attempts to centralize legislative and administrative functions closed unsuccessfully. His heirs were not pleased with this situation and strove in the early 17th century to widen their power and completely hold in their hands the legislative and administrative prerogative.

The final portion of chapter two,¹⁹ Beneš devotes to the results of the battle of White Mountain. In 1618, the Czech Estates rose against Habsburg rule. The ruler’s forces (Ferdinand II, 1619-1637) defeated the forces of the uprising on November 8, 1620 at White Mountain, close to Prague. Beneš makes no mention at all of these events. He merely notes that Ferdinand II executed 27

¹⁶ Ibid, 6-24, 25-43.

¹⁷ The history of the 1526 union of the Austrian, Hungarian and Czech crowns has been thoroughly documented. The gist of it is that a pact was made in 1515 between Maximilian I (Holy Roman Emperor between 1493 and 1519) and Vladislaus (king of the Czechs and of Hungary between 1490 and 1516) under the terms of which, in case of no direct male heir in one dynasty, succession would fall to the other dynasty. On the death, with no heir, of the Jagellonian Louis II in 1526 – who was simultaneously king of both the Czechs and Hungarians – under the terms of the 1515 agreement, the Czech and Hungarian crowns fell to the House of Habsburg, Ferdinand I. Thus, from the perpetual Austrian provinces, with the addition of Bohemia and Hungary, was born the Habsburg Empire.

¹⁸ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. 26.

¹⁹ Ibid, 34-43.

nobles as the leaders of the uprising and confiscated their properties. The remaining 112 families of the high nobility became vassals of the ruler. The deposed noble families were replaced by foreign nobility who faithfully and without reservation served the Habsburgs. The results of these events can still be felt today – writes Beneš – since the descendants of the new aristocracy hold sway in the Diet and the Catholic Church has successfully re-Catholicized the Czech people.

Ferdinand II completely broke the resistance of the Czech Estates after the Battle of White Mountain and shattered the constitution. He introduced absolutism, which was the first step of centralization. The Catholic Church obediently served the dynastic plans of the Habsburgs. Ferdinand wished to avoid new opposition by the Czech Estates, thus, in 1627, he had the constitution amended. This step was explained by trumped up excuses by the Viennese politicians. This was the theory of ‘lost rights’, meaning that the Czechs lost their rights when they turned against their chosen ruler. The king, thus, had legitimate right to punish them. In reality, the new constitution of 1627 was nothing less than a coup: illegal and unconstitutional – said Beneš.

In the new constitution, the law of succession was re-defined. Ferdinand II became the sole ruler of the Czechs, not having to share power with the Estates. It also changed the constitution of the Diet, as well. The three estates – nobility, the knights and the cities – were enlarged by a fourth, the Church, which assumed the position of the First Estate. All were expected to return to the Catholic faith, or leave the country. The German language assumed equality with the Czech language. This equality became altered by the 18th century when the German language assumed primacy. After the introduction of the new constitution, the Czech chancellery embodied the legislative and administrative independence and unity of Saint Wenceslaus’s Crown; the chancellery announced the new laws and regulations. The Czechs began the road to absolutism – said Beneš.

In the third chapter of his dissertation, Beneš deals with the history of what he calls the second era.²⁰ According to Beneš, Charles III – between 1711 and 1740, Holy Roman Emperor as Charles IV, simultaneously on the Czech and Hungarian thrones as Charles III – tried to centralize his empire in the interest of dynastic concerns. Parallel to his centralizing efforts, and in concert with them, Charles III managed to have the *Pragmatica Sanctio* enacted on April 19, 1713. This contained three major principles: (1) the permanent Habsburg provinces can not be divided, (2) the investiture is based on the law of primogeniture, and (3) lacking a male heir, the crown descends on the female branch (first along Charles III’s daughter, then Joseph I’s and Leopold I’s). In practical terms, the rules of inheritance were extended to the Habsburg daughters. The Czech estates ratified the *Pragmatica Sanctio* in 1720. The

²⁰ Ibid, 44-79.

Habsburgs, thus, took another step towards centralization and the unity of the empire. Charles III was able to get the other Great Powers to accept the Pragmatica Sanctio, the guarantee of his dynastic plans, ensuring the throne to his heir, Maria Theresa.

After his death, the Prussian ruler, Frederic II, attempted to gain control of Austria's richest province, Silesia, igniting and winning the war of the Austrian succession. After such precedents, the new ruler on the throne, Maria Theresa, blamed the war's losses on the diverse composition of her empire, deciding to adopt the Prussian method, which is to say, increased centralization. The Czech estates expressed mild opposition to Maria Theresa's aspirations. The reason was White Mountain, that is, the defeat of the Czech nation, the reorganization of the nobility and the creation of common institutions. Hungary's situation differed from the Czech's. The Magyar estates were strong and could afford to ask a steep price for the defense of Austria against the Prussians. Maria Theresa was clear that Hungary's revolt would be more dangerous. The Magyar resistance was much stronger against absolutism. For these reasons, the Magyars gained more importance in this period than the Czechs. Maria Theresa's aim was to give uniform administration and uniform laws to the Czech and Austrian parts of the Empire. In 1749, she merged the Czech and Austrian chancelleries. From this time onwards, the Prague Viceroy was appointed directly by the ruler from among her own bureaucrats. The sole right the Czech Diet retained was the vote to approve the taxes. In Hungary, Maria Theresa allowed the institutions of the estates, while the Czech ones were repressed. Thus, the Habsburg rulers made concessions to the Magyars. This policy of concessions came to its zenith with official Dualism.

It must here be pointed out that this statement in Beneš' dissertation is a rather liberal interpretation, as it washes together and fails to differentiate between the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise and the reforms of Maria Theresa of a century before.

Beneš continues his chain of thought with the assessment of Joseph II (1780-1790), who made attempts to make Austria into a modern state. His aim was to unify the parts of the empire, through a centralized bureaucracy and to get all the ethnic parts speaking one language, German. He attempted to govern by edict and expected immediate results but did not count on national opposition. His secular reforms brought him opposition from the Church, while his social reforms pitted him against the nobility. The Church and the nobility both looked for support against the Joseph-inspired germanization and found it in national sentiment. In an empire seemingly on the way to unification, the seeds of decentralization were beginning to germinate, which blossomed into the later national struggles. Joseph II was faced with very strong resistance and finally rescinded all his edicts on his death bed.

His successor, Leopold II (1790-1792), seemingly took some steps backward – reinstating the power of the Diet – but the centralized institutions

remained strong. The estates did not regain their ancient rights, which precluded their hope of returning to the previous constitution.

Under the reign of Leopold II's successors, Francis I (1792-1835) and Ferdinand V (1835-1848), public life was defined by one factor: the bureaucracy, which acquired so much power that it could doom to failure any federalist constitutional reform attempts. The estates were powerless against the ruler. Their objections remained fruitless. There was a vast abyss between the written laws and the reality. This was the situation that faced the Czechs in the spring of 1848.

In his dissertation, Beneš titles chapter four as „*Austria and the Czech lands during the 1848 revolution.*”²¹ He broke the chapter into four parts. In the first part, bearing the title of „*The awakening of the Czech people and the result of the revolution on Czech Kingdom*”,²² he develops the idea that the national awareness of the Slav people, on a theoretical plane, followed the ideal of the French Revolution – espousing human and civil rights – while on the practical level, the desires for democratic needs that filled the void subsequent to the destruction of feudalism. Of all the theories of national rights, Herder's theory exercised the greatest influence on the Czechs. According to Herder, a nation can only be homogeneous; thusly, a heterogeneous state has no foundation for existence.

In 1848, the struggle between the Czechs and the Germans living on Czech lands reignited – Beneš continued his line of reasoning. At the beginning of the revolution, the Czechs and the co-habiting Germans stood shoulder to shoulder in common defiance against absolutism. Shortly, though, clashes of interests appeared. The National Assembly, gathered in Frankfurt on May 18, 1848 had, as its prime goal to unite all German-populated territories from the Baltic to the Adriatic. The Czech Germans supported the plan, meaning they cast their vote on the principles of national rights. On the opposing side, the Czech were fighting for a Czech homeland and not for the independence of any ethnic component. They wanted personal rights and universal freedom for all, regardless of national affiliation. Beneš stated that, in this conflict, the Czechs held the moral high ground as opposed to the Czech Germans, as the national principle could not be applied since the Czech and Germans were settled in a greatly commingled manner. The application of the national principle proposed by the Germans would have meant the end of the Czech state. For this reason, the Czechs saw Frankfurt as the greatest danger to their own national survival. To avoid the German peril, the Czech leaders began to support Austria – even though it was strongly anti-Slav – and thus was born the program of historical rights of the Czechs. Its basic tenet was the creation of a federal union with Austria and Hungary. This program could not come into existence because, after the failure of the revolutions, the Habsburgs reinstated absolute rule.

²¹ Ibid, 80-162.

²² Ibid, sub-chapter I, 80-119.

In the second sub-chapter, Beneš factually acquaints us with the events of 1848.²³ He states: In the spring of 1848, the ruler was forced to make concessions but this did not satisfy his peoples. The Czechs wrote a petition to the king (and sent it to Vienna on March 11, 1848 – auth.) in which they demanded the complete equality of the Germans and Czechs in legislative and administrative matters in the territories of the Czech Crown: Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. (hereafter, referred to simply as Bohemia – *ed.*) The ruler, again, conceded. He issued the Czech Charter on April 8, 1848 in which he decreed the equality of the Czech and German languages, as well as segregating the Czech legislative and executive powers from that of the Empire. He stated that the National Assembly can independently manage its own internal affairs. Only one thing was not granted in the Czech Charter, the unification of the three component parts of the Czech crown, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. The tactics of the Emperor led to the Moravian estates to also write a petition to the Viennese Court. In it, they demanded their independence from the Czechs and stated their opposition to the legislative unification. The National Assembly drafted a new Constitution on June 7, 1848, which it presented to the Diet. The Prague uprising broke out five days after the Diet met. At this point, the Emperor decided on armed intervention. He dissolved the National Assembly and adjourned the Diet.

In the third sub-chapter, Beneš acquaints the Czechs' continued struggle for federation.²⁴ He expounds that the Pillersdorf²⁵ Constitution, published in April of 1848 – which ensured certain freedoms and rights for the Empire's population, although retained strong centralization – was rejected by the empire's nationalities. The Emperor, seeing the discontentment, called for a Constitutional Assembly in Vienna, with the task of drafting a definitive constitution for Austria. Due to the uprisings of the Viennese students and workers, the Emperor relocated the Assembly to Kremsier (on May 21, 1848 – auth.) where work was begun on drafting a constitution. In Kremsier, the Czechs wanted to achieve independence, although still within the Empire. One of their prominent leaders – Karel Havlíček – phrased it as: „... *only within Austria can we retain our independence.*”²⁶ František Palacky – the defining personage of the Czech delegates to Kremsier – thought that the total independence demanded by the Magyars was extremely risky,²⁷ and so worked out a draft himself. According to his proposal, a central parliament must be

²³ Ibid, sub-chapter II, 120-129.

²⁴ Ibid, sub-chapter III, 130-151.

²⁵ Franz Freiherr von Pillersdorf was Interior Minister in the Ficquelmont Government that took office in April 1848. He drafted a constitution on the Belgian model.

²⁶ Karel Havlíček-Borovsky (1821-1856) publicist and politician, a leading figure of Czech national liberalism.

²⁷ Frantisek Palacky (1798-1876), historian, archivist of the Sternberg family. First appears in political life in 1830, as one of the founders of the *Matice česká*. One of the most important Czech personage of the Kremsier Assembly.

created, which would look after common undertakings but the individual National Assemblies could intervene in the legislative work of the central parliament. The representatives to the central parliament would be delegated by the National Assemblies.

According to Beneš, Palacky's plans were not entirely perfect but should have still been implemented after the Hungarian Revolution was put down. However, these plans only remained on paper.

The fourth sub-chapter Beneš gave the title „*Struggle for the constitution.*”²⁸ In this part, he again returns to the problem faced by the Kremsier Assembly. He relates that Palacký's constitutional proposals failed but the Assembly eventually worked out a new draft constitution. This proposed to transform Austria into a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy. The ruler would only have the power of veto. It envisioned Austria divided into 14 provinces, every one of which would wield equal rights. This constitutional draft was acceptable to both Czech federalists and German liberals, hence it seemed certain to be accepted. However, reactionary forces conspired and, on April 7, 1849, with the help of the army, broke up the Assembly. Here, it must be noted that Beneš errs a whole month with regard to this event, or perhaps merely mis-typed, as the Emperor dissolved the Kremsier parliament on March 7, 1849.

In continuing with his narrative, Beneš relates that the new Emperor, Francis Joseph, announced a new constitution (historians refer to it as the Octroi Constitution or the Olmütz Constitution – *auth.*). With it, Czech federalist dreams died and centralization again won. The Czechs, along with the Magyars and the other provinces, became indelibly bound to the Monarchy. In 1851, absolutism was again openly reinstated.

Beneš devotes the fifth chapter of his dissertation to the period from the Olmütz Constitution to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.²⁹ His line of reasoning is as follows: The dissolution of the Kremsier Assembly dashed all Czech hopes. During the decade of absolutism, the Czechs suffered the most, being completely subjugated. At the same time, Vienna carried on skirmishes with Prussia; the question was: under whose leadership would German unity be realized, Austria or Prussia? The running confrontation between Austria and Prussia had consequences for the Slav nations of the Empire, too. In order that German unity may be realized under Austrian direction, Francis Joseph had to continue a centralist and absolutist policy, and attempt to Germanize his empire. Germans filled the leading positions in the Habsburg Empire, thus they, too, had to be resisted. As part of this struggle, Palacky again published his federalist plan in his 1866 book, *Austrian state theory*. On September 2, 1870, at Sedan, the Prussians handed an overwhelming defeat to the forces of France, thereby putting an end to the question. German unity was realized under Prussian leadership, not Austrian.

²⁸ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit., sub-chapter IV, 151-162.

²⁹ *Ibid*, chapter V, 163-208.

The official document published in October of 1860 (treated in more detail later in Part I, chapter IV – *ed.*) gave a degree of satisfaction to the Czechs, wrote Beneš. In his opinion, the document elucidated two important principles: the necessity of unity for the Monarchy and the independence of the provinces. The major characteristic of the document was that it attempted to impose a new constitution over the whole Empire. It created two Reichsrats (parliamentary houses-*ed.*): the ‘narrow Reichsrat’ for the non-Magyar affairs (meaning the Austrian half of the Empire – *auth.*) and a plenary Reichsrat, whose sphere extended over the whole of the Empire. At the sessions of the plenary Reichsrat, the various provinces were not equally represented, rather representation took into consideration population, taxes paid, etc. The document left untouched the existing Magyar constitution but introduced the new one in the other provinces. Hungary was afforded separate treatment, a situation that precluded the concept of federalism. Furthermore, the rights of the provincial estates were completely confined, until little more was left for them to do than vote (really only approve) the annual taxes. To consider this federalism is preposterous. The only winners of the changes wrought by this document were the Imperial Court and the Magyars.

According to Beneš, the legislation was a blend of centralism, federalism and dualism, but mostly centralism and dualism. In this assessment, we disagree with Beneš and side with József Galántai, who posits that the document merely set out the broad parameters of a constitutional order, which could have been expanded in either centralist or federalist directions.³⁰

Beneš is even more critical of the decree published in February of 1861 (also treated in more detail later - *ed.*), stating that it distinctly enraged the Czechs. On this point, we must state our agreement with him as the decree indeed propelled the Empire on the road towards centralization. Beneš presumes that the February decree is the work of Schmerling³¹ and the German centralists. The diktat created a bicameral parliament. In selecting representatives, the interests of the Germans were deemed paramount. Article 13 clearly serves the interests of absolutism, when it defines the roles and responsibilities of parliament whereby the ‘smaller Reichsrat’ holds overriding powers above the provincial assemblies. We find the same in the composition of the Council of State, as it was always filled by men loyal to the Emperor. The decree was born in the spirit of dualism, said Beneš. The powers of the Transleithanian national assemblies were more circumscribed than Hungary’s. While Hungary possessed its own constitution and a National Assembly wielding wide powers, the ‘inner’ Austrian provinces carried the yoke of

³⁰ GALÁNTAI, József: *A Habsburg Monarchia alkonya* [Twilight of the Habsburg Empire]. Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest 1985, 25.

³¹ Anton Ritter von Schmerling (1805-1893) politician, Austrian Minister of Justice 1849-1851, Minister of State and Minister of the Interior 1860-1865. The decree was published on February 26, 1861.

unbridled centralism. Thus, the Czechs decided to oppose the decree and attempted to stand up for their rights in parliament. The Court's attempts at centralization ran into sharp opposition in Hungary, too, but Vienna was unable to overcome Magyar resistance. This, then, leads to the Emperor coming to a compromise with the Magyars, setting the stage for the necessary creation of Dualism. The fiercest opponents of Magyar aspirations were the Czechs, who wanted a federal system – wrote Beneš, finishing his line of reasoning.

Chapter VI of the dissertation is devoted by Beneš to detailed examination of the Austro-Hungarian compromise and the constitution of 1867.³² In his estimation, the February decree never fulfilled its intent. There was great opposition in Hungary after its publication, while, in the Austrian half, the provinces refused to send representatives to the Reichsrat, leading to the fall of Schmerling. His successor, Belcredi, promised some concessions but decided to convene a special sitting of the parliament.³³ At this time, a struggle erupts between the centralists and the federalists. The Court, fearful that the proposal will not gain acceptance, recalled Belcredi and, in his place as Prime Minister, appointed Beust.³⁴ Beust recalled the 'narrow Reichsrat', which showed greater loyalty. Two means of expressing their displeasure lay open to the Czechs: go to the Reichsrat and attempt to fight for their rights or simply protest by boycotting the proceedings. The Czechs, following the Magyar example, chose the latter. Thus, the constitution of 1867 was drafted without the Czechs. To quote the words of Rieger: „*about us, without us*”, meaning, about the Czechs but without the Czechs.³⁵

Hence, the new constitution that was thus born set the state on the road towards constitutionality, on the one hand but, at the same time, strengthened the dual centralism, as well. The Germans and Magyars divided the Empire between themselves along the Leitha River, in Trans- and Cisleithania. In drawing his thoughts to a conclusion, Beneš stated that modern Austria was an amalgam of cautious federalism and dynastic centralism, the state becoming the flawed creation of the Habsburgs. Austria could not be a perfectly absolutist state, not having all the preconditions; the component territories are fundamentally different, their historical traditions seemingly incompatible. The different nationalities had never wanted the creation of a unified Austria, always opposing every move towards centralism. The dynasty could never realize this intent, merely able to maintain the façade of a seemingly united Empire.

³² BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. chapter VI, 202-232.

³³ Count Richard von Belcredi (1832-1902), politician, Austrian Prime Minister 1865-67, as well as Minister of the Interior and Minister of State Security (police forces).

³⁴ Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust (1809-1886) politician, Prime Minister from February 1867, the first Foreign Minister, from November, 1867, of the combined Austro-Hungarian Empire.

³⁵ František Ladislav Rieger (1818-1905), newspaper man, economist, Czech politician, Palacky's son-in-law. The author of the 1868 Czech declaration of statehood.

The seventh chapter of the dissertation is devoted to the appraisal of the 1867 constitution.³⁶ In it, he argues that the constitution's basis rests on federalist ideas but, at the same time, also strengthens centralist principles. This dichotomy arises from the fact that the document was not a homogeneous work, arising from one single principle, but was born from two competing doctrines: federalism in the legislative area and centralism in the executive. The Reichsrat and the provincial Diets were envisioned to be the legislative bodies, while the executive powers were to be centralized. The provincial Diets' did not possess individual executive branches. They could enact laws but had to turn to a central authority to have them carried out. The executive branch, in turn, is not responsible to the Diets. This segregation of functions makes the Diets ineffectual. The creation of the executive branch, based on federalist principles of the legislative branches, would seem to be the next logical step. Without it, the creation of a National Assembly is merely a apparent concession, hamstrung by the centralized executive power; what the constitution gave with the one hand, it took away with the other. This gave rise to „*the struggles of the non-German peoples of Austria*” - Beneš continued his reasoning. Austria's true role should have been to satisfy the desires of the various nationalities but the successive Austrian governments did not work towards this end, in fact, they worked to ensure the primacy of one nationality in the state, the Germans. They had favored positions reserved in the legislature, the administration and every public place of work through the simple expedient of declaring German as the official language. Until 1906, they controlled the army and the bureaucracy. Schmerling's election rules ensured a majority in the Reichsrat for the 9 million Germans of Cisleithania against 15 million Slavs.

It was against this situation that the Slavs, living in the Austrian portion of the Empire, took up the fight. While the struggle between the Czechs and the Germans is the basis of every ethnic struggle, at the same time, it also encapsulates the gist of the Austrian problem: if the Czech-German conflict would be solved, then every ethnic conflict within Austria would be solved. For the Germans, the continued centralist form of state was their only guarantee for the retention of their privileges and position. They felt that Austria could not exist if it were not German, or at least in German hands. That is why they take steps to frustrate Czech plans to return to the position of the old Czech state, i.e., the federalization of the Monarchy. In German minds, the state is more important than the nation. The differences on this point alone, between the Germans and the Slavs, incited intractable dissent. This clash is primarily a linguistic one. In 1627, the parity of the Czech and German languages in the Czech lands was announced but the bureaucracy of the monarchy, created by Maria Theresa and Joseph II, needed an official language. This, of necessity, became German. At the same time, the stirring ethnic awareness of the Slavs

³⁶ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. chapter VII, 233-278. Beneš divided this chapter into three parts: the first part (unnumbered) runs from 233 to 251, the subsequent two parts are identified as II and III.

was apparent in their embrace of their national languages and historical cultures. The centralists wanted to make German as the state language, as the most important instrument in the creation of a unified Monarchy. The Czechs took up the battle for the equality of their language because, in their view, linguistic equality meant national equality. Within their country, they wanted to use their own language in public administration, the government, etc. Closely bound to this is the problem of education. For a long time, the Czech language was banished from the schools, forcing the Czechs to press for new schools, which successive governments refused to sanction. The government refused to permit the building of new Czech middle schools, refused the establishment of a single university in Moravia. According to Beneš, the question of the schools and the language of public administration were the two topics where Czechs and Germans clashed violently. This claim Beneš supports with numerous statistics.³⁷ As an example, he illustrates the situation of higher education with the following statistics: „9 million Austrian Germans have 5 universities, while 6 million Czechs (and 2 million Slovaks) have only 1, in Prague; 4.2 million Poles have 2 universities, while 3.4 million Ruthenians have none, 1.2 million Slovenes have none, 700,000 Italians have none and 230,000 Romanians have none.”³⁸

After marshalling more statistical evidence, Beneš continues his line of reasoning. He cites, verbatim, article 19 of the constitution, according to which: „all the nations of the Monarch are equal before the law and every nation has an inalienable right to, and protection of, its national language and culture – the state concedes to the legal equality of languages used in a country in the schools, administration and public life - ... In those countries populated by several nations, the educational institutions should be organized such that every national group is to receive educational facilities in its own language, without being forced to learn another nation’s language.”³⁹

Next, Beneš takes several pages to list examples showing that, although article 19 guaranteed linguistic equality, in reality, the Czechs are forced to use German in their homeland in the courts, in public administration, in education and every important site of officialdom.

After discussing the linguistic problem, Beneš depicts the behavior of the Czech political elite after 1867.⁴⁰ He begins his reasoning with a question: „After the acceptance of the constitution and compromise of 1867, what could be the conduct of the Czechs?”⁴¹ He proceeds to answer the question thus: the constitution was written without, and against, the Czechs, it was of a centralist character with only ostensible concessions to federalist principles; the structure is

³⁷ Ibid, 242-244.

³⁸ Ibid, 243.

³⁹ Ibid, 245.

⁴⁰ Ibid, part II, 251-266.

⁴¹ Ibid, 251.

illogical and is full of anti-Slav dictates. In the midst of such a political landscape, the Czechs could not waver for long, they had to develop a new political program. This undertaking was accepted by the Czech nobility. The Czech nobility were envious at seeing the advantages that the Magyar nobility derived from the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. In the interest of obtaining the same role for themselves, the Czech nobles thought to employ the same method as their Magyar counterparts. Thus, the Czech nobility became avid supporters of Czech historical rights, transforming from the most compliant German courtiers into the most uncompromising, radical Czechs. In this manner, they became the leaders of the Czech national movement for 20 years, after 1867. The Czech nobles emulated the Magyars in demanding the same rights and privileges as those granted to Hungary. To counter Dualism, they proposed a three way power sharing, based on the Czechs historical rights. Beneš evaluated this tripartite plans as follows: this program can be censured on several points, although admirable as a patriotic ‘daydream,’ it does not address neither the realities of the time nor the situation. The Czech political elite can not create a Czech state, one third of whose population – here Beneš hints at the Germans – has decided to oppose it strenuously and will never accept its legality.

In order to shed light on the ethnic background, let us interrupt the examination of the dissertation. According to the first official census of 1880,⁴² in the Austrian Empire of 21,750,000 people, there were 5,100,000 Czechs, living in the ‘three provinces of the Czech crown’: Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. However, these three provinces were not only populated by Czechs. According to the statistics, the population breakdown by province is as follows: Bohemia: 63% Czech & 37% German; Moravia: 70% Czech & 30% German; Silesia: 23% Czech, 49% German & 28% Polish. To summarize the census figures for these three crown provinces, in 1880, they had a total population of 8 million, of which 62% were of Czech extraction, 35% German and 2% Polish, meaning that the provinces were the mutual homelands of both the Czechs and Germans. To make matters worse, the Germans lived in one contiguous block.

To return to the dissertation, we can state that, when Beneš criticized the tripartite proposal of the Czech nobility, he was basing it on the previously cited ethnic situation. We must also cast back to the portion of the document dealing with 1848, where he reasons that the nationality principle supported by the Bohemian Germans would have inevitably led to the breakup of the historical Czech territory. Beneš continued: the whole Czech nation, under the leadership of the nobility, demanded a position such as Hungary’s, and worked out a plan for an upcoming Austrian-Czech agreement. This ‘right-to-a-state program’ became unassailable dogma. As a result, the quarrels between the Bohemian Germans and the Czechs became more fanatical. In support of their program, from 1867, the Czechs practiced passive resistance, declining to take

⁴² GALÁNTAI: *A Habsburg ...* op. cit. 205-206.

part in the Reichsrat. In April, 1870, count Potocki formed a new government in Vienna and made an offer of serious negotiation to the Czech leaders⁴³ but only if they cease their passive policy and return to Parliament. The Czechs rejected the offer and Potocki's attempt failed. His successor, Hohenwart, also attempted to reach a compromise with the Czechs in February of 1871, so a new round of discussions were begun.⁴⁴ These resulted in the Emperor signing a document, on September, 1871, in which he formally recognized Bohemia's rights and obliged himself to respect them. The final terms of the document awaited the Prague parliament.

On October 10, 1871, the Prague Parliament passed the 'Fundamental Article.' This draft constitution consisted of 18 articles. These articles were meant to govern the position of the Czech Kingdom, its relationship with Hungary and the other countries of Cisleithania. In these founding articles, the Czechs accepted the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, accepted the joint rule of the monarchic government, the combined foreign affairs office of the various parts of the Monarchy, accepted the various delegations created on the basis of the Austro-Hungarian agreement, and demanding 15 seats for the Prague Diet. The articles further decreed the unity of Bohemia and Austria in the areas of customs and commercial matters, indirect taxes, transportation, railways, mail and telegraphs, military and finance affair, and the national debt. In order to be able to pass laws in these areas, a common legislative body must be created, in which all the provincial Diets would be represented. In all other areas, the Prague Diet will have unrestricted right of action. Hence, the Czechs would have regained control over primarily education, justice and internal administration. The executive power in Cisleithania would be exercised by such bodies which would be overseen by appointed national governors with ministerial rank. The executive body of Austria would not have the right to interfere in Bohemian matters. The application of a law, even those enacted by the common legislative body and pertaining to mutual affairs, can only be with the ratification of the applicable Czech Minister whose mandate it is to ratify the laws of the Prague Diet. Finally, a Senate is to be created, its hereditary members appointed by the Emperor, from lists recommended by the Diet. This Senate would have the role of Privy Council, reviewing and ratifying state agreements with foreign countries.

After acknowledging the terms of the draft constitution, Beneš sharply criticizes it, arguing that the plan is much more federalist than tripartite. After his critique, Beneš appraised the subsequent events: the plan was opposed by both the Germans and the Magyars. The centralist Germans began a campaign against Czech-Austrian compromise-supporting Hohenwart government. The

⁴³ Count Alfred Potocki (1817-1889), Austrian politician, supporter of the Czech aspirations, Minister-President of Austria 1870-1871.

⁴⁴ Count Karl Sigmund von Hohenwart (1824-1899), Austrian politician, Minister-President of Austria from February to October, 1871. Supporter of a tripartite monarchical structure.

Magyars, on their side, kept repeating that they will have no part with a Slavicized Austria and will do anything to prevent this transformation. These led to the failure of the proposal. The Emperor – at the beginning willing to make concessions to the Czechs –, unable to resist the combined opposition, rejected the proposal; the Hohenwart government fell in October of 1871. The Emperor, in a ruling, declared that the sole body of constitutional reform is the central Reichsrat and requested the Czechs to appoint representatives from the Prague Diet to the Vienna Parliament. In a note, the Czechs openly refused taking part in the Reichsrat and decided to continue their abstention. The Auersperg government – in office from 1871 to 1879 – took strong steps against every Czech endeavor.

Minister-President Taaffe,⁴⁵ whose government was sworn in on August 14, 1879, was more conciliatory towards the Czechs, who decided to capitulate. The Czech representatives returned to parliament on September 23, 1879, bringing to a close the era of passive resistance. At this point, Beneš again heaps sharp criticism on the right-to-a-state program: „*The right to a state is an honorable dream, a very justified hope but merely a hope. It is clear from the events that this program lacks common sense. ... This policy was condemned to unavoidable failure. We have already alluded how absurd is the thought of founding a state over the protest and opposition of one third of the population. The Bohemian Germans would not accept a minority role, no matter how solemn the guarantees offered to them by the Czechs to allay their fears of oppression and loss of rights.*”⁴⁶

Beneš continued his thinking with: the concessions made by the Taaffe government to the Czechs, in return which they returned to the Vienna Parliament, were inadequate. It consisted of Pražak – the Moravian Czech leader – being appointed as Minister of Justice, a positive passage in the throne speech (extolling the enthusiasm of the Czech representatives), a few vague promises on the equality of rights of nationalities, the April 19, 1880 decree (which announced the linguistic equality of the nationalities) and the permission to open a Czech university in Prague. In spite of these concessions, the Czech were not satisfied. They received much but were far from their ultimate goal. The ‘old Czech’ politician supported the Taaffe government in return for the concessions but ran into confrontation with the ‘young Czechs’ who were not satisfied by the political hand-outs of the Taaffe government. Taaffe was unlikely to have been sanctioned to make serious concession to the Czechs, as the Crown was never willing to go past certain boundaries with regard to making compromises with the Czechs, lest it imperil the unity of the Empire. The Prague National Assembly of 1889 gave the mandate to the ‘young Czechs’ – half of the ‘old Czech’ representatives were not reelected.

⁴⁵ Viscount Eduard Taaffe (1833-1895), Austrian politician of Irish descent, twice Minister-President, in 1868-1870 and 1879-1893.

⁴⁶ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. 272.

To digress again from the dissertation, we must note that the Czech political landscape, in the second half of the 19th century, and especially so in the final decade, developed into a highly segmented party structure. The more important parties were: Old Czech Nationalist Party, Liberal Young Czech Party, Czech-Slav Social Democratic Workers Party, Czech-Moravian Farmers Party (later the Czech-Slav Agrarian Party), Czech National Socialist Party, Czech People's Party, Czech Progressive Party.⁴⁷

Returning to Beneš' argument: On top of the internal strife among the Czechs, the clashes between the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia became more severe. The Germans already lost their majority position in the Prague Diet in 1883. Every attempt at coming to an agreement was futile due to the disproportionately sizeable German demands. In 1886, the Germans refused to sit in the session of the Prague Diet after it rejected their motion to have Bohemia divided into Czech and German territories. In January of 1890, Taaffe opened new negotiations with the Czechs to try and arrange an agreement between the Czechs and their Germans. The Old Czechs tried to show some nominal success, after their disastrous losses in the election, and accepted Taaffe's invitation to the negotiating table. The outcome of these negotiations, which created an internal crisis among the Czech political elite, is referred to as the 'Agreement' – observes Beneš. In it, the sides stated their agreement on the following points: 1.) The makeup of the ministry for public education in Bohemia. The council must be split into two: Czech and German. Thus, both nations can decide on the issues that impact their schools. The united council can make decisions affecting every school in Bohemia on matters of common interest. 2.) The division of the country's agricultural ministry. This council, also, was split into two, Czech and German; also to sit as one to render decisions over matters of common interest. Otherwise, both factions to operate independently. The judicial and administrative ridings were re-drawn, as far as possible, to contain only Czech or German settlements. 3.) Schools for the Czech and German minorities. Minority schools were to be provided and maintained, at state expense, where the settlement had 80 school-age children of minority nationality, whose father has lived in the community for 3 years and expressed a need for education in his mother tongue. 4.) The creation of a chamber of commerce for the eastern portion of Bohemia. 5.) Revision to the rules of election to the chamber of commerce. 6.) Separation of the Prague Court of Appeal. The appeals court was again split into two, Czech and German, with 26 advisers who were fluent in both languages and a further 15 who were merely unilingual in German. 7.) The rules for the appointment of judges. 8.) The question of the languages. The 1880 decree of Taaffe to be reviewed. 9.) The question of language use in common

⁴⁷ URBAN, Otto: *A nagykorúvá érés gyötrelmei. Társadalom és politika a 19. század és a 20. század fordulóján* [The anguish of growing up. Society and politics in the 19th and the turn of the 20th century], IN: *Csehország a Habsburg-monarchiában 1618-1918* [Bohemia in the Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1918]. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest 1989, 132-155.

administrative affairs. This item was deferred for decision to the next session of the Diet. 10.) The founding of two national Curiae. Instead of a Curia for the towns and rural villages, two were to be created: Czech and German. Either Curia had the power of veto over questions of the Bohemian constitution, the electoral rules, language use in common administration and educational matters where linguistic segregation was not possible. 11.) The reform of the electoral process. The government must present its planned electoral reform before the Diet's next session.

The agreement between the Old Czech and Taaffe brought discontent and displeasure among the Czech public, while the Germans were very content with it – states Beneš – as the integrity of the Czech kingdom was breached with the recognition of an inviolable German territory. The Czechs had no rights in the German zone, while the Germans enjoyed equality in the Czech zones. Put another way, the Old Czechs abandoned the Czech minority in the German regions, while ensuring the rights of the Germans. The Young Czechs – who were not invited to the negotiations – deemed the ‘Agreement’ unacceptable and took position against it, citing the indivisibility of the entire country. This garnered the Young Czechs the support of the electorate, leading to their 1891 win in Parliament over the Old Czechs, where they stopped the ratification of the ‘Agreement.’ This also led to the fall of the Taaffe government.

In the closing portion of the chapter, Beneš covers the period between 1891 and 1906, the Badeni⁴⁸ and Gautsch⁴⁹ governments, and the Czech-German skirmishes. He closes the chapter with these words: *„Every attempt at a mediated a settlement between the two peoples was a failure. All Austria suffered under this regimen; the situation was near impossible to bear. A solution had to be found at any price. After long hesitation, and opposition by the conservatives, the Court ... decided to employ the last possible means at its disposal: in 1907, it granted universal suffrage to all the peoples of Austria.”*⁵⁰

After sketching the history of the ‘Czech question’ through seven chapters, Beneš gave the next chapter the title *„Solution to the Austrian problem”*, serving notice that he intends to present what he considers the correct solution.⁵¹ In introducing his rationale, he criticized the strategy of both the Old and Young Czechs. In his opinion, the Old Czechs’ right-to-a-state program was built on historical rights and considered all of Bohemia as indivisible. In 1890, they embarked on the path of compromise by giving up this principle and agreeing to administrative and territorial separation of the Czechs and

⁴⁸ Count Felix Kasimir von Badeni (1846-1909), Polish aristocrat, Austrian Minister-President between 1895 and 1897.

⁴⁹ Baron Paul Gautsch von Frankenthurn (1851-1918), Austrian politician, Minister-President between 1897-1898, as well as 1905-1906, and again in 1911.

⁵⁰ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. 278.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 278-307. Beneš broke this chapter (VIII) into two parts, labelling them as ‘I’ and ‘Conclusions’.

Germans. Even though this is a acceptable idea – states Beneš – since the institution of areas with homogeneous populations could lead to self-rule by the nationalities, to more privileges and, to a large extent, the reduction of the central government in their affairs. The Young Czechs exploited the dissatisfaction of the Czech people with the ‘Agreement’, wrapped themselves in the mantle of historical rights, and displaced the Old Czechs in the elections. The Young Czechs thought Bohemia’s historical rights as *sacrosanct* and, for them, it was the ultimate Czech political aim. But while they alluded to Czech historical rights, in reality, they tended towards a federalist direction – Beneš states. They concluded that the Czech question can only be solved if they strive toward the solution to the entire Austrian question. Meaning that they must strive for such a redrafted constitution – one that could be adopted for the whole of Austria – which rests on one single principle. But, a reform of such magnitude could only be of a federalist nature – says Beneš. The Young Czechs – according to Beneš – held themselves to be nationalistic radicals after 1890 but in reality were federalists. Their federalism was ill-defined, uncertain whether to anchor it on historical rights or natural rights, i.e., whether to transform Austria into a federation of provinces or a federation of nations. This is demonstrated by the draft constitution written by the Young Czechs in 1903, which contained strong federalist elements.

In this question, Beneš takes a strong stance on the side that Czech politics must be based on natural rights. He feels that demanding historical rights is dangerous, as this principle can be cited against the Czechs, too. Next, he surveys the views of the other Czech parties regarding the solution of the „*Czech question*”.⁵² Thus, he introduces the policies of the Czech National Socialist Party (radicals), the Agrarian Party, the Czech-Slav Socialist Workers Party (social-democrats) and the Czech People’s Party (Masaryk’s party, also called the ‘Realists.’⁵³) The radicals definitely base their policies on historical rights, extracting some high-sounding mottoes from the historical programs of the past to use to incite the populace into an ‘all-or-nothing’ political direction. For the agrarians, class interests override all, their national policies closely following that of the Young Czechs. According to the social-democrats, the struggle between the nationalities was merely the outcome of capitalism; that the nationalism question is, in the final analysis, a social problem since the struggles against feudalism in Austria took a decidedly national coloring. The

⁵² For more on the various parties, see Otto Urban (footnote 47) and Jiří KOŘALKA: *A világpolitika színpadán. Egy „állam nélküli nemzet” a világpolitika színpadán* [On the stage of world politics. A “stateless nation” on the stage of world politics] IN: SZARKA László (ed.): *Csehország a Habsburg-monarchiában 1618-1918* [Czechs in the Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1918]. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1989, 156-197.

⁵³ Masaryk founded the Czech People’s Party in 1900 (later the Progressive Czech Party), which secured two mandates in the 1907 elections. For Masaryk’s pre-WWI activities Roman SZPORKUK: *The political thought of Thomas Masaryk*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1981, 55-79.

Realists – led by Masaryk – definitely held themselves to be believers in natural rights. Their political program stems from it. They discard the possibility of reinstating the old Czech state, as well as rejecting the ambiguity of the Young Czechs, which, theoretically, is based on historical rights but in reality makes use of natural and nation's rights. The Realists are definitely disciples of federalism. Their solution to the „*Austrian problem*” and the „*Czech question*” is decentralization, promoted by constitutional reform strengthening federalist and autonomist traits. The crux of the reform is the creation of national territories, the separation of administrative and judicial jurisdictions along ethnic lines. The Realists are not afraid of dismembering the Czech Kingdom, seeing the solution in the creation of ethnically homogeneous zones. We can't help but note that, while listing the various party platforms, Beneš hold the Masaryk-Realist program as pre-eminent.

Next, Beneš again poses the question: „*How would it be possible to reorganize Austria in such a manner as every nation could be self-governing? Based on the principle of territory or personal choice?*”⁵⁴ His answer was convoluted. In the first part, he argues the advantages of the personal rights as opposed to territoriality. He contends that the division of territory based on ethnicity is impossible. In Bohemia, there are German-populated areas that contain large Czech minorities, and these would be difficult to define on this basis. Here Czechs and Germans live in the same cantons, same communities, occasionally ‘in the same house.’ The only solution, therefore, - states Beneš – is the reliance on the individual principle (otherwise personal principle). The country would be divided into individual ethnic units and every citizen would have the right to be registered into the region of their choice. Those belonging to the same nationality, not necessarily in the same region but anywhere in the country, would form one national unit one body, one ‘pseudo-legal person.’ It would be the responsibility of this national unit, this *corpus*, to provide for all the needs of its members: schools, theaters, libraries, museums, institutions, education, etc, in the required amount. It should ensure that the applicable laws are applied to its members, hence, it possesses its own administration and judiciary, collects taxes from its members – in all, truly behave as a state.

At this point, Beneš introduces a twist into his reasoning, setting the territorial principle beside the personal principle. (It must be noted here that in the remainder of the dissertation, Beneš never again mentions the personal principle, leaving us in the dark how he intends to reconcile the personal principle with the territorial principle – *auth.*) Beneš states that the country should be carved up into regions. These administrative regions, as far as possible, should be populated by members of the same nation. (We must point out that here Beneš contradicts himself, since only a few pages previously, he stated that the Czechs and Germans could not be separated – *auth.*) Each

⁵⁴ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. 289.

national and administrative level (villages, towns and regions) would elect a special council exclusively dedicated to its national schools, educational facilities, museums, theaters, libraries, etc. Financial questions at the three levels would be resolved by the councils, chosen by universal suffrage, whose make-up would reflect the proportion of the minority. Thus, the framework proposed for Austria and Bohemia – since this proposal would have to be applied to the whole of Austria – must be envisioned as follows: every village, every town, every region where members of two nationalities live, there would exist three institutions, three councils, etc. In Bohemia, for example, in every administrative sub-unit, there would be a Czech national council, a German national council and a council of mixed composition looking after common political and economic matters. The National Council would consist of the representatives of the local councils, which would send a responsible Minister to the central government.

In an earlier part of the dissertation, the importance of schools and the question of language use was a particularly important topic of the Czech-German conflict. So, it is not surprising that, in his solution, Beneš specifically addresses these topics. Regarding schools, he states that the state would have no stake with regard to the founding of schools. In this matter, every nation would be the independent and absolute overseer of its public education. Elementary and middle schools would be the responsibility of the villages and towns and their councils, while regional schools would be established and maintained by the regional council. The lower schools would be supervised by the national councils, the advanced institutions falling under the National Assembly. In ethnically mixed districts, every school falls under the supervision of the council of the appropriate nationality.

Beneš proposes the following solution to the linguistic use problem: in districts with homogeneous population, the language of public administration is the language of the majority. In mixed districts, each nationality would conduct its business in its own language, similar to the manner in which it supervises its schools. Only those matters would be conducted bilingually – in Czech and German in Bohemia – without bias toward either nationality, which are common in the mixed districts.

In continuing, Benes stresses that the basis for the fundamental re-organization of the state apparatus would be regional autonomy. This, however, requires a degree of democratization, the introduction of a democratic electoral process. Today – writes Benes – the bourgeoisie of the various Austrian nations would not permit, under any circumstances, the extension of the franchise to the proletariat, because every democratic process would aid the oppressed nations and hinder the oppressors. In the fight for democracy is part and parcel of the of the struggles of the nationalities in Austria. Beneš then goes on to say that the central constitution must be annulled. Austria must convert itself into a federation of nationalities. In this conversion, particular attention must be paid

to the national bodies, districts, areas and settlements, that is, in re-drawing the boundaries of the old regions and historical provinces, every effort should be made to create national units with homogeneous populations. The units thus derived must be equipped with its own administration and a legislative body – democratically chosen by universal suffrage. The right of universal suffrage must be the basis of every election. Administrative autonomy – similar to the British local councils – must be unhindered. The communities, areas and districts must have the right to organize into national institutions by ethnicity. National Assemblies must be organized – with sovereignty. The central parliament would only retain jurisdiction over the most necessary common affairs, such as military matters, railway transportation, postal and telegraphic services, and the police. To these may be added the national judicial institutions, which would mediate complaints between the nationalities. All these would be applied equally in all parts of the Monarchy. In resolving conflicts in the mixed regions, the model of Belgium, or even more likely Switzerland, could serve as an excellent model for Austria. All these would not eliminate conflicts between the nationalities – says Beneš – but they would become localized to a few mixed regions and should become less aggressive.

In the concluding portion of his reasoning, Beneš reviews the federalist plan of Aurel C. Popovici,⁵⁵ which he considers inadequate for eliminating conflicts among the nationalities. He especially criticizes Popovici's proposal that, in the newly re-organized monarchy, each nationality absorbs any minority living on its territory. (We need to note here that Popovici only excludes the Germans where they are in a minority position, since he wished to endow them with minority rights.) After his critique of Popovici, Beneš once more articulates one of his plan's cornerstones, the principle of territoriality: „*Historical traditions must cede their place to national territories ... Czechs must shed their dreams of a state based on historic rights.*”⁵⁶

Beneš gave the title of „*Conclusions*” to the final part of chapter VIII,⁵⁷ in which he covers the electoral reforms of 1907 (this introduced universal suffrage, for all Austrian male citizens over 24, in electing Reichsrat representatives). He takes special note of the number of representatives of the various nationalities in the 516 seat Reichsrat: Germans 233, Czechs 108, Poles 82, Ruthenians 33, Slovenes 24, Italians 19, Serbs and Croats 13 and Romanians 5.⁵⁸ (We must point out that Beneš made a calculation error because, if we add it all up, the total comes to 517. – *auth.*)

Beneš takes pains to point out the shortcomings of the election reforms, i.e., the disproportionality among the nationalities. He expresses that the Germans

⁵⁵ Aurel POPOVICI: *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Österreich*. Politische Studien zur der nationalen Fragen und Staatsrechtlichen Kriesen in Österreich-Ungarn. Leipzig, Elischer 1906.

⁵⁶ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. 302.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 303-308.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 305.

again received preferential treatment at the expense of the Czechs, the Poles over the Ruthenians, and the Italians over the Serbs and Croats. In proportion, one representative represents 40,400 Italians, 41,100 Germans, 46,200 Romanians, 52,000 Slovenes, 54,000 Poles, 54,700 Serbs and Croats, 57,300 Czechs and 103,000 Ruthenians.⁵⁹ He concludes that “although we are very far from equality and genuine universal suffrage, the Slavs have finally achieved majority over the Germans in Austria.”⁶⁰ If we look at the numbers, Beneš is indeed right, since the Slav total comes to 260, with a further 19 Italians and 5 Romanians. In reality, the Germans allied the Poles to their side and ensured their majority (233 + 82 = 315).⁶¹ Beneš also explores the effects of the 1907 elections on Bohemia, remarking that „universal suffrage had deep consequences especially on the Czech state. Almost one half of the Czech electorate voted for the socialists.”⁶² With this statement of Beneš, another problem of interpretation arises, since the Czech were able to send 108 representatives and those seats were captured by the various parties as shown below.

As can be seen clearly, no party alone won 87 seats! On this point, we can categorically state that Beneš propagandized aggressively, as the Socialists (more precisely the Social Democrats) did actually get 87 seats in the 1907 elections but NOT in Bohemia, rather in Austria – officially, the Austrian Empire. Of the 516 Reichrats seats, they garnered 87 – 49 of them held by Germans – thus, not of the 108 Bohemian seats. Hence, the Social Democrats did not capture ‘more than half’ of the mandates in either the Empire or in Bohemia.⁶³

Returning to his line of reasoning, Beneš closes his dissertation with the following: „We have spoken often of the dissolution of Austria. I do not believe any of it. The historic and economic ties that bind the Austrian nationalities, one to the other, are too strong to permit this dissolution. Universal suffrage and democratization in Austria, especially in Bohemia, will lay the groundwork for the easing of tensions between the nationalities; the union of various classes of the various nationalities, uniting out of a common economic interest will, of necessity, exert a pressure to solve

<i>Party name</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Agrarian Party	28
Coalition of Young Czechs (National Liberal Party) and Old Czechs (National Party)	26
Czech-Slav Socialist Worker’s Party (Social Democrats)	24
Clerical parties	17
Coalition of Czech National Socialist Party and State’s Right Progressive Czech Party (aka Progressives)	2
Czech People’s Party (Masaryk’s party, or the Realists)	2
Independents	2
Total	108

Final results of the 1907 elections in Bohemia.
This table was assembled by the author on the basis of data in the cited works of Kofalka and

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Erich ZÖLLNER: *Ausztria története* [History of Austria]. Osiris Kiadó, 2000, 330-311.

⁶² BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. 306.

⁶³ ZÖLLNER: *Ausztria ...* op. cit. 330.

the Austrian and ethnic question. Certainly, the national struggles will not cease overnight. They will continue to play an important role in Austria for a long time to come but will cease to be like those of the previous half century. Universal suffrage prepared the groundwork for the conclusion of this difficult situation, whose termination ... will lead to the solution of the problem."⁶⁴

In assessing the first plan of Beneš, it can be said that it was completely loyal to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a restatement of the Palacky Austro-Slav course that „if it (the Habsburg's state – auth.) did not exist then, in the interest of Europe and all humanity, we should create it". He did not wish to dissolve the Monarchy but felt a serious reorganization as a necessity. The crux of his suggested solution: federative reorganization with its attendant decentralization.

It is worth comparing his first plan with the plans of the Czech political parties of the day. By the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, the Czech national political structure had become deeply segmented, with a number of directions and parties competing for the voters.⁶⁵ Of the eight parties standing for election in 1907, only the Czech National Socialist Party – led by Václav Klobučák – took a sharply anti-Habsburg direction. This position was only exceeded by two of the leading politicians of the State's Right Progressive Party, founded in 1908, - poet Viktor Dyk and journalist Egon Bondy - when they openly demanded, before 1914, the creation of an independent Czech state outside the framework of the Monarchy.⁶⁶ The other Czech parties all unanimously took a stand on striving for national independence within the Monarchy. These parties all stressed that the Czechs form an independent nation but the realization of complete independence – the creation of an independent Czech state – is frustrated by foreign political circumstances, not the least among them the geographic location occupied by the Czechs, the sensitive central Europe between encroaching Germany and tsarist Russia. For this reason – they said – they accept the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a more or less acceptable state form, although far from ideal. One of the leaders of the Young Czechs – Karel Kramář – put it thus: „Only politically immature rookies in Bohemia can entertain the idea that an independent Czech state can come into being in the middle of Europe amid the territorial and economic expansion of Germany.”⁶⁷

In line with their platform, these parties strove for a singular type of Czech-Austrian compromise, to accomplish Czech independence within the Monarchy. We must point out that Beneš, at several places in his dissertation, flogs these parties' programs with harsh criticism. He stated that the rejuvenation of the historical Czech Kingdom, a part of both the Old and New Czech parties, was an impossibility as you can not create a state against the wishes of one third of the population (the Bohemian Germans). It was for this that he stressed that the only

⁶⁴ BENEŠ: *Le problème ...* op. cit. 308.

⁶⁵ URBAN: *A nagykorivá ...* op. cit. 147-154.

⁶⁶ KOŘÁLKA: *A világpolitika ...* op. cit. 161.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 177.

solution for the coexistence of the Czechs and Germans in the Czech provinces was decentralization and autonomy, that is, within the affected boundaries, the Germans – and the Czechs, also – must be given autonomy.

We can state that in his first proposal, Beneš asks for less for the Czechs – and grants more to the Germans – than the right-to-a-state program. That program proposed the union of the three provinces of the Czech Kingdom – Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia – with the Germans becoming a minority within the reconstituted, enlarged whole. Against this, Beneš would have liberated the Germans living within the Czech territories from the control of the Czech state. In his plan, Czechs and Germans, living within the boundaries of the historical Bohemian provinces, lead independent lives, within the boundaries of their autonomy.

István Borsody, in his biography, mentions that in the 1930's – almost 30 years later – the Sudeten Germans dusted off this almost-forgotten book of Beneš and began 'to cite very unpleasant passages from it,' demanding autonomy from the Czechoslovak state on that basis.⁶⁸ The peril that the young researcher's book represented, was handled by President Beneš by allegedly buying up every copy of the book available in Europe.⁶⁹

Relinquishing the first concept

There are no signs in the pre-1914 activities of Beneš that would have pointed to a political career. In this period, he was more the young, unknown scientist than a serious politician. At the outbreak of First World War, he is 30 years old with the beginnings of typical intellectual future consisting of university studies at home and abroad, bursaries, work towards a diploma, various studies and some political interest. Beneš led the life of an average intellectual, returning every day to a pleasantly furnished middle class home in an outer suburb of Prague, to a loving wife.

At the outbreak of the war, Beneš simply abandoned his first concept. Why he changed his views as chronicled in his 1908 Dijon dissertation, he noted: „... *the changes in the situation at home (Bohemia – auth.) in the years between 1909 and 1914 gave me more and more disappointments. The internal political battles within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the struggles for universal suffrage, the Bosnian political crisis of 1908, the absolutist rule in Bohemia and Croatia all served to convince me that we are living in the midst of significant political crises, which will lead to significant changes, either peacefully or through deep trauma.*”⁷⁰

So the War fundamentally changed his peaceful existence, transforming the studious young man into a 'conspirator,' an émigré and, finally, one of the founders of the Czechoslovak state.

⁶⁸ BORSODY, István: *Beneš*. Budapest, 1943, 37.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 17-18.

Róbert L. Holndonner

Parallel Histories: Germany and Japan from Demilitarized Pacifism to Peace-Keeping Operations¹

Germany and Japan are two distant countries – distant both in geographical and civilizational terms; however they have had astonishing parallelism in the course of twentieth-century historical happenings: without mentioning concrete names and exact dates, we can depict their history in the same way at length, without letting know the audience which country we are talking about: Expansionist ambitions in the 1930s, accompanied with a naive neglect on the part of the international community; sweeping victories at the beginning of the Second World War that finally led to a crushing defeat; peace agreements and „*peace constitutions*” dictated by the Allied Powers; demilitarization and/but economic reconstruction and social rehabilitation, democratization during the occupation-years; integration into the Western alliance system; under the umbrella of the American security guarantee and with the help of the fertilizatory and catalyst effect of American economic aids, the phenomenon of an „*economic miracle*”, resulting a strong national economy, yielding high domestic living standards and world-scale economic influence... By now, both of them have become often-cited examples of successful American „*nation-building*” efforts, and both of them are pressed by the international community to activate themselves on the international scene in security matters as well.

Definitions

Before elaborating on our subject in detail, it is important to put some definitions of key concepts here, at the beginning.

Pacifism, in short, is a political movement giving voice to yearning for peace. Pacifism can be subdivided into several trends or streams according to several factors. According to „*degree*”, the scale ranges from idealist anti-violence (excluding the theoretical possibility of violence in all spheres of social life) to realist objection to wars or antimilitarism (maximal effort to avoid wars, viewing war as the last resort); according to its theoretical base, we can distinguish between pacifism of principle (violence is bad, evil, violence is a moral crime, it is unethical) and pragmatic pacifism (violence is harmful and wars do not compensate their costs); while according to interpretation of roles,

¹ The present study is a shortened version of a seminar paper and an adapted version of a conference lecture: the original version is an unpublished seminar paper written at the ELTE Faculty of Arts, Present-Day World History PhD Program in January 2007; the shortened version of the seminar paper was presented at the conference entitled „*A modern kor legújabb kutatási eredményei*”, organized by the Modern and Contemporary World History Department (Eötvös Loránd University, 18 May 2007).

we can tell apart passive (negating, refusing fight) and active (fighting for peace, responsible) pacifism.

Peace keeping, using the relevant definition of the United Nations, is making an area/country struck by conflict be capable of setting the prerequisites and circumstances of enduring peaceful conditions, in the long run. In more detail, a typical peace-keeping operation can be depicted by the following: it takes place in a post-conflict situation; the participants work under the command of the United Nations or they are „employees” of international security regimes or ad hoc coalitions being present on the scene with UN-authorization – the employees are typically soldiers, police officers, political and social science experts, and other civilian employees; their missions are, typically, the observation of a peace process and facilitating the keeping of provisions of a peace agreement – the activities include operations such as impartial election monitoring, separating enemy troops, restoring law and order. Peace-keeping is only one „section” of conflict and crisis management, and „peace supporting”, and it is not equal with peace-making. Finally, as it concerns our scrutiny, we have to point out some definitive differences of peace-keeping related to classical military functions and mentality: *„a professional peace-keeper needs and uses areas of knowledge and pieces of experience of kinds that have never been used by ‘the soldier’ as a historical actor; moreover, ‘unclassical’ methods are used predominantly and in a declared way. The scene of peace-keeping is full of tensions, but – unlike the scenes of wars – it is characterized by the lack of hatred, on the one hand, and self-control, rational carefulness, empathy, tolerance, mutual respect, and the ability of co-operation towards common goals, on the other; so, dominant attitudes common in traditional war situations, like boldness, recklessness, irrational risk-taking, and – particularly – brutal behaviour, are categorically excluded.”*² That is, in short: peace-keeping is a military concept, indeed, but it is by no means militaristic; peace-keeping is a tool of activist pacifism.

Demilitarization and pacifism in Germany and Japan:

Instead of narrating about the widely-known events of the end of the Second World War in detail, I only want to give a comparative overview of some relevant aspects of the German and Japanese defeat and international rehabilitation: the chart below highlights some characteristic features of the happenings; it will be followed by a more detailed explanatory analysis.

² István MOLNÁR: *A béketámogatók magatartásformái*, Új Honvédségi Szemle 2006/9. Online Version. [Translation by the author]

The occupation of both Germany and Japan was successful if we consider reaching the goals of the occupying powers to be the main criterion of success:

	GERMANY	JAPAN
Capitulation	total occupation; the occupation of Berlin by the Soviet Red Army >> 7 May 1945	island-hopping; two atomic bombs >> 2 September 1945
Demilitrization	the gathering in of weapons; destructing / drawing domestic industry capable of producing military equipment under international supervision	the gathering in of weapons; destructing / drawing domestic industry capable of producing military equipment under international supervision
„Destructive” democratization	„de-nazification” (dissolving party organizations, forbidding ex party members to hold an office); (Nuremberg, 20 November 1945); „re-socialization” of the German people	disbanding the army; bringing war-criminals to trial (May 1946 – November 1948: “Far Eastern International Military Tribunal”; 7 convicts)
Great powers’ dissent	multilateral occupation Aims: Soviet Union – compensation-maximizing, expansion; France - sterilization; USA and Great Britain - stabilization, restoration integration (policy of balance)	unilateral occupation Aims: China - sterilization; USA - rehabilitation
„Constructive” democratization	aiding of the bomb-damaged “shortage”-economy: Marshall Plan (5 June 1945); reorganizing the public administration from the bottom upwards (Allied Powers office-holders > appointment of natives by Allied Powers authorities > suspension of Allied Powers’ provisional rights in April 1949)	leaving the effectively functioning public administration apparatus intact; supreme imperial authority left intact in principle; creating spreading property structure; educational reform with the aim of pushing Shintoism, the cult of the emperor, militarism, and ultranationalism into the background
Constitution	Grundgesetz: 8 May 1949 (German Federal Republic)	Constitution: 3 November 1946
International rehabilitation	peace treaty / declaring the end of state of war: 9 July 1951; „Germany-Treaty of Paris” in 1954: declaring the FRG to be a sovereign state from 5 May 1955; NATO-member since 9 May 1955; birth of ESDP in Cologne, 1999	peace treaty / declaring the end of state of war: 8 September 1951; US-Japan Security Agreement (1952); US-Japan Cooperation and Security Agreement (1960, always to be renewed after a period of 10 years); Guidelines for Defence Cooperation (1978); US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century (1996)

Methods and phenomena of the victory and the occupation policy of the Allied Powers at the end of and directly after World War II.

desirable political systems, productive economies and societies free from regionally and globally destabilizing factors came into being in the two “newly formed” countries. This, according to David M. Edelstein, can be owed to the adequate methods and circumstances of the occupation.³

³ Edelstein gives six major criteria as the prerequisites of a successful occupation. For details, see David M. EDELSTEIN: *Occupational Hazard*, 51. 58-75. (These criteria could be further analysed and scrutinized in the case of present, less successful “occupational” conflicts, such as the occupation of Afghanistan or Iraq...).

As a result of the will of the international community and the occupying powers, both Germany and Japan has got a pacifist-antimilitarist „*peace constitution*”. The 26th Article of the German constitution stipulates the prohibition of offensive war still today; thus, it subordinates the sovereign right of the Federation to securing peaceful conditions among the people of the world and the interests of the universal inter-state collective security regime; however – consequently controversially – the 24th Article approves the possibility of applying force on certain conditions, in multilateral action. Self-defence is also permitted, and thus Germany has a standing army; moreover, the soldiers are conscripts: every healthy citizen is obliged to serve in the military – although everyone can choose civilian service on the basis of conscience (Article 12.A). Japan has an even more strict constitution concerning the use of force: Section II./Article IX. unambiguously states that Japan renounces war as a legitimate tool for fixing international disputes for ever, and that Japan does not maintain an army: even the right of self-defence is out of question. This point serves as the backbone of the argumentation of the structuralist-institutionalist school of Japanese pacifism.

Comparing the two constitutions, we can highlight some relevant similarities and differences. Both constitutions were inspired by the occupying powers of the time, and both constitutions contain declarations of pacifism and antimilitarism in an uncommon manner, compared to international standards. However, they differ in degree: while the Japanese constitution is very straight, unambiguous, and uncontradictable, the German one avoids absolute formulations, and gives ground for differing interpretations – this difference in degree of „*categoricalism*” might be attributed to three factors: the different lengths of the period between the defeat and the birth of the document (one year in Japan, four years in Germany); the difference in constitutional cultures (Germany had more preceding attempts that could serve as pattern, model or could provide the drafters with lessons, and that were more compromised or comparable to Western standards and the will of the occupiers); territorial-geopolitical differences (while Japan was far away from probable future theatres of war, Germany was a potential buffer zone of the Cold War scenery). Despite all these differences, we can point out one more similarity: both constitutions have had to suffer disputes on interpretation and strives for modifications, still, both of them have the support of the mainstream forces of domestic political life and the support of the majority of the population.

During and directly after the years of occupation both domestic and international tendencies strengthened the formation of security doctrines that gave way to pacifism and antimilitarism. In the early years of the Cold War era, under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the policy of „*Westbindung*” gained ground, while the policy of „*Sonderweg*” or „*Alleingang*” had become illegitimate and unrepresentable; later Willy Brandt’s „*Ostpolitik*”, the support of the CSCE/OSCE-regime and the Helsinki process, also pointed to this same

direction.⁴ In Japan, the Yoshida Doctrine – declaring Japan’s behaviour in international disputes to be decent and low-key, and giving the encouragement of technical development, the development of entrepreneurship, and the energizing of the domestic economy as the focus of Japanese political missions⁵ – had the same effect on Japan’s international role.

The international community also wanted to „pacifize” the two countries: their pacifism was supported by the general international public opinion, by the period-policies of the United Nations, and by the populations of the neighbouring countries – particularly France and Poland or China, the Koreans, and islands of South East Asia – with still vivid bad memories. All these factors made German and Japanese foreign policy reactive in attitude.

Beside international expectations and domestic political wills described above, pacifism or antimilitarism had also become a socially internalized value – this can be viewed as a solid fact, proved by several social scientific surveys. However, the background of the process of internalization has been explained differently by several different theories. The „aversion theory” put the humiliating defeat in the focus of its scrutiny: according to „aversionists” the defeat had a conditionalizing effect on the population, it taught them that war equals defeat, humiliation, loss, and death, and that they are impotent against foreign powers; moreover, the Pygmalion effect also came into action, as the German and the Japanese take a collective responsibility of all war crimes acted out by their past leaders and some of their soldiers, which were cast in their face by the international public opinion,⁶ and this made them live together with abnormally exaggerated self-reproach, refusing any kind of future violence.⁷ The social aversion to militarism and wars was particularly strengthened by the „nuclear allergy” in the case of Japan and by the geographical-political situation in the case of Germany, as in a potential war, Germany would have certainly become a main theatre of the war, and, what is even more problematic, German soldiers would have had to fight other German

⁴ The case of Eastern Germany was just the opposite: „increased defence readiness”; „the Western bastion of the Eastern bloc” – the GDR had the second strongest army of the Warsaw Pact states, and conscientious objectors were treated as anti-state criminals; the GDR also helped the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

⁵ The foundation of social market economy under Adenauer can be seen as a similar endeavour – after the defeat and the shame of the Second World War, it also had a positive effect on self-confidence and national pride.

⁶ According to a US public opinion poll in 1944, 13% of the population thought the total termination of the Japanese people desirable, while in 1945, 23% was unhappy with the fact of the Japanese capitulation before the dropping of more atomic bombs would have been possible. Racism and anti-Japanese feelings were very much similarly common like anti-Arab/anti-Muslim attitudes today. „German” was quasi-synonymous with „Nazi”, the social atmosphere was somewhat similar to the „red scare” of the later McCarthy era.

⁷ 54% of the Japanese population would not even support a military action in the case of the invasion of the country: this was the result of a public opinion poll done as late as the end of the 1990s.

soldiers from the other side. The „welfare-”, or „prosperity status quo theory” – going back to Tocqueville and even known and applied by General McArthur in Japan – says that high living standards supported anti-destabilizing attitudes among wide ranges of the society. This theory also implies that pacifism fed by short-term (two- or three-generation long) memories and emotions has been rationalized on the long run. As an addition, we can also mention budgetary pragmatism, as, under the „generous umbrella” of the security guarantee of the United States and/or the NATO, it was also irrational to spend on defence issues, while money spared on this expense item could also catalyse the growth of the economy, and so further boost the living standards, making domestic leaders generally popular. Finally, pacifism was also supported and propagated by all major political parties and media – and what is really extraordinary: later, in Japan, anti-militarism has even become a fundamental expression of Japanese sovereignty and national autonomy (the Japanese left also had to be „neutralist” pacifist, considering the US influence and the „block-logic” of the age).

Tendencies directing against pacifism in the Cold War-years and the Post-bipolar era:

The two one-time allies on the Eastern and Western border of the socialist block, Germany and Japan, with their enormous demographic and economic potential, only some years after the end of the Second World War, got to the same alliance system – although independently of one another and cultivating only loose relations. A so-called „triangular” diplomatic mechanism has formed, with the United States in the middle, and with a really pale „hypotenuse” between Japan and Europe. Thus, the US ambitions, rather converging in the two regions, could make their way quite successfully.

Germany, in the beginning, according to the Pleven Plan, was urged to be integrated into the European Defence Community – so utilizing potential German military force without the creation of a German army: although this plan has actually never been realized, the later NATO-membership resulted in a rather similar function and conditions. For many years, Germany, and Europe as a whole, has been urged by the United States to take responsibility in security issues proportionally to their political, financial and military capabilities, making the EU-US partnership a more balanced one. This endeavour, however, has recently been urged even by the European political community itself: although, according to popular wishes, defence budgets tended to shrink and defence activities tended to be minimized in the early post-Cold War years, after the bitter experience in the neighbouring Balkans and the suffering from the flows of immigration from distant areas of the world, as well – CFSP and ESDP has become a focal point of political and public interest all over Europe.

Japan, for many years, simply acted as an advanced post, as „the unsinkable aircraft-carrier” of the United States. However, for many decades,

but particularly in recent years, similarly to Europe, Japan is also urged to take a firmer stance in international disputes and a bigger and actual military role in military missions in conflicts all around the world. However, while the question of German military participation in solving local or regional conflicts abroad, together with other European forces, has become rather unproblematic by the present time, Japan still has to face earnest objection against its military activism, so its participation, in some cases, can do more political harm than military advantage.

If we examine domestic tendencies against pacifism, in the case of Germany, we have to mention the feeling of solidarity that has formed between the German and the American people after the Blockade of Berlin and the American Airlift in 1948-9 and after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961: the one-time „*occupiers*” became „*protectors*”, the one-time „*war-criminals*” became „*freedom-fighters*” in the eyes of the other party – this feeling embodied itself in John F. Kennedy’s famous „*Ich bin ein Berliner!*” speech delivered in Berlin in 1963. Due to this solidarity, the German society tended to be somewhat responsive to American needs and requests, even in international security issues. After realizing the status of Germany as an „*economic giant and political dwarf*”, national pride and ambitions has been boosted: this even led to aspirations after permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the criticism of present-time US unilateralism. Finally, the German society is rather sympathetic with humanitarian disasters and committed to the advocacy of human rights, what also makes them give way to willingness to international activism – although human losses and casualties sometimes make the public opinion indecisive.

Just like realizing the status of the country as being full of contradictions (“*economic giant and political dwarf*”, again), the phenomenon of solidarity can also be mentioned in the case of Japan, similarly to Germany, as well: here, the informal personal relationships formed between the members of the American and the Japanese society during the long decades of presence of American garrisons on the Japanese soil take a leading role in creating this mentality (although, in recent years, some severe criminal incidents, abuses of locals, have occurred, what has made the Japanese society ambivalent in this question). Another supporting factor for the need of Japan’s building a capable military is that the borders and some of the main islands of the country are only 8,5 minutes of flying distance from the hostile North Korea (who launched test rockets directing towards the Japanese Isles in 1998 and 2003), and not much further from the similarly proactive, provocative China – these geographical-political facts particularly count for a lot if we take into consideration that the formation of a regional security regime, like the NATO, in the Asian-Pacific region is highly improbable – the ARF is not such an organization, and it is not a real option for Japan. A further supporting factor for international activism is that in the course of the past decades, Japan has been deeply involved in the

world economy, and has serious economic interests in remote areas all over the world:⁸ Japan is export-oriented and capital-exporting, on the one hand, and is dependent on food and oil imports, on the other: these are key factors of welfare.⁹ The pacifist stance is also weakened, both to international and domestic actors, by the fact that some really important symbolic gestures towards the victims and the sufferers of the Japanese aggression in the Second World War has failed to come about – by that I mean: compensation for widows and orphans, the still living and still controversial status of the Yasukuni Shrine, commemorations on the jubilee of Pearl Harbor, still unsettled territorial controversies with Russia, South Korea, China, and Taiwan. Opposed to that, Germany has closed its Second World War past: it has paid compensation for France and has taken responsibility for the victims and the offspring of the victims of the Holocaust; while Germany is the least nationalistic great power of the world, Japan, according to a recent survey, is the second in the rank order, after the United States. All in all, Japan seems to follow a relational principle: being less active than France and Great Britain, but being more active than Germany.

As a result of the balancing between the fundamental pacifist stance and the new activist ambitions and rational defence claims, controversial constitutional solutions and interpretations have gained ground. In Germany, as the wars and civil wars in the Balkans and the on-the-spot NATO-involvement made it necessary, the constitutional court interpreted self-defence in a broader sense, and it rendered multilateral, allied military operations under UN-authorization to be legitimate; in the recent years of the „*global American war on terror*”, the Green Party particularly had to face serious troubles when opposing its one-time pacifist attitude, because it had to support Europe’s voice against the unilateral American activities. In Japan, the phenomenon of „*nashikuzushi*”¹⁰ can be observed: the political class is unwilling to adapt the original post-World War ideas to present-day factual realities: instead, it overwrites the *de jure* regulations with its *de facto* measures one after another, waiting until the *de facto* conditions, by some time passing and by „*the force of habit*”, replace the *de jure* state of affairs by themselves, creating a considerable inconsistency in the field.¹¹

⁸ Of course, it is true of Germany too, but Germany, as a part of the European Union, can project its influence through a „*filter*”, while such thing does not exist in the case of the „*alone-standing*” Japan.

⁹ It is somewhat controversial: until this point we have talked about welfare as being a stabilizing, pro-status quo factor.

¹⁰ Death by a thousand cuts.

¹¹ For example: the administration expanded its responsibility of self-defence beyond the shores of the main islands to „*regions around the Japanese Isles*”, while it also committed itself to „*stabilizing the peaceful conditions of the South East Asian region*”; Japan continuously exports dual-use (i.e. civilian-military) products and components produced by its „*hybrid*” „*keiretsus*”.

Actual participation in international conflicts during and after the Cold War-years:

In this section, I want to give a comprehensive overview of the possible methods of „*pacifist activism*” on the part of Germany and Japan, while, simultaneously, I also intend to give some supportive actual examples of participation. Finally, I will give a short summary and evaluation of the military capabilities of the two countries.

In short, we can say that both Germany and Japan was relatively successfully compromising its pacifism with its national ambitions and the expectations of the international community for several decades, as they could find alternative, practically non-military ways of inclusion into international co-operations. Germany, for example, as the „*fare-dodger*” of the NATO, pursued the policy of chequebook-diplomacy in many cases, like in the Gulf War; German logistical and medical staff was sent to Cambodia, border control units to Namibia to participate in the UN-PKO contingent in the beginning of the 1990s; Germany was the first state that acknowledged the sovereignty of Slovenia and Croatia, as a result of their fight for independence and separation from the former Yugoslavia; Germany hosted some very important security policy meetings, like the Petersberg talks that resulted in serious commitments in the long run. However, while Bonn, the capital of Western Germany had relatively easily been able to wriggle out of taking part in concrete military operations (like the Iraq-Iran war or civil wars in the Latin American continent), Berlin, the capital of the united Germany could only solve it with more and more difficulty. In the course of the decades, Japan has become the biggest supplier of the United States in the field of armament technology (250 thousand million USD in the late 1980s), and its contribution to Official Development Assistance grants has exceeded that of the United States; Japan has also espoused global cases other than military interventions in conflict areas – cases such as climate change and other environmental issues, cooperation in scientific achievements, international organized crime; lately, Japan even participated in military operations in practically non-military fields, such as intelligence gathering, supply services, surgery service, disaster relief etc., but it has taken part in joint US-Japanese military exercises as well; the administration has also made efforts in goodwill missions and has been trying to promote peaceful conditions and democratic values – primarily in the South East Asian region – independently of other states and international regimes (for example, by aiding policies conditioned by human rights issues: the case of East Timor and Burma can be cited).

Concerning present-day or recent participation in military conflict management, the following examples have to be mentioned. About 9300 German soldiers are serving all around the world nowadays (e.g.: Afghanistan,

Bosnia, Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Sudan); they are mainly applied by the UN or the EU-led and NATO missions; the spectrum of application extends from anti-terrorist operations through peace-keeping missions to humanitarian aids and observer activities. The most important missions are the following: Active Endeavour (NATO, Mediterranean naval patrol, November 2001); Enduring Freedom (USA, fighting units deployed against Taliban training camps, November 2001),¹² International Security Assistance Force (UN, defence of Kabul and the newly established political regime, December 2001); Althea (EUROFOR, peace-keeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 2004). Japan, of course, did not take part in the Korean or the Vietnam war – they have taken place too early and in a too sensitive neighbouring territory; but Japanese bomb-disposal units were sent to the Gulf in April 1991 (officially sanctioned only one year later, retroactively!), after its 13 thousand million financial contribution to the war was received by the international community with a hint of despise – this was Japan's first actual participation in a military operation after the Second World War. After that, in accordance with the International Peace Cooperation Law legislated at that time, Japan has taken part in eight PKO-missions, 5 election observations and 12 other contributions; however, in Afghanistan, Japan only takes part with logistic units.¹³

Getting to the point of military capabilities, the conditions can be summarized as follows. The German military force is called Bundeswehr (in word by word English translation: „*Federal Defence*”). The Bundeswehr is divided in five main institutional units, and it employs 250000 persons (among them, 75000 civilian employees and 50000 nine-month conscripts between the age of 18 and 25); the available manpower fit for military service amounts to 15-19 million persons, with half a million new persons reaching the age of military service every year. In 2006, the military budget amounted to 27.9 thousand million euros, that is, 1.3% of the German GDP. The Bundeswehr was established in 1955 without official predecessor – it only fosters the tradition of 19th century German strategists and military thinkers, and it naturally denies any ties to the Wehrmacht of the „*Third Reich*”. According to the German „*Grundgesetz*” – more precisely, its Article 87.A) –, the Bundeswehr functions as a defensive body, but – as it has been mentioned earlier –, according to a constitutional court decision in 1994, self defence can

¹² In order to gain support for the deployment, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder requested a vote of confidence against himself, and he was also supported by the Green Party-member minister of foreign affairs Joschka Fischer.

