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Malicious Identities

If one day my life submerges for ever,
who will adore the tiny cricket-fiddlers?
Who will breathe tender warmth on a frosty branch?
Who'll crucify himself on a rainbow, parched?
In tears who will embrace and mellow
hips of rocks into a tender meadow?
Who will fondle what's taken root in bare,
rough walls – arteries and human hair?
And for ravaged faith – who on earth
will build a cathedral from swear-words?
If one day my life submerges for ever,
who will care and scare away the vulture!
And who'll take gently between his teeth preserved
Love safely to the other bank of the river!

(László Nagy: Who Will Take Love? [1957, transl. by Katalin N. Ullrich])

Who am I? This is one of the most fundamental questions that have been exciting both the philosophers and ordinary persons for centuries. To reply we need to define that what a person is, who the real self is. This is not only an academic question but also a very practical one, although individual usually faces this question only in despair or after a trauma. Our answer will influence the way of thinking about life, death, disability, and social values including moral, cultual, aesthetic, political or technological values. We got used to the fact that all things could be changed around us in the world, but what about the people? Does exist eternal human nature, or rather we would like to believe in our nature existing over history. Globalization, while it was a motor of the economic and cultural unification of the world, set in motion of a dissimilating process: the multiplication of identities. It turns out that there are as many worlds as the individual is able to create. Identities and moral considerations connected with them seem to be the most important factors in twenty first century, which impact the course of history. In this paper I would like to present the dilemmas about identities and the challenges that we must confront as the pushing vision of future.

I. Odd identities: Conchita Wurst, Annie Jones and Joseph Merrick

In Western civilization human nature has a double disposition due to its Christian origin. Human is a created and creative being together. The stress is, of course, the last one, and the real dilemma is always that what people is allowed to do, or is prohibited. And again we do not speak only about theoretical question now. That someone was born as a man or woman has been seemed to be unalterable evidence for a long time. At least so far, as it is not certainly true by now as a result of scientific and technological developments. Can you imagine that someone you got acquainted with as a man, he introduces himself as a woman fifteen years later? This is already not a fiction, but reality.

As though it could be a caricature of this "brave new world,"[2] in the ESC 2014 (European Song Contest, 2014) a singer appeared, a woman with a beard, called as Conchita Wurst, whose appearance, her own name, behaviour, that is to say, all her being hit the stage. Her performance

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[2] "*O wonder!*
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
That has such people in it!" (from William Shakespeare: The Tempest, 1611).

claimed a curious thesis: there no exists sex, there is no gender. At least, as for her, she won't choose, or to put it in another way, if she must decide, he wants both. Wurst scandalized the public at large. Many people were shocked and got confused all over Europe. All the essential knowledge of realness and scientific facts would dictate that half-man or half-woman does not exist. Is it really not a bad joke that an unscrupulous manager did with the European audience? We have known experience about bearded woman: the American Annie Jones who was tackled as a circus attraction. Although there is a common point of their careers, but I think their stories are completely different. "Conchita Wurst" is a born man chosen for a show whose identity was torn up, and another gender was put into him as a dummy instrument of the show. Wurst eventually won the big show with a great song, but next year she appears again in the show, featuring as a hostess of ESC 2015 now. Those who felt there was something wrong out there needed a self-review: if there was a trouble with them, a test in live for whether or not they were an intolerant person?

When I think about their stories and reactions, another story is coming into my mind, that of the elephant man. Joseph Merrick was an intelligent and friendly man, but he was hated by his Victorian-era English society because his body was severely deformed. His fellow-citizen tackled him as a subject of a bizarre attraction not as a human being, and called him as elephant man. The movie in which his life was adopted in 1980 exactly presents how difficult is for the contemporaries to accept someone whose body is so different than that of theirs. And how intolerants they could be against the "other". Watching the movie you may have an impression that how many people have a deformed mind in a sound body. The end of the movie is one of the most touching scenes in the history of cinema. Merrick with a masked head is just in a fleeing at a railway station in London, when he is taunted by several boys and accidentally knocks down a girl. He is chased, unmasked, and cornered by an angry mob, at which point he cries: "I am not an elephant! I am not an animal! I am a human being! I am a man!" before collapsing, and a short after he dies in a hospital.

