Rethinking Mackinder’s thoughts: The „Heartland” in the 21st century geopolitics

I. Halford J. Mackinder’s “Heartland” theory

“Who rules Eastern Europe is commands the Heartland;
who rules Heartland is commands the Island of the World;
who rules the World Island commands the world.”

Absztrakt


Kulcsszavak: geopolitika, geostratégia, Halford John Mackinder, Heartland, háború.

Abstract

The concept of political science, political philosophy and geopolitics of classical war has been reevaluated or restructured from the 19th century to the 21st century. How applicable, implementable, and adaptable is Halford John Mackinder’s “Heartland” theory in resolving modern and premodern geopolitical conflicts? How can Mackinder’s thoughts be interpreted in modern political science and geopolitics today? These questions form the core of my study.

Keywords: geopolitics, geostrategy, Halford John Mackinder, Heartland, war.

Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861–1947), of Scottish descent, developed his geopolitical theory in order to preserve British empire, in which he interpreted its geographical basis and its potential based on the political-economic-socio-technological development of the age. Mackinder’s career is of paramount importance in the professionalization of British geography, on the way to its institutionalization, legitimacy and
the professional autonomy of geographers - in the history of geopolitics. Mackinder, one of the most prominent British geographers of the era at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, paved the way to the primacy of geopolitics. For Mackinder, geology is the past and for geography the present.

It is up to us to adapt Mackinder’s theory to our age. It is considered to be the hypothetical starting point for Mackinder’s theory. A presentation on “The Geographical Pivot of History” at the meeting of the Royal Geographical Society on 25 January 1904. He believed that the geographical discoveries and colonization efforts of the past four hundred years were over. This Columbus era will be followed by the post-Columbus era, which will focus on increasing efficiency rather than territorial growth. According to Mackinder, Europe and Asia can be interpreted as a unit, which is largely based on the accessibility of the hinterland and the exploitation of its potential, thanks to the opportunities arising from the development of transport. The internal land dimension - mainly due to economic and trade distances, long-term military security and, last but not least, remote unavailability - has so far not been an opportunity or a security risk in geostrategic terms, but by the turn of the century this process had reached may appear as a future counterpart to domination.

The 1904 theory is based on the fact that the Pivot Area is the northern coastal part of Eurasia without an inland or navigable sea exit. This area was owned by the Russian Empire at the birth of the theory, but according to Mackinder, what matters in this case is not the identity of the current state, but everything that can be interpreted as an advantage for Russia from this position of domination. The theory mentions two perimeter curves around the key zone that can be measured by Eurasian standards (The Interior or Marginal Crescent, The Outer or Insular Crescent). The inner periphery includes continental Europe, the Middle East, India, and China, while the outer perimeter also encompasses this area as a much deeper area — including Canada, the United States, Great Britain, the Middle East, and the South. Africa, Australia and Japan. According to Mackinder, building on the key zonal raw material resources that become available, the land country that dominates it would be able to build a much larger power than the new British Empire with its current naval powers. The position of power on land and at sea would be concentrated in one hand, which would completely upset the current balance of power. Adapting the theory to the great power situation at the turn of the century, the British theorist estimated that the greatest threat to the European status quo would be in a Russian-German alliance. The 1904 Mackinder contains new, primarily geopolitical, ideas and interpretations of great power that were novel in the political as well as political geographic thinking of the age, but the “game of chess” that took place in the background was much more complex.

Russia’s expansion into East Asia with the occupation of Manchuria and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway projected that Russia could become not only a land power but also a maritime power in the Far East. For Britain and France, Russia is a distant land power that not even Napoleon has been able to defeat with his mighty pan-European army. A land-based power that will soon have access to the raw materials of the Pacific and later perhaps the Indian Ocean coast, which is distant from Europe but more important. Due to the acceleration of technical progress, this has emerged as a crucial issue for great powers that have been difficult to control directly from Europe. Another aspect of the dilemma posed even greater dangers to the British and French. A Russian-German alliance would have had a near-land military potential that France and Britain could not offset.

6 Mackinder rethought his first theory later (1919 and 1943), updating it according to the historical and geopolitical changes that took place. It is not the purpose of this study to present that era
In addition, during this period, the German Empire created the conditions for the construction of a naval fleet and began to build its own maritime power.