¹³ US and international criticism was also drawn to Japan by the fact that the Japanese Self-Defence Force has no anti-terrorist unit, the anti-terrorist policy is confined to defending Japanese citizens staying abroad; moreover, the administration is not true to the internationally approved principle of not negotiating with terrorists (a counter-example concerning the last argument might be the case of Japanese hostages in Iraq).

not only mean operation within German borders, but multilateral operations under UN-, NATO- or EU-command are also acceptable, even far away beyond the borders. As an evaluation, we have to observe that the Bundeswehr is the strongest military force between the English Channel and the Russian borders, even without weapons of mass destruction, so American garrisoning is only reasonable on political grounds, but on military grounds not any more: Germany is the key guarantor of the security of Central Europe; Germany gives the most soldiers, 18000 troops, for the Eurokorps too. Despite these facts, due to traditional German „*Zurückhaltung*” („*Self-Control*”), the main transatlantic negotiating partners of the United States are Great Britain – its „*special relationship*” – and France – the rivalling „*cock*” of Europe. Other problematic issues concerning the German military force are the cutting of the military budgets due to social tensions and social political challenges, and the failure of coming about military reform directing to a professional army. However, public approval of the military is very high – humanitarian interventions, for example, were supported by 96% of the population in 1993.

The Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF) is constituted by three institutional units. The available manpower fit for military service more or less equals that of Germany, but there is no compulsory military service (2% of people above 18 years of age only enters the military every year on a voluntary basis), but the number of soldiers in the country is increased by the continuously decreasing number of American troops garrisoned in Japan (presently 50000). Japan spends 1% of its GDP on military expenses – this is rather low to the NATO-average, that is 3%, but in absolute measure, it cannot be characterized in any other way than considerably high. Concerning legal regulations, we have to cite the already mentioned International Peace Cooperation Law from 1992 and the so-called „*PKO-Law*” modified in 1995 – the latter contains five fundamental guiding principles (the deployment of Japanese troops has to be preceded by a cease-fire agreement signed by all parties; every concerned party has to give its consent to Japanese involvement; peace-keepers are impartial,¹⁴ the ceasing of any of the above conditions entails the withdrawal of Japanese troops; use of firearms is only permitted in case of self-defence, as an „*ultima ultima ratio*”) and enumerates the possible types of operations in which Japanese soldiers can participate (monitoring cease-fires and separating hostile forces; patrolling in buffer-zones; observing and controlling the transfer of arms; collecting arms; assigning demilitarized areas; co-ordinating exchanges of prisoners of war; monitoring elections; counselling and assisting police or security forces; assistance in public health missions; finding and helping refugees; providing, transferring and distributing supplies/products of basic needs; reconstruction works; environmental consequence management – so all other types of operations, such as preventive deployment (e.g.: Macedonia), traditional peace-

¹⁴ They are, by definition...

keeping (e.g.: Kashmir, Iraq, Middle East, Cyprus, Croatia), UN peace-making (e.g.: Somalia), cease-fire enforcement (e.g.: Bosnia-Herzegovina) are categorically forbidden).¹⁵ As a matter of evaluation, we have to highlight the following points. The Japanese military branch has serious structural weaknesses, one of the most important ones of which is that defence policy has no separate ministerial leadership (it is rendered to some sub-departments of the ministry of foreign affairs¹⁶), but we cannot neglect the fact that Japan has no foreign intelligence, either. Another inherent problem is that the units of the SDF suffer from a lack of real deployment experience – let alone routine; there is much room for improvement of budget-efficiency as well, as military equipment and military salaries are extraordinarily high in Japan. Still, after the United States, Japan has the second biggest military budget in the world, with its spending 46 thousand million USD per year (Japanese military capabilities are often underestimated on the basis of GDP-proportional data, whereas GDP-proportion does not tell too much about real capabilities, it rather measures degree of effort or willingness).¹⁷ All in all, Japan has the most modern military in the East Asian region – although the Chinese military is bigger as far as manpower is concerned, but the Japanese military is much fitter for action (its land forces are weak in offence and defence, its air force is medium in offence and strong in defence, and its naval force is strong both in offence and defence: it has AWACS exploratory capabilities, effective land-air anti-missile systems, and marine corps equipped with anti-submarine warfare).¹⁸ Finally, although Japan has no WMD-aspirations, according to reliable sources, Japan could develop its first atomic bomb in six months' period, and it could acquire 3-4000 explosive warheads.

Summary – conclusions:

The course of the two states, Germany and Japan, has been full of contradictions, inconsistencies, and sometimes unclear compromises, and it required the whole arsenal of the tricks of balancing diplomacy. They have the same challenges concerning finding a healthy balance between satisfying the increasing international expectations and meeting the domestic pacifist requirements, between cultivating friendly relations with neighbouring countries

¹⁵ Some other regulations which we cannot examine here should also be mentioned: Bill to Support Counter-terrorism, Law Regarding Response to Armed Attacks, Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, Law to Amend the Self-Defence Force.

¹⁶ A ministry that, with its 5000 employees, is rather weightless in any case. The Japanese national security council also has sessions much more rarely than habitual in other countries. Domestic politics and policies are traditionally of higher importance than foreign affairs.

¹⁷ Russia is the third in the rank order, while Germany is the fifth item in the list. Compared to the United States, Japan spends 15%, Germany spends 10% on their military; compared to one another, a 2.1:2.3 Germany:Japan ratio can be shown.

¹⁸ It is a separate issue that telling offensive and defensive systems apart is not that straightforward in every case.

and making the alliance with the United States as tight as possible, between threatening provocativity and threatening defencelessness. However, both of them succeeded in formulating a realistic and constructive national strategy and pursue a successful foreign policy – even if we take into consideration that both states have to be much more thoughtful concerning some actual public policy decisions and some political communicational manoeuvres. If they keep it in view, there opens a chance to play an actively decisive role, in a world characterized by generally peaceful conditions, without the necessity of giving up their responsible and rational pacifist attitudes.

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Attila Kolontári

„Transsylvania to us, Bessarabia to you!”¹

On 26 June 1940, at 10 p.m. Moscow time, Vyacheslav Molotov, the President of the Council of Commissars and Foreign Commissar, summoned G. Davidescu, the Romanian Ambassador to Moscow, and handed over to him the Soviet government's ultimatum demanding the evacuation and surrender of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.² Molotov emphasized that for the sake of the peaceful settlement of the conflict, he would wait for the Romanian government to approve the Soviet note until midnight the following day. This event actualized the single „issue” the „solution” to which provided an opportunity for the harmonisation of Hungarian-Soviet interests, for joint action. The idea of the unity of interests concerning territorial claims against Romania was raised from time to time during the history of Hungarian-Soviet relations between the two World Wars. The main question to be answered is to what extent Moscow and Budapest had the intention to act jointly in the summer of 1940, and whether there was any specific initiative on either side in this direction.

The developments did not surprise either politicians or the public opinion of the world. As in the autumn of 1939 the Soviet Union started to occupy territories falling within her sphere of interest, it was only a question of time that she should declare her claim concerning Bessarabia. In spring 1940 signs indicating this became more and more frequent. On 29 March, at the 6th session of the Supreme Council, when analysing the Soviet Union's foreign policy and her relation with her Southern neighbours, Molotov mentioned that the Soviet Union had not signed a non-aggression pact with Romania. On the contrary, there was an unsolved dispute – Bessarabia, the annexation of which the Soviet Union had never recognized, despite the fact that she had not attempted to find a military solution to the problem. Therefore, he said, the rumours about the deterioration of Soviet-Romanian relations were unfounded.³ In June 1940, during his talks with Schulenburg too, Molotov confirmed that the declaration made at the session of the Supreme Council was a message to Romania, „an invitation to the dance”. They were waiting for the Romanian reaction so that the conflict could be settled in a peaceful way, but Bucharest

¹ The expressions was used by Semyon Mirny, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest in his report of 16 August 1936, when he tried to describe the atmosphere characterising the Hungarian capital at the time of the establishment of the diplomatic representation. Arhiv Vnyeshnyey Polityiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Foreign Archives of the Russian Federation) – AVP RF F. 05. Op. 16. P. 118. d. 40./ 139.

² *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya 1935-1941*. Volume 2, (Ed.: AVDYEYEV, A. A. et al.) Moscow, 2000. 310-315.

³ *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000. 286.

was silent. The Soviet government's position was that the problem could not be put off any longer.⁴

On 19 April 1940, Lev Helfand, the Soviet chargé d'affaires to Rome, raised the issue of Bessarabia rather openly during his talks with his Romanian colleague Bossy. Helfand said that the Soviets were not interested that much in Bessarabia, they were rather offended by the fact that Romania occupied the territory taking advantage of Russia's distressful situation. When Bossy said that under no circumstances could his government make territorial concessions, Helfand mentioned as a possibility that the Soviets, instead of the cession of Bessarabia – following the Estonian example – would be satisfied with the provision of a naval base as well. „*Get in touch with Molotov, talk to him informally, find out about the Soviet position! The situation is getting worse every day.*”⁵ Meaningful words. At the end of May, Romanian diplomatic documents mention with increasing concern the advance of the Soviet military force in the Bessarabian frontier zone. Behind the concentration of Soviet troops – as contained in the Romanian foreign minister's instructions to Davidescu – there are underlying aggressive intentions, based on this, one may rightly question the sincerity of Moscow's high-flown words about peace.⁶

On 23 June 1940, a day after the signature of the ceasefire of Compiègne putting an end to the German campaign against France, Molotov conducted long talks with Friedrich von Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to Moscow. One central issue was the question of Bessarabia. The Soviet foreign commissar inquired whether the government of the Reich still maintained their declaration made last autumn concerning Bessarabia. (By this, he referred to the secret clause in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, in which Germany declared that politically she was fully uninterested in the territory concerned.) On hearing an affirmative reply from Schulenburg, Molotov said that the Soviet Union would raise the issue of Bessarabia and Bukovina „*inhabited by Ukrainians*” in the near future and „*the Romanian government acted wisely*” if they ceded the mentioned territories in peace. The German Ambassador did not show too much enthusiasm for the Soviet plans. Although confirming political indifference, he stressed that Germany had rather important economic interests in Romania and Bessarabia. He pointed out that, according to the original plans, the Soviets would declare their demand concerning Bessarabia if, prior to this, Hungary and Bulgaria wanted to enforce territorial claims against Romania. Molotov doubted if this interpretation was right, however he was willing to concede that the Soviet government would wait for the reply from Berlin before taking further steps, at the same time, he warned his talking partner that the matter could not be put off.⁷

⁴ 1941 god. Dokumenti. Volume 1, (Ed.: YAKOVLEV, A. N.) Moscow, 1998. 48. 53.

⁵ Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya Volume 2, 2000. 296.

⁶ Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya Volume 2, 2000. 300.

⁷ 1941 god. 1998. Volume 1, 48-49.

Two days later Ribbentrop's reply arrived from the German capital. Acknowledging the legitimacy and validity of Soviet claims concerning Bessarabia, the German foreign minister gave expression to his surprise at the Soviet aspirations for Bukovina. Without Bukovina – as the thoughts continued – peaceful settlement of the conflict would be easier. With regard to the expectable reactions from Hungary and Bulgaria, Schulenburg doubted the timeliness of Budapest's and Sofia's demands. Berlin feared that simultaneous actions of the three countries might lead to chaos in Romania, which would concern rather important German economic interests and which could have a disastrous effect on the fuel supplies of the German military force. In his reply, Molotov underlined that „*it appears to the Soviet government that Hungary's and Bulgaria's claims concerning Romania are not unfounded but the Soviet government cannot decide instead of them whether these claims are urgent for them or whether they can be put off. The issue raised about Bessarabia and Bukovina is unrelated to the Hungarian and Bulgarian claims and the problem must be settled without delay.*”⁸ The Soviet foreign commissar made a similar statement to Italian Ambassador Rosso as well: the Soviet Union has no claims against Hungary, Soviet-Hungarian relations are normal, Hungary's claims concerning Romania are not unfounded.⁹ He pronounced these words being well aware that they would get to Budapest through the German and Italian diplomatic channels. Historian Tofik Islamov thinks that, in spite of Romania's weakness, her neighbours separately could not have counted on certain success against her. This was true not only concerning Hungary and Bulgaria but also the Soviet Union of the time.¹⁰ In the military field, this manifested itself in the following way. In order to carry out the action against Romania, on 10 June

⁸ 1941 god. 1998. Volume 1, 53-54. It should be noted that originally the Soviets wanted Romania to surrender the whole of Bukovina, this version was mentioned at the conciliatory talks with the Germans too. Because of the German disapproval, on 26 June „*in the last moment*” Molotov informed Schulenburg that the Soviet government had restricted its territorial claims to Northern Bukovina and the town of Chernovtsi. The territory had never before belonged to Russia; Moscow justified her efforts at acquisition by the ethnic principle: this is a territory connected by a thousand ties to the Ukraine from linguistic and national aspects and from the aspect of shared historical fate. Beyond this – stressed Molotov to Davidescu at the time of the delivery of the ultimatum – the surrender of Northern Bukovina means at least partial reparations for the damage caused to Bessarabia and the Soviet Union by the 22-year Romanian rule. (Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya Volume 2, 2000. p. 311.) In diplomatic circles the issue was raised already at that time that this step was directed at Germany as a matter of fact and that the Soviet Union wanted to improve her strategic position against the Third Reich. The territory meant defence for the left wing of the protrusion of Lemberg and Stanislau against a possible enveloping action. In June 1941, on the eve of the German attack, the Soviets formed one of their attacking drive out of four armies here.

⁹ 1941 god. 1998. Volume 1, p. 52, *Olasz diplomáciai dokumentumok a második bécsi döntésről* [Italian diplomatic documents concerning the Second Vienna Award.], (Ed. and foreword by: György RÉTI) Bp. 2000. pp.37-38. (hereinafter ODD, 2000.)

¹⁰ *Transylvansky vopros. Vengersko-ruminsky tyerritorialnyy spor i SSSR 1940-1946.* Dokumenti. (Ed: ISLAMOV, T. M. et al.) Moscow, 2000. 6.

1940 a part of the units of the three armies in military preparedness was filled up with poorly trained rank-and-file, they did not have the sufficient number of command staff at their disposal, there was a shortage of transportation facilities, the troops did not receive the necessary weapons and equipment in time. As a consequence, they were able to occupy the starting positions only three days after the set deadline.¹¹ Up to the last moment, the Soviet leadership considered that the Romanian armed force would resist and that Bessarabia would have to be occupied by the units of the Red Army using military force. In this situation it could obviously serve the interests of a successful military action and the minimisation of Soviet losses if Romania was to concentrate on her Western and Southern borders as well.¹² This must have been the purpose of the positive messages addressed to Budapest and Sofia. At the same time, as it will become obvious, the Soviets refrained from specific military cooperation with the mentioned countries.

It should be noted though that Soviet diplomacy did not seem to treat Hungary and Bulgaria in the same way, the quality of gestures used in their directions was not the same. Molotov characterized the existing relations with Bulgaria as friendly, which could become even closer. He recognized the lawfulness of Bulgarian claims not only concerning Romania, but Greece as well. On the contrary, in relation to Hungary, he spoke of „*merely*” normal relations not challenging that Hungary’s territorial claims against Romania were not unfounded.¹³ A similar difference can be observed in the conduct of the Soviet press as well. No firm positions or commentaries appear to have been published about the Romanian-Hungarian conflict or the Second Vienna Award; they reported the events relying on both Budapest and Bucharest sources.¹⁴ With regard to Bulgaria, the Izvestia article of 13 August 1940 condemned the forcible Romanization in Southern-Dobrudja, it spoke of the Bulgarian territorial claims as lawful and fully well-founded: „*As is well-known, the Soviet Union has supported and will support also in the future the enforcement of Bulgarian claims against Romania*”.¹⁵ Concerning Hungary, no such position was taken in the press, that is, in public. On his visit to Dyekanozov on 14 August 1940, new Romanian Ambassador Gafencu stated with satisfaction that the Soviet press presented the Hungarian-Romanian

¹¹ MELTYUHOV, M. M: *Upushchennyi shans Stalina*. Moscow, 2002. 180-181.

¹² Based on Meltyuhov’s data, the major part, approx. 60% of the Romanian armed forces marched in the direction of the Soviet Union. There was one army stationed along the Bulgarian and the Hungarian borders respectively. MELTYUHOV, 2002. 186.

¹³ ISLAMOV, Tofik Muslimovich: *Rumino-vengersky konflikt v kontyektse germano-sovietskovo sopernyichestva*. IN: *Vostochnaya Yevropa mezdu Gitlerom i Stalinim 1939-1941 gg.* (Ed: VOLKOV, V. GIBIYANSKY, L.) Moscow, 1999. 308.

¹⁴ The Soviet press does not take sides concerning the matter of the untenableness of Trianon – reported the Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow in his cipher telegram of 24 June 1940. Hungarian National Archives – MOL K-74-1940-III./ №.1165. p.70.

¹⁵ Izvestiya, 13 August 1940. p. 2.

conflict in „*an objective and understanding*” tone toward Romania.¹⁶ According to Tofik Islamov, all this may be explained by the fact that Soviet foreign policy was characterised by differing attitudes toward the two sub-regions enclaved between the Third Reich and Stalin’s Soviet Union. While in case of Hungary and the Carpathian Basin, it indicated that it did not intend to question German hegemony – at least in the short run, the perspective of tightening ties with Bulgaria was an obvious hint to Berlin that Moscow desired to play a decisive role in the eastern part of the Balkan Peninsula.¹⁷

The Soviet military and diplomatic preparations directed at the occupation of Bessarabia incited ambivalent feelings in Hungarian political circles. On the one hand, the expectable Soviet action against Romania could enhance the chances of Hungarian revisionist endeavours. This realization pushed the Hungarian government in the direction of the improvement of Hungarian-Soviet relations. At the beginning of the year 1940, Antal Ullein-Reviczky, the Head of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed Sharonov that the Hungarian papers had obligatorily been instructed not to publish articles in anti-Soviet tone, he also assured the Ambassador that in the future more space would be devoted in the papers to the materials of the TASS Intelligence Agency.¹⁸ In the press review prepared at the Soviet Embassy, particular emphasis was given to the following lines of the article published in the New Hungarian on 31 January 1940: „...*We maintain friendly relations with Germany, and cordial relation with our Northern neighbour, the Soviet Union. We do not feel threatened on this side. The only danger comes from Romania.*”¹⁹ Following the Belgrade conference of 1940 of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Alliance, before Sharonov, Foreign Minister István Csáky and his deputy János Vörnle carefully alluded to the shared Soviet-Hungarian interests against the mentioned group of states. In Belgrade the countries of the Balkan entente, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey – besides their endeavours to maintain peace and the status quo – underlined the member states’ right to independence and to have their own national territory.²⁰ During his talks of 5 February with the Soviet Ambassador, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister evaluated the Belgrade events as the formation of a military alliance against Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union (Transylvania, Dobrudja, Bessarabia).²¹ Csáky went even further; he desired to arouse in his talking partner the feeling of the Soviet Union’s endangeredness. In his opinion, the military alliance of the Balkan entente was not directed against Hungary or Bulgaria but Germany and the Soviet Union. Observing

¹⁶ *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000. 354.

¹⁷ ISLAMOV, *Rumino-vengersky konflikt...* 1999. 308-309.

¹⁸ AVP RF F. 011. Op. 6. P. 36. d. 15./ 19.

¹⁹ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 13./ 26.

²⁰ JUHÁSZ, Gyula: *A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája*. Budapest 1964. 86-87.

²¹ AVP RF F. 011. Op. 6. p. 36. d. 15./ 27.

Sharonov's surprise, the Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister explained that the real winner of the agreement was Turkey siding with the allies, which, if taken to war, would drag down the other Balkan states with her too. Csáky talked about the possibility of a new Crimean war. The allies would redeploy the Syrian and Egyptian expedition force through Turkey against the Southern territories of the Soviet Union.²² During the approximately 40-minute exchange of opinions, they also mentioned the expression "national territory" appearing in the communiqué about the Balkan conference. Csáky characterised the expression as Romania's and Gafencu's Pyrrhic victory. *„Hungary will not give up what belongs to her. If the allies win and we remain within our present borders, we will set aflame the whole of Europe.”* The above aggressive remark has been preserved for us by Sharonov's political diary, the Soviet Ambassador writes about what Csáky said between quotation marks, indicating that he is telling the foreign minister's thoughts word for word. We have no Hungarian sources about the meeting at our disposal for the time being. Sharonov repeated Molotov's statements made at the session of the Supreme Council before Csáky: *„There will not be a second Versailles.”* *„Neither Versailles, nor Trianon, we have already declared that we are not going to wait ad calendas graecas, but I repeat, even if the allies win, we will start to fight.”* – reacted Csáky to the Soviet Ambassador's remark.²³

We also have data indicating that during 1940 even more far-reaching ideas than the above were formulated in Budapest concerning the building of relations with the Soviet Union. The reports of the Soviet Ambassador to Budapest following the publications of the Hungarian press had registered the disappearance of anti-Soviet attacks from the Hungarian papers beginning from March 1940, the time of the conclusion of the peace treaty putting an end to the Finnish-Soviet war. Moreover, newspaper headlines focussed on the following elements of Molotov's speech given at the end of March. *„The question of Bessarabia awaits solution.”*, *“The Soviet Union does not guarantee Romania's borders.”*²⁴ At the beginning of April, during his meeting with Montgomery, the Ambassador of the United States, Antal Ullein-Reviczky referred to the possibility of the improvement of Hungarian-Soviet relations. Accordingly *„numerous pro-Russian articles would be published”* in the Hungarian press in the coming days in order to win the goodwill of the Soviet Union. The Head of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested to Sharonov that the Pravda should reply to the publications of the Hungarian press in a similar friendly tone. Even more surprisingly, the

²² AVP RF F. 011. Op. 6. p. 36. d. 15./ pp. 22-21. Csáky mentioned the neuralgic point of Soviet-Russian foreign political endeavours, the straits, as the possible route of the redeployment of the military force. In his opinion, the fast reconstruction of East-Turkish roads in the region of Lake Van and Trabzon and Erzurum is also linked to a planned action against the Soviet Union.

²³ AVP RF F. 011. Op. 6. p. 36. d. 15./ 22-21 ad calendas graecas – *lat.* when hell freezes over.

²⁴ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 39.

Hungarian politician mentioned the possibility that in the future „*Russia would guarantee Hungary's independence of the great powers*”.²⁵ As a matter of fact, Ullein-Reviczky did request Sharonov to forward to him the TASS materials and newspaper articles he found desirable to be published in Hungary. The Soviet Ambassador was pleased with the initiative since – as he had said – it also served Hungary's interests to learn about the Soviet Union's position concerning some matters.²⁶

In June 1940, Sharonov met Foreign Minister István Csáky several times. At the meetings – as recorded in the Soviet Ambassador's report – the question of Bessarabia and Romania was mentioned only in general. No attempt was made to harmonise the steps taken by the two countries concerning Romania, both parties tried to find out about the position of the other party. Sharonov did not mention the planned Soviet action; considering the functional characteristics of Soviet foreign policy controlled by Stalin and Molotov, we may presume that he, himself, was informed about it in the very last moment. In the diplomatic circles of Budapest, great sensation was caused by Csáky's visit of 19 June to the Soviet Embassy. Since the outbreak of the war, the Hungarian foreign minister had not visited any diplomatic representation. The leader of Hungarian foreign policy arrived officially in the Bajza Street for the premiere of the film entitled „*Peter I*”. He was accompanied by Jenő Ghyczy, Head of the Political Department, Antal Ullein-Reviczky, Head of the Press Department and Gábor Farago, the military attaché to Moscow.²⁷ At the event also participated diplomats of other countries including the German, Italian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Slovakian Ambassadors, therefore, obviously, genuine political discussion could not take place between the Hungarian and Soviet diplomats. The Soviet Ambassador's report also recorded only a few chance remarks to Bessarabia. However, Sharonov did not exclude the possibility that these had been generated by Csáky's presence. Farago told Counsellor of Embassy Belyayev that Hungary was waiting for the Soviet Union to occupy Bessarabia before her re-conquest of Transylvania. The Bulgarian Ambassador also confirmed to Sharonov that Bulgarian public opinion counted on a Soviet action in Bessarabia in the nearest future. However, gossip, as usual, exaggerated the real events. The „*news*” concerning Csáky's visit referred to a Soviet-Hungarian military agreement and the impending attack against Romania.²⁸

At the same time, Budapest feared further Bolshevik expansion. The argument that Western civilization may only be defended by Hungary on the ridge of the Carpathians was raised repeatedly. In February 1940, the

²⁵ Roosevelt követe Budapesten. *John F. Montgomery bizalmas politikai beszélgetései*. [MONTGOMERY, 2002. – K. A.] Published by: Tibor FRANK. Budapest 2002. 272.

²⁶ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 47.

²⁷ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 64.

²⁸ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 69.

Ambassadors to London and Paris delivered memoranda to the governments concerned, in which, in case of a Russian attack in the Balkans, they considered the advance of the Hungarian armed forces to the line of the Carpathians necessary in order to stop the Soviets. In the memorandum, the Hungarian government declared that it would not cooperate with the Soviet Union under any circumstances.²⁹ This idea was repeatedly emphasized to foreign diplomats by Hungarian political leaders. On 30 January 1940, Prime Minister Teleki told Montgomery, the Ambassador of the United States to Budapest, that Hungary considered Romania her enemy, but she considered the Soviet Union an even greater enemy, consequently she did not plan to take advantage of a possible Soviet attack against Romania. Even Horthy talked to the Ambassador in a similar spirit. The regent considered Hungarian military intervention unavoidable only if the Soviet armed forces should march against Transylvania.³⁰ In May 1940, after receiving information from Kristóffy about the concentration of Soviet troops along the Romanian border and the restrictions of civil rail traffic, Csáky instructed the Hungarian Ambassador to Rome to inform Ciano that „*the Hungarian government has the reason to presume that, in case the Soviet armed forces get into Romania either peacefully or by force, neither the Romanian armed forces, nor the Romanian public opinion will be in the moral or material position to stop the Russian army at the Carpathians. It is the primary interest of Hungary and Central-Europe for reasons of self-defence that Hungary should stand on the line of the Carpathians militarily prepared for this situation*”. Csáky was curious about the Italian and German positions, as in his opinion, Hungarian defence preparations could not be put off much longer.³¹ However, the arguments did not fully convince either Berlin or Rome.

Based on the documents at our disposal, in the days preceding the delivery of the Soviet ultimatum, none of the leaders of the Foreign Commissariat had conducted talks on this subject with Ambassador József Kristóffy. Concerning this Ullein-Reviczky remarked disapprovingly before Sharonov that the Hungarian government had not received the information about the Soviet ultimatum delivered to Romania from Kristóffy but from the Hungarian Ambassador to Bucharest. At the same meeting, the Soviet Ambassador inquired whether Hungary wanted to start a war against Romania and if it was so, whether she had prepared for it. [At the time of the conversation, it was not yet obvious whether Bucharest would accept the ultimatum – A. K.] Ullein-

²⁹ Islamov, Tofik Muslimovich: Vengersko-ruminsky konflikt i sovietskaya dyplomatyia. In: Voyna i politika. (Ed.: CHUBARYAN et al.) Moscow, 2001. p. 456. From April 1939 Romania had an agreement on guarantee with France and Great-Britain, and this could not be ignored by Hungarian diplomacy at the beginning of 1940.

³⁰ MONTGOMERY, 2002. 259 and 261.

³¹ *Diplomáciai Iratok Magyarország külpolitikájához 1936-1945.* [hereinafter DIMK] Vol. 5, (Ed.: Gyula JUHÁSZ) Bp. 1982. pp. 144-145.

Reviczky's reply indicated the scope of action of Hungarian foreign policy: the Head of the Press Department considered that Hungary had long been prepared for the war, but the start depended on Germany's and Italy's permission.³²

Based on the information available at present, there is no element of truth in the story related by J. F. Montgomery, the ex-Ambassador of the United States to Budapest in his memoirs entitled „*Magyarország, a vonakodó csatlós*” [Hungary, the Unwilling Satellite]. According to this, Stalin received Hungarian Ambassador Kristóffy [!] in his study before the start of the Bessarabian action and asked him about the Hungarian claims concerning Transylvania. Kristóffy told him that these claims still existed, to which Stalin replied in the following way: „*Then why don't you attack Romania? The time has come.*” The surprised Kristóffy promised to inform his government about the idea.³³ Montgomery does not name the source of his information. An event of such importance would by all means be reported in the Soviet or Hungarian documents, e.g. in Kristóffy's political reports, moreover, in all probability, the news would have been leaked to the press as well. As to Stalin, we know that he met foreign diplomats very rarely, he reserved this „*pleasure*” for Molotov and his deputies. Considering all this, we may fully exclude the reality of a Stalin-Kristóffy meeting. At the same time, in the literature of memoirs, this is not the only element referring to close Soviet-Hungarian cooperation, which did not exist in reality. In András Hory's memoirs published in Vienna in 1967, one may read that in July 1940, the Soviet Union allegedly suggested active military cooperation in case of a Hungarian-Romanian warlike conflict.³⁴ The contemporary archival documents, Ambassadorial reports, telegrams available at present do not seem to confirm this version.

Apart from the suggestions delivered to Budapest through the above-mentioned indirect channels – that Hungarian and Bulgarian territorial claims against Romania appeared to be justified – Moscow did not want to involve Hungary as a strategic partner in the solution of the problem any further. On 23 June 1940, Csáky instructed Kristóffy to find out whether the Soviet government was aware of the Hungarian-Romanian problem and what their position was concerning its solution.³⁵ On 26 June, a few hours before the delivery of the ultimatum, the Hungarian Ambassador indicated to Csáky that he would wait for Deputy Foreign Commissar Dyekanozov's return to Moscow to carry out the instructions as, out of the leaders of Soviet diplomacy, it was with him that he had closer relations and could conduct political discussions best.³⁶ This meeting took place on 29 June, i.e. after the Red Army started the occupation of Bessarabia. The deputy foreign

³² AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 69.

³³ MONTGOMERY, John Floumoy: *Magyarország, a vonakodó csatlós*. Budapest 2004. 163.

³⁴ ZSELICZKY, Béla: *Regent Vengrii, Miklos Horthy (1868-1957)*. Novaya i noveysaya istoriya. 1996/ № 2. 193.

³⁵ DIMK Volume 5, p. 205.

³⁶ DIMK Volume 5, p. 214. During the days in question, Dyekanozov stayed in Kaunas as Stalin's special envoy and directed the Soviet occupation of Lithuania.

commissar – based on Kristóffy's telegram – „*seemed to understand*” Hungary's territorial claims, however, he added as his personal opinion that the Soviet Union had no interest in the matter.³⁷

On 27 June the Hungarian Council of Ministers discussed the new situation resulting from the Soviet action. In his bulletin, Foreign Minister Csáky underlined that Germany and Italy urged Romania to grant the Soviet claims. „*The Hungarian government watches the developments carefully and will act energetically. Its position is that Hungary cannot bear any discrimination.*”³⁸ This final conclusion constitutes the guiding principle of the circular telegram Csáky sent to the Hungarian diplomatic representations a few days later. The Hungarian Embassy in Moscow also received the telegram. At their posts, the Ambassadors had to emphasize that the Hungarian government and public opinion found injurious Romania's conduct of starting territorial negotiations with other states without involving Hungary.³⁹

Soviet action was unequivocally approved by Hungarian public opinion. „*The inhabitants of the town are excited. The people are positively disposed toward us.*” – recorded Sharonov in his political report.⁴⁰ The papers approved the step independently of their party affiliation. The social-democratic Népszava (People's Voice) reported on the *re-conquest* of Bessarabia and the *liberation* of Northern Bukovina. All this is of mighty importance for Hungary – one may read in the editorial of the paper's issue of 29 June: „*This process is the elimination of the situation forced on Europe by the peace treaties of Paris. This time it is Romania's turn to restore the situation which had evolved as a result of a century-long development and which had existed until the territory of Southern Europe was torn up into pieces for artificial strategic reasons.*”⁴¹ Even the extreme right-wing press, which could not be accused of being pro-Soviet was jubilous: „*Our heart, every Hungarian's heart leaps. The Soviet sent an ultimatum to Romania.*”⁴²

Ferenc Rajniss, who was later sentenced to death and executed as a war criminal, the emblematic figure of the Hungarian radical right and a member of the Parliament's Foreign Committee, had been the Soviet Ambassador's regular guest and permanent source of information. On 28 June, he informed Sharonov that the breaking up of the territorial integrity of „*Great-Romania*” was approved

³⁷ DIMK Volume 5, 240-241.

³⁸ MOL K-27-1940-3622/81. Minutes of the Session of the Council of Ministers of 27 June 1940.

³⁹ DIMK Volume 5, 249.

⁴⁰ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 69.

⁴¹ Népszava, 29 June 1940. p. 1. In the mentioned article, the paper of the Social Democrats followed the chain of thought prescribed the previous day by Ullein-Reviczky for the foreign columnists of the Budapest papers, when it discussed the natural liquidation of the peace treaties of the Paris Peace Conference. *Nem engedélyezem! A cenzúra bizottság dossziéjából.* (Compiled by: László MÁRKUS, Miklós SZINAI, Miklós VÁSÁRHELYI) Budapest 1975. 102.

⁴² SIPOS, Balázs: *Szovjetbarát és szovjetellenes nyilas propaganda 1939-1941.* Múltunk, 1996/№ 2. 124.

by the Hungarian public opinion. Although the Hungarians – said Rajniss – are happy about the peaceful settlement of the conflict, they would have preferred a Soviet-Romanian war, which would have enabled them as well to attack Romania, which would have collapsed in a two-front fight. This way it will be more difficult for the Hungarians to execute their plans alone.⁴³

On 1 June, Csáky instructed Kristóffy to meet Dyekanozov urgently. The Hungarian Ambassador was to find out whether the Soviet government would be willing to calm down Belgrade in case of a Hungarian-Romanian armed conflict. Two days later another cipher telegram arrived at the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow, which contained more general instructions this time. The leader of Hungarian foreign policy wanted to get an answer to the question whether the Soviet Union had further plans with Romania or what her conduct would be like in case of a possible Hungarian-Romanian military confrontation.⁴⁴ Kristóffy expressed his satisfaction to Dyekanozov and emphasized the favourable evaluation of the events by Hungary with regard to the actions in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. „Hungary also has territorial claims against Romania, the only difference lies in the fact that the Soviet Union has already solved her problem and Hungary has not.” In his political report, by his own admission, Dyekanozov expressly evaded taking a firm position concerning the matter interesting Hungarian diplomacy the most, namely the Soviet Union’s reaction in case of a Hungarian action against Romania.⁴⁵ On 3 July, in the late evening Kristóffy was also received by Molotov. In his reply to the Hungarian Ambassador’s questions, the Foreign Commissar explained that the Soviet Union maintained no diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, consequently she could not exert any pressure on Belgrade. He showed understanding concerning Hungary’s claims against Romania, at the same time he signalled that the Soviet Union did not want to interfere in the conflict.⁴⁶ Italian diplomatic sources suggest that there was some change in the Soviet position concerning Belgrade in the following days. On 9 July, Csáky informed Talamo about Molotov’s statement made to Kristóffy, according to which „if Yugoslavia should take a hostile position against Hungary, the Soviet government would be ready to exert pressure on Belgrade”. Moreover, Sharonov declared before Csáky that he was going to notify the Yugoslavian Ambassador to Budapest officially in the name of his government about Moscow’s position.⁴⁷

⁴³ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 70. The relationship between Rajniss and the Soviet Ambassador is typically characterised by the small intermezzo, which has also been recorded for us in Sharonov’s political records. According to Rajniss, he was accused in the Parliament by a Social Democratic representative of visiting the Soviet Embassy despite being a patriot. Rajniss returned like for like: „You would also like to go there, but you are not invited.”(ibid.)

⁴⁴ DIMK Vol. 5, 255 and 268.

⁴⁵ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 1./ 51-52.

⁴⁶ DIMK Volume 5, 269-270, and ISLAMOV, Tofik Muslimovich: *Erdély a szovjet külpolitikában a második világháború alatt*. Múltunk, 1994/ №1-2. 32.

⁴⁷ ODD, 2002. 68 and 78.

In his political report of 11 July, Kristóffy evaluates the situation more optimistically and he can see relaxation of the so far reserved Soviet conduct. Still referring to Molotov's statements, apart from the information provided telegraphically, he draws attention to the fact that in case of a peace conference, the Soviet Union would support Hungary against Romania and in case of a Hungarian-Romanian armed conflict „*the Soviet Union's conduct would correspond to her position concerning the Hungarian claims*”. Kristóffy did not have specific information about the background and driving force of the change experienced by him. According to his subjective opinion, the Soviet Union is concerned about the quick German success achieved in the Western theatre, therefore Moscow would like if a Hungarian-Romanian armed conflict caused disorder in the German federal system.⁴⁸

Although Kristóffy evaluated the situation of the moment as favourable from the perspective of Soviet-Hungarian relations, „*it would be shaky ground to build our future on it*”, as Soviet foreign policy may take a U-turn any moment. The uncertainty of the Hungarian Ambassador concerning the future must have been increased by the news about Sub-Carpathia spread to him by the members of the German diplomatic representation to Moscow. Based on it, the Soviet Union cannot surrender the given territory, as the final settlement of the Ukrainian question requires the union of all Ukrainians within Soviet borders. If Hungary gets into a difficult situation, Moscow will take advantage of the opportunity.⁴⁹ Reports of such content arrived at the Dísz Square from the German capital too. Berlin did not seem to understand the reason that in case of further Soviet advance, in order to prevent Bolshevik/Pan-Slavic danger, the Hungarian army should occupy the line of the Carpathians („*running race for the Carpathians*”). Mentioning Sub-Carpathia seemed the suitable means to curb Hungarian ambitions against Romania. The Germans made the Hungarians feel that in case of a Soviet-Hungarian conflict, they would be left alone as Germany, being on „*friendly terms*” with Moscow, would not be in a position to fly to Hungary's aid.⁵⁰ In accordance with the instructions addressed to Erdmannsdorff and tapped by the VKF (general staff of Hungarian Army), the German Ambassador to Budapest had to inform the Hungarian government about the following: „*As to the Hungarian government's position, according to which the bastion formed by the Carpathians is needed to prevent the further spread of bolshevism, it is under debate. The accidental border incidents taking place in the Carpathian Ukraine do not conform to communist mentality [sic – A. K.] and as a result, it is possible that after a careless step, it will become timely to address the*

⁴⁸ PASTOR, 1992. 256. Earlier, Soviet politicians manifested understanding for Hungary's territorial claims.

⁴⁹ PASTOR, 1992. 256.

⁵⁰ DIMK Volume 5, 265. Döme Sztójay's cipher telegram to Foreign Minister Csáky on 3 July 1940.

question of the Carpathian Ukraine. Taking into consideration that the government of the Reich appreciates the delicate nature of the issue, it may declare, being fully aware of the responsibility, that, if the Hungarian government follows its advice, the issue will not be raised."⁵¹ The Hungarian diplomats seem to have been worked on successfully in Berlin. Viewed from the German capital, a Soviet-Hungarian military conflict seemed tangible reality in the nearest future. In his report of 4 July 1940, colonel and military attaché Sándor Homlok urged the elaboration of specific measures already to counter-balance the Soviet air and armoured supremacy in case of a collision where Hungary was left alone with the attacking Soviet Union. In his opinion, if Russia raised the issue of Sub-Carpathia, the axis powers would suggest surrendering the territory to Hungary without fight.⁵² On reading the reports arriving from Berlin, Csáky considered it necessary to cool down the sparkling warlike atmosphere at the foreign representation: repeating Molotov's words addressed to Kristóffy, the foreign minister excluded the possibility of a Soviet-Hungarian war. Moscow assured Hungary of its benevolence, it would remain neutral in a Romanian-Hungarian armed conflict and, at the future peace conferences, it would support Hungary's claims.⁵³

Hungarian diplomacy was right to conclude that the Soviet-Romanian conflict was far from coming to rest by the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern-Bukovina. Nevertheless, we cannot add a lot more now either, more than six decades after the events. The cause of uncertainty lies in the fact that the former Soviet archival documents are still closed to the public to a great extent and also in the carefulness characterising Moscow after June 1940. Romania was the first station on the road of Russian-Soviet foreign political activity directed toward the Balkans and the straits, dating back to century-long tradition. Apart from this, Germany had crucial strategic interests in the country because of the oil quarry. From the point of view of a future Soviet-German collision, it was important to what extent Soviet expansion threatened the fuel supplies of the German armed force. In accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Romania fell within the scope of German interests except for Bessarabia. In summer 1940, taking advantage of the Germans being occupied in the Western theatre, the Soviet Union announced her claim concerning the whole of Bukovina, which, as a matter of fact, meant the violation of the agreement of 1939. However, seeing the disapproval of German diplomacy, Moscow was satisfied with the Northern part of the territory for the time being. At the same time, it became obvious to Moscow that any further claims concerning Romania would be firmly rejected by Berlin. In June 1940, the Soviet Union got across to the line of Prut and the Danube delta. By this, she

⁵¹ DIMK Volume 5, pp. 267-268.

⁵² DIMK Volume 5, p. 282.

⁵³ DIMK Volume 5, pp. 294-295. Foreign Minister István Csáky's cipher telegram of 5 July 1940 to the Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin.

had reached and at one point even crossed the border of the sphere of interest allocated to her. Further expansion would have consequently violated German interests, therefore care was needed. „*No one knew the maximum of Soviet claims against Romania, what their limit was. Except, maybe, for Stalin. It is most probable that the leader of nations knew exactly what he wanted from the Romanians.*” – thinks Professor Islamov, one of the best-known experts of the issue.⁵⁴ As we will see, in the documents at our disposal, there appears a wide scale of possible versions from the conquest of Southern-Bukovina to the Poland style partitioning of the country. However, these versions belonged to the category of suppositions; no specific steps were taken to carry them into effect. At the beginning of August 1940, Sharonov recorded several conversations of similar content in his political report. On 6 August, Yugoslav Ambassador Rashich inquired from his Soviet colleague about the news spreading in diplomatic circles, according to which the Soviet Union wilfully pushed Hungary toward war so that she could take hold of further Romanian territories during a Hungarian-Romanian armed conflict. Two days later, at a lunch given at the Embassy, at which participated the German, Italian, Yugoslav and Slovakian Ambassadors, he also raised the question. Replying to Sharonov’s inquiries, Rashich and Shpishiak both named the English Ambassador and the English-friendly Budapest political circles as the source of information.

Such suppositions were based on the fact that in the period in question, Csáky met Sharonov more often than usually and he visited even the Soviet diplomatic representation twice. As the Soviet diplomat recounted in his report addressed to Dyekanozov, he met Csáky once a month normally.⁵⁵ In summer 1940, these meetings became more frequent. As proved by the Soviet Ambassador’s report, in the weeks before and after the Bessarabian crisis, he met the Hungarian foreign minister on 11 June, 19 June, 6 July and 8 July as well, apart from this, he talked to Deputy Foreign Minister János Vörnle several times. The news spreading about such activities of the Ambassador were not looked upon approvingly at the Foreign Commissariat either. In August 1940, Alexandrov, the Head of the Central-European Department asked Sharonov whether he agreed his visits to the Foreign Ministry with Molotov or Dyekanozov, to which the Ambassador replied that he did not know about such obligation.⁵⁶ From the reports on the surveillance of the Soviet Embassy we know that Alexandrov stayed in Budapest from 30 July to 3 August 1940.⁵⁷ His task was obviously to coach Sharonov on the Soviet line of policy mainly concerning Hungarian-Romanian relations and the question of

⁵⁴ ISLAMOV: *Rumino-vengersky konflikt...* 1999. 306.

⁵⁵ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 4./ 26.

⁵⁶ SERES, Attila: *Újabb szovjet dokumentumok a második bécsi döntés és a magyar-szovjet kapcsolatok történetéhez (1940)*, Pont, 2004/ № 1. 77.

⁵⁷ MOL K-64-86. cs.-1940/599/res pol

Transylvania. Unfortunately, for the time being, we do not have detailed information about what the high-ranking officer of the Foreign Commissariat exactly said to Sharonov.

In his political discussions, the Soviet Ambassador refrained from express formulation. He recognized the correct and loyal nature of Hungarian-Soviet relations, at the same time, concerning the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, he cited Molotov's declaration published in the issue of 2 August of the *Izvestiya*, according to which nothing could disturb good neighbourly relations with Romania after the surrender of Bessarabia.⁵⁸ However, behind this apparently reassuring declaration there lay the news about the concentration of Soviet troops in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and the recurring armed incidents along the new border. This line had not been exactly laid down even by August 1940. It was an express instruction of the Romanian Ambassador to Moscow that during the talks on this subject he should strictly avoid the expression *border* and use *line of demarcation* instead.⁵⁹ In his records dated 26 August, Gafencu considered that strong German guarantee was required for the defence of the interests of the country. According to Romanian diplomacy, the following questions needed to be answered first of all: „*Are they [the Germans – A. K.] ready to resist Russian expansion if required even at the expense of putting an end to the war with England? Are they determined enough to prevent the Hungarian military games, which may serve as a ground and excuse for the Russians to march into Moldva under the changed circumstances not for the sake of the further «acquisition of territories» but so as to «restore order»? (the example of Poland!) Under the influence of events got out of their control and under pressure from the Russians, would they not reconcile themselves – as in the case of Poland – to the partitioning of our country up to the line of the Carpathians?*”⁶⁰

Based on the above circumstances, it is understandable that the Hungarian government tried to take the Soviet factor also into consideration during the implementation of its revisionist endeavours. On 23 August, during the recess of the bilateral Hungarian-Romanian talks of Turnu Severin,⁶¹ Csáky instructed

⁵⁸ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 13./ 82-83. and Transylvansky vopros 2000. 58-59.

⁵⁹ *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya* Vol. 2, 2000. p. 358.

⁶⁰ *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya* Vol. 2, 2000. p. 365.

⁶¹ In Turnu Severin by the Lower Danube direct talks between the Hungarian and Romanian sides were taking place from 16 to 24 August 1940. During the talks interrupted several times, the positions of the Hungarian delegation headed by András Hory and of the Romanian delegation headed by Valeriu Pop could not be approximated to such extent that would have produced result. At the beginning, the Romanians suggested the exchange of populations exclusively, while the Hungarian party demanded the surrender of the major part of Transylvania, a territory of approx. 69 thousand kms². On 24 August, János Vörnlé informed German Ambassador Erdmansdorff that according to the expectations, Hungary would start military action against Romania within a week's time if the axis powers did not intervene in the conflict. (About the talks of Turnu Severin, see: CZETTLER, Antal: *Teleki Pál és a magyar külpolitika 1939-1941*. Budapest 1997. 143-149.).

Kristóffy in a cipher telegram to meet Molotov urgently and inform him about the expected breakdown of talks and the increasing prominence of a military solution. Hungarian diplomacy counted on a friendly and understanding attitude on the part of the Soviet press concerning the Hungarian claims, on the other hand, they wanted to achieve that the Soviet military leadership possibly maintained the number of troops stationed along the Romanian border and the state of their military preparedness in order to hinder the redeployment of the Romanian armed forces from Moldva to the territory of Transylvania. The Hungarian government would welcome – continues the instruction – if the Soviet Union sold bombers and fighters to Hungary, delivery would be urgent and the price did not matter. In case of a reply in the affirmative, Alfréd Nickl, the head of the delegation of the Hungarian trade representation staying in Moscow, and military attaché Gábor Faragó were to strike a deal without delay.⁶²

The Hungarian Ambassador informed Molotov about the contents of the instruction the following day, on 24 August. The Foreign Commissar practically refused the request about the purchase of fighters, saying that the needs of the Soviet army did not render it possible to satisfy the Hungarian demands. However, he promised to consult the competent military circles about the matter and possibly, to notify the Hungarian Ambassador about the details.⁶³ With the help of the documents at our disposal, we may trace the developments in the „fighter case” up to this point. Probably a lot more did not take place, as we have seen that the Soviet Union refrained from interfering in the Hungarian-Romanian conflict directly, and supplying weapons to the other side would have fallen within this category. Moreover, the Foreign Commissar repeated the earlier Soviet declarations. He emphasized that Moscow had never considered the Romania of Versailles and Trianon an ideal state configuration, her existence was injurious to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Hungary too. He promised that during the events the Soviet position would be favourable for Hungary, although he did not specify it. „Our one-hour conversation was conducted in the most friendly tone, but Molotov appeared to choose his words in a way so that the general friendly declarations could not be interpreted to mean too specific promises” – summed up Kristóffy the experiences of the meeting in his cipher telegram sent to Budapest.⁶⁴

Parallel to the breakdown of the talks of Turnu Severin, the idea of settling the matter by arbitration came more and more to the foreground. It is interesting that in some diplomatic talks in Budapest it was formulated that the Soviet Union might also play a role in this. When French Ambassador Pierre Guerlet shared his information with Sharonov about the forthcoming German

⁶² DIMK Volume 5, 508-509.

⁶³ DIMK Volume 5, 519.

⁶⁴ DIMK Volume 5, 520. It is characteristic of Moscow’s carefulness that during the conversation with Kristóffy, Molotov did not find it justified to publish his government’s official position in the Soviet press.

arbitration, his Soviet colleague reacted by pointing out that the arbitrators might be neutral countries as well, for example, Greece, Yugoslavia or the *Soviet Union* [my italics – A. K.].⁶⁵ On 26 August, at the lunch given by Yugoslav Ambassador Rashich, the participating István Bárczy, the under-secretary of the Prime Minister's Office addressed Sharonov with the following words: „*As the representative of the great Soviet Union, you must be our adviser (Ratgeber) just like Talamo and Erdsmandorff*”. Sharonov did not reply to the suggestion.⁶⁶

On 26 August 1940, Hitler wrote a letter to Mussolini requesting that Italian Foreign Minister Ciano should travel to Germany. According to Antal Czettler, this was the time when the Führer, changing his earlier point of view, decided on German-Italian arbitration. German politicians and diplomats had ruled out this possibility in their earlier declarations. At the end of July, German Ambassador to Moscow Schulenburg declared to Molotov: “Germany is not going to participate as an arbitrator in the forthcoming talks between the Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian parties.” It was at that time too that Schulenburg revealed to Molotov that Berlin considered the Hungarian claims over-exaggerated and had called upon Budapest to reduce them.⁶⁷ On 13 August, in his telegrams sent to the German foreign representations in Budapest, Sofia and Bucharest, Weizsäcker indicated that it contradicted German desires that the states concerned endeavoured to make Germany appear to share their own points of view and to provoke her interference with the settlement of disputes.⁶⁸

Keeping his promise, Ciano arrived in Germany on 28 August. Following this, events took place rapidly. Representatives of the Hungarian and Romanian parties were summoned to Vienna for 29 August. The delegations were headed by Foreign Ministers István Csáky and Manoilescu, Prime Minister Pál Teleki was also a member of the Hungarian delegation. After both parties had been made to promise to accept the arbitration award unconditionally, the award was announced in the Belvedere Palace at 15.00 on 30 August. Under the award Székely land, the Northern part of Transylvania, Máramaros, Oradea, Nagykároly, the Szatmárnémet region, altogether approximately 43 thousand km² territory were returned to Hungary. At the same time, Germany and Italy were to guarantee the new borders of Romania.⁶⁹

When examining the conduct of the Soviet Union during the days in question, the following needs to be paid attention to: On 26 August, that is, before the Vienna Award, Dyekanozov received Romanian Ambassador Gafencu. Referring

⁶⁵ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 85.

⁶⁶ AVP RF F. 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 3./ 85.

⁶⁷ ISLAMOV: *Rumino-vengersky konflikt...* 1999. 321-322.

⁶⁸ CZETTLER, 1997. 146.

⁶⁹ About the details of the decision and the establishment of the borderline, see: JUHÁSZ, 1964. 178-211, and CZETTLER, 1997. 149-169.

to information provided by his government, Gafencu inquired about the concentration of Soviet troops in Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia and the advance of the units in the direction of the border (line of demarcation). The Romanian diplomat added that he did not believe news of this kind, however it had caused serious concern in the Romanian public opinion, so it would be advisable to refute it categorically. Dyekanozov stated that he had not heard of any concentration of troops along the Romanian border, he classifies the news about this as pure fabrication. In his telegram sent to Bucharest after this conversation, Gafencu considered the news provided by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar reassuring.⁷⁰ To the contrary, the Romanian political circles were really shocked by the note handed over by Deyekanozov to the Romanian Ambassador at night on 29 August. The document contained a specified list of border and air space violations committed by the Romanians during August. On 25 August – as the note read – Romanian planes penetrated Soviet air space six times. Moreover, the preceding day, serious fight broke out at one border guard point, when Romanian border guards fired twice at the Soviet squad on duty.⁷¹ The Soviet government expressed its protest against the series of Romanian provocations. „*It is true that there have not been any victims on the Soviet side, but if there should be any, the events may take a serious turn. The Soviet Government passes all responsibility to the Romanian government for the possible consequences of the actions mentioned above.*”⁷² In Gafencu’s opinion, the Soviet démarche was aimed at „*reminding us of the presence of Soviet troops along our new borders not «demarcated» [sic – A. K.] yet at the time of the Vienna Conference*”.⁷³

The note may rightly be considered of key importance in the course of events. The Soviet factor appeared even to the contemporaries to play an important role in Romania’s acceptance of the provisions of the Second Vienna Award. The Crown Council conducting its session during the night from 29 to 30 August yielded, not least, to the argument of the Germans, according to which Bucharest’s opposition might lead to immediate joint Soviet-Hungarian attack. In his records, Gafencu laid down the opinion wide-spread in the diplomatic circles of Moscow, according to which: „*The Soviet Union agreed, without hesitation, to promote the success of the court of arbitration, threatening the Romanians by Russian penetration in order to reduce their resistance.*”⁷⁴ The note delivered to Gafencu on 29 August was not mainly

⁷⁰ *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000.. 367-368.

⁷¹ *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000. 369-370. In the course of the quickly evolving events it cannot be considered of minor importance that at 15 p.m. on 29 August, Gafencu himself asked for a meeting with Dyekanozov, but at that time the Romanian Ambassador’s request was refused by the Foreign Commissariat. However, in the late hours the Deputy Foreign Commissar himself wanted to see Gafencu, who appeared at the Commissariat around midnight.

⁷² *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000. 370.

⁷³ *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000. 370-371.

⁷⁴ ISLAMOV, 2001. 464-465.

uncheckable information coming merely from the German diplomatic circles, but an express threat from Moscow. The border incidents objected to in the document had not been either more frequent or serious than in the earlier period. Similar actions had often occurred along the Hungarian-Soviet border as well, it had mostly been possible to find a solution to them within the framework of regular diplomatic or border policing procedures. Behind the Soviet step there obviously lay political tendentiousness and careful timing. As pointed out by Attila Seres, the purpose of the note was not in the least to make Romania „swallow the Vienna pill more easily”. Moscow did not count on a quick arbitration award, they thought the delegations arriving in Vienna were going to continue the talks that had broken down in Turnu Severin, with German and Italian participation this time. This conviction was also confirmed by the information provided by Soviet Ambassador to Bucharest Lavrentyev.⁷⁵ The background and motives behind the Soviet conduct are aptly clarified in two reports by Kristóffy dated 3 September. According to the Hungarian Ambassador, Moscow would have welcomed a Hungarian-Romanian conflict, which might cause disorder in the German federal system on the one hand, and provide the opportunity for the Soviets for further expansion at the expense of Romania. At the same time – as the train of thought continues – Soviet diplomacy tried to avoid everything that might give the impression of open confrontation with the Germans. Therefore, „the Soviet government tried to increase the possibility of war not by encouraging Hungary to start war but by the sudden straining of Soviet-Romanian relations.”⁷⁶ Even more interestingly, Kristóffy considers it obvious that the border incidents were provoked by the Soviets. Thinking reasonably, Romania badly needed peace along her new Eastern borders because of her conflicts with Hungary. During the clashes, only the Romanian side suffered losses. According to Kristóffy’s interpretation, the Soviet note was to prevent the peaceful settlement of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute, it pushed the Hungarian government indirectly in the direction of an armed solution.⁷⁷ In his memoirs written in the ominous months of 1944, István Bethlen referred to the fact that Moscow had executed the concentration of troops and the border incidents along the Romanian border with Csáky’s approval.⁷⁸ This remark of Bethlen’s was also repeated by Antal Czettler in his monograph about the foreign policy of the

⁷⁵ SERES 2004. 75. On 26 August, referring to information received from Foreign Minister Manoilescu, Lavrentyev reported to Moscow that the Hungarian-Romanian talks were going to be reopened on 28th or 29th.

⁷⁶ PASTOR, 1992. 258-259.

⁷⁷ PASTOR, 1992. 259-260. Gafencu did not deny to Dyekanozov the fact of incidents, but he explained them by the generally strained situation. He expressed his regret about the events, but he did not acknowledge that solely the Romanian party was responsible for the matter. (*Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000. 370.)

⁷⁸ *Bethlen István emlékirata, 1944.* (published by: Ilona BOLZA and Ignác ROMSICS) Budapest 1988. 107.

Teleki government, accompanied by the comment that this statement could not be either proved or confirmed. Concerning his statement, we may add that the Russian archival data found so far do not contain any reference to action harmonized and agreed to such extent between Moscow and Budapest.⁷⁹

The „*Romanian factor*” influenced Hungarian-Soviet relations even after the Vienna Award. Moscow was extremely dissatisfied with the procedures of the axis powers, it voiced its disapproval already in the first days. It did not criticise the content elements that much but the method itself. At the meetings of 31 August and 9 September between Molotov and Schulenburg, the name of Hungary was not even mentioned in effect. All the more did Molotov complain about the lack of preliminary consultation and the fact that a question directly relating to the Soviet Union had been decided without her.⁸⁰ The Foreign Commissar protested mainly against the German and Italian guarantee of the new Romanian borders and he did not even hide the reason for this. At the time – said Molotov – when Moscow was squaring matters with Berlin concerning the territorial claims against Romania, the Soviets limited their claims to Northern Bukovina at the express request of Germany. Molotov had declared already at that time that they counted on Germany’s support if it was time to raise the issue of Southern Bukovina.⁸¹

The next day, on 10 September, the first man of Soviet diplomacy informed Gafencu about his government’s position in an informal way typical of him. The Romanian Ambassador requested that the new borderline should be revised in the region of Gerca, as the advancing Russian units had occupied even such territories (the Ambassador claimed this concerned 15 villages), which had never before belonged to either Bessarabia or Northern Bukovina but had always been part of the Ancient Romanian Kingdom. Gafencu would have liked the matter to be solved in the spirit of fairness and generosity. Molotov immediately gave an inkling of Soviet „*generosity*”. The Soviet government, reducing its claims to the minimum – he declared to the Romanian Ambassador – did not feel fully satisfied, but it did not want to cause further difficulty to Romania. Anyway, the Romanians had already accepted the new borderline, the modification of which was out of the question.⁸² So the Soviet Union had further territorial claims against Romania, she did not conceal the fact that she was merely waiting for the right opportunity. These endeavours of her appeared to be threatened by the above-mentioned German and Italian guarantee.

⁷⁹ CZETTLER, 1997. 157.

⁸⁰ Article 3 of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939 laid down the need for consultation in matters concerning both of the signatories. With regard to the Second Vienna Award, Molotov accused Germany of violation under this Article.

⁸¹ *1941 god.* 1998. 219-220. The seriousness of Soviet claims concerning Southern-Bukovina is suggested by the fact that Molotov explained these claims to Hitler too during their meeting of 13 November 1940. (DVP Vol. XXIII, 2/1. 1998. 65.)

⁸² *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Vol. 2, 2000. 335 and 373. Gerca – called Herca today in the territory of the Ukraine.

Hungary was not fully satisfied with the Vienna Award either. Although officially, „to the outside world”, the country was celebrating, the sounds of dissatisfaction got even to Sharonov, who reported them to his superiors. On 9 September Margit Bethlen phoned the Soviet Ambassador. She invited him to lunch saying that her husband, former Prime Minister István Bethlen wanted to tell him his views concerning Transylvania. In his report, Sharonov emphasized that apart from him and the former Prime Minister, nobody else had been present, Bethlen wanted to talk to the representative of a neighbouring great power in private.⁸³ The meeting took place after Bethlen had conducted a three-hour discussion with Prime Minister Pál Teleki returning from Vienna a few days earlier. Sharonov's impression was that Bethlen had discussed with the head of government the main points he wanted to talk about. The Soviet Ambassador knew that Teleki did not have any special liking for the Nazi Germany (this conviction of Sharonov's was confirmed by his remarks concerning the Second Vienna Award). Based on all this, the Soviet Union's representative in Budapest did not consider it impossible that Bethlen was conveying him ideas that Teleki and Csáky could not formulate officially. Considering the above circumstances, it is justifiable to dwell on the Sharonov-Bethlen meeting in detail and to quote what was probably being said longer than usual. In Bethlen's opinion, Germany in her own interest, had gravely cheated Hungary when she awarded the economically and industrially more valuable territories of Transylvania to Romania. In the near future, Romania was going to become a colony of the Third Reich and Hungary was going to be the passage to it. He called Slovakia and Romania Germany's forward bastion in case of an attack against the Soviet Union. „Neither you nor we need such an expansion of Germany and it is our interest that your influence prevailed in Romania.” Bethlen expressed his gratitude to Sharonov for the Soviet-Romanian border incidents, „by which you have demonstrated your attitude toward us”. At this point some debate evolved between the talking partners. According to the former Prime Minister, the message of the events along the Soviet-Romanian border is obvious to all Hungarian people of common sense. Nevertheless, Sharonov stuck to the official Soviet position published in an article of 9 September 1940 of the Pravda, alleging that the incidents had been provoked by the Romanian party. In the rest of the conversation, Bethlen repeatedly mentioned Hungary's intention to buy weapons, saying that, apart from the important industrial and defence industry raw materials (chromium ore, manganese), Hungary badly needed tanks and fighters as well. Sharonov avoided discussing the issue saying that he was not competent in such matters as a diplomatic representative. The exchange of ideas between Bethlen and Sharonov was probably the most characteristic formulation of the foreign

⁸³ This undoubtedly interesting and valuable account of Sharonov's was found by Attila Seres in the Foreign Archives of the Russian Federation. It was he who published it adding an introduction and notes. SERES, 2004. 78-82.

political concept, based on which the Soviet Union might play a role in ensuring Hungary's independence against German expansion. Hungary had to endeavour to maintain good relations with Moscow – said Bethlen – as the Soviet Union was the only power that could balance the danger threatening Hungary.⁸⁴ Of course, the importance of this should not be over-evaluated. Hungarian foreign policy was not in a position – partly because of necessity, partly because of conviction or fear – to articulate anti-German endeavours. Teleki's agony and, finally, his tragic fate illustrate this pitfall well. At the same time, the episode indicates the search for alternatives on the part of the Conservative Liberal circles centred around Bethlen. Unfortunately, in the mentioned period, the influence of this circle on the mechanism of political decision-making was decreasing continuously.

The reaction of Soviet Ambassador Sharonov to what Bethlen said was extremely interesting and informative. After expressing his gratitude for the sincerity of the former Prime Minister, he declared that he did not share his views. He emphasized the good and close German-Soviet relations and the existence of an agreement on consultation between the two great powers. It may be added though that Molotov – not without just cause – accused Berlin of violating this agreement in connection with the Second Vienna Award. During his stay in Budapest, in his discussions with foreign diplomats, Sharonov talked about the stability and friendly nature of Soviet-German relations not only *ex officio* and following central instructions, but he also appeared to seriously believe in this. Regardless of whether it was Rashich, Montgomery or even Rajniss or Imrédy that he conducted talks with, he always tried to refute all hints and suppositions that might refer to the possibility of a Soviet-German warlike conflict. When in January 1941, Yugoslav Ambassador Rashich mentioned military pressure on the Soviet Union or Turkey as a possible task of the German troops stationed in Romania, Sharonov replied the following: „*Our relations [with the Germans – A. K.] are so good that the first supposition may be dismissed easily.*”⁸⁵ Before Montgomery, he indicated the stability of relations when debating German aspirations concerning the Ukraine. At a lunch given by Ferenc Rajniss, he mentioned to his conversation

⁸⁴ Seres, 2004. p. 81. These statements support that in 1940-41 Bethlen considered orientation toward the Soviet Union an alternative which may be suitable for decreasing the ominous German pressure. He formulated all this more firmly in December 1944, under the circumstances of the collapse of the war, already in Soviet captivity, during his interrogation: „*I was not mistaken by the circumstance that Hitler re-annexed certain territories to Hungary. He did all this out of necessity. We could also have received them after peaceful talks with the Soviet Union.*” (GYÖRKEI, Jenő: *Bethlen dokumentumok Moszkvából*. Történelmi Szemle, 1994/ № 3-4. 336.) The germ of the thought appeared already in his foreign political conception before the war against the Soviet Union, we cannot consider his words recorded in the records of interrogation as mere subsequent self-justification, even if the way of expression bears the characteristics of the historical situation.

⁸⁵ DVP Volume XXIII, 2/1. 1998. 339.

partners rather disapprovingly that the majority of Hungarians still did not believe in long-lasting Soviet-German relations.⁸⁶ He continued repeating the above arguments mechanically even in May 1941, when even in Budapest the possibility of a German-Soviet war was brought up more and more openly and frequently. During another lunch on 5 May, he tried to convince Ferenc Rajniss that „*considering our special relation with Germany and Germany's [i.e. her dependence on the Soviet Union – A. K.], and the danger of a war on two fronts, one may hardly think that [Germany] would attack the Soviet Union.*”⁸⁷ The Soviet Ambassador to Budapest refuted the possibility of Soviet-German confrontation not only in his conversations but, what is even more important, he did not come to such conclusions in his reports either. As a counter-example, one should mention his colleague, Lavrentyev, the Ambassador to Bucharest, who, as opposed to Sharonov, had no illusions concerning Berlin's intentions. To him the aim of German military presence in Romania was obvious: they looked on the country as a base of operations, a bridge to military action against the Soviet Union.⁸⁸

His superiors were not fully satisfied with Sharonov's activities in Budapest either. His comprehensive evaluative report on the year 1940 presenting Hungary's internal political and economic situation was returned to him for revision. The Ambassador's attention was drawn to several deficiencies and inconsistencies. For example, the document contained, at the same time, such statement as „*Hungary succeeded in preserving her neutrality*” and „*Berlin had practically involved Hungary in the war already*”.⁸⁹ It is also worth mentioning that even in this report of his, Sharonov talks about firm Soviet-German relations having an effect on Hungarian foreign policy, despite the fact that Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940 was an unambiguous sign of the straining of tensions. According to the Soviet Ambassador, both camps of the Hungarian political elite – both Bethlen and those surrounding him (considered to be anglophile) and Imrédy's group (considered the absolute supporters of Germany) – understand and pay due attention to the importance

⁸⁶ DVP Volume XXIII. 2/1. 1998. 355 and 387.

⁸⁷ Transilvansky vopros 2000. 152-153.

⁸⁸ STIKALIN, A. S: *Transilvansky vopros v otnosheniyah Vengrii i Rumunii v 1940-e godi*. IN: *Natsionalnaya politika v stranah formiruyusegosya sovietskogo bloka*. (ed.: MARIINA, V. V.) Moscow, Nauka 2004. 375. 382. Although concerning the Second Vienna Award – as we have seen – Lavrentyev misinformed the Soviet leadership relying on German Ambassador Fabricius's information, when analysing the background of events, he did not fail to mention that underlying behind the partitioning of Transylvania there were Germany's anti-Soviet endeavours as a matter of fact: By the economic and political subjection of Romania and the transformation of Northern-Transylvania and Romania into a base of operations for the war against the Soviet Union, Berlin was preparing for expansion in the direction of the Black Sea. (see Lavrentyev's report of 17 September 1940 to Foreign Commissar Molotov, Transilvansky vopros 2000. 93.)

⁸⁹ AVP RF F. 06. Op. 3. P. 36. d. 466/ 1.

of the stability of Soviet-German relations when forming their policies.⁹⁰ All this could contribute to the fact that Sharonov's diplomatic carrier ended soon after his departure from Budapest.

Thus the Soviet Ambassador participated in talks which emphasized the unity of Soviet-Hungarian interests against Romania even after the Second Vienna Award. Although his activity was mostly restricted to the role of passive recipient, he listened to these dialogues with visible interest and he forwarded the information collected this way to Moscow. Dissatisfaction with the Vienna Award – he wrote in his summary report – had led to a situation where, practically, Hungary complained to the Soviet Union about the German procedures.⁹¹ „*The Germans did not give us the whole of Transylvania, while the Soviets acknowledged the lawfulness of all our claims.*” – Csáky's words addressed to a foreign diplomat and delivered to the Soviet Ambassador through multiple transmissions were laid down in Sharonov's political records.⁹² However, at their meeting of 28 October, the Hungarian Foreign Minister did not express his regret directly to Sharonov about the fact that the Soviet Union had not been present in Vienna among the arbitrators. In order to find out about the further Soviet plans concerning Romania, Csáky mentioned the possibility that earlier Anglo-French, then German protectorate could be replaced in the future by Russian protectorate. Sharonov evaded the „*experimental balloon*” of the first man of Hungarian diplomacy by a few general remarks: „*no country is our protectorate and we do not wish to become the protectors of any country*”.⁹³

These conversations were going on right until the eve of the German attack against the Soviet Union. In May 1941, Sharonov's conversations partners included Ferenc Rajniss, István Fenczik and Archduke Albrecht Habsburg infamous of being pro-Nazi. All three were determined to prove to the Soviet Ambassador that the Antonescu regime was unable to maintain order in Romania; consequently the task would have to be undertaken by other states. The Soviet Union would have to receive (occupy) Moldva so that afterwards Hungary could occupy the Banate and Southern Transylvania. „*To my inquiries whether they really wanted the repetition of the situation when Hungary was able to raise the issue of Transylvania after Bessarabia had been returned to the Soviet Union, both of them [Rajniss and Fenczik – A. K.] replied that this was just what they expected.*”⁹⁴ When Ferenc Rajniss was

⁹⁰ AVP RF F. 06. Op. 3. P. 36. d. 466./ 43-44. As far as Bethlen's understanding of the stability of Soviet-German relations is concerned, the words of the Soviet Ambassador do not describe the reality and they contradict everything told by the former Hungarian Prime Minister to Sharonov at their personal meeting in September concerning Germany threatening Soviet interests too.

⁹¹ AVP RF F. 06. Op. 3. P. 36. d. 466./ 35.

⁹² AVP RF 077. Op. 20. P. 109. d. 13./ 99.

⁹³ SERES, 2004. 83-84.

⁹⁴ Transilvansky vopros, 2000. 156.

discussing the coming advance of the Soviet Union in the regions of Romania and Iran, all what Sharonov said was that one could hear about Iran only in Hungary, no one talked about it in Moscow. The Soviet diplomat did not say anything about Romania. Probably this was the point when, quoting historian Tofik Islamov's words, the Foreign Commissariat had had enough of the „*dangerous conversations of their Ambassador to Budapest*”.⁹⁵ In the part of Sharonov's political records concerning Moldva, one may read Molotov's and Vishinsky's handwritten notes: „*Why does the Ambassador not object to it?*” (Molotov), „*Provocation*” (Vishinsky). „*He is suggesting this himself*” – wrote Molotov on the margin, when, as a matter of fact, the Soviet Ambassador, rushing to the aid of his conversation partners, himself defined the Hungarian wishes about the repetition of the situation of 1940.⁹⁶ On 28 May, Sharonov compiled a political report addressed directly to the Foreign Commissar. In this he also repeated the various variants of plans concerning the partitioning of Romania: according to one of them, the Soviets would receive a part of the Romanian territories by the Moldva to the south of the „*Hungarian wedge*” together with Bucharest.⁹⁷ Thus Sharonov minutely recorded and reported to Moscow every conversation initiated by the Hungarians and suggesting the possibility of a joint action against Romania. In Tofik Islamov's opinion, it may be excluded that the foreign apparatus's „*reliable and law-abiding officer acted upon his own initiative*”.⁹⁸ He may not have perceived that the German-Soviet relations stretched to breaking point and the less and less concealed concentration of German troops along the Soviet Union's borders did not make possible the repetition of the summer of 1940, when the German armed forces were occupied in the Western theatre. Therefore Sharonov was mistaken primarily not regarding the Soviet intentions, as the quoted notes of Molotov show that Moscow was far from being satisfied with the surrender of Bessarabia and Northern-Bukovina. However, he was undoubtedly wrong regarding the timing.

The letter which drew the Soviet Ambassador's attention to his serious mistakes committed so far was written by the Foreign Commissariat on 21 June 1941. The main mistake mentioned was that he had not firmly refused all exchanges of views concerning the partitioning of Romania, which were of provocative nature obviously and lacked all realistic foundation, he had not underlined it unambiguously that the Soviet Union did not have territorial claims against Romania (the Soviet Ambassador had probably not done so because he had not been fully convinced of this). Apart from this, Sobolyev, the General Secretary of the Foreign Commissariat, who had signed the document, expressed his criticism that Sharonov had referred to second-hand

⁹⁵ ISLAMOVI, Múltunk 1994/№ 1-2. 39.

⁹⁶ Transilvansky vopros, 2000. 156 and 159.

⁹⁷ Transilvansky vopros, 2000. 161.

⁹⁸ Islamov, Múltunk 1994/№ 1-2. 39.

information and unreliable news as facts, he had not taken enough care to check their contents.⁹⁹ The date of the letter reveals that it did not probably get to the addressee any more.

The question of the proper place of Transylvania occurred as some „*ultima ratio*” even on the second day of the German attack on the occasion of the meeting of 23 June 1941 between Molotov and Kristóffy. Molotov wished to clarify Hungary’s expected conduct in the conflict. The Foreign Commissar repeated again that the Soviet Union „*did not comment on the implementation of Hungarian claims at the expense of Romania and she will not comment on this in the future either*”.¹⁰⁰ Kristóffy’s lines form the basis for the later supposition that Moscow would have supported Hungary in conquering the whole of Transylvania if she did not join the German military action. The same episode is described in Molotov’s political records in the following way: „*The Soviet Union has no objection to the territorial expansion realized by Hungary at the expense of Romania (protiv osushchestvlyonnogo uvelicheniya tyerritorii)*”.¹⁰¹ The past participle makes it unambiguous that the Foreign Commissar’s remark refers to the past, it contains no allusion to possible future Soviet behaviour. Comparing the two documents today, it is not possible to tell whether the difference was caused by the fact that Kristóffy thought he had heard something in what Molotov was saying that he did not really say or the Soviet official recording the dialogue did not consider it worthwhile to put down the ominous clause. However, all this had no real effect on the events. Some years later, the place of Transylvania was decided by the peremptory order of the Soviet Union winning the war and occupying the territory militarily.

It must be added to the story and legend that Molotov’s words addressed to Kristóffy appeared in the documents of the László Bárdossy case already in the form of specific promises: „... *Russia has already forgotten that Hungary had joined the anti-Comintern pact, she cannot see any reason why Hungary could get into war with Russia. Hungary may count on Moscow’s full support in the future as well concerning the re-conquest of the whole of Transylvania, if she remains neutral in the war that has broken out between the two great powers.*”¹⁰² Slight corrections have to be made to the part of Peter Pastor’s remark, according to which Molotov’s promises concerning Transylvania could not be taken for granted because it is possible that he may have made them without Stalin knowing about them for reasons of being in a worn-out state of mind in the first days of the war, „*therefore they were not relevant*”.¹⁰³ In diplomacy, the value of verbal promises equals null, only a naive government may found its policies on them. Molotov’s words would not have meant a

⁹⁹ Transylvansky vopros, 2000. 163-164.

