The Habsburg Monarchy and Austria–Hungary Between Global and Comparative History


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This review article examines two conflicting approaches to nineteenth-century Habsburg history. The relatively new but now widely applied framework of global history reaches beyond the nation-state to empires and transnational, preferably transcontinental connections. Pieter Judson calls his magisterial volume A New History. As detailed below, he concentrates on transnational social and cultural connections within its borders and into the wider world. Like the general practice of global history, the diplomacy of great power politics and the domestic conflicts of party politics are barely mentioned.

The longer standing approach, particularly to the post-1867 framework of Austria–Hungary, is comparative history. Its interwar founding fathers, as represented in the first section of a new reader (The Rise of Comparative History, edited by Trencsényi, Iordachi and Apor, pp. 61–142) focus instead on comparing the economic and social history of near neighbours. The selections from Henri Pirenne, Henri Sée, and more explicitly from Marc Bloch spell out the attraction of comparing similar cases in order to identify the differences. Austria and Hungary, 1867–1914, compiled an ample record of separate economic statistics and elected bodies to invite this approach. The invitation to compare the foreign policies of the competing European powers before 1914 is of even longer standing in scholarship too.
voluminous to mention. Let us consider the wider base of these two approaches and then weigh their usefulness in appraising the much-debated prospects for what became Austria–Hungary from 1867. Taken together, they suggest a peacetime balance between imperial unity and Austrian and Hungarian division that preserved the Dual Monarchy until it was undone by their joint failings in World War I.

I.

Empires rather than nation-states have attracted the attention of the new global history, spreading widely in English-language scholarship since the 1990s. As recently summarized by Sebastian Conrad, this new approach has grown up as a critique not only of Eurocentrism but also of the ethnically based nation-state.\(^1\) While denying the dominance of the European model makes little sense for East Central Europe, a case can be made for devaluing the nation-state in the face of minority abuses by its ethnic majority. Conrad details the current predominance of global history in Anglo-American scholarship and English-language publication. He welcomes its emphasis on empire as the major political model over time and space since the ancient world. Empires are credited with having lasted longer than the modern nation states, accepting migration and promoting transnational transfer among a multi-ethnic population and with the wider world through trade and cultural transfer. He acknowledges that the approach began in the 1970s with the world-systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, making the West European empires the capitalist core for the profitable exploitation of its overseas colonies from the early modern period forward. Conrad makes no mention of subsequent statistical evidence from economic historians that, individual profits side, the core economies did not generally profit from their colonies.\(^2\) But he joins the new global historians in discounting world systems theory as a Eurocentric argument that relies on the sociology of modernization as a one-way street for Westernization. They focus instead on the social-as-cultural framework that allows them to range across empires as diverse, distant and undocumented, for Conrad, for example, as the Mongols and the Native American Comanches.\(^3\) Their approach has however concentrated on the modern European overseas empires and the post-colonial burdens and reciprocal transfers with non-Western continents, now dubbed the Global South.

Pieter Judson introduces his new Habsburg history as an account of state-building, its imperial centre connecting a multitude of multi-ethnic elites and

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1 Conrad, *What is Global History?*
2 See a summary of recent research: Austin, “Economic Imperialism.”
3 Conrad, *What is Global History*, 185–204.
Starting almost a century ahead of any Ottoman reform, the Cameralist consolidation of central authority over previously autonomous kingdoms under Empress Maria Theresa from the 1750s were followed by the land reforms of Joseph II in the 1780s. Judson points to her creation of a single supreme court in Vienna and the efforts of her ministers to staff state institutions with an educated civil service. Enlightenment ideas, Masonic lodges, and popular education were welcomed, and the restrictive Jesuit Order banned in 1773. The start of land reform, the abolishing of internal tariffs and a first census were also part of what Judson calls state-building (pp. 28–42). Joseph II paid even more attention to administrative regulation and its reform than did his mother. Acknowledging her anti-Semitism while not mentioning her expulsion of Prague’s Jews in 1745, Judson details Joseph’s decision to emancipate the Jewish population growing after the annexation of Galicia in 1772. His disputed efforts to make German the state language and end the use of Latin in Hungarian territory receive equal attention. His regime relaxed censorship but also established a secret state security service. Missing from Judson’s account is the

4 Calic, The Great Caldron, 2–4; Baer, The Ottomans: Khans, Caesars and Caliphs, 6–8. Baer argues that the Ottoman Empire should not be judged as backward by Eurocentric standards but was a constituent part of the European experience, ranging from modernization to trans-national connections beyond the conventional continental borders.