Figure 1: Joseph Merrick, Annie Jones, Conchita Wurst

Annie Jones and Joseph Merrick were contemporaries, both lived at the turn of the twentieth century, and unfortunately the career of both was alike. However, you may think and say that the stories of Jones and Merrick and that of Conchita are not analogous. Jones and Merrick were victims of nature and society. They were tackled as a subject of a freak show, but they wanted to be ordinary person in their entire life. Their stories are heart-stirring. Conchita is, however, just fudge, who is Thomas Neuwirth as a real person, but he changed his gender identity on the stage for the sake of a song contest. This story may be at most sad.

II. Two Images of Building Identity in Philosophy

In fact, in Western civilization there are two main, complemented though confronted images which govern the building of identity.[3] Great philosophers give these massages overarching centuries, but we behave many times as if we did not think them over, or as if we were deaf to them. One origin of the ideas about human nature is the principle of autonomous person: that the core of the real self is the ability to choose for oneself. Go back to the starting point of modern philosophy and consider the example of René Descartes. He tells us that one day he resolved to understand himself better, so he withdrew from the company of others to discover within himself the truth about himself. Alone, apart from others, Descartes could search for his inner real self and could decide for himself what is true and what is false:

> "I shall now close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall call away all my senses, I shall efface even from my thoughts all the images of corporeal things, or at least (for that is hardly possible) I shall esteem them as vain and false; and thus holding converse only with myself and considering my own nature, I shall try little by little to reach a better knowledge of and a more familiar acquaintanceship with myself. I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many [that loves, that hates], that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives; [...] In order to try to extend my knowledge further, I shall now look around more carefully and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other things which I have not hitherto perceived."[4]

All what Descartes says is about the importance of autonomy, the independence self. First of all, he says that the real me exists within myself. And this real me and its qualities including my desires, fears, hopes, loves exist there inside me independently of others. Then, he claims that I, by myself, can discover this real me by withdrawing or separating from others. Finally, he claims that only I can be the judge of what the truth about me is. In short, Descartes gives us a picture of the independent and self-sufficient individual. I do not need others to be who I really am. In Descartes' conception a key aspect of the real me is my ability to decide for myself – that is, the ability to judge the truth of things for myself without relying on others.

Some philosophers have gone even further than Descartes in emphasizing the importance of this ability to judge things for oneself. For example, Immanuel Kant argued that the core of the real self is the ability to choose for oneself the moral laws and moral principles by which one will live one's life. He thinks that the moral value of actions is found in motives. However, Kant contrasts motives of inclination with the motive of duty (although in practice, duty and inclination often coexist), and he insists that only actions done out of the motive of duty have moral worth. Only people with motive of duty are able to live by the principle of autonomy of the will, that is, the principle of self-imposed law. The will's autonomy consists in its capacity to be its own law, without being influenced by the objects it chooses. The will is a causal power that living beings have if they are rational. We say such a causal power has freedom if its acts are not determined by causal influences other than itself.[5]

Not all views of the Self assume that the Self is independent of others. In ancient history, for example, Aristotle declared that humans are "social animals" (*zōon politikon*) who are not self-sufficient:

> „The individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need

[3] The discussion follows the thread of Manuel Velasquez: Philosophy. Wadsworth, Boston, 2014, p. 106-114.
[4] René Descartes: Meditations On First Philosophy. In: The Philosophical Works of Descartes (transl. by E. Haldane). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911, p. 12-13.
[5] Immanuel Kant: Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002, p. 22-62.