The concentration of military rule in the two geographical areas began to radically transform the balance of military power at the turn of the century. The Mackinder solution to the problem rests on two pillars: on the one hand, bases and bridgeheads must be set up on the inner perimeter to prevent the formation of a naval power, and alliances must be set up in the land force to force the challenging country to not be able to focus solely on developing maritime capability. Under the practical implementation of the above Mackinder theory, the Anglo-Japanese federal treaty was concluded in 1902, which resulted in a counterproductive power factor against Russian aspirations in the Far East. The “entente cordiale” signed in 1904 placed Western Europe on the same platform - British and French geopolitical and security interests. The background of the Second Boer War, which brought new military procedures (and a great deal of annoyance), was over, so both Egypt and South Africa, which had an English interest in the Anglo-French treaty, gave the Mahan naval power freedom of movement. According to Mackinder, it is man, and not nature, who has the power to create, but “nature is what governs greatly” theories), but these fears are not limited to Eastern Europe: What is happening globally seems to justify these concerns. In 1904, in a classic text of geopolitical thinking, Mackinder formulated theories that the alliance of Germany and Russia would create a combination of forces that the maritime powers themselves would exclude from Eurasia. The United Kingdom and the United States fought against this nightmare in World War I, and it is rightly assumed that the United States intervened in Europe from 1942 to prevent it. NATO, geopolitically certified by Mackinder in 1943. Mackinder interpreted the processes of world history based on the idea that the world was originally divided into isolated areas, each of which had a specific function. He argued that European civilization was the result of external pressure. His account of Europe and European history, which he considered to be the result of many centuries of struggle against invasions in Asia, was based on the same idea. He believed that Europe's advance and expansion was driven by the need to respond to pressure from the center of Asia. Accordingly, Heartland (where the continental masses of Eurasia were concentrated) served as the totality of the geopolitical transformations of the historical dimensions within the World Island. He highlighted that Heartland is in the most geopolitically advantageous

---

location. Aware of the relative nature of the concept of “central location,” Mackinder pointed out that in the context of global geopolitical processes, the Eurasian continent is in the middle of the world and the Heartland occupies the middle of the Eurasian continent. Tana suggested that the geopolitical subject (actor) who ruled Heartland would have the necessary geopolitical and economic potential to ultimately control the World Island and the “planet”.

According to Mackinder, a retrospective analysis of Heartland’s military-political and socio-economic processes has revealed its obvious objective geopolitical and geoeconomic unity. Mackinder was convinced that Eurasia had sustainable conditions for the development of military and industrial power. When he structured the geopolitical expanse in a system of concentric circles, Mackinder traditionally placed the Pivot at the center of the planet, which included the Volga, the Yenisei, the Amudarya, the Syr-darya, and two seas (the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea). “So this Pivot was impractical against attacks by naval powers, but it itself was able to sustain large populations. For historical and geopolitical reasons, the Pivot has become a natural center of forces. Mackinder also identified the “inner crescent” that coincided with the Eurasian coastal areas. He characterized them as the most intense development of civilization. It included Europe and South, Southwest and East Asia. There was also the “outer crescent,” which included Britain, South and North America, South Africa, Australia, and Japan, which were geographically and culturally alien to inner Eurasia. He believed that historical processes were focused on the territory of the Heartland: whoever rules the Heartland commands the Island of the World; who rules the island of the world commands the world.” The history of Pivot suggests that its spatial-functional parameters have been constantly changing. The geopolitical unit asine qua non is the functional validity of the Pivot on an Eurasian scale. Mackinder’s later work supports Heartland’s thesis.

