

The Clash of Civilizations and Game Theory

The issue of world order is central to an understanding of international politics. The shape of world order affects both the level of stability within the global system and the balance within it between cooperation and conflict. For a long time the bipolar world system was used as the ideological geopolitics of the Cold War. This paradigm worked because two states pretending to the mantle of modernity confronted each other globally. In the Post-Cold War period, from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present, some commentators and politicians in the West do offer demonized portraits of the BRIC², especially China, and/or the Islamic world that would give the impression that they provide an equally well-defined, competitive and potent substitute. Nevertheless, it seems that the two most obvious candidates as the basis for a new geopolitics are one that identifies those new practices and representations of a deterritorializing and transnational global economy (often referred to by the term “globalization” or “neoliberal doctrine”) and that sees the prospect of culture wars between different “civilizations”. The visions about the future world politics, which are linked to the prior conceptions, are called as “The End of History” scenario and the “Clash of Civilizations” scenario. After briefly presenting them, I am going to present a game-theoretical model, which can be an analytic description of the antagonism within the “Clash of Civilizations” paradigm.


I. The Change of Geopolitical Paradigm Aftermath of the Cold War

Although there is a considerable debate about the nature of twenty-first century world order, there is a considerable agreement about the shape of world order during the Cold War period. There were two major power blocs confronted each other, a US-dominated West and a Soviet-dominated East. Aftermath the defeat of Germany, Japan and Italy in WW2, and with the UK weakened by war and suffering from long-term relative economic decline, the USA and the USSR emerged as superpowers. A bipolar world system was consolidated by the formation of rival military alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including Western European countries together with Japan and the Non-Socialist Third World and the Warsaw Pact including Eastern Bloc countries together with the Socialist Third World. Fortunately, the Cold War remained always “cold”, that is to say, the parties avoided direct confrontations. However, the period was characterized by a permanent tension, reflected both in covert operations and in the build up by both parties of massive armouries of nuclear weapons, creating a balance of power. If we want to give a sketch about this geopolitical situation, it is displayed as follows:³

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² In economics BRIC is an acronym, which refers to the countries of Brazil, Russia, India and China. They are all deemed to be at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development, and all considered as candidates for the new competitors of traditional leading world economies.

³ John Agnew: *Geopolitics. Re-visioning World Politics*. Routledge, London, 2003, pp. 117.



When the Cold War came to an end, this end was dramatic and rapid: over seventy years of communism collapsed in just two years, 1989-91, and where communist regimes survived, as in China, a process of radical changes took place. The demise of the Soviet Union as an “Ideological Other” undermined the entire basis of Cold War ideological geopolitics. But instead of euphoria, a nostalgia for the ‘good old days’ soon filled the US administration, when East was East and West was West and never the twain should meet. The upstanding republican Bush administration, which was a continuation of the Reagan Era under changed world circumstances, pronounced “uncertainty,” “unpredictability,” “instability” and “chaos” as the new threats. In responding to the Iraqi invasion of the tiny state of Kuwait, it found the reason and rationale to define a “new world order” with America at its centre with a “unique responsibility” to do the “hard work” of bringing freedom to the rest of the globe.⁴ However, the national exceptionalism and triumph that characterized President Bush’s declaration of a “new world order” during Gulf War of 1990–91 was already evident in US strategic and political culture. An illustrious example of this was Francis Fukuyama’s essay titled *The End of History*, which got admiration and widespread publicity in the West at the beginning of 1990s.

II. “The End of History” Scenario

The image of a world of democracies is rooted in republican liberalism, and has a history that can be traced back to seventeenth and eighteenth century ideas about the contractual basis of government power. In its modern version, it highlights a supposedly irresistible trend in favour of democratic governance and against autocracy and authoritarianism. According to “the end of History” thesis, democracy, or more accurately, liberal democracy, represents the determinate end-point of human history. Drawing upon the writings of the early nineteenth-century German philosopher, G. W. F. Hegel as interpreted in the 1930s by the Paris-based Russian émigré philosopher Alexandre Kojève, Fukuyama claims that we are now witnessing the end of History as a struggle over ideas and principles.