> because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god. [...] social instinct is implanted in all men by nature."[6]

Aristotle argued that I depend on others not just to exist but to be the human that I am. In modern philosophy, following Aristotle, it was the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Hegel that most forcefully challenged the idea of the independent, self-sufficient individual and argued instead for the idea of a kind of relational self. Hegel argued that my own identity depends on my relationships with others and that I cannot be who I am apart from my relationships with others:

> "Every self wants to be united with and recognized by another self [as a free being]. Yet at the same time, each self remains an independent individual and so an alien object to the other. The life of the self thus becomes a struggle for recognition. [...] Each self is in a struggle to convince the other that he is [a free being] worthy of the other's respect and recognition. This mutual struggle for recognition by the other is mixed with feelings of mistrust and uncertainty. The struggle carries with it all the dangers and risks that the self faces when it dares to lay itself open to the other. This life-and-death struggle can degenerate into a bloody fight in which one of the combatants is killed. But then the whole issue of recognition will be missed. Recognition requires the survival of the other as a condition and sign of one's freedom. The struggle of the self is essentially a struggle for freedom. Historically, this struggle is the basis of the rise of masters and slaves. [...] Preferring survival to freedom, the slave gives up his attempt to be recognized as free. The master, on the other hand, is recognized as free. The master sees in the slave the very sign of his freedom."[7]

Hegel denied the principle of autonomous person, arguing that who one is depends on one's relationships with others and that we can know we are free and independent only if others recognize us as such. Moreover, Hegel claims that everyone struggles to get from others the recognition each needs to be independent and free. Some emerge as slaves, others as masters, yet the master becomes dependent on the slave, and the slave comes to see himself as more competent than the master. Thus, the slave is slave because that is what others see him as being, and the master is master because others recognize him as such. Hegel implies that the powerful and powerless classes in society are created by the qualities we are willing to recognize in them. This gives munitions to the leftist, Marxist thinkers about the idea of class struggle.

Yet there is another important implication of Hegel's view. Consider that every person has a culture. A culture consists of the traditions and language; the practices and beliefs of a group of people. Hegel argues that a person's culture is the mirror through which society shows the person who and what he is. It is, in fact, through his culture that a person gets the recognition that makes his a free person. Recognition comes through culture. What this means is that who I am, the qualities that define me, depends on my culture and on my relationships to the important people in my life. There is, then, no "real me" that I can find inside apart from others. Instead, I am who others tell me I am in the language that culture gives us.

Who is right, then? From childhood and from every forum of liberal society we hear the constant refrains: "Think for yourself and don't just follow the crowd", or "Take responsibility for yourself and don't blame others for what you are". These expectations work in the spirit of the principle of autonomous person. That is exactly what Descartes or Kant wish to tell us. However, the real me is not there inside, independent of others and waiting to be discovered. The real me is something that is created from my relationships with others and with my culture. The people I love and care for, the people who are important to me, the people whose opinions I trust, and the ideas and beliefs of my culture all make me who I am. I cannot think for myself without using the ideas that they and my culture give me. That is also an important fact which is not canonized enough in

[6] Aristotle: Politics (transl. by B. Jowett). Batoche Books, Kitcener, 1999, p. 6.
[7] Georg Wilhelm Hegel: Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (transl. by G. Mueller). Philosophical Library, New York, 1959, p. 215–217.

liberal society. Yet I do not think Hegel is completely right. If you are relational self, and so who and what you are depends on others, then you are not responsible for what you are. Neither are you responsible for what you do. But surely that is not right. Surely, in some way and to some extent, you are responsible for who you have become and what you do. That's the reason why I said above that the two approaches are complemented though confronted each other.

III. Relational Identity as Social Bonding

Social bonding can take place by different means of interpreting individual identity as a relation. Following Roger Scruton, I differentiate three main types of relational identity.[8]