Mackinder revised his position twice (1919, 1943) and adapted his theory to changing geopolitical realities. Mackinder’s main goal as a geographer and professor was to rehabilitate political geography in the eyes of academia following the prestigious work of Carl Ritter and Friedrich Ratzel in Germany. The Geographical Turn in History (1904) c. his work is considered to be the basic text of modern / premodern geopolitical discourse (s), but at the same time a complete lack of the word geopolitics can be observed in it. This shortcoming is also reflected in all the other important work of the British geographer. All indications are that this absence was intentional, and not a lack of knowledge of the works of Kjellén and his German followers, but of the dismissive behavior of a premeditated patriotic (understandable given their previously vulnerable political positions). Because of the Germanic connotation of neologism. Mackinder reviewed synthetic history synthetically and comprehensively, through its political geographic dimension, confirming that the vast events of universal history took place on the vast plains of Asia and that this area of the world has had a decisive influence on world events for millennia. In the introduction to his presentation, Mackinder recalled that the thinking of the “great organizers” (Napoleon I and Bismarck I) who had the greatest influence on the political destiny of nineteenth-century Europe was fundamentally always strategic. And that this way of thinking is, of course, at odds with the thinking of pure Democrats, who tend to argue almost exclusively on great ethical (and legal) principles, international politics. With a metaphor full of symbolism and originality, Mackinder reminded the leaders of the victorious states of World War I that a Roman warlord had instructed his slave to whisper in his ear that he was mortal: he who ruled Eastern Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the Island of the World; whoever rules the world island commands the world (whoever rules Eastern Europe rules the hinterland; those who rule the hinterland will rule the world island; whoever rules the world island will rule the world).9,10

9 José Pedro Teixeira Fernandes, op. cit. 221-244. pp.
10 ex. MACKINDER, 1919 (1942), op. cit. 150. pp., ex. Semra Ranâ Gökmen: Geopolitics and the study of international relations (Thesis) - The Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University,
is best known for his Heartland thesis, which has been interpreted as environmental determinism.

Mackinder’s conception of peace was essentially one of the uncertain power relations between competing empires. He left little room for justice among them. Within the British Empire, Mackinder cared more about justice, but his thinking here was fraught with contradictions and simplifications. For example, he testified that he despised the teaching of the kind of imperialism in British schools, the possession of which is pleasing and leads to despotism. Instead, he wanted the empire to be an “alliance of equals,” where the British now act as “agents of semi-civilized millions”. Britain was best placed to preserve the existence of the empire by redistributing its resources more evenly and rejecting racism, the Indians and others as equal – “it can only be peacefully conquered by self-exclusion,” he said.\footnote{Mackinder, Halford John: Britain and the British Seas, 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907. 35. pp.} For Mackinder, therefore, peace was the maintenance of the status quo, which protected the position of the British Empire from potential rivals. It was a resource that could be “won” in the international balance of power by creating complex alliances backed by military force. Interstate and intra-state justice was only vaguely mentioned in his writings. Recent geopolitical analysts have debated whether land or naval power is more important and which region of Eurasia is vital to dominance across the continent. One of the most prominent of them, Harold Mackinder, launched this debate at the beginning of the century with the notion of the Eurasian “pillar” (which included all of Siberia and much of Central Asia) and Central and Eastern Europe, which he said were important springboards for in gaining continental domination. He had a famous saying in his popular form of “heart theory”: Who rules Eastern Europe rules the Heart; He who rules the Heart also rules the island of the world; who rules the island of the world rules the world. geopolitics was also favored by German experts in political geography, justifying their country’s “Drang nach Osten” policy; one of them is Karl Haushofer, who adapted Mackinder’s theory to Germany’s strategic needs.\footnote{ex. Zbigniew Brzezinski: A nagy sakktábla. Amerikai elsőbbség és geostratégiai követelményei (translated: József Hruby) Antall József Tudásközpont, 2017, Budapest, 53., 287-310. pp., ex. Zbigniew Brzezinski: Stratégiai Vízió. Amerika és a globális hatalom válsága. Antall József Tudásközpont, 2013. Budapest, 180-181, 185-186. pp.} Harold Mackinder identified Eurasia as a key “island of the world” and concluded that “whoever rules the island of the world rules the world.” Throughout world history, only three cruel leaders at the head of a huge military machine have come close to realizing this “rule.” Due to his fantastic military capabilities, Genghis Khan has almost succeeded, but his efforts to conquer the “island of the world” have stalled on the edge of Central Europe. He was unable to cope with the difficulties of distance and numbers, and eventually the Mongol glaze in the numerical minority of his “empire” soon merged into the majority of the previously conquered peoples. In Mackinder’s words, “dominate” Eurasia and thus the world. its role, especially after twenty years of wasting it, must now be more restrained and adaptable to the new realities of power in Eurasia.