For Hegel, the contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness, i.e., on the level of ideas. Kojève sought to resurrect the Hegel of the *Phenomenology of Mind*, the Hegel who proclaimed history to be at an end in 1806. For as early as this Hegel saw in Napoleon's defeat of the Prussian monarchy at the Battle of Jena the victory of the ideals of the French Revolution, and the imminent universalization of the state incorporating the principles of liberty and equality. Kojève, far from rejecting Hegel in light of the turbulent events of the next century and a half, insisted that the latter had been essentially correct. The Battle of Jena marked the end of history because it was at that point that the *vanguard* of humanity actualized the principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work to be done after 1806, the basic principles of the liberal democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in twentieth century and their attendant

⁴ George Bush: The Hard Work of Freedom. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1992.

revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spatially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully.

“In the past century, there have been two major challenges to liberalism, those of fascism and of communism.” The former saw the political weakness, materialism, anomie, and lack of community of the West as fundamental contradictions in liberal societies that could only be resolved by a strong state that forged a new "people" on the basis of national exclusiveness. Fascism was destroyed as a living ideology by World War II. This was a defeat, of course, on a very material level, but it amounted to a defeat of the idea as well. What destroyed fascism as an idea was not universal moral revulsion against it, since plenty of people were willing to endorse the idea as long as it seemed the wave of the future, but its lack of success. After the war, it seemed to most people that German fascism as well as its other European and Asian variants were bound to self-destruct. [...] The ideological challenge mounted by the other great alternative to liberalism, communism, was far more serious. Marx, speaking Hegel's language, asserted that liberal society contained a fundamental contradiction that could not be resolved within its context, that between capital and labour, and this contradiction has constituted the chief accusation against liberalism ever since. But surely, the class issue has actually been successfully resolved in the West.”⁵

According to Fukuyama neither religious fundamentalism nor nationalism are not potent competitors, since the conflicts and problems created by them potentially resolvable by liberalism.

“Modern liberalism itself was historically a consequence of the weakness of religiously-based societies which, failing to agree on the nature of the good life, could not provide even the minimal preconditions of peace and stability. In the contemporary world only Islam has offered a theocratic state as a political alternative to both liberalism and communism. But the doctrine has little appeal for non-Muslims, and it is hard to believe that the movement will take on any universal significance.”⁶

In a recent published book,⁷ following the “The End of History” scenario, Anne Norton sees the Islamophobia as an irrational fear of Muslims, especially in Europe and America. She argues that Islamophobia will be defeated in the end by means of our shared lifestyle. She wonders how Muslims have become objects of fear and dread, and how this fear has developed to affect everyone. Her book, *On the Muslim Question*, deliberately adopted a title from the nineteenth century. She believes that just as the “Jewish question” was central to the debate on enlightenment in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,⁸ the pertinent political question now is the “Islamic question.” For a long period, the “Jewish question” was a topic of concern in Western political thought in the post-enlightenment period. Jews were the “Other” who cannot be integrated into European society, which questioned the integrity and scope of secular rationality and the theory and practice of modern politics. Anne Norton says that “Islamic question” originated as a similar concern about the lack of national security, and the threat of the “Foreign Other”, and the threat to democracy from irrational religious fanatics. Westerner philosophers and political commentators including prominent philosophers such as

⁵ Francis Fukuyama: The End of History? In: The National Interest, Summer 1989. Internet access: <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm> (Downloaded: 12.03.2015.)

⁶ Ibid, Fukuyama (1989)

⁷ Anne Norton: *On the Muslim Question*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2013.