1. *Tribal Identity.* Tribal societies define themselves through a fiction of kinship. Individuals consider themselves as members of an extended family, and even if they are strangers, this fact is superficial, to be instantly put aside on discovery of the common ancestor. Tribal societies tend to be hierarchical, and outsiders cannot easily become the member of the community, because the lack of identification tag. Tribal ideas survive in the modern world as different forms of racism. There are several hate groups in the world, such as new National Socialist Movements (neo-Nazis), Ku Klux Klan, Skinheads, new Black Panthers, or Jewish Defense League, which are all based upon racism. A rough definition of it would be this: the attempt to impose a tribal idea of membership on a society that has been shaped in some other way.
2. *Creedal Identity.* Distinct from the tribe, but closely connected with it, is the *creed community*, that is, the society in which membership is based upon religion. Here the criterion of membership has ceased to be kinship and has instead become worship and obedience. Those who worship my gods, and accept the same divine prescriptions, are joined to me by this, even if we are strangers. Both tribal and creedal identity tend to look back in the past, they are historicists in the sense that they regard the events of the world as are determined or influenced by conditions and inherent processes beyond the control of humans. That's why they put a premium on traditions and transcendence. This may serve a harmony between tribal and creedal identity, but may give way to conflict, as the rival forces of family love and religious obedience exert themselves over small communities. Scruton in another book of him[9] makes an attempt to point out that this conflict has been one of the motors of Islamic history, and can be witnessed all over the Middle East, where local creed communities have grown out of the monotheistic religions and shaped themselves according to a tribal experience of membership.
3. *National Identity*. By nation we mean a group of people settled in a certain territory, who share institutions, customs and a sense of history and who regard themselves as equally committed both to their place of residence and to the legal and political process that governs it. National identity or loyalty evolves only under certain conditions, above all the existence of common language. If it fails to keep up the public spirit of citizens, the country will go to the dogs. People in democracy are under the delusion that good citizen is that who puts all the issues to the vote. But, in fact, a good citizen is able to perceive which issue is worth voting, avoiding the tyranny of the majority. However, on the other side, the obligate ways of life, the sole faith and the too strong ties to traditions or/and transcendence, briefly the too strong ties to tribal or creedal identities, may be a real danger to national identity.

For a long time there was a multicultural vision in Europe that, in due course, assuming that the proper resources were committed and benevolence deployed, Islamic and other immigrants would eventually become liberals. As it is said, they would come to "accept" the values of their new countries. By now what Europeans are waking up to is a difficult fact: the immigrants who perform the Continent's menial jobs, and began coming to Europe in the 1950s because European

[8] Roger Scruton: England and The Need for Nations. Civitas, London, 2006, p. 10-12.
[9] Roger Scruton: The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist. ISI Books, New York, 2002.

governments and businesses encouraged their mass migration, are profoundly alienated from European society. This alienation is cultural, historical and above all religious, as much if not more than it is political. Immigrants who were drawn to Europe because of the Continent's economic success are in rebellion against the cultural, social and even psychological sources of that success. Whatever the roots of the "internal" clash of civilizations in Europe, what is undeniable is that many immigrant Muslims and their children remain unreconciled to their situation in the West. Some find their traditional religious values scorned, while others find themselves alienated by the independence of women, with all its implications for the future of the "traditional" Muslim family. In response, many have turned to the most obscurantist interpretation of the Islamic faith as a salve. At the fringes of the diaspora, some have turned to violence.

European politicians today are talking about tighter immigration law controls.[10] They are compelled by two different sides to take measures. First, a "kind of immigration" emerges from the inner regulations of Europe. Free movement of labour forces is an important achievement of the EU. Nevertheless, we can see last years a movement of labour force with a huge extent from the poorer east states to the richer west. The movement seems to go too far in some countries (GB, Germany, Austria and the Scandinavians), and becomes a political issue on agenda. As usual in the host countries, populist voices are getting stronger by saying that "people from east comes us to misuse our social allowance; they occupy our jobs; push down wages", etc. Amazingly, politicians of east countries give voice to the fact that younger generation leaves their own countries, with no intention of coming back in the future, and so poorer regions will be poorer and empty; or in some professions (e.g. health care) insolvable vacancies will be arisen. So, at first sight, there should not be clash at level of European politics. And here we are suddenly on the other side of immigration problem, which is very similar to that facing in other parts of the world. The reality is that the old Continent is in demographic freefall (though this is not true for all countries) and, in a long-term perspective, Europe including member states needs more not fewer immigrants if it is to maintain its prosperity. However, there remain two dilemmas: 1) what is the capacity of states to absorb immigrants? 2) As last decade several incidents have ruffled a few feathers, the old European vision seems to be getting a multicultural fantasy, which is no longer sustainable. And as if most Europeans realized it. For example, addressing a national meeting of the youth wing of her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party in 2010, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel straightly said that attempts at creating a multicultural society in Germany had utterly failed.