The rule of a single state, no matter how strong, is now impossible, especially in light of the rise of new regional powers. Accordingly, the timely and necessary goal of America’s thoughtful longer-term endeavor must be to create a broad-based trans-Eurasian stability based on ever closer cooperation between the old powers of the West and the new powers of the East. In the conceptual definition of geopolitics, a researcher who explores and learns about the topic in detail may feel right in a carousel that accelerates or decelerates, returning to the same place - the starting point - from time to time to define oneself - this is the defining metaphor of geopolitics. The Cold War affected this framework in terms of avoiding nuclear war, but in geostrategic terms it was characterized by extreme diversity, as
seen in the theories of power in the bipolar array, especially the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the bipolar world, the above modern geopolitical thinking took on a so-called postmodern form. Geopolitics, in which our concepts and their meaning have undergone and are undergoing dynamic changes, cannot be an exception to this. The history of the development of geopolitics can be divided into classical, modern and postmodern periods, but it has always been at the forefront of its research as the relationship between the state as a functioning socio-economic organization and the opportunities and constraints of geography. They arose from geographical determination, that is, they were in line with the framework of geographical opportunities and constraints and the relative position of rival states, as well as cultural and historical antecedents. The geopolitical theories developed from the end of the 19th century were mostly born independently of each other, but a kind of development history can be discovered in them, ie certain elements of the initial theories are repeated in later theories - so we cannot ignore the Cold War nor the processing of the literature of the ages. On the other hand, during the processing of the theories, we had to realize that the large amount of resources to be processed and their comprehensive examination cannot be realized by writing a single study.

In Heartland theory, Mackinder actually incorporates political geography into international politics, both literally and figuratively. Literally, Heartland theory pointed out that Eurasia is strategically the most advantageous geographical location. On the other hand, Heartland theory shifts the focus to the central role of the Eurasian region. Heartland theory is thus relevant and influential as long as regional policy continues to be formulated as a conscious geopolitical approach, making the analysis of Heartland key in any geostrategy. He founded the modern geopolitical imagination and visualization, created his image of the world as a spatial and temporal picture, sought the connection between history and geography, and argued for the geographical essence of world politics. On January 25, 1904, Mackinder presented his famous Heartland theory to the Royal Geographical Society entitled “The Geographical Axis of History,” in which he analyzed the relationship between geography and politics in a historical context. Mackinder stated that geography is the end of the science of discovery and exploration. Central to his argument is that in the post-Columbian era, imperial states will have little opportunity for further territorial conquests.

The world became a closed system, and so in one part of any event it eventually affected events in other parts of the world. As the world map was completed, ‘intensive survey’ and ‘philosophical synthesis’ became possible, and these constitute the fundamental aspiration of the new ‘geographer’ he represents. The 400-year-old Colombiscian era ended after 1900. Mackinder described history as a struggle between land and sea powers, treating the world as a major battleground, arguing that identifying and controlling key global positions would lead to global supremacy. Thus, he divided the world map into zones / islands and sought a connection between geography and history to identify the “natural residences of power”. The conclusion of Mackinder’s survey of world map and history was his well-known formula: whoever rules Eastern Europe commands Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the Island of the World; who rules the Island of the World commands the world.

Thanks to Mackinder, Germany seeking “lebensraum” was suddenly given a world domination scenario (Weltpolitik). By trying to warn his own compatriots of the new geopolitical reality, Mackinder inadvertently encouraged a wave of German thinkers to build on his theories, “learning from their enemies”. Mackinder’s theories laid the intellectual foundation of German geopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century. Heartland represented roughly the territorial core of the Soviet Union. In “The Geographical Pivot of History,” as far as the American continent is concerned, Mackinder did not pay much attention to the United States because he believed that the United States, as an Eastern power, would not have a direct impact on European power relations. In 1924, however, Mackinder
published his theory of the Atlantic community and proposed an alliance with the United States against a possible alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. This idea, as is well known, also became a reality after the Second World War with the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Mackinder’s conceptions of types of foreign policy ideals predate Carr’s realist-utopian distinction by two decades, while his interpretation of the realities of international politics contradicts Morgenthau’s realism.