⁸ It is Karl Marx that has a famous essay published under this title in 1844. Internet access: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/> (Downloaded: 12.03.2015)

Rawls, Huntington, Derrida or Žižek, drew their negative outlook of Islam and its adherents. Such persons advocated Islam and Muslims as the “Other” and therefore undesirable. They placed Islam and Muslims face to face in front of the Western civilization to compare and debate the issue of women, terrorism, democracy, and secularism. Norton believes that the “Muslim question” if there is such a thing, is a question about non-Muslims. To put it in another way, the “Muslim question” is about values not the fear of Islam, but of the Western civilization. Secularists who fear Islam are not afraid of Islam, but the return of religious authority. Considering the past and present Islamic voices such as the medieval philosopher al-Farabi to Sayyid Qutb and Tariq Ramadan who are partners in a dialogue within the Western tradition, Norton provides a new vision of a democratic life that is richer and more diverse in the West. Her vision offers room for Muslims rather than make them scapegoats for Western fears.

However, even in the same columns of *The National Interest* where Fukuyama originally published the conception of “the End of History”, some intellectual critically reply to Fukuyama’s thesis. One of the harsh responses was by Irving Kristol who was himself the publisher of *The National Interest* and a distinguished fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He writes as follows:

„I am delighted to welcome G.W.F. Hegel to Washington. He will certainly help raise the intellectual level of the place. [...] I don't believe a word of it, but we are all neo-Hegelians now to such a degree that his quite brilliant analysis is not easy to reject or refute. [...] After Hegel, all politics becomes neo-Hegelian. He saw the modern constitutional state and its liberal social order as having accomplished the end (i.e., the inner purpose) of History. He realized that this accomplishment, however, remained at the level of theory and much political work remained to be done before it could achieve incarnation in the real world. Now, Mr. Fukuyama arrives to tell us that, after almost two centuries, the job has been done and that the United States of America is the incarnation we have all been waiting for. I don't believe a word of it, but we are all neo-Hegelians now to such a degree that his quite brilliant analysis is not easy to reject or refute.”⁹

Kristol claims that the only way he knows “to liberate oneself from the Hegelian sensibility and mode of thought is to go back to Aristotle, and to his understanding that all forms of government – democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, tyranny – are inherently unstable, that all political regimes are inherently transitional, that the stability of all regimes is corrupted by the corrosive power of time. [...] We may have won the Cold War, which is nice. [...] But this means that now the enemy is us, not them.”¹⁰

III. The “Clash of Civilizations” Scenario

Fukuyama or Norton actually rejects the thesis of a clash between civilizations, which was presented by Samuel Huntington in 1993, and it was a rival reply to the geopolitical situation after the fall of bipolar world order. There is a story about a seminar where Huntington first presented his nascent ideas about the “clash of civilizations.”¹¹ The Cold War had recently ended, much to everyone’s surprise, and people were scrambling to figure out what world politics would look like next. Others had already staked their claims. John Mearsheimer had predicted a return to rough-and-tumble 1930s-style multipolarity. Charles Krauthammer had proclaimed, shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, America’s “unipolar moment”, and Francis

⁹ Irvin Kristol: Response to Fukuyama. In: *The National Interest*, Summer 1989. Internet access: http://www.wesjones.com/eoh_response.htm (Downloaded: 12.03.2015.)

¹⁰ Ibid, Irvin Kristol (1989)

¹¹ David A. Welch: *Enemy Wanted – Apply Without*. In: J. Paul Baker (ed.): *The Clash of Civilizations – Twenty Years On*. E-International Relations Edited Collections, Bristol, October, 2013, pp. 15.

Fukuyama had foreseen the triumphal sweep of liberal democracy across the globe. “Islam is the next enemy” – said Huntington, and when the audience put the question why, he answered “Well, it just is. They hate us.” The audience was of course quiet unsatisfied with his reply, saying that it is not a reason, some kind of theory should be needed to back that up, Huntington’s reaction was that “OK, I’ll be back.” First, he wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, and then he published a book on the topic in 1996.¹²

Huntington’s explanation based upon civilizations and their relationships. According to him, differences among civilizations are too fundamental in that civilizations are differentiated from one another by history, language, culture, tradition, and religion. These fundamental differences are the product of centuries, so they will not soon disappear. However, Non-Western countries can attempt to achieve isolation in order to preserve their own values and protect themselves from Western invasion.