Figure 2: Angela Merkel speaking (left). The provocative cover of the Hungarian Edition of Houellebecq's book (Mona Lisa in burqa)

[10] I am speaking about Europe now, but I notice this is not only a European trend. The issue also occurs on agenda in other parts of the world. Two recent examples: Canada's Citizenship and Immigration Minister Chris Alexander said last year that Canada tightens citizenship rules, "citizenship is a privilege, not a right", said he roughly. And this year the Australian PM Tony Abbott speaks about that Australia will strengthen its immigration laws in spirit of the nation's new anti-extremism strategy.

What Europeans don't really know is what to do next. In 2015, the French novelist, Michel Houellebecq published an outcrying fiction about France being run by a Muslim president. According to the story of Submission (*Soumission*),[11] in 2022, with the help of the French Socialist party and the centrists, Mohammed Ben Abbes defeats the far-right Front National and takes up residence at the Elysée Palace. After that the country where the percentage of Muslim population is the highest on the whole Continent is in turmoil. As a matter of fact, figuring out how to prevent Europe's "multicultural reality" from becoming a war of all against all is the challenge that confronts the Continent.

IV. The Future of Identities

Hundreds of years ago, a paintbrush may have been sufficient enough to create a masterpiece. Artists simply used paintings to share their ideas and feelings. However, there are numerous media outlets and new technologies that artists can choose today. The rapid advancement in technology is clearly affecting our lives, including the work of artists. The leading representatives of Body Art, such as Matthew Barney or Orlan, think that natural human body is not so natural any more in our technological ages, and we should alter it in accordance with the milieu around us. New body techniques are needed, they say, which might as well lead to a metamorphoses of *homo sapiens*. In their mind human body has a capacity to change without restraint. Orlan, for example, is ready to use her body through plastic surgery to reach her audience. Her declared aim is to defy the beau ideal of woman, that is, to alienate from the traditional gender identity. On this point, she follows the feminist Judith Butler, who says that gender identity is actually a consequence of the colonization of masculine civilization.[12]

Figure 3: The French body artist, ORLAN

Body Art including the most common forms of that, such as tattoos or body piercings, which are very fashionable recently, eventually expresses the individual demands of the autonomous ways of life. If you like it, you can create as many worlds as you want. However, here we must perceive a real danger: we should draw lines between our created identities. Whether is it no matter that you are a street fighter in a computer game or in real life? Of course, it matters. And if everybody runs their own life as they like it, the individual moral judgements are not embedded in an ethical self-understanding that tells us why should be getting moral persons at all. In traditional society, and this is an important difference between fictional and real world, the people have a demand for a

[11] Michel Houellebecq: Submission. William Heinemann – Random House, New York, 2015.
[12] Judith Butler: Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge, New York, 1990.

universal ethical background, which occurs in the most obvious way as a result of the new developments of genetic technology.

This is the main theme of German contemporary philosopher Jürgen Habermas' book, *Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur*.[13] The starting point of Habermas' idea based upon an everyday observation: Sometimes those who anyway stick to the pluralism of ways of life tend to refer to "normal life". The good example is the permanent success of psychoanalysis in western civilization. As the state of disease are defined in terms of the "normative ideas" of healthy human body in case of somatic diseases, something same happens in psychology or in psychiatry, trying to eliminate mental deviances by tracing patients back a "standard" way of life. Universal ethics, of course, have to go in a different fashion, to understand ourselves as normative creatures. But it requires an ability to differentiate between standard and non-standard ways of life – this is the conviction of Habermas. The important dilemmas of ethics lead to a universal anthropologic question: how can we successfully being ourselves in fact? The question cannot be answered other than transsubjectively, as a result of social communication processing.[14] And genetic engineering is exactly a danger to the knowledge of successfully being ourselves, since outsiders (who are usually our parents) are able to restrict us or to hold us up to differentiate between the dispositions what we want by free will, or what they put into ourselves by their own preferences. "Prepersonal life that has not yet reached a stage at which it can be addressed in the ascribed role of a second person still has an integral value for an ethically constituted form of life as a whole. It is in this respect that we feel compelled to distinguish between the dignity of human life and human dignity as guaranteed by law to every person – a distinction which, incidentally, is also echoed in the phenomenology of our highly emotional attitude toward the dead."[15]