Mackinder’s writing clearly fits into Molloy’s definition of realism as a way of thinking; Mackinder’s work directly influenced the development of realistic strategic studies after the 1940s and has been regularly used and cited in strategic studies for the past six decades; Mackinder’s “concept of idealism” can be seen as an earlier version of Carr’s later realistic-utopian dichotomy. He shares with Carral and Morgenthau the desire to find an alternative to the grim logic of power. Mackinder influenced the direction of realistic thinking, his work showing striking differences with Morgenthau’s realistic international theory. While both are based on the common realistic assumption that human power relations are based on laws rooted in nature, they view two different natural phenomena. Morgenthau studied the laws of history rooted in human nature, while Mackinder (and later Nicholas Spykman) studied the laws of history rooted in the interaction between human societies and their natural environment. By rethinking Mackinder’s thoughts, my goal is to present diverse realistic thinking, especially in the context of the two world wars, thereby regaining Mackinder’s realism. My intention is to show that just as there is no idealism between the two world wars, there is no realism between the two world wars. The realist-idealist debate is a myth not only because there was no debate, but also because there was never an idealistic paradigm and no realism. Both Mackinder and Ratzel believed that the current trend in history is toward larger territorial states, and this has helped give Mackinder information on the logic of land power. Similarly, Mackinder and Mahan have kept in mind the policy of peripheral maritime powers. He cited Mahan’s work as the basis for understanding the role of the Navy, and agreed with Mahan’s view that the advantage of naval power lies in being able to choose where to attack enemy shores.\footnote{Mackinder, 1907, op. cit. 310., 314. pp.}

Mackinder’s work is intended to represent one of two viable paths for the development of geopolitics. The other is embodied in the geopolitics of Rudolf Kjellén and Karl Haushofer. Franz Neumann formulated “geopolitics” in 1942 as “nothing more than an ideology of imperialist expansion”.\footnote{Mackinder, 1904, op. cit.,147. pp.} Mackinder’s geopolitics seem to differ in its view of spatial conflicts between states, which overrides moral and legal considerations. Mackinder differed in trying to map out how and why it was necessary to transcend this geographical reality. Since the state is only an aggregate organism (interpreted in Mackinder terminology) held together by spiritual forces, it follows that a change in these spiritual forces changes the effect of geographical reality. In 1887, his article on the scope and methods of geography articulated this connection clearly and comprehensively. Mackinder’s most important geopolitical work is his 1904 article, “Geographical pivot of History,” which he restructured in 1919 and finally in 1943. Basically, the geographical axis or area of rotation of history (later renamed Heartland in 1919) was the name of Mackinder inaccessible to the maritime power of the Eurasian mainland (the “island of the world”). Development has had the effect of allowing larger political units and becoming more dominant.

The historical trend has moved from the smaller periphery to the larger continental states. Recent technological advances have seemed to tilt the language of the balance in favor of the land power that controls the area of rotation. Mackinder highlights railways as Mackinder opens up opportunity to develop the interior of Eurasia without ocean traffic\footnote{Mackinder, 1904, op. cit. 434. pp.} and
the Air Force, which threatens the coastal navy. According to Mackinder, naval power has always been weaker than land power because land power had two strategies to defeat naval enemies. A land power can either conquer all bases of a naval power, thus creating an internal sea under its control (e.g. Macedonia, Rome); or conquer a larger resource base than the naval power holds, and then use that base to build a fleet to confront the naval power (Dorian Greek, Sparta). In 1905, Mackinder put it this way: “half a continent can eventually build an island and overtake an island.” In 1919, Mackinder reiterated his 1904 area-of-rotation argument, adding details that seemed to tip the balance even more in favor of land power. The Heartland area was extended to Eastern Europe from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. This was the result of war experience, which showed that the land power under the control of the Dardanelles and the Danish Straits made a significant area inaccessible to the naval power. Mackinder argued that the vast zone of Central Asia had long been the geographical axis of history and would remain the “axis of world politics”. Europe was eventually subordinated to Asia. Mackinder’s theory can be seen both as a provocative reflection on international diplomacy, which is why it demonstrates the political relevance of political geography in helping political science, with its effective involvement.