¹⁰⁰ DIMK Volume 5, 1214.

¹⁰¹ AVP RF F. 06. Op. 3. P. 11. d. 132./ 1.

¹⁰² Quoted in ÖLVEDI, Ignác: *Kassa bombázása*, Történelmi Szemle, 1985/ № 2. 345-346.

¹⁰³ PASTOR, 1992. 344.

commitment even if Hungary had steered clear of the German-Soviet conflict. Consequently, Stalin's role is irrelevant with regard to the issue. At the same time, one should accept Pastor's reasoning pointing out that at the conference between Molotov and Gafencu characterised by a rather strained atmosphere because of the Romanian declaration of war, the Foreign Commissar did not make any reference to Transylvania and the possible Soviet support for Hungarian revisionist endeavours even in the form of an implied threat.¹⁰⁴ Thus in June 1941 the Soviet Union reserved full discretion for herself in deciding the post-war fate of the region and in settling the issue of Transylvanian territorial claims.

¹⁰⁴ PASTOR, 1992. 344-345. Concerning the meeting between Molotov and Gafencu, see: *Sovietsko-ruminskiye otnosheniya*, Volume 2, 2000. 511-517.

Melinda Marton

Vorstellung der utilitären Pferdezzucht in Anbetracht der Geschichte des Gestüts Fenék

Der Titel spricht für sich und beinhaltet gleichzeitig die Agronomie, die Wirtschaftswissenschaft und die Geschichtswissenschaft, von denen die ausschlaggebende Rolle während der Bearbeitung des Themas die Methoden der Geschichtswissenschaft spielten. Mit dem Anspruch auf das Erfassen des Ganzen habe ich die utilitäre Pferdezzucht deduktiv untersucht, durch allgemeine Gesetzmäßigkeiten habe ich mich dem Einzelfall genähert. Die von mir untersuchte Epoche ist von 1711 bis 1945 einzugrenzen, den Schwerpunkt stellt der Zeitraum von 1867 bis 1945 dar.¹

In dem ersten Teil der Studie analysiere ich diese Epoche mit Hilfe einer wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Methode – Porters Diamant – aus historischer Sicht. Ich möchte beweisen, dass der Staat zwischen 1867 und 1914 in der Pferdezzucht einer liberalen Wirtschaftspolitik gefolgt ist, und so die Möglichkeit bestand, dass die Menschen das Utilitätsprinzip in diesem Zweig ausüben konnten. In dem zweiten Teil der Studie werde ich all das mit einem historischen Beispiel, nämlich mit der Geschichte des Gestüts Fenék unterstützen.²

Die Epoche der utilitären Pferdezzucht (1867–1945)

1. Spezielle Umstände

Liberalismus

Im 19. Jahrhundert hatte der Liberalismus eine determinierende Rolle, als politische Richtung. In der Verwirklichung der utilitären Pferdezzucht spielte der Liberalismus, genauer gesagt der wirtschaftliche Liberalismus, eine wichtige Rolle. Die theoretische Grundlage für den wirtschaftlichen

¹ Als Basis dieses Artikels diente die Arbeit mit dem Titel *'Vorstellung der utilitären Pferdezzucht in Anbetracht der Geschichte des Gestüts Fenék'*, die 2007 in der Abteilung für neuzeitliche Geschichte der humanwissenschaftlichen Sektion der OTDK (Országos Tudományos Diákköri Konferencia = Wissenschaftliche Landeskonferenz der Studenten) vorgetragen wurde und die Diplomarbeit mit dem Titel: *'Vorstellung des Raumgewinns der utilitären Pferdezzucht in Anbetracht der Geschichte der Menschheit, des Ungarntums und des Gestüts Fenék'*.

² Auf diesem Wege möchte ich mich bei meinem Konsulent Dr. János Majdán, bei dem Direktor des Schlossmuseums in Keszthely Dr. László Czoma, bei meiner Professorin Dr. Mária Ormos und bei den Mitarbeitern der Bibliotheken und Archiven für die Hilfe bedanken, die sie mir während meiner Forschungsarbeit geleistet haben; eine Danksagung kommt auch noch dem Endre Grastyán Fachkollegium zu, das mir ermöglicht hat, meine Forschungsergebnisse bei der V. Interdisziplinären „Konferenz Grastyán“ vorzustellen.

Liberalismus liefert das Utilitätsprinzip. Laut dem Vater des Utilitätsprinzips, Jeremy Bentham: „*Der Mensch strebt nach Glück, er will die schmerzhaften, unangenehme Gefühle minimalisieren und das Freudengefühl maximalisieren.*” – dies nennt er Utilitarismus. Der Utilitarismus bedeutet aus der Sicht des Staates, dass er nach dem größtmöglichen Glück strebt, so dass es der Mehrheit der Menschen so gut wie möglich geht. Diese neue Sichtweise und die profitorientierte Auffassung begründeten die Ausbildung und die Verbreitung des utilitären Pferdezüchtungssystems.³

Landwirtschaftlicher Systemwandel

Als Besonderheit dieses Jahrhunderts kann erwähnt werden, dass ein Systemwandel sich in den 1880er Jahren in der Landwirtschaft abspielte.⁴ Es wurde erkannt, dass die Tierzucht und der Pflanzenanbau aufeinander angewiesen sind und, dass ein gutes Ackerwesen ohne eine angemessene Tierzucht nicht möglich ist. Zur gleichen Zeit gewann die Tierzucht an Gewicht und Bedeutung im Vergleich zu dem Pflanzenanbau.⁵

Der Raumgewinn des Pferdes

In diesem Zeitalter wurde auch die Rolle des Pferdes bedeutender. Auf vier verschiedenen Gebieten des menschlichen Lebens ist die Rolle des Pferdes gewachsen, so auf dem Gebiet der Landwirtschaft, des Militärs, des Transportwesens und auf dem Gebiet der gesellschaftsformenden Aktivitäten.⁶ Unter der letzten Kategorie sind solche Tätigkeiten zu verstehen, wie die Parforcejagd und das Pferderennen, diese sind in Ungarn in der erwähnten Epoche sehr populär geworden.⁷

Arbeitsverteilung im Reich

Aus dem Aspekt der Pferdezüchtung war es ein bedeutender Faktor, dass sich der Prozess der Ausbildung der Kapitalwirtschaft innerhalb der Habsburger

³ BAYER József: *A politikai gondolkodás története* (Geschichte des politischen Denkens), Osiris, Budapest 1998. 177-191.

⁴ NAGY Mariann: *A magyar mezőgazdaság regionális szerkezete a 20. század elején* (Die regionale Struktur der ungarischen Landwirtschaft am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts) Gondolat, BIP, Budapest 2003. 46.

⁵ GERGELY András (Hrsg.): *Magyarország története a 19. században* (Geschichte Ungarns im 19. Jahrhundert), Osiris, Budapest 2003. 361.

⁶ MARTON Melinda: *A haszonelvű lótenyésztés térnyerésének bemutatása az emberiség, a magyarság és a Fenéki Ménes történetének tükrében* című diplomadolgozat ((Vorstellung des Raumgewinns der utilitären Pferdezüchtung in Anbetracht der Geschichte der Menschheit, des Ungarntums und des Gestüts Fenék - Diplomarbeit), Pécs 2007. 16.

⁷ Gr. ERDŐDY Rudolf: *Magyar kopófalkek és falkászok* ((Ungarische Schurze und Parforcejagden), Élet, Budapest 1940. 90.

Monarchie abspielte. In der Arbeitsverteilung innerhalb des Reiches bekam Ungarn die Chance seine Landwirtschaft, sein Bergbauwesen und seine Hüttenindustrie auszubauen.⁸ Dazu kam noch, dass die Pferdeversorgung der Reichsarmee auch Ungarns Aufgabe war, das bedeutete natürlich für die einheimischen Pferdezüchter eine qualitative und quantitative Herausforderung.⁹

2. Die Struktur

Als Antwort auf die quantitative Herausforderung kann die Herausbildung der Zentralstellen – der staatlichen Militärgestüten – verstanden werden. Ungarn war am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts fähig den Bedarf des Militärs an Pferden zu sichern; eine qualitative Verbesserung erfolgte aber nur dann im Gezücht allgemein, wenn die Bevölkerung daran wirtschaftlich auch interessiert war oder wenn sie in der Nähe eines Militärgestüts lebten. Am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts kann man bezüglich der Pferdezucht drei verschiedene Interessengruppen unterscheiden: eine militärische Gruppe, eine die Remonte –Verpflichtung hatte und eine wirtschaftlich interessierte Gruppe. So wartete die Aufgabe der Vereinigung der Interessen dieser drei Gruppen auf die Herrscher, Hippologen und Pferdezüchter des nächsten Jahrhunderts.¹⁰ Die Lösung auf dieses Problem brachte der Ausgleich im Jahre 1867 mit. Die Verwaltung der Gestüthöfe gelang in die Zuständigkeit des ungarischen Staates und die Einrichtungen bekamen neben der militärischen Führung auch Agrarexperten.¹¹ Diese neue doppelte Führung hat sich als Ziel vorgesetzt die Qualität des Pferdebestands zu verbessern und die Pferdezucht gewinnbringend zu machen.¹² Um die Qualität zu verbessern haben sie das englische Vollblut einheimisch gemacht, da dieses für die Auswählzüchtung der ungarischen Pferde sehr gut geeignet war.¹³ Die wirksam funktionierenden Institutionen der Pferdezucht wurden ausgebaut,¹⁴ die umfassende Verwertung der Pferde wurde organisiert¹⁵ und die Ausbildung des Pferderennens wurde auch gefördert.¹⁶ Demzufolge hat sich ein einheitliches Rennsportsystem in Ungarn

⁸ GERGELY: 26.

⁹ ERNST József - Dr. FEHÉR Dezső - Dr. ÓCSAG Imre (Hrsg): *Magyar lovaskönyv* (Ungarisches Reiterbuch), Natura - Corvina, Budapest 1988. 98.

¹⁰ MARTON (2007): 23.

¹¹ ERNST-FEHÉR-ÓCSAG: 97.

¹² Dr. ÉBER Ernő: *A magyar állattenyésztés fejlődése*.(Entwicklung der ungarischen Pferdezucht), Agroinform, Budapest 1996. 331.

¹³ PODMANICZKY Gyula: *Magyarország állami- és magánménesei lótenyésztésének kézikönyve* ((Handbuch der Pferdezucht der Staats- und Privatgestüte Ungarns), Pallas, Budapest 1903. 7.

¹⁴ Ebd. 340.

¹⁵ ÉBER: 234.

¹⁶ ERNST-FEHÉR-ÓCSAG: 98.

herausgebildet. Zu der Verwirklichung der utilitären Pferdezucht und zu der Qualitätsverbesserung trugen auch die Aktivitäten der Privatgestüten bei.¹⁷ In dieser Periode ist ihre Zahl deutlich gestiegen, in 1903 gab es schon 423 Privatgestüte in Ungarn, die Mehrheit von denen wurde nach 1867 gegründet. Die Pferdezucht war also ein gewinnreiches Unternehmen.¹⁸

3. Unterstützende Wirtschaftszweige

Dass die Pferdezucht gewinnreich war, ist der Tatsache zu verdanken, dass sie von zahlreichen anderen Wirtschaftszweigen unterstützt wurde, wie zum Beispiel von der Landwirtschaft. Das zeigt auch, dass auf den Ackerfeldern der Anteil des Futtergewächses deutlich gestiegen ist. Das Transportwesen war auch ein unterstützender Industriezweig, da der Transport der Pferde zu verschiedenen Wettrennen mit Hilfe der Bahn geschah. Auch die Presse ist als ein unterstützender Zweig zu verstehen, da sie über die aktuelle Zuchtlage und über die Wettrennen berichtete.¹⁹

4. Die Faktoren der Nachfrage

Andererseits gab es noch einen Faktor, der den Gewinn der Pferdezucht beeinflusste: die Züchter hatten damals besondere Möglichkeiten bei dem Verkauf. Die gemeinsame Armee und die ungarische Landwehr benötigten insgesamt jährlich 8–10000 Remonten (Ergänzungspferd beim Militär).²⁰ Die Landwirtschaft benötigte auch Pferde, da die Pferde –statt der Ochsen – immer öfter wegen ihrer Gespannkraft auf den Ackerfeldern benutzt wurden. In dem Transportwesen waren sie auch unentbehrlich. Sie spielten eine wichtige Rolle in der Transportierung, in der Zugförderung, in dem alltäglichen Verkehr und beim Reisen. Natürlich hätte das Wettrennen ohne Pferde auch nicht funktioniert. Die Rolle des Pferdes ist auch in der Heilkunde gewachsen.²¹ Neben den erwähnten Sachen war der Export auch ein wichtiger Faktor, da der Staat neben dem Pferdebestand von 920000 Pferden im Ausland jährlich 50–60000 Pferde verkaufte und das bedeutete für die Kammer ein beträchtliches Einkommen. Die Pferdeauktionen, die die gemieteten Hengste, die Kampfpreise, die Bahntarifsätze und der Export sind alle als wirtschaftliche Erfolge in unserer Balance – den Innen – und Auslandshandel betreffend –, erschienen.²²

¹⁷ MARTON: 38-41.

¹⁸ PODMANICZKY: 345.

¹⁹ MARTON: 42-43.

²⁰ ÉBER: 331.

²¹ MARTON: 42-43.

²² HECKER, Walter - KARÁDI Ilona (Hrsg): *Lovas nemzet* (Ungarische Reiterei), Helikon, Debrecen 2004. 75.

Wenn man die utilitäre Pferdezucht zusammenfassen möchte, kann man feststellen, dass diese durch die Vereinheitlichung der einzelnen Interessen der verschiedenen Gesellschaftsgruppen zustande gekommen ist. Der wirtschaftliche Nutzen hat zwischen den militärischen Gruppen, den Remonte-Verpflichtung tragenden Gruppen und zwischen den wirtschaftlich interessierten Gruppen Kohäsion geschafft. Das Ziel des Habsburger Reiches mit der ungarischen Pferdezucht, die Verbindung der Pferdezucht mit dem Wettrennen, der Raumgewinn des Pferdes in der Landwirtschaft, in dem Transportwesen und in der Heilkunde, die Tätigkeit der staatlichen und privaten Gestüten beziehungsweise die Anwesenheit des Militärs als fester und dauerhafter Absatzmarkt haben den ungarischen Pferdebestand und die Züchter reich und erfolgreich gemacht. Die utilitäre Pferdezucht trug nicht nur zur Entwicklung der Gesellschaft bei, sondern auch zur Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse und zur bürgerlichen Umgestaltung der Gesellschaft.²³

Das Gestüt Fenék 1797–1945

Laut meinen Hypothesen waren die profitorientierten Privatgestüte die größten Gewinner dieser Epoche. Ich werde jetzt versuchen, diese Behauptung mit Fakten und Argumenten zu Beweisen an dem Beispiel des weltberühmten Gestütes der Familie Festetics.

Gestüt Fenék 1797– 1819

Die Aristokraten hielten seit den Anfängen des 16. Jahrhunderts für eine mit ihrem Rang verknüpfte Verpflichtung, Gestüte zu halten.²⁴ Die Familie Festetics handelte auch so. Dank ihrer ausdauernden und begeisterten Arbeit wurde das Gestüt Fenék während seines Bestands einer der berühmtesten und erfolgreichsten Privatgestüte des Landes. Sein Erfolg ist solchen bedeutenden Persönlichkeiten zu verdanken wie dem Gründer des Georgikon, György Festetics; dem Förderer des ungarischen Pferderennens, László Festetics; dem Kavalier des Ordens vom goldenen Vlies, Tasziló Festetics dem I.; dem Besitzer des Fürstentitels, Tasziló Festetics dem II. und seinem Sohn, dem Letzten aus der Familie Festetics, der noch in Ungarn gelebt hat. Mit ihrer Persönlichkeit und Arbeit haben sie alle zu dem Erfolg des Gestüts Fenék beigetragen.²⁵

Das Gestüt wurde von György Festetics (1755–1819) im Jahre 1797 gegründet. Fenékpuszta, das Ort, wo früher die römische Festung Valcum sich befunden hat, gab dem weltberühmten Gestüt den Namen und den Platz.

²³ MARTON: 46-47.

²⁴ PALÁDI-KOVÁCS Attila: *Lótarítás* (Pferdehaltung), IN: *Magyar néprajz* II. *Gazdálkodás*, Akadémiai, Budapest 2001. 179.

²⁵ MARTON: 49.

Fenekpuszta war sehr geeignet für die Ausbildung eines Gestüts, da das Herrscherhaus in dem 17. Jahrhundert seine Pferde auch hier gehalten hat und das Zentrum des Hofguts, Keszthely auch nur 6 km entfernt war.²⁶

Obwohl für die Familie Festetics die Landwirtschaft eine wichtige Einkommensquelle bedeutete – sie schalteten sich auch in die Getreide – und Wollenkonjunktur ein²⁷ –, spielten finanzielle Faktoren bei der Gründung des Gestüts keine Rolle. Neben der aristokratischen Verpflichtung spielte das Georgikon eine wichtige Rolle, die berühmte landwirtschaftliche Institution der Familie Festetics, wo durch das Gestüt die dort unterrichtete Pferdezucht unterstützt wurde. Das Gestüt diente mittelbar den Zielen der militärischen Pferdezucht der Monarchie und war ein Beweis für die Treue von György Festetics zu den Habsburgern. Das war eine Investition für lange Zeit.²⁸ Am Anfang wurden im Gestüt ungarische, siebenbürgische, spanische und ab dem 1800 Araberhengste verwendet. Im Gestüt gab es eine ernste Selektions – und Zuchtarbeit.²⁹ Nach dem Tod von György Festetics übernahm das Gestüt in 1819 sein Sohn, László Festetics.³⁰

Gestüt Fenék 1819–1846

László Festetics (1785–1846) setzte die Benutzung der Araber – Zuchtrichtung fort. Die Wirtschaftsgebäude des Gestüthofs wurden im Jahre 1820 gebaut. 1819 erhöhte er die Ausbildungszeit der Pferdeknechte auf vier Jahre.³¹ Er förderte die ungarische Pferdezucht und den ungarischen Rennsport, er meinte, dass das Land nur mit planvollen Reformen emporzubringen sei. 1846 folgte György Festetics in der Führung des Gestüts sein Sohn, Tasziló Festetics.³²

Gestüt Fenék 1846–1883

Tasziló Festetics (1813–1883) machte die Erfahrung als Kavallerieoffizier, dass die Armee bessere Pferde brauchen würde. Es war ihm klar, dass in der Züchtung der Gebrauchspferde die wertvollsten Veredler die englischen Vollblüter sind. Aus diesem Grund benutzte er im

²⁶ Ebd. 57.

²⁷ PÉCZELY Piroska: *A keszthelyi Festetics Kastély és belső berendezése* (Das Schloss Festetics in Keszthely und seine innere Einrichtung), Múzeumok Központi Propaganda Irodája, Budapest 1958. 23.

²⁸ MARTON: 63.

²⁹ Vadász és Versenylap, 1896. október-december 1. 4.

³⁰ SZABÓ Dezső: *A herceg Festetics család története* (Die Geschichte der Herzogfamilie Festetics), Franklin, Budapest 1928. 332.

³¹ Dr. SÁGI Károly (Hrsg.): *Georgikon 175*. Mezőgazda, Budapest 1972. 55.

³² Magyar Országos Levéltár - MOL (Ungarisches Staatsarchiv) FL P235 141. cs. 359.

Gestüt ab 1847 auch englische Vollbluthengste neben der Araber-Zuchtrichtung. Nach seinem Tod im Jahre 1883 übernahm Tasziló Festetics II. das Gestüt.³³

Gestüt Fenék 1883–1933

Tasziló Festetics II. verfügte über bewundernswerte Fachkenntnisse im Gebiet der Pferdezucht. Seine Erfahrungen, die er in England gesammelt hat³⁴, die Wettrennen³⁵ und die Parforcejagden³⁶ können in seinem Leben auf dem Weg zu der utilitären Pferdezucht als Meilensteine betrachtet werden. Es war ihm klar, dass in der Veredelung die besten Pferde die Englische Vollblüter waren und um die Pferde auszuprobieren, die beste Methode der Rennsport war. Diese zwei Sachen zusammen bedeuteten immer Qualitätspferdezucht, und Qualitätspferdezucht bedeutete immer finanziellen Gewinn. Deshalb hat er das Gestüt 1883 abgebaut und auf dem gleichen Ort ein neues, mit englischen Vollbluthengsten gegründet. Dieses neue Gestüt wurde unter dem Namen „*Gestüt Fenék*“ weltberühmt.³⁷ Er hat die Möglichkeiten, die diese Epoche bot – d. h. die Anwendung der Pferde in der Landwirtschaft, im Verkehr, beim Militär und im Rennsport – erkannt und sich sie zunutze gemacht und so erwies sich der Gutshof in Fenékpuszta als gewinnbringend. Bis 1926 hat er drei Gestüte gegründet, 1883 ein Englisches Vollblutgestüt, 1897 ein Englisches Halbblutgestüt³⁸ und 1926 ein kaltblütiges Halbblutgestüt.³⁹ Er hat auch die umfassende Vermarktung der Pferde organisiert. Die übrig gebliebenen Pferde wurden verkauft, neben der Armee kauften auch Staatsgestüte und private Stutereien Pferde aus dem Gestüt. Sein Pferd, namens Fenék wurde von dem Staat für 30000 Kronen gekauft.⁴⁰ Aus der Bedeckung ist auch eine große Summe eingekommen. Aus dem Gestüt stammten solche ausgezeichnete Vaterhengste wie zum Beispiel Pázmán. Dieser Hengst deckte in 1927 fünfzig Stuten, das machte pro Stute 3000 Pengő aus, also das bedeutete für den Besitzer insgesamt 1.500.00 Pengő.⁴¹ Dazu kam noch die Summe, die aus den verschiedenen Pferderennen eingegangen ist. Die Gewinne betreffend stehen Daten zwischen 1870 und 1922 zur Verfügung. Innerhalb der 52 Jahre betrug

³³ Vadász és Versenylap 1896. október-december 1. 1-4.

³⁴ Ebd.

³⁵ KRÚDY Gyula - PÁLMAI Henrik (Hrsg.): *Starttól a célig* (Vom Start bis zum Ziel), Légrády Testvérek, Budapest 1922. 34.

³⁶ ERDŐDY: 29-64.

³⁷ MOL FL P275 140. cs. 701.

³⁸ DÖHRMAN Henrik: *Magyarország állattenyésztése. II. Lótenyésztés* (Ungarns Tierzucht. II. Pferdezucht), OMGE, Budapest 1926. 152.

³⁹ MOL FL P275 140. cs. 699.

⁴⁰ MOL FL P275 137. cs. 206.

⁴¹ MOL FL P275 136. cs. 37.

das Einkommen des Gestüts insgesamt 5.000.000 Kronen.⁴² Dieses Einkommen wird in der folgenden Tabelle detailliert dargestellt.⁴³

Anhand dieser Angaben konnte ich feststellen, dass solange die ersten 26 Jahren – also während der Wettrennentätigkeit von Tasziló Festetics zwischen 1870 und 1883 und während dem 13jährigen Bestand des Gestüts Fenék (1883–1895) – 1300000 Kronen Gewinn brachten, haben die nächsten 26 Jahre (1896–1922) 3700000 Kronen Gewinn gebracht. Das bedeutete ein 2,8 faches Wachstum des Einkommens, diese Angaben berücksichtigen aber die Inflation nicht. Nach dem Tod von Tasziló Festetics übernahm die Führung des Gutshofs in Fenékpuszta sein Sohn, György Festetics III.

<i>Periode</i>	<i>Gewinn</i>
1870–1896	1 300 000 Kronen
1896–1900	700 000 Kronen
1900–1905	1 200 000 Kronen
1905–1922	1 800 000 Kronen

*Quelle: MOL FL P275 140. cs. 742.
Keszthelyi Hírlap 1905. december 10/4.
KRÚDY-PÁLMAI: 35.*

Gestüt Fenék 1933–1945

György Festetics III. war ein würdiger Nachfolger seines Vaters, er war ihm ähnlich in der Hinsicht, dass er auch ein aktiver Teilnehmer des Reiterlebens war. Diese zwei Männer waren unermüdete Streiter in dem Kampf, dessen Ziel es war die ungarische Pferdezucht emporzubringen.⁴⁴ Tasziló Festetics II. war von 1891 bis Mai 1914,⁴⁵ György Festetics III. zum ersten Mal vom 4. Mai 1922 bis zum 18 August 1927⁴⁶ und zum zweiten Mal vom 10. Oktober 1936 bis August 1941 der Vorsitzende der Neunten Kommission.⁴⁷ Während Tasziló Festetics II. in verschiedenen Jockey-Clubs Vorstandsmitglied war – im Ungarischen, im Wiener, im Englischen⁴⁸ und auch im Internationalen Rennverein von Baden-Baden⁴⁹ –, war György Festetics III. der Vorsitzende des Ungarischen Jockeiklubs.⁵⁰ György Festetics leitete das Gestüt relativ kurzzeitig, nur 8 Jahre lang. Nach seinem Tod behielt seine Frau Maria Haugwitz das Gestüt eine Zeit lang. Maria Haugwitz brachte das Gestüt zwischen 1941 und 1945 zwei Mal zur Auktion.⁵¹ Die Kriegsverwüstung hat das Gestüt auch nicht geschont.

⁴² KRÚDY-PÁLMAI: 35.

⁴³ Im Jahre 1892 während dem Vollzug der von Sándor Wekerle initiierten Währungsreform wurde in der Monarchie 1 österreichischer Silbergulden in 2 Kronen gewechselt. Die Währung des neuen Geldes wurde nach dem Wert des Goldes bestimmt. GERGELY: 338.

⁴⁴ Keszthely és Vidéke 1941. augusztus 9. III. évf. 32. sz. 1.

⁴⁵ Telivér 2001. október, IX. évf. 10. sz. D.

⁴⁶ Ebd.

⁴⁷ Ebd. E.

⁴⁸ Vadász és Versenylap 1896. október-december 1. 1.

⁴⁹ Vadász és Versenylap 1908. december 19. LII. évf. 99. sz. 654.

⁵⁰ Keszthely és Vidéke 1941. augusztus 9. III. évf. 32. sz. 1.

⁵¹ MOL FL P275 143. cs. 228.

Das Gestüt wurde 1945 aufgelöst,⁵² in einem Jahr, das das Ende der militärstrategischen und wirtschaftlichen Anwendung des Pferdes bedeutete. Wie die Darstellung dieses Prozesses zeigt, hat die Familie Festetics die Zukunft immer nach den Chancen des gegebenen Moments bestimmt.

Zusammenfassung

Die historische Analyse, der Leitfaden meiner Arbeit, wurde durch die utilitäre Pferdezücht zu einem einheitlichen Ganzen verknüpft. Während der Analyse habe ich festgestellt, dass die utilitäre Pferdezücht mit Hilfe der Vereinheitlichung der einzelnen Interessen der verschiedenen Gesellschaftsgruppen zustande gekommen ist. Der wirtschaftliche Nutzen hat zwischen den militärischen Gruppen, den Remonte- Verpflichtung tragenden Gruppen und zwischen den wirtschaftlich interessierten Gruppen Kohäsion geschafft. Das Ziel der Monarchie mit der ungarischen Pferdezücht, die Verbindung der Pferdezücht mit dem Wettrennen, hat den ungarischen Pferdebestand und die Züchter reich und erfolgreich gemacht. Diese wurden mit den schon erwähnten Faktoren gut ergänzt: der Raumgewinn des Pferdes in der Landwirtschaft, in dem Transportwesen und in der Heilkunde, die Tätigkeit der Staat- und Privatgestüten beziehungsweise die Anwesenheit des Militärs als fester und dauerhafter Absatzmarkt. Die utilitäre Pferdezücht trug zur Entwicklung der Gesellschaft, zur Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse und zur bürgerlichen Umformung der Gesellschaft bei.

Die Verwirklichung der utilitären Pferdezücht in der Praxis kann am besten durch die Geschichte des Gestüts Fenék (1797–1945) bewiesen werden: die Familie Festetics hat die Chancen der Epoche erkannt und ausgenutzt und so auch den Gutshof in Fenékpuszta zu reich und erfolgreich gemacht. All das wird durch die Tatsache unterstützt, dass die Familie Festetics bis 1926 drei Gestüte in Fenékpuszta gegründet hat. Die Familie hat die Möglichkeiten, die diese Epoche bat erkannt, und sich sie zunutze gemacht und so erwies sich der Gutshof in Fenékpuszta als gewinnbringend. Sie haben die umfassende Vermarktung der Pferde organisiert. Die übrig gebliebenen Pferde wurden verkauft, neben der Armee kauften auch Staatsgestüte und private Stutereien Pferde aus dem Gestüt. Aus der Bedeckung ist auch eine große Summe eingekommen. Das Einkommen der Familie, nur aus den Pferderennen, betrug zwischen 1870 und 1922 mehr als 5.000.000 Kronen.

Die genau und gut geplante Zucht und der Rennbetrieb bedeutete die tatsächliche utilitäre Pferdezücht. Im Hintergrund der utilitären Pferdezücht ist eine solche positive Lebensanschauung zu finden, die auch heutzutage erforderlich wäre. Wir sollten es einsehen, dass eine neue Betrachtungsweise nötig wäre!

⁵² Telivér 1999/6. VII. évf. 3-4. sz. 3.

Zoltán Maruzsa

Denuclearization in Central Europe? The Rapacki Plan during the Cold War

As the Cold War started after the Second World War, Europe quickly became its most important political battleground for many years. The majority of European countries became members of a belligerent alliance system, and most countries raised their defence budgets considerably. There was a rising menace of war between these groups, lead by the USA and the USSR, as humanity entered the atomic age in August 1945. After the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nobody could realistically believe that nuclear weapons would not be used in the event of a Third World War. This became obvious when the USA lost its monopoly on nuclear weaponry, following successful English and Soviet test detonations. Many public figures, including leading scientists, politicians, and artists soon began to voice their concerns, and various plans were hastily developed to circumvent such a catastrophe. If we examine it superficially, the plan proposed by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki on October 2nd, 1957 fits into these ideas.

During the 12th term of the United Nations General Assembly, the Polish Foreign Affairs Minister suggested¹ that creating a ‘nuclear-free’ zone in Central Europe would go a long way to alleviating the political tension of the times. According to his proposal, if the two German states were willing to prohibit the production and storage of nuclear weapons on their territory, the Polish People's Republic would follow suit. The very next day, the Czechoslovakian Government joined the Polish in their proposal. On October 5th, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) also agreed to join the initiative,² and on December 9th, following these first signs of approval, the Polish Secretary of State distributed written copies of his speech of October 2nd, together with the relevant explanations, to representatives of various foreign powers. In the following days he held negotiations with the Swedish, Norwegian, Austrian, Soviet, Czechoslovakian, and east German delegates. On December 10th, after an almost two-month silence, a memorandum on behalf of the USSR was taken by the Prime Minister Nyikolaj Alexandrovics Bulganin to Paris, Bonn, London and Washington. In it, the USSR committed itself to the Rapacki Plan and asked the Western powers, in order to reduce political tension, to contribute to the establishment of a nuclear free zone that would

¹ The proclamation of Rapacki dated October 2, 1957 can be read in the first appendix.

² The People's Chamber of GDR had already submitted a decision on the 8th of August 1957 in which they proposed not to accept the presence of nuclear weapons in the German states, and to use what nuclear technology they did have for purely peaceful purposes. LABOOR: Ernst: *Der Rapacki-Plan. Realistische Friedensidee oder Kampfplan gegen Bonn?* Die Sicht Warschaus, Moskaus und Berlins. In: Hefte zur DDR-Geschichte 11. Berlin 5.

cover a territory containing over 100 million inhabitants. On January 8th, 1958 a second Soviet memorandum was issued, in which Moscow suggested a summit meeting where issues such as the Rapacki Plan could be clarified. Henceforward, for almost 8 years, the Rapacki Plan was discussed internationally and three further texts (1958, 1962, and 1964) appeared. The goal of this study is to give a comprehensive analysis of the coming into existence, content and the international context of the Rapacki Plan. What gives novelty to the research is that, in addition to the theme-based approach and traceable, specialised sources, relevant reports made by the Austrian and Hungarian diplomatic corps are also analysed. This should give an interesting and comprehensive analysis of the diplomatic atmosphere at the time, and the nature of various, contemporary diplomatic sources related to the Rapacki Plan.

Antecedents of the Rapacki Plan's Formation

The Rapacki Plan was certainly not the first diplomatic initiative aiming to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The Soviet Diplomatic Corps had already suggested the freezing of all nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War, but American government, conscious that they possessed a nuclear monopoly, was not keen on doing so.³ After the Soviets had developed their own nuclear weapons in 1949, both superpowers began to concentrate on their nuclear programs. At the time, they lacked only the right delivery vehicle – which restricted the effective range of their arsenals to those places at greatest risk of conflict. For example, American troops stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the early 1950s had units equipped with atomic charges⁴ in 1954. By then, the United Kingdom had already developed its own nuclear weapons (1952); and the two superpowers had developed the Hydrogen-bomb (H-bomb). In the final stages of the Korean War the Americans had a serious opportunity to use their weapons, albeit they decided not to. Not long after that, during the Suez crisis, the USSR's threat of a nuclear attack worked wonders in forcing the participants to negotiate.

In the midst of general armament and military tension, the USA and the USSR were also intent on improving their respective strategic positions. At the beginning of 1950s, with the enlargement of its Army bases, the rearming of Japan and the FRG, and with the establishment of further regional, defensive alliances such as ANZUS, and CENTO, the USA tried to surround Moscow and the countries of the Soviet bloc. Meanwhile, the USSR not developed its military force considerably and built up its own federal system, known as the Warsaw Pact. With the establishment of neutral zones it also strove to loosen

³ The USSR had superiority in traditional forces particularly in Europe. Considering this, it is obvious that the Soviet proposal could not have been taken seriously.

⁴ LABOOR: 7.

the grip of the Americans.⁵ This kind of Soviet policy made many important political developments possible, including Finland's neutralization in 1952, the signing of the Austrian treaty in 1955, and even Vjacseszlav Mihajlovics Molotov's suggestion in 1952 to establish a uniform and neutral Germany. The latter arose from the Soviet belief that a neutral and militarily weak Germany could theoretically have been a useful buffer state between the forces of the two superpowers. Yet, the original form of Molotov's plan would have obviously given greater advantage to the Soviets than to the Western powers, and as such was summarily dropped, even though the plan was reasonably popular in the Foreign Office of the FRG.⁶ At the same time, the Soviets rejected the withdrawal of troops from the territory of the GDR. Karl Georg Pfleiderer had hoped⁷ that this would bring about separation of troops and that „*German question*” could be solved by its unification, yet this was not to be.

The idea proposed in 1953 by Belgian Secretary of State, Paul van Zeeland, was more realistic. According to his suggestion, the American and British troops would move from the occupied German territories into France and onto the territory of the Benelux countries, while the Soviet military forces would be stationed from the Vistula to the east. According to the plan, the multinational teams of the European Defence Community (EDC) would occupy the united German territories, from the Oder to the west, and the territories between the Oder and Vistula would be held exclusively by Polish troops. In exchange for this, the united Germany would have acknowledged the Oder-Neisse boundary.⁸ This proposal granted mutual advantages and might have been favoured in Bonn over the previous ideas – which would have granted advantages for only one of the sides. Nevertheless, it was not acceptable to the Soviets. After all, the EDC – which failed anyway because of French resistance – would have actually meant the teams of NATO's member states. The Bonn plan, continuing to develop the Belgian suggestion, would have disarmed the territory between the Oder and the Vistula; moreover it would have included Czechoslovakian and Austrian, and even (according to certain versions) Yugoslavian and Italian territories. In the end, the proposal was deemed irresponsible not only by the Soviets, but also by the Chancellor of the FRG,

⁵ FISCHER: *A megosztott világ* (The Divided world), Dialóg-Campus, Pécs-Budapest 2001. 169-173.

⁶ There was a substantial difference between the territorial and economical potential of the FRG and the GDR in favour of the FRG, so the USSR would have gained considerable advantages by the withdrawal.

⁷ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik (AdR), 01 Pol-II BRD/424. 1957/218389. Vollgruber, the Austrian Ambassador to Paris, in his confidential report dated on 25th March 1957, writes about his discussions with French diplomats, in which they complained that the „*Austrian solution*” is very popular among their German colleagues.

⁸ PFLEIDERER, Karl Georg: *Politik in Deutschland. Reden und Aufsätze 1948-1956*. Stuttgart 1961. 83.

⁸ LABOOR: 9.

Konrad Adenauer, who considered the FRG's NATO membership and continental integration more important than such an uncertain endeavour.

Ultimately, high-level diplomatic talks between the two parties only started at the Geneva negotiations in 1955. Albeit they did not lead to concrete results, the very act of discussing these problems bore serious lessons for both sides. It became evident that both sides were aware of the threat of mutual annihilation should a nuclear war break out, and that to fight one was in neither of their interests. Another important lesson for the western powers came in learning of the power struggle going on at the time, following the death of Stalin. In practice, this meant that the Party leadership was taking a more conciliatory approach in order to reduce, international tension; the signing of the Austrian treaty and the execution of the time-table justified occupation of Austria suggested to the West that an agreement could be made with the Soviets. On this basis, the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden came forward with his proposal again. According to him, the German question could be solved as following: the GDR would go under the supremacy of the FRG; at the same time a pact on comprehensive limitation of armaments would put an end to the arms drive, and an international pact would define the maximum size of the military forces of Germany and its neighbouring states. Furthermore, a mutual control system would insure⁹ the effectiveness of the pact. The Eden plan demonstrated that mutual concessions and paying heed to the interests of the opposition had become accepted in western realpolitik. Nevertheless, this idea also failed in that due to the contemporary atmosphere of suspicion and animosity. In light of their experiences during the last decade, Western leaders did not believe the Soviets, based on an international agreement, would indeed withdraw their troops from the German territories. Adenauer soon drove Eden's proposal into the direction of the previous Bonn plan, which was certainly unacceptable for the Soviets. However, at the Secretary of State conference held on 31st October 1955, Molotov seemingly accepted Eden's idea and agreed that the size of military forces stationed in the GDR, FRG, and in the neighbouring states, as well as the principal of the mutual control, should be defined in a four-power agreement. Yet, in their suggestion the Soviets had failed to include or endorse any plans to unify Germany under Bonn's control, leaving it a one-sided and therefore unacceptable proposition from the West's point of view. At this point it should be noted that the background for the Soviet's new diplomatic approach, which was quite flexible compared to the previous years' dogmatic one, stood the Soviet reversal of political leadership and policy: for instance, Stalin's and Zhdanov's thesis on the inevitability of the World War was no longer infallible¹⁰ after February 1955. In addition, in February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet

¹⁰ LABOOR: 10-11.

¹¹ Ibid. 11.

Union (CPSU) Khrushchev officially announced their newly adopted policy of peaceful coexistence. His words were taken seriously by Western diplomats, who after deep consideration gave back the Porkkala naval base to Finland, and the harbour of Port Arthur¹¹ to China, as a show of good will and support for the new attitude of the USSR.

This global reversal of Soviet diplomacy was deeply influenced by the fact that the rapidly growing arms race had become a big burden for the USSR and its allies. Also, the Russians had to face the serious increase of forces standing against them: in 1954 with the Paris Agreements the restoration of the FRG's sovereignty was completed, and in May 1955 it became a fully qualified member of the NATO. The progressive rearmament of the formerly great German power had remarkably changed the military situation in the area of conventional warfare in Europe. In addition, in December 1955, the NATO Council decided that it would provide its member states with a set of instruments suitable for carrying tactical nuclear weapons. The prospect of the FRG having an effective nuclear arsenal became a real and immediate danger for Moscow – one which they would go to great lengths to remove. The Soviets were not the only ones made nervous by the idea of Germany becoming a nuclear power: even 10 years after Nazi Germany had been defeated, neither the French, nor the British were too enthusiastic about the idea. It is no great surprise that the Soviet diplomatic circle spent most of its energy attacking the FRG when the session of the Political Advisory's Commission of the Warsaw Pact was held on January 28, 1956. For obvious reasons, one of the main issues during this summit was the question of creating a special sector, or buffer-zone, between the West and the East. And so, the following decision was made: the military forces of the two German states and their ally states must be seriously restricted, and all nuclear weapons within East and West Germany should be frozen. This was effectively the first concrete suggestion on establishing a nuclear free zone in Europe. Andrej Gromiko, the Deputy Foreign Minister outlined the plan as a Soviet suggestion during the session of the Committee on Disarmament of the United Nations Organisation held in London, on March 27, 1956.¹² The Soviet diplomatic corps was aware of the fact that NATO would not accept a plan that would give the USSR an advantage, and in order to prove their trustworthiness, they announced the unilateral reduction of their military forces.

However, the Soviet policy of detente broke down. When revolution broke out in Hungary in October, 1956, it was brutally stamped out by the Soviet army in order to discourage dissent. Later, at the time of the British-French-

¹² Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives - MOL), XIX-J-1-j-Szovjetunió-100t-002923/1957. The proclamation of the Soviet government about dismantling and about the lessening of international tension was sent to Budapest in a strictly confidential report on 10th June 1957 by the Hungarian Embassy of Moscow.

¹³ LABOOR: 12.

Israeli action against Egypt the Soviet leadership threatened to use nuclear weapons to end the conflict. The end of the temporary detente ended when it became evident that nothing could stop the rearmament of the FRG on the field of conventional weapons. An added concern surface when, in 1957, the United States President agreed to Bonn's request to have tactical nuclear weapons stationed on West German soil.¹³ In the same year, the British H-bomb was developed, and the USA and UK equipping rockets with these devastating warheads. Then, in the summer of 1957, the Soviets successfully tested their first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and two days after the Rapacki speech the first Soviet satellite, Sputnik, entered the Earth's orbit, paving the way for an entirely new type of warfare. Indeed, the entire strategic board shifted, as the USSR now had it within its power to launch an effective nuclear strike against the American continent without the need for forward bases.¹⁴

Paradoxically, despite the ongoing talks about disarmament and dismantling, nuclear war seemed nearer and more devastating in 1957 than it ever had. During this period of general arms-craze, more and more interest groups spoke out against the new threat of the Atomic Age and the nuclear arms race; on April 12, 1957 the leading nuclear scientists accepted the Göttingen proclamation addressed against nuclear arms and on April 23, Albert Schweitzer asked in his famous speech the cessation of arms production and experimental detonations.¹⁵ Of course, the power politics of the times could not initially take into consideration what was regarded as unreal idealism. However, after some time, these ideas influenced public opinion in the West, and in order to win elections politicians could not ignore the voter's opinion. For entire decades, they were forced to carry on negotiations about dismantling and the limitation of nuclear weapons with the Soviets, while the number of the nuclear weapons kept growing steadily until the end of the cold war. Many proposals came forward and quickly fell apart, such as that of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, which appeared on several occasions, mainly for the benefit of an anxious public, and outlined plans to disband the Warsaw Treaty and establish a neutral zone from Finland to Switzerland, while maintaining NATO

¹⁴ These atomic weapons of course – just like the newly set up military force of the FRG – were under the NATO command, meaning that the FRG had not in effect become a nuclear power. Nobody doubted that Bonn was technologically capable of manufacturing its own nuclear weapons. Already at the very beginning, many states would have liked to prevent it, especially the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

¹⁵ FISCHER: 175-177.

¹⁶ The USSR was gloated as it witnessed this process in the Western states, since communist states did not believe in social freedom, and did not have to count on similar resistance. Nevertheless, in the countries of the Soviet bloc, the communist parties organized peace movements for their own reasons. The crushing of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 had all but ruined the Russians' reputation, and supporting such initiatives was one attempt at repairing its reputation in the circles of Western left-wing sympathizers, as well as providing an outlet for anti-nuclear sentiment. FISCHER: 177.

as a functional alliance.¹⁶ Another such proposal was made by the British Labourite, Hugh Gaitskell dealing with the formation of a neutral and unified Germany, and with the political neutralization of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria. However, in view of the aforementioned atmosphere of anxiety, suspicion, and competition, these ideas lacked realism and pragmatism.¹⁷ In this respect, Rapacki Plan was the first proposal concerning the limitation of arms that received not only public attention and interest in both the East and West, but was also seriously addressed during diplomatic negotiations.

Background of the Rapacki Plan's Diplomatic Welcome

The Rapacki Plan quickly became the object of intense and secret diplomatic negotiations, because every state actively participating in the contemporary system of international relations found something in the idea that would further their own interests. It was difficult to find anything objectionable in it, as the suggestion offered almost the same advantages for both sides:

- In contrast to the previous ideas, with the addition of Czechoslovakia, the territories intended to join the nuclear free zone represented an equal contribution in area from both sides of the Iron Curtain; according to Warsaw, there was no relevant difference considering the economic capacity, either;

- In the plan the presence of troops with conventional weapons was not touched i.e. nobody had to withdraw from a single square centimetre territory;

- the suggestion did not deal with the German question directly – it did not touch the occupation sectors and left the question of Berlin alone, but would nevertheless reduce the tension around the German question by preventing the FRG from acquiring atomic weapons;

- the Great Powers had to take into consideration the fact that the proposal had been made to the entire UNO General Assembly where it received publicity and became relatively popular even in the circle of non-committed states.

Based on all these factors it can be concluded that the Rapacki Plan was good for arousing attention. However, there were various reasons why some countries dealt with it more than others did:

- the USSR and the countries of the Eastern Bloc believed the Polish proposal capable of preventing FRG's military force from acquiring nuclear weapons, and found this worth the price of not being able to place their own warheads on GDR, Polish or Czechoslovakian soil. It would have been

¹⁷ LABOOR: 12. The reason of this amazingly naive idea was that the Warsaw Pact was seen as an 'offensive' alliance, apparently based on a spirit of aggression, and that disbanding it would supposedly strengthen universal peace. On the other hand, NATO is a primarily *defensive* alliance, and therefore does not endanger peace in any way.

¹⁷ LABOOR: 14.

unnecessary in any event, since the advent of the ICBM had made distance all but irrelevant.

- The government of the FRG knew very well that Germany's rearmament was at stake, especially the opportunity to gain a nuclear arsenal. From their point of view, the consequences of the Polish plan would result in the withdrawal of American troops and the most serious crisis NATO had ever seen. The FRG had the Cold War to thank for its quick rehabilitation, the recovery of its sovereignty, and its remilitarization after its defeat in the Second World War. For this reason, it did not really have much interest in arranging a relationship that would preserve the Oder-Neisse boundary and the two separate German states. For this reason - as we will see - Adenauer soon connected the negotiations related to the Rapacki Plan with the notorious question of the two German states – a quagmire of conflicting interests in every previous proposal of this nature had so far sank.

- As a member of NATO, the United Kingdom and France assisted the integration of the FRG and German rearmament; however the prospect of a German atomic arsenal – after Charles de Gaulle gained power - was not really welcomed.¹⁸ As the USA had been the ones assisting in the placement of nuclear weapons on German soil, they could not make a public issue out of it, since they had a vested interest in having American troops stationed in Europe. The Rapacki Plan offered an opportunity to prevent this in a way that cost nothing for the British or the French. Even so, the Quai d'Orsay later rejected the plan, considering French-German relations more important than the prevention of German nuclear weapons.¹⁹

- The USA considered the Rapacki Plan, which had been proposed by the Polish, as a Soviet idea and rejected it immediately on principle. However, this standpoint soon dissolved, when American analysts expressed their opinion of the initiative as an independent Polish idea. They believed that there may have been disagreements within the Warsaw Pact in the background. This opportunity led to some serious brainstorming by the analysts of the State Department, since they did not have any real proof to support this claim. Furthermore, as we will soon see, even after 50 years the work of the researcher is still not easy. What we can be sure of is that during 1956-57, the

¹⁸ AdR 01 POL-II BRD/482. 1958/55235. Report of the Austrian Ambassador of Paris, Rotter dated July 19, 1958 regarded as strictly confidential.

¹⁹ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/544499. The Austrian Ambassador of Paris, Vollgruber, in his strictly confidential letter of 19th February 1958, he reported on the conversation with the leaders of the political department of Quai d'Orsay. According to Vollgruber's report, he was interested in Paris's opinion about the completed Rapacki Plan. M. Daridan stated that their negative attitude had not changed because the perspective goal of the whole proposal is the neutralization of Germany, the sending home of the American troops and on a final row the disbanding of NATO, which is opposite the French objectives. „*Considering Poland we declared that the proposal is being examined thoroughly but it was and it is unenforceable.*” - said the French diplomat.

US State Department paid to Poland,²⁰ because they believed that the Polish could be separated from the Soviet federal system. This was possibly the reason for the financial aid for Warsaw²¹ from the states in the late 1950s – needless to say, this caused strong Soviet disapproval.²²

An independent Polish initiative or a proposal co-authored with the Soviets?

It is generally agreed that the Soviet Federal System operated under the strict direction of the Kremlin. We can state with great certainty that the member states of the Warsaw Pact did not have anything resembling independent foreign policy, especially not those countries living under Soviet occupation – a good example of this is the suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, and of course, it was openly declared in the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968. The question is really the following: in these delicate years, did the Polish diplomatic corps really have the opportunity for an independent initiative such as the Rapacki Plan or not, and if so, did they grasp it? The ever-determined Kremlin, in the Stalinist period was changing too: in January 1956, in a letter written by Molotov before the session of the Warsaw Pact in Prague he told the governments of the Member States that besides preserving the unity, which is an external question, independent initiative from each country must be encouraged, and from the USSR's part, he promised more information and consultation. Wladyslaw Gomulka, the new first Polish Secretary, was balancing on a razorblade in 1957. On one hand, Khrushchev's program to clean up the mess left by Stalinism was clear for him. This program wrought deep changes in the relationship of the allies after the XX. Congress of the CPSU, like the statement about the equal relationship with the allies made by the Soviet Government on October 30th, 1956, and the promise that in the future the USSR would keep in mind the history and the national character of each ally country. On the other hand, some days after this statement, the USSR crushed the Hungarian revolution when dissenting Hungarians demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and intended to become neutral state.

²⁰ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/452. 1957/221523. in his letter of June 4, 1957, Verosta, the Austrian Ambassador to Warsaw, gave a detailed account on the changes occurred in Polish-American relationship and on the negotiations related to American loans.

²¹ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-48t-00694/1961 Ambassador Dezső Szilágyi in his top secret report of 10th January 1961 analyses the Polish-American relationship. According to his data, since Douglas Dillon announced the economic assistance of Poland at the American Poles Congress in Chicago on October 2nd, 1956, Warsaw had received \$426.3 million in aid altogether, 85% of which was for buying agricultural products. By 1961 Poland had received the most-favoured-nation clause, they had been accepted into the GATT and they addressed the issues regarding rights of ownership that had arisen during and after the Second World War.

²² MOL XIX-J-1-j-USA-47t-002388/1957. The Hungarian Embassy in Washington sent a top secret letter of on the 4th of May, 1957, giving a summary of American foreign policy in the year 1956.

Based on what was found in the given diplomatic sources, one might think that Gomulka's announcement of this new policy at the VII. Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (October 1956) was an attempt to extend his margins against Moscow. If we take this view, it follows that there was possibility and room for such individualism within Soviet diplomacy at the time.²³ Among the member states of the Warsaw Pact, the Polish Foreign Ministry lead by Rapacki, who took up his post in October 1956, was the first one to arrange their relationships with France, the United States of America, Italy, the Benelux-states, and the Scandinavian states. The USA was declaredly open to the Polish initiative: on one hand they believed that Poland is detachable from the federal system of the Kremlin, on the other hand the presidential administration wanted to gain²⁴ the sympathy – and the vote – of the million Polish living in America. Remember, if you will, the position of George Kennan, who had already suggested in 1952 that the USA should accept Molotov's proposal about the unified but neutral Germany. With this the legal ground to station Soviet troops on German soil would end, and it would mean their withdrawal from the Poland as well.²⁵

It is, of course, a valid question whether Gomulka and the Polish leadership wished the Soviets' withdrawal. One can presume that it would not have been regretted if Soviet troops were not stationed on Polish territory, and if their country was not surrounded by pro-Soviet states.²⁶ They were not able to embrace this wish openly – especially considering the example that was made of the Hungarians in 1956 – because this would have certainly meant political suicide. Let us not forget that, despite whatever reservations the Polish might

²³ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/546268. The Austrian Deputy Ambassador to Warsaw, Liedermann, in his letter of 21st February 1958, expressed his belief that the Rapacki Plan has been the first independent proposal since the Second World War ended.

²⁴ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-48t-0096/1/1958 The Hungarian Ambassador János Katona sent a top secret letter from Warsaw to Budapest on 25th March 1958 in which he mentions the question of Soviet-Polish tension, as well as the intention of the „west imperialist circles” to tear Poland from the socialist camp. The document points out that the most disturbing question for Moscow during 1957, when their relationship was improving, was the unwillingness of the Polish leadership to „submit to the leading role of the USSR which was adopted by the rest of the friendly states.” He also mentions that the cause of this is tactical in the first place, namely the Polish inhabitants are very nationalist. The analysis mentions that in order to increase its strength on the playing field, Warsaw had strengthened its relationship with China and Yugoslavia.

²⁵ AdR 01 POL-II Politische Berichte/528D. 1958/2-Pol-58. The Austrian Ambassador to Warsaw, Verosta in his report of January 9th 1958 (confidentiality unknown), pointed out that Kennan's radio talks held in London in December declaredly harmed the Soviet's welcoming of the Rapacki Plan because in his speech he explained his thoughts above mentioned. Thus, he paid the Kremlin's attention on the hidden perils of the Polish proposal.

²⁶ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/452. 1957/225522. The Austrian Ambassador to Warsaw, Verosta in his report of September 28th 1958 (confidentiality unknown) analyses that from Polish viewpoint the value of the Baltic Sea had significantly raised lately being the single opened boundary of the country.

have had, the Soviet battalions did provide protection against the potential military aggression of the FRG. It was, unfortunately, within the interests of the Poles to accommodate Soviet troops at least until the German question had been solved; we could even say that a viable solution to the German issue was considered the prerequisite for Soviet withdrawal from Poland.²⁷

Even if the withdrawal of Soviet forces did not become a reality, we can be sure, based on the sources, that the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lead by Rapacki, believed in traditional Polish national politics.²⁸ From the point of view of the Polish nation, dangerous clouds were gathering on the horizon in 1957. The remilitarizing FRG, which might in a few years have nuclear weapons at their disposal, and stubbornly refused to acknowledge the GDR and the Oder-Neisse boundary, was a serious threat for Warsaw. The Poles felt more and threatened each day, in fact, because Bonn was not willing

²⁷ AdR 01 POL-II Politische Berichte/428D. 1958/1-Pol-58. The Austrian Ambassador of Warsaw, Verosta in his report of 7th January 1958 (confidentiality unknown) emphasized that the goal of Gomulka is the withdrawal of the Soviet troops with the help of the Polish national interest. Nevertheless, it is only possible if the German question is solved and the international tension – at least in the region - ends.

²⁸ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/646. 1960/72923. The Austrian Ambassador of Warsaw, Verosta in his report of 11th February 1960, gives a detailed biography of the leaders of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; since, from October 1956 to 1968 the Management of Foreign Affairs was constant, we shall focus our attention on a few interesting things. The source pointed out that Rapacki was born in a lower noble family in 1909 in Lemberg, but his father already had a part in the labour movement. Rapacki fell into German captivity in the war, but managed to escape into Italy. From 1945 he was an active member of the Polish Socialist Party, and later participated in the establishment of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1948. In the period of Stalinism, he was Minister of Education, and from autumn 1956 he is clearly Gomulka's man. The deputy Foreign Minister, Marian Naszkowski was 50 years old, also born in Lemberg, a socialist politician of Jewish descent, he got the rank of general while fighting in the Polish army on the Soviets' side. In 1944 he was the first Ambassador from Moscow to Poland, until 1956 he was considered as a Stalinist but he moved to Gomulka's side just in time to retain his position and reputation. Jósef Winiewicz, the second deputy Foreign Minister, also age 50, was born in Posen and before the war he was the editor of a nationalist newspaper. During the war he lived in London for some time, but disconnected his relationships with the government in exile in time to become the Ambassador of Poland to Washington from 1946 to 1954. It is interesting that he was not a party member as a deputy foreign minister either, however he frequently referred to himself with the expression „*we old nationalists*”. He and Naszkowski did not like each other, but he was in Rapacki's confidence on the first place. Przemysław Ogródzinski, the Head of Department, 44 years old, born in Lemberg, he was a real careerist within the party, who stood only onto Gomulka's side in October 1956. He was not far removed from Polish nationalism's sphere of interest. The Austrian Ambassador considered him the instigator of the Rapacki Plan, he was one of the brain trusts of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Maria Wierna, the Head of Department, age 44, an old communist activist of Jewish descent, one of the high-ranking leaders of the resistance, a real Stalinist, who accepted Gomulka's takeover only after a proverbial whipping. The source points out something interesting about this individual: Mrs. Wierna, one of dominant personalities of the old Jewish communists, took exclusive control of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1944 and she could only keep her seat in 1956 in order to represent continuity during the Soviet mopping-up.

to readdress and stabilize its relationships, and what is more they refused to start a diplomatic relationship²⁹ on the basis of the Holstein Doctrine. What really frightened the Poles were the actions of Khrushchev, in his attempts to displace the German question from the deadlock. Although it does not seem likely that Moscow would indeed have considered such plans, there were reports from various diplomats suggesting that, in the spirit of Molotov's suggestion made in 1952, the FRG and the USSR would reach a settlement, and in compensation the united Germany would receive territories from the Oder-Neisse line to the east from Poland.³⁰ This threat was strengthened by Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955 and with the emergence of a diplomatic relationship between the FRG and the USSR. Even if, with the benefit of hindsight, we regard this information as mere alarming rumours, we must not forget that, in those days, the Polish generation of politicians had been alive when Berlin and Moscow divided Poland into parts in 1939. It is neither coincidence nor surprise that, upon hearing such news, Gomulka and Rapacki took a stand next to the independent and active Polish foreign policy. However, it could easily mean danger for them. Czechoslovakia was also clearly a good ally in this case, as Prague was afraid of losing the Sudet territory. The two countries carefully harmonised their steps in the foreign policy.³¹ It is a fact that the Polish government had consulted not just with Prague, but the member states of the Warsaw Pact before its idea was launched. At the end of September 1957, they did the same with Hungary.³² Most of the allies of Warsaw backed the initiative and helped hold the proposal on political program. Even the tension³³ started after October 1956 between Poland and West Germany disappeared: on 11th December 1957, President Otto Grotewohl's communiqué was accepted. It consisted of four points which were

²⁹ FISCHER: 159.

³⁰ AdR 01 POL-II BRD/482. 1958/557631. The Austrian Ambassador, Verosta was clearly talking about such pieces of information in his report of 2nd December 1958. There were talks about the handing-over of Stettin and Lower-Silesia to the GDR in the Soviet-Polish negotiations. In return, Poland would receive Grodno and perhaps the territory around Tarnopol. After the territorial reordering, they would conclude with a German peace-treaty.

³¹ AdR 01 POL-II BRD/424. 1957/224171. The Austrian Ambassador of Prague, Dr. Wilhelm-Heininger, confidentially wrote about the institutionalised Polish-Czechoslovakian negotiations in his report on September 5th, 1957.

³² MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-004333/1957 On September 25, 1957, Deputy Foreign Minister István Sebes informed the first Vice-Chairman of the Hungarian government, Ferenc Münnich, about a Polish idea outlined for him by the Polish Ambassador in Budapest in a top secret document on 21st September. He asked about the official attitude of the Hungarian government in regard to this. He also indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports the Polish launching in harmony with the USSR. It is evident from the document that the proposal was already known in diplomatic circles before its launching on 2nd October.

³³ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-48t-0096/1/1958 The Ambassador in Warsaw, János Katona, touches the Polish-East German question of tension in his top secret report sent to Budapest on 25th March 1958, although its improvement was his responsibility in the first place.

synchronized with the Rapacki Plan. On 28th January 1958 in his radio speech in both German states he proposed a referendum about the joining the nuclear-free zone.³⁴ But Bonn refused it so nothing happened.

Additionally, there was a question as to whether the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had incorporated Soviet ideas into the Rapacki Plan. It can be assumed that negotiations took place, but it is not clear if they had agreed on the date of the publication. If it had been a harmonised date, Moscow would certainly not have timed it two days before the Sputnik launch on October 4, and the Polish would have found a better date. As it was, the centre of the international focus became the Soviet satellite. This was another reason why the USSR only voiced its support next to the Rapacki Plan in December. After all, any declarations related to disarmament would have been strange. In the course of October, Moscow put vociferous emphasis on their technical superiority in the field of rocketry and space research, causing the Sputnik shock in the western world.³⁵ On the eve of the 40th anniversary of the 1917 revolution, it was obviously far more telling to speak about the victory than about the dismantling. In case of a harmonised Polish-Soviet viewpoint, it is possible that Gromiko would not have talked solely about the necessity of reducing the conventional armaments in his speech on the 21st of September, at the UNO General Assembly.³⁶ The date was most likely decided by Warsaw, and the reason for choosing October was definitely the winning of Adenauer on the election in September 1957. This caused disquiet in Warsaw as the chancellor had already promised activity³⁷ in the campaign, which was bad for the country.³⁸

In light of the above, let us examine what advantages Warsaw would have had in the event that the proposal had been realized:

- without nuclear weapons, the military threat of the FRG would have decreased significantly, which would have helped to stabilize the relationship between Bonn and Warsaw, as well as the relationship between Bonn and Prague, an important element of which would have been the acknowledgement of the Oder-Neisse border,

³⁴ LABOOR: 22.

³⁵ FISCHER: 176.

³⁶ AdR 01 POL-II UN/463. 1957/547974. The aforementioned source contains the speech of Gromiko in German translation.

³⁷ AdR 01 POL-II BRD/424. 1957/225513. The Austrian Ambassador of Bonn, Rotter in his report of 8th October 1957, (confidentiality unknown), he was dealing with the eastern policy of FRG that is expected to become active. Important element of it would have been the establishment of unofficial diplomatic relations for example with Warsaw, nevertheless without the acknowledgment of the Oder-Neisse boundary and the GDR, which was obviously unacceptable for Warsaw.

³⁸ AdR 01 POL-II BRD/424. 1957/216309. Declared by Austrian Ambassador to Bonn, Mr. Rotter, in his report of 18th October 1957, when he confidentially and thoroughly analysed the results and the consequences of the elections.

- with the disarmament of the FRG, the tension concerning the German question would have lessened which would have helped the agreement and – with relevance to Polish interests – the stabilization of relations between the two German states,

- if the opposition among the superpowers had decreased, or if it had ended in the German question, there would have been no need for the occupation of the GDR by the Soviets (i.e. the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Poland would have also been possible,³⁹)

- the plan would have prevented the FRG from developing or storing nuclear weapons on its territory, which in turn would circumvent the location of further Soviet troops – possibly also equipped with nuclear weapons - into the territory of Poland⁴⁰ or the GDR, which would have geared up the influence of the Kremlin on these countries.

Regardless of the long-term outcome of the plan, it could have granted favourable possibilities for Warsaw in the short term.⁴¹ For example, it helped to form the image of an independent Poland, and to establish a general favourable and respectable reputation for Poland. It also helped to establish stronger relationships with the various non-aligned movements and with the neutral states, as well as their relationship with the western social-democrats who had assisted disarmament.

The fact that the Rapacki Plan was familiarized with the Kremlin just shortly before its first announcement does not mean that it did not fit into the row of the proposals released by the USSR by the end of 1957. In terms of Moscow's goal of possessing temporary technical superiority, further bans on nuclear tests were instilled. In addition, it urged the mutual abandonment of nuclear weapons usage. On account of this, the Kremlin manifested its consistent desire to organise an international summit conference, on which they would have liked to negotiate general disarmament with the United States in the first place. The disarmament was also backed by various international peace movements, which were, in turn, supported by the USSR.⁴² Subsequently,

³⁹ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/546362. On March 7, 1958, Vienna informed its embassy in Moscow and Warsaw that the goal of the Rapacki Plan is the settling of the German question and to force the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. For this reason, Warsaw were in fact grateful for the many rejections that the Plan received from the Western powers, since this would calm the Soviets and let their attention wander elsewhere; in the long-term, however, the Polish government counted very much on the West's eventual acceptance of the proposal.

⁴⁰ MASTNY, Vojtech: *Learning from the enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact*. IN: *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung* Nr. 58. Edited by Kurt R. SPILLMANN and Andreas WENGER. Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich. 2001. 51.

⁴¹ ROYEN, Christoph: *Außenpolitik*. IN: *Länderbericht Polen*. Schriftenreihe Studien zur Geschichte und Politik, Band 296. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1991. 221.

⁴² MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-002288/1958 The Rapacki Plan was analysed by the 2nd Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. Gyula Németh, the Secretary of Embassy who wrote the analysis pointed out as merits of the Polish suggestion that,

Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin released his annex on December 10th, 1957, in which he aligned himself with the Rapacki proposal, after the first waves of shock of the Sputnik launching. Bulganin affirmed this in a letter to the American President, also suggesting another summit conference, with one of the agendas being the creation of a denuclearised zone⁴³ (February 2, 1958).

The second edition of the Rapacki Plan

Western media had an important role in making the Polish suggestion public and well known in the next two months after the Rapacki Speech. Rapacki himself received more publicity in the months following the speech than he had expected. *Le Monde*, *Die Welt*, *The Times*, *Der Spiegel* all dealt with his plan.⁴⁴ The telephones rang continuously in Warsaw, and the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs was asked for interviews and his position on this question.

The politicians and diplomats' opinions were more moderate and critical, and both Warsaw and Moscow were reproached particularly for the roughness and the sketchiness of the concept, especially that part which dealt with mutual supervision. Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary General of NATO raised the issue of Central Europe's freedom from nuclear weapons, claiming that the idea of a denuclearised zone was militarily useless, since contemporary rocket technology had significantly increased the effective range of nuclear missiles.⁴⁵ The President of the United States of America, in his answer written to Bulganin on January 12th 1958, rejected the idea of a nuclear-free zone, because he did not find it an effective way to ease international tension. At the same time he indicated that he would investigate the question more thoroughly with his government's allies.⁴⁶ Chancellor Adenauer, in his answer written to Bulganin on January 20th, stated that it was unimportant from the point of view of the Federal Republic of Germany where the nuclear weapons were stored, as well as agreeing with Spaak that the nuclear free zone would be pointless from a strategic point of view. According to him, the most important question would be the total prohibition of nuclear weapons production.⁴⁷ The French

first of all, it confused the Western government circles before the Parisian term of the NATO, secondly, it gave concrete objectives to the international peace movement, and thirdly, that it was a viable basis for international negotiations. At the same time he pointed out that it was dangerous for Polish society, because it might have increased „*the worship of the West*”.

⁴³ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/546268. Liedermann, the Austrian Ambassador's Deputy in Warsaw, in his report of February 21st, 1958 (confidentiality level unknown), talks about the supposed Russian activity related to the Rapacki Plan.

⁴⁴ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-5d-00780/1958 Poland. The Hungarian Ambassador, János Katona's strictly confidential report from Warsaw.

⁴⁵ LABOOR: 23.

⁴⁶ LABOOR: 24.

⁴⁷ It is worth pointing out that Adenauer's reasoning was in accordance with the Federal Republic of Germany's interests. They were not willing to give up the nuclear weapons installed in their territory. As the country nuclear weapons of its own, it would be willing to back up the

minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau, in his answer written to Gromiko on February 13th, insisted on arranging a summit on Germany's reunion, which was also suggested by the Soviet Union. According to him, the Rapacki Plan would be an item on the agenda of that meeting. Consequently, summarising the reaction of NATO's leader states we can conclude the following: The first version of the Rapacki Plan was either completely refused, or was subject to such conditions and demands that either could not have been met under the circumstances of the cold war or were themselves among the causes of the cold war, such as the German question.⁴⁸

Naturally, there were countries that insisted on debating the Rapacki Plan thoroughly, such as Sweden, Norway and Denmark. After internal deliberations, the British labour party also took sides with the plan along with many other European states' leftist parties.

As the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rapacki himself put it down as a definite success that the suggestion had evoked such a strong reaction, they decided to elaborate the suggestion. At this time, an independent Polish initiation was out of question. There was a secret reconciliation among the member states of Warsaw Pact between 9-10th January 1958, and in the course of this meeting, the member states synchronized their steps in accordance with primarily the soviet ideas. A secret Khrushchev-Gomulka negotiation was also organised.⁴⁹ On February 2nd 1958, Rapacki and Gromiko held talks as well, finalizing the specific contents of the plan subject to disclosure. Among others they came to the decision that the Rapacki Plan was an important part of the Soviet suggestions on general disarmament, and that these various suggestions should be treated as a unit instead of separately. As a result of these Soviet steps and policies, the previously simple and practical Rapacki had quickly come to resemble its cumbersome and controversial forerunners. It was no coincidence, of course, that the Soviet Union suggested the idea of a North-European denuclearised zone right after this. Some time later, the Soviet Union also mentioned similar plans in connection with the Near-East, but these

general prohibition of nuclear arms, which would of course be rejected by both Moscow and Washington; hence. Everything would remain as it was.

⁴⁸ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/545732. Waldheim, the Austrian Ambassador in Ottawa, pronounced in his strictly confidential bulletin, written February 12th 1958, that according to diplomatic sources the Polish suggestion would be deleted from the agenda because of the Western powers' rejection, primarily Washington, Rome, Bonn, Paris, in the face of Warsaw's efforts. According to Waldheim, Washington did not dedicate enough effort to handling the question at all, which was taken by Ottawa with great regret.

⁴⁹ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-5d-00780/1958 Ambassador János Katona's strictly confidential report from Warsaw. AdR 01 POL II. Polen/513. 1958/547497. With some delay, Austrian Ambassador Verosta also gave a summary of these Soviet-Polish negotiations in his report written on 28th March 1958 (confidentiality unknown). He regards it as a Polish success that they could temporarily prevent soviet nuclear weapons from being installed in Poland by having the Rapacki Plan made public. Nevertheless, they had to clear everything with Moscow from then on.

various schemes never bore fruit.⁵⁰ In any event, Rapacki soon found that the „mutual agreement” of the Warsaw Pact’s member states had left his hands tied in phrasing the second version of the Plan.

At the same time, in an interesting development, Khrushchev made a slightly surprising statement on January 31st 1958, claiming that the Rapacki Plan is only the first step. After its successful execution, assuming that mutual control was successfully implemented, it could be followed by the next steps of disarmament, including the mutual withdrawal of foreign military forces stationed on the invaded territories of the time. Paradoxically, even though we can assume that Khrushchev did not truly mean it, it was his opinion and Kennan’s radio speeches in London that influenced Western analysts the most regarding the possibilities hidden in the Rapacki Plan.

The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the second version – attached in Appendix II – to the diplomatic representatives of those countries connected with it, on 14th February 1958. This version was made public on radio on the 18th of February.⁵¹ Besides keeping the content of the first version, this version was much more elaborate. It specified that it would be prohibited for the states included in the zone to produce, possess or use nuclear weapons for their own purposes, or to station these on their territories. Moreover, the great powers of the world would accept the obligation not to station either nuclear weapons or their facilities and delivery vehicles, in these zones, and that they would not supply any organization of the denuclearized states with such devices.⁵² As can be read in the Appendix, the Memorandum had already dealt with the question of control, suggesting the establishment of special control bodies.⁵³ These would have offered posts for not only the representatives of the two military alliances, but also for the representatives of states not concerned, as independent observers. Not recognizing each other the FRG and the GDR would not sign an international agreement with each other. Hence, in order to make it easier for the two German states to participate, the denuclearized zone would have been created not only by international agreement, but by the separate declarations of the individual states as well.

⁵⁰ The latter two Soviet suggestions were made with the sole purpose of diminishing the Rapacki Plan’s significance. According to other judgements these two plans were only messages addressed to the states concerned and to international public.

⁵¹ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-001755/1958 Ambassador, János Katona’s strictly confidential report from Warsaw dated February 15th 1958. According to the document, the Hungarian ambassador received the memorandum together with the Albanian, Bulgarian and Romanian Ambassadors, which was later also received by the Soviet, American, French, Eastern German, Czechoslovakian, Danish, Canadian and Belgian ambassadors.

⁵² This phrasing reappears in the Non-Proliferation Treaty signed on 1st July 1968.

⁵³ KÜNTZEL, Matthias: *Bonn und die Bombe. Deutsche Atomwaffenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt*, Campus, Frankfurt am Main/New York 1992. 19.

The Reception of the Second Version

In the following weeks after the document had been made public, the Rapacki Plan came to the forefront of the international diplomacy's attention. The archival sources of Vienna and Budapest also show that nearly every capital city was engaged in the matter. The Soviet government made a statement on February 19th, declaring their support of the Rapacki Plan.⁵⁴ The GDR did the same on 28th February 1958, later followed by the members of the Warsaw Pact. After some negotiation, however, the governments of NATO members, one after the other, refused the creation of the denuclearized zone. Their most important qualm was that its creation would result in a disproportionate advantage for the Warsaw Pact, since Western Europe would become defenceless against the USSR with its superiority in traditional armament. Italy also objected on the grounds that the states of the zone would be defenceless against a nuclear attack, having nothing with which to defend themselves.⁵⁵ The USA was primarily concerned with the issue of control, and in light of recent developments in rocket technology, did not see any reason for such a denuclearized zone.⁵⁶ Canada, on the other hand, looked for a compromise. According to their suggestion, the preparation and stationing of short-range air-to-air missiles would be prohibited in the zone, but tactical weapons could remain there. The idea also arose that in the zone proposed by the Polish, only the great powers would be allowed to station nuclear weapons, and the smaller states would not. Apparently, however, these ideas remained just that – ideas – and finally this plan was rejected by Canada too.⁵⁷ The initiative was rejected by the FRG as well. Adenauer was afraid that after the creation of the denuclearized zone, the Americans would withdraw not only the nuclear weapons stationed in the western German areas, but also their troops, having been deprived of their most modern weapons. This would make the FRG defenceless against Moscow in the event of the GDR's rearmament.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. A document without a registration number, date or signature.

⁵⁵ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/546443. Löwenthal, the Austrian Ambassador in Rome in his bulletin dated February 28th 1958, reports the statement of Italy in connection with the Rapacki Plan.

⁵⁶ AdR 01 POL-II. Polen/513. 1958/546448. In his bulletin written on February 28th 1958, the Austrian Ambassador in Washington reported in detail the State Department's observations, and he found that the Polish suggestion was dealt with seriously in Washington but was sure that it would be rejected. AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/548951. Attaching the rejecting American bulletin, Austrian Ambassador Verosta in Warsaw spoke of it in his report dated May 6th, 1958 (non-confidential).

⁵⁷ AdR 01 POL-II UdSSR/518. 1958/546855. Waldheim, the Austrian Ambassador in Ottawa, wrote about the ideas of the Canadian government in his confidential letter written on March 7th, 1958.

⁵⁸ Adenauer would not even accept moderation, as the prestige and influence of the FRG had been growing in the western world since the signing of the Paris agreements, and would have

Consequently, in Adenauer's eyes, the purpose of the whole Polish idea was to prevent the German rearmament and to force the withdrawal of American troops from Europe.⁵⁹ Thus the idea was different only in form from the Soviet suggestions of preceding years.⁶⁰ Accordingly, it was not coincidence that the parliament of the FRG, together with the rejection, accepted a statement on March 25th which made it possible to supply the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons and which Warsaw had wanted to prevent. Nevertheless, because of social resistance, it was much more difficult for Adenauer to execute the decision under these circumstances. In an attempt to lessen dissent and stop the Rapacki Plan from becoming any more prominent in public discussion, the West German government came forward with their own proposal, written by Franz Joseph Strauss, the Minister of Defence, referred to colloquially as the Strauss plan. The main point of this was that the FRG would accept the denuclearized zone's creation if all member-states of the Warsaw Pact took part in it except for the Soviet Union. The other important stipulation was that the number and the strength of Soviet troops stationed on the territories of the member states would be equal to that of the foreign troops stationed in the FRG. This German suggestion was obviously unacceptable for Moscow, because it would have resulted in a military advantage for NATO.