Unlike Kant, people living in society have to admit that their life is more or less instrumentalized because it is very difficult to separate the spheres of freedom and obligation. To understand it, consider two thought experiments. Supposing someone is educated in a highly conservative spirit. Though the person considered may be influenced by father-house, his political identity will not be totally determined once and for all. Growing up, and getting into communities with different politics, he will be able to revise his political identity by making a self-sufficient decision. So the alteration of identity is reversible in this case. Yet take another example now. Supposing genetic and technological developments enable the parents to alter not only the sex of their own child but also the baby's eyes, nose, or to add some special disposition giving the baby some extra talent. This "positive eugenics"[16] could be an irreversible alteration, and there is nothing trouble in principle with that as long as the parental preferences come up to the preference of the youth. What if, however, parents might want to give a child some subtler elements of personality whose benefits are not so clear-cut? Parents may be under the sway of a contemporary fad or cultural bias or simple political correctness, which can easily fall out of favour in the next generation. All in all, "child who is brought up in a certain way by a parent can rebel later, but genetic modification is more like giving your child a tattoo that she can never subsequently remove and will have to hand down not just to her own children but to all subsequent descendants."[17]

In fact, manipulation with therapeutic goal seems to be acceptable because they can be justified in the future. Who is that would prefer ill-health rather than being hale and hearty. In practice, however, it is difficult to separate the two kinds of manipulation from each other because

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[13] Jürgen Habermas: The Future of Human Nature (transl. by W. Rehg, M. Pensky and H. Beister). Polity Press, Cambridge, 2003. (In German: J. Habermas: Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt Am Main, 2002).

[14] Ibid. Habermas, 2003, p. 11-15.

[15] Ibid. p. 35-36.

[16] „*Why, man too, almost, if he should but learn,*
Might in his kitchen seethe as good a broth,
In Thy great kitchen Thou hast placed man
And seest, indulgent, how he spoils the food,
A very bungler, thinks himself a god." (from Imre Madách: The Tragedy of Man, 1861, transl. by J.C.W. Horne).

[17] Francis Fukuyama: Our Posthuman Future. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2002, p. 94.

the consideration of disease cannot be independent of the normative idea of "healthy human" in history. "Homosexuality, to take one example, was long considered unnatural and was classified as a psychiatric disorder until the latter part of the twentieth century, when it was depathologized as part of the growing acceptance of gayness in developed societies. Something similar can be said of dwarfism: human heights are distributed normally, and it is not clear at what point in the distribution one becomes a dwarf."[18] The situation is more complex in case of psychosomatic diseases. Thomas Szasz, representing a radical point of view, speaks about the myth of mental illness. Mental illness is an expression, a metaphor that describes an offending, disturbing, shocking, or vexing conduct, action, or pattern of behaviour, such as schizophrenia. Szasz writes as follows: "If you talk to God, you are praying; if God talks to you, you have schizophrenia. If the dead talk to you, you are a spiritualist; if you talk to the dead, you are a schizophrenic."[19] He maintained that, while people behave and think in disturbing ways, and those ways may resemble a disease process (pain, deterioration), this does not mean they actually have a disease.