II. Mackinder’s “premodern critique”

Heartland theory has been the subject of a number of scientific critiques in the decades since. Maps not only shape the way we see the world, but also the theories that played a key role in their creation, as each map is a theory in its own way and thus influences practice. Critical geopolitics suggests that it is essential to look at all scientific discoveries with a critical, some say cynical, eye. Mackinder's Heartland theory is outdated - critics have argued in their debates that Makinder’s analysis is not rational because it assumes conflict in a system where it does not exist. In his article, U.S. journalist Robert D. Kaplan, quoting Halford J. Mackinder, urges actors in international politics to study more closely the practical application of the theoretical concepts developed by Mackinder in order to better understand Mackinder’s own changes in the past shifts. Referring to Mackinder, Kaplan claims that Europe’s history is subordinate to Asia “primarily because of Russia’s power, but it does not take into account the weakness of centuries of relations between the country and Western Europe,” says Yves Lacoste. Large, flat areas of land topography play a fundamental role in the formation of empires and desires for conquest. A new map of Eurasia that is tighter, more integrated, and more populous will be even less stable than Mackinder thought. In fact, there will be a stifling climate like in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, where everything depends on geography, with no room for maneuver.

Paul Dibb, like Mackinder, acknowledges that the rise and fall of states and the prospects for war or peace have been strongly influenced by the balance of power between the

continental and maritime states. Dibb focused on the Soviet Union and China: (a) the possibility of global conflicts on economic issues, especially oil; (b) the external relations of the Pacific island States; and (c) long-term threat assessments within Australia's strategic neighborhood. In Dibb’s conception, Mackinder’s Heartland theory underestimated the importance of the threat in the system of political-socio-economic relations between states. While insisting on the overriding assumption that geography remains a determining factor in the fate of states, he carefully explained that a country’s geographic environment does not necessarily determine its state defense policy. Dibb sees the use of political geography as an “independent variable”.20

According to Gerard Toal, the resulting geographical areas “cannot be seen as not simultaneously examining the organization of economies, the governance of states, the application of technological systems, and the distribution of power all over the earth”. This observation coincides with Dibb’s finding that political geographers should be members of the interdisciplinary scientific community.

Nicholas John Spykman, a former journalist (1913-1920), professor of international relations at Yale University since 1928 (who was also a former director of the university). The United States and Power Relations (1942). In his work, Spykman paid close attention to the role of the Eurasian continent’s Pivot in world history. Spykman is convinced Mackinder overestimated the geopolitical importance of the Heartland. He argued that the dynamics of the geopolitical history of the “inner crescent” - the Periphery, the coastal zones - were the result of internal development momentum rather than external pressure from “land nomads” than Mackinder claimed. Spykman was convinced that Heartland was nothing more than a geographical expanse open to cultural and civilizational impulses from the Periphery. Spykman's Thesis (Sounds Like Mackinder): Who rules the Periphery commands Eurasia, and who rules Eurasia is the world. In both geopolitical conceptions, the spatial-functional structure of the world consists of three main levels: Heartland, Eurasia, and Planet Mackinder, and in the geopolitical theory of Rimland, Eurasia, and the planet (the Planet) constructed by Spykman.

The former model insisted on the primary and dominant role of Heartland in the geopolitical extent of the World Island, while the latter lent the same role to the Periphery. At different times, in different ages and contexts, views of the Heartland and Rimland state structures were objects or subjects of Eurasian geopolitical relations. Their functional value in global geopolitical processes has changed accordingly. It is therefore very difficult and hardly correct in the present context to regard either Heartland or the Periphery as primary and most important. Both theories have one serious shortcoming: it is not intended to explain objective global geopolitical processes. It has been formulated to serve the strategic interests of two Western powers (the UK and the US). Their arguments confirm their apparent bias; therefore, Mackinder’s and Spykman’s theories of the place and role of Heartland / Rimland on the Eurasian continent and worldwide will not be easily reproducible. Instead, they will use their approaches as a reference to an alternative geopolitical conception of the 21st century axis and possible future scenarios for future challenges. Most readings of Mackinder’s geopolitics outside of political geography are content with treating it solely as a debate over conflicts of power between global land and sea powers. Mackinder becomes the hero of experts in more conservative strategic studies because he was willing to tell how it is and becomes a villain to radicals, antimilitarists and recent historians for failing to reach out to the world. competing power, conquest, and military violence. Both systems of argument are flawed.