It is also worth noting that the Western press and the European leftist parties in general – including the German SPD, the British Labour party and Italian socialists and communists⁶¹ – supported the Rapacki Plan, just as they had supported the Soviet idea of disarmament and peaceful coexistence. It seemed to Moscow and Warsaw that the question of the disarmament had become more and more popular in the Western public, and in order to take advantage, they tried to keep it on the agenda by all means. On May 5th 1958, the USSR urged the calling together of a summit meeting for the umpteenth time with one of its

been brought to an end by such a policy. It was also the opposition of the superpowers that made it possible for the FRG, 12 years after the Second World War, to gain access to nuclear weapons, even if only through NATO's command.

⁵⁹ NIDERBERGER, Judith: „*Making the Difference Between Mutual Destruction and Survival*”. *Amerikanische Rüstungskontrollpolitik unter Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953–1960*. Zürcher Beiträge. IN: *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung* Nr. 62. Edited by Kurt R. SPILLMANN and Andreas WENGER. Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse der ETH Zürich. 2001. 393.

⁶⁰ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. 1958/546513. In his strictly confidential report, Austrian Ambassador Rotter in Bonn wrote about Bonn's answer on March 3rd 1958. As there was no diplomatic relationship between the FRG and Poland, the report was sent to Warsaw via Sweden. Following suit, Poland also sent the text of the Polish memorandum to Bonn through Stockholm. The German answer, whose text was not made public, did not address to the Polish suggestion of bilateral negotiations. At the same time, it admitted that the Rapacki Plan offers a solution for some of the regional problems. Bonn declared in this answer that the acceptance of the nuclear free zone plan is geared to the solution of the German question, and asked the Polish government to plead the matter of German reunion with Moscow.

⁶¹ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-002288/1958.

items on the agenda being the Rapacki Plan. Poland also did its best to breathe life back into the Plan after its rejection. Throughout the whole year, Rapacki negotiated, travelled, made statements, and tried to make all the diplomatic corps, but primarily the public, believe that the realization of the plan was possible. One part of this important process was that on April 12th 1958, the Polish, Czechoslovakian and the East German Foreign Ministers addressed the arriving answers in Prague, and spoke up for the idea in a unified statement.⁶² Subsequently, between May 2nd and 7th, top-level Czechoslovakian-Polish negotiations were held.⁶³ On November 4th 1958, Rapacki held a press conference to keep the plan on the agenda, reinforcing officially that the execution of his plan would be the first step of disarmament. This would be followed by the reduction of traditional weapons in Central Europe and all around the world.⁶⁴ In this, he identified himself with the soviet standpoint, wishing to negotiate for the reduction of conventional weapons, although there was not any chance for its acceptance. The leftist press celebrated Rapacki as the vanguard of disarmament and world peace to no effect; Bonn, followed by the other member states of NATO rejected the plan. Being a realist, Rapacki had to have known by the end of 1958 that the second version of the plan and its modified variant of November would fall, despite his attempts.

The Third Version and its Antecedents

The fact that, after its second failure, the Rapacki Plan did not end up in the world of the libraries and archives for good was primarily thanks to the Minister of Foreign Affairs having done his best to make it popular. In the following years, the plan became attached to his personality as it were. It also helped that those circumstances which had given rise and momentum to the plan did not fundamentally change in the following years either. The German question, in particular, remained unsolved in the political storms of the next few years. And so, it was one of the most important questions in contemporary international politics that was raised by the Soviet Union in 1959 and would be kept on the agenda for a long time. The Soviet idea of a German peace treaty caused alarm not only in Warsaw, but also in the circle of the GDR leaders, as both governments were afraid of the possibility that Moscow would sacrifice them on the altar of a neutral and unified Germany. After a promiscuous

⁶² AdR 01 POL-II Polen/513. The Austrian Ambassador in Warsaw, Verosta in his report dated April 15th 1958 (non-confidential), wrote about the negotiations of the three countries supporting the Rapacki Plan and their communiqué.

⁶³ AdR 01 POL-II Tschechoslowakei/1958 Written on May 8th 1957 (non-confidential), the report of the Austrian embassy in Prague is about the visit of the Polish government's delegation to Prague.

⁶⁴ This form of expansion of the Rapacki Plan is regarded as the third version of the plan by certain diplomatic sources but that does not meet the facts. The modification happened only orally and, can rather be seen as a statement supporting the earlier idea.

Soviet-Western agreement, the GDR provinces would be annexed by the FRG, and Poland would be obliged to give up some parts of the eastern German territories obtained in 1945. As has already been mentioned, the primary purpose of the Rapacki Plan for Warsaw had been to keep off the essentially territorial threat of the FRG. Thus, as long as the threat remained, the plan did exist and was of great importance for Rapacki and the Polish State. Many documents prove that they thought about the question in this way, including the Polish report of July 19th 1960,⁶⁵ Rapacki's negotiations in Austria in 1961,⁶⁶ and his announcement made during his visit to Rome.⁶⁷

Consequently, the Polish diplomacy needed only wait for the chance to dust the plan off. Of course, this would only be possible in a period of political calm, since there was even less chance of the plan's success now than there ever had been. Therefore, until the Soviet Union forced the settlement of the disputes about the German peace contract or the Berlin issue, the realization of the Rapacki Plan was not a realistic goal. But as soon as the German question had reached a temporary state of calm following the construction of the Berlin Wall, it could be negotiated again. The question was brought out again at the beginning of autumn 1961, by none other than the very Western powers who had rejected it,⁶⁸ as an alternative to the German peace treaty. Although Warsaw rejected this association, in his speech made at the general assembly of

⁶⁵ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-005500/1960 The Hungarian Ambassador in Warsaw wrote a report on July 20th 1960 about the bulletin of the Polish government, made public on the previous day, calling the attention of all NATO member states to the danger of resurgent nationalism and repercussions in the remilitarizing FRG. The Polish memorandum emphasized that Bonn does not recognize the Oder-Neisse border, which creates the danger of war for Europe. Rapacki, Minister of Foreign Affairs frequently returns to this question on his personal journeys, for example on his journey to Denmark. MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-48t-004943/1960 The top secret report of the Hungarian ambassador in Warsaw, written on June 24th 1960.

⁶⁶ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-003361/1961 The Hungarian Ambassador, Dezső Szilágyi's top secret report dated March 20th 1961, summarizes Rapacki's announcement, which was made in front of the Soviet, the Czechoslovakian and the Hungarian ambassadors concerning his visit and negotiations in Vienna. Rapacki brought on the question of his plan, which the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Kreisky was ready to support according to his impressions.

⁶⁷ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-008094/2/1961 The Roman Ambassador, Gyula Simó in his top secret report written on October 28th 1961, wrote about Rapacki's unofficial visit to Rome. Here, Rapacki gave a review of his visit to Washington for the ambassadors of the allied countries. Answering a question, he explained that the power relations had shifted towards the socialist wing since 1957. Consequently, the realization of the Rapacki Plan was no longer enough aim in itself but only a means in the interest of the greater goals. Naturally, he meant by this, the solving the German question in accordance with Polish interests, and of, course general disarmament.

⁶⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lngyelország-98t-006087/2/1961 The Hungarian Ambassador, Dezső Szilágyi's top secret report written on September 23rd 1961, emphasizes that certain western politicians had begun to mention the Rapacki Plan far more often. It seemed that they supported it as the alternative to the German peace solution appearing in the Soviet suggestions, but this view was not shared by Warsaw or Moscow.

the United Nations, Rapacki announced that Poland would take the lead in establishing a denuclearized zone. Rapacki also had a meeting with Dean Rusk, the State Department's under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, who explained that the Polish suggestion had been rejected by the former American administration, but would be reconsidered.⁶⁹ There was a top level Polish-Czechoslovakian meeting as well, with the revival of the Rapacki Plan being one of the main issues on its agenda.⁷⁰

It is important to state in connection with the Polish waiting period that, in spite of the previous failure, the further floatation of the plan meant serious possibilities for growth in prestige⁷¹ mostly for those 3rd world countries not concerned.⁷² Furthermore, the Polish initiation inspired further suggestions such as the French ex-Prime Minister, Pierre Mendes-France's plan, made public on April 3rd 1959.⁷³ Similar to the Eden plan, its purpose was to separate the two blocs. Yet, as it did not contain anything novel compared to previous, similar ideas, the matter was soon dropped.

After these initial developments, on March 28th 1962, the third version of the Rapacki Plan was delineated by the delegates of the Polish People's Republic during the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.⁷⁴ The choice of

⁶⁹ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-48t-007869/1961 The Hungarian Ambassador, Dezső Szilágyi's top secret report written on October 24th 1961. For the Polish, it was potentially advantageous to bring up the subject in the autumn of 1961, because after the elections, this was the soonest that the Kennedy administration could properly deal with the issue.

⁷⁰ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/719. 1961/33942. In his report written on October 26th 1961, Enderl, the Austrian Ambassador of Warsaw spoke about the reconciliation between the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments. He found it likely that a further version of the Rapacki Plan would come to light.

⁷¹ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-48t-003665/1959 Having arrived in Budapest on May 20th 1959, the top secret report of János Katona, the Ambassador reported on the Indonesian President, Sukarno's visit in Poland between April 29th and May 3rd. Sukarno supported the Rapacki Plan in his announcement. As Sukarno was one of the most important personalities of the movement of non-aligned states, this was a significant success for the Polish diplomacy.

⁷² MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-005599/1961 Dezső Szilágyi, the Hungarian Ambassador's top secret report from Warsaw dated June 21st 1961, assumes that the Polish raised the question because with their *apparently* independent initiative, and as the seeming vanguard of disarmament, they possessed the sympathy of dozens of countries. The latter was very favourable for the Polish in the forums of the United Nations and other international organizations. A subsequent report has mentioned that, because of Rapacki's international reputation and popularity it had become a possibility that he would be nominated to be the President of the UN's 20th General Assembly session. Unfortunately for him, his illness prevented this from coming to pass. MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-002232/1964 The latter was mentioned by Ferenc Martin, Hungarian Ambassador to Warsaw, in his top secret report dated February 29th 1964.

⁷³ The main point of the former French Prime Minister's idea was that a completely disarmed zone and two lightly armed zones have to be created between the troops of the two opposing allies. LABOOR: 34-35.

⁷⁴ MOL XIX-J-1-j-USA-100t-008236/1/1961 In his strictly confidential report dated December 19th 1961, Tibor Zádor, the Ambassador's deputy in Washington, made an

the location was appropriate, making it possible to put the question on the international stage in one step, and eliminating the need to initiate bilateral negotiations. In addition, all the members of the committee responsible for the disarmament could be acquainted with the suggestion. The timing could as likely as not have been the consequence of the temporary tranquillity in the area of the German question, because this, and particularly the matter of Berlin, had been under constant discussion since 1958-59. This latter fact had made any kind of constructive discussion of the Polish suggestion impossible. Naturally, there was not a big chance for agreement during 1962, either, but raising the question again gave an opportunity to deepen the conflict of interests concerning the question of nuclear weapons in NATO.⁷⁵

The document can be regarded as a rephrased and rearranged variation on the second version, containing the supplements announced to the public in November 1958 – which remained relatively unchanged as far as the subject-matter is concerned. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the participants are referred to in the document as the ‘signing states’, that is to say, in contrast to the second version, it would be possible to join the zone merely by signing an international contract. This of course would have meant the FRG and GDR negotiating at the same table; obviously there was no chance of this happening a scant few months after the construction of the Berlin Wall. At the same time, the modification indicated the deepening relationship between the GDR and Poland.

Although the disarmament committee discussed the document, they did not deal with it favourably, and the informal reactions of certain countries depended mainly on their alliances and diplomatic connections. In connection with this version, it makes the research difficult that certain countries did not make written diplomatic reports, as they had not received the suggestion through the diplomatic corps. But we know from secondary sources that the

announcement concerning the negotiations about disarmament which had been under discussion for years in Geneva. In contrast to the previous routine, as from 1962, after having decided to include the third world countries, these negotiations would be held with the participation of not 10 (5 Socialist and 5 Western) but 18 countries. The disarmament committee expanded with the third world countries would have been more likely to support the Polish suggestion.

⁷⁵ MOL XIX-J-1-j-USA-100t-005416/1962 The Ambassador’s deputy in Washington, János Radványi’s strictly confidential bulletin, dated May 30th 1962, reports the conflicts among the western allies in detail. The essence of the conflict was that the USA partly shared its nuclear secrets with the United Kingdom, but not with France. That is why de Gaulle’s aim was to create an independent nuclear power and prevented London from taking part in the integration process. Consequently, the FRG ended up in a very delicate situation, because they wanted to be the number one ally of both the USA and France at the same time. In addition, good French-German relations gave Adenauer some security when he adopted a determined eastern policy. At the same time, Bonn itself was disconcerted with Washington because Kennedy had wanted to negotiate with Moscow about Berlin and the German question. In this situation, Bonn’s mediator role had been appreciated even more, which did not serve the interests of the Polish. Raising the Rapacki Plan, which wished to block German nuclear armament, made French-German cooperation difficult, and further on it deepened the conflicts between the western allies.

reception of the NATO's member states was negative. In addition, Bonn even rejected the subsequent Polish suggestion unequivocally. In contrast to the suggestion made in 1958, the plan was not followed with great attention either by the western press, or public opinion. Nevertheless, it was a tangible accomplishment that thanks to the plan, the connections between the Polish United Labour Party and the western social democrat parties had become deeper and more involved. For example, the leader of the British Labour Party, Gaitskell had numerous meetings in Warsaw. He assured the Polish that his party supported the Rapacki Plan, the idea of general disarmament and that they would prefer the FRG not to possess nuclear weapons, as would most of the British constituency.⁷⁶ Josip Broz Tito made his support of the plan clear during Rapacki's visit to Yugoslavia.⁷⁷

The interest in the third version of the Polish suggestion had died down significantly by the summer, and the Cuban missile crisis bursting out not long after made it impossible to keep the issue on the agenda.

The fourth version

The Rapacki Plan gained prominence in Warsaw again upon the establishment of a multilateral nuclear NATO force. The main point of the American suggestion was for NATO to possess an autonomous nuclear force under its own command, which would be maintained through common funding by the Member States.⁷⁸ From Washington's point of view, the plan would have obviously unburdened the budget of the USA, and solved the question of French and German nuclear armament, if the French and Germans could only

⁷⁶ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-007465/1962 In his top secret bulletin dated September 20th 1962, Dezső Szilágyi, the Hungarian Ambassador in Warsaw, reported in detail on the talks that Gaitskell had in Warsaw.

⁷⁷ AdR 01 POL-II Polen/799. 1962/76582. In his non-confidential bulletin written on November 19th 1962, the Austrian embassy in Belgrade reported on Rapacki's visit to Yugoslavia.

⁷⁸ MOL XIX-J-1-j-USA-100t-001017/1963 The Ambassador's deputy, János Radványi's top secret report dated January 16th 1963, thoroughly investigates the American-British so-called Nassau contract signed in the Bahamas. Based on this, London bought Polaris rockets and other technologies for use with nuclear weapons from the United States of America, but these were placed under NATO command. With this step, the establishment of NATO's common nuclear force had begun, which was referred to as the „*multilateral nuclear force*” in most of the sources henceforward. Washington tried to dissuade France from the notion of establishing an autonomous nuclear arsenal. On the other hand they wanted to give the FRG nuclear weapons in such a way that they would stay under NATO command – that is the Americans' command. The project was the source of debates inside NATO for some time. The Soviet Union wanted to preclude the plan, because it would have provided more resources for NATO's nuclear programmes. Consequently, during international negotiations, Moscow organized the signing of an agreement similar to the subsequent Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was reported in the top secret bullet number MOL XIX-J-1-j-USA-97t-007168/1963 written by János Radványi, the Ambassador's deputy in Washington, and which arrived in Budapest on November 1st 1963.

obtain nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. Moreover they would have contributed to the costs. Additionally, the question of the multilateral nuclear force could help to convince France that it was useless to establish an autonomous French nuclear force.⁷⁹ The American idea, which was immediately backed by Bonn, was met by strong protest from Warsaw and Moscow. Thus, diplomatic actions began against the setting up of the multilateral nuclear force. The Finnish Kekkonen plan concerning the disarmament of the whole Scandinavia, strongly influenced by the Soviets, was such a plan.⁸⁰ Another such initiative was the partial resurrection of the Rapacki Plan, under Gomulka's name, similar to the original but with enough novelty to improve its chances, which was announced on December 28th 1963.⁸¹ This plan can be read in the Appendix. The Polish and Soviet diplomacy got inklings that the question of the multilateral nuclear force generated serious debates among the Member States of NATO. Paris looked at the originally American-British idea with suspicion and doubt. Nobody was enthusiastic about the issue of German armament. West Germany's approval of the American proposal temporarily cooled French-German relations, which had been strengthened by the international contract signed in January 1963. As Bonn's determined eastern policy of the previous years was backed by the German-French relationships, the FRG temporarily became isolated during 1964, at least in Europe. This was partially because Adenauer, a strong man of the previous decade, relinquished his place to Ludwig Erhard on October 15th 1963, who was primarily an economist, and had difficulties in growing accustomed to the world of diplomacy. Warsaw in all probability counted on the support of West Germany for the fourth version of their plan, because for them Adenauer's resignation was a success and they thought that a more flexible leader in West Germany might serve their interests. It was also an important aspect that the proposal was brought out again just before the West German elections, due in 1965, which in terms of the elective campaign, could be favourable for the SPD.

⁷⁹ The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by the USA, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, but not by France and China, in 1963, was aimed at setting the nascent French nuclear programme back by prohibiting nuclear tests.

⁸⁰ The Finnish idea, partially influenced by the Soviets, was formulated in 1963. It intended to influence, primarily the decision of Norway, so that it would not support the initiative of a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

⁸¹ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-00817/1/1965. The Hungarian Ambassador in Warsaw, Ferenc Martin, in his top secret bulletin dated January 22nd 1964, reported on the circumstances of Gomulka's speech in Plock. He explained that the speech was a simplified version of the Rapacki Plan, and dealt with only its first part, the matter of freezing nuclear weapons. From this source, it turns out that Gomulka's speech, far from giving up on the Rapacki Plan, was intended to pave the way for its public reappearance in a new version. The novelty of the Gomulka plan lay in not attacking the issue of the multilateral nuclear force, regardless of Soviet suggestions. The report touches on the fact that Warsaw was supported by Wilson, of the British Labour Party, and Nenni, of the Italian socialists.

Before the fourth version of the Rapacki Plan was made public – which, after the events in December, could also be considered as the second version of the Gomulka plan – there were comprehensive negotiations in Moscow on the 8th and 9th of January 1964, attended by the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the FDR, Hungary and Romania. These talks were made necessary by the negotiations on disarmament in Geneva, as a result of which the participating states attempted to harmonize their strategy, especially as regards the revival of the Polish proposal. Considering this, in the case of the fourth version we can again speak of a document carefully written for its time.⁸² Before any further steps were taken, the Polish diplomacy carried out inquiry meetings with numerous states including Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and even with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant.⁸³

The fourth variant which was disclosed on 28th February 1964 - the text of which can be read in the appendix - meant a return to the directives of the proposal announced in autumn 1957. It dealt with the reduction of conventional weaponry, its declared goal became exclusively the freezing of nuclear weapons on the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and the FRG. The reaction of the various states did not bring any surprise: Moscow and its allies assisted it while the Member States of NATO refused the repeated Polish proposal. Their reasons were the well known ones, most important of which were: the disproportion between the number of bases to be disarmed per side, giving the potential advantage to the Warsaw Pact, and the discriminating character of the Polish proposal in its intention to remove nuclear weaponry from essentially one state – namely the FRG. There was also the obvious scantiness of the marked territory, considering that the rockets of the age had far greater effective ranges, combined with the fact that the proposal dealt solely with nuclear weapons, making the entire proposal somewhat of a strategic joke. The question of control of certain territories had also not been elaborated, leading many states to openly declare that the proposal wanted the present Polish-German boundaries to remain unchanged, which was completely unacceptable for them until the German peace-treaty was concluded, ending of the German question.⁸⁴ The hardest rejections came from the FRG and from the Netherlands, whereas the USA and the UK, despite their scepticism, emphasized the possibility for and importance of negotiation. Of course, it was

⁸² MOL XIX-J-1-j-the USSR-100t-00802/1964. The top secret memorandum written by Péter Mód on January 13th 1964, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported in detail the conference in Moscow, and the need to establish a European nuclear-free zone.

⁸³ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-00817/1964 The Hungarian Ambassador in Warsaw, Ferenc Martin's top secret bulletin, dated February 11th 1964, reports in detail the tentative Polish negotiations, of which the chief executive of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a summary to the representatives of all socialist countries.

⁸⁴ MOL XIX-J-1-j-Lengyelország-98t-00817/4/1964 Ambassador Ferenc Martin's top secret report, dated November 14th 1964, summarizes the answers given on the Polish memorandum.

not taken too seriously, since negotiations concerning disarmament had already been taking place for a decade without any serious results. In the end, regardless of Poland's attempts over several months to keep the proposal in play, it became evident by the end of the year that the Rapacki Plan, in all its variations, was ultimately doomed to failure.

The Fall of the Rapacki Plan

After the failure of the 1964 version, the Rapacki Plan no longer held any interest for most people in the diplomatic community. Since Warsaw's opinion had not changed regarding the matter, the proposal's total failure is best attributed to changes in external circumstances. These changes are the followings:

- The new Soviet administration, after the failure of Khrushchev, kept a tighter hold on the ally countries, and progressively narrowed the margins of Poland's foreign policy.⁸⁵ After the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, its independence came to an end. On the other hand, it is true that Warsaw did not have to fear of any Soviet-West deal regarding Germany, because of the more dogmatic Soviet leadership.⁸⁶

- The American-Polish relationship was also continuously worsening when it became evident for Washington that the developments of October 1956 were turning against the NAP. What is more, Warsaw was not moving away from Moscow politically, but in fact, after 1964, was even forced to advocate Moscow's viewpoint to the Chinese.⁸⁷

- In the second half of the sixties, the threat of the FRG was continuously declining. One reason for this was the loosening of German-French cooperation after the departure of Adenauer – it became evident after the de Gaulle's trip to Moscow that Paris would not assist the armament of West Germany, even through the project of the multilateral atomic strike-force.⁸⁸ Another reason was the gentle shift of the FRG's internal politics to the left that resulted in the governmental participation of the SPD from 1966. With this in the background,

⁸⁵ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/1191. 1967/34706. Proksch, the Austrian Ambassador in Warsaw, in his non-confidential report, dated November 23rd 1967, evaluated the Soviet-Polish relationship during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in 1917. The analysis provides us with a precise picture of the pressure of the Brezhnev administration, being markedly more dogmatic than that of Khrushchev.

⁸⁶ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/930. 1964/81345. Enderl, the Austrian Ambassador in Warsaw, in his non-confidential report dated November 20th 1964, analyzed at some length the Soviet-Polish relationship after Khrushchev's downfall.

⁸⁷ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/930. 1964/79460. The Austrian Ambassador Enderl in Warsaw, in his non-confidential report dated October 13th 1964, wrote about the deterioration of the Polish-American relationship and its reasons.

⁸⁸ AdR 01 Pol-II BRD/974. 1965/144999. In his non-confidential report dated November 10th 1965, the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Fuchs, analyzed the French-German relationship.

French-Polish relations were stimulated, and in May 1966 the French Foreign Minister visited Warsaw; the next year between January 26th and 28th, Adam Rapacki attended negotiations in Paris.⁸⁹

Despite all this, the Rapacki Plan had not disappeared totally. The Polish Foreign Minister, during his international negotiations returned to it regularly. According to diplomatic sources, during 1964 and 1965 he had talks on the subject in Mexico, New York, Rome, Stockholm, Tehran and Brussels;⁹⁰ in November 1965 on the Polish-Yugoslavian negotiations for example, Tito expressed his support on the fourth variant known as the Gomulka plan.⁹¹ Furthermore, when Rapacki was in Stockholm in 1966, the Swedes assured him of their support for his proposal of a nuclear-free zone.⁹²

At the same time, it is evident that during these bilateral negotiations, Poland became increasingly isolated. In London, in December 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson also declared his disinterest in the proposal,⁹³ which was repeated during the negotiations in March 1967, although the British assured the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs of their understanding.⁹⁴ The

⁸⁹ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/1191. 1966/14764. In his non-confidential report dated January 28th 1967, the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Fuchs, reported Rapacki's negotiations in Paris. Rapacki was met by de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and Foreign Affairs Minister Couve de Murville, and even took part in a television interview. In his time there, Rapacki did not talk about the plan of the nuclear free zone as Paris would have said no to it considering the German-French relationship. Nevertheless, he made it clear that European safety and the German question are interconnected, and that was why the FRG had to acknowledge the current boundaries and the existence of the GDR, and why they had to make do without nuclear weapons. If this happened, a European safety conference may call peace in Europe into being for a long time. In my opinion, Rapacki's train of thought, touched on only briefly because of its complexity, can be identified with the Helsinki-process schedule.

⁹⁰ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/997. 1965/133478 The Austrian Ambassador in Warsaw Enderl, in his non-confidential report dated March 10th 1965, wrote about his talks with Foreign Affairs Minister Rapacki. The Polish politician spoke about his journeys, emphasizing that he was negotiating of the European situation and the question of disarmament.

⁹¹ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/997. 1965/145668. The Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade, Pasch in his non-confidential report written on November 24th 1965, gave a summary of the negotiations in Belgrade. He emphasized that the Polish wanted to sign a communiqué principally against FRG, which he toned down because of the negotiations between Belgrade and FRG. But he supported, for example, the anti-West German idea of a nuclear-free zone.

⁹² AdR 01 Pol-II. Polen/1065. 1966/39351. Marquet, Austrian Ambassador in Stockholm, in his non-confidential report written on June 20th 1966, reported on Rapacki's visit to Sweden.

⁹³ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/997. 1965/130304 Schwarzenberg, Austrian Ambassador in London, in his non-confidential bulletin reported in detail Rapacki's talks in London. He specified that Wilson, whose party had supported the Rapacki Plan before the electoral victory of 1964, now considered it to be of no interest. According to Wilson, the main point was no longer the place where the nuclear weapons were established, but where they were pointed. Rapacki was disappointed that after having taken over governance, the British Labour Party did not support the ideas discussed so many times in the previous years.

⁹⁴ AdR 01 Pol-II. Polen/1191. 1967/17490. The Austrian Ambassador, Schwarzenberg in his non-confidential letter written on March 2nd 1967, summarised Rapacki's talks in London. Rapacki explained that the premise of the settlement of the German question is that Bonn

same happened when Rapacki visited Copenhagen⁹⁵ and Brussels, after which the Belgian Foreign Minister expressed his disappointment to the Austrian Ambassador while they discussed the negotiations, because he felt that, compared to Rapacki's previous flexibility, he had become comparable to the Soviets in his stubborn positions, especially concerning the German question.⁹⁶

The reason for the loss of flexibility in the Polish point of view was the control of Moscow, which was getting tighter and tighter. The increasingly active Stalinist opposition from Gomulka might also have played some role in it. The so-called „*partisan group*” had also been making stronger attacks on the Polish leadership, which had not changed since October 1956. After the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, riots which were probably covertly organised by an outside influence broke out in March 1968. After these riots, the political attacks strengthened perceptibly, resulting in serious political purging. In the whole territory of Poland, an anti-Zionist campaign began, the unspoken target of which was Gomulka because his wife was of Jewish descent. Although he was left⁹⁷ in his place because of his international prestige, there were many replacements among the Party Leaders standing close to him. The purge also extended to other branches of the government authorities and the administration. Two-hundred people were laid off from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among them twenty top managers, including the Deputy Minister, Naszkowski (of Jewish descent), General Director Wierna, who was the Chief Executive Officer dealing with the countries of the Eastern Bloc, Birecki (also of Jewish descent) who had led the department responsible for cultural relationships, and of course General Director Meller-Conrad, who was the Chief Executive Officer dealing with the Asian communist countries and who had for years tried to bring Moscow and Beijing eye to eye.⁹⁸ Even Rapacki, the Foreign Minister, was not able to prevent the replacements of staff.⁹⁹ The clear political defeat caused Rapacki to enter a state of depression, exacerbated by his genuine cardiac problems, and he did not enter the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for some months.¹⁰⁰

recognizes the Oder-Neisse border and the GDR, and give up its attempts to possess nuclear weapons.

⁹⁵ AdR 01 Pol-II. Polen/1191. 1967/34752. The Austrian Ambassador in Warsaw, Proksch, in his non-confidential report dated November 24th 1967, wrote about Rapacki's negotiations in Denmark.

⁹⁶ The Austrian Ambassador in Brussels, Cornaro, in his non-confidential report dated November 8th 1967, summarized Rapacki's negotiations in Belgium.

⁹⁷ Gomulka's place was taken over by Edward Gierek in December of 1970.

⁹⁸ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/1392. 1968/126763. The Austrian Ambassador in Warsaw, Proksch's non-confidential report dated September 21st 1968, reports in detail on the political clean up.

⁹⁹ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/1392. 1968/116351. The Austrian Ambassador in Warsaw, Proksch's non-confidential report dated April 9th 1968, reviewed the changes in Polish internal affairs.

¹⁰⁰ AdR 01 Pol-II Polen/1392. 1968/120182 The Austrian Ambassador's deputy in Warsaw, Stolberg, dealt with the question in his report written on July 12th 1968. Rapacki had survived two heart attacks already in 1958 and 1963, which were then followed by a more serious third one.

In such circumstances, it is not surprising that Gomulka, without any disagreement, approved the participation of Poland in the occupation of Czechoslovakia, which had until then been on good terms Warsaw. This of course, encouraged the activities of the partisan group who, by the autumn of 1968, even had the open support of Moscow behind it. At the end of the year, staff replacements took place again, during which Rapacki lost his position in the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and so his position as the Foreign Minister, which meant the death of the Rapacki Plan. Rapacki lived two more years,¹⁰¹ but he did not stay active in the political life. Unfortunately, he was not alive when the FRG and Poland signed an agreement in November 1970, in which Willy Brandt, the leader of the new West-German government, acknowledged the Oder-Neisse boundary.¹⁰² He also normalized the relationships with Poland and ended the threat that Rapacki had spent so much time trying to end.¹⁰³ With the signing of the so-called 'eastern contracts' the Cold War tension began to diminish markedly in central Europe, and they became the precondition of the negotiations known as Helsinki.

Epilogue

In this study, I attempted to introduce the Polish proposal about the disarmament of Central Europe, which is known in history as the Rapacki Plan. I think, based on the archival sources from Budapest and from Vienna, that we were able to gain a general picture of the political background for the Polish proposal and its importance during this period of the Cold War, and that we had the chance to familiarize ourselves with its role in the German question. It can be said that, although none of the versions of the plan that were brought to the public came to fruition because of the opposition of the Great Powers, the Rapacki Plan was an important element of the international negotiations about disarmament and nuclear regulation in the period. In my view, the arguments about the Polish idea laid the path for international pacts like the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in 1963, the Outer Space Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (or 'Antarctic Treaty') signed in 1968.

¹⁰¹ Adam Rapacki died on October 10th, 1970.

¹⁰² NÉMETH, István: *Németország története* (History of Germany), Aula, Budapest 2002. 428-429.

¹⁰³ FISCHER: 264-271.

I. Appendix

The declaration made by Minister Rapacki during the General debate of the XII General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1957

„In the interest of Poland's security and detente in Europe, having agreed the initiative with other members of the Warsaw Pact, the Government of the Polish People's Republic declares that if both German states agree to the introduction of a ban on a production and storage of nuclear weapons on their territory, the Polish People's Republic is prepared to introduce on its territory the same ban.”

II. Appendix

The Memorandum of the Polish Government on 14 February, 1958

On 2nd October 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented to the United Nations General Assembly a proposal to establish a denuclearised zone in Central Europe. The Governments of the Czechoslovak Republic and the German Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede to this zone.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded on the assumption that the establishment of the proposed denuclearised zone might improve the international atmosphere and promote broader talks on disarmament and the solution of other outstanding international problems, whereas the further growth of nuclear armaments and their extension to other countries would further perpetuate Europe's division into opposing blocs and aggravate the situation, particularly in Central Europe.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic repeated its proposal through diplomatic channels in December 1957.

In view of the broad repercussions caused by the Polish initiative, and also the conclusions drawn from the debate on this proposal, the Government of the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed statement of its proposals, which may facilitate the opening of negotiations and agreement on this subject.

I

The proposed zone should embrace the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. No nuclear weapons would be produced or stored and no equipment or plant for

their delivery installed in this territory; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone would be prohibited.

II

The commitments arising from the establishment of a denuclearised zone would be based on the following principles:

1. The States of this zone would undertake not to produce, stockpile, import for their own use, or allow the deployment in their territories of any types of nuclear weapons, and also not to install, or allow to be installed, in their territories equipment or installations for delivering nuclear weapons, including rocket launching ramps.

2. The four powers — France, the United States, Britain and the USSR — would undertake:

(a) not to maintain nuclear weapons among the armaments of their forces in the territory of the States comprising the zone; not to have or install in the territory of these States equipment or installations for the delivery of nuclear weapons, including rocket launching ramps;

(b) not to provide, in any way or in any circumstances, the governments or any other agencies in this territory with nuclear weapons, or their associated equipment or installations.

3. The powers possessing nuclear weapons should undertake that these weapons would not be used against the territory of the zone or any targets within it. Thus these powers would undertake to honour the status of the zone as a denuclearised territory against which no atomic weapons would be used.

4. Other States whose forces are stationed in the territory of any of the States comprising the zone would also undertake not to maintain nuclear weapons with the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to governments or other agencies within this territory. Nor would they install any associated equipment or installations, including rocket launching ramps, in the territory of the States belonging to the zone, or transfer them to governments or other agencies within this territory.

Detailed agreements could be mutually agreed for the method and procedure for carrying out these commitments.

III

1. To ensure the effectiveness and implementation of commitments set forth in paragraph II, items 1, 2 and 4, the countries concerned would undertake to establish a system of extensive and effective control in the territory of the proposed zone and would submit to it.

This system could comprise ground as well as air control. Control posts with rights and facilities for action ensuring effective inspection could also be established.

The details and forms of exercising control could be mutually agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired in this field and the proposals submitted by various States in the course of disarmament talks held heretofore, in the form and to the extent applicable to the territory of the zone.

The system of control established for the denuclearised zone might serve as a useful experiment for putting into effect broader agreements on questions of disarmament.

2. An appropriate control machinery should be established to supervise the implementation of the proposed commitments. It might include, for instance, representatives appointed (possibly by name) by bodies of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. It might also include citizens or representatives of States which do not belong to either of the military groupings in Europe. The procedure for the establishment, operation and reporting of the control organs could be the subject of further agreements.

IV

The simplest method of establishing the commitments by States belonging to the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate international treaty. However, to avoid complications which some States might discern in such a solution it would be possible:

1. to embody these commitments in the form of four unilateral declarations in the nature of an international undertaking deposited with a country chosen by agreement;

2. to embody the commitments undertaken by the great powers in a joint document or in unilateral declarations, as indicated above;

3. to embody the commitments by other States, whose armed forces are present on the territory of the zone, in the form of unilateral declarations, as indicated above.

On the basis of the above proposals, the Government of the Polish People's Republic suggests negotiations to elaborate in detail a plan for the establishment of a denuclearised zone, the documents and guarantees connected with it, and the methods of putting the commitments into effect.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic is convinced that acceptance of the proposals for the establishment of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe would facilitate agreement on the restriction of conventional armaments and reduction of the foreign troops stationed in the territories of States belonging to the zone.

Annex

Summary of notes accompanying the memorandum

To the three major western powers:

France

The Polish Government recalls its views on the tendency of nuclear weapons to become widespread in Europe and the growing armaments in Western Germany, and supports the Soviet proposals for a conference between the major powers with the participation of Heads of Governments. The Polish Government hopes that France will study the more detailed proposals for creating a denuclearised zone in Central Europe.

United Kingdom

The Polish Government states that it has paid great attention to the interest shown by the United Kingdom Government in the Polish proposals, as expressed in the letter of 16th January 1958 from the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, to the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Bulganin, and that the statements by several British statesmen and politicians and the expressions of public opinion in Great Britain on this subject are being studied in Poland with the attention due to them.

United States

The Polish Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will examine the detailed proposals for the creation of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe which is contained in the memorandum.

To those States other than the major western powers which have military units stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany:
Belgium, Denmark and Canada

The Polish Government expresses the hope that the more detailed Polish proposals on the creation of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe will be welcomed by these governments.

Federal Republic of Germany (through the intermediary of Sweden)

The Polish Government proposes that representatives appointed by the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the Federal

Republic of Germany should hold conversations on problems raised in the memorandum.

To the countries of Eastern Europe concerned:

USSR

The Polish Government expresses its conviction that the Government of the USSR, which has supported the Polish proposal, will view with favour the detailed proposals contained in the memorandum and will continue to support the creation of a denuclearised zone in Central Europe.

Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany

The Polish Government expresses its satisfaction at the fact that these governments have previously declared themselves ready to accede to the denuclearised zone in Central Europe, and its conviction that the Polish Government can count on the full co-operation of these governments.

(1) Text of the memorandum handed by the Polish Government on 14th February 1958 to the representatives in Warsaw of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Czechoslovakia, the Eastern German Democratic Republic and the USSR, and to the representative of Sweden for transmission to the Federal Republic of Germany — these recipient countries being those to be included in the proposed denuclearised zone and those with forces stationed therein. The memorandum was accompanied in each case by a note to the recipient government; those notes are summarised at annex.

III. Appendix

The Rapacki plan II.

Memorandum concerning the creation in Europe of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone.

Submitted on March 28, 1962 in Geneva by the Polish delegation to the 18-nation disarmament conference

Whereas the conference of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee is to consider, simultaneously with the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, proposals on steps and measures aiming at the lessening of international tension and increasing mutual confidence among

states, thus to facilitate the implementation of general and complete disarmament:

Whereas the creation of denuclearized and limited armaments zone constitutes one of the most important measures and steps of this kind, the delegation of the Polish Peoples' Republic in agreement with the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, submits on the agenda of the Committee a proposal for the creation of denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe.

1. Purpose

The purpose of the Polish proposal is the elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles, a reduction of military forces and conventional armaments on a limited territory, on which this can contribute towards to lessening of tension and towards a substantial reduction of the danger of conflict on that territory.

2. Territorial scope

The zone ought to include basically the following states: the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. The agreement concerning the zone is open: other European states ought to have a possibility to accede to this agreement.

3. Rights and duties of states included in the zone or acceding to it

Rights and duties resulting from the creation of the zone should be carried out in the two following stages:

Stage one – freezing of all nuclear armaments and rockets and prohibition of the creation of new bases.

a, Rights and duties of states included in the zone

1. On the territory of states included in the zone, preparation of production and production of any kind of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them shall be prohibited.

2. States included in the zone shall be prohibited to introduce any kind of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them.

3. States included in the zone shall be prohibited to grant permission to establish new bases and facilities for stockpiling or servicing nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them.

b, Rights and duties of other states

1. All states which dispose of any kind of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them shall be prohibited to transfer them to states included in the zone.

2. All states which dispose of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them shall be prohibited to introduce new quantities of such weapons of any kind into the zone.

3. Establishing in the area of the zone of new bases and facilities for stockpiling or servicing of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them shall be prohibited.

Stage two – elimination of nuclear armaments and rockets and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

a, Rights and duties of states included in the zone

1. Elimination from the national armaments of all nuclear delivery vehicles by the states included in the zone.

2. Reduction to an agreed level of military forces and corresponding reduction of conventional armaments by states included in the zone.

b, Rights and duties of other states

1. Withdrawal from the area of the zone of all kinds of nuclear weapons and all facilities for their stockpiling and servicing as well as of all nuclear delivery vehicles permanently or temporarily stationed by foreign states, and of all facilities for their servicing.

2. Reduction of foreign military forces stationed on the area of the zone to an agreed level with a corresponding reduction of their armaments.

4. Control

1. To secure the effectiveness of disarmament measures mentioned in part 3 of this Memorandum, a strict international control and inspection on the ground and in the air will be provided, the establishment of appropriate control posts included.

2. A special control body will be established to supervise the implementation of the proposed obligations. Composition and competence of this body as well as its procedure will be agreed upon by the states concerned.

The signatory states of the agreement concerning the creation of a nuclear-free zone will enter an obligation to submit to the control of the said body and provide all facilities and assistance in its activity.

3. The signatory states of the agreement concerning the creation of a nuclear-free zone will agree on the extent and measures of control in each of the two stages.

5. Guarantees

In order to guarantee the inviolability of the nuclear-free zone powers disposing of nuclear weapons will undertake to:

a, Refrain from any steps which might violate directly or indirectly the status of the zone;

b, Not to use nuclear weapons against the territory of the zone.

In view of the above, the delegation of the Polish People's Republic proposes the following:

1. The 18-Nation Committee will request the states concerned to take immediate steps to carry out the proposal concerning the creation of denuclearized and limited armaments zone.

2. The 18-Nation Committee will request to initiate appropriate consultations on the creation of the zone, with the states concerned and to submit a report on these consultations not later than 1962.

3. The 18-Nation Committee will also request the General Assembly of the United Nations to adopt a resolution concerning the creation of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in Europe.

IV. Appendix

The Gomulka plan I. / The Rapacki plan III.

Extract from a speech made by Władisław Gomułka in Płock, on december 28, 1963

Practical steps have to be taken to curb the arms race and facilitate further disarmament understandings. For instance, the countries concerned should examine the following as the most immediately urgent tasks:

FIRST, a freezing of nuclear arms in central Europe. Of course, a suitable system of control would have to be agreed. The question of limiting conventional weapons could also be discussed. Poland is prepared to submit this proposal in specifically worded terms.

SECOND, of the proposals discussed by the three great powers in New York and Washington last autumn the most urgent is the question of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and the elaboration of a set of measures to avert the danger of surprise attack. Consultations should now become concrete negotiations.

THIRD, determined efforts should once again be made to bring our views closer together and find agreement in the matter of general and complete disarmament, with the main emphasis on freeing the world from the horror of a nuclear cataclysm.

General and complete disarmament is the imperative of our times. There are many ways of hastening this goal. A good example has once more been given by the Soviet Union which has reduced its defence budget for the coming year by 600 million roubles. Other countries would be well advised to follow suit, especially as the financial burden of armaments is becoming increasingly oppressive even for the wealthiest.

FOURTH, the road to disarmament could also be opened through the adoption of partial measures which would widen the area of security in other parts of the world, regardless of the steps taken in central Europe.

FIFTH, Poland and the other socialist countries also attach great importance to the proper development of international economic collaboration. International trade – without any discrimination, of course – not only benefits all sides, but also promotes better understanding and brings nations closer

together. Next year's trade and development conference offers a great opportunity for turning the problems of trade and development to the advantage of better and closer international economic relations, an ending of the cold war in the economic field and helping the countries whose development has been held black by years of colonial dependence. This chance must be seized in full.

V. Appendix

The Gomulka plan II. / The Rapacki plan IV.

Polish Government memorandum on the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe

Warsaw, 28 February 1964

The Government of the Polish People's Republic has already on numerous occasions manifested its consistent desire in the search for solutions aimed at bringing about international détente and disarmament and lent its support to all constructive proposals designed to achieve this end. The reduction of international tensions and creation of conditions of security in Central Europe have always been and continue to be the matters of particular concern to the Polish Government. This objective can and should be achieved above all by way of arresting the armaments race in this part of the world.

With this in mind the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented some time ago a plan for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe which, as is known, aroused the interest of numerous States and of world public opinion. In the view of the Polish Government that plan continues to be fully topical.

The Polish Government believes that there are at the present time suitable conditions for undertaking immediate measures the implementation of which could facilitate further steps leading to a détente, to a strengthening of security and to progress in the field of disarmament.

Basing itself on these premises, the Government of the Polish People's Republic is submitting a proposal to freeze nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in Central Europe. The implementation of such a proposal would be of particular significance to the security both of Poland and of all countries of this region as well as of the whole of Europe, since, while in no way affecting the existing relation of forces, it would contribute to the arrest of the nuclear armaments race.

1. The Polish Government proposes that the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments include in principle the territories of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, with the respective territorial waters and airspace.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic sees the possibility of extending that area through the accession of other European States.

2. The freeze would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear charges, irrespective of the means of their employment and delivery.

3. Parties maintaining armed forces in the areas of the proposed freeze of armaments would undertake obligations not to produce, not to introduce or import, not to transfer to other parties in the area or to accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

4. To insure the implementation of those obligations, an appropriate system of supervision and safeguards should be established.

The supervision over the implementation of other obligations not to produce nuclear and thermonuclear weapons covered by the freeze would be exercised in plants which are or could be used for such production.

To insure the implementation of other obligations, control would be established to be exercised in accordance with an agreed procedure in proper frontier railway, road, waterway junctions, sea and air ports.

The supervision and control could be exercised by mixed commissions composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and of the North Atlantic Treaty on a parity basis. Those commissions could be enlarged to include also representatives of other States. The composition, structure and procedure of the control organs will be the subject of detailed arrangements.

Parties whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the armaments freeze and which have at their disposal nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would exchange at periodical meetings of their representatives all information and reports indispensable for the implementation of the obligations with regard to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments.

5. Provisions relating to the implementation of the proposal submitted above should be embodied in appropriate documents.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic is ready to enter into discussions and negotiations with the interested parties to reach an agreement on the implementation of these objectives.

The Polish Government will give due attention to all constructive suggestions which would be in accordance with the objectives of the present proposal and would aim at the freezing of armaments in Central Europe.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic expects a favourable attitude to the proposal submitted hereby.

Nagy Botond

A magyar és a román pénzügyi bürokrácia ütközéspontja. Sóexport a Balkánra a 19. század utolsó negyedében

Thallóczy Lajos 1881-ben tett körutat a Balkán félsziget keleti részén, amely során élménybeszámolóit azzal a szándékkal jelentette meg a *Pesti Napló* hasábjain, hogy felhívja ezzel a kormány és a vállalkozók figyelmét a piacszerzési lehetőségekre. Bulgária függetlenné válása után néhány évvel a így írta le egy Duna-menti város állapotát: „*A widdini dunamenti vár most rendkívül szomorú látványt nyújt. A város hanyatlásának egyik főoka: a törökök kivándorlása. A pacifikáció óta 2400 török hagyta oda házáat, 500-600 arany értékű házaikat 50-60 aranyon vesztegetve keresztény polgártársaiknak. Török forrásból hallom, hogy nem annyira a bolgár kormányzat készíti őket kivándorlásra, mint inkább a velük született felsőbbbségi érzet. Ismeretes dolgot írok, mikor a török lakosság becsületességét említem. A külföldi Widdinben megtelepedett kereskedők közül 50-55 osztrák s magyar illetőségű; ezek fájlalják a leginkább a török kereskedők távozását. Bulgár szójárás: <sok török sok becsület, sok görög semmi becsület>”.*¹ Anélkül, hogy vitába szállnánk a jellemről tett megállapításainak érvényességéről, el kell ismernünk, hogy egy pontos, mikroszintű pillanatfelvételt készített annak a folyamatnak egy részéről, ami a Török Birodalom bomlásával kezdődött, és az általa létező *hagyományos balkáni piac* szerkezetének átrendeződésével és szereplőgárdájának cseréjével járt.

Részesedésnövelés igénye a keleti és balkáni piacokon folyamatosan jelen volt a magyar politikai és közgazdasági gondolkodásban. A reformkori nagy tervek és megfogalmazott ambíciók között meghatározást nyert úgy a balkáni piacok felé a terjeszkedés, mint Magyarország világpiaci közvetítő szerepének a kiemelése. Berzeviczy Gergely a szabad kereskedelem híveként, a napóleoni tengeri blokád élményének hatása alatt fejtette ki azt az elképzelését, hogy az ázsiai-indiai áruforgalom Magyarországon és Ausztrián keresztül bonyolítható le, amit a bécsi kongresszus elé is bocsátott.² Széchenyi István is osztotta ezt a nézetet és a keleti kereskedelemnek fontossága vált irányadóvá több reform-, illetve beruházási tervezetében. A kiegyezés után, a Török Birodalom folyamatos hanyatlásával megteremtődtek a külső feltételek, hogyha nem is az ázsiai kereskedelem közvetítő szerepének az átvételére, de legalább megvetni a lábukat a balkáni piacokon. A belső feltétel az volt, hogy a Monarchia felhagyott expanziós törekvéseivel és inkább a térség stabilizációjára

¹ THALLÓCZY Lajos: *Utazás Levantében. A keleti kereskedelem története Magyarországon.* Budapest 1882. 2.

² BERZEVITZY, Gregor von: *Ansicht des asiatisch-europäischen welthandels nach dem jetzigen zeitbedürfniss betrachtet.* Pest 1808.

törekedett, és az, hogy a külpolitikai törekvéseiben a gazdasági érdekek váltak irányadóvá. Az osztrák-magyar külpolitika számára is Kelet-Európa maradt a fő működési terület, miután Nyugat-Európában lezárult a nemzetállami átrendeződés. A balkáni és kelet-európai nemzeti átrendeződésnek alkotóeleme volt a függőség, illetve függetlenség különböző fokain álló országokkal való viszony, és ezen belül a gazdasági kapcsolatoknak a rendezése is. Ennek a sikeres véghezvitelében elévülhetetlen szerepe volt Andrássy Gyula közös külügyminiszternek. A keleti politikának az osztrák hagyományokkal ellenkező felfogása (dinasztikus expanzió, akár a konzervatív status quo politika) az európai liberalizmusból és a magyar nacionalizmusból táplálkozott. Az európai liberalizmus a Monarchiának a védőgát szerepét szánta a cári Oroszország terjeszkedésével szemben, a magyar nacionalizmus pedig ebből a defenzív funkciókból a soknemzetiségű Monarchia nemzeti összekovácsolásának lehetőségét származtatta.³

Magyarország azonban nemcsak abban járt élen, hogy társországával közösen megteremtse a szabad kereskedés feltételeit a polgárai számára, hanem maga az állam is vállalkozóként, exportőrként lépett fel egy olyan termékkel, amelynek az eladási jövedelmei egyenesen a kincstárat gazdagították, tehát állandó költségvetési tényezőként szerepelt. Ez a termék a só volt. A pénzügyminisztérium kezdeményezése nyomán, a kiegyezést követő évben, törvényben szabályozták a sókivitel feltételeit.⁴ Az osztrák kormánnyal egyetértésben a magyar kormány közvetlenül nem vett részt a szállításban és forgalmazásban, hanem versenytárgyaláson döntötték el az exportört. Annak érdekében, hogy megakadályozzák a kivitt só visszacsempészését a határon, magasabb összegben állapították meg a beszerzési árat, mint a hazai piacra szánt, jövedék előtti sóét. Ugyanezért állították fel a raktárakat is a határszélen.⁵

Kitermelés, helyi piac és felesleg

Az osztrák magyar vámterületről exportált sónak a cél-országai kezdetben Bosznia és Hercegovina, valamint Szerbia voltak. Ezeknek az országoknak általajkincsei között nem szerepelt a só és tengerparttal sem rendelkeztek, hogy párologtatás útján a tengervízből kinyerhető lett volna. Piacsa szabad volt, mert az állami szuverenitás nem volt olyan mértékű, hogy egyedáruság megvalósítható lett volna. Ezen a piacon jelen volt korábbi időktől fogva a román, és újonnan teret hódított a német só. A román só hasonló tulajdonságokat mutatott, mint a magyar, mivel mindkét helyen a szilárd

³ DIÓSZEGI István: *Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia külpolitikája 1867-1918*, Vince Kiadó, Budapest 2001. (DIÓSZEGI) 60.

⁴ 1868. évi XI. törvénycikk.

⁵ B. PONGRÁTZ Emil - LUKÁCS Béla: *A Magyar Királyi Pénzügyminisztérium működése 1867-1871-ig*, Budapest 1873. 58.

formában előfordulót termelték ki. A Kárpátok mindkét oldalán rendkívüli tisztaságban fordult elő ez az ásvány, és Európában gyakorlatilag csak itt bányászták. Máshol, ahol szennyezett formában, vagy másodlagosan fordult elő, vízben oldották, majd párologtatták, vagy a vízből feltörő sós vizet párologtatása során nyerték. A magyarországi sóbányák Erdélyre és Máramarosra koncentráálódtak, a felvidéki Sóváron pedig a párologtatás eljárást alkalmazták. A sóbányák termelési kapacitása nagyban összefügg a szállítási költségeivel, illetve mekkorák a termék szállítási költségei. A termelési költséget azonban befolyásolták olyan véletlenszerű események is, aminek következményeként hosszabb-rövidebb időre használhatatlanná vált egy-egy bánya, vagy annak egy része. A Maros hajózható szakasza mellett fekvő Marosújváron termelt sónak a költségei már igen korán, tartósan alacsonyan tudtak maradni, ezért termelési kapacitása is eléggé dinamikusan fejlődött. A többi bányák esetében a szállítási költségek csak akkor csökkentek, amikor a vasút már elérhető közelségbe ért. Ennek következtében a só nagyobb távolságra is biztonságban eljutott, azaz a többszörös átrakással nem volt kitéve a lemorzsolódás okozta tömegcsökkenésnek. A vasút térhódításával és a szállítási költségek csökkenésével arányosan növekedett a sóbányák termelési kapacitása, termelési visszaeséseket általában a balesetek és az omlások okoztak.

<i>Éves termelési átlag (métermázsa)</i>		
Bánya	1871-1880	1881-1890
Désakna	61 741	143 043
Marosújvár	482 673	524 040
Parajd	47 853	40 380
Torda	46 657	22 086
Vízakna	27 920	33 097
Rónaszék	168 448	166 515
Sugatag	263 140	195 357
Szlatina	183 911	381 719
Sóvár	66 105	65 627
Összesen:	1 348 448	1 571 864

Forrás: Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv

A fogyasztás növekedését általában nagyobb mértékben nem befolyásolhatja a lakosság étkezési szokásainak a változása. Keleti Károly a magyarországi alapélelmiszer-fogyasztását becsülte meg a rendelkezésre álló statisztikák alapján. A sófogyasztásra vonatkozóan személyenként évi 7,16 kg átlagot állapított meg.⁶ Ez abszolút számban összesen 982.969 métermázsa, lakosság számára étkezési céllal értékesített sót jelentett az 1871-es évben. Az kitermelésből fennmaradt 528.279 métermázsa só értékesítésére a belső piacon az állattenyésztésben és kisebb mértékben, a vegyiparban nyílt lehetőség. Az államkincstár számára ez 14.293.683 forint jövedelmet hozott, ami a magyar költségvetés rendes bevételeinek 9,82%-át és az összes bevételeinek 6,28%-át jelentette. A kiadások terén a só a rendes kiadások 2,84%-át, míg az összes kiadások 1,73%-át tette ki az 1871-es évben. Mérleget vonva tehát

⁶ KELETI Károly: *Die ernährungs-statistik der bevölkerung Ungarns*, Athenaeum, Budapest 1887. 174.

megállapítható, hogy a sóértékesítés egy stabil és kiemelkedően fontos jövedelemforrást jelentett a kincstár számára. A belső piac azonban meglehetősen korlátozott volt, az eladásokat csak a lélekszám növekedés és az állatállomány gyarapítása befolyásolhatta számottevően. A termelési kapacitás- és az értékesítés növelése így csak egy úton vált elérhetővé, külső piacok szerzésével. A külföldön eladott só után a pénzügyminisztérium 465.517 forintot könyvelhetett el 1871-ben, amit a továbbiakban növelni igyekezett a számára gyakorlatilag egyetlen potenciális külső piacon, a balkánin való részesedésnöveléssel, amely igyekezetben igénybe vette a közös külügyet is.

A célba vett felvevőpiacok közül mindegyik jóval kisebb méretű volt, mint a magyar és mindenhol szembe kellett nézni a főleg román konkurenciával. A társország piacán a magyar sónak nem volt kizárólagossága. Itt jórészt az Adriai tengerből nyert sóval látták el a piacot, de importáltak Trieszten keresztül az

<i>Sópiacok</i>			
ország	lakosság	állatállomány	
		szarvasmarha	juh és kecske
Magyarország (1870)	13.561.245	4.599.946	14.748.940
Románia (1884/1873)	5.290.000	1.455.800	4.800.000
Szerbia (1880)	1.700.822	900.000	3.400.000
Bulgária és Kelet Rumélia (1883)	2.828.000	478.500	6.984.400

Forrás: *Magyar Statisztikai Közlemények*; Keleti Károly: *A Balkán-félsziget némely országai- és tartományainak közgazdasági viszonyai*. Budapest, 1885.

olaszoktól és a Német birodalomból is. Ugyanez volt érvényes Horvát-Szlavónországra is, ahol a tengeri só származási helyei *Pirano*, *Trieszt*, *Capo d'Istria* *Obravazzo* és *Scardona* voltak. Magyarországra is szállítottak import tengeri sót, ám ez inkább tranzitforgalomnak tekinthető, ugyanis magyar közvetítéssel jelentős mennyiségben áramlott Szerbia felé.⁷ A magyar export sót a máramarosi Rónaszék, Sugatag és Szlatina bányákban termelték ki, valamint az erdélyi Marosújváron. A korábbi évszadokban is van rá példa, hogy az említett bányákból származó sót a Maroson és a Tiszán Szegedig leúsztatva, ott a Török birodalom felé értékesítették alkalmoszerűen.⁸

A két társország különböző irányú orientációt tanúsított a saját sóértékesítési stratégiájában, ami az egymástól független indirekt adózási rendszerükből eredt. Míg monetáris oldalról teljes volt az integráció, a fiskális rendszer harmonizációja nem valósult meg. A sóexport növelése a magyar kormány önálló kezdeményezésének tekinthető, a költségvetés számára új bevételek szerzésének a céljával. Ennek ellenére a következő évtizedekben az

⁷ TELKES Simon: *Magyarország mezőgazdasági nyersterméneinek és néhány főbb mezőgazdasági iparkészítményeinek behozatala és kivitele*. Budapest, 1884. 299.

⁸ BELLON Tibor: *Áruszállítás az Alföld folyóin*, IN.: *Számadó. Tanulmányok Paládi-Kovács Attila tiszteletére*, MTA Néprajzi Kutatóintézete, Budapest 2001. 275-276.

állami monopóliumok vesztettek relatív fontosságukból az éves költségvetésekben.⁹

Alkudozások és export

A magyarországi kincstári só exportjára kiírt első versenytárgyalást 1864-ben a bécsi Credit Anstalt Bank nyerte öt éves időtartalomra.¹⁰ Az üzletet lebonyolító pesti fiók nem egy kész piacot vett át, hanem maga alakította ki a struktúrát, és a legjövődélőbb magyarországi üzletágának bizonyult.¹¹

1872-ben a korábbi exportörrel szerződéses viszonyban álló Magyar Általános Hitelbank nyerte a versenytárgyalást és kötött szerződést a Magyar Államkincstárral, hogy 1873-1877 között évi 300.000 mázsa¹² sót vesz át meghatározott áron (1,50 forint/mázsa) és exportál a Balkánra. Rövidesen azonban kiderült, hogy a balkáni sószállítás nem megy minden akadály nélkül, mert az előző sószállító vállalkozás 280.000 mázsányi eladatlan sókészletet hagyott a raktárakban, amit a Hitelbank kénytelen volt átvenni. A román só tehát igen erős konkurenciának bizonyult: 1873-ban, Szerbiában osztrák-magyar vámterületről 7.784.325 oka¹³ sót értékesítettek, míg Romániából érkezőt, 10.477.561 okát.¹⁴ A magyar pénzügyminisztérium ennek ellenére növelni akarta a kivitelt és a külügyminisztérium bevonásával egy ankétot bonyolított le a román és bolgár területeken lévő diplomáciai képviselőknél. A konzultáció célja az volt, hogy a Balkán keleti részére milyen feltételekkel és várható nyereséggel lehetne kincstári sót szállítani. A külügyminisztériumból 1875 augusztusában érkezett válasz a forgalomban lévő román só előállításai és szállítási költségeiről nem ígerte a várt lehetőséget, s ezért a piacbővítés elmaradt.¹⁵ Ehhez a döntéshez kétségtelenül hozzájárult az is, hogy a Balkánon háborús helyzet alakult ki. A Hitelbank igazgatósága a boszniai ügynökeik táviratai nyomán jelezték a pénzügyminisztériumnak, hogy a zavaros déli tartományokba a szállítást beszüntették, és kérték a külügyminisztérium segítségét a raktárak biztosítására.¹⁶ Ugyanebben az évben a Hitelbank már azzal a kéréssel fordult a pénzügyminisztériumhoz, hogy a szerződésben megállapított, az 1876-os évre esedékes mennyiség átvétele alól mentsek fel,

⁹ SCOTT M. Eddie: *A pénzügyi függetlenség korlátai a vámunio szuverén államaiban: az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia mint „adóunió” 1869 és 1911 között*, Aetas, 2004. 1. sz. 208.

¹⁰ *Geschäfts-Bericht des verwaltungs-rathes der k. k. priv. österreichischen Credit-Anstalt für Handel und Gewerbe* (Geschäfts-Bericht) für das Jahr 1864. Wien. 1865. 7.

¹¹ *Geschäfts-Bericht*. 1869.10.; 1870. 7.

¹² A szerződésben *vámmázsa* szerepel. 1 Vámmázsa=50 kg

¹³ *Oka [okka]*: a balkáni országokban használt régi török mértékegység. 1 Oka=1282 gramm

¹⁴ Magyar Országos Levéltár, (MOL) K. 255. (Pénzügyminisztérium, elnöki iratok). 120. cs. (8. tétel, 1875.) 491.

¹⁵ MOL K. 255. 119. cs. (6. tétel, 1875.) 166.

¹⁶ MOL K. 255. 120. cs. (8. tétel, 1875.) 370.

mert a boszniai és hercegovinai felkelés miatt képtelenek értékesíteni azt.¹⁷ A pénzügyminiszter bizottságot hozott létre az eset kivizsgálására és a minisztertanács előtt az átvételi kötelezettségtől való eltekintést javasolta, nem kimondottan méltányossági okokból, hanem azért, hogy a Hitelbank nehogy a belföldi piacot árassza el a raktáron lévő készleteivel.¹⁸ A magyar minisztertanács ezzel szemben azt ajánlotta a pénzügyminiszternek, hogy hosszabbítsák meg a bankkal kötött szerződést azzal az időintervallummal, amennyi kiesett a harci cselekmények miatt. A pénzügyminisztérium végül azt az ajánlatot terjesztette a Hitelbank igazgatósága elé, hogy kizárólag a zavargások miatt nem értékesíthető mennyiségnek az átvétele alól ad felmentést, és javasolta a bank az utolsó szerződéses évének kitolását 1878. április 30-ig és mérsékelt áron kisebb mennyiség (225.000 m. mázsa) értékesítését.¹⁹ A minisztertanács pedig egyetértett a pénzügyi tárca vezetőjével, hogy azért kell akár olcsóbban szállítani, mert *„Magyarország pénzügyi s gazdasági érdeke kívánja, hogy a Törökországi sópiacot megtartsa, minden valószínűség szerint pedig azt elveszteni, ha a magyar hitelbankkal létező szerződési viszony megszüntetnék, mert a fennforgó viszonyok között jelenleg senki sem vállalkoznék ilyen sóüzletre”*.²⁰

A Magyar Általános Hitelbank raktárhálózata

A balkáni sópiac megtartásának az elve az orosz-török háborút követően is előkelő helyet foglalt el a magyar kormány gazdaságpolitikájában. A háborút lezáró San Stefano-i békét revideáló berlini kongresszus megkezdése előtt a külügyminisztérium azzal a kéréssel fordult a magyar kormányhoz, hogy az nevezze meg az általa követendőnek ítélt szempontokat. A magyar kormány a dunai hajózás és a vasúti csatlakozások biztosítása mellett azt tartotta célszerűnek, hogy a Monarchia az újonnan megalakuló államokkal ne kössön kereskedelmi és vámszerződéseket, hanem a Török Birodalommal meglévő tartsa életben, az abban biztosított kereskedelmi előnyök maradjanak meg. Ezek az előnyök *„különösen a dohány és só kivitelre nézve a török birodalom területén lévő tartományokkal szemben továbbra is fenntartassanak s lehetőleg tovább terjesztessenek s illetőleg biztosítsanak”*.²¹

A berlini kongresszus nemcsak a politikai kapcsolatokat rendezte újjá, hanem a gazdasági életben is alapvető változásokat hozott, gyakorlatilag újraosztotta a balkáni piacot. Magyarország, ha a tárgyalások előtt nem is szándékozott tárgyalni a kereskedelmi kapcsolatokról, rövidesen be kellett látnia ezek szükségességét, ami a következő években az egész Monarchia

¹⁷ MOL K. 255. 138. cs. (8. tétel, 1876.) 561.

¹⁸ MOL K. 27 (Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvek). 1876. 07. 25./ 11. napirendi pont.

¹⁹ MOL K. 255. 138. cs. (8. tétel, 1876.) 570-573.

²⁰ MOL K. 27. 1876. 11. 02./ 4. napirendi pont.

²¹ MOL K. 27. 1878. 03. 25./ 1. napirendi pont.

kiemelt célkitűzése lett. A kongresszus nyomán bekövetkező megszállás Boszniában és Hercegovinában azonban közvetlen hatással volt a sószállításokra is.

A magyar pénzügyminisztériumban, 1878 júliusában, még mielőtt Bosznia és Hercegovina státusára vonatkozóan és a közös vámterületre való felvételére törvényes keret létrejött volna, már megfogalmazódott az az igény, hogy ott kizárólag magyarországi só kerüljön fogyasztásra, kizárva így a román konkurenciát.²² A magyar kormány kezdetben komoly fenntartásokkal viseltetett a megszállt tartományoknak a közös vámterületbe bevonásával kapcsolatban, a kérdést 1879 tavaszán napirendre tűző osztrák-magyar közös értekezleten hangot is adtak ennek.²³ A Bosznia és Hercegovina helyzetét rendező törvénytervezet előkészítése a kiegyezési okmány szellemiségében zajlott le, ami előírta, hogy a fogyasztási adókról határozat csak a két társország egyetértésével történhet.²⁴ Ekkor már kész tény volt, hogy a só- és dohányárusítás osztrák-magyar regálévá vált. 1878 őszén az osztrák és a magyar pénzügyminisztériumok rövid úton eldöntötték ezt, csak az maradt kérdés, hogy mi legyen a sorsa a korábbi szállítónak, amelyiknek még három évre érvényes szerződése volt.²⁵ A vámterületről szóló közös értekezlet munkálatainak megkezdése előtt a román só szállító Kozmanovič fivérek vállalkozásának jogát megszüntették, és a továbbiakban megtiltották a román származású só importját.²⁶

1878-ban egy újabb balkáni piacnak a megszerzési lehetősége bontakozott ki. A vidini osztrák-magyar konzul a külügyminisztérium útján értesítette a magyar kincstárat, hogy Bulgária lecsökkentette a só vámját az okánkénti 30 piaszterről 7-re és felhívta a figyelmet, hogy a sókiviteli vállalkozó Magyar Általános Hitelbank szállítana oda.²⁷ Következő év elején pénzügyminiszter a közmunka és közlekedési miniszterhez fordult, hogy a Bulgáriába szánt sószállítványok részére kedvezményes szállítási tarifákat alkalmazzon az akkoriban sorozatosan bírált, Romániát tranzitáló orsovai vasútvonalon. A vasútert felelős miniszter válaszában visszautasította a kérést azzal az indokkal, hogy nem adhat a kincstár számára olyan kedvezményt, ami a nagyközönség számára nem volt biztosítva. A vasútvonal megválasztását sem találta célszerűnek „*mivel a körülmény alkalmat szolgáltatna a közönségnek s illetőleg a sajtónak azon heves kifakadások és szemrehányások ismétlésére, melyeknek a csatlakozás kérdésének kényszerült függőben tartása miatt már több ízben kitéve volt*”.²⁸ A vállalkozó bank ezúttal fokozott óvatosságról tett

²² MOL K. 255. 171. cs. (6. tétel, 1878.) 510.

²³ MOL K. 27. 1879. 04. 15./ 5. napirendi pont.

²⁴ MOL K. 27. 1879. 09. 22./ 6. napirendi pont.

²⁵ MOL K. 255. 172. cs. (6. tétel, 1878.) 170.

²⁶ MOL K. 255. 191. cs. (6. tétel, 1879.) 3.

²⁷ MOL K. 255. 172. cs. (6. tétel, 1878.) 545.

²⁸ MOL K. 255. 190. cs. (6. tétel, 1879.) 30.

tanúbizonyosságot és saját embereit küldte ki Bulgáriába és Romániába, hogy információkat szerezzenek a lehetőségekről.²⁹ A kilátások nem lehettek túlságosan kecsegtetőek és a néhány évvel korábbi tapasztalatoknak még hatása alatt lehetett a bank, mert a kelet-balkáni felvevőpiac méretéhez képest csak csekély mennyiség szállítására vállalkozott.

A Szerbiába történő sószállítás 1881-ben fordulóponthoz érkezett, amikor a szerb kormány a szerződések lejártával versenytárgyalást helyezett kilátásba. Magyar vállalkozónak itt is a Hitelbank jelentkezett, lévén érvényes szerződése a magyar kincstárral. A román só mellett a német konkurencia is számottevőnek bizonyult, mivel a Dunán a vízi szállítás Regensburgtól Belgrádig zökkenőmentes volt és a költségei is kedvezőek voltak nagyobb mennyiség esetén. A belgrádi konzulátus szerb kereskedőknél is informálódott a német só költségeiről, ami után az vált nyilvánvalóvá, hogy évi 100.000 mázsa fölötti mennyiségnél igen előnyös a helyzete.³⁰ A szerb sógyedárúság következő év elején jutatta el feltételeit a bécsi szerb követségen keresztül a Hitelbankhoz, amiben a korábbi megállapodás folytatását szándékozták elérni. A bank nem mutatott hajlandóságot a feltételek teljesítésére, és az újabb alapokon kezdődő tárgyalásoknál kérték a pénzügyminisztert, hogy ebben támogassa, érvként felhozva a kincstárral való közös érdekeket.³¹ A belgrádi diplomáciai képviselő bizalmas információknak a birtokába jutott egy szerb pénzügyminiszteri tisztviselő útján a készülő sógyedárúság sorsát eldöntő kormányhatározatról. A külügyminisztérium útján ezek az információk a Hitelbank tudomására is jutottak, azzal a céllal, hogy a versenytárgyalásra megfelelő ajánlatot tudjon tenni. Ezek szerint a megszokott román és német konkurens mellett megjelent a francia és a belga is. A tervek szerint a szerb kormány a kb. 260.000 mázsányi éves importszükségletének 50-60%-át román, 25-30%-át magyar, míg a maradék mennyiséget német vagy tengeri sóval kívánta fedezni. Regálédíjnak egy fix összeget, 800.000 frankot határoztak meg, és kilátásba helyezték, hogy a szállítókat raktárak fenntartására kötelezik Radujevac, Gradiste Semendria nevű településeken és a fővárosban.³² A Hitelbank nem mutatott hajlandóságot arra, hogy részt vegyen a szerbiai sószállításban és ezzel gyakorlatilag kivonult a Balkánról. Helyét az Angol-Osztrák Bank vette át, és a magyar só szállítására, a szerb kormánnyal ez a pénzügyintézet kötött szerződést, 1882 októberében.³³ A német részvétel a szerbiai sószállítások már korábban egy igen komoly jövedéki kérdéseket vetett fel Magyarországon. A német kormány tranzitengedélyi kérelmét a magyar kormány bizonyos feltételekhez kötötte.³⁴ A magyar pénzügyi szervek ugyanis felfigyeltek

²⁹ MOL K. 255. 190. cs. (6. tétel, 1879) 144.

³⁰ MOL K. 255. 233. cs. (6. tétel, 1881.) 173.

³¹ MOL K. 255. 233. cs. (6. tétel, 1881.) 120.

³² MOL K. 255. 233. cs. (6. tétel, 1881.) 410-422.

³³ MOL K. 255. 234. cs. (6. tétel, 1882.) 359.

³⁴ MOL K. 27. 1882. 02. 22./ 1. napirendi pont.

arra a jelenségre, hogy szokatlanul megnövekedett a német sóátviteli engedélyeknek a száma, és ahogy a pénzügyminiszter megfogalmazta: „*alig szenvedek tehát kétséget, hogy a kérdéses sóbevétel célja nem az, hogy a só Szerbiába kerüljön fogyasztás alá, hanem inkább az, hogy azt Szerbiából részben visszacsempésszék hozzánk, részben pedig becsempésszék Boszniába.*” Ennek ismeretében a külügyminisztérium felé azt a javaslatot tette, hogy a tranzitengedély megadása csak olyan feltételek mellett valósuljanak meg, amelyek minimalizálják a jövedékkiesést. Ezek a feltételek a következők voltak: 1.) *engedély minden szállításra a pénzügyminisztérium részéről;* 2.) *bemondás mellett meg lehessen mérni az átviteli küldeményt;* 3.) *a rövid tranzitidő érdekében a hajó ne álljon meg;* 4.) *átviteli engedély csak készpénz vagy biztosítékképes értékpapírok biztosítása mellett adható meg;* 5.) *a szállító mutasson fel igazolást a szerb vámhivataltól, hogy a só belépett, ezután kapja vissza biztosítékát (3 forint 18 krajcár/mázsa).³⁵* A külügyminisztérium a javaslattal egyetértett azzal a feltétellel, ha a tranzitengedélyt a társországok pénzügyminisztériumai közös egyetértéssel állítják ki.³⁶ A német kormány tiltakozása nyomán a magyar minisztertanács a következő formában fogadta el a javaslatot: 1.) *tranzitengedélyért ne minden szállításkor kelljen folyamodni;* 2.) *a hivatalos német zárjegyet elismerik a magyar pénzügyi szervek;* 3.) *a hajó késlekedésének okát igazolni kell a magyar pénzügyi szerveknél;* 4.) *kauciónak elfogadható kezesség is;* 5.) *a só bevitelét vámhivatali bizonyítványokkal igazolja.³⁷* A határvidéki sócsempészet veszélye reális lehetett, mivel a magyar pénzügyminisztérium szigorította az érvényben lévő, II. József által hozott rendelet hatályát, és a rendvédelmi szerveket felhatalmazták a szállítási eszközök lefoglalására.³⁸

Az Angol-Osztrák Bank sószállításai Szerbiába 1889-ig tartottak, mikor a sójüvedék újjászervezésével a szerb kormány a szerződését felbontotta. A magyar kormány ennek a piacnak a megtartásának nagy jelentőséget tulajdonított és a román kormánnyal is megpróbált egy kartellszerű egyezményt létrehozni a közösen alkalmazott egységes árak életbeléptetésének érdekében. A román kormány, mint látni fogjuk a következőkben, már komoly tapasztalatokat szerzett a magyar kincstár piacszerző stratégiájáról, és visszautasította ezt a lehetőséget. Újdonságnak számít, hogy a magyar kormány kizárta a közvetítőt és ezáltal közvetlenül a szerb kormánnyal szándékoztak tárgyalásokba bocsátkozni, amivel természetesen a pénzügyminisztériumot bízták meg. Komoly árkedvezményt helyeztek kilátásba arra az esetre, ha a szerb kormány kizárólagosságot biztosít a szállításban.³⁹ A

³⁵ MOL K. 255. 233. cs. (6. tétel, 1881.) 179.

³⁶ MOL K. 255. 233. cs. (6. tétel, 1881.) 193.

³⁷ MOL K. 27. 1882. 06. 07./ 3. napirendi pont.

³⁸ *Pénzügyi Közlöny*, 1881. 30. sz. 888.