“For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies. The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.”¹³

The world is becoming a smaller place as a result of the development of modern civilization, thus the interactions across the world are increasing, and they intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. In this multipolar world those countries will cooperate whose are close cultural relationship with one another. The attempts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful. The most influential exponent of the “clash of civilizations”, future wars will occur between the nations and groups of “different civilizations” – Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Orthodox Christian and Latin American, perhaps also African and Buddhist (see the figure below¹⁴).



Huntington says that many important developments after the end of the Cold War were compatible with the civilizational paradigm and could have been predicted from it. These include: the breakup of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. For example, in Yugoslav civil war in 1990s, to follow the paradigm, it is easily understandable why Russia helps the Serbs; Turkey, Iran and Saud Arabia back up the Bosnian Muslims; and Germany the Croats. In his paper in *Foreign Affairs* he enclosed a map to




¹²Samuel P. Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations?, In: Foreign Affairs, Vol. P. Huntington: The Clash of Civilization. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996.

¹³ Ibid, Huntington (1996), pp. 20.

¹⁴ Ibid, Agnew (2003), p. 119.

display the cleavage of civilizations in Europe (see on the right¹⁵). He predicted other conflicts, too, say from the region, the current Ukraine Crisis, which tragically began in 2013:

“Ukraine is divided between the Uniate nationalist Ukrainian-speaking west and the Orthodox Russian-speaking east”.¹⁶ It is well-illustrated on the map of Ukraine on the right, which visualizes the result of Ukraine presidential elections in 2004,¹⁷ so almost ten years after the publication of his work, but even ten years before the Ukraine crisis. In the orange part of the country the winner candidate was Yushchenko mostly supported by Ukrainian-speaking west, and in the blue part of that the winner was the Russophile Yanukovych mostly supported by the Russian-speaking east.



Huntington’s large-scale vision about the twenty-first century world order is as follows:

Due to „the West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China [...] The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique, but not universal [...]. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.”¹⁸

Huntington’s thesis has nevertheless been widely criticized. The most common criticism is that it fails to recognize the extent to which globalization and other forces have already blurred cultural differences in many parts of the world. For instance, the notion of an “Islamic” or “Western” civilization fails to take account of either the extent of political, cultural and social division within each civilization, or the extent to which Islam and the West have influenced on each other, and continue to do so. The rise of political Islam in the Middle East, for example, may be better explained by tensions and crises linked to the inheritance of colonialism, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the survival of unpopular but often oil-rich autocratic regimes, and urban poverty and unemployment than by cultural incompatibility between Western and Islamic value systems.

Nevertheless, supporters of Huntington’s thesis have argued that the advent of global terrorism is best explained in civilizational terms; in particular, as a manifestation of the conflict between Islam and the West. Fukuyama could be partly right in the end of History but not as for the total world, but as for the West, that is to say, for European civilization. However, as Daniel Sabony points out in his deep philosophical analysis,¹⁹ the reason for conflicts between Muslims and Jews (Arab-Israeli conflicts) and conflicts between Muslims and Christians/Atheists (Islam-Western conflicts) is not only that the representatives of the three civilizations do not tolerate one another, because the message of the sole God cannot be interpreted in different ways. There are more that we must speak about, about something that touch on the civilizational heritage, which pertains to all including those who have forgotten the God for a long time now. According to Sabony, the source of the confrontations between civilizations is not the behaviour of their representatives, but their interpretations of Being that their ways of life depend on. And

¹⁵ Ibid, Huntington (1993), pp. 30.

¹⁶ Ibid, Huntington (1996), pp. 138.

¹⁷ Source: ЦВК (ЦЕНТРАЛЬНА ВИБОРЧА КОМІСІЯ УКРАЇНИ) – Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Internet access: <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011e> (Downloaded on 20.06.2014).

¹⁸ Ibid, Huntington (1996), pp. 21.