According to Habermas, autonomous moral and anthropological self-understanding should be harmonised with each other. And the basis for this harmony is the identic self-descriptions of human species, which concern not culture that is very diverse, but the anthropological universality that is same everywhere.[20] I would like to remark here that in this respect Habermas exceeds the earlier standpoint of his discourse ethics by letting human nature into the conditions of mutual recognition. Thus he closely arrives at Karl-Otto Apel's model of discourse ethics. Unfortunately, Apel, who represents an alternative of discourse ethics, is not so known and discussed as Habermas. Apel defends a thesis in discourse ethics that we, as cosubjects of a universal communication community, must always presuppose the "transcendental-pragmatic ultimate foundation of the ideal procedural norms of discourse ethics, i.e. of settling moral problems through practical discourses of the affected persons or their advocates."[21] And, he claims, this transcendental-pragmatic foundation covers both ideal and real discourses. In his model the basic assumption is that rational argumentation and responsibility to others constitute the ordering principles of communication. He is sure in his explanation of discourse ethics, that all types of discourse are rationally grounded and, as such, are capable of not only fashioning consensus, through the redemption of claims to truth, rightness, and authenticity, but also functioning as a basis for critique. He argues that in order to resolve the contradictions that make up our contemporary world, we require a transcendentally based, rationally grounded, and universally valid metaethics based on a shared sense of justice and co-responsibility.

Reasoning about morality involves, in my view, a continual moving between our moral responses to specific situations (or cases) and our moral theories. That's why Kant uses the terms of hypothetic and categorical imperatives. This continual moving is patterns between ideal and real discourses in Apel's model. This process also occurs in John Rawls' theory of justice, and he calls it reflective equilibrium. As for the question from the viewpoint of medical science (medical ethics), there are four main principles serving a basis for our mutual moral convictions:[22]

1. *Respect for patient autonomy*. Autonomy is the capacity to think, decide, and act on the basis of such thought and decision, freely and independently. Respect for patient autonomy requires health professionals (and others, including the patient's family) to help patients to come to their own decisions (e.g. by providing important information) and to respect and follow those decisions (even when the health professional believes that the patient's decision is wrong).
2. *Beneficence*: the promotion of what is best for the patient. This principle emphasizes the moral importance of doing good to others and, in particular in the medical context, doing good to patients. Following this principle would entail doing what was best for the patient.

[18] Ibid. p. 209.
[19] Thomas Szasz: The Second Sin. Doubleday, New York, 1974, p. 101.
[20] Ibid. Habermas, 2003, p. 39.
[21] Karl-Otto Apel: The Response of Discourse Ethics. Peeters Publishers, Brussels, 2001, p. 85.
[22] Tony Hope: Medical Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 65-66.

This raises the question of who should be the judge of what is best for the patient. This principle is often interpreted as focusing on what an objective assessment by a relevant health professional would determine as in the patient's best interests. The patient's own views are captured by the principle of respect for patient autonomy. The two principles conflict when a competent patient chooses a course of action which is not in his or her best interests.

3. *Non-maleficence: avoiding harm.* This principle is the other side of the coin of the principle of beneficence. It states that we should not harm patients. In most situations this principle does not add anything useful to the principle of beneficence. The main reason for retaining the principle of non-maleficence is that it is generally thought that we have a *prima facie* duty not to harm anyone, whereas we owe a duty of beneficence to a limited number of people only.
4. *Justice*. There are four components of this principle: (i) distributive justice; (ii) respect for the law; (iii) rights; and (iv) retributive justice. (i) With regard to distributive justice: first, patients in similar situations should normally have access to the same health care; and second, in determining what level of health care should be available for one set of patients we must take into account the effect of such a use of resources on other patients. In other words, we must try to distribute our limited resources (time, money, intensive care beds) fairly. (ii) The second component of justice is whether the fact that some act is, or is not, against the law is of moral relevance. Whilst many people take the view that it may, in some situations, be morally right to break the law, nevertheless if laws are made through a reasonable democratic process they have moral force. (iii) The types and status of rights are much disputed. The fundamental idea is that if a person has a right it gives her a special advantage – a safeguard so that her right is respected even if the overall social good is thereby diminished. (iv) 'Retributive' justice concerns the fitting of the punishment to the crime. In the medical context this issue is sometimes raised when a person with mental disorder commits a crime.