³⁹ LAKOS Lajos (szerk.): *A Szapáry- és a Wekerle-kormány Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvei 1890. május 16.-1895. január 13.* Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 1999. (LAKOS), 1890. 04. 24./ 15. napirendi pont.

pénzügyminisztérium megbízottja Belgrádban a javaslatot meg is tette, a szerb kormány azonban a versenytárgyalás előtt nem akart tárgyalni és az a hír járta, hogy a román kormány jóval kedvezőbb feltételeket tett.⁴⁰ Úgy tűnik, hogy ezúttal a román félnek sikerült kiszorítani a magyar kincstárat egy balkáni nemzeti piacról.

A bolgár piacon való részesedésnövelés és a szállítások igen sajátos úton mentek végbe, ami az eddigieknél jobban kiélezte a Romániával való viszonyt. A magyar minisztertanács támogatta a pénzügyi tárca vezetőjének azt a javaslatát, hogy Bulgáriában kell növelni a piaci részesedést abban a pillanatban, mikor nyilvánvalóvá vált, hogy Szerbiában a várakozásokhoz képest kisebb szeletet kap a magyar só. Első lépésben csökkentették az eladási árat és megemelték azt a mennyiséget, amit a Hitelbank a szerződés szerint köteles volt exportálni.⁴¹ A külügyminisztérium útján 1883 tavaszán megindult az informálódás a kiviteli lehetőségekről, de a szófiai konzul a tárgyalások halasztását javasolta⁴² feltételezhetően a feszült politikai légkör miatt. Az őszi folyamán a bolgár kormány is jelezte, hogy hajlandó lenne a magyar só átvételére,⁴³ és időközben egy bolgár kereskedő konzorcium is jelentkezett sóvásárlásra.⁴⁴ Bulgária 1884-ben a román sóval szemben ukázt adott ki és a beviteli vámját 50%-kal megemelte. Ez annak volt a következménye, hogy Románia magasabb árat állapított meg a Bulgáriába szánt export sónak, a piaci részesedésének csökkenésére adott válaszként. Az eseményről a külügy tudósította a Magyar Általános Hitelbankot azzal a felhívással, hogy ez kedvező alkalom a piac bővítésére.⁴⁵ Az elkövetkezendő hónapokban a bolgár kormány részéről több ízben is kecsegtető ajánlatok fogalmazódtak meg az osztrák-magyar külügy felé.⁴⁶ Ezek az ajánlattételek összefüggtek Bulgária külpolitikai törekvéseivel, ugyanis erre az időpontra megromlott viszonyuk korábbi fő protektorukkal, Oroszországgal. Bulgária tisztában volt a Monarchia politikai és gazdasági törekvéseinek az összefonódásával a balkáni politikájában, ezért nyilvánvalóan ennek egyengetésére tette a gesztust. 1885 őszén ez be is bizonyosodott, amikor Bulgária Németországtól és a Monarchiától kért segítséget Oroszországgal szemben, amikor az Bulgária és Kelet Rumélia egyesítésének semmissé tételét tűzte ki célul.⁴⁷

A Magyar Általános Hitelbank ekkor nagy érdeklenséget tanúsított az újabb lehetőséggel kapcsolatban. Az, hogy a Szerbiában tevékenykedő Osztrák-Angol

⁴⁰ LAKOS: 1890. 05. 01./ 16. napirendi pont.

⁴¹ MOL K. 27. 1882. 06. 07./ 3. napirendi pont.

⁴² MOL K. 255. 244. cs. (6. tétel, 1883.) 271-272.

⁴³ MOL K. 255. 244. cs. (6. tétel, 1883.) 588.

⁴⁴ MOL K. 255. 244. cs. (6. tétel, 1883.) 273.

⁴⁵ MOL K. 255. 254. cs. (6. tétel, 1884.) 151.

⁴⁶ MOL K. 255. 255. cs. (6. tétel, 1884.) 96., 405. 276. cs. (6. tétel, 1886.) 142. 288. cs. (6. tétel, 1887.) 179.

⁴⁷ DIÓSZEGI: 86.

Bank mutatott-e érdeklődést a só szállítás iránt, nem lehet tudni. Ebben az időben éppen szerződésmódosítást próbált elérni a pénzügyminisztériumnál. A szállítás és átrakodások során ugyanis a só akkora tömeget veszített, hogy veszélyeztette a nyereségességet is. Feltételezhető ezért, hogy egy újabb szerződéskötést jobban megfontolt.⁴⁸

A magyar kormány igyekezete felháborodást váltott ki a román kormányban s a parlamentben is, amint arról a bukaresti diplomáciai testület beszámolt.⁴⁹ A feszültség akkor is nőtt, amikor a külügy tárgyalásokat kezdeményezett.⁵⁰ Részben a bolgár piacról való kizorulásnak köszönhető az a magatartás, amit a román tárgyaló fél tanúsított az osztrák-magyar - román kereskedelmi és vámegyezmény megújításának a tárgyalásain 1886-ban.⁵¹

A pénzügyminisztérium végül 1888 végén kötött szerződést a Bulgáriába sót szállító vállalkozással, tíz éves időtartamra.⁵² Ez esetben sem volt bonyodalommentes a sóexport szerződés megkötése és a szállítások lebonyolítása, ezáltal kisebb belpolitikai botrányt eredményezve. 1890 elején ugyanis a Képviselőház *összeférhetetlenségi bizottsága* vizsgálatot kezdeményezett Horváth Gyula képviselő ellen annak kiderítésére, hogy milyen szerepe volt a fent nevezett üzletben. Az ügyben megkeresett Wekerle Sándor pénzügyminiszter válaszában a nevezett személy szerepét a következőképpen összegezte: „*említett képviselő úr Bere D. bécsi czéggel a maga idejében, mint igen megbízható vállalkozót csakugyan ajánlotta, a kezdetleges tárgyalások alkalmával említett czéget*

Beviteli részesedés			
	Romániába	Szerbiába	Bulgáriába
Ausztria-Magyarország			
1881	49,10%	89,70%	25,60%
1911	24,10%	41,10%	24,20%
Németország			
1881	11,64%	-	0,48%
1911	32,25%	27,15%	19,98%
Anglia			
1881	18,54%	-	22,88%
1911	15,02%	8,25%	15,07%
Franciaország			
1881	8,36%	-	5,09%
1911	6,23%	4,98%	12,50%
Belgium			
1881	1,31%	-	-
1911	4,93%	1,80%	2,53%
Olaszország			
1881	0,69%	-	9,83%
1911	5,02%	4,21%	5,57%
Oroszország			
1881	2,06%	-	2,06%
1911	2,38%	2,94%	4,38%

Forrás: *Kereskedelmünk a Balkán-országokkal. A Balkán-statisztika tanulságai. A Magyar-Bosnyák és Keleti Gazdasági Központ kiadványai. Budapest, 1916.*

⁴⁸ MOL K. 255. 255. cs. (6. tétel, 1884.) 44.

⁴⁹ MOL K. 255. 255. cs. (6. tétel, 1884.) 162.

⁵⁰ MOL K. 255. 265. cs. (6. tétel, 1885.) 131.

⁵¹ Lásd. *Conférences pour la conclusion d'un traité de commerce entre la Roumanie et L'Autriche-Hongrie. Procès-verbal.* Imprimerie Charles Göbl. Bucharest 1886.

⁵² MOL K. 27. 1888. 12. 22./ 3. napirendi pont.

képviselte is, s közreműködött azon irányba, hogy ezen kiviteli üzlet létesítése lehetővé váljék, mivel is a magyar sójövődék említett képviselő úrnak csak is köszönettel tartozik, amennyiben ezen a sójövődékre nézve minden esetre előnyösnek mondható vállalat folytán a magyar só részére új piac szereztetett s a jövődék részére nem megvethető évi jövedelem biztosított. Mióta a Bulgáriába való sószállítás rendes kerékvágásba tereltetett, Bere D. czéget a Pénzügyminisztériummal szemben az anglo-osztrák bank képviseli, ez óta tehát Horváth Gyula mint Bere D. czég megbízottja már nem szerepelt, s arról hogy nevezett képviselő úr Bere D. czéggel áll-e még, és minő viszonyban nincs tudomásom.”⁵³

Magyarországon a képviselői összeférhetetlenséget törvény szabályozta, ami a képviselők függetlenségének, jellemzilárdságának és a ház erkölcsi hitelének igényével lett megalkotva.⁵⁴ Ennek a kivizsgálását az összeférhetetlenségi házbizottságra bízta, míg a döntés jogát a Ház részére tartotta fenn. Alapvető célja volt a képviselők függetlenségének biztosítása a kormánytól és közegeitől, távol tartásuk az egyéni haszonszerzést lehetővé tevő üzleti, hivatali élettől. Az 1875-ben hozott összeférhetlenségi törvény, bár elvileg kizárta a kormánnyal szerződéses viszonyba álló vállalkozókat a képviselőházból, elsősorban mégis a hivatali összeférhetetlenséget helyezte középpontba. Ennek eredete az addig kormányzó és fontos gazdasági pozíciókat megszerző Deák-párt és az addig ellenzéki, állami és közigazgatási posztok megszerzésében érdekelt, Tisza Kálmán vezette balközép pártfúziót megelőző kompromisszumában keresendő. Másfél évtizedig működött ilyen alapokon ez a törvény, azonban a '80-as években, Európában kibontakozott gazdaságpolitika nyomására a Szabadelvű Párton belül és a törvényhozásban az agráriusok igyekeztek visszaszorítani az ipari-kereskedelmi vállalkozói körök és a pénzügyi bürokrácia gazdasági és politikai befolyását, aminek alkotó része volt az összeférhetetlenség szigorítása.⁵⁵ A vizsgált képviselőnél összeférhetetlenséget végül nem állapított meg a bizottság és az ügy nem került a Ház elé, mivel a kincstár által is érintett üzleti tevékenységben már nem a mandátuma alatt részt, azonban az ügy ennek az agrárius-merkantil ellentét keretébe illeszkedik be.

A magyar-román rivalizálás kerete

Magyarország és Románia rivalizálása a balkáni sópiacon egy jóval szélesebb folyamatnak az indikátoraként értékelhető. Összehasonlítva a két ország termelését és belső piacát megállapíthatjuk, hogy amíg a magyar só számára a Monarchia egy hatalmas, szilárd piacot jelentett lakosságával és

⁵³ MOL K. 255. 327. cs. (6. tétel, 1890.), (6).1.

⁵⁴ 1875: I. törvénycikk.

⁵⁵ PÖLÖSKEI Ferenc: *A magyar parlamentarizmus a századfordulón*, História/MTA, Budapest 2001. 225-226.

kérdő állatállományával, addig Románia jóval szerényebb feltételekkel rendelkezett. Ebből kifolyólag a román só számára a balkáni piac ugyanolyan, vagy még nagyobb jelentőséggel bírt. A magyar pénzügy ragaszkodása a balkáni piacok folyamatos bővítéséhez akkor is, ha a szállítók többször elbizonytalanodtak, abból a szempontból érthető jelenség, hogy az állam ebben az esetben vállalkozó szerepet vállalt magára, mondhatni példával járt a Monarchia kereskedői előtt.

A két ország belső piacait vizsgálva megállapítható a hazai kitermelésű só szigorú védelme. Románia 1871-es kiviteli vámtarifájában a só minden fajtája vámmentes. Ebben az időben Románia számára a vám még nem a hazai termelés védelmében játszott főszerepet, hanem a kincstár direkt bevételi



Forrás: *Kimutatás a Magyar Korona területén lévő vámhivataloknál be-és kivitelben vámkezelt árukról.*

forrásának számított. Az exportcikkek túlnyomó többsége 1%-os értékvám alá esett és zömében csak azok kaptak mentességet, amelyek közvetlen kapcsolatban voltak a kincstárral.⁵⁶ Az 1876-os általános bevételi vámtarifában pedig fel sincs tüntetve,⁵⁷ míg az 1891-esben meg van jegyezve, hogy tilos az importja.⁵⁸ Az 1878-as osztrák-magyar vámterület általános tarifájában szerepel a só 100 kilogrammonkénti 84 krajcáros vámmal, azonban csak pénzügyminisztériumi külön engedélyhez volt kötve.⁵⁹ Az 1882-es általános

⁵⁶ *Tarifu pentru percepțiunea drepturilor de vamă la esportatiune și lista produselor aperate de plata acestor drepturi.* Imprimeria Statului Hotelului Șerban-Vodă, București 1871.

⁵⁷ *Lege generală a drepturilor de vamă promulgată la 16 martie 1876.* Imprimeria Statului Hotelului Șerban-Vodă, București 1876.

⁵⁸ *General Zolltarif für den Im- und Export Von Rumänien sammt dem Bericht der Zollkommission Giltig vom 10 Juli 1891.* Bucharest, 1891. XXV. Osztály, 551. tarifaszám.


⁵⁹ 1878: XXI törvénycikk. XVII osztály, 62. tarifacsoport.

vámtarifában ugyanígy tüntették fel.⁶⁰ Az 1875-ben az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia és Románia között létrejött kereskedelmi- és vámegezmény értelmében Románia vámmentesen szállíthatta be a sót a Monarchiába, külön pénzügyminiszteri engedéllyel, aminek következtében csak igen csekély mennyiségű só haladt át a magyar-román határon.⁶¹ A vámegezmény és a vasúti összeköttetések szabályozása optimizmusra adott okot, amint azt a magyar kormány felhívására készült tanulmány írója megfogalmazta: „A román kapcsolat kiépítése után nem lehetetlen, hogy a marosújvári, tordai és parajdi sónak Románia felé is megnyílik útja, s a külföldi eladásra szánt 350 000 mázsa lényegesen emelhető lesz a kincstár javára. Ez azonban teljesen a kormánytól függ.”⁶² Erre az áttörésre a későbbiekben nem került sor, és ez teljességgel nem a magyar kormány magatartásán múlt.

Románia nemcsak a jövedéki haszon miatt ragaszkodott a balkáni piacokhoz, hanem azért is, mert a román kereskedelem fontos közvetítő szerepet játszott főleg Bulgáriában és számára ez a teljes piacról való kiszorulást előre jelezte. Románia exportjának 68%-a Törökországba ment 1868-ban,⁶³ ez az arány rohamosan csökkent a berlini kongresszus után. Románia bár igen fiatal nemzetállam volt, a piac régi, hagyományos szereplőjének számított, míg a Monarchia újoncként jelent meg ezen a szintéren.

A Monarchia csak átmenetileg tudta átvenni a vezető pozíciót, mert fokozatosan csökkent a megszerzett előnye, majd a Romániával és Szerbiával vívott vámháborúk után jelentősen veszített piaci részesedéséből a térségben.

Összevetve Magyarország éves kiviteli mennyiségeit, szembevetve a csökkenés elsősorban a berlini kongresszus előtti időszakhoz viszonyítva. Igaz ugyan, hogy az ezután Boszniába szállított mennyiség már nem számított vámkülföldinek, ennek ellenére a tendencia negatív volt minden fentebb vázolt erőfeszítés ellenére. Ez az erőfeszítés egy-egy év adataiban mutatkozott meg, és ez a szaggatottság is mutatja az éles harcot a két exportőr ország között.



Forrás: Jezerniczky J.: *Az alsó-Duna, mint magyar piac.* Budapest, 1887.

⁶⁰ 1882: XVI. törvénycikk. XLIV. Osztály, 317. tarifacsoport.

⁶¹ 1876: XIX. törvénycikk. B.) tarifa.


⁶² GYÖRGY Endre: *Keletre magyar. Magyarország közgazdasági érdekei és teendői kelet felé.* Budapest 1877. 102.

⁶³ JEZERNICZKY J.: *Az alsó-Duna, mint magyar piac.* Budapest, 1887. 56.

1885-ben, amikor napirendre került az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia és Románia közötti kereskedelmi- és vámegezmény megújítása Románia ugyan nem rendelkezett nagyhatalmi potenciállal, de már szuverén királyság volt, vagyis nem vezérelte az a tíz évvel azelőtti igyekezet, hogy gazdasági engedményeket tegyenek diplomáciai előnyökért. Az egyezmény tárgyalásait lebonyolító és megkötését kivitelező román konzervatív párt, amelyik a nagybirtokosokat tömörítette akkor nagy előnyökhöz jutottak a gabona vámmentességével és a szarvasmarhák kedvező vámjaival. A német és francia agrárius törekvések nyomán azonban beszűkültek ezek a piacok a Monarchia számára, ami ellen a maga módján a kelet felé irányuló korlátozásokkal védekezett. A román nagyiparban érdekelt liberálisok már az egyezmény megkötésekor elégedetlenek voltak azzal, mivel iparosítási törekvéseiknek a feláldozását látva benne. Ehhez jött az állami pénzügyi bürokrácia Monarchia-ellenessége, amelyhez nem kis mértékben járulhattak a Balkánon szerzett tapasztalatok. Az egyezmény meg nem újítása ezeken a fennebb vázolt, sajátos érdekeken túl azzal is összefüggött, hogy Románia a külkereskedelmi deficitjét is igyekezett korrigálni.

Románia számára az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia addig a legfontosabb üzleti partnernek számított, ezért a teljes politikai paletta számára elfogadhatóvá vált az az érvelés, hogy a keletkezett deficitért – amit akár lehet az 1877-es orosz-török konfliktusban való részvételéből is eredeztetni – a tíz évvel korábban kötött egyezmény a felelős.

A Monarchia az 1886-1891 között lezajlott vámháború nyomán olyan mértékben teret vesztett a román piacon, amit a későbbiekben sem sikerült helyrehozni. Bár a bevitt áru mennyisége növekvőben volt a '90-es évek közepére, piaci részesedése nem közelítette meg az 1886 előtti, a visszaesése hasonlatos volt ahhoz a folyamathoz, ami Bulgáriában és Szerbiában játszódott le.



Forrás: Kereskedelmünk a Balkán-országokkal. A Balkán-statisztika tanulságai. A Magyar-Bosnyák és Keleti Gazdasági Központ kiadványai. Budapest, 1916.

László Nagy

The Ecclesiastical Policy of the Hungarists during the Second World War¹

The „culture” of hungarism - this is an idea contradictory, an absurd combination of two totally antagonistic word. The hungarism, the Hungarian version and practice of the National-socialism, is incompatible with whatever true culture. The idea of culture contains the worth, and if we take away this, we can call it anti-culture. The human is the most important manifestation of the worth, the unrepeatably individual person. If a regime refuses the human, it's a worthless regime. In the dictatorships the sovereignty and independence of the culture vanish: it becomes a „servant” of an impersonal, oppressor power, as propaganda culture strives to fill the requirements. This is the most important characteristic of the hungarist „culture”, too.

The three „columns” of the hungarism are the belief in the God, the nationalism and socialism. In the order the first place is the religion, „the moral base of the hungarism”, but that kind of religion, which symbol is Father Kun. A monk, who committed the biggest cruelties without any remorse. All these could follow, because the most important teaching of the Bible, the love was absent from the belief of the hungarists. The head of the Hungarian National-socialist movement, the hungarism, Ferenc Szálasi devoted long meditation for questions of the religion, refer to God and Jesus many times, but he has never mentioned the love. From the Bible he recognized only the New Testament and refused totally the Old Testament. He explained the New Testament in a particular aspect according to his total anti-Semitism, the a-Semitism: (the a-Semitism means the extermination of every Jews, this is the synonym of Endlösung): he didn't consider Jesus as a Jew, but a Partian. (He said that the Partian people correspond with the Sumerian and Hungarian people - it's absurdity in the reality.) Nowadays we can meet many times with this uncertified point of view. Szálasi made this idea public, under the influence of Ferenc Zajti's book „Jesus was a Jew?”. Zajti was an adventurer, totally insignificant painter (secondarily friend of Csontváry), who was uninformed in historical questions. (This book is often unloaded in stressed places of bookshops.) Szálasi in his Prison diary took over the point of view of Zajti as an axiom, in basement of dogmatism: Jézus was a Parthian prince and the Partian People is the Sumerian people's direct descendant (naturally he didn't take notice of Accads, Amorites, Assirs and the passed three thousand year) and direct ancestor of Hungarian people (passed one Thousand year).²

¹ This lecture was delivered in „From Emancipation to Remembrance - New Approaches to Research on Hungarian Jewry and the Holocaust in Hungary” International Conference at Holocaust Memorial Center, Budapest in 29 March 2007.

² SZÁLASI, Ferenc: *Börtönnapló 1938-1940* (Prison diary), Budapest Főváros Levéltára

The aim of Szálasi was to secure recognition for the chosen position of the Hungarian race in a basement propagandistic and to neglect the Jewish bases of Jewish-Christian culture. In the spirit of this he denied the historical significance of the Jews: the establishment of monotheism and the creation of the universal first ethical regulation: The Ten Commandments. He refused to recognize the Old Testament as the precedents of the Christian faith: „*The Old Testament is the wisest foolishness and the most foolish wisdom, which was written, believed. Christ has nothing, but nothing to with it.*”³ *The difference between the Christian faith and Jewish faith is just like between the true Monotheism and the primitive people’s monotheism, which rests upon their superstition. The Moses-faith may be everything, except religion. ... The Old Testament is the story and writing of God’s contempt towards the Jews. The Old Testament is the sanctioning of despise the God.*”⁴ Szálasi took over the a thousand years old anti-Semitic tradition, too: held the Jews responsible for the crucifixion of Christ (although Roman tribunal sentenced him to death on the basis of Roman law, with Roman manner of death). He refused to acknowledge of Jewish religion as a religion: „*The Jews aren’t a religion, but a race and that ethnic group of foreign race, which have never taken on community with the Hungarian fate, have never made not any sacrifices for the community and so couldn’t get right to live in this moral people’s community. Therefore the Hungarism proclaims not the anti-Semitism, but the a-Semitism (Endlösung).*”⁵

As private person Szálasi refused the Church: „*My soul is always ready the reception of Christ and his doctrines. I believe in the God with my soul and my intelligence. But for all these the Church isn’t necessary for me. So I can tell that privately. But I don’t tell in public. Because the masses are needed the Church.*”⁶ He gives such a reason: „*The Churches made the most negative doctrine from the most positive doctrine of the creation, doctrine of Christ. Death! Death! Death! They speak about this, they threaten with this! But the God and Christ are the Lords of the Life! The Life! The Life! The Life! There isn’t death. The priests should know it the best.*”⁷ He approached the faith from emotional bases, he refused all kinds of reasons: „*We can believe in God, we can’t believe in God, we can’t do with him only anything: explain his existence or his non-existence. We can’t explain 2x2, because it’s a fact and a law. Likewise there is an universe-law, this: there is the God, because we are in existence and it would be at that time, if we aren’t in existence. ... Discussions*

(Budapest Metropolitan Archive) and Filum, Budapest 1997. 109-110. SZÁLASI (1997).

³ Ibid. 114.

⁴ Ibid. 82-83. (30 January 1939)

⁵ *Út és cél* (Way and Aim), IN: SZÁLASI, Ferenc: *Hungarizmus* (The Hungarism) Gede Testvérek Bt. Budapest 2004. 108. SZÁLASI (2004).

⁶ SZIRMAI, Rezső: *Fasiszta lelkek* (Fascist Souls), Faust Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1946. 261.

⁷ SZÁLASI (1997): 87. (22 February 1939).

of faith! How ineffective! One of us says: I believe in $2 \times 2 = 4$ (two times two is/equals four)! The other says: I believe in $2 + 2 = 4!$ '⁸ „The biggest sin is the explaining of the God, because it's a silliness. And the biggest sin is the silliness.”⁹ The discussions of faith led to dogmatism: „It goes at completeness's expense, if we would like doing the completeness to more completeness. So this happened with the Churches, who dogmatized the doctrine of Christ: they made the absolute to relative.”¹⁰ „The dogma is the materialistic-historical precipitation of the system of ideas.”¹¹ „The religions fail, when really and exclusively move in the plain of materialism, set moral and spirit to serve the materialism.”¹² „This is the great problem with the priests, that they know the theology, but they haven't any faith. ... They hand theology on to the believers, not the faith.”¹³ „When the popes stated the dogma of infallibility, they cheated themselves the best.”¹⁴

Szálasi considered the most important mistake of Churches having an end in themselves: „Not any Church may be an end in itself, each are instruments.”¹⁵ This may lead their fall: „If certain Churches fall, only come true their well-deserved fate. And they deserve their fate, because they the divine revelation hangs heavy on their hands.”¹⁶

The outline of the hungarists's ecclesiastical policy became distinct in Szálasi's Aim and Claims and Way and aim. In the III. paragraph of the Aim and Claims Szálasi intend subordinate role for the Church in the prospective hungarist state: „We want and claim the totally apolitical religions, which must really educate for the moral national life, which proclaim the rights founded on fulfillment of the duties, which stop the political branches of every religion, which conclude new concordat and treaties of faith reckoned with the all of the interests of the state. We don't accept the undenominationalists, every citizen must be a member of one of the accepted or recognized Church.”¹⁷ In the Way and aim he refuses the secular power of the Church, the political Church: „The ambition for secular totality of the Church is based on sinful frail human misinterpretation of the Christ's order. ... Our movement won't stand the Church which is engaged in politics. The servants of the God don't engage in politics, so they can purely and entirely fulfill their holy function.” He promises his assistance the purely „religious Church”, who withdraws from the state:

⁸ Ibid. 84. (15 February 1939).

⁹ Ibid. 218. (11 June 1940).

¹⁰ Ibid. 144. (29 November 1939).

¹¹ Ibid. 257. (15 November 1940).

¹² Ibid. 244. (3 August 1940).

¹³ Ibid. 100. (2 May 1939).

¹⁴ Ibid. 148. (20 October 1939).

¹⁵ Ibid. 102. (13 May 1939).

¹⁶ Ibid. 209. (29 May 1940).

¹⁷ *Cél és követelések* (Aim and Claims) IN: SZÁLASI, Ferenc: *Hungarizmus* (Hungarism) *A cél* (The Aim), Gede Testvérek Bt. Budapest 2004. 92.

„Our movement never won't have any problem with the religious Church, moreover it will find the truest, the most faithful and the most powerful support by all means in us.” He assigns the duty of the clergy in the keeping alive of the nationalism: „The Hungarian priest must love the God, and through the God his nation, his fatherland, his race. He will be a Hungarian priest. As priest he can surpass the border of our country, but as a Hungarian he must live and he must die here. He will be priest and brother of every Hungarians and he leads his Hungarian brothers to God according to commandment of his faith. It won't be important for him that the Hungarian person is Catholic, Calvinist, Greek Catholic, Lutheran, Greek Orthodox or Unitarian. Our Hungarian National-socialist system creates Christian Hungarians and demands in return, the priest of the fatherland educate Christian Hungarians in the interest of sure establishment of our National-socialist moral life.”¹⁸

The hungarists's propaganda-literature demonstrated perfectly the deformed, bigoted piety of the National-socialism. Szálasi's court poetaster, Géza Alföldi's „art” (in quotes) symbolizes this spiteful faith. Alföldi got many position after the hungarist's take over -from 1944 October-1945 March-: Defence Under-Secretary, representative of the hungarist party and head of national-defense propaganda-department in the Propagandaministry, member of the board of directors in foundation of the film industry, member of the filmcensorship's Council of the Five. The hungarist newspapers published his poems with permanent steadiness, he often lectured on Hungarian-German friendly connections in the Radio. Alföldi was a fanatic hungarist, who was always voluntarily ready to sacrifice his human being in the altar of hungarism:

„My Lord, My Christ, forgive for me, because I can't fulfill your sacred order. I would like it, My Lord, vainly, I can't! I'm a human, and I have blood, flesh, ...I don't hate my fellow-man, / I help for him, I bless him, too, But to love, however I want, / I can't: if he isn't from my race!” (If he isn't from my race)¹⁹

The fundamental question of the National-socialist's ideology, the racial theory is one of the most important motive force of his poems. He make a correspondence between triad of race- blood- soul and the Holy Trinity his epigram „The race- blood- soul”:

„Race. Blood. Soul! Mysterious trinity. And they are same, as I see for same, becoming the God: the Holy Spirit, the Son and the Father.”²⁰

Alföldi compared his puppet-„Führer”, Szálasi to Jesus. The culmination of his Szálasi-cult is in his poems written in the emigration, which compares execution of Szálasi to the crucifixion. Otherwise the parallel of Szálasi - Jesus started from Szálasi himself, he considered himself as a divine delegate as Jesus and Buddha. The correspondence is the most unambiguous in the poem

¹⁸ *Út és cél* (Way and Aim), IN: SZÁLASI: (2004), *A cél* (The Aim), 113-114.

¹⁹ ALFÖLDI, Géza: *Jön a Feltámadás* (The Resurrection Is Coming), Edition of Dobszay, Dortmund 1986.14. (ALFÖLDI (1986).

²⁰ ALFÖLDI, Géza: *Végrendelet* (The Will), Gede Testvérek Bt. Budapest 2005. 590.

„So he died - about Christ”. The poem begins in the Roman age and writes the preparations of the crucifixion, then with a sudden change it closes with the hanging of Szálasi. He doesn't name the hungarist dictator, but it's evident from the description of the manner of death.²¹

He presents Szálasi's execution in such a way as a martyrdom. The „Christ before Pilate” describes Szálasi's firm faith in himself and in his idea under his imprisonment and his case:

„And I thank You, My Lord, You didn't implore,
You were Christ, better than before. And I see truly, You are the son of God,
When You stood before Pilate!”²²

The „Christ lives” is preach the eternity of the hungarism and his master. He sets up a characteristic trinity with defining three manifestation form of Christ (and Szálasi): the „soul of the Master”, the Holy Scripture (the ideological works) and the Idea (which he created with the ideology):

„My Lord, I sow your death.”... “because the soul isn't from this world,
and the Master's soul,
the Scripture and the Idea:
Christ lives.”²³

The other favourite poetaster of Szálasi was Ottó Géza, who wrote similar poems. He was an ironworker and he was interested in literature for hobby. He was a permanent performer of hungarist cultural programmes.²⁴ His poem „Talk with a tin-Christ” reveal everything about his human and artistic attitude. He is unwilling to recognize Jesus as a Jew, according to Zajti's and Szálasi's mentality, but if he had to recognize it in any case, he would refuse not only Jesus, but the God himself (the common Jewish-Christian God). With this he refuse his human essence, his humanity. The poem is founded on the hate, we don't even find the bud of the Christian love in it:

„Look at me and look at the Jews:
I don't have double mouth and ears gaping,
And I don't talk with a twang.”
„Other people suffered innocently
from their tower-multitude of sins.”
„But if you regard as your son
this villain, who are dispersed on the Earth
You can beat me as a punishment,
I don't stop to talk with You...”²⁵

²¹ ALFÖLDI (1986): 15.

²² Ibid. 28.-29.

²³ ALFÖLDI, Géza: *Áldás! Béke! Húgomasszony!* (Blessing! Peace! My sister-woman!), Hortobágy, Schloss Teising, 1958.79.

²⁴ HEGEDŰS, János: *Népi írók, népi költők* (Peasant Writers, Peasant Poets), Kókai Lajos Bizománya, Budapest 1944. 47.

²⁵ *Harc* (The Fight), 4 November 1944. 3.

The most brutal hungarist ecclesiastical person was a minorite monk, Father Kun (his original name was András Kun). He committed numberless outrages: he carried off and shot to the Danube a lot of Jews, he beat his victims with a whip and burgled them,²⁶ he raped women with red-hot truncheon²⁷ and he led the massacre of 94 sick person of the Maros street's hospital in 12 January 1945²⁸. In spite of his crimes his conscience was undisturbed and for that question and argued in this manner: „*Before I die, I confess. If I confess I will be absolved. If I will be absolved, my business will be fine, when I get before Our Lord.*”²⁹ (He was sentenced to death and he was hanged in 1946.³⁰) Father Kun was the secretary-general of the Society of Composers under the hungarist regime.³¹ We don't know what musical work was pursued by Kun, probably he was totally insignificant, because he wasn't in possession of no kind of musical grounding. He didn't compose not even hungarist marches and provincial operettas. In spite of this fact he reached a high position in the musical life.

The hungarist ideology and government didn't deal with other denomination except the Roman Catholic and the Jewish religion. Although there were only 55% (8.073.234) Roman Catholic and 4,9% Israelite (725.007) of the population of Hungary (14.683.323 person) according to the data from 1942. The rest (30,1%) were Calvinist (19% - 2.789.276), Greek Catholic (11,6% - 1.700.146), Lutheran (5% - 729.929), Greek Orthodox (3,8% - 560.954), Unitarian (0,4% - 57.999), Baptist (0,2% - 36.802) or other (0,1% - 9976). There were 63,1% (734.914) Roman Catholic and 15,8%-a (184.453) Israelite of the population of Budapest, the rest (21,1%) were Calvinist (13,5% - 158.325), Lutheran (5,7% - 61.817), Greek Orthodox (0,4% - 4.455), Unitarian (0,3% - 3141), Baptist (0,1% - 1062) or other (0,1% - 2174).³²

The Hungarian Roman Catholic Church apparently refused the hungarists. The head of the Hungarian Catholic Church, Jusztinián Serédi Archbishop of Esztergom was informed of the hungarist's takeover in 15-16 October 1944 from the radio, just like the hungarist measures few days later, which set limits to the Church. He stated subsequently in his memorandum that he was indignant at drafts of the cancellation of the renamed Jews's marriage, the nationalize and confiscation of property of the ecclesiastical schools, which would cover „*the credit of the national-education*”. These was published in the

²⁶ SZIRMAI, Rezső: *Fasiszta lelkek* (Fascist Souls), Faust Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1946. 195. (SZIRMAI (1946).

²⁷ Ibid. 196.

²⁸ VINCELLÉR, Béla: *Szálasi hat hónapja* (Six Months of Szálasi), Volos Kiadó, Budapest 1996. 103-104. VINCELLÉR (1996).

²⁹ SZIRMAI (1946): 200.

³⁰ Ibid. 298.

³¹ VINCELLÉR (1996): 102.

³² Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv 1942 (Hungarian Statistical Yearbook), Magyar Kir. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest 1944. 18-19.

first plan of the „*Countrybuilding*”. The sovereignty ecclesiastical was injured, too, when in the capital the nuns were sworn in Szálasi and the hungarism beside the secular institutions (ministries, offices): „*In the question of the oath my vicary of Budapest couldn't apply to me: he gave permission for swear to several hundreds of nuns on the basis of the oral declaration of the legate.*” The legate apostolical was Angelo Rotta, who opposed the National-socialist power and participated in live-saving actions of the Jews later. For the news about reorganization of the Upper House Serédi forbade his prelates to participate actively in the group, which would enforce party politics, he turned himself a deaf ear to take part in the National Union of Legislatives: „*Lajos Szász and others immediately started to found political organization named "National Union", which aided Szálasi. I got organizing letter from Lajos Szász, too, but I didn't answered for it. In the Upper House supreme prince József would recruit me. For me the prince didn't dare to write. I told to my bishops and priests, who are member of the Upper House, that the Upper House always bypassed to form such political groups, and the canons of No. 139 and No. 142 definitely forbid to the participation of the bishops. This is why we can't join the Union. P. István Zadravec titular bishop joined, he was chosen for vice-president! Canon Subik, Kolozsváry highprepost of Vác, count György Mailáth, the president of Holy Crown Society, too!*” All Serédi could achieve that he protested against the first plan of the „*Countrybuilding*” with József Stolpa under-secretary of the Ministry of Education, who visited him in Esztergom. So the nationalizing of the ecclesiastical schools was left out from the revision of the „*Countrybuilding*” in 22 October 1944. In 24 October Szálasi visited the archbishop in Esztergom in the company of Jenő Szöllösi Vice-president, Ferenc Rajniss Minister of Education, captain Ernő Gömbös, aide-de-camp of Szálasi (son of Gyula Gömbös) and Béla Tarján, bodyguard of Szálasi (former boxer who was in prison with Szálasi in the Csillag-prison of Szeged). Szálasi gave the following impression for Serédi: „*I don't doubt his catholic character and good intention, because I saw from our conversation, he is a believer, who lives in the hungarist, National-socialist sphere of thought so much that he can't understand and accept beyond that nothing, even it's backed up with clear arguments. He answers with great orations for the objections, so repeatedly I had to ask him: yes or no?*” The central topic of the discussion was the legitimacy of Szálasi's power. Serédi regarded illegal the appointment of Szálasi according to his memorandum: „*Szálasi took over de facto the power of the regent, but according to our constitution, namely de jure it's illegal.*” Only his appointment as Prime Minister would be legal, but only in that case, if Horthy had resigned of his own free will. Serédi was doubtful about the authenticity of resigning-letter of Horthy, because it isn't a holographic, but a typed letter, which is addressed to the two house of the parliament and there isn't the countersignature of Prime Minister on it. Although Szálasi said to him, Géza Lakatos signed the document, but he made

sure personally of this lie in 27 October, in the first session of the Countrycouncil. „*But the takeover of the supremacy is invalid, because the regent hasn't the right to transference it according to 1920:I. Act and 1937:XIX. Act. The power of the regent goes on not with transference or inheritance, but with election. During the vacancy the Countrycouncil and the parliament practice the supremacy.*” Szálasi's measures, for example the appointments of the ministers, were inoperative for lack of legal head of state. The other thorny question of the talk was the cancellation of mixed-marriages, which Serédi estimated as „*breaking up the sanctity of marriage*”. He would have solved this question less radical than Szálasi, but there can be no doubt about he was anti-Semitic: he wished to force back the Jews in a legal way, but without their deprivation of civil right. He argued against the confiscation of Jewish property with the order of Ten Commenandments: mustn't misappropriate the other's property. On this Szálasi named the archbishop Jewish-henchman: „*I always took sides against the Jewish Acts, because I observed that it means our nation's destruction if that false principle gets into our collection of laws that a Hungarian can't assimilate a foreign-raced, who hasn't got two Hungarian grandparents. And in spite of the fact we assimilated the Petchenegs, the Cumanians, the Armenians, many Slavonics, Germans etc., we would adopt it the native Germans, Romanians, Slavonics etc. besides the Jews, Hungarians hardly remains here, our domination will be finished, our reason for the existence will be attacked, even the greatest part of the hungarists, including Szálasi, wouldn't be Hungarian. Szálasi listened it with dread. He has never thought on this.*” Serédi pressed for liberate the arrested members of parliament. He achieved that few days later dean Király, Gyula Kornis, József Pálffy and István Antal (who offered his services for the hungarists) were set free. Ferenc Rajniss, who was present in the meeting, promised the archbishop, while he will be the Minister of Education, the schools won't be nationalized.

According to Serédi his connection with the hungarists worsened on the Countrycouncil in 17 October 1944. Serédi called the House of Common's and Upper House's president's and Minister of Defence Károly Beregfi's attention that the present Szálasi and Beregfy weren't members of the Countrycouncil and their appointments were invalid. In spite of this, „*they only shrugged their shoulders and hummed*” and the president of Upper House, baron Zsigmond Perényi declared the session open and presented the regent's letter. Then Serédi made a speech: he told the regent's resignation was invalid, because it was happaned for influence of pressing, but nobody agreed with him in the defence of constitution. He proposed for the Countrycouncil to suggest for the parliament, which assembles in 3 November that they elect not a regent, but a provisional countryleader (stateleader, nationleader) by secret election, not by acclamation: „*The nominee mustn't be member of any political party, if he is, he must resign from his party. The elected person get from the regent's sphere of authority as much as it's necessary without fail for the continuation of the state's life.*” He underlined the

provisional character of the head of state: „*the parliament doesn't represent the whole nation any more*” (the representatives were arrested -Szálasi liberated only those who were arrested after 15 October-, or they were called up or they resided in liberated areas. Then, in spite of the items on the agenda, which were fixed in the invitation of Countrycouncil- Szálasi took his Prime Minister's oath (the president of House of Common, András Tasnádi Nagy swore him), which was necessary, because the army was reluctant to swear on him. Serédi call the Countrycouncil's attention again, only legal Prime Minister could take the oath: „*I feel ashamed, that under the session only I -myself- fight for defense of our constitution and our law. The others were silent.*” - he wrote in his memorandum. He blame the politician's indifference for Bethlen's and Gömbös's sins, who „*educated the leader of the nation for total servility.*”

Serédi was present in the second session of Countrycouncil, in 2 November, when the ministers swear on Szálasi. In this case he called Perényi's attention for the invalidity of the taking of the oaths, too. Perényi gave a short answer: „*we can't do anything, because the ministers are assembled, they are here and they enter immediately.*” He asked the minutes of the first session, but he got that answer, only the two house-president got the minutes. In the minutes Serédi's speech wasn't in entirety, the criticism concerning the legality of the hungarist power was cancelled in it. In this session Szálasi's proposal for the 1944:X.Act (establishing the position of nationleader as the head of state) came up. Serédi rose to speak, „*that couldn't be accepted by a Catholic and a Hungarian*”. Then he didn't go to the next session of Upper House that day. He didn't attended the passing of the nationleader's law, but in the House of Cammons Közi-Horváth, a priest-representative, made a speech, in which he scourged the illegalities. The press totally kept back the speech. For nationleader's taking the oath the delegations of the House of Commons and the Upper House together invited Szálasi. P. István Zadravec was the member of the Upper House's delegation.³³

Serédi wrote a letter against the deprivation of civil right of Jews in 25 November in Esztergom. He protested against the collective guilt. He felt aggrieved at that Jews, who were in Christian religion (only for them!), -ill persons, women, children, too- were driven on foot for more hundred kilometers long way in winter, and beside the road collapsed persons and dead bodies lay. Serédi held it for an unjust punishment and requested Szálasi to replace the Jews in their original rights.³⁴ The archbishop refused the regulation of sermons by the „*Government Commission of Mobilization*”.³⁵

³³ *Nagybányai vitéz Horthy Miklós kormányzó lemondása és a lemondás következményei* (Governor Miklós Horthy's Resignation and the Consequences of the Resignation) - IN: *Serédi Jusztinián hercegprímás feljegyzései* (Memoranda of Primate Jusztinián Serédi) 1941-1944, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest 1990. 110-129.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 175-177. *Serédi Jusztinián hercegprímás levele Szálasi Ferencnek* (Primate Jusztinián Serédi's Letter to Ferenc Szálasi), Esztergom, 25 November 1944.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 51. *Orbán Sándor és Vida István bevezető tanulmánya* (Opening Lecture of Sándor Orbán and István Vida).

Serédi presented himself in his memorandum in such a way as to the utmost fighter against the dictatorship. Naturally he wrote his memorandum when the Red Army surrounded Esztergom and it was important for himself, he wouldn't be considered as a collaborator. As his speech against Szálasi wasn't been taken in the minutes, presumably, he didn't protested against the National-socialist puppet-state. This interpretation is supported with the fact, that he ordered for the teachers and the schoolmasters of the ecclesiastical schools, so teaching part (this is the biggest part of the Church) of the Church to swear on the hungarism in the end of November 1944. With this oath these priests automatically became members of the hungarian National-socialist's Hungarist party and got certificate from the party. The archbishop ordered in connection with the prime minister's decree No. 4070/1944 regarding the oath of public employees published in November 18 in Budapesti Közlöny (Gazette of Budapest), that the headmasters and the teachers of the ecclesiastical schools must swear by Szálasi, within 8 days if they didn't do it after 15 October. From the oath a certificate was made out and sent to the government commissioner of personal affairs, the ill-famed Csaba Gál. The newspapers Magyarország (Hungarians) and Dunántúli Hírlap (Transdanubian Newspapers) covered Serédi's measure in 24 and 25 of November.³⁶

After the thorough treatment of the Hungarian Catholic Church's official newspaper, the Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review) it's proved that the Catholic Church was a mouthpiece of Szálasi's ideas and an important instrument of hungarist propaganda campaign long before the hungarist takeover. The National-socialist „science”, the race-biology is one of the central question of Katolikus Szemle. There are many studies and articles which deal with the superiority of the Hungarian and the Arian peoples and the breeding of pure Hungarian type. The writing of Zoltán Szabó entitled The individual and the race - The racialism and the selective breeding was distributed as offprint, too. Szabó withdrew the reason for the existence of „the inferior races” according to the social Darwinism's viewpoint: „*The human's racial questions couldn't be picked out from under the generally effective principles of living world.... The defense of allogamical races culminates in that the average racial genotype of race-compound is secured in such a manner, that biotypes containing additional genes or originating from other race don't be got into the race. ... First of all it's important that those persons could propagate exclusively, who represent the race's inherited qualities of comparatively more noble-minded and higher value. That fallen persons affected with a hereditary decease must be exclude from the possibility of reproduction. The racial character could be controlled artificially in the case of plants, animals and humans alike.*”³⁷ The Katolikus Szemle in its number of

³⁶ Magyarország (Hungarians), 24 November 1944. 2. and Dunántúli Hírlap (Transdanubian Newspapers), 25 November 1944. 2.

³⁷ SZABÓ, Zoltán: *Az egyén és a faj. A fajvédelem és fajnemesítés alapgondolatai.*

July 1938 aided stressed the proposal of obligatory medical examination before marriage, which was reported in Béla Imrédy's prime-ministerial introducing speech. The Catholic newspaper comment on this with the arguments of the ill-famed race-biologist, Lajos Méhely, who is regarded as a great authority on the science: „*The past master of anthropological researches, Lajos Méhely says the above as golden-words, which would be engraved on ore, so as not to be torpedoed, before it results. According to Méhely the obligatory medical examination before marriage could be taken of the Hungarian nation's rebirth for thousand years.*” Méhely considers the interbreeding of short-headed and long-headed races as „*a physiological blunder*”: „*The Hungarian (Ugrian) raced person wouldn't marriage with the northern and the Mediterranean races. Not even with a Jew, because this race originally contains two long-headed (Semitic and Negro) race-elements and only one short-headed (Hettite) race-element. And if the Jewish parent is short-headed, it's possible, that the progeny will be long-headed with Semitic and Negro characteristics*”. This article applauds enthusiastically Méhely's other race-biological drafts: the authorizations of marriages on the basis of blood groups and establishment of race-biological chairs in the universities.³⁸ The Catholic organ neglects the scientific facts concerning the Hungarian people's formation and composition. In January 1939 there is an appreciation of Gyula Barsy's article entitled „*Our magic melting power and the reality*” (it was published in *Kissebbségvédelem /Minority-defense/*) in the column of Hungarian problems (Press-review). The anonymous writer of the appreciation gives evidence of his National-socialist conviction: „*The deformed theory of melting power has an exceptional harmful influence, which has influenced disadvantageously the national and racial consciousness of Hungarians until now. ... So in the people we must see the blood's community, which involves more frequent occurrence of certain racial-types in the people and stronger and more ruling spreading of typical attributes determined by the racial character. That's true with regard to the Hungarians, too. Without doubt the loss of ancestral blood called forth the loss of our typical character, our ancestral Hungarian ethnic character, too. The extremists of melting-theory say this viewpoint, often in riddles*”. He states firmly, that „*the results of linguistic sham assimilation taken place in the cities deceived the representatives of melting power*”. He qualifies Kazinczy's nation-definition (The nation lives in his language) as a mistake with strong anti-Semitic overtones. According to him this approach forgets the people, the peasant strata: „*The enthusiastic standard-bearer of the Hungarian language*

Különlenyomat a Katolikus Szemle 1939.évi februári számából (The Individual and the Race. The Fundamental Ideas of Racialism and Race-Improving. Offprint from the Issue February 1939 of Catholic Review), Published by Zoltán Szabó, Budapest 1939. and Katolikus Szemle, February 1939. 86-92.

³⁸ *Magyar problémák (Sajtószemle) /Hungarian Problems (Press Review)/*, Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), July 1938. 440-441.

forgot the Hungarian people. Since then it was proved grievously that the nation lives in his people."³⁹ In January 1940 János Karl wrote an appreciation of Lajos Bartucz's book entitled „*The Hungarian*” in his article entitled „*The anthropological picture of Hungarians*”. Bartucz regarded the so-called Homo Pannonicus as the true Hungarian race, which lives in Csallóköz, Győr country, some parts of Zala and Somogy country and Middle-Tiszanian region.⁴⁰ The viewpoint of Hungarian Roman Catholic Church in Jewish-question is well-characterized by a review published in July 1939, which criticizes the French Catholic, supposedly leftist philosopher, Jacques Maritain, who urged acceptance and emancipation of the Jews. The journalist, who remains in anonymity again, presents the „*arguments*” of a teacher from Liege Marcel De Corte: „*The Jewish people has a hereditary disease with two original sins. (The Fall and crucifixion of Christ - L.N.) ... That belief that the Jews could be assimilated entirely, was shipwrecked. Therefore now, just like in the Middle Ages, the segregation of Jews is indispensable. The moral of the history the emancipation of Jews led to the domination of Jews over non Jews. They occupied every leading position of the living of host peoples. ... The Jew is the eternal danger for every people, where it settles down.*” He lists the usual anti-Semitic banalities: the Jews are „*selfish, pushy, extorter, schemer*”. Therefore the natural reaction of peoples „*strive to secrete of foreign body, that is why they couldn't be condemned as anti-Semite. The true Christians couldn't hate the Jews, but they are required to defend themselves, without hostilities, but without weakness, too*”.⁴¹

In columns of *Katolikus Szemle* the popularization of the hungarist party was published, too. The review written about József Közi-Horváth's book entitled „*The National-socialist movement in our country*” in March 1938 (which was a critical period for the hungarists, so this article is ambiguous, but rather it stands by National-socialism) greets this allegedly „*objective*” book, which „*sincerely obliges those interested in Hungarian public life. Don't forget nobody, the National-socialist movement is undeniably present in Hungary and if the causing reasons don't stop, it will be in the future. ... We can establish that the truths of National-socialism are dangerous, not its faults*”. Later, according to Serédi, Közi-Horváth protested against Szálasi's appointment as nationleader in 4 November 1944 in the House of Commons,

³⁹ *Magyar problémák (Sajtószemle) /Hungarian Problems (Press Review)/, - Varázslatos beolvasztó erőnk és a valóság. A Kisebbsévédelem című folyóiratban Barys Gyula cikke (Our Magic Assimilating Force and the Realty. Gyula Barys's Article in the Newspaper „Minority-Defence”), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), January 1939. 86-92.*

⁴⁰ KARL, János: *A magyarság embertani képe (BARTUCZ, Lajos: A magyar ember. /Egyetemi Nyomda/)* (The Anthropological Image of the Hungarian People (BARTUCZ, LAJOS: A Hungarian. /The University Press/), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), January 1940. 43-45.

⁴¹ *Maritain és a zsidókérdés (Maritain and the Jewish Question), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), July 1939. 383-384.*

but any document doesn't remain from it. The judgment of Közi-Horváth's historical role demands additional researches.⁴²

Not only the Hungarian National-socialists, but the Romanian anti-Semitic and anti-Hungarian National-socialist movement led by Codreanu, the Ironguard was greeted in this Catholic newspaper. The Ironguard committed brutal massacres against the Jewish and Hungarian population. This religious, chauvinistic party was regarded a political ally by Szálasi in the spirit of European National-socialist „*con-nationalism*” under German hegemony. Szálasi commemorated Codreanu's assassination, „*political execution*” with fraternal sympathy. He states the Jews are the scapegoats for Codreanu's death, as if „*the world-Jewry's supporting group*” had organized the assassination committed in prison. On the other hand Szálasi predicts cocksurely that the National-socialism will win in Romania, too.⁴³ In February 1938 the Katolikus Szemle praises the National-socialist István Juhász's study entitled „*Romanian nationalism with new meaning*”, which was published in Hitel (Credit) in Kolozsvár (Cluj). The Catholic newspaper publishes almost completely the writing, which considered as „*stressedly informant and objective*”. István Juhász greets the Romanian chauvinistic propaganda concentrating on the Greek Catholic Church, the newspaper „*Gandiera*” and the National-socialist Ironguard. The Orthodox Church laid claim to creation of a certain totalitarian dictatorship in the spirit of close feudal relationship between the state and the church: „*The Romanian public opinion considers the Orthodox Greek Catholic Church as a “Romanian Church”, which for this reason claims the supreme spiritual leadership of the state and the people. It was proclaimed by the Holy Synode in 10 March 1937, when it assembled for the calling of Minister of Education. ... The orthodox doctrina states that the Church must take care of that people's total life, amongst which it was sent by God. ... The Church must direct the people in every field of their life.*” The state definitely must be a Romanian state, the connection with the minorities must be defined by „*the fraternity and the spirit of national solidarity*”. But the minorities „*are kept under control, that they don't damage the Romanian nation*”. The Romanian Church's actions against the freemasonry (national enlightening campaign, the refusal of ecclesiastical funeral from the freemasons, checking of public figures, the request of the Romanian government to enact a law about the dissolution of freemasonry and if they don't do it, the Holy Synod will take care of the law's coming into existence from parliamentary initiative) are greeted in Katolikus Szemle, too. The social organ of Romanian Church was Romanian Orthodox Fraternity, which mass base was the „*educated*” middle

⁴² *A nemzetiszocialista mozgalom hazánkban*. Közi-Horváth József könyvéről. (The National-socialist Movement in Our Homeland. About the Book of József Közi-Horváth), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), March 1938. 181-183.

⁴³ SZÁLASI, Ferenc: *Börtönnapló* (Prison diary) 1939-1940, Budapest Főváros Levéltára (Budapest Metropolitan Archive) and Filum, Budapest 1997. 63. (19 November 1938).

class. It popularized the Curch's chauvinistic ideas. The Catholic newspaper makes an appreciative statement about anti-Hungarian Transsylvanian archbishop, Miklós Balan as a personage, who leads the great ecclesiastical renewal. The newspaper „Gandirea” is a „spiritual and scientific” forum „proclaimed through the of official organs of Romanian Church”. The Katolikus Szemle states that „the editorial staff recruited from the most outstanding Romanian philosophers, scientists, writers”, who didn't represent any worth-creating culture in realty. The all-round amateurish general editor, Nichofor Crainic was a theology professor in university of Bukarest, according to the appreciation he was „philosopher, political and literary essay-writer and poet”, but in realty he was a typical, schematic person of National-socialist anti-culture. In March 1937 he popularizes the program of „etnocratic state” in his writing entitled „Christianity and fascism”. The National-socialist writer „regards the fascism as the best form of state, because it stresses the most definitely the objective will becoming incarnated in communal life, which is the nation's will. According to the orthodox mysticism the Church manifest itself in national units in this world. The “etnocratic” state develops in this was contrary to the constitutional state and the democratic state. The “etnocratic” state is the manifestation of the historical identity, the community of blood, spiritual unity and the nation's will of power, which is aimed at the future.” The corporative system is the first fundamental statute of the organizing of national state and the second fundamental statute is the proportion on national basis, certain „*numerus clausus*”, which is binding on every intellectual and manual worker: „A nation is master in its homeland, only when its creating power has been expressed in every work-category”. After this two National-socialist fundamental statute the third is the following: „Christ's law is the state's law.” In the minority question he has chauvinistic, anti-Hungarian views: „Official could be only Romanian in state and ecclesiastical institutions. In the parliament the minorities must be assured representation in accordance with their proportion, but it isn't concern for those, who recognize other sovereignty beside the sovereignty of etnocratic state.” The Katolikus Szemle stress the importance of anti-Semitic and anti-democratic attitude of the Romanian National-socialist movement, the Ironguard. The reason for the existence of the movement's is accounted for Codreanu's words: „What's the nation's aim. The Resurrection. The nation's Resurrection on behalf of Jesus Christ. (There is a striking similarity with Szálasi's slogan: „Without Good Friday there isn't any Resurrection.” - L.N.) Creation and culture aren't the aim, these are only instruments for the share of the Resurrection.” We can state that the Hungarian Catholic Church, just like the hungarists, would have sacrificed voluntarily even the country and the people for the National-socialist Germany in the interest of the power.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ *Az új értelmű román nacionalizmus* (Romanian Nationalism with New Meaning),

The Katolikus Szemle published a lot of articles about hungarist writers, who were totally insignificant in the Hungarian literature, mainly Kálmán Sértő and József Erdélyi. József Erdélyi wrote the words of hungarist march, „Alarm”. Its most ill-famed line is „because the Jew is the devil”.⁴⁵ In his poem entitled „Eszter Solymosi’s blood” he recalls the great political suit of XIX. Century and he holds the Jews responsible „for every people, who died innocently”. The Katolikus Szemle wrote the followings about Erdélyi: „He doesn’t talk politics, still less he stirs up or sets the social classes against each other, only he fulfils his mission, when he points to the antagonism and he writes about his grief owing to the life’s insulting duality. József Erdélyi is one of the most talented personality of our contemporary Hungarian lyric poetry.”⁴⁶ „After the great preparatories, Ady, Szabó (Dezső Szabó was an extreme right, anti-Semitic writer. His literary historical importance is only that: Kosztolányi modeled the title role of his novel entitled „Neron, the bloody poet” from him. - L.N.), Móricz, Móra - József Erdélyi presents himself as the pioneer of the conscious peasant literature.”⁴⁷ „The pioneer and the greatest writer of the new peasant line is József Erdélyi. Now everybody has recognized already, he has brought something new and healthy, he has become an initiator of new line. His poem „Mania” is an interesting description of his anti-Semitism: „In my dream a Jew / hunts for me in that way, / like King Herod hunted for / Jesus, the infant.” (He was a paranoid. - L.N.) He escapes from the infernal hand to the God, whom he asks to darken the Sun and to bring about dark clouds, that he can defend himself. This state of mind is the source of his poems entitled „Eszter Solymosi’s blood” and „Ahasver and the magic piper”. Now there isn’t nobody, who doesn’t recognize that his poetry is completely Hungarian and value.”⁴⁸ (Unfortunately, the National-socialist Erdélyi got on in the state-socialist regime, too, but then he glorified Stalin and Rákosi.) The Katolikus Szemle praised the hungarist movement’s „poet-prince”, Kálmán Sértő (he died before the hungarist takeover), who wasn’t able to acquire the basics of education: „Kálmán Sértő arrived at the first line in fame and talent. Sértő pours out the poems. He writes easily, with pleasure. Every time the rhythm rolls from him. (In fact his poems wallow in nonsense rhymes, he was an absolutely dilettante. - L.N.) He is a honest, sensitive man.” (He was a

Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), February 1938. 126-128. and JUHÁSZ, István: *Az újértelmű román nacionalizmus*. (Romanian Nationalism with New Meaning) Különlenyomat a Hítel 1937/4-i számából. (Offprint from the Hítel’s (Credit’s) issue 4. of 1934), Tipográfia „Glória”, Cluj.

⁴⁵ ERDÉLYI, József: *Riadó* (Alarm), Stádium Sajtóvállalat Rt. Budapest 1944. 20-22.

⁴⁶ SZIRÁK, Ferenc: *Erdélyi József költeményei* (Poems of József Erdélyi), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), July 1938. 434-436.

⁴⁷ HORVÁTH, Miklós: *Népi irodalmunk* (Our Literature of Peasant Writers), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), May 1944. 129-138.

⁴⁸ PÉNZES, Balduin: *Erdélyi József* (József Erdélyi), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), September 1944. 249-256.

warmonger and an anti-Semitic agitator - L.N.). The newspaper has a deformed approach from the totally amateurish worker-„poets”, who belonged to Szálasi’s friends and often appeared in hungarist propaganda-evenings: „*Ernő Számadó and Sándor Szerető are the poets of goodness. They live in the capital, but they sing world of their childhood. They not only wish the poor better fate, but they hope trustfully.*” The member of hungarist parliament, the leader of extreme right propaganda-radio, later one of the most important organizer of Hungarist emigration, József Nyírő is appreciated by Katolikus Szemle. The newspaper states that Nyírő „*is a match for Áron Tamási*”, mainly with his nature-descriptions and force of ballad.⁴⁹

The general editor of Katolikus Szemle, Vid Mihelics had a stressed role in the spreading of extreme right, hungarist propaganda. After 1945 nobody called him to account his war-crimes, he became a peace-priest. But he kept his anti-Semitism in the future, too and aided enthusiastically the anti-Semitism of Stalin, which came out in formalism-discussion. He was engaged in that spiritual campaign, which was directed against one of the most important philosopher of XXth century, György Lukács: „*The approach of Lukács isn’t the approach of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Sztálin and MDP (Hungarian Worker’s Party, the Hungarian state-socialist party), of which he is a member, but it’s dangerously assimilates to Bucharin’s theory (only in other wording).*”⁵⁰

It’s evident in the mirror of documents, the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church didn’t issued any pastoral letter for the defense of persecuted persons and didn’t protested against the Holocaust. A few ecclesiastical persons - like Angelo Rotta nuncio and Margit Schlachta, leader of Association of Social Brothers - truly helped some people with isolated actions, but these didn’t become general.

Contrary to the official viewpoint of Jusztinián Serédi and the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church József Mindszenty, bishop of Veszprém was consistently against the puppet-statehood. He described the year of 1944 in his memorandum: „*In 1944 armies of two oppressive and inhuman regime, Hitler’s and Stalin’s arrived in our remained land to fight to the last finish.*” The approach of the front line the wave of refugees became strong, therefore Mindszenty took steps, too. He vacated the ecclesiastical buildings for them and he accommodated the teachers, the seminarists and the fugitive social brothers in the palace of bishop. His court priests put the art treasures, chalices and the clothes in a safe place, in the houses of his parents and brothers. In the second part of October, after the hungarist takeover, Mindszenty went to Budapest to convoke the Upper House, but he didn’t find not a single bishop there. „*And the secular members of the Upper House scraped a living for one*

⁴⁹ Horváth, Miklós: *Népi irodalmunk* (Our Literature of Peasant Writers), Katolikus Szemle (Catholic Review), May 1944. 129-138.

⁵⁰ MIHELICS, Vid: *Kérdések és távlatok* (Questions and Perspectives), IN: *A Lukács-vita* (The Lukács-Debate), Múzsák Közművelődési Kiadó, Budapest 1985.68.

day after the other in the under the summit of the National-socialist occupation and the terror of hungarists” Finally he visited baron Vilmos Apor bishop in Győr. (He didn’t apply to Serédi, because there were grave fights in the Esztergom area and the archbishop was seriously ill.) In Győr they drafted a memorandum to the hungarist government with Lajos Shvoy, bishop of Székesfehérvár and Krizosztom Kelemen, high abbot of Panonhalma on behalf of the nation. They asked Szálasi that in the hopeless case (there wasn’t any defensive line, the Hungarian Army wasn’t equipped, there were many refugees) „*the still unhurt Dunántúl (Transdanubia) won’t be thrown as prey of retreated fighting, because with this the last piece of the Hungarian fatherland and with it the last hope of the Hungarian future and recovery will be lost. The nation mustn’t be thrown for suicide on principle. There were resurrection after Muhi, Mohács, Majtény, Világos, Trianan, but after the annihilation there won’t be it.*” Mindszenty handed the memorandum to the Prime Minister’s First Deputy, Jenő Szöllösi, because he didn’t desire to call on Szálasi personally. Two weeks later, in 21 November he was arrested for the order of dr. Ferenc Schieberna, a lawyer, who was the Lord Lieutenant of Veszprém country and operational government commissioner. From Veszprém the hungarists carried off the Jews, including the baptized, with the direction of Schieberna. The council of the bishop protested, but they didn’t issue a pastoral letter. Schieberna wanted a thanksgiving mass for the cleaning in the Franciscan church, but Mindszenty was forbade this. And the pretext of his arrest was the following: the hungarists wanted to accommodate soldiers in the bishop’s palace and the warden, Szabolcs Szabadhegyi protested against it. He was taken into custody, Mindszenty rose to his defence, but he was arrested, too. The hungarists took possession of the bishop’s palace. In 23 December Mindszenty was transported under police surveillance to the prison of Sopronkőhida, where the next day Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was executed. He languish in prison with ex-Prime Ministers count Móric Eszterházy, Miklós Kállay, Géza Lakatos and other politicians, artist (for example the famous actor Pál Jávör), priests, soldiers and leftist resistance fighter (for example László Rajk, brother of Endre Rajk, the hungarist store-economic government commissioner. He celebrated masses every day in the prison, the most harrowing mass of his life was at Christmas according to his memorandum. In the end of 1944 he was transported to Sopron and he was in custody in the house of mothers Doughters of Divine Redimeer.⁵¹

In January 1945 Lajos Shvoy, bishop of Székesfehérvár and his brother, general Kálmán Shvoy were arrested and they were taken to Sopronkőhida. Bishop Shvoy didn’t allow his priests to tell in their sermon the parts drawn up by the hungarists and this was the reason of his arrest. Mindszenty could be

⁵¹ MINDSZENTY, József: *Emlékirataim* (My Memoirs), Vörösváry István kiadása, Toronto 1974. 39-49.

released, because for the approach of the Red Army the gendarmes, who guarded him, disappeared one morning.⁵² Serédi died in the liberated Esztergom, in 29 March, one day after the hungarists left Hungary.⁵³

The bigger part of the Church stood opposite the hungarist regime. The hungarist Minister of the Interior, Gábor Vajna sent the report of National Account-calling Organization to Minister of Education, Ferenc Rajniss. The report gave an account of the hostile attitude of Roman Catholic priests:

„The Roman Catholic priests are in international base. They never make common cause in no way with the contemporary regime, they don't mention the present-day life-death fighting of Hungarian nation, the hungarist idea and the Nationleader in their sermons.

The rightist priests are insignificantly few.

The attitude of the priests, which can't reconcilable with the present-day regime, is dangerous and harmful, because the mass are under the influence of them, they consider them as spiritual leaders. The defense against them is very hard, because their propaganda is the hush up present-day regime and its aim, which doesn't manifest itself in acts.”

Albert Panajoth, a hungarist ensign drew up a similar letter in 20 January 1945 in Szombathelyen. He finds guilty the Church, because there wasn't any movement for „heroic defenders of Budapest”. (He refers to the battle of Sztálingrád as counter-example, when the Church commemorate the fallen.) „This great war is the war of the Christianity first of all and the churches must take part in this with all their might.” For this purpose we must organize a national prayer-day for the soldiers, who fight in Budapest: there will be a festive mass in the every churches and at every corps in the country in the same time and when the bells will be ringing, everybody must stop for three minutes to pay tribute to the memory of the „heroes”.

Sándor Kovács, bishop of Szombathely denied the charges against the Church in his letter written in 27 February 1945 to Ferenc Rajniss. He avoided carefully the relation to hungarist-National-socialist power, and he made an effort to call his attention to the Church's role in the war: „Since the war's outbreak the Hungarian Catholic Church has propagated constantly the admonition of great General, Hindenburg from pulpits: „If prayers are left off at home, we scent it immediately in the front.” We can explain of the refusing of National-socialism, which he refers to Hindenburg, who didn't named Hitler as chancellor until it was possible. He reminds the National-socialists that the Church ordered many measures, which promoted the war-propaganda: there was prayer for homeland and victorious peace in every mass. The masses finished with the prayer „In the difficult days of ordeals”, which was written for the Second World War. The May and October of 1944 in the spirit of

⁵² Ibid. 50-52.

⁵³ www.mek.oszk.hu

„*prayer-campaign*”, the soldiers were supplied with prayer-books. He gave a neutral answer for the question of national prayer-days: he isn't competent in this question, because these are appointed by the bishop of Esztergom and the realization of this posing is the government's competence now, „*after Castle of Buda was fallen*”.

Szálasi planned the breaking off of diplomatic relations because of the hostile attitude of the Church. Vilmos Köfaragó-Gyelnik, the head of Nationleader's Civil Office wrote a letter in 15 February 1945, in which he related that „*the Nationleader would weigh over the possible stopping of mutual ambassador-sending with the Vatican*”. The Council of Ministers passed a resolution in 2 March, that the question diplomatic relations -including the ecclesiastical relations, too- fall within the competence of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁴

Szálasi dealt with the „*passive resistance*” of the Catholic priests in his speech given in 28 February 1945 in his press release. He explained the unlawful arrests: „*I accept responsibility for the arrests up till now. Because it's about arrests of priest, I ask to note the followings, brothers: In April I write a letter for the Pope, in which I would like express the connection of the hungarist movement and the hungarist ideology with the Church. In this letter I would propose concrete motions, particularly I would like setting down the underlying principles of signing of a new concordat from the point of view of hungarist nation-education. And in May I will do something with the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church and their priests.*”⁵⁵ For 28 March 1945 he planned to call a conference in Szombathely, in which probably the draft of concordat would be discussed. Baron Vilmos Apor, bishop of Győr and Krizosztom Kelemen high abbot of Pannonhalma didn't accept the invitation, so Szálasi ordered their arrests. But they haven't been taken into custody, because the Red Army arrived in Pannonhalma and Győr sooner than the hungarist detachment, which would have arrested them. The hungarist felt aggrieved the work of the apostolical legate of Budapest, Angelo Rotta, who stood up openly with the persecuted Jews and he made safe the success of Holy See's rescue-actions with his personal presence. Although the last Hungarian Ambassador in Vatican, Baron Gábor Apor resigned from his office after the German occupation (19 March 1944), but he managed the ecclesiastical affairs of Hungary in Vatican in the future too.

The draft of concordat between the hungarist puppet-state and Vatican was probably „*prepared*” by Kálmán Hubay in the first months of 1945. Hubay was the head of the Nationleader's Cultural Office and previously he dealt with ecclesiastical questions. It's peculiar of hungarism, that this draft was the

⁵⁴ Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archive), K638, 1.csomó (1. Knot).

⁵⁵ GERGELY, Jenő: *Concordatum Hungaricum. A nyilas kormány konkordátum-tervezete 1945 elején* (Concordatum Hungaricum. The Hungarist Government's Draft of Concordat), Századok, 1995/III. 711.

translation the Austrian concordat in 5 June 1935, which contains the dictatorial ecclesiastical ideas of the Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss's ultra-right autoriter regime. Only a few, little changes, which refer to hungarism, were achieved in it.⁵⁶

This statement is a such example that the prelate-nominee, which is desired by the Holy See, must be one hundred per cent Hungarian and he must swear on the hungarist state (IV.Act 1. and 2. § (paragraph)). The racial law, which excludes „*the persons of Jewish raced*”, is the base of the „*sacrament*” of marriage (VIII.Act 1.§). The draft damages sovereignty of the ecclesiastical schools in large measure: these are „*ecclesiastical styles in the relation of wealth-law and personal-affair, but these receive the same treatment as the state schools in the question of teaching and education*” (VI.Act 3.§). „*Only patriotic*” professors can teach in the theological colleges and the theological faculties of universities (V.Act 3.§). The legal base was created for the removal of undesirable priests, too: „*The State punishes strictly the abusing of religion, the Church proceeds in the same way against the priests, who give proof of un patriotism.*” (XVII.Act) The postscript of draft's explanation mentions the person of apostolical legate, because the hungarists would thrown off Angelo Rotta: „*It's desirable from hungarist viewpoint that the nuncio will be such ecclesiastical man, who knows perfectly the hungarism, who values efforts of Hungarist State and helps that in our empire the pure faith and the heroic patriotism live together in the souls, and even, it will be expressed efficiently both in our national life and our international relation, too.*”

The confiscation of ecclesiastical wealth is a fundamental element of the draft, too. The Church is bound to admit to important parts of his properties to the State for the realization of the radical land reform (XI.Act 2.§). „*The leading viewpoint of hungarist land reform is the healthy and economical settlement. The Hungarian State would like to aid the Roman Catholic fellow-citizens in the first place with the land given up from the Church (possibly in the form of perpetual lease).*” (XI.Act 3.§) The Church's sources of income will be reduced and will be taken under the supervision of the State: „*The Hungarian Roman Catholic Church mustn't collect money directly from his believers in no way. The voluntary donations, endowments, mass-moneys for the Church must be sent with postal payment. The Hungarian State keeps under governmental control the spending of this money.*” (XI.Act 4.§) The priests are warned to live in a simple manner instead of outward appearances of the rites: „*The effort for the exterior pageantry must be prevented.*” (XI.Act 5.§) The hungarists wanted to organize the ecclesiastical persons into a corporation: „*The organizational and operational regulation of top organization of Roman Catholic religious association, the Catholic Actions must be revised in the spirit of this Concordat and must be introduced to the Hungarian government for approval for the sake*

⁵⁶ Ibid. 709-711.

of the state granting of his exterior manifestations. This is obligatory with regard to the regulations of parish church's organization and religious institutions." (XIII.Act 1. and 2.§) „*Both the Church and the State promote the corporational organizing of ecclesiastical persons, with this they could secure their human interests and therefore preconditions of perfect fulfilling their function are derived voluntarily*” (XXI.Act).⁵⁷

Few days after the hungarist takeover, in 21 October 1944 the newspaper *Magyarság* published a warning for the establishment of ecclesiastical corporation: „*The National-socialist priests, cantors and other employees are requested that in order to the corporational work they must report immediately in the Corporational Centre (V. district, Szent István boulevard No.18) personally or in writing.*”⁵⁸ At the request of ecclesiastical circles the Ecclesiastical Corporation made a statement in the question of Old Testament's use in the official hungarist newspaper, the *Összetartás* in 15 November 1944. This document states that the hungarism stands in Christian basis and „*the Old Testament must be used in the way and the manner, which is shown by Jesus Christ*”. It states that the present Jewry has nothing to do with the Old Testament, „*because the people of Israel denied Christ, they aren't the chosen people any more. The Old Testament isn't the same as the history of the Jews, because the people of Israel was only flimsy instrument of a part of the revelation. The present Jewry has two-thousand-years-old dispute not only with the state, but with the Church, too. The Church must regard the Jewish-question as a state-political question and don't valued the Jewry of Old Testament better, than the prophets themselves. The flimsinesses of Old Testament advocate the greater perfection of the Gospel.*” The priests must stress only that parts, which refer to Christ, from the holy book of Jews and they must preach about Jesus's glory.⁵⁹ Finally in 18 March 1945 the decree No. 814. of 3 March in *Köszeg* was published in *Hivatalos Közlöny* (Official Gazette), which rank the ecclesiastical persons in a separate corporation within the Worker Nation's Corporation.⁶⁰

The official viewpoint of the Hungarian Catholic Church was represented by György Bálint army-priest, too. His base, inflammatory reflections were published in *Soproni Hírlap* in 10 December 1944: „*The Bolshevik regime is a movement against the God, in which Stalin and the Jewry meet together.*” Every soldier „*must launch an attack with prayer, belief in God must radiate from their.*” „*This war will be a crusade.*” „*We must call for brother each other. Hungarian must help Hungarian, as his brother; this is the Hungarism. Our fight will be a horrible war, which treads on heaven and earth and finally we will win.*”⁶¹

⁵⁷ Ibid. 714-724.

⁵⁸ *Magyarság* (Hungarians), 21 October 1944. 3.

⁵⁹ *Összetartás* (Togetherness), 15 November 1944. 8.

⁶⁰ *Hivatalos Közlöny* (Official Gazette), 18 March 1945. 3.

⁶¹ *Soproni Hírlap* (Newspaper of Sopron), 4 December 1944. 4.

The hungarist ecclesiastical policy handled the Protestant Churches peripherally. Only a tiny part of Albert Bereczky's very short book „*The Hungarian Protestantism against the persecution of the Jews*” deals with the hungarist regime and the connection of Protestants and hungarists. On the part of Calvinist Church bishop László Ravasz asked Jenő Szöllősi vice-president that Budapest would be an open city and humane treatment with the Jews: the deportation would be stopped and mixed marriages would be accepted - unsuccessfully. Therefore in 26 November 1944 he wrote a letter in Budapest to Jusztinián Serédi, in which he asked that the Hungarian Christian churches would protest against the atrocities. This letter was given to the archbishop's office-director by the head of Swedish Red Cross, Waldemar Langlet. The office-director reported that Serédi have already made a motion to Szálasi. So in 1 December he addressed a petition to Szálasi with the Lutheran bishop, Lajos Ordass. Ravasz drafted the followings: „*This treatment makes a mockery of that eternal law of God, which compels to humane treatment with the enemy, too, and it causes the anger of the just God for the head of our nation. This treatment stains ferociously the fame of that Hungarian nation, which is been known as generous and chivalrous since thousand year.*” He published a pastoral-letter in December, too, in which he requested his pastors to pray for Israel's dispersed flock, for the exiles and for the persecuted persons in the services.⁶² These measures proved insufficient, because the Protestant Churches officially took sides with the National-socialism. There is a casual remark concerning the attitude of churches in the book entitled „*The vital force of Hungarians - Biology, race-hygiene and eugenie of the body of nation*” by the ill-famed National-socialist race-biologist, Gábor Doros. This more than 600 page book published in 1944 is the most detailed summary of the Hungarian ultra-right, National-socialist racial theory. Doros's life is a typical East European course of life. He was born in Transsylvania, Székelyudvarhely and the chauvinism and the anti-Semitism have already become a very important part of his childhood. He specialized in race-biology and he was appointed as dermatologist head physician and as a university professor. After 1945 he wasn't held responsible for his war-crimes and anti-humanity-crimes, he worked as head physician to his retirement in 1973.⁶³ He wrote in his race-biological „*invective*” that the viewpoint of the Calvinist and generally the Protestant Churches („*Református élet*”, it means „*Calvinist Life*”) was the following: the Church must deal with the question of selective breeding and the sterilization must be trusted the medical order. Although Pius XI. refused the sterilization in his encyclical „*Casti connubi*”, but Roman Catholic Church permitted an important „*back door*”: they weren't averse to the instruments of

⁶² BEREZKY, Albert: *A magyar protestantizmus a zsidóüldözések ellen* (Hungarian Protestantism Against the Persecutions of Jews), Református Traktátus Vállalat, Budapest 1945. 31-34.