¹⁹ Daniel Sabony: *Nom De Dieu. Par-delà les trois monothéismes*. Points, Paris, 2006 (in French).

this can be unresolvable. That’s why Sabony can be deemed as a successor of the “Clash of Civilizations” paradigm.

IV. A Game-Theoretical Model of the “Clash of Civilizations”

We now make an attempt to give an analytic model by which we try to demonstrate Sabony’s thesis plastically. This model perhaps simplifies the matters a little bit, but it could still be a good amendment to Sabony’s philosophical investigations. What follow, of course, is not Sabony’s discussions, nor an interpretation of his work; you consider it as a keeping on his way of thinking.

Religious fundamentalism is very much a production of the modern world. The upsurge in religious fundamentalism in the final decades of twentieth century seems to go back to modernization including secularization, that is, the “victory” of reason over religion and the displacement of spiritual values by secular ones. However, in many parts of the world, religious movements have gained a renewed potency. This revivalism has sometimes assumed an overtly political form. This was most dramatically demonstrated by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Nevertheless, it became clear that this was not exclusively Islamic development, since fundamentalist movements emerged within Christianity in the USA or within Sikhism or Hinduism in India. So, it is difficult to generalize about the causes of fundamental upsurge in the different parts of the world. What is clear is that fundamentalism arises in deeply troubled societies, particularly societies afflicted by an actual or perceived crisis of identity. Fundamentalism seems to be driven by the “search for meaning” in a world of growing doubts and uncertainty, that is to say, under the new geopolitical circumstances in the Post-Cold War period. Tariq Ali, however, suggested that such developments are not so much evidence of a clash between rival civilizations, but as an evidence of conflict between rival fundamentalist trends within each civilization. Thus the so-called “war on terror” has been interpreted as a “clash of fundamentalisms”.²⁰

Last decade several incidents have raised issues in Europe, which can be considered as an “internal” clash of civilizations:

- The 1989 “Salman Rushdie affair”, in which Muslim Protestors in several countries denounced Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* as blasphemous and thus (partially, at least) responsible for the *fatwa* condemning him to death.
- The 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh, a Dutch film director who had collaborated on a film criticizing the treatment of women in Muslim countries.
- The 2005 “Danish cartoons affair”, in which the publication of twelve cartoons about the Prophet Mohamed by a newspaper provoked protests across the Muslim world.
- The 2015 “French Charlie Hebdo massacre”, in which two Muslim fanatic brothers armed with assault rifles and other weapons killed 11 people and injured 12 others in the office of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical weekly newspaper that regularly had published abusive cartoons about different religious including Islam.



The list is not by a long complete, but there is a common lesson of these issues: Islamic values and beliefs are fundamentally incompatible with those of the liberal West.

²⁰ Tariq Ali: *The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity*. Verso, London, 2003.


Clashes over issues include a dilemma to scrutinize: whether the public realm should be strictly secular or protecting “sacred” beliefs justifies the curtailment of free speech and press freedom?

The situation can be interpreted in game theory as a kind of Battle of Sexes (BoS) Game,²¹ in which liberal West facing with fundamental defenders of religious. The possible strategies of Liberals: maximal freedom of speech (D, i.e., their defecting strategy) or to put up some limit considering personal rights and dignity (C, i.e., their cooperative strategy). These are confronted with the fundamentalist standpoint (D), that is, public realm is shaped by ideas and values in accordance with sacred ordinance or to budge the expansion of secularization (C).