Christopher Fettweis justified contemporary international politics by saying that it does not show the conflicts of great power. Based on this reasoning, he stated that there is no

20 From Mackinder to Dibb, every political geographer emphasized the prominent role of the “map”.

36
need for a balance between East and West in the system, so Mackinder’s geopolitical view is outdated. Fettweis placed great emphasis on the dominance of the United States in the world economy. He argued that the global economy would open up U.S. access to Central Asia’s economic resources - the exploitation of which would provide outstanding economic potential.

In the words of Ferenc Mező, the word “… remained, but the underlying content changed in space and time, showing and showing a huge richness of form. […] ‘Geopolitics’ is a designation, a multifaceted concept for the changing mergers of geography and politics…”21

Gusztáv Molnár’s assessment that Mackinder’s or, in other words, British geopolitical thinking is “a rational ‘methodology’ for establishing and maintaining a global balance of power. For the method to be effective (that is, to lead to the successful assertion of power interests), there is no need for economic and strategic geographical conditions and the relative number, courage, equipment and organization of the competing peoples’,22 Molnár draws the reader’s attention to the following contexts: On the one hand, we must accept as a geostrategic basis that although Britain faced increasing challenges to its maritime power position in this era, British hegemony could not be called global because it was unable to do so to enforce in multiple places and against multiple rivals at once. From this we can conclude that the existence of geographical factors is not enough for the naval power, it is much more important to possess the ability that Molnár identifies as an “effective global capability”. This requires an area of adequate size, economic resources and population, a sound socio-political system and stable government.

Ágnes Bernek cites the classic of geopolitics, H. Mackinder23, who said that the concept of the “island of the world” cited by many meant nothing more than that the peoples and states of Europe and Asia were at the center of world power. Although many people oppose this interpretation of the concept of “Eurasianism”, Ágnes Bernek argues that it is fundamentally wrong to mean only Europe in the West and Eurasia in the East, as it is also misleading that Central Europe should therefore choose between Europe and Eurasia. The geopolitical “chessboard” of the 21st century seems to be fundamentally transforming, and the transformation shows that the central region of the world is increasingly relocating to the Pacific. The people of Europe need to make friends with the idea that Europe-centric maps and the international order divided into traditional North-South and East-West relations are in transition.

Accordingly, in his book The Theory of Geopolitics, István Szilágyi clearly believes that describing geopolitics as a concept “schematically” is practically impossible nowadays. Geopolitical thinking is generally divided into three eras: the initial period until 1945 was classical geopolitics, the Cold War period was modern geopolitics, and the period after that was postmodern geopolitics. The origin of the word geopolitics is etymologically composed of the Greek words geos (Earth) and politics (community), ie it examines the organization formed by the community, the state in geographical space, its changes, its relationship to other state entities in the process of historical development: “Geopolitics is a multidisciplinary social science with a thousand strands in the analysis of international relations” to geography, political geography, social geography, human geography, history, economics and many

23 Ágnes Bernek’s thesis is that from 2013, with the announcement of the Chinese “New Silk Road Economic Zone” concept, the concept of Eurasia received a new, highly economic interpretation, permanently exceeding the post-bipolar and post-Soviet imperial interpretations.
branches of the social sciences. Geostrategy as a term and the underlying content is related to geopolitics, in fact Szilágyi is part of the results of the political geographic and geopolitical scientific thinking born in the period from 1885 to 1963) and the Mahani-Mackinder geostrategic trend that developed independently merged to form a unity. Indirect enforcement of interests and wills, it is not only concerned with military science, but also goes far beyond it: it can be interpreted in a complex way in almost every system of society.