⁶³ www.mek.oszk.hu

discarding eugenie, even they recommended their espousing (dissuading from marriage, if there is a prospect of seriously ill descendants; placing in charge of a guardian).⁶⁴ From the articles of *Katolikus Szemle* it's proved, what the Church thought in fact: the liquidation of Jews, who were condemned as a foreign body and the breeding of pure Hungarian race.

The connections of churches and hungarists demand further researches. We must clear once and for all, how far the Church aided the persecution of Jews and after an adequate self-examination, facing up, we must draw its own conclusions. This is the most important question.

⁶⁴ DOROS, Gábor: *A magyarság életereje. A nemzettest biológiája, fajegészségügye és eugéniája* (The Vital Force of the Hungarian People. The Biology, Race-hygiene and Eugeny of the Nation), Turul, Budapest 1944. and Gede Testvérek Bt. Budapest 2000. 604.

Julien Papp

A Vichy-kormány szerepe a francia és menekült zsidók elpusztításában (1940-1944)

Franciaország területén 1940-ben hozzávetőlegesen 330.000 zsidó, az összlakosság 0,75%-a élt, franciák és menekültek fele-fele arányban. E népesség kétharmada, és főleg a külföldi zsidóság nagyobbik része Párizsban és Párizs környékén lakott vagy talált menedéket. A 150-160 ezernyi francia zsidó közül 90.000 régi eredetű volt, míg a többi, nagyrészt kelet-európai bevándorolt zsidó lakosság fele az 1930-as években kapott állampolgárságot. Ez az 50-60 ezres szám az 1927-es igen liberális törvényt követő, 1940-ig adományozott 900.000 honosításnak egy kis töredékét (6,6%) képezte.

Amióta a Forradalom az 1790-1791-es törvényekkel megvalósította emancipációjukat, a zsidók integrálódása és felemelkedése megnyilvánult az élet minden területén. Az 1880-as évekig az antiszemitizmus szinte megszűnt létezni, legfeljebb a katolikus monarchia és a letűnt rendi társadalom híveinél lehetett vele találkozni. A zsidóságnak a francia nemzettel való azonosulására jó példa az I. világháború kitörésekor tanúsított magatartás. 1914-1916 között a német hadseregből 17.000 elzászi származású katona állt át a franciák oldalára. Ezeknek a dezertálóknak 4%-a volt zsidó, holott ők csupán 1,6%-át képezték a német oldalon mozgósítottaknak. Az önkéntes idegen zsidók pedig ezt a felhívást függesztették ki jiddis nyelven Párizs falaira mindjárt a háború kezdetén: „*Franciaország, a Szabadság, Egyenlőség és Testvériség országa, amely nekünk Zsidóknak az összes nemzet közül elsőként ismerte el emberi és állampolgári jogainkat, Franciaország, ahol mi és családaink hosszú évek óta menedéket és védelmet találunk, Franciaország veszélyben van! [...] Testvéreink! itt az a pillanat, amikor leróhatjuk elismerésünket annak az országnak, ahol erkölcsi felszabadulásra és anyagi jólétre találtunk*”¹.

M. Marrus és R. Paxton amerikai szerzők szintén emlékeztetnek rá, hogy „*az etnikai és vallási megkülönböztetések annyira idegenné váltak a francia magánjog számára, hogy még manapság is szinte lehetetlen pontosan megállapítani a Zsidók számát a III. Köztársaság idején, vagy tanulmányozni elegendő anyakönyvi adatok hiányában olyan kérdéseket, mint a Zsidók és nem Zsidók közötti házasság*”². Mindezek ismeretében még érthetlenebbnek tűnhet, hogy a franciaországi zsidóságot is elérte az üldöztetés és megsemmisítés politikája.

Serge Klarsfeld megbízható számításai szerint³ 76.000 zsidót deportáltak

¹ Michel WINOCK: *La France et les Juifs de 1789 à nos jours*, Ed. du Seuil, Paris 2004. 170-171.

² Michaël R. MARRUS - Robert O. PAXTON: *Vichy et les Juifs*, Calmann-Lévy, Párizs 1981. 19.

³ Összefoglalja François BÉDARIDA: *Le nazisme et le génocide. Histoire et enjeux*,

Franciaországból 1942 tavasza és 1944 júliusa között, akik közül 2.500 (3%) élte túl a haláltáborokat. A deportáltak egy kis harmadát (24.000) képezték francia zsidók és több mint kétharmadát a külföldiek: lengyelek (26.000), németek (7.000), oroszok (4.500), románok (3.300), osztrákok (2.500), görögök (1.500), magyarok (1.200) és egyéb nemzetiségűek. A haláltáborokba küldöttek 14%-a nem töltötte be a 18-ik életévét és közülük 8,5% a 12-diket. A 60 évnél idősebbek aránya 12% volt és 75% a 18-59 éveseké.

Időrendben az 1942-es év volt a leggyilkosabb, amikor márciustól decemberig 43.000 személyt (a deportáltak 56,6%-a) szállítottak 43 szerelvényrel Auschwitzba. Ezeknek az áldozatoknak a háromnegyede az északi (megszállt), egynegyede a déli, „szabad” övezetből származott. 1943-ban a deportáltak száma 17.000 volt. Az ekkori 17 szerelvényből 13 Auschwitzba és 4 Sobiborba ment. 1944 első hét hónapjában 16.000 zsidót 14 szerelvényrel ismét az auschwitzi haláltáborba küldtek. Ha az így meggyilkoltakhoz hozzászámítjuk a francia internáló táborokban elhalálozottakat és a túszként kivégzetteket, az elpusztított franciaországi zsidók száma eléri a 80 ezret. Ez a 330 ezres itteni zsidóság 24%-át jelenti, s nagy eltérés volt a francia (16%) és az idegen zsidók (30%) veszteségeit illetően.

Vichy és a zsidóság a történetírásban

Az a tény, hogy a 330.000 lelket számláló zsidó lakosságból 250.000 megmenekült, a háború után hosszú ideig a közvélemény és a kutatók számára egyaránt magától értetődővé tette Vichy pozitív szerepét. Így Leon Poliakov és Gerard Reitlinger szerint Vichy semlegesítette a náci végső megoldás politikáját és megmentette a zsidók nagy részét a megsemmisítéstől. Poliakov, aki jóllehet maga is megszenvetve az antiszemitizmust, 1951-ben kiadott könyvében⁴ azt magyarázza, hogy a Vichy által adminisztrált szabad zónának köszönhetően a zsidók ezrei menekülhettek biztonságos helyre a németek elől. Még abban a kérdésben is engedékeny, hogy Laval „csak” az idegen zsidókat kívánta kiszolgáltatni a két övezetben élő francia zsidóság megmentése érdekében.

1953-ban az angol Reitlinger⁵ szintén kiemeli ezt a megkülönböztetést, mint pozitívumot, és azt állítja, hogy a francia hatóságok ellenszegültek a német politikának. Emiatt nem lett „végleges” a végső megoldás. Olaszországon és Dánián kívül egy ország zsidóságát se érte ilyen (viszonylag) kevés veszteség, és ez, mondja a szerző, jelentős mértékben Laval taktikázásainak köszönhető.

Nathan, Párizs 1989. 32-33.

⁴ Léon POLIAKOV: *Bréviaire de la haine. Le III^e Reich et les Juifs*, Calmann-Lévy, Párizs 1951. 268.

⁵ Gerald REITLINGER: *The Final Solution: the Attempt to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945*, A.S. Barnes & Co, New York 1961. 305.

E két történész véleményét többé-kevésbé magáévá teszi Raoul Hilberg 1961-ben publikált nagy átfogó munkájában.⁶ A Franciaországnak szentelt részben kihangsúlyozza Vichy stratégiájának sikerét, amely a nácik destruktív politikáját a régóta megtelepedett és asszimilálódott zsidókról el tudta terelni az újonnan érkezettekre és a menekültekre. Meglepő az is, hogy Hilberg renitensnek állítja be a francia hatóságokat a zsidó vagyonok árjásításával szemben.

M. Marrus nem ért egyet azokkal, akik szüntelenül hajtogatják, hogy a franciák nem mernek szembenézni vichysta múltjukkal, cinkosságukkal a zsidók legyilkolásában, és a II. világháborút illetően különös hajlamuk lenne mítoszok gyártására. Hasonlókat lehetne állítani Svájcra, Belgiumra, Hollandiára, Svédországra, sőt még Dániára is, írja Marrus. Szerinte sokatmondó, hogy a három idézett szerző feltehetően egymástól függetlenül jutott Vichy politikájának hasonló értelmezésére, anélkül egyébként, hogy bármilyen okuk lett volna nagylelkűnek lenni a franciák iránt. A „*Vichy és a Zsidók*” című Paxtonnal közösen írt könyvüket „*tizenöt év után*” méltatva,⁷ Marrus három tényezővel magyarázza az őket megelőző szerzőknek a Vichy-kormányzattal szembeni túlzott engedékenységet.

Az első az, hogy idő kellett a Holokauszt szörnyűségeinek történelmi távlatba helyezéséhez. Pontosabban, a háborút követően érthető módon minden figyelem a náciizmus bűnös gépezetére és vezetőire koncentrálódott és a nürnbergi per még inkább előtérbe helyezte a német militarizmus felelősségét. Ebben a kontextusban Auschwitz, Treblinka vagy Buchenwald és Bergen-Belsen borzalmai mellett Vichy kicsinyes intrikái eltörpültek, és a helyzethez szinte méltatlan lett volna egy kis provinciális kormányzatot a gázkamrák és tömeggyilkosságok szervezésével kapcsolatba hozni, vagy tovább menve, annak szerves részeként tekinteni.

A másik tényező a végső megoldás kronológiájához kapcsolódik. Ugyanis mind a közvélemény, mind a kutatás figyelmét jó ideig elsősorban a folyamat legvéresebb, a háború második felére eső szakasza kötötte le. Így többé-kevésbé árnyékban maradt az 1940-1942-es periódus, amikor pedig a Vichy-rendszer jórészt saját kezdeményezése nyomán kidolgozta zsidóellenes programját, anélkül, hogy erre a megszálló német hatóságok kényszerítették volna.

Marrus és Paxton ismerték fel az első évek intézkedéseinek alapvető fontosságát és azt, hogy a két periódus elválaszthatatlan egymástól: 1940-1942-ben zúzta szét Vichy azokat az anyagi, jogi és morális kapcsolatokat, melyek a zsidóságot a francia társadalomhoz kötötték, előkészítve ezáltal a deportálásokat és tízezrek megsemmisítését.

⁶ Raoul HILBERG: *La Destruction des Juifs d'Europe*, Fayard, Paris 1988. 523.

⁷ M. R. MARRUS: *Vichy et les Juifs: quinze ans après*, IN: Sarah FISHMAN et alii (ed.): *La France sous Vichy. Autour de Robert O. Paxton*, Ed. Complexe/IHTP-CNRS, Bruxelles 2004. 49-62.

Végül a harmadik körülmény, ami sokáig elterelte a figyelmet Pétain kollaboráns rendszerének a természetéről és felelősségéről, annak a fel nem ismeréséből származott, hogy a zsidóellenes törvénykezésnek sajátos francia gyökerei voltak, és mindez szervesen illeszkedett a rendszer jellegét meghatározó „*nemzeti forradalom*” ideológiájába és programjába.

Hasznosnak tűnik tehát egy rövid történelmi áttekintés annak érzékeltetésére, hogy a Vichy-rendszer összetevői között (forradalom – köztársaság - és népfront-ellenes reakció, dühödt nacionalizmus, klerikalizmus, antibolsevizmus) az antiszemita dimenzió sem rögtönzösen alapult.

A „*modern*” francia antiszemitizmusról

A 19. század két utolsó évtizede óta az antiszemitizusból magának politikai fegyvert kovácsolva kialakult Franciaországban egy eszmei áramlat, melynek képviselőit az ország 1940 május-júniusi katonai veresége, és az ezt követő megszállás hatalomra juttatott. Ezt nevezte az „*integrális*” nacionalista Action française egyik alapítója, Charles Maurras, „*divine surprise*”-nek, azaz isteni meglepetésnek.

Emlékeztetni kell arra, hogy a zsidóellenes megnyilatkozások végigkísérték a III. Köztársaság minden nagy botrányát és bizonyos politikai eseményeit: Panama-ügy, Dreyfus-ügy, az egyház és az állam kettéválasztása (a ma is nagy viták tárgyát képező 1905-ös törvény), a Stavisky-ügy és az azt követő nagy parlament-ellenes tüntetés (1934. február 6), majd a Népfront-kormány hatalomra jutása a zsidó származású Léon Blum vezetésével (1936. május 5 - június 5).

Mint eszmei áramlat a zsidógyűlölet katolikus miliőben öltött formát az 1880-as évekkel kezdődően,⁸ amikor a kormányon lévő mérsékelt köztársaságiak elkezdték a klerikalizmus felszámolását a közélet laicizálásával, és a vallások magánügyévé tételével. Kezdetből fogva az újkeletű antiszemitizmus keveredett egy nagyfokú protestáns-, és szabadkőműves ellenességgel és ez lehetővé tette a katolikus egyház számára a Köztársaság napirenden lévő elfogadásának az igazolását.⁹ Azt találták ki ugyanis, hogy nem a Köztársaság a „*vétkes*”, amikor kizárja a vallást a közéletből, hanem az őt hatalmában tartó nemzetközi zsidóság és szabadkőművesség. Ebben a légkörben látott napvilágot 1886-ban és aratott nagy sikert (60.000 példánnyal alig egy év leforgása alatt) Edouard Drumont „*La France juive*” (A zsidó Franciaország) című könyve, amit a történészek a politikai antiszemitizmus

⁸ Laurent JOLY: *Vichy dans la „solution finale”*. *Histoire du Commissariat général aux Questions juives (1941-1944)*, Grasset, Párizs 2006. 33-68.

⁹ A szocialista mozgalmak veszélye és Bismarck, valamint Crispi egyházellenes politikája következtében XIII. Leó pápa kereste a francia kormány támogatását. A katolikus burzsoázia helyeselte a közeledést, és a pápa 1892. február 20-i Körlevelével meghirdette a „*ralliement*” (csatlakozás) politikáját, azaz a Köztársaság elfogadását (a royalisták tiltakozása ellenére).

alapkövének tekintenek. A mű lényege egy mondatban összefoglalható: a zsidó nép a keresztény civilizáció ellensége. Ő az oka a laicizmusnak, a kapitalista kizsákmányolásnak, és még sok mindennek, ezért vissza kell térni a zsidók emancipációját megelőző, régi szép időkhez.¹⁰

Drumont maga köré tudta gyűjteni az opportunisták kormányzattal elégedetlenek nagy táborát, szélső baloldaliaktól a monarchistákig, és doktrinális zavarossága hasonló volt a boulangizmuséhoz. Ennek az ideológiai bizonytalanságnak a Dreyfus-ügy vetett véget. Ettől kezdve az antiszemitizmus végleg a jobboldal ügyévé válik, a baloldali erők pedig egyre határozottabban a megrágalmazott zsidó származású kapitány védelmére kelnek. Ugyanakkor a zsidóellenes megnyilvánulások ezt követően a francia politikai élet egyik jellegzetes összetevői lesznek. Így nem sokkal Zola híres cikkének megjelenése után (J'accuse, 1898. január 13), az 1898 tavaszán lezajlott képviselő választásokat követően létrejön egy antiszemita parlamenti csoport kb. 30 képviselővel. Ezt megelőzően már 1889-ben Drumont megalakította a Francia Antiszemita Ligát, és a század végén több jobboldali, illetve klerikális mozgalom lép fel zsidó-, szabadkőműves és protestánsellenes javaslatokkal. Például, a Saint-Etienne-ben üléselő keresztény-demokrata kongresszus (1897. március) követeli ezek kizárását a magas állami funkciókból. Közel áll ehhez a Franciaországi Nagy Nyugat (Grand Occident de France) programja 1901-ben, amely kirekeszteni a zsidókat a gazdasági életből és a köztisztviselők sorából.

Egy másik, az Edouard Dubuc Párizs városi képviselője által létrehozott Zsidóellenes Nemzeti Párt (Parti national antijuif) szintén 1901-ben olyan javaslatokkal áll elő, amik elég közel állnak a Vichy-kormány antiszemita intézkedéseihez. Így követeli a Crémieux-törvény¹¹ érvénytelenítését és a zsidókat honosító rendeletek felülvizsgálását, az izraelita elemi iskolák megszüntetését, és a zsidók eltávolítását a közhivatalokból.

A Baloldali Blokk győzelmét követően (1902) tovább csiszolódnak a 20. századi francia antiszemitizmus fő ismérvei, úgymint a nacionalizmus, a szocializmus elleni harc, és a katolikus, idegengyűlölő nemzeti identitás védelme. Igaz, 1910 körül még fellebben a „*társadalmi antiszemitizmus*” a baloldali szakszervezeti vezető, Emile Pataud kezdeményezésére, de a francia munkásság nem követi az Action française-zel magát kompromittáló szindikalistát, aki egy nagyméretű Rothschild-ellenes kampány ötlete körül belegabalyodik az antiszemitizmus és az osztályharc ellentmondásaiba, és kénytelen lemondani (1911. július 1).

¹⁰ A francia konzervatívizmusról általában lásd MAJOROS István: *Bossuet-től Maurras-ig. Megjegyzések a francia konzervatívizmusról*, IN: BÉKÉS Márton-MAJOROS István (szerk): *A hagyomány politikája. Fejezetek a konzervatívizmus történetéből*, ELTE, BTK-Történeti Intézet, Budapest 2006. 135-144.

¹¹ Isaac Adolphe Crémieux (1798-1880), igazságügy-miniszter 1848-ban majd a II. Császárság bukása után, 1870. október 24-i rendeletével 37.000 algériai zsidót és minden európai telepest állampolgárrá nyilvánított. Ez volt a III. Köztársaság egyik első nagy intézkedése.

Közben a Dreyfus-ellenes tábor tovább aktivizálódott, napirenden tartva a „nagy úttörők” (Drumont, Garnier páter, Barrès...) eszméit. Ezeket elsősorban az 1905-ben alapított Ligue d'Action française és a három évvel később indított napilapja, a L'Action française, voltak hivatva továbbítani az egymást követő nemzedékeknek.

A Dreyfus-ügyhöz tapadó számtalan rekrimináció (a nagyipar és az osztályharc, a romlott városi lét, a patriarkális család és a vallás halála, az individualizmus, az intellektuelek bomlasztó szerepe...) szintézisét végül is az újság egyik alapítója, majd fő mentora, Charles Maurras fogja létrehozni, oly módon, hogy azonosítja, szinonim fogalmakká teszi a Zsidót és a Köztársaságot: zsidó sugallta az antiklerikális törvényeket, ő teszi tönkre a takarékoskodókat; gyökértelenségével, kozmopolitizmusával és modernségével ő a nemzet dekadenciájának a fő okozója. Ezért Maurras doktrínájának alapkövetelménye a királyi restauráció, és elnevezése a royalizmus és nacionalizmus keverékéből származó ún. „*integrális nacionalizmus*”.

Megjegyzendő, hogy a Köztársaság ilyen kezelése nem egyezett a „*csatlakozás*” politikájával, amit a francia katolikusok egy része elfogadott, úgyhogy 1926-ban a pápa elítélte Maurras mozgalmát. Ennek ellenére doktrínája és antiszemita programja (több cikkben már 1911. február-márciusában közzétette) nagy hatással lesz a két háború közti politikai életre és a zsidóellenes olvasóközönségre.

Az első világháború frontjain közösen átélt megpróbáltatások enyhítették a zsidóellenességet, habár ezt a jelenséget jórészt semlegesítette az októberi forradalmat követő bolsevizmus elleni gyűlölet. Újult erővel lángolt fel aztán az antiszemitizmus az 1930-as években a gazdasági válság, Hitler hatalomra jutása és a Népfront győzelme következtében.¹² Fejezeteket tesz ki ekkor a gyűlölet tematikája, a zsidó fizikai, erkölcsi és szellemi portréjának ecsetelésétől kezdve a névtelen levelekig és a nyilvános tüntetésekig vagy molesztálásokig. Végül a kormány módosította az 1881-es sajtótörvényt, és az igazságügy-miniszter, Paul Marchandea, 1939. április 21-i törvényerejű rendeletével bünteti a faji és vallási csoportok elleni izgatást, illetve az ezzel összefüggő gyűlöletkeltést az „*állampolgárok és lakosok*” között.¹³ A rendelkezés annál sürgetőbb volt, mivel az Anschluss-t követő zsidó menekült hullámot, majd a spanyol polgárháború menekültjeinek tömeges érkezését követően egyre inkább keveredett az idegen és a zsidó fogalma, és az irántuk megnyilvánuló irritáció is a lakosság részéről. 1938 novemberében, Georges Bonnet külügyminiszter 3 milliónyira becsüli az idegenek számát Franciaországban, és Daladier-hez hasonlóan „*megindítónak*” nevezi a menekültek helyzetét. Mivel az Évian-i konferencia, amit Rooseveltt hívott össze júliusban 32 állam részvételével a zsidó menekültek ügyében, nem hozott

¹² Ralph SCHOR: *L'Antisémitisme en France dans l'entre-deux-guerres*, Ed.Complexe, Bruxelles 2005. 145-181.

¹³ Uo. 142. MARROUS- PAXTON: 17-18.

megoldást, a francia kormány, a jobboldali propaganda nyomására is, a tömeges internálásokhoz folyamodott. Így a háború előestéjén létezett nemcsak egy ideológiai háttér, hanem a gyűjtőtáborok gyakorlata is, ami egy bizonyos folytonosságot jelent a hatalomra kerülő Pétain marsall rendszerével.

A Vichy-kormány kezdeményezései

1940 nyarán - őszen egy egész sor intézkedés látott napvilágot, amelyek közvetve vagy közvetlenül a zsidóságot érintették. Mindjárt július 17-én, egy héttel Pétain marsall teljhatalommal történt felruházása után, egy törvény az apa francia származásához kötötte a közhivatalok betöltését. Ezt követte egy másik, július 22-én, amely elrendelte az 1927 óta adományozott állampolgárságok felülvizsgálását: több mint 15.000 személy, köztük 6.000 zsidó lett így megfosztva politikai jogaitól.

Nagy megaláztatás érte a zsidókat a leszerelésnél is. Mivel az 1940. június 22-én aláírt fegyverszünet csökkentett (100 ezres) létszámú francia hadsereget engedélyezett, a hadügyminiszter megragadta az alkalmat a zsidók eltávolítására a hadsereg kötelékéből. Márpedig a 60.000 zsidó önkéntesből, akik 1939 – 1940-ben lelkesedéssel jelentkeztek katonai szolgálatra, kb. 30.000 külföldi volt, akik egyszerűen elvesztették a státus nyújtotta védelmet, amire égető szükségük lett volna. Itt-ott régi parancsnokaik megpróbálták baráti körökbe szervezni őket, de legtöbbjük internáló táborokba került, majd onnan, 1942 augusztusában, Auschwitzba.

Az 1940-es törvénykezés folytatódott az augusztus 27-i rendelkezéssel, amely eltörölte a Marchandea-törvényt, szabad teret engedve a gátlástalan antiszemita propagandának a francia sajtóban. Az augusztus 16-i törvény létrehozta az Orvosi Kamarát, amely eltiltotta az orvosi pályáktól a nem francia származású apáktól született állampolgárokat. Szeptember 10-én egy másik rendelkezés ugyanilyen módon szabályozza az ügyvédekét. Leglátványosabb és kifejezetten zsidóellenes volt az 1940. október 3-án kihirdetett törvény. Ez faji alapon határozta meg ki a zsidó a Vichy-féle „*Francia Állam*” (ez az új rezsim neve a „*Francia Köztársaság*” helyett) szemében, és kizárta a zsidókat a közhivatalok vezető állásaiból, a tiszt és altiszt karból, és minden olyan tevékenységből, ahol befolyásolni lehetett a közvéleményt: oktatás, sajtó, rádió, mozi és színház. A zsidókat megtűrték másodrangú állásokban, ha szolgáltak az I. vagy II. világháborúban. Ezt követte az október 4-i törvény a külföldi zsidók internálásáról, vagy rendőri felügyeletéről, majd az október 7-i, amely eltörölte az 1870. október 24-i Crémieux-féle rendeletet. Az algériai zsidóságot így megfosztották francia állampolgárságuktól, és alávetették az anyaország diszkriminációs intézkedéseinek.

A háború után általános volt az a meggyőződés, hogy mindez a német megszállók nyomására történt. Ezért 1947-ben, amikor Raphaël Alibert volt igazságügyi miniszter, az első zsidótörvény szerzője, bíróság elé került, a

főügyész meglepődve tapasztalta, hogy az illetőnek semmilyen kapcsolata nem volt a németekkel, és hogy ejtenie kell az „*ellenséggel való összejárás*” fő vádját. Ez annak idején az adott helyzetből is következett, mivel 1940 nyarán a németek az Anglia elleni háborúval voltak elfoglalva, és a megszállás politikailag legaktívabb szervei csak a nyár végén kezdtek berendezkedni. Az SS-százados Dannecker, Eichmann képviselője, augusztus 12-én kezdi szervezni a zsidóügyek különleges rendőrségét, a Judenreferatot, és 20-án tesz Otto Abetz német követ javaslatot Ribbentropnak több antiszemita intézkedés azonnali foganatosítására a megszállt zónában: megtiltani az elmenekült zsidók visszatérését, kötelezővé tenni a helybenmaradottak feliratkozását a prefektúrákon, megjelölni vállalataikat különleges plakátokkal és gondnokokat nevezni ki az elmenekült zsidótulajdonosok javainak kézbevitelére.

Miután ezeket a rendőrség vezetője R. Heydrich Berlinben jóváhagyta, 1940. szeptember 27-én jelent meg az első német rendelet, ami kifejezetten a zsidókra vonatkozott. Követte ezt egy másik október 18-án, ami már nemcsak a tulajdonos nélkül maradt, hanem minden megszállt övezetben lévő zsidóvállalat élére gondnok-biztoságok kinevezését tette kötelezővé. Mivel ez előre vetítette a jelentős nemzeti javak kirablását, a francia hatóságok megrettentek és az ipari minisztérium belement egy ideiglenes gondnokságokat ellenőrző szolgálat (Service de contrôle des administrateurs provisoires, a továbbiakban SCAP) létrehozásába (1940. december 2). Így a francia adminisztráció kezdettől fogva részese és végrehajtója lett az átjárásokat előkészítő német politikának az északi zónában.

A háború után Vichy szószólói úgy védelmezték ezt a döntést, és általában a zsidóellenes intézkedéseiket, mint afféle „*preventív stratégiát*”, ami szerintük elejét vette a brutális német faji törvények alkalmazásának és esetleges kiterjesztésüknek a déli övezetre. Ezzel szemben Marrus és Paxton meg vannak győződve, hogy a megszállók sokkal kevesebb eredményt értek volna el a helyi adminisztráció segítségével. Az pedig valószínűtlen, hogy ebben az időben a németeknek szándékukban lett volna saját rasszista törvényeiket a demarkációs vonalon túl alkalmazni. Ekkor még, sőt jó ideig 1941-ben is, a németek célja a zsidók kitoloncolása volt úgy Németországból, mint minden megszállt területről. Ebben a távlatban, s mivel a franciákat a nácik úgyis kevert fajnak tekintették, a déli, „*szabad*” zóna ideális helynek látszott a kiűzött zsidóság elhelyezésére.

Így mindjárt 1940 júliusában a németek 3.000 elzászi zsidó lakost szállítottak a demarkációs vonalon túlra, amit követett több hasonló kisebb-nagyobb kontingens: 1.400 német zsidó augusztus 8-án, és megint 6.504 október 22-én Bade és Sarre-Palatinat vidékéről; luxemburgi zsidó menekülteket toloncoltak ki november 30-án, majd 1941 februárjában és áprilisában 247, 38, illetve 300 személyt. Összesen mintegy 270.000 zsidó kiűzése volt tervbe véve. Ez azonban ütközött Vichy saját antiszemita politikájával, és vezetői hevesen tiltakoztak a wiesbadeni fegyverszüneti

bizottságnál. Ezalatt a leplombált vagonok ide-oda gördültek szállítványaikkal, mielőtt kikötöttek volna a különböző délnyugati internáló táborok közelében, gyakran már halottakkal. Azok, akik majd túlélnek a hideget, az éhezést és a betegségeket, 1942-1943 nyarán kerülnek a haláltáborokba. A különféle emigrációs tervek (Madagaszkár, Palesztina, Indokina) fontolgatása után ugyanis az internálás lett a menekült külföldi zsidók jó részének a sorsa.

Az internáló táborok története Vichy antiszemita politikájának egyik legsötétebb fejezete, ami igaz elkezdődött már a spanyol nemzetközi brigádok önkénteseinek és más franciaországi politikai foglyoknak az internálásával.

Amikor 1940 nyarán a német tisztviselőkből és Gestapo-ügynökökből álló Kundt-bizottság átfésülte az összes déli övezetben lévő gyűjtőhelyet német politikai menekültek felkutatására, nem kevesebb, mint 31 koncentrációs tábort számolt össze. Köztük a Rivesaltes a Keleti-Pireneusokban 6.000 internálttal, és szintén ebben a megyében, Argelès legalább 15.000, főleg spanyol menekülttel volt a legjelentősebb; aztán a vernet-i fegyelmező tábor Ariège megyében; a rieucros-i nőtábor Lozère megyében; Les Milles, Aix-en-Provence közelében; Gurs az Alacsony-Pireneusokban, ahová több ezer németországi zsidót hoztak; a betegetek és öregeket gyűjtő tábor a Felső-Garonne megyei Noéban és a Toulouse melletti Récébédouban. A táborokon kívül voltak még internáltak a meg nem szállt övezet 10 kórházában és 16 börtönében.

Az északi zónában a fegyverszünetkor legalább 15 kisebb-nagyobb gyűjtőhely létezett. Ezeket a németek hamar összevonták, s 1941-ben a különböző razziák alkalmával elfogott zsidókat három, francia igazgatással működő nagy tábor valamelyikébe internálták: a Loiret megyében lévő Beaune-La-Rolande és Pithiviers táborába, illetve Párizs egyik északkeleti elővárosába, Drancyba. Sokakat aztán letartóztatott kommunistákkal és más ellenállókcal együtt Compiègne-be szállítottak és itt válogatták ki az agyonlövésre kijelölt túszoikat.

A május 14-i akció során kb. 3.400, jobbára lengyel zsidót, majd augusztus 20-án ugyanennyire tehető franciát fogtak össze. Ezt követte december 14-én mintegy ezer zsidó túszként való letartóztatása. Köztük 743 a francia szellemi és szabadfoglalkozású elithez tartozott, míg a többi külföldi menekült volt, akiket Párizs utcáin találomra szedtek össze. Ez alkalommal használták először a párizsi rendőrfőkapitányság közel 150.000 zsidó adatait tartalmazó kartotékját, amit az 1940. szeptember 27-i német rendelet nyomán a francia rendőrség állított össze a megszállt övezetben.

Az említett helyeken kívül voltak még táborok Algériában (Boghari, Colomb-Béchar, Djelfa) és Marokkóban (Azemmour, Bou-Arfa, Oued-Zem és Casablanca vizein lehorgonyozott hajók), 14-15.000 internálttal 1941-ben. Észak-Afrika egyébként rendszerint kimarad a számszerű becslésekből, s nélkülük a különböző jelentések 50 ezerre teszik 1940 szeptemberben az anyaország két zónájában internált zsidók számát. Novemberben, csak a déli

övezetben 70% lehetett a zsidók aránya az internáltak között. Számuk itt 1941 nyarán a Nemzetek Szövetségének illetékes szervei szerint kb. 30.000 volt, majd 1942 júliusára az elhalálozások, a sikeres emigrálások, és főleg a deportálások következtében 9 - 10.000-re csökkent. A mindennemű kirekesztést és az internálásokat követte ugyanis a deportálások időszaka, amikor Pétain kormánya közvetlenül részesévé válik a „végső megoldás” náci politikájának.

A Zsidókérdés Főbiztossága

A háború elhúzódása és a sorozatos német győzelmek megerősítették a Francia Állam vezetőit a kollaborációs politika két fő célkitűzésében: tető alá hozni a „nemzeti forradalmat” és jó helyre kerülni a német békét követő „Új Európában”. A szuverenitás illúziója és az a hiedelem, hogy a győztes hatalom számára Vichy egyenrangú fél, a francia közigazgatás teljes visszaállításának az igényéhez vezetett a megszállt zónában is. Az volt az elképzelés, hogy így majd a francia törvények helyettesítik a német rendelkezéseket a „nemzeti forradalom” programjának megfelelően. Vichy nem fogta fel, hogy különösen a Szovjetunió megtámadása óta a náci antiszemita politika is európai méretű lett, és ebben a helyzetben a francia ügyek csak egy átfogó rendszer elemeként jönnek számításba. Ha a Reich ragaszkodott a Francia Állam szuverenitásának a fikciójához, az azért volt, mert így „legálisan” érhetett el mindent, saját hasznára működtetve a francia államgépezetet. Másodrendű engedmények mögött a kollaboráció politikai tartalmát Hitler határozta meg. Néhány ezer hadifogoly kiszabadítása, vagy a demarkációs vonal megszüntetése (1943. március) és hasonlók ellenében olyan alapvető kérdésekben kellett Pétain kormányának együttműködnie, mint a „terrorizmus” (ellenállás) üldözése és megtorlása, a zsidók teljes kiszolgáltatása, a kötelező munkaszolgálat bevezetése, és a gazdaság egészének mozgósítása a német hadigépezet számára. Berlin megtiltotta az érdekeit közvetlenül kiszolgáló Pierre Laval eltávolítását¹⁴ is, és a párizsi náci barát pártok feloszlatását. Ezek afféle politikai tartalékok voltak arra az eshetőségre, ha a szuverenitás fikciója tarthatatlanná válik, de menet közben is hasznosak voltak Vichy szorongatására. Így a „judeo-bolsevizmus” elleni szüntelen propagandával és túllicitálásaikkal napirenden tartották az un. „zsidókérdés” megoldását a Reich doktrínájának megfelelően. A közvetlen nyomást persze a megszálló hatóságok gyakorolták. Hitler taktikája szerint a zsidó ügyekben is több, egymással konkurens hivatal intézkedett, ami egyébként még inkább megzavarta a Vichy-kormány vezetőit. Mind hozzáállás, mind „stílus” tekintetében érezhető különbség volt ugyanis az egyes német szervek között: a katonai

¹⁴ Laval-t 1940. december 13-án Pétain lemondatta és Darlan lett a Vichy-kormány második embere. 1942. április 18-án Laval visszatér és kormányfőként három miniszteri tárcának lesz a birtokosa (belügy, információ, külügy).

parancsnokság Otto von Stülpnagellel, a követség Otto Abetz-cel, a Gestapo Helmut Knochennel és a biztonsági szolgálat speciális zsidóügyi részlege, (Judenreferat) a fanatikus antiszemita Theodor Danneckerrel az élén, továbbá az „*Einatzstab Rosenberg*”, a náci teoretikus fiával, Alfred Rosenberggel (a zsidók által birtokolt művészeti kincsek és a francia levéltárak fosztogatásának volt a szakértője), és végül a wiesbadeni Fegyverszüneti Bizottság, amelynek csak 1940-1941-ben volt szerepe a déli zónába áttoloncolt zsidók ügyében. Hosszú távon Dannecker lesz a legaktívabb képviselője a zsidóellenes politikának Franciaországban. De mivel a keleti front megnyitása után jelentősen lecsökkent a megszálló csapatok létszáma, civakodásaik ellenére az említett német vezetők mindegyike egyetértett abban, hogy a zsidóságtól csak a francia apparátus segítségével lehet „*megszabadulni*”.

Amikor 1941 februárban Dannecker bejelenti, hogy egy Központi Zsidó Hivatal (Zentraljudenamt) megszervezésére akarja a Vichy-kormányt rávenni, mindegyik német vezető helyesli elgondolását. Darlan admirális, az új francia kormányfő, március első hetében vesz tudomást a tervről Abetz révén, aki Pétain rövid, és bizonyára tetetett habozása ellenére úgy látja, hogy Vichy kész „*érvényes jogi alapot*” nyújtani az új Hivatalnak. Főként az serkentette a francia kollaboráns kormányt, hogy a zsidóellenes politika egyesítésével megőrizheti szuverenitását az egész ország felett. Mivel a németek a lényegre illethetően elérték céljukat, nem akadékoskodtak azon, hogy az új intézményt ne Hivatalnak, hanem franciásabban a Zsidókérdés Főbiztosságának hívják (szó szerint: Zsidókérdések Általános Biztossága - Commissariat général aux Questions juives, a továbbiakban CGQJ), és hogy ennek élére, megkérdezésük nélkül az antiszemita, de németellenes Xavier Vallat kerüljön a francia kormány akarata szerint. Így született meg az 1941. március 29-i törvénnyel az a szerv, amely a SCAP után még jobban bevonta a francia adminisztrációt a német rendelkezések végrehajtásába. Az intézményt, amely 1944-ig 2.500 személyt alkalmazott, Vallat szervezte meg és vezette 1942. május 19-ig, majd Louis Darquier de Pellepoix 1944. február 26-ig. Utódja, Du Paty de Clam csak névleges szerepet fog betölteni, mivel 1944 tavaszától kezdve minden kapcsolat megszakad a Judenreferat és Vichy között, és az SS-ek önállóan végzik a deportálásokat.

Vallat egy szegény tanító tizedik gyereke volt, aki az Action française és a buzgó katolicizmus légkörében nevelkedett. Az I. világháborúban elvesztette egyik szemét és egyik lábát. Mint kitűnő szónoki tehetségű képviselő (1919-1924, 1928-1940), ismert figurája lesz a katolikus konzervatív köröknek és kipróbál szinte minden szélsőjobboldali politikai mozgalmat. Maurras barátjaként Vallat az „*állami antiszemitizmus*” híve, amelyben kibogozhatatlanul keverednek faji és vallási elemek. Hagyományos németellenességén túl, inkább riválisa, mint ellenfele lesz a náci hatóságoknak, akiket már első látogatása alkalmával felbosszant azzal, hogy különbséget kíván tenni a „*régi, jó*”, teljesen asszimilálódott, főleg elzászi eredetű, továbbá

a III. Köztársaság idején érkezett, sok 1914-1918-as frontharcost felölelő, és végül az utóbbi években beáramlott közép-európai zsidó tömegek között. A zsidó javak árjásítása mellett ezeknek a „*hontalan*” tömegeknek az eltávolítása képezi Vallat egyik célkitűzését, míg a németek már kivétel nélkül az összes európai zsidóság szintjén kezdik kezelni a kérdést, és ebben a távlatban nem a kitoloncolás, hanem egyre inkább a helyben való tömörítés a céljuk. Így április 5-i megbeszélésük alkalmával Dannecker gettók létesítését javasolja a párizsi zsidó és nem zsidó lakosság elkülönítésére, ami Vallat szerint „*elavult, érdektelen ócskaság a modern világban*”. Állandóan arra törekedve, hogy az északi zóna zsidó javai ne kerüljenek német kézre, Vallat hozzálátott az ország egész területére érvényes törvények kidolgozásához. Szerinte ezeknek az ésszerűsége rábírja majd a megszálló hatóságokat tévedéseik beismerésére és rendelkezéseik visszavonására. Műve három jelentős részt tartalmazott: az 1941. június 2-i második zsidótörvényt, a déli övezet zsidóságának részletes összeírását, valamint az árjásítások kiterjesztését erre a területre (1941. július 22). Ezt megelőzően, július 19-én, a SCAP-ot a CGQJ-hez csatolták. A július 22-i dokumentum, ami „*összetett és gyanús jogi alapot nyújtott a zsidó javak kifosztására*”, nagy mennyiségű szövegből tevődött össze: 18 különböző törvény, 18 végrehajtási utasítás az anyaországban, 13 Algériában és 5 a gyarmatokon, amikhez jött még több másodrendű határozat, összesen 77 szöveg 397 cikkellyel. Algériában Roger Franceschi vezette az árjásítást, kezdetben 60 alkalmazottal, majd 230-cal november 17-től kezdve.

Miközben Vallat egy harmadik zsidótörvény tervezetén szorgoskodott, Dannecker közép- és kelet-európai mintára egy zsidótanácsot (Judenrat) akart létrehozni és sürgette a zsidó lakosság elkülönítését. Tartotta ugyan a kapcsolatot Vichyvel, de tárgyalásokba kezdett a Konzisztórium Párizsban maradt vezetőivel, és egy újonnan alakult zsidó jótékonyági szervezettel. Azon túl, hogy – amint ez ismert – be akarta vonni a zsidóság vezetőit népük megsemmisítésébe, a tét közvetlenül az Egyetemes Izraelita Szövetség 13-18 millió frankot kitevő pénzvagyona fölötti rendelkezés volt. Amikor Dannecker szeptember 25-én bejelentette, hogy létrehozza a zsidótanácsot az északi zónában, Vallat ezt saját ötleteként mutatta be kormányának, mint ami együttesen érvényes a megszállt és szabad övezetre, és amiben majd inkább Vichy lesz az illetékes, és nem a németek. Az eredmény az 1941. november 29-i törvénnyel létrehozott Franciaországi Izraeliták Egyetemes Szövetsége lett (Union générale des Israélites de France), amely összevont valamennyi zsidó jótékonyági szervezetet a CGQJ fennhatósága alatt. Mindez megosztotta és megdöbbentette a zsidó vezetőket. De az új intézmény alig kezdett el működni, amikor a szabotázs akciók ürügyén a zsidókra kiszabott egy milliárdos bírsággal a németek semlegesítették Vallat törvényét: a francia letéti pénztárba az árjásításokból addig befolyt pénz távol állt ettől az összegtől, amit nyilvánvalóan a Reich magának tartott fenn.

Végeredményben Vallat minden próbálkozása, főleg az, hogy kijátssza a

németeket, csődöt mondott. Középutas antiszemita politikája összeegyeztethetetlennek bizonyult a végső megoldás programjával. Másrészt, németellenessége tudott volt, a Gestapo megvetéssel kezelte, kutatásokat rendezet a CGQJ helyiségeiben, stb. 1942. február 17-én hevesen összetűzött Danneckerrel és „gyerekesnek” nevezte a németek módszereit. „Sokkal régebben vagyok antiszemita, mint maga. Ráadásul az apja lehetnék”, - vágta oda a fiatal náci tisztnek. A németek sürgették tehát Vallat eltávolítását, amit Darlan tudomására is hoztak március 19-én. A viharos jelenet ellenére Dannecker elismerését fejezte ki Vallat és a CGQJ tevékenységét illetően egy Berlinbe küldött jegyzékben, kihangsúlyozva a zsidóellenes törvénykezés terén elért újabb eredményeket. Világos, hogy a tömeges deportálások előestéjén egy sokkal gátlástalanabb és szolgálatkészebb hivatalnokra volt szükség a Főbiztosság vezetésére.

Vallat utóda 1942. május 6-tól kezdve a „de Pellepoix” nemesi előnevet bitorló Louis Darquier lett. Ő egy orvos fia volt, aki átélte a frontot, majd több sikertelen vállalkozás után az 1934. február 6-i parlament-ellenes tüntetésnek köszönhetően alapozta meg politikai karrierjét. Itt ugyanis a rendőri összecsapások során megsérült, és erre hivatkozva az Action française-beli barátaival megalakította a Február 6-i Sebesültek Társulatát, aminek ő lett az elnöke. 1935 májusában sikerült magát megválasztatnia Párizs városi tanácsába, és ettől kezdve jobboldali agitátorként lesz ismert. Eszmevilágában egyetlenegy kérdés létezett: a zsidóság. Obszcén antiszemita megnyilatkozásai miatt 1939-ben a Marchandea-törvény értelmében börtönbüntetésre és pénzbírságra ítélik, és ezt megelőzően már több ízben letartóztatták zsidók fizikai bántalmazása miatt. Vallat-tól eltérően Darquier nem volt németellenes, sőt 1937 vagy 1938 óta a Reich titokban pénzelt. Ezzel a támogatással alapította a France enchaînée (Leláncolt Franciaország) című hetilapot és több zsidóellenes propaganda szervezetet. Ilyen körülmények közt nem volt meglepő, hogy Abetz és az SD (Sicherheitsdienst) őt javasolta a CGQJ élére. Vele nem a törvénykezés, hanem az ideológiai szerep jutott elsőséghez, és a Főbiztosság káderei a hivatásos tisztviselők helyett a sajtó és a jobboldali szervezetek köreiben verbuválódtak. Mivel a francia endogén antiszemita programot teljesen elnyelte a végső megoldásé, a németek nem sokba nézték Darquier-ét, és állandóan beavatkoztak a Főbiztosság ügyeibe. Mindezen túl, a CGQJ energiájának nagy részét továbbra is az árjásítás kötötte le. Kirendeltségei behálózták az egész országot, mint megannyi ingatlanügynökség, melyek 1943 végére jórészt véghezvitték a zsidóság kisémmizését. Egy tisztviselői beclés szerint 1943 januárjában a zsidók lakásai a rendes árnál 30%-kal kevesebért kerültek kiárusításra. Azonban, a németek minden ígérete ellenére a zsidó javak vevői és gondnokai nem voltak biztosak abban, hogy mit hoz a jövő, úgyhogy 1943 szeptemberében érdekeik védelmére létrehozták az Árjásított Javak Tulajdonosainak Francia Szövetségét, amit követett 1944 januárjában a gondnokok hasonló szervezete.

A letartóztatásokat, összegyűjtéseket és az áldozatok kiszolgáltatását tehát jórészt nem a CGQJ végezte, hanem Vichy rendőri apparátusa. Az egyesített rendőri alakulatok fölött Laval rendelkezett és működésüket René Bousquet belügyminisztériumi rendőrségi főtitkár, illetve párizsi delegátusa, Jean Legay irányította. 1942 nyarán a német rendőrségnek 2.500 - 3.000 embere volt. Ezek nem ismerték az országot, a lakosság gyűlölte őket és túlnyomó többségük nem beszélt franciául, így kezdettől fogva a francia rendőrségre hárult a zsidóellenes rendeletek végrehajtásának ellenőrzése az északi övezetben is. Miután a németek megszállták a déli zónát (1942. november 11), rendőri személyzetük hiánya még érezhetőbb lett, ami magyarázza, hogy a francia függetlenség látszatának összeomlása ellenére miért ragaszkodtak mégis Vichy „szuverenitásához”. A németekkel ellentétben, a francia kormány hatalmas rendőri erővel rendelkezett. Apparátusát a katonai vereség érintetlenül hagyta, és majdnem 100 ezer fővel megközelítette a fegyverszüneti egyezmény által engedélyezett hadsereg létszámát. Magába foglalta a csendőrséget, a városi rendőrséget, a nemzetőrséget (garde mobile) és a párizsi főkapitányságtól közvetlenül függő 30.000 rendőrt a fővárosra és közvetlen környékére (kb. 3 millió lakosra) kiterjedő hatáskörrel. Központosító politikájának megfelelően Vichy a belügyminisztériumhoz csatolta a csendőrséget, államosította a 10.000 lakosnál többet számláló községek rendőrségét, regionális prefektúrákat hozott létre rendőrbiztosokkal és bevetésre kész rendőri különítményekkel.

Az 1941-es nagy razziák tapasztalatai után a németek számíthattak a deportálásoknál is a francia rendőrség együttműködésére. Az 1942 júliusában létrejött egyezmények az SS főparancsnok Karl Oberg és René Bousquet között kölcsönös engedmények alapján garantálták a kollaborációt. Az egyezményeket 1943 áprilisában felújították a déli zóna megszállása után, annak ellenére, hogy a németek nem tartották be ígéreteiket, nevezetesen a túsok ügyében. Tény, hogy az Oberg-Bousquet egyezmények nélkül soha nem tudtak volna annyi zsidót deportálni, mint amennyit így véghezvittek.

Az 1942. július 16-17-i nagy, Vél'd'hiv'¹⁵ néven ismert razziákat 9.000, hat különböző alakulathoz tartozó csendőr és rendőr hajtotta végre, 300-400 doriotista pártszolgálatos segítségével. Miközben Párizs északi felének hét kerületét átfésülték, német rendőrt alig lehetett látni. Hatóságaik jelentése szerint az operáció első napján 9.800, másnap több mint 3.000 zsidót tartóztattak le, azaz a tervbe vett kontingensnek „csak” a felét. A rendőrök egy része nem bizonyult megbízhatónak, sok zsidó elmenekült és nyilvánvaló volt a lakosság együttérzése, különösen a gyerekek iránt. Az is kitudódott, hogy a razziák alatt és a következő napokban több, mint száz zsidó lakos öngyilkos lett. A Vél'd'hiv'-ben összezsúfolt áldozatok öt napig szenvedtek itt a szomjúságtól, az éhségtől, a nappali hőségtől és az éjszakai hidegektől, a

¹⁵ A Vélodrome d'hiver (Téli kerékpár-versenypálya) rövidítése. Ez a fedett sportpálya a XV. kerületben volt, nem messze a Bir-Hakeim hídtól. A sportrendezvényeken kívül sok politikai, többek közt xenofób és antiszemita nagygyűlést tartottak itt a 30-as években.

bélgyulladás és a vérhas okozta szörnyű büztől és fájdmaktól. A foglyokat ezután a különböző internáló táborokba szállították. Köztük több mint 4.000 gyereket Laval külön közbejárására „*családegyesítés*” címen fognak Auschwitzba deportálni. A gyűjtőhelyek listáján különleges helyet foglal el Drancy, mivel ez lesz a haláltáborok legnagyobb előcsarnoka egészen 1944. július 31-ig. Az összes deportáló szerelvényből innen indult el 67, tehát erről a helyről vittek el 67.000 zsidót a megsemmisítésre ítétekből.

A közvéleményről

1940 nyarán Franciaországban drámai volt a helyzet. Legalább 8 millióan menekültek dél felé a német invázió elől, a visszatérések elhúzódtak 1941-ig és vajmi kevés embernek volt eszében a zsidókat érintő kérdéseket elkülöníteni a többi egyéni és kollektív tragédiáktól. A lakosság fásultsága és közömbössége mögött azonban a hatóságok hamar észrevették, hogy a francia társadalom alig fogékony az antiszemitizmusra. R. Csaki, a Deutsches Auslands-Intézet igazgatója szerint a franciák „*semmi megértést sem tanúsítanak a faji kérdés iránt; úgy vélik, hogy a Fekete vagy a Sárga is francia, ugyanazokkal a jogokkal, mint ők*” (1941 tavasza). Egy másik német megfigyelő, H. Knochen SS tiszt azt írja 1941 januárjában, hogy „*szinte lehetetlen a franciáknál antiszemita érzést táplálni ideológiai alapon, ellenben gazdasági előnyökkel a zsidóellenesség könnyebben találna szimpátiára*”.¹⁶

Az is jellemző, hogy a németekkel történt heves szóváltás ellenére, Vichy nem merte elrendelni a sárga csillag hordását a déli övezetben. 1942 januárjában Darlan tudatta velük, hogy a csillag „*mélységesen megbotránkoztatná a francia véleményt*” és kiválthatna egy izraelitáknak kedvező folyamatot. Egyébként Vichy minden erőlködése ellenére, hogy az ő antiszemitizmusa autentikusan francia, a nép továbbra is azt gyanította, hogy német találmányról van szó.

Az ország megszállt részére vonatkozólag előkerült 50 évvel a megírása után egy érdekes dokumentum, „*egy rendkívül részletes jelentés*”, amit Léo Hamon írt 1940-1941 telén Párizsban tett megfigyeléseiről.¹⁷ Ez az elzászi katonatiszt, aki Toulouse-ig vonult vissza egységével nem térhetett vissza otthonába a leszerelés után. Toulouse-ban ismerkedett meg a legnagyobb franciaországi emigráns zsidószervezet elnökével, az orosz származású cionista-szocialista Marc Jarblummal, akinek kérésére Párizsba utazik információkat szerezni a megszállt területen maradt zsidóságról. Itt találkozik több szervezett ellenállóval és Julien Weill főrabbiával, akik segítik „*kettős nyomozásában*” (az ellenállás és a zsidók helyzetéről).

¹⁶ Idézik MARRUS- PAXTON: 295-296.

¹⁷ Léo HAMON - Renée POZNANSKI: *Avant les premiers grands rafles. Les Juifs à Paris sous l'occupation (juin 1940-avril 1941)*, Les Cahiers de l'IHTP (A Jelenkori Történelmi Intézet Füzetei), 22. sz. CNRS, Párizs 1992. December, 125.

Jelentésében tarlózva megtudjuk, hogy Párizs falain ritkák az antiszemita feliratok, de annál több „V”-betűt, lotaringiai keresztet és sarló-kalapácsot lehet látni. A munkásság körében tartózkodnak a szokásos zsidó-viccektől és a sárga plakátokkal megjelölt zsidó boltokban még több a vevő, mint azelőtt. A német zsidóellenes politikával szembeni ellenállás legerősebb a közoktatásban volt, az egyetemeken és a tanítók körében. A helyzet sokkal kedvezőtlenebb az orvosi pályákon. A zsidó orvosok megőrizték ugyan pácienseiket, de a szakmai összejöveleken és a publikációkban sok az ellenséges megnyilatkozás. Hamon konklúziója azonban az, hogy a németek minden igyekezete ellenére csődöt mondott a zsidók morális elszigetelése a francia nemzeten belül.

Még ha túl optimistának tűnhet is ez az észrevétel, eléggé egybevág azzal a véleménnyel, hogy a kifejezetten antiszemita magatartások nem a társadalom szövetét jellemezték, hanem bizonyos körökét. Mindenesetre, a passzív együttérzést sok esetben cselekvő segítőkészség és mentőakciók váltják fel 1942 nyarától kezdve, amikor a deportálásokat kísérő szívtépő jelenetek sokakat ráébresztenek arra, hogy itt valami másról van szó, mint a megszállással járó megpróbáltatásokról. A sok névtelen egyéni akció mellett főként a helyhatóságok, közszolgáltatások alkalmazottjai, kis tisztviselői és a rendőrség tagjai, valamint néhány egyházi tekintély és szervezet játszottak kiemelkedő szerepet a zsidók mentésében.

Pusztai, Dávid

„Barátok a bajban”

A főtitkár és más nemzetközi szereplők diplomáciai tevékenysége az ENSZ szomáliai szerepvállalása idején

1991. december 15-én Pérez de Cuéllar, a hivatali idejének utolsó napjait töltő ENSZ-főtitkár levelet kapott Omer Arteh Ghalib szomáliai miniszterelnöktől, amelyben a kormányfő az országában az év során kialakult helyzetnek a Biztonsági Tanács elé vitelét kérte. Egy nappal később hasonló tartalmú levél érkezett Abdou Diouf-tól, az Iszlám Konferencia Szervezetének (OIC) elnökétől, amelyben Diouf ismertette az 1991. decemberi OIC-csúcstalálkozó határozatát is Szomáliáról: az iszlám szervezet az ENSZ bevonását szorgalmazta a mélyülő szomáliai válság megoldására.¹ Két nappal ezután, december 18-án az Afrikai Egységsszervezet (OAU) főtitkára fejezte ki aggodalmát a Szomáliában folyó eseményekkel kapcsolatban és kérte, hogy az ENSZ foglalkozzon az ügygel.² Néhány héttel később, 1992. január 21-én Ahmed Snoussi marokkói ENSZ-nagykövet aláírásával érkezett levél Boutros Boutros-Ghalihoz, a hivatalát frissen elfoglalt ENSZ-főtitkárhoz, amelyben Snoussi ismertette az Arab Liga (LAS) január 5-i határozatát a szomáliai helyzetről, kérve, hogy azt ismertessék a Biztonsági Tanács tagjaival.³

A szomáliai helyzethez kapcsolódó intenzív „levélhullás” az ENSZ New York-i központjában nem csak a világ közvéleményének fokozódó aggodalmát jelezte a Sziad Barré tábornok 1991 januári elűzése után Szomáliában kialakult politikai és humanitárius válsághelyzetben. Az ENSZ Alapokmánya minden tagállam számára lehetővé teszi a nemzetközi békét és biztonságot veszélyeztető helyzetek Biztonsági Tanács elé vitelét.⁴ Szomália esetében azonban azt láthatjuk, hogy a tagállami megkeresések mögött – amelyek a BT-n kívül a főtitkárt is érintették – nem kizárólag azok kormányai, hanem nagyobb országsoportok, illetve az ezeket tömörítő nemzetközi szervezetek álltak. És bár a regionális szervezetek részvételét a válsághelyzetek megoldásában az ENSZ Alapokmánya szintén nem tiltja, aktivitásuk szintje és az ENSZ szerveivel való együttműködésük érdemessé teszi nem csak a főtitkár, de az ő tevékenységük alaposabb vizsgálatát is a szomáliai kérdésben.

A főtitkár tevékenysége

1992 és 1995 között, vagyis abban az időszakban, amíg a szomáliai kérdéssel a Biztonsági Tanács érdemben foglalkozott, miközben az ENSZ

¹ S/23469, biztonsági tanácsi előterjesztés.

² S/23469, biztonsági tanácsi előterjesztés.

³ S/23448 + Annex, biztonsági tanácsi előterjesztés.

⁴ Alapokmány 35. cikk 1. bekezdés.

„*humanitárius intervenciója*” zajlott, a BT-n és a konfliktusban résztvevő feleken kívül számos szereplő bukkant fel a politikai porondon.

Dag Hammarskjöld 1955-ös „*Peking-formulája*”⁵ óta az ENSZ mindenkori főtitkárainak állandó igénye volt, hogy saját jogukon önálló, a Biztonsági Tanácstól és a Közgyűléstől független politikai szereppel bírassanak; ez a szerep a hidegháború idején fokozatosan fejlődött ki.⁶ A főtitkárok kezdetben jobbára jószolgálati missziókból álló diszkrét tevékenysége kitűnően kiegészítette a Biztonsági Tanács nyilvános tárgyalásait és meghozott döntéseit. Mivel azonban a BT-hez hasonló katonai és pénzügyi eszközök nem álltak rendelkezésükre, fokozatosan elkezdtek kimunkálni saját „*eszközeiket*” e háttérdiplomáciai tevékenység vitelére; ezek közül a legmaradandóbbnak a különleges megbízott (Special Representative) intézménye bizonyult.⁷

Mindezek nyomán nem véletlen, hogy Szomália ügyében Ghali főtitkár igyekezett komoly háttértevékenységet végezni annak érdekében, hogy elősegítse a rendezést és megkönnyítse a Biztonsági Tanács döntéseinek megvalósítását. A főtitkárnak, miután Szomália 1992 januárjában a Biztonsági Tanács napirendjére került, 1992 áprilisától az UNOSOM II 1995. tavaszi kivonulásáig folyamatosan volt szomáliai speciális megbízottja,⁸ akik segítségével aktív és kezdeményező diplomáciai tevékenységet fejtett ki. Ghali 1992 februárjában, nem sokkal az első Szomáliával foglalkozó BT-határozat⁹ megszületése után New Yorkba hívta a szomáliai szembenálló felek képviselőit, amelynek központi témái a folyó ellenségeskedések beszüntetése és a helyzet politikai rendezése volt.¹⁰ Ez a konzultáció jelentette annak a többéves diplomáciai erőfeszítés-sorozatnak a nyitányát, amelynek során a szomáliai szembenálló feleket megpróbálták az ellenséges cselekmények beszüntetése mellett valamilyen hosszú távra szóló politikai megegyezésre is rábírni. A folyamat eredményeként a főtitkárnak a nemzetközi közösség segítségével két alkalommal (1992. március, 1993. január) is sikerült átfogó tűzszüneti, illetve békemegállapodást tető alá hoznia; igaz, ezek megvalósítása a szembenálló felek magatartása miatt meghiúsult.

Ghali azonban nem csak diplomáciai tevékenységével befolyásolta a Biztonsági Tanács döntéseit. A rendezési folyamat során az ENSZ

⁵ Hammarskjöld főtitkár 1955-ös pekingi látogatása kapcsán úgy fogalmazott, hogy „*az ENSZ Alapokmányában lefektetett főtitkári jogkörében jár el, nem pedig a Közgyűlés határozatában megfogalmazottak megtestesítőjeként.*” <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/dag/time1955.htm>

⁶ WHITFIELD, Teresa: *Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict.* USIP Press, Washington 2007. 20.

⁷ WHITFIELD: 22.

⁸ Ghali szomáliai különleges megbízottai voltak: Mohamed Shahoun (1992. április – november), Ismat Kittani (1992. november – 1993. március), Jonathan Howe admirális (1993. március – 1994. május), Lansana Kouyate (1994. május – július) és James Victor Gbeho (1994. július – 1995. április).

⁹ 733 (1992), BT-határozat.

¹⁰ IHA/431, IHA/434, ENSZ sajtóközlemény.

döntéseire jelentős determináló erővel bírtak a főtitkár Biztonsági Tanácsnak címzett rendszeres beszámoló a helyzetről és a szembenálló felekkel folytatott folyamatos tárgyalások állásáról. E jelentések általában néhány nappal előzték meg a soron következő, Szomália kérdésével foglalkozó BT-ülést és számos, ilyen ülésen született BT-határozat egyszerűen annyit tartalmazott, hogy a Tanács áldását adja az eléje tett főtitkári jelentésben felkínált döntési alternatívára.

A főtitkár bevonását a szomáliai válság kezelésébe az ENSZ alakuló joggyakorlata is elősegítette. Az 1990-es években megszilárdult erő alkalmazására való felhatalmazás gyakorlatának jogilag aggályos elemei ugyanis szükségessé tették a Biztonsági Tanács és az ENSZ széleskörű felügyeleti és ellenőrző tevékenységét az ilyen konstrukcióban zajló műveletek felett; ennek következményeként pedig a főtitkár vált az egyik fontos ellenőrző tényezővé. Szomália esetében is jelen voltak a főtitkár összekötő tisztjei az UNITAF főhadiszállásán és rendszeres jelentésekben kellett számot adni az akció menetéről.¹¹ A főtitkár bevonását az amúgy a Biztonsági Tanács *domain réservé*-t képező erő alkalmazásába azonban szervezeti okokból nem fogadta osztatlan lelkesedés; kritikusai szerint ugyanis ez összezavarja mind a Tanács, mind a Főtitkár szerepét, kölcsönösen csökkentve egymás politikai mozgásterét és szavahihetőségét, így a jövőre nézve célszerűbbnek tartották e feladatköröket megosztani és elválasztani egymástól.¹²

A regionális nemzetközi szervezetek részvétele a tárgyalásokon

Ghali a diplomáciai gépezetet messze nem egyedül üzemeltette, hanem olyan regionális szervezetekkel együttműködve, amelyek geopolitikai vagy más okokból maguk is érdekeltek voltak a válság rendezésében. Az Afrikai Egységszervezet (OAU), az Iszlám Konferencia Szervezete (OIC) és az Arab Liga (LAS) kezdettől támogatta a rendezést és aktívan, mintegy az ENSZ „*állandó partnereként*” részt vett a folyamatokban.

A három nemzetközi szervezet, mint láthattuk, tagállamain keresztül igyekezett felhívni az ENSZ figyelmét a szomáliai történésekre és elérni, hogy a Biztonsági Tanács foglalkozzon az ügygel – voltaképpen *de iure* ők indították be a világszervezet politikai gépezetét az adott ügyben. Ekkorra már egyébkéntis komoly erőfeszítések álltak az említett szervezetek háta mögött: a LAS közvetítője útján kapcsolatban állt a szembenálló felekkel és 1991 májusa óta működtetett egy Szomália-bizottságot, amely a szervezet későbbi vonatkozó határozatát is előkészítette; az OIC pedig az 1991-es év során a dzsibuti kerekasztal és a dzsiddai találkozó megszerzésével próbált meg –

¹¹ 792 (1992), BT-határozat. §§ 15, 18.

¹² PICCO, Giandomenico: *The UN and the Use of Force. Leave the Secretary General Out of It*, Foreign Affairs Vol. 73. 1994. N° 5/15-17.

sajnálatos módon kérészetűnek bizonyult – eredményeket elérni.¹³ Mind a LAS, mind az OIC 1991 végén, illetve 1992 elején megtárgyalta a kérdést és formális határozatban vetette fel az ENSZ szerepvállalásának lehetőségét,¹⁴ s ezeket a határozatokat kapta meg azután az ENSZ-főtitkár.

1992 elején, miután a BT is napirendre tűzte az ügyet, és szóba került valamiféle ENSZ-személyzet telepítése a válságzónába, a három szervezet a Biztonsági Tanács ülésén is aktiválta magát. Élve a BT eljárási szabályai nyújtotta lehetőséggel,¹⁵ az OAU soros elnökségét ellátó Nigéria képviselője, valamint a LAS és az OIC állandó megfigyelője is tanácskozási joggal a Tanács asztalához ült és ott ki is fejtette véleményét; ismertették eddigi erőfeszítéseiket és támogatták a főtitkár javaslatát is a későbbi BT-határozatra.¹⁶ A későbbiekben ezt a fajta koncentrált fellépést nem ismételték meg, de a Tanácsban ülő tagállamaikon keresztül mindig kifejtették a véleményüket. E tagállamok így egyszerre nyilvánultak meg saját nevükben és egy nemzetközi szervezet képviselőjeként.

Mindezek után nem csoda, hogy az 1992. február 12-14-i konzultációra a szembenálló felekkel Ghali meghívta a három „*állandó partner*” nemzetközi szervezet képviselőit is, amelyek a tárgyalásokon végig részt vettek a főtitkár, illetve helyettese oldalán. Első körben voltaképpen a főtitkár egyeztetett a partner nemzetközi szervezetek képviselőivel szerepvállalásukról a békefolyamatban;¹⁷ ennek során leszögezték, hogy a konzultációkba való bevonással egyetlen szomáliai frakciót sem kívánnak elismerni, pusztán a lehetőségekről kívánnak velük tárgyalni.¹⁸ A következő körben a főtitkár, illetve a három szervezet képviselői egyenként találkoztak a Mahdi elnök, illetve az Aidid tábornok vezette csoporttal. Annak terve, hogy a felek közvetlenül is leüljenek egymással tárgyalni, Aidid tábornok ellenállásán végül meghiúsult.¹⁹

A New York-i megbeszélések eredményeként a szembenálló felek hozzájárultak egy, a tűzszünet előkészítésén munkálkodó delegáció beengedéséhez Mogadishuba, amely Jonah főtitkárhelyettes vezetésével február végén meg is érkezett a szomáliai fővárosba. A delegáció az ENSZ, valamint a három partner nemzetközi szervezet közös delegációja volt és az elkövetkező napok során is ilyen minőségben folytatták tárgyalásaikat részben Mogadishuban, részben Addisz-Abeában. A megbeszélések eredményeként létrejött 1992. március 3-i tűzszüneti egyezmény – betartásának ellenőrzésére

¹³ S/PV. 3060. A Biztonsági Tanács 1992. március 17-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve.

¹⁴ LAS Council Res. N° 5157. Sixth Islamic Summit Conference Resolution on Somalia.

¹⁵ Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, 37-38. cikk.

¹⁶ S/PV 3060. A Biztonsági Tanács 1992. március 17-i ülésének jegyzőkönyve.

¹⁷ S/23693, főtitkári jelentés. §20 skk.

¹⁸ IHA/431. ENSZ sajtóközlemény.

¹⁹ S/23693, főtitkári jelentés. § 22.

az első kéksapkások megérkeztek Szomáliába²⁰ – megszületésénél bábáskodó nemzetközi szervezetek érdemeit a BT 746-os határozata is elismerte.²¹

A szomáliai politikai rendezést szolgáló tárgyalásokon ezután az ENSZ és a három partner nemzetközi szervezet együttműködése állandósult. A végleges rendezést szolgáló tervezett konferencia helyszínéül az OAU soros elnökeként Nigéria felajánlotta Abuját.²² A főtitkár speciális megbízottját szomáliai útjaira elkísérték a LAS, az OAU és az OIC képviselői is,²³ illetve a főtitkár speciális megbízottja is általában jelen volt a regionális szervezetek különböző tanácskozásainak Szomáliával kapcsolatos momentumain, illetve tárgyalásokat folytatott úgy a szembenálló felek képviselőivel, mint a partner nemzetközi szervezetekkel azok margóján.²⁴

A szomáliai politikai rendezésről zajló tárgyalássorozat első nagyobb köre 1992 tavaszán lezárult és a figyelem középpontjába a terepen végrehajtott műveletek, illetve az ezeket végrehajtó humanitárius szervezetek kerültek. Az UNOSOM felállításakor a három szervezethez tartozó államok derekasan kivették a részüket mind a csapatok küldéséből, mind a finanszírozásból²⁵, és továbbra is támogatták a diplomáciai rendezést, amelyre a helyzet romlása miatt mindinkább szükség lett.

1992 nyarán a rendezési folyamatba a három nagy szervezet aktivitását segítve még egy regionális csoport kapcsolódott be, mégpedig az „*Afrika szarva*” (Horn of Africa) régió államainak (Kenya, Etiópia, Eritrea, Dzsibuti, Szudán) csoportja, amelyek egyébként tagjai voltak a három nagy szervezet valamelyikének, esetleg többnek is. A csoport még a tavasz folyamán felállított egy Szomáliával foglalkozó állandó bizottságot, amely 1992. május 31-június 3 közötti időre Bahir Darba összehívta a szomáliai politikai erők képviselőit és aláíratott velük egy nyilatkozatot, s ebben hitet tesznek egy tartós tűzszünet megteremtése mellett és kinyilvánítják szándékukat egy mindenki által elismert ideiglenes kormány felállítására.²⁶ A bahir dari nyilatkozatban az aláírók arra is kötelezték magukat, hogy képviseltetik magukat az OAU Miniszterek Tanácsának június végi dakari találkozásán. Itt azután megjelent a főtitkár különleges megbízottja, Mohamed Shahoun is és rábírta a szomáliai politikai erők képviselőit, hogy beleegyezzenek egy 50 fős, az addisz-abebei megállapodásban foglalt tűzszünet ellenőrzését végző megfigyelői csoport Szomáliába telepítésébe.²⁷

Mindezeknek, valamint Shahoun és a partner szervezetek további koordinált erőfeszítéseinek köszönhetően a nyár folyamán az ENSZ fokozatosan emelni

²⁰ 746 (1992), BT-határozat.

²¹ 746 (1992), BT-határozat, preambulum.

²² S/23829, főtitkári jelentés. § 54.

²³ S/24343, főtitkári jelentés.

²⁴ S/24343, főtitkári jelentés.

²⁵ http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom1facts.html

²⁶ S/24184, biztonsági tanácsi előterjesztés.

²⁷ S/24179, főtitkári jelentés.

tudta az UNOSOM létszámát, amely szeptemberre elérte a 3.000 főt.²⁸ Az eredmények ellenére a helyzet mégsem javult, Aidid tábornok október végi nyilatkozata után pedig, amelyben az UNOSOM erőinek eltávolítását követelte Mogadishuból, miközben támadások érték a mogadishui kikötőt és repülőteret,²⁹ az ENSZ hozzáállása megváltozott. Miután Ghali főtitkár november 25-én találkozott az amerikai külügyi tárcát vezető Lawrence Eagleburgerrel, aki jelezte, hogy Washington kész vezető szerepet játszani egy esetleges békekikényszerítő műveletben,³⁰ a forгатókönyv néhány napon belül összeállt és 1992. december 3-án megszületett a Biztonsági Tanács erő alkalmazására felhatalmazó és a hadműveletet végrehajtó UNITAF-ot létrehozó határozata.³¹ Az informális konzultációkon történekről, illetve az Alapokmány VII. fejezete alá tartozó kényszerítő intézkedés várható alkalmazásáról Ghali még a kérdésről formálisan döntő 1992. december 3-i BT-ülés előtt külön informális levelekben tájékoztatta az OAU, a LAS és az OIC képviselőit.³²

Az UNITAF hadműveleteinek megkezdése a diplomáciai rendezés számára is új környezetet teremtett. Miután a somáliai humanitárius helyzet javulni kezdett, több erőfeszítést lehetett tenni a végleges rendezés ügyében. Az ekkor éppen üléselő ENSZ Közgyűlés ezért nemzetközi konferencia összehívását kezdeményezte a világszervezet felügyelete alatt a három partner nemzetközi szervezet, illetve az Afrika szarva csoport bevonásával a somáliai helyzet végleges rendezéséről.³³ A felhívásban érintett OAU, LAS, illetve OIC, valamint az Afrika szarva csoport állandó bizottságának képviselői még 1992 decemberében technikai találkozót tartottak Addisz-Abeában a Világbank képviselője részvételével, amelyen humanitárius kérdések mellett főleg a somáliai civil társadalom újjáépítése szerepelt a napirenden.³⁴ Néhány héttel később, 1993. január 4-15. között került sor a 14 somáliai politikai frakció, illetve az OAU, a LAS és az OIC, valamint az Afrika szarva csoport állandó bizottságának részvételével zajló, az ENSZ-főtitkár által elnökölt addisz-abebai találkozóra, amelynek napirendjén a politikai rendezéssel kapcsolatos kérdések szerepeltek. A találkozó első napján egyébként, az egy évvel korábbi New York-i tárgyalások mintájára, Ghali a partner nemzetközi szervezetekkel egyeztetett, a somáliaiakkal való tárgyalásokra csak ezután került sor. A találkozóon több megállapodás is született, közöttük a január 8-i általános

²⁸ 775 (1992), BT-határozat.

²⁹ S/24859, főtitkári jelentés.

³⁰ S/24868, biztonsági tanácsi előterjesztés.

³¹ 792 (1992), BT-határozat.

³² Letter dated 30. November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States reporting the five options presented to the Security Council in document S/24868 (Not issued as United Nations document). The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, Annex IV, Doc. 34.

³³ 74/167, közgyűlési határozat.

³⁴ A/48/504, közgyűlési előterjesztés.

megállapodás (General Agreement),³⁵ amelyben az aláírók az ellenségeskedések beszüntetése mellett ígéretet tettek egy 1993. március 15-re az etióp fővárosba összehívandó nemzeti megbékélési konferencia megrendezésére.³⁶ A konferencián született újabb addisz-abebei megállapodás a lefegyverzés, az UNOSOM II-vel való együttműködés és más egyebek mellett azt is tartalmazta, hogy a társadalmi élet újjászervezése érdekében helyi (kerületi) és regionális tanácsokat állítanak fel Szomáliában az átmenet levezénylésére, amelyek küldötteiből azután majd valamiféle ideiglenes parlament összeállhat.³⁷

A nemzeti megbékélés érdekében tett erőfeszítések azonban nem vezettek sikerre és időközben a biztonsági és humanitárius helyzet is aggasztó jeleket mutatott. Az UNITAF örökébe lépett UNOSOM II egyre súlyosabb támadásokkal nézett szembe.³⁸ A június 5-i és október 3-i mogadishui incidensek nyomán pedig a tagállamok hajlandósága is megfogyatkozott a misszió folytatására. Az október 3-i incidens után az USA, majd több más tagállam is bejelentette, hogy záros határidőn belül visszavonja csapatait az UNOSOM II-ből.³⁹ Az új helyzetben, Ghali térségbeli konzultációinak nyomán több opció kezdett körvonalazódni, és miközben a kivonulások miatt csökkenő létszámú UNOSOM II mandátumát folyamatosan néhány hónappal hosszabbították,⁴⁰ egyre valószínűbbé vált a misszió teljes távozása Szomáliából, s ez végül 1995. március 31-én következett be.