See below the payoff matrix describing the situation in game theory:

		<i>Fundamentalists</i>	
		<i>D</i>	<i>C</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	<i>D</i>	-1, -1 → 2, 1	1, 2
	<i>C</i>	1, 2	-2, -2

Following their most cautious strategies, the parties can achieve their natural outcome DD, which means a mutual struggle, may as well take upon some undesirable consequences, such as segregation and terrorist attacks. If we note down the preferences of the actors, which are the same for both parties, as the situation is a symmetric dilemma, we have this one:



The worst outcome in the situation is the „failure of tolerance” with mutual concessions (CC), which is not equilibrium: this outcome needs the limitations of personal autonomy and the realm of publicity from the side of Liberals, and as for the Fundamentals to make norms and values relative and empty. That’s why CC is worse than natural outcome DD. On the other hand, remaining two outcomes, DC or CD, would give the equilibrium of the game. But these require unilateral concessions from one of the parties, which issues in tight moral dilemmas. If, for instance, Liberals want to adopt the curtailment of free speech and press freedom in the name of personal rights or the defend of collective dignity, whether this does not lead to cutting down secularization up to the extent that Fundamentals set their tribal and religious customs as social norms, which must not be criticized because of referring to responsiveness.

However, as we will point out below, these equilibria do not come up to the test of democracy, either. Imagine a simple society with only two people and only one social issue to consider.²² The two members of society are named "Lewd" (L) and "Prude" (P). In this society there is a copy of a Lovers of Lady Chatterley by D.H. Lawrence and it must be given either to Lewd to read (d_L), to Prude to read (d_P), or disposed of unread (d_0). Suppose Lewd enjoys this sort of reading and would prefer to read it himself rather than have it disposed of. However, he would get even more enjoyment out of Prude being forced to read it. Prude thinks that the book is indecent and that it should be disposed of unread. However, if someone must read it Prude would prefer that he, himself read it rather than Lewd since Prude thinks it would be even worse for someone to read and enjoy the book rather than read it in disgust.

Given these preferences of the two individuals in the society, what will be the result of a voting on whether Lewd to read the book, or Prude to read the book, or let it go unread?

$P_{rude}: d_0 > d_P > d_L$,

²¹ The original BoS was presented in classic book Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa: Games and Decisions. Dover, New York, 1957, pp. 90. The below BoS is a variety of that.

²² Amartya Sen: The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. Journal of Political Economy 78, 1970, pp. 152–157.

L_{ewd}: $d_P > d_L > d_0$.

If the choice is about alternatives d_P and d_0 , the requirement of personal autonomy for Prude requires preferring the preference of Prude, as he does not wish to read it and there must not be one who forces him to do it. If the choice is about alternatives d_L and d_0 , the requirement of personal autonomy for Lewd requires preferring the preference of Lewd, as he wants to read it, and there must not be one who prohibits him from doing this. Social preference is as follows: d_L, d_0, d_P , which means the Lewd would read the book. However, paradoxically, d_L is an *inferior* outcome, as obviously both prefer d_P to d_L by their own personal preferences.

It is not difficult to identify the Fundamentals and the Liberals in the example. This is a restatement of the problem in terms of Rational Decision Theory. The reason for complications is found in the fact that both actors want to meddle in other people's business. This phenomenon is called as *nosy preferences* in Rational Decision Theory or as *external preferences* in the Theory of Law after Ronald Dworkin.²³

The Nobel laureate economist, Amartya Sen proved in a theorem²⁴ that it is impossible to satisfy the minimal form of personal autonomy if the nosy preferences are not eliminated. The solution might be the assignment of rights the precondition of which is either to rule out certain people of those concerned in the choice (autocratic decision) or to persuade some people to change their personal preferences (motivational mechanism). In the sphere of business they are OK and working, but at a social level neither of them is democratic. So, the consequence of the model is that it is reasonable to take on the cohabitation with segregation and terrorist attacks in the West. The secret of a "good marriage" is to give mutual concessions simultaneously or in turn. But this spontaneous practise is working as long as one of the parties does not require unilateral tolerant behaviour in an intolerant way, while taboos have not been emerged. Unfortunately, our society does not follow this social practise, and there is no available option to get divorced in society unlike bad marriage. Although there might be remained debates about the details, I think some variety of the "clash of civilizations" paradigm as a vision of future world, or at least, future Europe should be considered seriously, indeed.

²³ Ronald Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously. Bloomsbury, London, 1997, pp. 282.

²⁴ Ibid, Sen (1970).