During the transmission between ideal and real discourses, or reflective equilibrium process both the theories and the beliefs about individual situations can undergo revision. When there is lack of agreement between theory and our intuitions about individual cases, there is no principle, there is no protocol that can tell us which or what we must change. That has to be a matter of judgement.

V. Summary

Kant's famous answer the question "what is Enlightenment?" is a common knowledge in Europe, and not solely among philosophers: "It [Enlightenment] is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity", writes he in 1784. By the revolutionary impulse of Enlighten-ment individual was getting to be in focus, and people discovered their own body again, which had been uncared for a long time. Body came from the shadow to footlights, and we began to pay attention to our appearance and healthy. Our body is a part of our own identity. What is more, we have arrived at a society in which body is becoming of vital importance – this is an age and civilization of body cult, and we pay a lot of money for fashion and health. Technology seems to enable us to alter our appearance, our body to express ourselves; to create a new identity, a new world for us. The question is again what Habermas put earlier: can we really successfully being ourselves in this fashion?

Who is Conchita? Who is Orlan? Okay, they are artists with alias, but who are they as humans? Actors always play a role on the stage or in a movie. If they are good, they can empathize with the person, with the fairy or the devil, or with some one/thing they perform. But, they exactly know it is not their identity. Some featuring may impact on actor or actress very deeply, but he or she should realize the borderlines of the worlds and their identities. And again, if I play a fighting game in "cyberspace", I could be a very good player at combat, but I should be aware of the fact

that I am not a trained fighter. This was the trouble with Conchita and ESC anyway. It worked as a reality show, by mixing the world of the stage with reality. As Orlan does in Body Art, they should have emphasized the fact that Conchita was an artificial (art&fictional) person, a designed identity, and not real. However, and that's why this is a difficult issue, this was neither politically correct from the organizers of ESC. Why?

Some people are suffering from "malicious identities" when they have to live with complex seemingly incompatible identities. We could see an instance of this fate, the case of Annie Jones. In general, transsexual people experience a gender identity inconsistent with their assigned sex, as if their mind were in a "wrong" body. Several transsexual persons cannot accept this fact, and as young man they often commit suicide. This is an existing sexual disorder associated with gender identity (called *gender dysphoria*), and it would be unfair to consider these persons as a half-woman or a half-man. They want to choose: their gender identity belongs to the essence of their identity, or as Habermas would put it, they want to successfully being theirselves. The latest known case is the Olympic gold medallist, car racer, businessman and media personnel, Bruce Jenner, who suffered from gender dysphoria and got a gender transition. He is 65 years old this year, lives as a woman, changed first name; her full name is Caitlyn Jenner now.

Figure 4: Jenner as man, and Jenner as woman

The phenomenon of Conchita does not take gender identity disorder seriously, as if another idea appeared in the mind of the devisers of Conchita. As a matter of fact, sometimes just the compulsory choice of identity would be problematic. I think that it is true for all types of relational identity presented above. For example, it is unfair for a mixed race person to ask if he prefers her parent of the same coloured rather than the other; or a Muslim French is asked if she is French or Muslim; or a Hungarian person as an ethnic minority living in Romania is asked if he is a fan of the Hungarian or the Romanian national team when they are at play during a sport event, etc. In these cases persons need not to choose indeed. That's why it seems to me that relational identities (may be tribal, creedal or national identity) are only the accidents to personal identity.[23] However, the "essence of identity" is a knotty question in philosophy from the Ship of Theseus and Gottfried Leibniz to Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell to Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam to Derek Parfit and Sydney Shoemaker, and so forth, and many people with non-philosophical interest think these arisen logical-metaphysical problems are not worthy of practical attention. Malicious identities point out that the "essence of personal identity" remains a very important issue for moral person to make technological, legal or political decisions related to identity.

[23] The term of accidents is used in philosophy as an attribute which may or may not belong to a subject, without affecting its essence.