Az 1993 késő ősztől az UNOSOM II távozásáig tartó időszakban minden bizonytalanság ellenére is konszenzus volt abban, hogy a politikai rendezés elérésére szolgáló lépéseket az OAU, a LAS és az OIC bevonásával végig folytatni kell és igyekezni kell addig eredményt elérni, amíg az ENSZ-erők még a helyszínen vannak.⁴¹ A főtitkár és a partner nemzetközi szervezetek figyelmének középpontjában ekkoriban a helyi és regionális tanácsok beüzemelése, a szomáliai rendfenntartó erők felállítása, illetve egy újabb nemzeti megbékélési konferencia megszervezése állt. A rendfenntartó erők képzése úgy-ahogy haladt, a helyi tanácsok felállítása Aidid tábornok mozgalma, az SNA, valamint a többi szomáliai politikai erő és az ENSZ ellentétei miatt akadozott.⁴² Az újabb nemzeti megbékélési konferencia megtartásáról egy 1994 márciusában, Nairobiban tartott találkozón állapodtak meg a szomáliai politikai erők, a főtitkár, valamint a három partner nemzetközi szervezet képviselői. Ennek kezdetét május 15-ben határozták meg, azzal az

³⁵ S/25168, főtitkári jelentés, Annex II.

³⁶ S/25168, főtitkári jelentés, Annex II, § 1.

³⁷ UN Press Release SG/SM 5179

³⁸ S/26351, főtitkári jelentés.

³⁹ S/26738, biztonsági tanácsi előterjesztés. S/1994/12 - főtitkári jelentés.

⁴⁰ S/RES/886 (1993); S/RES/897 (1994); S/RES/923 (1994); S/RES/946 (1994); S/RES/953 (1994); S/RES/954 (1994).

⁴¹ S/26783, főtitkári jelentés.

⁴² S/1994/12, főtitkári jelentés.

ambícióval, hogy ott államfőt és kormányt is választanak.⁴³ Az időközben súlyosbodó ellenségeskedések miatt azonban a határidők folyamatosan tolódtak, egyre messzebb az eredeti időponttól, s közben több tartományban (Juba, Kismayo) összeomlott a tűzszünet. Ghali és a partner nemzetközi szervezetek főtitkárai folyamatosan konzultáltak,⁴⁴ miközben együtt győzködtek a feleket, illetve Ghali speciális megbízottja a belharcoktól gyötört Hawiye klán – ehhez tartozott Aidid és Mahdi elnök is – ellentéteinek elsimításán fáradozott.⁴⁵ A nyár és az őszi fáradozásainak eredménye azonban felemás lett: a nemzeti megbékélési konferencia ügye végleg megfeneklett azzal, hogy a felek még 1994 novemberében külön-külön megbékélési konferenciákat tartottak, kizárva a másik fél – illetve Aididéknál az ENSZ – képviselőit.⁴⁶ Igaz, 1995 februárjában a két fő ellenfél, Mahdi és Aidid végül békeegyezményt kötött. Az UNOSOM II kivonásáig azonban a biztonsági és humanitárius helyzet folyamatosan tovább romlott és a próbálkozások dacára már nem tudtak érdemi politikai eredményt elérni.

Egyéb szereplők: nem-kormányzati szervek, szakosított szervek és „filantrópok”

A Biztonsági Tanácsban zajló események, illetve a főtitkár és a vele együttműködő nemzetközi szervezetek diplomáciai tevékenysége mellett számos egyéb szervezet, mégpedig jobbra nemzetközi nem-kormányzati szervek, illetve az ENSZ szakosított szervei is bekapcsolódtak a szomáliai rendezés és segítségnyújtás folyamatába. Közéjük tartozott az ENSZ fejlesztési ügynöksége (UNDP), a Világélelmezési Program (WFP), az UNICEF, a WHO, a FAO, illetve a Menekültügyi Főbiztosság (UNHCR). Hozzájuk kapcsolódtak más nemzetközi humanitárius szervezetek, mint például a Nemzetközi Vöröskereszt, a Save the Children, illetve az egyes tagállamok humanitárius szervezetei.⁴⁷

Ezek a szervezetek a diplomáciai folyamatokban nem igazán voltak aktívak, viszont a konfliktus sújtotta helyszíneken az UNOSOM, illetve az UNITAF missziók mellett ezek végezték a tulajdonképpeni humanitárius munkát – a diplomáciai erőfeszítések tehát voltaképpen az ő munkájuk zavartalanságát szolgálták. Szerteágazó tevékenységük egymás közötti koordinálását szolgálta az Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), az UNOSOM-mal való összehangolásban pedig ez utóbbi humanitárius koordinátora játszott fontos szerepet.⁴⁸ A politikai szinthez való kapcsolódásukat szolgálta még a

⁴³ S/1994/614, főtitkári jelentés.

⁴⁴ S/1994/839, főtitkári jelentés.

⁴⁵ S/1994/977, főtitkári jelentés.

⁴⁶ S/1995/231, főtitkári jelentés.

⁴⁷ S/24343, főtitkári jelentés, valamint The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, Annex IV, Doc. 28.

⁴⁸ S/24859, főtitkári jelentés.

Közgyűlés 1992 végén hozott határozata is, amely a Titkárságon belül éppen a Szomália kapcsán megnőtt humanitárius aktivitás koordinálására létrehozta a humanitárius ügyek osztályát (Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DHA).⁴⁹

Ahogy a regionális politikai szervezetek együtt mozogtak a főtitkárral, a válság kezelésében résztvevő NGO-k ugyanúgy egyeztetették tevékenységüket egymással, illetve az ENSZ Titkárságával. Amikor 1992 őszén Eliasson főtitkárhelyettes Szomáliába látogatott felmérni a humanitárius helyzetet, vele érkeztek az NGO-k képviselői és együtt dolgozták ki az ENSZ 100 napos akciótervét a humanitárius helyzet javítására, és hasonló „koprodukción” készült a 100 napos terv utóda, az 1993 március – december időszakot átfogó segítségnyújtási és újjáépítési program (UN Relief and Rehabilitation Programme) is.⁵⁰ Az újjáépítési tevékenység finanszírozása érdekében az ENSZ megfelelő együttműködést alakított ki a Világbankkal is.⁵¹

A bemutatottakon kívül számos egyéb szereplő is részt vett valamilyen módon a Szomáliáért tett erőfeszítésekben. Közéjük tartozott az USA Kongresszusának tekintélyes tagjai által alapított és vezetett bizottság, a Select Committee on Hunger⁵², amelynek több tagja (Tony P. Hall, Nancy Kesselbaum, Paul Simon) is levelezésben állt a főtitkárral az ENSZ szomáliai missziója idején és javaslatokat tettek neki a humanitárius segítség eljuttatásának legegyszerűbb módjára.⁵³ Ghali főtitkár emellett hasonló levelezésben volt 1992-1993 fordulóján Mary Robinson ír államfővel és David Andrews ír külügyminiszterrel is.⁵⁴

Béketeremtés a hidegháború után: a sokszereplős játszma

1987 és 1994 között az ENSZ által kezelt konfliktusok száma megháromszorozódott, a Biztonsági Tanács által egy évben hozott határozatok száma megnégyszereződött. A békefenntartó missziók száma 5-ről 17-re, a bennük résztvevő katonák száma 10 ezerről 73 ezerre emelkedett.⁵⁵ Nem véletlenül nevezik ezt az időszakot az új intervencionizmus korszakának.⁵⁶ Ahogy az ENSZ egyre szélesebb körben – immár belső konfliktusokra is – kezdte alkalmazni az Alapokmány VII. fejezetét,⁵⁷ úgy mosódtak el a határok

⁴⁹ 16/182, közgyűlési határozat.

⁵⁰ The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, Annex IV, Doc. 29, Doc. 50.

⁵¹ A/RES/48/504, közgyűlési előterjesztés.

⁵² <http://www.hungercenter.org/chc/history.htm>

⁵³ The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, Annex IV, Docs 7, 18, 22.

⁵⁴ The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, Annex IV, Docs 27, 46.

⁵⁵ WHITFIELD: 30.

⁵⁶ MAYALL, James (szerk.): *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994. United Nations experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996. 3-4.

⁵⁷ MATHESON, Michael J.: *Council Unbound. The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War*. United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington 2006. 51, 53.

politikai-katonai és humanitárius fenyegetettség, az állami szuverenitás és a nemzetközi közösség felelőssége között. Mindez persze azt is jelentette, hogy azon tényezők, szereplők száma is megnőtt, amelyek így vagy úgy befolyást tudtak gyakorolni a nemzetközi közösségre, így az ENSZ-re egy-egy adott ügyben. Megjelenésük az ENSZ számára, amelynek az előző négy évtizedben kialakult struktúráját kemény kihívásként érte az új feladatoknak mind a száma, mind azok korábbiaktól eltérő karaktere, egyszerre jelentett alkalmazkodási kényszert és lehetőséget arra, hogy bevonásukkal hatékonyabban lássa el feladatát. Ennek a folyamatnak a keretében erősödött meg a főtítkárok önálló diplomáciai szerepe is.⁵⁸

Bár az „új intervencionizmus” korszakának egyik fejleménye éppen az volt, hogy a politikai és humanitárius veszély fogalma nem különült már el egymástól. Voltaképpen ez a fogalmi kiterjesztés tette lehetővé az ENSZ Alapokmány VII. fejezetének alkalmazását a Biztonsági Tanács számára Szomália ügyében.⁵⁹ A konfliktus kezelése során aztán érzékelhetően elvált egymástól a humanitárius helyzet megoldása, illetve a hosszú távú politikai rendezés ügye, és e két vonulat kezelésében sajátos munkamegosztás jött létre a szereplők között. A főtitkár funkciójából adódóan mindkét területen aktív volt, hiszen mind a műveletek operatív irányítása, mind a döntések előkészítése, mind a speciális megbízottján keresztül bonyolított diplomáciai háttértevékenység valahol az ő kezében futott össze. A két területen azonban eltérő „szövetségesekre” számíthatott, akikkel együtt tudott működni. A humanitárius ügyekben elsődleges partnerei azok a nemzetközi humanitárius NGO-k és szakosított szervek képviselői (Vöröskereszt, World Food Programme, UNICEF, stb.) voltak, amelyek munkatársai a helyszínen tartózkodva ténylegesen részt vettek a helyzet kezelésében. Diplomáciai síkon a főtitkár „barátai” elsősorban a fentiekben bemutatott regionális nemzetközi formációk – az OAU, a LAS, az OIC, illetve részben a Horn of Africa csoport – voltak, amelyek így vagy úgy maguk is érdekeltnek számítottak a helyzet megoldásában és ennek érdekében folyamatos kapcsolatban álltak a főtitkárral, sőt összehangolták vele diplomáciai tevékenységüket.

Ez utóbbi csoport, vagyis a főtitkár „barátai” csoportjának megjelenése az ENSZ konfliktuskezelő tevékenységében jellegzetesen hidegháború utáni fejlemény. Ezek informális, éppen ezért rugalmas, ám nehezen dokumentálható tevékenysége hatékony segédfunkcióként jelent meg a Peking-formula óta egyre önállóbb főtitkári diplomácia mellett.⁶⁰ A sajátos szimbiózisból mindkét fél profitált: a főtitkár szavai, kezdeményezései nagyobb nyomatékot kaptak az együttműködés által, az együttműködő tagállamok vagy nemzetközi szervezetek pedig nagyobb befolyáshoz és nemzetközi figyelemhez jutottak.

⁵⁸ SUTTERLIN, James S.: *United Nations and the maintenance of International Security. A Challenge to Be Met*. Praeger, Westport – London 2003. 138-139.

⁵⁹ MAYALL: 9.

⁶⁰ WHITFIELD: 12.

Hozzá kell ugyanakkor tenni, hogy a főtitkár „*barátainak*” csoportjában általában térségi vagy globális nagyhatalmak szoktak meghatározó szerepet játszani. Szomália esetében viszont az tehette lehetővé az említett nemzetközi szervezetek és csoportok előtérbe kerülését, hogy távoli, bonyolult, nem-állami szereplők által vívott és alapvető nagyhatalmi érdeket nem érintő mivolta miatt Szomália tipikusan „*árva konfliktus*” volt, amelyben éppen ezért egyetlen nagyhatalom sem sietett exponálni magát.⁶¹ Ebben az értelemben tehát a regionális nemzetközi szervezetek sajátos úrt töltötték be.

A béketeremtés gyakorlati folyamata tehát, amit az ENSZ Alapokmánya alapján kétpólusú, a Biztonsági Tanács (illetve az öt képviselő erők) és a kényszerítő intézkedésnek alávetett fél közötti folyamatként képzelhetünk el, sajátos módon kinyílt és többpólusúvá vált. Ebben a Biztonsági Tanács mellett szerepet kapott egyrészt a főtitkár mint önálló diplomáciai szereplő, illetve az ő tevékenységét jelenlétükkel, nyomásgyakorlásukkal vagy más módon elősegítő államok, országcsoportok, nemzetközi szervezetek. Ez a nyitás minden jel szerint egybevágott az ENSZ szándékaival; olyannyira, hogy az 1992-es Békeprogram (Agenda for Peace) regionális nemzetközi szervezetekről szóló része a szomáliai együttműködést (valamint a főtitkár „*barátainak*” intézményét) mint követendő példát nevezi meg.⁶² A béketeremtésnek ez a megnyitása a nemzetközi politikai élet különféle szereplői előtt a pozitív eredménnyel járt az ENSZ számára, hogy esélyt adott egy új korszak új kihívásaira új mechanizmusokkal reagálni.

A nemzetközi konfliktuskezelés illetően „*társadalmasítása*” ugyanakkor politikai értelemben a felelősségi viszonyokat sem hagyta érintetlenül. Számos hatalom részéről szokás ugyanis úgy tekinteni az Egyesült Nemzeteket, mint egy tehetetlen, bürokratikus szervezetet, amely képtelennek bizonyult feladatai ellátására, többek között Szomália esetében is. Az ENSZ konfliktuskezelő tevékenysége azonban a '90-es években a nemzetközi szervezetek, tagállamok vagy azok csoportjai bevonásával kinyílt annyira, hogy az esetleges kudarcokért meglehetősen kevésbé elegáns csak és kizárólag a világszervezetet hibáztatni. Nem szabad megfeledkezni azok felelősségéről sem, akik – igaz, informálisan és időnként nehezen dokumentálható módon – maguk is tevékeny részt vállaltak az események alakításában.

⁶¹ Uo. 7-8. 31.

⁶² A/47/277-S/24111 (Agenda for Peace), §62 skk.

Krisztina Slachta

***Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten in der Gegenkultur der
Jugend in West- und Ost-Europa sowie ihre Wirkung auf die Mode
Die Umstände der Herausbildung gegenkultureller Bekleidung
und der Antimode***

Laut der Definition von Gábor Klaniczay, kann eine kulturelle Erscheinung als Gegenkultur bezeichnet werden, wenn diese in all ihren Aspekten gegenüber den herrschenden kulturellen Normen steht und zu ihnen in allen Bereichen eine Alternative bietet. Die in den 60er Jahren auftretenden Jugendkulturen standen einerseits der damaligen Elitkultur, andererseits der kommerziellen Kultur gegenüber und markierten in all ihren Aspekten neue Wege, weshalb diese – obwohl sie keine einheitliche Bewegung war – als Gegenkultur bezeichnet werden kann.¹ Die Zeit der Gegenkultur der Jugend und die des „*kulturellen Konflikts*“² kann zwischen 1960 und 1975 gelegt werden, welche in der Tiefe der Ereignisse Änderungen³ hervorrief, von denen die ganze Gesellschaft in ihren Grundlagen betroffen war.

Die Erscheinungen, die zusammenfassend Gegenkultur genannt werden, gewinnen immer erst im Vergleich zur Kultur der Mehrheit einen Sinn. Sie selbst bestimmen nämlich das eigene Dasein und die eigene Tätigkeit im Vergleich zu dieser Kultur, obwohl dies in den meisten Fällen natürlich kein bewusster Prozess ist. Die Meinung der gegenkulturellen Gruppen über die Mehrheit der Gesellschaft kristallisiert sich am meisten in deren kulturellen „*Produkten*“ heraus. Ihr Gegenüberstehen wird auf anschaulichster und

¹ KLANICZAY Gábor: *Ellenkultúra a hetvenes-nyolcvanas években* (Gegenkultur in den 70er und 80er Jahren), Noran Kiadó, Budapest 2004. 17-24.

² Gerhard Schulze, deutscher Soziologe, beschreibt am Ende seiner Arbeit, Erlebnisgesellschaft – Die Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart, den Weg zur Herausbildung der Erlebnisgesellschaft in drei Phasen. In dieser Beschreibung nennt er die Zeit zwischen 1960-1975 der Zeit des kulturellen Konflikts. SCHULZE, Gerhard: *Die Erlebnisgesellschaft. Kultursoziologie der Gegenwart*, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, New York 1992. 535.

³ Die traditionellen gesellschaftshistorischen Großgruppen haben ihre gesellschaftlichen Positionen verloren, die neu gebildeten Gruppen wurden jedoch allmählich bedeutender und haben ihre Rollen unauffällig übernommen. Die bislang hierarchische Schichtung verlor ihre Gültigkeit, bot keine sicheren Orientierungspunkte mehr, das Lebensalter als neuer Aspekt der gesellschaftlichen Wahrnehmung hat plötzlich und mit großem Schwung die traditionellen gesellschaftlichen Großgruppen umstrukturiert. „*Das bestimmende Milieu der Zeit bestand aus gebildeten Jugendliche – Gymnasialschülern und Studenten. Im Hinblick auf die Wahrnehmung um den Unterschied zwischen jung und alt wurde die gewohnte Positionsbestimmung von oben und unten zweideutig, vorübergehend sogar umgekehrt. (...) Die Hierarchisierung der gesellschaftlichen Milieus wurde von der Hierarchisierung auf Grund des Lebensalters durchkreuzt.*“ SCHULZE, Gerhard: *A Német Szövetségi Köztársaság kulturális átalakulása* (Kultureller Wandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland), IN: WESSELY Anna (Hrsg.): *A kultúra szociológiája* (Kultursoziologie), Osiris – Láthatatlan Kollégium, Budapest 2003. 186-204.

empörendster Weise mit Hilfe ihrer Bekleidung zum Ausdruck gebracht, die ebenfalls als kulturelles Produkt interpretiert werden kann.

Die Wurzeln der Antimode findet man noch in den Jugendsubkulturen der 50er Jahre, deren explosionsartige Verbreitung später als die sich zur Zeiten des „*kulturellen Konflikts*“ und der Revolution der Jugend entfaltende Mode der Gegenkultur verfolgt werden kann. Die revolutionäre Neuheit der Antimode kann in ihrer wahren Bedeutung erst dann betrachtet werden, wenn diese mit der jeweiligen Mode der Mehrheit verglichen wird, jedoch gibt es in der vorliegenden Arbeit aus inhaltlichen Gründen keine Möglichkeit dazu.

Ursprünglich wurde Antimode als von den Gegenkulturen vertretene Gegen-Mode interpretiert,⁴ wobei nach der kulturellen Revolution der Jugend praktisch die Kleidungsgehnheiten aller Jugendsubkulturen, später die aus diesen in die Alltagsmode übernommenen Elemente oder die sich aus diesen ernährenden Modestile zusammenfassend Antimode genannt wurden. Im Vergleich zur Alltagsbekleidung sind die Elemente der Antimode stets empörend, für beide Geschlechter gleichermaßen gedacht und steht in ihren Materialien, Formen und Farben im Gegensatz zu den gewohnten, allgemein akzeptierten Bekleidungstraditionen.

Zur Zeiten der Kultur- und Jugendrevolutionen waren alle unter 25 „*Mitglieder*“ dieser gegenkulturellen Bewegung, in dem Sinne, dass sie dieselbe Kleidung getragen und dieselbe Musik gehört hatten, sowie auf beiden Seiten des Eisernen Vorhangs im Kampf gegen ihre Eltern, ihre Lehrer, sprich gegen die ganze ältere Generation standen.⁵ Der ständige Slogan dieser Zeit war: „*Glaube niemandem über 30*“. Die Jugendlichen erfanden damals scheinbar umwälzend neue Dinge und entfachten in bestimmten Fällen politische Revolutionen. Dabei setzten sie sich einerseits gegen ihre den vorstädtischen Alltag des kleinbürgerlichen Wohlstands genießenden Eltern, andererseits für die eigene Kultur, für die Entfaltung der eigenen Lebensweise ein.⁶

Auch die neue Musik der Jugendlichen empörte die Älteren. Da die Schilderung der Musik dieser Zeit ebenfalls aus inhaltlichen Gründen nahezu unmöglich wäre, befasse ich mich in meiner Arbeit ausschließlich mit der Bekleidung, obwohl es natürlich nicht bestritten werden kann, dass

⁴ KÖNIG, René: *Divat és antidivat* (Mode und Antimode.), IN: KLANICZAY Gábor - S. NAGY Katalin (Hrsg.): *Divatszociológia* (Modesozilogie), Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, Budapest 1982. 44-51.

⁵ In Ungarn wurde bis Ende der 60er Anfang der 70er Jahre „*die Frage der Kleidung zur Privatsache. Wenn eine Frage zur Diskussion stand, verbargen sich im Hintergrund Generationsunterschiede bzw. die unterschiedliche Interpretation von Traditionen und Geohnheiten.*“ VALUCH Tibor: *A lódentől a miniszoknyáig* (Vom „Loden“-Mantel bis zum Minirock), Corvina Kiadó, Budapest 2004. 97.

⁶ HRADIL, Stefan: *Régi fogalmak és új struktúrák. Milió-, szubkultúra- és életstílus-kutatás a 80-as években* (Alte Begriffe, neue Strukturen. Milieu-, Subkultur- und Lebensstilforschung in den 80er Jahren), IN: ANDORKA Rudolf - HRADIL, Stefan - PESCHAR, Jules L. (Hrsg.): *Társadalmi rétegzódés*. Aula Kiadó, Budapest 1995. 347-387.

die beiden – Musik und Mode – in der besagten Periode voneinander unzertrennlich waren.

Die Zeit des kulturellen Konflikts kam am spektakulärsten in der Bekleidung zum Vorschein: es kann als (Mode-)Machtübernahme der Jugend bezeichnet werden. Diese Jahre lösten den als „youthquake“⁷ bezeichneten Anstoß aus, dessen „Nachbeben“ bis zum heutigen Tag die aktuellen Trends bestimmen. Von dieser Zeit an kann von parallelen, zur selben Zeit existierenden Moderichtungen gesprochen werden, die anstelle der Hegemonie des jeweilig aktuellsten Trends treten. Der sich in den Bekleidungen spektakulär manifestierende Aufstand mündete schließlich Ende der 70er Jahre in einem großen Konsummodewahn.

Bis zu den 60ern konnten alle Erscheinungen der Mode mit der Spencer'schen bzw. Simmel'schen Nachahmungstheorien⁸ beschrieben werden, die auch als klassische Verbreitungstheorie der Mode bezeichnet werden können, jedoch wälzte der kulturelle Konflikt die traditionellen Funktionen und Verbreitungsweisen der Mode um. In dieser Zeit erlebte die europäische Mode grundlegende Veränderungen. Es waren nicht mehr die Pariser Modedesigner, die die Trends bestimmten, es galt nicht mehr ausschließlich ein einziger Stil als modisch und nicht alle wissen, was die Mode von heute ist bzw. was die von gestern war. Es werden nicht mehr die reichsten und vornehmsten Damen nachgeahmt, sondern die Vielfältigkeit, die Vielfarbigkeit und die Originalität werden zu neuen Werten in der Mode.⁹ Das Objekt des Nachahmens änderte sich auch in ost-westlicher Relation: in den sozialistischen Ländern vertiefte man sich auch nicht mehr in den Pariser Modeblättern, sondern man versuchte die empörendsten Kleidungsstücke der westlichen Jugend zu besorgen oder zu kopieren.

„Wenn sich jemand vor den 60er Jahren nicht nach der herrschenden Mode kleidete, der teilte auf diese Weise über sich mit, dass er arm ist.“¹⁰ Von jetzt an aber gaben die anders Gekleideten der Welt ihre Freiheit, ihre Unabhängigkeit, ihre Jugendlichkeit und ihre Rebellion gegen die „Anciene Regime“ mit ihrer Bekleidung zum Verständnis. In diesem Sinne wurde alles zur Mode, was bis dahin nicht als modisch galt: die Volkstracht, die

⁷ STEELE, Valerie: *Fifty years of fashion – New look to now*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2000. 49.

⁸ Laut dieser Theorien wird die Verbreitung der Mode damit erklärt, dass die Menschen dazu neigen, die anderen in ihrer Umgebung nachzuahmen und gleichzeitig die zwischen ihnen bestehenden Unterschiede zu betonen. SPENCER, Herbert: *A divat* (Die Mode), IN: KLANICZAY Gábor - S. NAGY Katalin (Hrsg.) *Divatszociológia* (Modesoziologie), Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, Budapest 1982. 33-37. SIMMEL, Georg: *A divat* (Die Mode), IN: SIMMEL, Georg: *Válogatott társadalomelméleti tanulmányok* (Ausgewählte gesellschaftstheoretische Studien), Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest 1982. 473-507.

⁹ CRANE, Diana: *Fashion and its social agendas. Class, gender and identity in clothing*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 2000. 132-170.

¹⁰ BAUDOT, Francois: *Divat a XX. században* (Die Mode im 20. Jahrhundert), Park Kiadó, Budapest 2000. 188.

Arbeitsbekleidung, die grellen, farbigen oder alten, abgenutzten Kleidungsstücke. Es konnten praktisch alle Kleidungsstücke in der alltäglichen Bekleidung eine Verwendung finden, sogar jeder Gegenstand, jeder Krempel konnte zum Teil der Bekleidung werden.¹¹

In den 60er Jahren erschienen die Jugendlichen selbst in Osteuropa als selbständige Kaufkräfte in der Modewelt. Die Vertreter des klassischen Stils bemerkten auf einmal, dass die Jugendlichen die Führung übernommen haben¹² nicht nur auf der Straße, sondern auch in der Welt des „*Haute Couture*“-s, der Pariser Modehäuser. Die Mode der Straßen drängte in die Salons. Da die revolutionären Kleider der unverschämten jungen und unbekanntem Designer parallel zur Straßenmode entstanden sind, waren es nicht mehr die klassischen Haute-Couture-Kollektionen die Einfluss auf die Alltagsmode hatten. Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte hatten die Jugendlichen ihre eigene Mode, was an sich selbst schon empörend auf die älteren Generationen wirkte.

Das allgemeine Steigen des Lebensniveaus bewegt laut Bourdieu die Individuen dazu, nicht mehr die traditionellen Konsummodelle der eigenen Gruppe zu folgen, sondern sich solche Modelle anzueignen, die solche Gruppen zum eigenen nennen, zu denen sie gehören möchten. Bourdieu schickt voraus, dass dieser Prozess zum Erscheinen von neuen Konsummodellen führt, bei denen die Art des Konsums primär betont wird. Auf diese Weise werden die Ungleichheiten aus der Sphäre des materiellen Konsums in die des symbolischen Verbrauchs verlegt. Statt des quantitativen Aspekts des Konsums wird dessen Qualität bestimmend.¹³

Die Wirkung all dieser Veränderungen kann auch im Bereich der Mode beobachtet werden, denn die Revolution der Jugend hat die traditionellen Strukturen der Mode völlig durcheinander gebracht. Seitdem können alle neuen Trends und alle Modeerscheinungen als Folge dieser Veränderung gedeutet werden. Die Mode wurde in dieser Zeit nicht nur jünger, sondern auch demokratischer und internationaler und verlor ihren Elitecharakter. Der Prozess

¹¹ HEBDIDGE, Dick: *A stílus mint célzatos kommunikáció* (Der Stil als beabsichtigte Kommunikation), Replika, 1996/21-22. 183.

¹² „Die Jugend wurde nicht nur als selbständige Gruppe, sondern in ihrer Ganzheitlichkeit zum Schöpfer auf dem Gebiet der Mode. Ein bedeutender Punkt ist, dass die Jugend beginnt die Erwachsenenmode zu verändern. Diese strukturelle Veränderung verspricht lang anhaltend zu sein, denn sie wird vom Bewusstwerden dieser einzigartig neuen Situation bzw. ihrer Veränderung im Bewusstsein begleitet, welche ein neues Modemoral schaffen und dazu neue Wertmesser, neue Richtlinien und neue Weltanschauungen kreieren, die sich nicht nur in der Politik und Ästhetik, sondern auch durch die Mode immer mehr verbreiten. Zusammenfassend kann festgestellt werden, dass sich jene weit reichende und auf sicherer Grundlage ruhende Revolution der Jugend vor unseren Augen abspielt, welche beginnt, die ganze Gesellschaft zu verändern.“ KÖNIG, René: *Divat és antidivat* (Mode und Antimode), IN: KLANICZAY Gábor - S. NAGY Katalin (Hrsg.): *Divatszociológia* (Modesozilogie), Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, Budapest 1982. 47.

¹³ BOURDIEU, Pierre: *A társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek újratermelése* (Die Reproduktion der gesellschaftlichen Ungleichheiten), Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest 1978. 136-145.

aus den 50ern hat sich voll entfaltet, infolge dessen sich viel mehr Menschen „modisch“ kleiden konnten, sie konnten sich solche Kleidungsstücke leisten, die sie sich vorher nie haben leisten können.

Dieser Prozess kann als Generationsweltphänomen betrachtet werden, das sowohl in den entwickelten, als auch in den sozialistischen Ländern beobachtet werden kann. Die Gegenkultur der Jugendlichen ist der Nachkriegsgeneration ihr Eigen, wird von Politik nur leicht gefärbt und er spielt sich mit ein Paar Jahren Unterschied auf gleicher Weise auch in den Ostblockländern ab. Möglicherweise ist dies das einzige Mal, wo der Eiserner Vorhang verblasste und die Revolte gegen die ältere Generation im Osten ebenfalls ausbrach.¹⁴

Allgemeine Charakteristika der Jugendbekleidung in den 60er und 70er Jahren

Die kulturellen Veränderungen waren so rapide, das von einer Minute auf die andere alles aus der Mode gekommen war, was bis dahin als modisch galt. Es war nicht genug die alten Kleider einfach zu kürzen, weil eine völlig neue Silhouette entstand, deren wichtigstes Detail die ein wenig nach oben oder nach unten gerichtete Verschiebung der Taillenlinie war. Nach der Zeit der schmalen Taillen und dem betonten Dekolletée wurden kleine Brüste, ein wohlgeformter Bauch und eine unbetonte Taille zum Ideal, die sichtbare Schlankheit wurde also vom ganzheitlich dünnen Frauenkörper abgelöst. Diese neue Silhouette verbreitete sich rasch, zwischen 1965 und 1968 hat sich alles geändert, was mit Kleidung in Verbindung steht, die Farben, die Stoffe, die Muster, die Schnitte, die Art des Zuschneidens und des Nähens, die Accessoires, die Frisuren.

Neben der Veränderung der Formen und Farben ist es wichtig zu betonen, dass sich auch die Art des Tragens von einem Kleidungsstück, sowie die Bewegungskultur verändert haben. Der Gang wurde freier und lockerer, was die Begleiterscheinung des unmittelbaren, befreiten Lebensstils der Jugend war. Die aristokratische Manier ging aus der Mode, stattdessen wurden die sonnengebräunte Haut und die kurzen Haare in. Die Befreiung des Frauenkörpers¹⁵ zeigte sich zuerst in den verschiedenen Kleidungsstücken, die völlige Bewegungsfreiheit garantierten.

¹⁴ „Die Jugendsubkulturen sind in zahlreichen Ländern von West- und Osteuropa gleichzeitig erschienen, was darauf schließen lässt, dass in den einzelnen Ländern – trotz der politischen Unterschiede – die strukturelle Rolle der Jugend innerhalb der Gesellschaft und die sich daraus ergebenden Konflikte analog interpretiert werden können. Ob ‚Kapitalismus‘ oder ‚Sozialismus‘ das geeignetste Mittel zur emotionalen Selbstdarstellung der Jugend schien Rock and Roll zu sein.“ HORVÁTH Sándor: *Huligánok, jampecek, galerik. Fiatalok szubkultúrái a hatvanas éveken* („Huligán“, „Jampec“ und „Galeri“). Jugendsubkulturen in den 60er Jahren in Ungarn, IN: Rainer M. János (Hrsg.): *„Hatvanas évek“ Magyarországon* (Die „Sechziger Jahre“ in Ungarn), 1956-os Intézet, Budapest 2004. 410.

¹⁵ Zur gleichen Zeit wie die Jugendrevolution, die Verbreitung des Feminismus‘ und die Rebellion gegen die konservativen Werte, hat sich auch der Gebrauch der Antibabypille

Die Revolution des Minirocks bedeutete nicht nur, dass Frauenkleidung bis dahin noch nie so kurz war, sondern sie veränderte auch das Frauenideal: dieses Kleidungsstück brachte die kindliche, beinahe knabenhafte Figur der Teenager in Mode, ab jetzt war nicht mehr von „Frauen“ die Rede, sondern von „Mädchen“. Diese Unterscheidung ist in der englischen Sprache noch anschaulicher: statt „*woman*“ wurde „*girl*“ der herrschende Wortgebrauch, in den Medien hat sich sogar das Wort „*baby*“ verbreitet.¹⁶

Zu der charakteristischen Jugendbekleidung gehörten die grellen Kleider und Hemde, extrakurze oder extralange Röcke und Mäntel, Stiefel, die bis zu den Knöcheln, Knien oder Schenkel reichten, bunte Schuhe, farbige Strümpfe, Kleider mit Blumen oder geometrischen Mustern, weite, romantische Röcke, Pelze, afghanische Schafspelze und Westen, Sonnenbrillen, gehäkelte und gestrickte Kleidungsstücke, Mußelinkleider, Jeans mit Stickereien, Blumenmustern, riesige Taschen, lange Ketten aus bunten Perlen. Gebrauchte Kleidung kam ebenfalls in Mode, die mit neuen gemischt getragen wurden, sogar selbst gemachte oder selbst gestickte Stücke waren in.

Neben der grundlegenden Veränderung der Frauengarderobe wurden die älteren Generationen auch von der Bekleidung der Männer zu tiefst empört. Eine Folge der kulturellen Revolution der Jugend war die Verbreitung der Unisexbekleidung. Die jungen Paare trugen die Kleider des anderen, es gab keine ausgesprochene Frauen- und Männerkleidungsstücke. Das T-Shirt und die Jeans wurden zu Uniformen, auch die traditionelle Männerkleidung verjüngerte sich, die Jacketts und Hemde wurden schlanker, es wurden enge Hosen ohne Aufschlag angefertigt. Der Gebrauch der neuen Stoffe machte auch die traditionelle Männerbekleidung viel leichter. Knielange Mäntel und Hemde, die man über die Hose tragen konnte, waren in Mode. Der Rollkragenpullover hat sich verbreitet, der das Hemd und die Krawatte verdrängte. Zusammen mit den Studentenbewegungen wurde auch der Mao-Anzug populär.

Die als modern bezeichnete Männerbekleidung entwickelte sich in der Zeit der französischen Revolution und blieb seither beinahe unverändert. In den vergangenen 150 Jahren versuchten Männer mit ihrer Kleidung die eigene Seriosität zum Ausdruck zu bringen, weshalb sie der Mode nur mäßig folgten. In die Praxis umgesetzt bedeutet dies lediglich einige kleine Änderungen am Schnitt. Die jungen Männer stellten sich mit der neuen Mode, mit ihrer auffallend schlampigen, eventuell femininen Art und ihrer bunten Bekleidung gegen diese Tradition.

Viele Frauen und Männer trugen Stiefel, die Schuhe wurden meist mit breiter, runder oder eckiger Spitze und einem breiten, flachen Absatz hergestellt. Dabei wurden auch natürlichen Stoffe verwendet, aber

verbreitet, was den Frauen einen viel freieren Umgang mit ihrer Sexualität und den früheren Beginn ihres Sexuallebens erlaubte.

¹⁶ STEELE, Valerie: *Fifty years of fashion – New look to now*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2000. 55.

hauptsächlich waren Lack und bunte Materialien beliebt. Zu den Miniröcken trugen die Frauen Stiefel, die bis zu den Schenkeln reichten, es wurden auch Schuhe aus Plastik in bunten Farben und vielerlei Verzierungen angefertigt.¹⁷

Die Frage war nicht nur wie lang die Röcke sind, denn in der Zeit der revolutionären Minirockmode zählten ein Paar Zentimeter mehr oder weniger nicht mehr, das empörendste war die Verbreitung der Frauenhosen. Als Arbeits-, Sport- oder elegante Bekleidung war die Hose ausschließlich grundlegender Teil der Herrengarderobe.¹⁸ Ihre Verwendung als Frauenbekleidung stellt sowohl die Unterschiede, als auch die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den beiden Geschlechtern dar, sie wurde zum Symbol der Gleichberechtigung der Frauen und der Freiheit des Frauenkörpers.

Die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse der westeuropäischen Jugendbekleidung

In Westeuropa brachte die Massenproduktion einen im Alltagsleben nie da gewesenen Wohlstand und einen sprunghaften Konsumwachstum mit sich. Die Nachkriegsgeneration richtete sich gegen den Lebensstil und gegen die Lebensauffassung ihrer Eltern und versuchte sich eine eigene Denk- und Lebensweise zu gestalten.¹⁹ Diese Veränderung vollzog sich äußerst rasch und spektakulär. Die ältere Generation fühlte sich angegriffen, da die eigenen Kinder alles, was für sie Sicherheit und Geborgenheit bedeutete, aufwühlen wollten. Die Jugendbewegungen waren mit politischen Forderungen verbunden: der Protest gegen den Vietnam-Krieg, die Bürgerrechtbewegung der Schwarzen, später der Kampf um die Rechte der Homosexuellen, der Feminismus, sowie die Studentenaufstände, die in Europa mit den Forderungen der Arbeiter verflochten waren.

Die Kleidung wurde immer billiger und in immer größeren Mengen hergestellt, mehrere Stile waren gleichzeitig in Mode. Eine Vielzahl an kleinen Läden wurde eröffnet, in denen von mehreren Firmen hergestellte Kleidung im gleichen Stil verkauft wurde. In vielen Geschäften konnte man auch Vorort und in kleinen Mengen angefertigte Stücke, zusammen mit asiatischer Volkstracht

¹⁷ REI, Nii: *A 20. század második fele* (Die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts), IN: AKIKO, Fukai - TAMAMI, Suoh - MIKI, Iwagami - REIKO, Koga - REI, Nii (Hrsg.): *A divat története a 18.-20. században. A Kyoto Costume Institut gyűjteménye* (Die Geschichte der Mode vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Die Sammlung des Kyoto Costume Institute), Vince Kiadó, Budapest 2003. 568. 590.

¹⁸ Die Frauen trugen bereits seit den 30ern Hosen, jedoch nur zu Hause, im Urlaub oder beim Sport. An vornehmeren Orten und an vielen Arbeitsplätzen war das Hosentragen praktisch verboten. BAUDOT, Francois: *Divat a XX. században* (Die Mode im 20. Jahrhundert), Park Kiadó, Budapest 2000. 226.

¹⁹ SCHULZE, Gerhard: *A Német Szövetségi Köztársaság kulturális átalakulása* (Kultureller Wandel in den Bundesrepublik Deutschland), IN: WESSELY Anna (Hrsg.): *A kultúra szociológiája* (Kultursoziologie), Osiris – Láthatatlan Kollégium, Budapest 2003. 190.

und von überallher stammenden Secondhand-Kleidern kaufen. Neben den großen Warenhäusern und den kleinen Geschäften haben sich in dieser Zeit auch die Versandhäuser verbreitet, die ihre Erfolge dem zu verdanken hatten, dass ihr Angebot mit Kleidungsstücken erweitert wurde, die für Jugendliche gedacht waren. Das erste Versandhaus, das solche Kleidung verkaufte, war Biba in Groß-Britannien, das auch eigene Läden hatte, vor denen die Menschen oft in langen Schlangen standen.²⁰

Die Bekleidung der westeuropäischen Jugend wurde von einigen solchen Faktoren beeinflusst, die auch als Gründe für die grundlegenden Unterschiede zur Kleidung der osteuropäischen Jugend aufgefasst werden können. Ein solcher wichtiger Faktor ist der Zugriff auf die Kleidung, dem im Westen eigentlich nur die Brieftaschen der Jugendlichen Grenzen setzten, während in den sozialistischen Ländern bereits das Besorgen der Kleidungsstücke auf Hindernisse stieß. Bis zu dieser Zeit haben sich die finanziellen Möglichkeiten erweitert, die erste Generation nach dem Krieg wurde erwachsen, die besonders offen für die Möglichkeiten der neuen Verhältnisse waren: in der Gesellschaft der Fülle²¹ war der Ziel der Bekleidung nicht mehr die Befriedigung von Alltagsbedürfnissen, sondern der Ausdruck der Wahlgruppenzugehörigkeit.

Ein anderer wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen Ost und West war, dass die westeuropäischen Jugendlichen nur mit der Feindseligkeit der eigenen Eltern und der Lehrer, also mit der der älteren Generation zu kämpfen hatten, mit den Behörden eventuell nur bei Konzerten oder bei größeren Veranstaltungen. Im Gegensatz dazu mussten die osteuropäischen Jugendlichen wegen ihrer Bekleidung mit den unterschiedlichsten Retorsionen rechnen: regelmäßig mussten sie sich ausweisen, sogar Verhöre waren sie ausgesetzt, am Arbeitsplatz und in der Freizeit konnten sie ständig überwacht werden.²²

Es ist wichtig zu betonen, dass infolge der Veränderungen in der Mode die Jahrhunderte lange führende Position von Paris, von London übernommen wurde. Dass die britische Hauptstadt zum Kultzentrum wurde, hatte sie zum großen Teil auch den Beatles und den Rolling Stones zu verdanken. Auf der Carnaby Street und dem King's Road befanden sich die Geschäfte, die Kleidung im neuen Stil verkauften.²³ Hier boten viele junge talentierte

²⁰ LEHNERT, Gertrud: *Divat* (Die Mode), Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest 2003. 158.

²¹ BECK, Ulrich: *Túl renden és osztályon? Társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek, társadalmi individualizációs folyamatok és az új társadalmi alakulatok, identitások keletkezése* (Jenseits von Stand und Klasse? Soziale Ungleichheiten, gesellschaftliche Individualisierungsprozesse und die Entstehung neuer gesellschaftlicher Formationen, Identitäten), IN: ANGELUSZ Róbert (Hrsg.): *A társadalmi rétegződés komponensei* (Komponenten der gesellschaftlichen Schichtung), Új Mandátum, Budapest 1999. 419.

²² LIEBING, Yvonne: *All You Need Is Beat, Jugendsubkultur in Leipzig 1957-1968*, Forum Verlag, Leipzig 2005. 32-40.

²³ In diesen Straßen befanden sich die Geschäfte von Mary Quant, Thea Porter, Joan Bates, Zandra Rodhes, Nina Fratini und auch Barbara Hulanickis Warenhaus „Biba“. BAUDOT, Francois: *Divat a XX. században* (Die Mode im 20. Jahrhundert), Park Kiadó, Budapest 2000.

Designer an mehreren Orten – bei verschiedenen Herstellern, auf Flohmärkten, Dachböden oder in Theatergarderoben – gesammelte Kleidung zusammen mit eigens entworfenen und sogar selbst angefertigten Stücken an.

1966 brach der Miniwahn ebenfalls in London aus, als Mary Quant in ihrem Geschäft begann, selbst genähte Minikleider zu verkaufen. Die Wirkung war mächtig, in einem halben Jahr trugen in Europa alle Mini. Quant eröffnete ihren Laden in London bereits 1955, wo sie deshalb bunte, einfach geschnittene Kleider verkaufte, weil sie der Meinung war, dass die Mädchen in ihren spießbürgerlichen Kleidern so aussehen, wie ihre eigenen Großmütter, und weil sie selbst keine Kleider fand, die ihrem Geschmack entsprochen hätten.²⁴

Das neue Frauenideal verkündeten auch die Topmodels, die in den 60ern beliebter waren, denn je. Eine von ihnen war Twiggy, das dünne Mädchen mit langen Haaren, den großen Rehaugen und dem Minirock, die auf jedem Bild gelangweilt in die Kamera blickt.²⁵ Das andere Schönheitsideal der Zeit war der zügellose und strotzend natürliche, lange, offene Haare tragende Brigitte-Bardot-Typ.

Die Revolution der Jugend rief in der Tiefe der Ereignisse Änderungen hervor, von denen die ganze Gesellschaft in ihren Grundlagen betroffen war. Die hierarchische Gesellschaftsschichtung verlor ihre Gültigkeit, infolge der Änderungen war die eindimensionale strukturtheoretische Sichtweise, die für die Gesellschaft der 50er noch gültig zu sein schien und sich für die Beschreibung der Industriegesellschaft eignete, nicht mehr haltbar. Solche – wie sich später herausstellte – strukturbildende Aspekte rückten in den Vordergrund, wie der symbolische Konsum, die verschiedenen kulturellen Routinen, die Wahllebensgemeinschaften,²⁶ das Lebensalter als der neue Aspekt der gesellschaftlichen Wahrnehmung, die die traditionellen gesellschaftlichen Großgruppen plötzlich und mit großem Schwung umstrukturierten.

Die in der Arbeitswelt eingenommene Position, die „objektiven“ Lebensumstände bestimmten im Weiteren die mit dem jeweiligen Status verbundenen „subjektiven“ Lebensweisen nicht mehr. Zusammenfassend erklärt Beck diese Erscheinung mit der Verschiebung der Schichten, was zur Folge hatte, dass sich die traditionellen gesellschaftlichen Großgruppen in der Gesellschaftsstruktur nach oben hin bewegen, die Klassenidentität an Bedeutung verliert „und es beginnt die Diversifikation und Individualisierung

²⁴ DYER, Lisa (Hrsg.): *Vintage Fashion*, Carlton Books Limited, London 2006. 114.

²⁵ STEELE, Valerie: *Fifty years of fashion – New look to now*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2000. 59.

²⁶ HRADIL, Stefan: *Régi fogalmak és új struktúrák. Milió-, szubkultúra- és életstílus-kutatás a 80-as években* (Alte Begriffe, neue Strukturen. Milieu-, Subkultur- und Lebensstilforschung in den 80er Jahren), IN: ANDORKA Rudolf - HRADIL, Stefan - PESCHAR, Jules L. (Hrsg.): *Társadalmi rétegződés* (Gesellschaftsstruktur), Aula Kiadó, Budapest 1995. 348-349.

der Lebenswege, die das Hierarchiemodel der gesellschaftlichen Klassen und Schichten untergräbt.”²⁷

Die Revolution junger Designer in der Welt des Pariser „Haute Couture”

Die wichtigste Erscheinung der Zeit war gerade, dass nicht mehr die Pariser Mode der einzig bestimmende Alleinherrscher in der Modewelt war, jedoch spielte sich auch im „*Haute Couture*” und in den großen Modehäusern eine grundlegende Veränderung ab, die den jungen Designern zu verdanken war. Auf den ersten Blick scheint, als ob die Pariser Modedesigner und selbst die Konfektionshersteller nur mit ein Paar Jahren Verspätung den Änderungen hätten folgen können, aber in Wirklichkeit traf dies nur auf die älteren Designer und auf die konservativeren Firmen zu.

In der Welt des „*Haute Couture*” spielte sich dieselbe Revolution ab,²⁸ wie in den anderen Bereichen des kulturellen Lebens, und wenn wir die Jahreszahlen genau beobachten, können wir feststellen, dass diese jungen und neuartigen Designer der auf den Straßen entstehenden Mode keinesfalls nachhinkten, sie kamen ihr manchmal sogar vor. Die zu den Elitekreisen gehörenden Jugendlichen trugen nur scheinbar dieselbe Kleidung, wie die bürgerlichen oder Arbeiterkinder. In Wahrheit kauften sie weiterhin in den teuersten Pariser Geschäften ein, jedoch fiel dabei ihre Wahl auf die Kreationen junger Modedesigner, womit sie ihre Eltern genau so empörten, wie es damals alle Jugendlichen taten.

Eines der besten Beispiele dafür war Yves Saint Laurent, der mit 22 Jahren mit seiner 1958er Trapez-Kollektion, großes Aufsehen erregte. Berühmt wurde er aber mit seiner Beat-Kollektion aus 1960, in der ein schwarzes Jackett aus Krokodilleder und mit Nerzkragen für die größte Empörung sorgte. Dieses Kleidungsstück verwies nämlich auf Marlon Brandos skandalösen Film mit dem Titel „*Der Wilde*” aus dem Jahre 1954 und erregte auch auf den Pariser Laufstegen die Gemüter. Das war das erste Mal, dass ein offensichtliche Straßenkleidung ins „*Haute Couture*” eindrang.²⁹

Auch im Verkauf seiner Kleidungsstücke führte Yves Saint Laurent revolutionäre Neuerungen in Paris ein. Er war der erste, der ein Geschäft am linken Ufer der Seine, im nonkonformistischen Studentenviertel der

²⁷ BECK, Ulrich: *Túl renden és osztályon? Társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek, társadalmi individualizációs folyamatok és az új társadalmi alakulatok, identitások keletkezése* (Jenseits von Stand und Klasse? Soziale Ungleichheiten, gesellschaftliche Individualisierungsprozesse und die Entstehung neuer gesellschaftlicher Formationen, Identitäten), IN: ANGELUSZ Róbert (Hrsg.): *A társadalmi rétegződés komponensei* (Komponenten der gesellschaftlichen Schichtung), Új Mandátum, Budapest 1999. 420.

²⁸ BAUDOT, Francois: *Divat a XX. században* (Die Mode im 20. Jahrhundert), Park Kiadó, Budapest 2000. 224.

²⁹ Ebd. 198.

Stadt eröffnete, wo bis dahin echte Modedesigner keinen Fuß gesetzt hatten. Damit gab er der Pariser Mode neuen Schwung und ließ das „Pret-a-Porter“ aufblühen. In seinen Geschäften verkaufte er zu einem erschwinglichen Preis auch verschiedene, dem aktuellsten Trend entsprechende Accessoires.

Auch der Minirock war eher auf den Pariser Catwalks zu sehen als in Mary Quants Laden: 1965, ein Jahr vor Mary Quants Miniröcken, sah das Pariser Publikum bei der Modenschau von André Courrèges das erste Mal einen Minirock, was einen riesigen Skandal auslöste. Als später Quant gefragt wurde, wer schließlich den Minirock erfunden hätte, antwortete sie: „Nicht ich oder Courrèges waren die Erfinder des Minirocks, sondern die Mädchen auf der Straße.“³⁰ Die Jugendrevolution brachte gleichzeitig auch die Revolution der Frauen mit sich, was auch in der Pariser Mode sichtbar wurde, es gab viel mehr junge Menschen und viel mehr Frauen unter den Designern, die in den bereits erwähnten Designer-Hersteller-Kombinationen gearbeitet haben.

Die Verwendung der neuen Stoffe verstärkte den futuristischen, minimalistischen Stil, die Kleidungsstücke wurden mit modernen Schnitten angefertigt. Auch Pierre Cardin benutzte ähnliche Stoffe, die nicht genäht, sondern verschweißt wurden. 1966 stellte er seine aus einfachen, geometrischen Formen bestehende Astronauten-Kollektion vor, in der er ebenfalls die neuen Kunstfaserstoffe verwendete. Die Kleider von Cardin folgten in mehreren seiner Kollektionen der Unisex-Mode, jedoch entwarf er gleichzeitig auch Stücke nach den neuesten Schnitten aber im traditionellen Sinne des „Haute Couture“. Solche waren z.B. seine Kleider mit Halsträgern, die mit goldenem und silbernem Flitter vollständig verziert waren.³¹

In den 60er Jahren wurden in Paris viele neue Modehäuser eröffnet, jedes davon wurde von einem jungen, revolutionären Designertalent geführt. Viele von ihnen hielten sich nicht an die Regeln des klassischen „Haut Couture“, auch sogar zu dem Preis nicht, dass sie in Kammer der Modedesigner, ins Chambre Syndicale nicht aufgenommen wurden. Auch in der Konfektionsherstellung wuchs der Bedarf nach Qualitätswaren, die in den 60ern nicht nur mit einem Markennamen, sondern viel mehr mit dem Namen eines jungen führenden Designers vermarktet wurden.

³⁰ STEELE, Valerie: *Fifty years of fashion – New look to now*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2000. 52.

³¹ REI, Nii (2003): *A 20. század második fele* (Die zweite Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts), IN: AKIKO, Fukai – TAMAMI, Suoh - MIKI, Iwagami - REIKO, Koga - REI, Nii (Hrsg.): *A divat története a 18.-20. században. A Kyoto Costume Institut gyűjteménye* (Die Geschichte der Mode vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert. Die Sammlung des Kyoto Costume Institue), Vince Kiadó, Budapest 2003. 511. 572.

Die Hippiekultur, die Beatkultur und die Hippiemode

Seit Anfang der 60er Jahre sind die Hippies³² erschienen, die mit ihren Kleidern mit Blumenmustern und ihren aus den unterschiedlichsten Volkstrachten entnommenen Kleidungsstücken Frieden und Liebe verkündeten. Da die Welt der Hippies als eine einheitlichere und radikalere „*Richtung*“ in der Gegenkultur der Jugend interpretiert werden kann und ihre Kleidung einen besonderen Charakter hat, möchte ich auf diese im Weiter etwas näher eingehen. Die Bewegung hat seine Anfänge in Kalifornien, genauer im San Fransisco der 60er Jahre, jedoch verbreitete sie sich innerhalb von ein Paar Jahren auch in ganz Amerika und Europa. Die Hippiekultur war stark mit den damaligen politischen Bewegungen verbunden, hauptsächlich mit den immer heftigeren Protesten gegen den Vietnam-Krieg.

Im Wohlstand der 50er, in der Zeit der Ausbreitung der Massenproduktion war alles ganz neu, die Gegenstände, die Formen, die Materialien, die Geräte. Damals bereitete den Menschen der bloße Konsum, der Kauf von den neuen, bis dahin unbekanntem Produkten, Freude. Die Jugendlichen, die in dieser Zeit aufgewachsen sind, in diese Situation hineingeboren worden sind, wollten zurück zu etwas Natürlicherem, Originellerem. Einerseits sind sie im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes zur Natur zurückgekehrt, andererseits durchdrang dieser Slogan ihre ganze Lebensweise und Bekleidung, dementsprechend haben sie die Volkskunst, die Handwerkstraditionen, die natürlichen Materialien neu entdeckt.

Sie haben Festivals, Demonstrationen, Happenings, sog. „*Love Ins*“ veranstaltet, sie fuhren mit bunt bemalten Bussen, Wochen lang campen sie an einem Ort und zogen dann zu einem anderen Festival weiter. Sie wurden auch Blumenkindern und die Bewegung auch „*Flower-Power*“ genannt. Sich den orientalischen Religionen zugewandt und Marihuana rauchend haben sie den inneren Frieden gesucht, meditiert oder LSD konsumiert. Infolge des LSD-Konsums haben sich die grellen, merkwürdigen, psychedelischen Muster und die daraus angefertigten Kleider verbreitet.

Die Kleidung der Hippies vertrat im Vergleich zu den bisher beschriebenen Jugendbekleidungen eine noch radikalere und noch mehr empörende Tendenz. Die Jungen und Mädchen trugen ihre Haare gleichermaßen lang, die Männer ließen sich Bärte und Schnurrbärte wachsen, alle zogen sich Keilhosen oder enge Hosen und bunte Sachen an. Auch Unterwäsche, wie der Prinzessrock, wurde als Straßenbekleidung verwendet, es wurden alte Arbeiter- oder Bauernkleider, afghanische Mäntel, indische Tücher, Tuniken mit Blumenmuster getragen und Kleidungsstücke aus verschiedenen Volkstrachten

³² Ihre Bewegung kann als Gegenkultur betrachtet werden, sie im Vergleich zur bestehenden kulturellen Praxis einer gegensätzlichen folgten, obwohl sie dies nicht immer einheitlich und kohärent vertreten haben. KLANICZAY Gábor: *Ellenkultúra a hetvenes-nyolcvanas éveken* (Gegenkultur in den 70er und 80er Jahren), Noran Kiadó, Budapest 2004. 21-22.

miteinander gemischt. Die Kommune breitete sich auch auf die Kleider aus, immer mehr Kleidungsstücke galten als Unisex, was sich in der Praxis meist im gegenseitigen Tragen der Männer- und Frauenkleidung zeigte.³³

In den Materialien ihrer Kleider kehrten sie ebenfalls zur Natur zurück: sie verwendeten Leinen, Gaze, Wolle, Spaltleder und die Originalstoffe der Trachten, jedoch trugen sie auf der Straße auch Samt, Seide und Mußelin, welche ursprünglich Stoffe für Abendkleider waren. Diese benutzten sie in so intensiven und klaren Farben, die vorher eher selten getragen wurden. Stickereien, Perlstickereien, Krausen, Spitzen waren ebenfalls typisch für die Kleider der Hippies.

Auch die Geschäfte des King's Road hielten mit der Zeit Schritt, es wurden Geschäfte eröffnet die ausschließlich Hippiekleider verkauften, auf diese Weise konnte London seine führende Position in der Mode des Jahrzehnts bewahren. Legendäre Geschäften mit sprechenden Namen waren „*Hung On You*“, „*Granny Takes A Trip*“, „*Dandy Fashion*“, wo sich die auffälligen Schaufenster stets änderten. Das größte Angebot gab es an Krausehemden und Samthosen, aber jede Art von Kleidung war in diesen Läden erhältlich. Die älteren Geschäfte hielten mit der Mode ebenfalls mit, auch Biba und Mary Quant verkauften Hippiekleidung, man konnte alles kaufen, was ein „*richtiger Hippie*“ trug (Miles 2005:91, 180-181). In diesen Geschäften kauften auch die Mitglieder der Beatles³⁴ und der Rolling Stones ein.

Die Verbreitung der Hippiebewegung bedeutete in den meisten Fällen lediglich so viel, dass die Kleider in die Mode kamen, eventuell wurde noch die Musik damit verbunden. Auch auf den Pariser Laufstegen sind gestickte und mit Perlen verzierte Blusen und Kleider erschienen, und selbst die konsolidiertesten Damen aus dem Mittelstand trugen lange Kleider mit Blumenmuster. 1968 ist das Jahr, in dem die Hippiebewegung sowohl in Amerika, als auch in Westeuropa zur Mode wurde. Von da an war die Kommerzialisierung und das Ausschöpfen für der Bewegung charakteristisch.

Die Hippiemode kann aus dem Aspekt als die „*erfolgreichste*“ unter allen bezeichnet werden, dass eine die bestehende kulturelle Ordnung scharf kritisierende, von deren Lebensweise grundsätzlich unterschiedlich lebende Gruppe den Weg zu einer immer größeren Masse findet und schließlich völlig ausgeschöpft zur Mode wird. „*Die ganze Gruppe der Gegenkultur stürzt sich euphorisch und unaufhaltsam in den verhassten Konsum.*“³⁵

³³ DYER, Lisa (Hrsg.): *Vintage Fashion*, Carlton Books Limited, London 2006. 164.

³⁴ Die Beatles begannen ihren Laufbahn als Rockmusiker, wurden als Mods berühmt und sind schließlich zu Hippies geworden, trugen bunte Kleidung mit psychedelischen Mustern. STEELE, Valerie: *Fifty years of fashion – New look to now*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2000. 56.

³⁵ BAUDOT, Francois: *Divat a XX. században* (Die Mode im 20. Jahrhundert), Park Kiadó, Budapest 2000.

Die Punks

In den 70er Jahren hat sich die Punk-Bewegung³⁶ verbreitet, deren Stil einen großen Einfluss auf die Mode ausübte, jedoch stand diese Kleidung in der Maßen im Gegensatz zu jeglicher Kleidungstradition, dass ihre Wirkung in der Alltagsbekleidung nur wesentlich umgestaltet entdeckt werden kann.³⁷ Sosehr die Revolution der Jugend die traditionellen Strukturen der Mode auch aufgewühlt hat, kann die Bekleidung der Punks auch heute noch schwer interpretiert werden. Meist sieht man darin nur, dass sie alles Negieren, sich allem entgegen setzen und alles um sich herum hassen.

Die Wurzeln der Punk-Bewegung ist genau die Erscheinung, dass die Bekleidung der rebellierenden Jugend des kulturellen Konflikts zur Mode der mittelständischen Erwachsenen wurde: die Punks trugen die einst Rebellion symbolisierenden Kleidungsstücke zerrissen und neu zusammengenäht, oder auf einer anderen Weise neu interpretiert. Damit haben sie ihre Verachtung gegenüber den Mode-Hippies und den älteren Rebellen zum Ausdruck gebracht. Schließlich wurde auch dieser Stil von den Modemachern entdeckt, seine Elemente erschienen langsam in der alltäglichen Straßenbekleidung.

Die Welt der Punks ist typischerweise mit England verbunden, wo hauptsächlich die Kinder der Arbeiterklasse zur Bewegung gehörten. 1974 gründete Malcolm McLaren die Punkband Sex Pistols, was praktisch den Beginn der Punk-Bewegung bedeutete. Die Songtexte der Punkmusik waren noch empörender, als die auffälligen Kleider.³⁸ Am Anfang konnte man diese im gemeinsamen Geschäft von McLaren und Vivien Westwood, das den Namen „Let It Rock!“ trug, am King’s Road kaufen. Später änderte man den Namen auf „Sex“, der mit riesigen, aufblasbaren, rosa Buchstaben am Geschäft stand. Es wurde mehrmals umgestaltet, zur Zeit des Zerfalls der Punk-

³⁶ Die Punk-Bewegung kann als selbständige Gegenkultur aufgefasst werden, da sie sich allen Elementen der bestehenden Kultur völlig entgegengesetzte. Dem widerspricht aber, dass sie zur Kultur der Mehrheit keine Alternative boten, denn ihr oberstes „Programm“ war die völlige Anarchie. Aus diesem Grund kann sie auch als Subkultur betrachtet werden. KLANICZAY Gábor: *Ellenkultúra a hetvenes-nyolcvanas években* (Gegenkultur in den 70er und 80er Jahren), Noran Kiadó, Budapest 2004. 20-21. Hebdidge jedoch spricht in seinem Artikel über den Punkstil grundsetzlich über eine Subkultur. HEBDIDGE, Dick: *A stílus mint célzatos kommunikáció* (Der Stil als beabsichtigte Kommunikation), Replika, 1996/21-22. 181-197.

³⁷ „Den Prozess vom Entgegensetzen bis zum Einschmelzen, vom Widerstand bis zur Assimilation machen alle auf einander folgende Subkulturen mit.“ HEBDIDGE, Dick: *A stílus mint célzatos kommunikáció* (Der Stil als beabsichtigte Kommunikation), Replika, 1996/21-22. 181.

³⁸ Die Texte der Punkbands haben in einem höchst empörenden Stil praktisch alles verurteilt und kritisiert, was die wirtschaftliche, politische, kulturelle und ethische Praxis der Gesellschaft der Mehrheit verkörpert. Ein besonders herausragendes Element dessen ist die positive Konnotation des Nationalsozialismus’ und des Faschismus’ bzw. das gut sichtbare Tragen solcher Symbole.

Bewegung trug es den Namen „*World's End*“, über dem Eingang hing eine riesige alte Uhr als Symbol des Weltuntergangs.

Die Kleidung wurde hauptsächlich aus Leder, Kunstleder, Lack, Vinyl und Gummi angefertigt, meist wurde Schwarz getragen, die T-Shirts waren entweder Weiß und verschmutzt oder schwarz mit empörenden Aufschriften und Zeichnungen. Die Kleidung hatte oft Sado-Maso-Charakter oder sie waren schon ursprünglich solche Requisiten, deren Verwendung als Straßenbekleidung auch heute noch für Aufsehen sorgen würde. Diese Wirkung verstärkte auch die Vielzahl an Nägel und Nieten.

Die zerrissenen Kleider wurden mit Sicherheitsnadeln wieder zusammengefügt, die Mädchen trugen schwarze Miniröcke, zerrissene Strümpfe oder Netzstrümpfe mit Highheels oder mit den schwarzen Stiefeln der Jungen. Am auffallendsten war die Frisur der Punks, die den Irokesen gleich an beiden Seiten abrasiert und in der Mitte ihrer Köpfe mit Hilfe von Haargelee in den Himmel starnte.

Eine Besonderheit der Punk-Kleidung war, dass sie auch aus solchen Materialien (Folie, Müllsack) Kleider angefertigt hatten, die auf Grund ihrer ursprünglichen Funktion keineswegs als Kleidungsstücke bezeichnet werden konnten.³⁹ So etwas war auch der Sicherheitsnadel, aber sie trugen auch Bestandteile von Haushaltsgeräten, Rasierklingen, Ketten, also eigentlich alle Gegenstände. Diese waren aber mit der Denkweise und der durch die Bekleidung zum Ausdruck gebrachte Lebensphilosophie der Punk-Kultur homolog.

Die osteuropäischen Charakteristika der Jugendbekleidung

Die Geburt der Jugendsubkulturen hatte in den sozialistischen Ländern natürlich völlig andere Umstände als in Westeuropa, dem zufolge können auch viele grundlegende Unterschiede in der Bekleidung der Jugendlichen festgestellt werden. Trotz allem hat sich die ältere Generation empörende Kleidung auch im Kreise der osteuropäischen Jugendlichen beinahe auf der gleichen Art und Weise, zeitlich kaum oder überhaupt nicht verschoben durchgesetzt, ist aus dem Nichts entstanden.

Die in Kapitel 2 allgemein beschriebene, mit der kulturellen Revolution der Jugend verbundene Kleidung war in den sozialistischen Ländern in fast unveränderter Form präsent. Die bunten, grellen Hemde und Kleider mit großen Mustern, die Jeans, die Ledermäntel, der Minirock, die Elemente der Volkstracht, also das Grundprinzip des „*Egal-was-Hauptsache-auffällig*“ wurde auch in Osteuropa vertreten.

³⁹ „Grundsätzlich unterscheidet die Art des Gebrauchs der Waren die jeweilige Subkultur von den traditionellen kulturellen Formationen.“ HEBDIDGE, Dick: *A stílus mint célzatos kommunikáció* (Der Stil als beabsichtigte Kommunikation), Replika, 1996/21-22. 183.

Bereits am Anfang des Kapitels über die westeuropäischen Jugendlichen habe ich auf zwei grundlegende Unterschiede hingewiesen: im Westen war es einfach, die Kleidungsstücke zu besorgen, man musste nur in eines der speziellen Kultläden reinspazieren. In Ost-Europa wuchs durch den beschränkten Zugriff der Wert der erworbenen Sachen, ihre Besitzer galten als noch „cooler“ und durch das Anziehen von neuen Originaljeans aus dem Westen konnte man sich förmlich in jemand anderen verwandeln.

Es ist wichtig, die auch die Unterschiede zwischen den Jugendbekleidungen der einzelnen sozialistischen Länder zu betonen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit, möchte ich dies durch den Vergleich von Ungarn und der DDR veranschaulichen. Ein wichtiger Aspekt der ganzen Erscheinung ist jedoch, dass die westlichen Subkulturen fast ohne Ausnahme in allen sozialistischen Staaten zu finden waren.

Die Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Ländern haben ihre Wurzeln in den unterschiedlichen Traditionen, in fast allen osteuropäischen Ländern gab es bereits vor bzw. während des Zweiten Weltkriegs irgendeine Art von Subkultur, auf die die Jugend in der Nachkriegszeit zurückgreifen konnte. Auf dieser Grundlage konnte sich in Folge der neuesten Rock and Roll Anfang der 50er Jahre sehr rasch eine Jugendsubkultur entfalten. Diese waren in Deutschland z.B. die „Edelweißpiraten“ und die „Halbstarken“ und in Ungarn die „Jampec“.⁴⁰ Von den Behörden wurden die Mitglieder dieser Subkulturen Hooligans, randalierende Banden, Rowdys genannt und es wurden die unterschiedlichsten Maßnahmen gegen sie ergriffen: Beobachtung, regelmäßige Kontrollen, Verboten der Programme, Verfolgung des Rowdytums.

Die Kleidung der DDR-Jugendlichen wurde durch die geographische Nähe des Westens enorm erleichtert, da sie vor dem Bau der Berliner Mauer 1961 und der Sperrung der Grenzübergänge vergleichsweise leicht nach West-Berlin kommen konnten, um sich dort Kleidung nach neuester Mode zu besorgen.⁴¹ Natürlich waren auch diese Trips riskant und man musste immer eine passende Ausrede parat haben, wenn man von der Polizei gehalten wurde.⁴²

Im Gegensatz dazu stieß man bei der Besorgung der Kleider in Ungarn auf große Schwierigkeiten. *„Das Schmuggeln von Kleidung, Schuhen, Unterwäsche usw. sowohl aus den sozialistischen, als auch aus den westlichen Ländern wurde zur allgemeinen Erscheinung. Die Entschlossenheit und Kreativität der schmuggelnden ungarischen Bürger kannte keine Grenzen.*

⁴⁰ HORVÁTH Sándor: *Huligánok, jampecek, galerik. Fiatalok szubkultúrái a hatvanas években* („Huligán“, „Jampec“ und „Galeri“). Jugendsubkulturen in den 60er Jahren in Ungarn), IN: Rainer M. János (Hrsg.): *„Hatvanas évek” Magyarországon* (Die „Sechziger Jahre“ in Ungarn.) 1956-os Intézet, Budapest 2004. 410.

⁴¹ LIEBING, Yvonne: *All You Need Is Beat, Jugendsubkultur in Leipzig 1957-1968*. Forum Verlag, Leipzig 2005. 47.

⁴² Ebd. 48.

*Während dessen wurden die ungarischen Zollbeamten zu den meist gehassten und gefürchteten Vertreter des Systems. Die Kleidungsschwarzmarkt blühte, weil der Großteil der Einwohner bereit dazu war, mehr für Bekleidung auszugeben, als er es sich leisten konnte.*⁴³

Trotzdem gab es bereits in den 50ern Jampec', die in den Augen der Behörden lediglich Hooligans waren, die sich in Banden zusammentun, deren Verfolgung bzw. Eingliederung in das von der Jugend bestehende, idealistische Bild, eine ununterbrochene Aufgabe war. Mit diesem Bild über die Jampec' bzw. über die Halbstarke wollten die Behörden die Unangemessenheit ihres Verhaltens, die verwerflichen Kleidungs- und Vergnügungsgewohnheiten, und parallel dazu die zu folgenden Normen, die von der sozialistischen Jugend erwartet wurden, betonen.⁴⁴ Im Interesse von all dem sind in der Presse Artikel voll mit Übertreibungen erschienen. Auch in den Polizeiberichten kann dieselbe Tendenz beobachtet werden.⁴⁵

Ein wichtiges Element der Jugendsubkulturen ist der Gebrauch der sozialen und privaten Raumes, die Treffpunkte der Banden, der Ort der Konzerte. Auch unter diesem Aspekt können wesentliche Unterschiede festgestellt werden, der Grund dafür muss natürlich in der Auffassung der Behörden gesucht werden. Während die auffällige und empörende Kleidung tragenden Jugendgruppen auch in Westeuropa unter besonderer polizeilicher Beobachtung standen, konnte diese mit dem Ausmaß der bereits erwähnten Maßnahmen in den sozialistischen Ländern kaum verglichen werden. Die osteuropäischen Jugendbanden sammelten sich ebenfalls auf der Straße, in öffentlichen Plätzen, in Parks, jedoch haben die Polizei, die zentrale Jugendverband (KISZ), die Leitung des FDJ und das Jugendamt versucht gegen sie mit geplanten, gut organisierten Aktionen aufzutreten.

In den sozialistischen Staaten der 50er Jahre gab es noch keine ausgearbeitete Kultur und Unterhaltung für Jugendliche, auch die Jugendmode hatte damals keine selbständige Rolle. Aus dieser Hinsicht hat sich die sozialistische Führung auf allen Ebenen und in jedem Bereich verspätet: nur als Reaktion auf die westliche Musik, Kleidung und Freizeitgestaltung entstanden die Pläne, Berichte und Anordnungen, die den Jugendlichen „sinnvolle“, zur Sozialismus bauenden Generation würdige Mode, Musik, Stars und Programme

⁴³ MEDVEDEV Katalin: *Divat és bűnözés az ötvenes, hatvanas és hetvenes években Magyarországon* (Mode und Verbrechen in den 50er, 60er und 70er Jahren in Ungarn), Konferenzvortrag an der Konferenz „Öltözködés és divat a szocializmusban“ (Bekleidung und Mode im Sozialismus), Budapesti Történeti Múzeum, 5-6. November 2007.

⁴⁴ HORVÁTH Sándor: *Huligánok, jampecsek, galerik. Fiatalok szubkultúrái a hatvanas években* („Huligán“, „Jampec“ und „Galeri“). Jugendsubkulturen in den 60er Jahren in Ungarn.) IN: Rainer M. János (Hrsg.): *„Hatvanas évek“ Magyarországon*. (Die „Sechziger Jahre“ in Ungarn), 1956-os Intézet, Budapest 2004. 412.

⁴⁵ LIEBING, Yvonne (2005): *All You Need Is Beat, Jugendsubkultur in Leipzig 1957-1968*. Forum Verlag, Leipzig 2005. 29.

bot.⁴⁶ Natürlich stießen diese Initiativen bei den Jugendlichen der verschiedenen subkulturellen Banden auf keinen großen Enthusiasmus, sie haben diese meist sogar ausgelacht, wobei die Behörden schreckten auch nicht vor Gewaltanwendung zurück, damit der Erfolg ihrer Tätigkeit zu mindest auf Papier nachgewiesen ist.

Jugendsubkulturen in Osteuropa

In diesem Kapitel möchte ich konkret einige charakteristische Subkulturen beschreiben, insbesondere möchte ich von den vielen Jugendkulturen die Jampec', die Beatnis und die Punks hervorheben.

Die Jampec-Gruppen finden wir bereits am Anfang der 50er Jahre, denen in der DDR die Halbstarke und in der Sowjetunion die mit dem Wort „*stijljagi*“ bezeichneten Jugendlichen entsprochen haben.⁴⁷ Das Wesentliche der Subkulturen war Rock and Roll zu hören und dem damit verbundenen Tanz- und Kleidungsstil zu folgen. In der DDR trugen diese Jugendlichen rote Pullover und enge schwarze Hosen, die sie um ihre Knöchel mit einer Schnur gebunden hatten. Diese Art die Kleider zu tragen wurde von der öffentlichen Meinung und von der Presse, die Einfluss ausüben wollte, mit einer „*Vogelscheuche*“ verglichen.⁴⁸ Die Frisur der Jungen war in ganz Europa einheitlich: sie trugen mit Zuckerwasser oder mit Haargelee gestylte „*Entenfrisuren*“. Die zeitgenössische öffentliche Meinung war über das Folgen und Nachahmen dieser Mode zu tiefst empört – dies bezeugt auch die russische Bezeichnung –, obwohl sich dieser Stil unter den Jugendlichen noch in keinem weiten Kreis verbreitet hatte.