III. Summary

Mackinder recognized that after the end of World War II, some change was needed in the old structure of Anglo-Irish relations, recognizing the growing importance of national self-determination in modern international relations. Nevertheless, there were still serious personal doubts in his public proposals about the feasibility of a new federal Britain, fearing the disruptive effects of local nationalism at the heart of the British imperial structure: “Internationally, we are one, and it certainly is, it is the full determination of our citizens to remain one when we act with other countries... Our goal is to... not reverse the momentum of history and return to the state of being separate states. Scotland and England... and separate nationalities in Wales and Ireland... We want a bigger union and no less a union as a result of decentralization”. Mackinder also had negative consequences for his political career, contributing to his permanent dismissal from the Camlachie chair in November 1922. Eventually, Mackinder also regularly visited his early social and political elite, building close friendships or temporary partnerships with people like Milner, Curzon, Selborne, Haldane, and many others. By 1914, the eminent Oxford geographer found that British voters had rejected or rejected all major political ideas, including the fierce defense of England’s “rooted provincialism” against the collectivist tendencies of the new century. The relative complexity and resilience of Mackinder’s geopolitical views, rejecting both “imperialist” and “strategic” stereotypes, in order to more realistically assess his experience over his lifetime - as a kind of “chameleon” - Mackinder has always sought to find a solid gap in Edwardian “smooth”, moving in different political and intellectual positions in the hope that you can keep up with the most popular trends.

He never remained in a static role, adapting his own beliefs to the ever-changing circumstances of the moment. In fact, after the “recall” of the true late Victorian liberal Mackinder Chamberlain in 1903, he rejected his belief in free trade in customs reform and devoted much of his intellectual energies to promoting a new fiscal policy in support of imperial unity. And determined, as before, instead to betray a partial revaluation of unbridled financial capitalism in order for Britain to survive the conflict. Since its inception in March 1947, (1) British geography, for example, has known a huge “quantitative revolution” in the 1960s that rejected the deterministic and organic approach of the previous half-century in favor of a more systematic analysis of regional landscapes based on mathematical models. His cultural turn certainly seems quite different from the great disciplinary “bridge” between the humanities and sciences that Mackinder dreamed of in his first geographic discourse in the late 1880s, and instead shows a strong specialization over the complex human and natural sciences environmental issues. A few months later, India became an independent republic, de facto ending the long Anglo-Russian rivalry for control of Central Asia that was at the heart of the 1904 Pivot Paper, while Ireland followed the same path in 1948, breaking power.

On the other hand, I have to agree with Ágnes Bernek’s thesis that we are witnessing a renaissance of the Orthodox (traditional) geopolitical approach, in which Halford J. Mackinder is undoubtedly the most frequently cited theorist of modern and premodern geopolitical thinking. Mackinder has left a marginal legacy to our world today, partly forgotten even in his own field of science, where contemporary academic studies rarely mention the name Heartland theory. Francis Sempa, for example, says U.S. foreign policy in the twenty-first century will “continue to be shaped by this great geopolitical vision,” opposing any “particular constellation of power” emerging from the heartland, while Russian nationalist intellectuals are considering Mackinder. As the main inspiration for their united Eurasian bloc projects opposed to the hegemonic ambitions of the American superpower. Based on his research, James Sidaway observed that adapting the original “Pivot Paper” in places as diverse as Brazil, Turkey, Portugal, and Japan shows the remarkable “formability” of its major geohistorical concepts to ever-changing circumstances, overriding international relations to its own genesis, related ‘contextual knowledge’. The societies of the multipolar world order embodied in this form need a “geopolitical contextual framework” that rests on the legacy of the theory developed by Mackinder and, from it, becomes an independent scientific discipline in analyzing the crisis situations of our time.

Bibliography


Chris Seiple: Revisiting the Geo-Political Thinking Of Sir Halford John Mackinder: United


Mackinder, Halford John: The teaching of geography from an imperial point of view, and the use which should be made of visual instruction. In: Geographical Teacher, 1911, 6, 79-86. pp.


Nicholas John Spykman: America’s Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the balance of power, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, (2nd printing, April, 1942)


Semra Ranâ Gökmen: Geopolitics and the study of international relations (Thesis) – The Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University, 2010.

Simone Pelizza: Geopolitics, Education, and Empire: The Political Life of Sir Halford Mackinder, 1895-1925. Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The University of Leeds, School of History, 2013, URL: https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4598/1/Geopolitics%20education%20empire.pdf (Download time: 2021.10.26.)