Die Beat-Ära entfaltete sich in den 60ern, dank der politischen Entspannung in Osteuropa konnten immer mehr Bands gegründet werden und ihre Musik konnte zu einem immer breiter werdenden Publikum gelangen. Die Kleidung der Beatnis sah der der westeuropäischen Hippies ähnlich, jedoch kann jene als eine mildere Version betrachtet werden. Trotzdem regte sich darüber die öffentliche Meinung – die ältere Generation – zu tiefst auf. Die Musik der Beatnis war die mit dem meisten politischen Inhalt. Sie waren der Belästigungen der Behörden eher deshalb und nicht wegen den Straßen-Rowdys ausgesetzt.⁴⁹ Beide Geschlechter trugen lange Haare, die höchstens mit einem Lederband an der Stirn zusammengebunden war. In ihren Garderoben

⁴⁶ VALUCH Tibor: *A lódentől a miniszoknyáig* (Vom „Loden“-Mantel bis zum Minirock), Corvina Kiadó, Budapest 2004. 115.

⁴⁷ HORVÁTH Sándor: *Huligánok, jampecok, galerik. Fiatalok szubkultúrái a hatvanas években* („Huligán“, „Jampec“ und „Galeri“). Jugendsubkulturen in den 60er Jahren in Ungarn), IN: Rainer M. János (Hrsg.): „*Hatvanas évek*“ Magyarországon (Die „Sechziger Jahre“ in Ungarn), 1956-os Intézet, Budapest 2004. 410.

⁴⁸ LIEBING, Yvonne: *All You Need Is Beat, Jugendsubkultur in Leipzig 1957-1968*, Forum Verlag, Leipzig 2005.

⁴⁹ Ebd. 65.

lassen sich, wie bei den westeuropäischen Hippies, Kleidungsstücke aus der Volkstracht, Keilhosen, Jeans, Pelzmäntel, Hirtentaschen, Blusen mit Stickereien, indische Gazekleider und lange Röcke finden, die sie miteinander gemischt und in einem völligen Durcheinander getragen haben.⁵⁰

Die 70er Jahre brachten den Auslauf der Jugendsubkulturen mit sich, wobei die Punkmusik und die damit verbundene Subkultur Produkte dieses Jahrzehnts sind. Da die Punk-Bewegung bei den westeuropäischen Subkulturen bereits detailliert beschrieben wurde, möchte ich an dieser Stelle lediglich auf einige Unterschiede hinweisen: einerseits können wir im Falle dieser Bewegung die größte zeitlich Verschiebung feststellen, in Osteuropa tauchten sie erst Ende der 70er Jahre auf.⁵¹ Ihre Bekleidung, die auch noch heute empörend ist, hat damals für große Aufregung gesorgt, selbst die Mehrheit der Jugendlichen konnte es nicht akzeptieren. Eine typisch osteuropäische Erscheinung ist die sog. Art-Punk-Bewegung, die eine von intellektuellen Jugendlichen und Künstlern, hauptsächlich von Universitätsstudenten gegründete⁵² Richtung innerhalb der Punk-Bewegung ist, die den Texten besonders große Aufmerksamkeit widmete. In den musikalischen Grundlagen gibt es viele Ähnlichkeiten, die Vertreter der Art-Punk-Bewegung aber trugen nicht die charakteristische Kleidung der Punks, sondern eher die, die für die sich immer mehr verbreitenden alternativen Jugendlichen typische war.

Zusammenfassung der Wirkungen der Jugendsubkulturen auf die Mode

Die kulturellen Veränderungen der 60er Jahre setzten sich beinahe in jeder Hinsicht der älteren Generation entgegen, was sich auch auf dem Gebiet der Mode zeigte.⁵³ Der kulturelle Konflikt zeigte sich am spektakulärsten in den neuen Formen der Kleidung, im Hintergrund der politischen, weltanschaulichen Debatten ging es in der Wirklichkeit um Styfragen und Lebensphilosophien.

Die Richtung der Ausbreitung der Mode wurde praktisch umgekehrt, die Neuerungen wurden nicht mehr von den auserwählten Schichten verbreitet, sondern die auf der Straße, von den Jugendlichen erfundene und verbreitete Kleidung wurde zur aktuellen Mode.⁵⁴ Die Mode wurde nicht nur

⁵⁰ DYER, Lisa (Hrsg.): *Vintage Fashion*, Carlton Books Limited, London 2006. 132.

⁵¹ LOVAS Lajos: *A punk* (Die Punk-Bewegung), Magyar Szemle, (Ungarischer Rundschau) Jg. 1994/10. 1061.

⁵² z.B: die Bands Namens Albert Einstein Bizottság, URH, Kontroll Csoport.

⁵³ „(...) die Jugendmoden werden die ganze Mode bestimmen und zwar auf Grund der strukturell veränderten Position der Jugend in der modernen Gesellschaft. Auf dieser Grundlage lässt sich der Einfluss der Jugendmode auf die Erwachsenenmode vorhersagen.“ KÖNIG, René: *Divat és antidivat* (Mode und Antimode), IN: KLANICZAY Gábor - S. NAGY Katalin (Hrsg.): *Divatszociológia* (Modesozioogie), Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, Budapest 1982. 46.

⁵⁴ „(...) mehrere Moden haben die Teenager angetrieben, die sich aus ihren Kreisen nach oben, in die Erwachsenen-Gesellschaft verbreitet haben. Diese reichen von solchen

verjüngert, sie wurde auch demokratischer, gleichzeitig auch internationaler, und sie verlor ihren Elitecharakter. In diesem Jahrzehnt entfaltete sich der in den 50ern begonnene Prozess völlig, weswegen sich viel mehr Menschen „*modisch*“ kleiden konnten, sie konnten sich solche Kleidungsstücke leisten, wie vorher nie.

Ab den 60er Jahren verkündeten die sich anders Kleidenden mit ihrer Bekleidung ihre Freiheit, Unabhängigkeit, Jugend und ihre Rebellion gegen den „*Anciene Regime*“. In diesem Sinne wurde alles zur Mode, was es bis dahin nicht war: Volkstracht, Arbeitskleider, grelle, bunte oder alte, benutzte Kleidungsstücke. Jede Art von Kleidungsstücken konnte als Straßenbekleidung erscheinen, es konnte sogar alles zum Teil der Bekleidung werden.⁵⁵

Die klassische Nachahmungstheorie wurde zwar nicht völlig widerlegt, aber bedeutend modifiziert: in der Verbreitung der Mode spielte es weiterhin eine wichtige Rolle, dass die Menschen einer – selbst gewählten – Gruppe ähnlich sein möchten bzw. dass sie sich von anderen – ebenfalls selbst gewählten – Gruppen abgrenzen möchten. Die einfachste Methode ist die Äußerlichkeiten der Gruppe zum eigenen zu machen, um so vom Äußeren her die Gruppenzugehörigkeit zu sichern. In dieser Zeit wurde aber ein anderer Aspekt der Nachahmungstheorie wichtiger, dass die Menschen nämlich durch die Mode auch ihre Individualität zum Ausdruck bringen wollten.⁵⁶ Im Vergleich zur traditionellen Verbreitung der Mode ist die wichtigste Änderung, dass die Gruppe sich änderte, deren Kleidung nachgeahmt wurde: zur Zeit des kulturellen Konflikts wurde der Platz der oberen Schichten von der Jugend übernommen.

Die Jugendlichen konnten die ältere Generation am meisten mit der totalen Negierung der Mode und der Lebensweise ihrer Eltern empören. Die Funktion einiger Kleidungsstücke wurde völlig in den Hintergrund gedrängt, und bei einigen neu interpretiert. Wie wir es auf Grund der klassischen Nachahmungstheorie der Mode sehen konnten, bestimmte ab dem Zeitpunkt die Jugend die aktuelle Mode, die sich als Gegensatz zu den Mitgliedern der gesellschaftlichen Großgruppen definiert hat. Der Auslauf des kulturellen Konflikts fällt mit dem Prozess zusammen, in dem die empörende Kleidung der

Kleidungsgeohnheiten, wie die Jeansmode bis hin zur Mode der Automarken.“ PACKARD, Vance: *Feltörekvés, reklám, szexualitás Amerikában* (Empordringen, Werbung, Sexualität in Amerika), Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest 1971. 369-370.

⁵⁵ HEBDIDGE, Dick: *A stílus mint célzatos kommunikáció* (Der Stil als beabsichtigte Kommunikation), Replika, 1996/21-22. S. 183.

⁵⁶ Das allgemeine Steigen des Lebensniveaus motiviert laut Bourdieu die Menschen dazu, dass sie nicht mehr den traditionellen Konsummodellen ihrer eigenen Gruppe folgen sollten, sondern den Modellen jener Gruppe zu der sie gehören möchten. Bourdieu schickt voraus, dass dieser Prozess zum Entstehen neuer Konsummodelle beiträgt, in denen in erster Linie die Art und Weise des Konsums betont wird. Infolge dessen sind die Ungleichheiten statt in der Sphäre des materiellen Konsums, in der des symbolischen zu finden. BOURDIEU, Pierre (1978): *A társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek újratermelése* (Komponenten der gesellschaftlichen Schichtung), Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest 1978. 136-145.

Jugend zwar in einer konsolidierten Form, aber auch zu den Mitgliedern der gesellschaftlichen Großgruppen – sogar zu den eigenen Eltern – gelangen.

Auf der Grundlage dieser Veränderungen können wir die gewagte Aussage machen, dass die kulturelle „Gegen“-Revolution der Jugend, den Begriff der Kultur grundlegend geändert hatte, alles was bis dahin für die Mode gültig war, wurde beinahe völlig umgewälzt. Die Mode hat aufgehört das zu sein, was sie bis dahin war: glänzend, immer elegant, ein Privileg der Schönen und Reichen, eine Vielfalt an wundervollen Stoffen und raffinierten Schnitten. Der kulturelle Konflikt – den anderen Bereichen der Gesellschaft gleich – veränderte alle Aspekte der Mode grundsätzlich und jede „neue Mode“ sowie alle Erscheinungen in der Mode können seitdem als Folgen dieser Veränderung interpretiert werden.

Das Fortleben der Bekleidung der Jugendgegenskulturen und das der Elemente der „Antimode“

Im Vergleich zur Zeit des kulturellen Konflikts erlebte die Mode in den 80er und 90er Jahren eine viel ruhigere Periode. Es war weiterhin kennzeichnend, dass mehrere Moderichtungen parallel nebeneinander existierten, die sich aus der Mode der früheren Jahre ernährten. Alle Kleidungsstücke sind mehrmals zurückgekehrt und sicherten den Modedesignern somit eine unausschöpflich scheinende Ideenfundgrube.

Bei der Interpretation der heutigen Erscheinungen der Mode kommt uns jene Erscheinung zur Hilfe, die Mittelständisierung der Jugendsubkulturen genannt wird⁵⁷, und in der Kommerzialisierung der Subkulturen am besten zum Ausdruck kommt. Die ursprünglich gegen die ganze in der Gesellschaft herrschende kulturelle Routine rebellierenden und Alternativen bietenden Subkulturen wurden bis zu den 90er Jahren vollständig in die Konsumgesellschaft eingeschmolzen.⁵⁸

Die Subkulturen von heute können nur als das Preferieren eines Musikgeschmacks betrachtet werden, der eine charakteristische Kleidungsstil mit sich bringt, jedoch kaufen die Bandmitglieder ihre Konfektionskleidung in denselben Geschäften und Warenhäusern, wie alle anderen. Als Folge von diesem Prozess haben die Aussagen von Hebdidge bezüglich der heutigen subkulturellen Bekleidung ihre Gültigkeit verloren, obwohl zur Aufklärung dessen eine gründliche empirische und theoretische Untersuchung nötig wäre.

Die Mode der Jahrtausendwende fasst das Aufleben der Mode einer früheren Zeit als Offenbarung der Vielfältigkeit auf, wobei dies im Sinne der

⁵⁷ GÁBOR Kálmán: *A középosztály szigete* (Insel der Mittelklasse), Belvedere Meridionale, Szeged 2000. 23.

⁵⁸ KLANICZAY Gábor: *Ellenkultúra a hetvenes-nyolcvanas években* (Gegenkultur in den 70er und 80er Jahren), Noran Kiadó, Budapest 2004. 29.

Hebdidge'schen „*Bricolage*”⁵⁹ auch als Botschaft eines aus der Vergangenheit entnommenen Gegenstands betrachtet werden kann. In diesem Fall also wird „*Bricolage*” in der zeitlichen Dimension durchgeführt. Nicht ein Element eines parallel existierenden einheitlichen Kleidungsstils wird aus seinem ursprünglichen Kontext herausgegriffen und als Kleidungsstück einer Subkultur neu interpretiert, sondern ein Kleidungsstück oder Accessoires aus der Vergangenheit wird in den heutigen, weit verbreiteten Trend hineingehoben. Die älteren Kleidungsstücke werden immer im Kleidungskontext der Gegenwart interpretiert, weshalb sie immer eine neue Bedeutung schaffen, wie das auch mit „*Bricolage*” der Fall ist.

Die Mode der Jahrtausendwende verwendet die Bauweise von „*Bricolage*” weiterentwickelt und multipliziert: jeder einzelne Stück einer Bekleidung stammt aus einer vergangenen Zeit aus einem bekannten Trend, jeder Stück ist das Ergebnis von einem zeitlichen „*Bricolage*”. Auf diese Weise wurde der eklektische Stil geschaffen, der für die Mode von heute am meisten kennzeichnend ist.

⁵⁹ HEBDIDGE, Dick: *A stílus mint célzatos kommunikáció* (Der Stil als beabsichtigte Kommunikation), Replika, 1996/21-22. 183.

Ateş Uslu

Aux origines de la «note Vix»: contribution à l'histoire politique et diplomatique de la République Hongroise sous la présidence de Mihály Károlyi (janvier-mars 1919)

La mémoire collective hongroise de l'immédiat après-Première Guerre mondiale est très marquée par le traumatisme généré par le Traité de Trianon. La conception et l'image que les Hongrois se font de l'histoire de la Révolution de 1918 est plutôt déterminée a posteriori, par les faits et événements qui suivent cette révolution. L'image de Mihály Károlyi (leader de la Révolution démocratique de 1918) est souvent réduit à celle d'un politicien incapable de gérer la crise de l'après-guerre, incapable d'empêcher le processus qui a amené à la remise de la „note Vix”,¹ le déclenchement de la dictature du prolétariat en mars 1919, et plus tard, le Traité de Trianon. Une récente manifestation, d'apparition marginale, indique bien ce qui en est avec la mémoire de Károlyi: en fin février 2007, le monument édifié auprès du parlement à la mémoire du premier ministre a été endommagé par des coups de peinture rouge. La même manifestation n'a pas tardé à se répéter: cette fois, c'était le buste édifié sur un mur du Palais Károlyi qui était marqué de la redoutable peinture rouge, marque incontournable de la „collaboration” avec les communistes.

Dans la présente étude, on va plutôt essayer de contribuer à l'histoire de la révolution des Reines-Marguerites et à la biographie de Mihály Károlyi, tout en essayant d'éviter les *a priori* politiques qui semblent régner sur ce domaine. Cet article se concentre sur la période où Károlyi a assumé la présidence provisoire de la République, de janvier à mars 1919. Dans cette période de la «République populaire» de Hongrie, Károlyi se trouva plutôt écarté du pouvoir, bien qu'il ait gardé la plupart de ses prérogatives symboliques, notamment grâce à sa nomination à la Présidence provisoire. Pour contextualiser cette

¹ Le lieutenant-colonel Fernand-Vix avait remis, le 20 mars 1919, une note signée par le général De Lobit, Commandant provisoire de l'armée alliée de Hongrie fondée au printemps 1919. De Lobit écrivait à l'adresse de Károlyi, tout en l'informant de la décision du 26 février 1919 de la conférence de la Paix. Cette décision, prise par la Conférence «dans le but d'éviter tout conflit susceptible de gêner ses travaux en cours», prévoyait de «créer une zone neutre libre de toutes troupes hongroises et roumaines mais dont les points importants [seraient] occupés par des troupes interalliées». L'application de cette décision signifiait la perte de contrôle de l'Etat hongrois sur un grand territoire incluant non seulement des villes de Transylvanie ou du Partium comme Nagykaroly ou Nagyvárad, mais aussi de grandes villes majoritairement hongroises comme Szeged, Békéscsaba et Debrecen. D'autre part, les troupes roumaines étaient autorisées à porter leur ligne jusqu'à la limite orientale de la zone neutre, ce qui leur permettait de dépasser davantage vers l'est la ligne qu'ils avaient atteinte jusqu'à la fin du janvier 1919. Quant à l'administration civile dans la zone neutre, elle restait dans les mains du gouvernement hongrois, sous le contrôle du Commandement interallié. Pour le texte de la note, cf. *Károlyi Mihály levelezése - I. 1905-1920*, éd. par György LITVAN, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978, 445.

période, on va analyser la procédure qui mena à la démission du premier gouvernement de la république, et la constitution du cabinet présidé par Dénes Berinkey: la première partie de la présente étude est donc consacrée à la crise du gouvernement de Károlyi, qui commença en décembre 1918. Dans un second lieu, on va parler des affaires intérieures du gouvernement Berinkey. Finalement, on va évoquer la politique étrangère hongroise de l'époque.²

La montée des contestations conservatrices et la crise dans le gouvernement Károlyi

La situation qui mena à la crise du cabinet a ses racines dans la composition du gouvernement Károlyi. Ce gouvernement, qui unifiait à la fois les sociaux-démocrates, les bourgeois radicaux et les membres de l'ancienne aristocratie hongroise, était marqué d'une hétérogénéité qui causait des désaccords entre les membres du gouvernement durant les premiers mois de la République Hongroise. La discorde se manifesta assez tôt, le 12 décembre 1918, par la démission de Tivadar Batthyány du ministère de l'Intérieur.³ Cette démission est d'une grande importance, puisque Batthyány, membre du Parti de l'indépendance, fut l'un des plus proches collaborateurs de Károlyi pendant les années de guerre. Le motif de sa démission était exprimé dans sa déclaration: il avançait, en démissionnant, que l'Entente maltraitait la Hongrie non pas pour son alliance avec l'Allemagne dans le passé, mais plutôt à cause l'alliance de Károlyi avec les socialistes.

Cette démission fut suivie plus tard, le 23 décembre, par celle de Márton Lovászy du ministère de l'Éducation.⁴ Ainsi, le second «*pilier*» des indépendantistes du gouvernement retirait son soutien au gouvernement. L'une des raisons les plus importantes de cette démission était l'existence des sociaux-démocrates (et également d'Oszkár Jászi⁵) au sein du cabinet.⁶ Lovászy, avec Batthyány, tenta d'organiser une opposition bourgeoise et

² L'auteur tient à remercier M. Antoine Marès et Mme Catherine Horel, qui ont assuré la direction scientifique du mémoire qui a constitué le cadre de cette recherche (Université de Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, septembre 2006).

³ Cf. Télégramme de Batthyány Tivadar à Mihály Károlyi, 12/12/1918, IN: *Károlyi Mihály levelezése - I*, 323. BATTHYÁNY, Tivadar, *comte* (1859-1931), homme politique hongrois du Parti de l'indépendance. Membre du Conseil national hongrois, ensuite ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement Károlyi

⁴ Lovászy Márton (1864-1927), journaliste et homme politique hongrois. Membre du Parti de l'indépendance. Député à partir de 1901. Ministre des Cultes et de l'Instruction publique dans le cabinet Károlyi

⁵ Jászi Oszkár (1875-1957), sociologue et homme politique hongrois. Fondateur du Parti national radical citoyen. Célèbre notamment pour ses théories sur la question nationale en Europe Centrale. Ministre des Nationalités dans les gouvernements Károlyi et Berinkey. Emigré en 1919, pendant la période de République des Conseils, d'abord en Autriche, puis aux Etats-Unis

⁶ Cf. Lettre de Lovászy Márton à anonyme, Budapest, 29/01/1919, OSZK [Bibliothèque nationale de Hongrie]/Kézirattár/fol. hung./39/34, [f. 1].

démocratique, allant à l'encontre de la radicalisation de Károlyi, et ayant parmi les buts principaux la suppression du mouvement bolchevique. Cette opposition s'assurerait de l'appui de l'Entente, et notamment de la France, appui qu'avait perdu Károlyi à cause de son alliance avec la social-démocratie. Dans ce cadre, pour s'assurer de l'appui français, Lovászy rendit même une visite au lieutenant-colonel Fernand Vix (président de la Mission militaire alliée de Hongrie depuis novembre 1918), mais sans réussir à obtenir son appui.⁷

Batthyány et Lovászy, alliés au ministre de Guerre Albert Bartha, constituèrent ainsi l'opposition bourgeoise; le gouvernement Károlyi allait devoir démissionner le 8 janvier 1919 sous la pression socialiste. Ainsi, la social-démocratie sortait puissante de la crise. Le même jour, le Conseil ouvrier avait fait une réunion, où étaient apparues deux tendances dans la social-démocratie. Ernő Garami⁸ proposait que les sociaux-démocrates quittent le gouvernement Károlyi, alors que Sándor Garbai⁹ proposait la constitution d'un gouvernement totalement socialiste. Enfin, la solution intermédiaire de Zsigmond Kunfi,¹⁰ qui projetait la constitution d'un nouveau gouvernement avec prédominance socialiste, fut acceptée par le Conseil.¹¹ Le nouveau gouvernement fut constitué le 18 janvier, à la même date que l'ouverture de la conférence de la Paix de Paris, et gagna son poste le lendemain, le 19 janvier. Le nouveau premier ministre était un membre du Parti Károlyi, mais il était un juriste spécialiste du droit international, et non un politicien. Le gouvernement Berinkey comprenait cinq membres de l'aile gauche du parti Károlyi, un radical, quatre socialistes, et un représentant du parti agrarien, qui venait d'être fondé.¹²

Le même jour, Károlyi fut nommé président provisoire de la République et lors de son discours d'élection à la présidence, il exprima son désir de revoir

⁷ PASTOR, Péter, *Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three*, Boulder, East European Quarterly & New York, Columbia University Press, coll. «East European Monographs», 1976, 91. HAJDU Tibor, «A Contribution to the History of the Proclamation of the Hungarian Republic of Councils», *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae* vol. 19 n° 1-2, 1973, 69.

⁸ Garami Ernő (1876-1935), homme politique hongrois, dirigeant social-démocrate. Editeur en chef du journal *Népszava*. Ministre du Commerce dans les gouvernements Károlyi et Berinkey.

⁹ Garbai Sándor (1879-1947); homme politique social-démocrate hongrois. Président du Conseil de gouvernement révolutionnaire à l'époque de la République des Conseils. Emigré en Autriche, puis en France.

¹⁰ Kunfi Zsigmond (1879-1929), homme politique social-démocrate. Après la Révolution de 1918, Ministre de la Protection sociale, ensuite (à partir de janvier 1919), de l'Education nationale. Commissaire de l'instruction publique sous la République des Conseils. Emigré à Vienne après la fin de la République des Conseils.

¹¹ VERMES Gábor, « *The October Revolution in Hungary* », IN: *Hungary in Revolution, 1918-19 : Nine Essays*, (éd.) Iván VÖLGYES, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1971, 51.

¹² *idem*, 52.

les socialistes et les bourgeois se retrouver dans un même camp.¹³ Il est évident que le poste du président de la République était plutôt de nature symbolique par rapport à celui du Premier ministre, et la nomination de Károlyi signifiait plutôt un isolement relatif de la politique. Le Général Franchet d'Esperey, commandant en chef de l'Armée Alliée d'Orient, notait d'ailleurs que la présidence de Károlyi était bien souhaitée par le journal *Budapesti Hírlap*, «journal tout dévoué sous l'ancien régime aux intérêts des pangermanistes et de la grande industrie». Ce journal suggérait que, sans attendre la réunion de l'Assemblée nationale, Károlyi devait être nommé président de la République, tandis qu'un nouveau cabinet serait constitué: selon Franchet d'Esperey, c'était un moyen élégant d'écarter Károlyi.¹⁴

La crise eut un autre retentissement, mais cette fois au sein du Parti de l'indépendance: le 25 janvier, l'aile gauche du parti, désormais poussée à la minorité, quitta le parti. Quant à Lovászy et Batthyány, ils tentèrent réorganiser le parti sur une base plus nationaliste et conservatrice: ce nouveau regroupement contenait à la fois des éléments modérés (Lovászy et Batthyány) et à la fois des figures plutôt vouées à la contre-révolution (le comte István Bethlen).¹⁵ Une partie du corps des officiers sous la conduite de Gyula Gömbös suivit ce groupement de droite.¹⁶

Tentatives de rapprochement des conservateurs avec la France

La crise du gouvernement et la nomination de Károlyi furent bien suivies et commentées par les autorités françaises. Un document datant du jour de l'élection de Károlyi à la présidence provisoire précisait que le comte serait sans autorité réelle, et le que le Conseil national espérait présider. János Hock¹⁷ serait prêt à remplacer le présent cabinet par un autre incluant Lovászy et Batthyány,

¹³ KÁROLYI Mihály: «Beszéd a nemzeti tanácsban ideiglenes köztársasági elnökké történt megválasztásakor» [Discours au Conseil national, à son élection comme président provisoire de la République], 11/01/1919, publ. IN: *Politikai Híradó*, 11/01/1919, [rééd. IN: *Az új Magyarországért: Válogatott írások és beszédek, 1908-1919* [Pour la Hongrie nouvelle: écrits et discours choisis], Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1968, 286].

¹⁴ Télégramme chiffré n° 81-82-83 de Franchet d'Esperey, Louis à Georges Clemenceau et au général Foch, 21/01/1919, AMAE [Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (France)]/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/44, f. 209. Clemenceau, Georges (1841-1929), homme politique français. Président du Conseil (1906-1909 ; 1917-1920). Président de la conférence de la Paix de Paris (1919-1920). Foch, Ferdinand, *général* (1851-1929), maréchal de France, commandant en chef des Armées Alliées en 1918.

¹⁵ VERMES Gábor, «*The October Revolution in Hungary*», 54. Bethlen István (1874-1946), politicien conservateur hongrois, Premier ministre de Hongrie de 1921 à 1931.

¹⁶ KUN Béla, «*Pourquoi la révolution prolétarienne a-t-elle vaincu en Hongrie? A l'occasion du 15^e anniversaire de la république socialiste hongroise des conseils*», Bratislava, Imprimerie Pallas, 1934 [rééd. IN: *La République hongroise des conseils*, 430].

¹⁷ Hock János (1859-1936), religieux catholique et politicien hongrois, membre du Parti de Károlyi, président du Conseil national en 1918.

«*si du moins cette solution donnait satisfaction à l'Entente*».¹⁸ Ainsi, la nouvelle coalition conservatrice essayait de «*jouer la carte de l'ententophilie*», tout en profitant du discrédit de Károlyi auprès des milieux de l'Entente.

Dénes Pálasi, professeur à l'École de commerce de Temesvár, dans sa lettre adressée à Georges Clemenceau¹⁹ vraisemblablement pour faire la propagande du nouveau parti, écrivait que le chef actuel des Magyars qui soutenaient l'alliance franco-hongroise était Lovászy, tout en rappelant qu'il avait crié au parlement, «*laconiquement mais sincèrement*», «*nous voilà amis de l'Entente*».²⁰ De plus, Pálasi prétendait qu'il y avait une continuité du nouveau parti avec le mouvement francophile introduit au tournant du siècle par Gábor Ugron.²¹ Suite à cela, l'auteur de la lettre mettait en avant des arguments justifiant la constitution d'une alliance franco-hongroise, en accentuant notamment les intérêts économiques d'une alliance éventuelle, liés à la complémentarité de l'économie agricole de la Hongrie avec l'industrie française.²² «*Nous avons l'honneur donc d'offrir une alliance fidèle et honnête*», continuait Pálasi, «*En cas d'acceptation, nous allons créer avec l'aide française et dans 30 jours la nouvelle Hongrie et digne de l'alliance. A cette œuvre de réorganisation, il est nécessaire que la capitale du pays soit occupée par 10.000 hommes et que le chef de l'armée soit un officier français -qui devait disposer sur toutes les armées occupant notre pays- qui serait chargé par Mr. le Président [du Conseil, i. e. Clemenceau] de seconder tous les ordres nécessaires de Mr. M. Lovászy, le chef de la troupe des amis français.*»²³

Un autre document, transmettant les propos d'un informateur hongrois, dit encore plus de la nouvelle opposition bourgeoise. Cet informateur, qui «*ne cach[ait] pas ses sympathies pour Károlyi*» (ou plutôt, qui tentait d'occulter l'opposition entre Károlyi et Lovászy), avait la «*préoccupation d'intéresser l'Entente au nouveau parti fondé par M. Lovászy*».²⁴ Ensuite, l'informateur décrivait le nouveau parti comme «*républicain et démocratique, mais résolument opposé aux expériences collectivistes*».²⁵ Le nouveau parti

¹⁸ Télégrammes déchiffrés n° 115, 116, 117 de Clément-Simon, Frédéric à Stéphen Pichon, Prague, 19/01/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 79. Clément-Simon, Frédéric (1873-?) ministre de France à Prague (1918) et à Belgrade (1921). Pichon, Stéphen (1857-1933), diplomate et homme d'Etat français. Ministre des Affaires étrangères (1906-1911, 22 mars-9 décembre 1913, 1917-1920).

¹⁹ Clemenceau, Georges (1841-1929), homme politique français. Président du Conseil (1906-1909 ; 1917-1920). Président de la conférence de la Paix de Paris (1919-1920).

²⁰ Lettre de PÁLASI Dénes à Georges Clemenceau, Budapest, 20/01/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 168.

²¹ *ibid.* Cf. aussi, sur Ugron : BAUQUET, Nicolas, «*Un innocent flirt diplomatique*», art. cit.

²² *idem*, f. 169.

²³ *idem*, ff. 169-170.

²⁴ Bureau de Presse français (Berne), «*La Situation en Hongrie. La Menace Bolchewiste. Le Parti civique*», Berne, 03/02/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 95.

²⁵ *idem*, f. 98.

s'appellerait le Parti civique; le noyau serait formé par les membres bourgeois du parti Károlyi. L'informateur faisait un portrait de Lovászy, « *l'âme de cette nouvelle organisation* », tout en soulignant qu'il était un « *fidèle ami de Károlyi et l'un des chefs de l'ancien Parti de l'indépendance* ». Quant à la position à prendre à l'égard de Károlyi, le nouveau parti adoptait une stratégie compliquée. Lovászy et ses partisans soutiendraient résolument Károlyi. « *Tant que celui-ci pourra se maintenir au pouvoir, ils s'abstiend[raient] de prendre l'offensive contre les socialistes. Mais si le comte Károlyi venait à être renversé ou était contraint de se retirer devant les exigences de l'extrême gauche, le 'parti civique' ne se croirait plus tenu aux mêmes ménagements et entamerait une lutte énergique contre les socialistes.* »²⁶

L'informateur précisait encore que le Parti Lovászy voulait seulement mettre un terme aux progrès socialistes, et qu'il n'avait « *pas l'intention de servir les projets réactionnaires de quelques grands seigneurs* » (Windischgraetz, Andrásy, Esterházy).²⁷ il voulait juste mettre un terme aux progrès socialistes. D'ailleurs, toujours selon les propos de l'informateur, Lovászy avait toujours été un ententophile déclaré, son parti ne comprenait « *aucun élément favorable aux Allemands* ». Ces propos continuaient par une expression du désir de la bonne volonté de l'Entente: on espérait « *encore à Budapest que l'Entente n'écrasera pas la Hongrie et n'abandonnera pas aux Slaves et aux Roumains tous les territoires convoités par eux* », et on croyait que les Alliés laisseraient à la Hongrie les mines de charbon, les gisements de fer et les forêts qui lui sont indispensables.²⁸ Même ces lignes montrent que Lovászy et ses partisans essayaient de remplacer Károlyi dans ses tentatives de rapprochement avec l'Entente, tout en utilisant son discours et tout en profitant du discrédit qu'il avait subi à cause du déroulement de ses relations avec la France pendant son Premier ministère.

Activités contre-révolutionnaires à Berne

Tandis que le courant de droite du Parti de l'indépendance s'organisait en opposition, un courant plutôt réactionnaire dirigé par Andrásy et

²⁶ *idem*, f. 99.

²⁷ WINDISCHGRAETZ Lajos, prince (1882-1967), homme politique légitimiste hongrois. ANDRÁSSY, Gyula [junior], comte (1860-1929), homme d'Etat hongrois. Député, membre du Parti libéral à partir de 1885. Il quitta le Parti libéral (d'abord en 1898 pour une brève durée, ensuite en 1904) pour rejoindre l'opposition, tout en restant fidèle aux principes de 1867. Dirigeant du Parti de la constitution, fondé en 1905. Ministre de l'Intérieur dans le gouvernement de Wekerle (1906-1910). En 1913 il refonda le Parti de la constitution. Du 24 au 30 octobre, dernier ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Double Monarchie. Il revint en Hongrie après la chute de la République des conseils, et poursuivit une politique légitimiste. ESTERHÁZY Móric, comte (1881-1960), aristocrate hongrois. Premier ministre de Hongrie entre le 15 juin et le 20 août 1917.

²⁸ *idem*, ff. 99-100.

Windischgraetz surgissait, depuis l'automne 1918. Ce mouvement était surtout fort en Suisse où s'étaient installés Andrassy et Windischgraetz: ainsi, après sa nomination comme ambassadeur à Berne, Bedy-Schwimmer²⁹ allait devoir affronter les « *avocats des Habsbourg* », selon l'expression de Károlyi.³⁰ Le comte tout en évoquant les activités réactionnaires autour d'Andrassy, allait dire que ce dernier n'avait pas intrigué seulement contre le gouvernement Károlyi, mais contre toute la Hongrie,³¹ tout en contribuant à discréditer la révolution hongroise.

Les activités d'Andrassy et de son entourage ne trouvèrent pourtant pas d'accueil auprès des autorités françaises. D'ailleurs, même la démission du gouvernement Károlyi allait être interprétée, par le chargé d'affaires de France à Berne, comme une « *conséquence des manœuvres d'Andrassy et Cie.* ». Ces derniers savaient d'ailleurs que les chefs d'Etat ne seraient pas admis à représenter leurs nations à la conférence de la Paix,³² pour cette raison, ils assurèrent que Károlyi soit nommé président de la République, en étant enlevé ainsi de ses prérogatives politiques et de ses potentielles fonctions de représentation à la conférence de la Paix. De même, pour le chargé d'affaires, la scission dans le parti de Károlyi était l'œuvre du groupe réactionnaire présidé par Andrassy: « *Ils ont effectivement réussi à jeter la division dans le parti Károlyi et rendre précaire la situation personnelle de celui-ci* ». ³³ Cette hypothèse est bien entendu en contradiction avec le discours de l'entourage de Lovászy, qui, comme on vient de le voir, voulaient se distinguer des tendances réactionnaires.

Entre-temps, Andrassy poursuivait sa propagande, tout en accentuant sa « *déception* » envers l'attitude de l'Entente. Il déclarait qu'il espérait que l'Entente fonde une paix solide, mais le résultat, c'était une attitude intransigeante. D'ailleurs, l'Entente était partiellement informée sur la Hongrie. Andrassy précisait que « *la mentalité politique de la nation hongroise [s'était] radicalement modifiée pendant le drame affreux qui vient de s'écouler* ». ³⁴ Mais il s'abstenait d'imiter ceux qui pensaient assurer et sauver l'avenir de la Hongrie en attaquant les « *éléments dirigeants* » de la société et en salissant « *le glorieux passé* » de la Hongrie.³⁵ Ces lignes, qui contenaient une critique

²⁹ BÉDY-SCHWIMMER, Rózsa (1877-1948), journaliste, femme politique hongroise. L'un des leaders du mouvement féministe hongrois de l'avant-1914. Membre du Conseil national hongrois en automne 1918. Ministre de la République hongroise à Berne entre novembre 1918 et février 1919. Emigrée aux Etats-Unis en 1921.

³⁰ KÁROLYI, Mihály, « *Egy egész világ ellen II* », 471-2.

³¹ KÁROLYI, Mihály, « *Andrassy, vagy az arisztokrata* » [Andrassy, ou l'aristocrate], *Történelmi Szemle*, vol. 18, n° 2-3, 1975, 308.

³² Dépêche n° 55ACL du Chargé d'Affaires de la République Française à Berne à Stéphen Pichon, Berne, 27/01/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/44, f. 216.

³³ *idem*, f. 215.

³⁴ ANDRÁSSY Gyula, « *Le comte Andrassy aux puissances de l'Entente* », *Pesti Hírlap*, 10/12/1918, (traduction), AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/44, f. 180.

³⁵ *ibid.*

implicite de la politique révolutionnaire de Károlyi et des autres révolutionnaires de 1918, précédaient les longues descriptions de la situation désastreuse en Hongrie, et des revendications territoriales de « l'impérialisme tchèque », des Roumains et des Serbes.³⁶

Ce discours n'était pas convaincant pour la diplomatie française: les représentants diplomatiques de la France décrivaient la Suisse comme « un champ d'intrigues des représentants des anciens partis aristocratiques magyars », auxquels la révolution d'octobre avait porté un coup fatal. Selon le rapporteur du Bureau de Presse Français à Berne, le but d'Andrássy était « beaucoup moins de sauver la Hongrie en plaidant sa cause auprès des puissances de l'Entente que de précipiter la chute du Cabinet Károlyi et de faciliter la formation à Budapest d'un gouvernement plus conservateur ».³⁷

Le Temps était également défavorable aux tentatives de Gyula Andrássy et de son entourage. L'édition du 15 février 1919, après avoir précisé que le comte Andrássy avait établi son quartier général en Suisse, parlait de ses activités avec les mots suivants: « Il parcourt ce pays d'une ville à l'autre pour mener une campagne contre le droit des populations opprimées de Hongrie à disposer d'elles-mêmes ».³⁸ Ces mots étaient assez piquants, surtout dans la presse d'un pays qui se réclamait protecteur des nationalités opprimées. Ainsi, *Le Temps* approuvait indirectement la politique du gouvernement hongrois. Quelques semaines après, le journal écrivait que le château d'Andrássy à Tiszadob³⁹ avait été pillé par ses propres paysans en raison des activités contre-révolutionnaires du comte, et que la presse de Budapest (et même les journaux qui étaient contre Károlyi) rappelait le passé pro-germaniste de la Hongrie, et ses convictions anti-démocratiques: « la presse est unanime à affirmer que le comte Jules Andrássy n'a nullement le droit de s'inquiéter de la Hongrie nouvelle. Sa propagande est dirigée surtout contre les principes de Károlyi, qui en venant de faire décréter le morcellement des grandes propriétés, enlève aux hommes politiques, tels qu'Andrássy, leur dernière influence en Hongrie ».⁴⁰ Toutes ces lignes ont pour point de départ, de façon latente, une attitude plutôt favorable à Károlyi, tout en associant ce dernier à la politique visant à renverser l'ancien régime, incarné par Andrássy.

Affaires internes dans les derniers mois de la république populaire Mesures sociales et réforme agraire

Le gouvernement Berinkey, qui était en fait une coalition entre l'aile de gauche du parti Károlyi, la bourgeoisie radicale et les ailes de centre et de

³⁶ *idem*, ff. 181-3.

³⁷ Bureau de Presse français (Berne), communiqué sans n°, 30/12/1918, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 57.

³⁸ *Le Temps*, 15/02/1919.

³⁹ Actuellement au nord-est de la Hongrie, dans le comitat de Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg.

⁴⁰ *Le Temps*, 03/03/1919.

droite du Parti social-démocrate, allait avoir une orientation plus à gauche que le précédent ; donc, des mesures sociales radicales allaient être mises en œuvre. La constitution du gouvernement Berinkey inquiétait les autorités françaises. Dans une note du Bureau de Presse Française à Berne, il était précisé que la politique des socialistes présentait des dangers, tout comme celle des bolcheviques. Les socialistes exerçaient sur Károlyi une « forte pression », et en menaçant de lui retirer le soutien, avaient obtenu de lui quatre portefeuilles dans le ministère, et notamment celui de la guerre. « Jusqu'alors le ministre de la Guerre parvint difficilement à faire entendre raison aux Conseils de Soldats. Quelle sera l'autorité du ministre de la Guerre socialiste ? » se demandait l'auteur de la note.⁴¹ La situation était particulièrement inquiétante dans un contexte où la révolution bolchevique avait éclaté.

En fait, la gauche socialiste se radicalisa, surtout pendant le mois de mars 1919, ce qui créa une tendance à l'autonomisation dans la politique socialiste, tandis que les partis bourgeois du gouvernement se déclaraient toujours fidèles à l'alliance avec la social-démocratie. La situation devint si décourageante vers la fin de mars que le 19 mars le Parti radical déclara son intention de s'abstenir des élections.⁴²

Les mesures sociales s'accélérent dans la période du gouvernement de Dénes Berinkey, ce qui est essentiellement la conséquence de l'influence des sociaux-démocrates et de l'aile gauche des indépendantistes au sein du gouvernement. Ainsi, dès la fin de la première période, les entreprises d'Etat étaient centralisées au sein du ministère du Commerce, ce qui était un premier pas vers la nationalisation. Cet effort fut couronné le 18 mars par un projet de loi du peuple proposé par Vilmos Böhm⁴³ sur la socialisation des entreprises.⁴⁴ Ces mesures sociales étaient pourtant jugées insuffisantes par les autorités françaises. Une note du 3 février 1919 indiquait, par exemple, que l'indemnité de chômage en Hongrie entraînait une augmentation du chômage, en poussant les gens à la paresse ; bref, les autorités étaient impuissantes à remédier la crise du chômage.⁴⁵

Le plus grand pas fait par le gouvernement dans le cadre des réformes sociales fut la réforme agraire. Déjà à la date de la proclamation de la république, la réforme agraire était énumérée parmi les priorités de la nouvelle

⁴¹ Bureau de Presse français (Berne), « *La Situation en Hongrie. La Menace Bolchewiste. Le Parti civique* », note, Berne, 03/02/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 95.

⁴² VERMES Gábor, *art. cit.*, 55.

⁴³ BÖHM, Vilmos (1880-1949), homme politique hongrois, un des dirigeants de la social-démocratie hongroise. Ministre de la Guerre dans le gouvernement de Dénes Berinkey (1919). Commissaire du peuple de la Socialisation, puis de la Guerre à l'époque de la République des Conseils. Commandant en chef de l'Armée rouge hongroise. Ambassadeur à Vienne en juillet 1919. Emigré après la chute de la République.

⁴⁴ KÁROLYI Katalin, *Együtt a forradalomban*, 202.

⁴⁵ Bureau de Presse français (Berne), « *La Situation en Hongrie. La Menace Bolchewiste. Le Parti civique* », Berne, 03/02/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, ff. 97-98.

république. D'ailleurs, le projet existait même avant la proclamation de la république, et le 14 novembre 1918, l'Association économique hongroise nationale (OMGE)⁴⁶ avait déclaré que la réforme agraire était nécessaire, et que les propriétaires allaient distribuer de leur plein gré leur terre aux paysans.⁴⁷ La réforme ne fut pourtant pas mise en œuvre pendant le gouvernement de Károlyi. Ce retard est dû surtout à l'opposition de divers couches sociales et organisations politiques à la réforme agraire. Une partie des propriétaires terriens s'opposaient à la réforme, malgré la prise de position favorable de l'OMGE, et du parti agrarien présidé par István Nagyatádi-Szabó.⁴⁸ Mais curieusement, une opposition tout aussi importante provenait du mouvement socialiste et communiste. Plus tard, dans ses Mémoires, Károlyi allait critiquer cette position de la gauche : il allait écrire que les socialistes (mis à part Kunfi et Garami) sabotaient la réalisation de la réforme agraire, et la raison, c'était qu'ils voyaient en la masse paysanne une force contre-révolutionnaire.⁴⁹ De plus, les socialistes, mais surtout les communistes, essayaient de contrecarrer la réforme agraire, tout en craignant que cette réforme augmente le nombre des petits propriétaires en campagne, et que cela empêche une potentielle révolution socialiste. Pourtant, à partir de la fin décembre 1918, la plupart des socialistes changèrent de position, parallèlement à la montée du mécontentement paysan. Quant aux communistes, ils gardèrent leur opposition à la réforme agraire et optèrent pour une solution de nationalisation directe des propriétés terriennes, et cette politique se concrétisa lors de la période de la République des conseils.

La loi sur la réforme agraire fut promulguée le 18 février 1919, et significativement, Károlyi en entreprit l'application en distribuant ses propriétés de Kápolna.⁵⁰ Ce domaine avait été offert à Sándor Károlyi⁵¹ par l'empereur d'Autriche en 1711, en fonction de sa participation à la signature de la paix de Szatmár.⁵² Pour Károlyi, cette « *distribution de terres à Kápolna* » avait une grande signification ; et en même temps, ce sacrifice était une bonne occasion pour prouver que le gouvernement et le président provisoire de la République étaient décidés de mener à bout leur politique révolutionnaire. Károlyi, dans le discours qu'il fit lors de la cérémonie de la distribution des

⁴⁶ *Országos Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület* -, l'une des plus importantes sociétés de la Hongrie de l'avant-guerre, regroupant les propriétaires terriens.

⁴⁷ VERMES Gábor, *art. cit.*, 45-46.

⁴⁸ NAGYATÁDI-SZABÓ István (1863-1924), homme politique hongrois, du mouvement agrarien. Ministre de l'Agriculture dans le gouvernement Berinkey.

⁴⁹ KÁROLYI Mihály, *Hit, illúziók nélkül*, 154-155.

⁵⁰ Kápolna, commune faisant part du comitat de Heves, au nord de la Hongrie actuelle.

⁵¹ KÁROLYI, Sándor, baron (puis comte) (1669-1743), aristocrate hongrois. Participe à la guerre d'indépendance de François II Rákóczi contre les Habsbourg. En 1711, il fut l'initiateur principal de la paix de Szatmár, qui marqua la fin de la guerre d'indépendance, et le début du compromis entre la noblesse hongroise et le pouvoir de Vienne.

⁵² KÁROLYI Mihály, *Hit, illúziók nélkül*, 205.

terres, qualifia ce jour-là de « *la fête de la Hongrie nouvelle* », puisque ce jour-là les derniers restes de la Hongrie féodale étaient enterrés. Dans la Hongrie nouvelle, indépendante, démocratique et sociale, la terre allait appartenir à ceux qui la labouraient.⁵³

Le projet de réforme agraire ne fut pourtant pas mené à bien, notamment en raison de la démission de Károlyi et du gouvernement, et par conséquence, la réforme de la terre n'a pu être appliquée qu'aux territoires de Kápolna. La nouvelle politique de distribution de terres s'était d'ailleurs heurtée à l'opposition des éléments de l'ancien régime, et notamment de József Károlyi, demi-frère du président de la République. La réforme fut critiquée par l'Eglise (par Mgr. Prohászka),⁵⁴ et par les communistes, pour des raisons que l'on vient de mentionner ci-dessus.

La comtesse Károlyi⁵⁵ note dans ses Mémoires que la réforme agraire hongroise fut soutenue par les journaux français, à l'exception des journaux conservateurs.⁵⁶ En fait, le *Temps* publia, le 25 février 1919, un long article sur la réforme agraire. Le correspondant particulier du journal faisait une longue description de la situation de la propriété foncière hongroise, en soulignant l'importance de la grande propriété en Hongrie. C'étaient surtout les très grands propriétaires qui possédaient la terre dans ce pays, et le tiers du territoire (soit environ cinq millions d'hectares), appartenaient à 3,700 individus. Depuis longtemps, un changement radical était nécessaire, mais il n'avait pas été possible. Le correspondant du *Temps* continuait son analyse par le commentaire suivant :

Il a fallu que la révolution du 31 octobre renversât toutes les anciennes institutions et amenât au pouvoir un cabinet composé de bourgeois radicaux et de social-démocrates, pour transformer un des derniers refuges de la grande propriété terrienne en un pays où les propriétés d'étendue faible ou médiocres prédomineront tout comme chez nous.

Suite à cet éloge indirect de la révolution hongroise, le journal donnait des détails sur l'étendue de la loi sur la réforme agraire : désormais, l'Etat avait droit d'exproprier toute propriété couvrant plus de 500 arpents. Dans certains cas, des propriétés ayant plus de 200 arpents pourraient aussi être expropriées. Dans les parties septentrionales (dans les régions ruthènes), en

⁵³ KÁROLYI Mihály, « *A földosztás ünnepe* » [Fête de la distribution des terres], Kápolna, 23/02/1919, publ. IN: *Budapesti Hírlap*, 25/02/1919, rééd. IN: *Az új Magyarországért*, 290.

⁵⁴ KÁROLYI Mihály, *Hit, illúziók nélkül*, 159. PROHÁSZKA, Ottokar (1858-1927), évêque de Székesfehérvár à partir de 1905. Partisan de la distribution de terres aux mutilés de guerre pendant la Guerre de 1914-1918. Soutint la contre-révolution en 1918-1919.

⁵⁵ KÁROLYI, Katalin (née Andrásy), comtesse (1898-1985), petite-fille de Gyula Andrásy senior, nièce (et ensuite belle-fille) de Gyula Andrásy junior, mariée au comte Mihály Károlyi en 1914. Elle accompagna son mari en exil (1919-1946, ensuite à partir de 1949). Après la mort du comte, elle retourna, en 1963, en Hongrie, où furent publiées ses mémoires : *Együtt a forradalomban* [Ensemble dans la révolution] et *Együtt a száműzetésben* [Ensemble en exil].

⁵⁶ KÁROLYI Katalin, *Együtt a forradalomban*, 281 [*On m'appelait la comtesse rouge*, 200].

raison des conditions spéciales de cette région, ce chiffre se baissait jusqu'à vingt arpents.⁵⁷

Activités communistes sous le gouvernement Berinkey

Ce fut également dans la période du gouvernement de Berinkey que les activités du Parti communistes de Hongrie prirent de l'ampleur. Malgré la radicalisation de gauche du gouvernement Berinkey, il restait toujours un écart entre les communistes et le gouvernement. Béla Kun⁵⁸ écrivait, par exemple « *Nos revendications, même la démocratie la plus radicale, le gouvernement le plus populaire, ne pourraient pas les satisfaire* ». ⁵⁹ En outre, les communistes et le gouvernement s'opposaient sur la réalisation de certaines réformes, notamment sur la réforme agraire.

Paradoxalement, malgré toutes les tensions qui existaient entre le gouvernement et les communistes, Károlyi fut accusé, notamment par la fraction de Lovászy et par les réactionnaires proches d'Andrássy, d'avoir contribué à la montée des communistes. Un informateur, vraisemblablement un proche d'Andrássy, écrivait qu'en Hongrie, au moment de la débâcle militaire, les éléments radicaux et socialistes « *aidés par le Comte Károlyi* » avaient inauguré un régime qui assura à Budapest la présence des éléments communistes.⁶⁰ Károlyi qui n'avait été qu'un instrument et l'enseigne du parti radical, était incapable désormais d'exercer une influence quelconque sur la politique intérieure. La province voyait en lui « *le traître à la chose hongroise* », la capitale et ses éléments radicaux un instrument au moyen duquel ils cherchaient à tromper l'Europe sur l'existence d'un état de choses organisé en Hongrie. Károlyi avait pu d'abord assurer une certaine influence, notamment grâce aux éléments bourgeois de son parti (comme Lovászy), mais ensuite, il était devenu prisonnier du cabinet ; autrement dit, le président de la République était absolument dépendant des sociaux-démocrates.⁶¹ Selon l'auteur, seul Andrássy serait capable de grouper les différents courants bourgeois et nationaux hongrois ; mais il devrait connaître l'orientation politique de l'Entente pour agir.⁶²

⁵⁷ *Le Temps*, 25/02/1919.

⁵⁸ KUN Béla (1886-1939), leader communiste hongrois. Débute comme journaliste social-démocrate, converti au bolchévisme après la Révolution d'Octobre (1917) en Russie, où il se trouvait comme prisonnier de guerre. Fondateur du Parti Communiste hongrois. Commissaire des Affaires intérieures sous la République des Conseils. Emigré après la chute de la Révolution des Conseils, il s'installe à Moscou. Un des leaders de l'Internationale Communiste entre 1920 et 1935.

⁵⁹ KUN Béla, « *Discours prononcé le 4 novembre 1918 à la Conférence de fondation du parti* », rééd. IN: *La République hongroise des conseils*, 95.

⁶⁰ « *Exposé sur la situation politique intérieure et extérieure en Autriche et dans la Hongrie* », note sans n°, traduction, [20/02/1919], AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 116.

⁶¹ *idem*, f. 117.

⁶² *idem*, f. 118.

Quant aux ministres du gouvernement et à Károlyi, ils essayaient sans cesse, malgré ces accusations, de contrecarrer la montée en puissance des bolcheviques. Les autorités françaises étaient d'ailleurs bien conscientes du facteur de frein au bolchevisme que constituait le gouvernement Károlyi. Franchet d'Esperey écrivait, dans une lettre à Georges Clemenceau, que si Budapest avait été occupée en novembre 1918 (conformément à ses avis), le gouvernement Károlyi aurait pu s'affermir. Or, en janvier 1919, on témoignait d'une situation inquiétante liée à la propagande bolchevique.⁶³

Béla Kun note que Károlyi essaya même d'incorporer les communistes au gouvernement dans le but de créer un front unique national; mais les communistes refusèrent toutes ces avances. Kun décrit ensuite la position du gouvernement en février 1919 : le gouvernement, et même les sociaux-démocrates, tenta de réaliser un « *massacre de communistes* ». Or, cette tentative tourna court, et selon Kun, cela avait deux raisons : d'abord, les masses étaient déçues par l'Entente, et elles s'orientaient « *vers l'Est* », voire vers la Russie bolchevique. D'autre part, il y avait certains éléments chez les sociaux-démocrates qui refusaient d'utiliser la force contre les communistes.⁶⁴

Toujours en février, Károlyi demanda à l'Entente une assistance économique -et non militaire- pour lutter contre le bolchevisme. Mais il n'obtint pas de réponse, notamment en raison de l'attitude de son envoyé semi-officiel (son cousin Miklós Bánffy), qui critiquait sa politique intérieure.⁶⁵ Dans la nuit du 20 au 21 février, une importante mesure fut prise contre les communistes, avec l'arrestation d'une cinquantaine de dirigeants du Parti, dont Béla Kun. Les mesures policières furent consolidées les semaines suivantes. *Le Temps* du 2 et du 4 mars faisait part à ses lecteurs des « *menées communistes* » en Hongrie. Une enquête policière fut effectuée sur les activités communistes: « *Le 1^{er} mai, une nouvelle révolution devait éclater à Budapest. Les communistes avaient décidé de livrer la ville au pillage pendant quarante-huit heures afin de terroriser les habitants, puis de proclamer l'état de siège pour rétablir l'ordre et la tranquillité* ». ⁶⁶ Il est clair que le régime de Károlyi était considéré comme un élément de stabilité et d'équilibre contre les communistes hongrois, qui étaient « *constamment en contact avec le gouvernement des Soviets* ». ⁶⁷

⁶³ télégramme n° 585 BS/3 de FRANCHET D'ESPEREY Louis à Georges Clemenceau, Paris, 18/01/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 83.

⁶⁴ KUN Béla, « Les enseignements de la révolution prolétarienne de Hongrie », *Pravda*, 21/03/1929, rééd. IN: *La République hongroise des conseils*, 372.

⁶⁵ HAJDU Tibor, « *A Contribution [...]* », 73.

⁶⁶ *Le Temps*, 02/03/1919.

⁶⁷ *Le Temps*, 04/03/1919.

***Politique étrangère du gouvernement Berinkey.
La propagande à plusieurs niveaux***

Des quatre puissances ennemies, l'Amérique et l'Italie nous veulent le moins de mal et la France le moins de bien. L'Angleterre semble vouloir laisser faire.

L'auteur de ces lignes, le diplomate Gyula Szilássy, nommé ambassadeur de Hongrie à Berne suite à la démission de Bedy-Schwimmer en raison des difficultés qu'elle rencontra lors de sa mission, proposait un programme complet de politique étrangère à Mihály Károlyi. Selon Szilássy, il fallait gagner la France, « *son gouvernement et son opinion tout d'abord, tout en nous occupant simultanément de l'Amérique et de l'Angleterre et ensuite de l'Italie, du Japon, aussi sans oublier non plus les neutres et les Etats qui, comme la Grèce, ont un certain intérêt à restreindre la puissance des Slaves.* »⁶⁸ La politique étrangère hongroise à l'époque du gouvernement Berinkey était bien conforme à ce projet ; en fait, à cette époque, la république hongroise multiplia ses efforts pour convaincre les milieux de l'Entente de ses convictions pacifiques et démocratiques.

On peut, à titre d'exemple, analyser un numéro spécial de la revue *Politika* intitulée *La politique externe [sic] du président Károlyi et de la République Hongroise*. Cette brochure, qui contenait des articles en français, en anglais et en italien, publia une « *édition spéciale* » qui commençait par l'édition de la version française d'un discours de Károlyi. Ce dernier soulignait que le préjudice de la guerre n'était pas imputable au peuple hongrois: « *Les masses populaires hongroises ne sont elles-mêmes pas plus responsables que les autres nations de la monarchie* »;⁶⁹ autrement dit, il n'était pas logique que les Hongrois fussent traités comme responsables de la guerre, alors que les autres nationalités de la monarchie (Roumains, Tchèques, Slovaques...) étaient encouragés dans leur processus de constitution d'Etat-nation. De plus, il donnait l'exemple de sa propre attitude anti-germaniste pendant la guerre: « *Autant que j'étais en procès avant et surtout pendant la guerre avec les 'Junkers' et impérialistes allemands, autant je m'appitoie sur le sort du peuple allemand innocent, avec lequel je n'ai jamais été en opposition* ». ⁷⁰ Károlyi voulait donc prouver que sa dite « *germanophobie* » n'était point valable au niveau du peuple hongrois ; et qu'il n'était pas guidé par un « *chauvinisme hongrois* ».

⁶⁸ SZILÁSSY Gyula à Mihály Károlyi, note, strictement confidentiel, Berne, 09/02/1919, IN: *Károlyi Mihály levelezése - I. 1905-1920*, 419.

⁶⁹ KÁROLYI Mihály, « *La politique externe du comte Károlyi. Un discours du président de la République Hongroise* », IN: *The foreign policy of President Károlyi and of the Hungarian Republic = La politique externe du président Károlyi et de la République Hongroise = La politica estera del Presidente Károlyi e della Repubblica Ungherese. Edition spéciale de la revue hongroise "Politika"*, *Politika*, 1919, 3.

⁷⁰ *idem*, 2.

En outre, Károlyi accentuait sa position favorable à l'Entente avant et pendant la guerre, tout en soulignant ses efforts pour mettre un terme à l'alliance de l'Autriche-Hongrie avec l'Allemagne. Ainsi, il évoquait ses séjours en France et aux Etats-Unis, et aussi ses projets de rapprochement de la Hongrie avec la Russie et l'Italie.⁷¹ Bien entendu, la référence aux principes wilsoniens tenait toujours une place importante dans le discours de Károlyi: il ne cessait de marquer sa «*confiance dans la victoire des doctrines pacifistes de Wilson*⁷²», et il déclarait ne pas croire «*que Wilson admette que des expéditions de repression soient dirigées contre les masses innocentes*».⁷³ Károlyi rappelait d'ailleurs que déjà à une époque où les Allemands étaient victorieux, il s'était placé au point de vue de Wilson; «*c'était justement pour cela*», soulignait-il, «*que j'ai le droit d'exiger la réalisation des principes wilsoniens*». Selon Károlyi, Wilson resterait toujours «*le plus grand personnage historique de cette époque*», et il expliquait cette importance de Wilson par un métaphore: «*c'est lui le premier cismographe [sic] de cette secousse volcanique qui fera tomber en ruine l'ancien système du monde, pour en faire surgir un autre*». La réflexion de Károlyi sur les idées de Wilson était tellement profonde qu'il en déduisait même une sorte de philosophie politique: Wilson prêchait une sorte d'internationalisme, il voulait supprimer les barrières douanières ; mais ses principes ne faisaient pas disparaître l'idée de patrie, au contraire la transformation se faisait «*dans l'intérêt du foyer, du travail pacifique et de la défense de la patrie*».⁷⁴ Cette confiance en Wilson prenait même une allure eschatologique dans le discours du président hongrois : selon Károlyi, la paix ne se ferait que sur la base des principes de Wilson, et la totalité des nations ne respectera qu'une telle paix.⁷⁵

Károlyi n'oubliait pourtant pas de déclarer sa confiance envers les autres composantes de l'Entente: la Grande-Bretagne de Lloyd George, pour ses réformes radicales et démocratiques, la France, pour sa démocratie traditionnelle, et la «*libre nation italienne*», pour ses leaders, toutes avaient la confiance de Károlyi.⁷⁶ De plus, Károlyi essayait de contrecarrer la propagande roumaine auprès de l'Entente, en décrivant la politique de la Roumanie comme l'expression d'une envie barbare, martiale. La Roumanie, selon Károlyi, semblait «*vouloir surpasser les Allemands en cruauté, à la honte des nations civilisées de l'Occident*»; ce qui se traduisait dans le «*martyre du peuple magyar en Transylvanie*», ce qui était la conséquence des tortures du Moyen-Age appliqués par les Roumains.⁷⁷

⁷¹ *idem*, 4.

⁷² WILSON, Woodrow (1856-1924), juriste, homme politique américain démocrate. Professeur de droit et économie entre 1890 et 1910. Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique de 1913 à 1920.

⁷³ KÁROLYI Mihály, «*La politique externe du comte Károlyi*», 2.

⁷⁴ *idem*, 3.

⁷⁵ *idem*, 4.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

⁷⁷ *idem*, 2.

Quant à l'article en anglais de ce recueil, qui suivait le texte du discours de Károlyi, il mettait l'accent sur la question des nationalités. Les Hongrois respectaient les justes revendications de leurs voisins. Mais dans certains cas, il fallait penser cette question avec des réserves. La Roumanie « *moderne* », selon l'auteur (Edward J. Bink) était un reste du féodalisme médiéval, et une immense population hongroise vivait dans les territoires qu'elle revendiquait ; ses demandes ne pouvaient donc être justes.⁷⁸ Quant à la revendication de l'Etat yougoslave sur la Croatie, elle était juste, mais « *l'occupation arbitraire du Banat* » ne pouvait être justifiée en aucun cas. De même, il fallait respecter les frontières historiques de la Bohême, mais il fallait que les Tchèques respectent les frontières hongroises « *datant d'il y a mille ans* ». Selon Bink, la Hongrie historique constituait d'ailleurs une unité économique, et rompre cette unité tout en créant un « *irrédentisme hongrois* », ça revenait à constituer les fondements d'un « *état permanent de guerre* ».⁷⁹ Enfin, Bink se plaignait du fait que les Anglais étaient peu informés sur la situation réelle de la Hongrie, et il appelait les commissions impériales à faire une observation sur place.⁸⁰

Le recueil sur la *Politique étrangère du Président Károlyi* contenait en outre un article en italien qui faisait allusion aux liens historiques et culturelles des époques médiévales jusqu'à la révolution de 1848,⁸¹ et un article intitulé *Un nouveau Balcan* [sic] en Europe, qui donnait des informations statistiques sur les nationalités de la Hongrie, et qui avait pour but de prouver que la Hongrie ne constituait pas une agglomération divisible.⁸²

Le dernier article du recueil portait sur la Hongrie actuelle ; cet article en français, aussi reproduit en anglais et en hongrois, était un compte-rendu des activités législatives de la République hongroise. Malgré les circonstances précaires, précisait ce compte-rendu, le développement de la démocratie hongroise avait atteint un assez haut niveau. La déclaration de la république avait été immédiatement suivie par la loi concernant la liberté de la parole et de la presse ; ensuite, la question du travail, le problème de la réalisation du « *secours des inoccupés, des soldats retournant du front, des veuves et orphelins des soldats, et celui des invalides* » étaient résolues. La réforme agraire venait d'être réalisée, ainsi que l'autonomie des Allemands et Ruthènes. Enfin, le suffrage universel et secret, comprenant aussi les femmes était venu couronner toutes ces entreprises démocratiques. Le gouvernement était formé par des ministres socialistes et bourgeois, son activité était fondée sur l'étroite

⁷⁸ BINK, Edward J., IN: *The foreign policy of President Károlyi and of the Hungarian Republic*, op. cit., 6.

⁷⁹ *idem*, 7.

⁸⁰ *idem*, 8.

⁸¹ FELEKI, Giuseppe, « *L'Italia e l'Ungheria* », IN: *The foreign policy of President Károlyi and of the Hungarian Republic*, op. cit., 9.

⁸² SZEKEREZ, Jean, « *Un nouveau Balcan en Europe* », IN: *The foreign policy of President Károlyi and of the Hungarian Republic*, op. cit., 11-13.

coopération des classes ouvrières et bourgeoises. Cette activité avait pour but d'inaugurer une vie nationale démocratique, pacifiste et productive, mais aussi de « *sauvegarder la vie nationale* » « *contre les germes dangereux du bolchevisme* ». La question du bolchevisme prenait d'ailleurs une place importante dans le développement de l'article:

Le bolchevisme, source de graves événements néfastes dans les pays confinants [*sic*] et en Allemagne, ne saurait jamais se développer au-delà d'une agitation sans importance. Ceci est largement prouvé par l'inefficacité absolue de certaines tentatives communistes qui avaient le but de séduire les classes ouvrières à ne point payer leurs loyers.⁸³

L'analyse de la brochure sur la *Politique étrangère du Président Károlyi* montre bien quelles étaient les priorités de Károlyi et du gouvernement hongrois ; en fait, les responsables de la république s'efforçaient toujours de garder des relations diplomatiques avec le monde extérieur, tout en s'appuyant sur les pays de l'Entente ; ce faisant, ils essayaient de convaincre leurs homologues alliés de la validité du point de vue hongrois sur la question des nationalités. De plus, l'histoire des relations de la Hongrie avec le « *monde civilisé* » (voire, l'Europe occidentale), les projets de Károlyi pour un rapprochement entre la Hongrie et l'Entente pendant la Grande Guerre, ainsi que la politique intérieure de la République Hongroise étaient des références pour convaincre les Alliés de la sincérité et du bien-fondé de la politique hongroise en faveur de l'Entente.

La diplomatie vers la fin de la révolution des Reines-Marguerites

L'activité diplomatique du gouvernement Berinkey peut être considérée en continuité avec celle du gouvernement Károlyi: les priorités de politique extérieure restèrent les mêmes dans cette période. Les relations avec la France furent toujours soumises à l'intransigeance française sur la question des nationalités de l'Autriche-Hongrie, ce qui fut aussi d'actualité pendant les négociations de la conférence de la Paix de Paris, ouvertes le 18 janvier, le même jour que la constitution du gouvernement Berinkey. Ainsi, le 26 février 1919, une décision de la conférence de la Paix allait exiger, en faveur de la Roumanie, un nouveau retrait de 100 km des unités hongroises stationnées aux confins de la Transylvanie et de la région de la Tisza.⁸⁴ Bien entendu, la Hongrie n'était pas représentée parmi les délégations de la conférence.

Le gouvernement hongrois utilisa pourtant d'autres moyens pour faire entendre sa voix. On peut notamment parler de la visite de Kunfi à Berne dans le cadre du Congrès Socialiste International (tenu entre les 3 et 10 février

⁸³ « *La Hongrie d'aujourd'hui : L'activité législative de la République Hongroise depuis sa proclamation* », IN: *The foreign policy of President Károlyi and of the Hungarian Republic op. cit.*, 15.

⁸⁴ ROMSICS Ignác, *art. cit.*, 57.

1919), ce qui avait été l'occasion de faire une propagande au profit du gouvernement hongrois.⁸⁵ Kunfi, le « *représentant du socialisme hongrois depuis la démission de Diner-Dénes*⁸⁶ », s'étonnait que l'Entente « ait permis à l'Allemagne de nouvelles élections, alors qu'elle s'y oppose pour la Hongrie »; en fait, la révolution avait chassé le parlement hongrois responsable de la guerre et de la politique germanophile, « avec ses chefs accrédités, Tisza,⁸⁷ Apponyi⁸⁸, Andrássy ». Quant à la politique actuelle de l'Entente, elle allait avoir de graves conséquences, ce qui pouvait se résumer en un double danger : une réaction de droite ou une reprise « *extrémiste* » de la Révolution.⁸⁹

Lors de cette visite, Kunfi fit part de ses positions en ce qui concerne la politique étrangère de la Hongrie : il n'incriminait nullement le rôle de la mission militaire française présidée par le colonel Vix, qu'il trouvait « *parfaitement amical* ». ⁹⁰ Mais Kunfi reprochait à l'Entente (notamment à la France) de détruire la Hongrie. Mais cette destruction, c'était « *pour créer en Bohême une nouvelle Hongrie* ». Les Tchèques oppriment les Slovaques, et tyrannisaient leurs Allemands bien plus que les Hongrois n'avaient tyrannisé les Roumains. Ensuite, tout en adoptant le même discours que la brochure que l'on vient de citer sur la politique extérieure du Président Károlyi, Kunfi mettait en garde contre la reproduction des « *désordres balkaniques* » au centre de l'Europe. La Macédoine avait troublé l'Europe pendant cinquante ans, disait Kunfi : « *Vous faites de la Hongrie une Macédoine dix fois plus redoutable* ». ⁹¹

Dans une note qu'il remit à un informateur de l'Ambassade de France à Berne, Kunfi évoquait sur « *l'ententophilie* » du gouvernement hongrois : « *Du fait que ce Gouvernement ententophile est traité d'une manière hostile par les Puissances alliées, l'opinion publique est amenée à se demander quel aurait été l'accueil réservé à un Gouvernement germanophile de l'ancien régime* ». Ces lignes, même si elles ne font pas directement allusion à Károlyi, reflètent bien le côté problématique des relations entre Károlyi et la France : il était tout

⁸⁵ Cf. KÁROLYI Mihály à Zsigmond Kunfi, télégramme, Budapest, 15/02/1919, IN : *Károlyi Mihály levelezése - I*, 428.

⁸⁶ DINER-DÉNES József (1857-1937), homme politique hongrois social-démocrate, historien de l'art. Nommé secrétaire d'Etat chargé des Affaires étrangères en 1918, envoyé à Paris dans la période de la république des conseils.

⁸⁷ TISZA István, comte (1861-1918), homme d'Etat hongrois. Fils de Kálmán Tisza. Dirigeant du Parti de 1867. Premier ministre (1903-05, 1913-17).

⁸⁸ APPONYI Albert, comte (1846-1933), homme d'Etat hongrois. Leader du parti d'opposition à partir de 1878, il entre au parti gouvernemental (Parti libéral) en 1899. En 1903 il quitte le Parti libéral pour rejoindre de nouveau l'opposition. A partir de décembre 1904 jusqu'à 1918, l'un des dirigeants du Parti de l'indépendance. Ministre des Cultes et de l'instruction dans le gouvernement de coalition (1906-1910), puis pendant la guerre (1917-1918). Chef de la délégation hongroise auprès de la conférence de la Paix après la Première Guerre mondiale.

⁸⁹ Chargé d'Affaires de la République française à Berne à Stéphen PICHON, dépêche n° 76CL, Berne, 11/02/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/27, f. 110.

⁹⁰ *idem*, f. 111.

⁹¹ *idem*, f. 112.

à fait paradoxal qu'une république menée par un personnage favorable à l'Entente soit si mal vue par les gouvernements de l'Entente. En outre, Kunfi essayait de convaincre la France du bien-fondé des activités du gouvernement: le gouvernement était combattu par les grands propriétaires, inquiets de voir se préparer en Hongrie la réforme agraire qui avait été réalisée en France il y a plus d'un siècle et aussi par les grandes banques qui craignaient, non sans raison, d'être obligées de payer les dépenses de la guerre.⁹²

La visite d'Imre Csernyák⁹³ aux Pays-Bas (antérieure d'un mois à celle de Kunfi à Berne) peut aussi être mentionnée comme une tentative de rapprochement avec l'Europe occidentale, mais cette fois avec un pays de moindre poids que les pays principaux de l'Entente. Sa visite fut pourtant remarquée par les autorités françaises, et la note qu'il avait remise fut reproduite par les informateurs de l'Ambassade de France aux Pays-Bas.⁹⁴ Csernyák mettait en garde contre le danger bolchevique en Hongrie, qui pouvait surgir au cas où l'Entente ne prêterait pas son aide à la Hongrie. « *La position de la bourgeoisie hongroise vis-à-vis du bolchevisme ne diffère en rien de celle de la bourgeoisie française* », notait Csernyák : « *La Hongrie veut continuer son rôle historique de rempart contre les forces destructives et non civilisées venant de l'Est.* »⁹⁵ Ainsi, le représentant de la République hongroise faisait allusion à une référence bien ancienne, celle de la « *bastion de la Chrétienté* », tout en l'adaptant aux conditions de la période après la révolution d'octobre 1917. Les élections en Hongrie constituaient d'ailleurs une bonne occasion pour consolider la lutte contre le bolchevisme : « *un gouvernement hongrois sous la protection des gouvernements alliés mettrait fin à l'incertitude de ce pays* ». ⁹⁶

Le gouvernement néerlandais adopta pourtant une attitude bien réservée à l'égard de Csernyák, conformément à son attitude générale vis-à-vis des Etats nouveaux en formation ou des gouvernements nouveaux qui essayaient d'entrer en rapports avec lui.⁹⁷

Conclusion

L'analyse de la politique intérieure et extérieure hongroise après la crise de gouvernement de fin 1918-début 1919 mène l'historien à réévaluer le sujet sous

⁹² KUNFI Zsigmond, note remise à l'informateur de l'ambassade de France en Suisse, 05/03/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/44, f. 244.

⁹³ CSERNYÁK, Imre, *capitaine* (1885- ?), dirigeant du Conseil de soldats en octobre 1918. Participe aux activités contre-révolutionnaires pendant la période de la République des conseils.

⁹⁴ CSERNYÁK Imre, note sans n°, [sans lieu], 10/01/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/44, f. 192.

⁹⁵ *idem*, f. 193.

⁹⁶ *ibid.*

⁹⁷ ALLIZÉ Henri à PICHON Stéphen, dépêche n° 55, La Haye, 26/01/1919, AMAE/CPC/Z-Europe/Hongrie/44, f. 214. ALLIZÉ, Henri (1860-?), diplomate français. Ambassadeur aux Pays Bas (1914-1919).

l'angle des idées directrices et des motivations des dirigeants de la révolution. Mihály Károlyi et le gouvernement hongrois ont continuellement poursuivi une politique démocratique bourgeoise pendant la brève expérience de la République Hongroise. La coalition entre les indépendantistes, les radicaux et les sociaux-démocrates dans les premiers mois de la « *Révolution des Reines-Marguerites* » était ébranlée après la crise de gouvernement de fin 1918-début 1919 : ainsi, le rapport de force avait été modifié au profit des sociaux-démocrates et aux dépens de l'aile droite des indépendantistes. Par ailleurs, la social-démocratie restait un parti bien organisé, s'appuyant sur un fondement social urbain, alors que les autres partis restaient soit, comme le Parti indépendantiste, des organisations de cadre condamnés à devenir anachroniques après la chute de la monarchie, soit, comme le Parti radical, des partis organisés dans des cercles intellectuels restreints. En tout cas, la montée de la gauche ne peut pas être considéré comme le résultat des choix personnels de Károlyi : il s'agit d'un processus qui a ses fondements dans la société et la politique hongroise de l'époque.

Les tentatives de rapprochement avec les pays de l'Entente qui se voulaient les représentants de la démocratie bourgeoise sont d'une part les résultats du souci de consolider les fondements de la démocratie bourgeoise en Hongrie. D'autre part, « *l'ententophilie* » a des raisons historiques qui remontent aux idées francophiles et anglophiles d'une partie des politiciens hongrois de l'Empire habsbourgeois ; il faut rappeler que cette orientation pro-Entente et antigermanique a été reproduite par la politique de l'opposition indépendantiste dirigée par Mihály Károlyi pendant la Première Guerre mondiale.

Il ne serait pourtant pas judicieux d'attribuer toute la responsabilité de la « *note Vix* », de la République des conseils et, plus tard, du Traité de Trianon, aux initiatives subjectives de Károlyi : le processus de désintégration de la Hongrie historique est un processus beaucoup plus complexe, qui dépasse la personnalité de Károlyi, et qui se relie à un ensemble complexe de déterminants historiques, stratégiques et économiques.

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