5 Stamatopolos, ed., Imagined Empires.
continuing fiscal focus of the German Cameralism imported to centralize Austrian state administration in response to Prussia’s seizure of Silesia in 1740. No statistical tables are presented here, or elsewhere in the book, to show tax rates and collection, the balance of state budgets or of foreign trade. Nor is the Cameralist ideology of state-supported import substitution and state-controlled economic growth, which went beyond the trade-centred mercantilism of export surpluses and gold reserves identified with early modern Spain, France, and England.

Not missing is the attention, often omitted in standard scholarship, to the subsequent regimes of Leopold and his son Francis. In the two years before his death in 1792, Marie Antionette’s brother Leopold not only dismantled some of Joseph’s centralizing reforms and Hungarian restrictions but also convened provincial diets in the name of representing their nations. But in Bohemia and elsewhere he saw those nations only as their titled elites. His son Francis began as Francis II of the Holy Roman Empire but by 1806 had become Francis I of the Austrian Empire. He resisted constitutional reform and popular patriotism but not further administrative centralization including loyalty oaths for the growing bureaucracy. Acknowledging these restraints, Judson still finds the empire after the Napoleonic wars and occupations united by a common culture that stood above the disparate, largely peasant communities as protection against their local lords and elites (p. 101). His same appreciation of an educated state bureaucracy and the rule of law under a civil code enacted in 1811 continues through the oppressive political regime and censorship under Klemens von Metternich, his position as State Chancellor never identified. Absent here, Metternich’s role in restricting domestic reform, reinforced under the reactionary aegis of Francis I, remains prominent in the recent Habsburg history of Robin Okey as well as in previous historiography.6 This lack of attention to political leaders in favour of social conditions is common practice for global history. Okey joins Judson in acknowledging the considerable economic progress by 1848 under the imperial framework of railroad construction and a free market for middle-class private enterprise. Judson does amply reference the standard scholarship in covering the various conflicts in the revolutionary year of 1848. Then he steps away from much of it by concluding that the 1848 revolutions were essentially a set of demands to restructure the existing empire, leaving the insurrections in Hungary and the northern Italian region aside as exceptions to the rule (p. 136).

The centrepiece of Judson’s argument for a liberal empire is his chapter “Mid-Century Modern”, focusing on the reforms of the 1850s under the young Emperor Franz Joseph and his Minister of Justice and Interior Aleksander von Bach. Previous scholarship has concentrated on Bach’s repressive political control and centralization extending even to Hungary. Okey calls it neo-absolutism, similar to the

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6 See: Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy, 68–98.
Hungarian and Austrian historiography. Like previous standard scholarship, Okey traces the constitutional compromise of 1867 to the stirrings of pluralism by Bach’s successors in the early 1860s followed by the empire’s military defeat by Prussia in 1866. The two agree on the economic modernization led by Commerce Minister Bruck, ranging from the abolition of guilds, property rights extended to the peasantry, and to an internal customs union. The market economy spread further with an agreement with the German Zollverein and the transfer of railroad construction to private enterprise. Okey details the financial problems of Crimean War expenses and the European depression of 1857, but Judson moves past them to the visual representation of the Emperor and the Empire as social ties that held into the political turbulence of the 1860s7 (pp. 218–68). Judson’s chapter nonetheless concludes with a well referenced account of how liberal Diet representatives and liberal newspapers in Vienna and Budapest prevailed against imperial authority after the army’s defeat by Bismarck’s German Confederation in 1866. The Emperor was forced to accept the compromise settlement (Ausgleich) of 1867, creating Austria–Hungary.

With foreign policy and military authority left to the Emperor, the Ausgleich also established a common army and financial procedures. The terms were subject to renegotiation by a joint delegation every 10 years. Under separate constitutions, the settlement for the Dual Monarchy made Franz Joseph King of Hungary while remaining the Emperor in the Austrian Crownlands. Judson instructively notes the Crownlands’ experience with local councils and chambers of commerce as a positive step in the Bach era and a separate section is devoted to “Independent Hungary”. Such separate attention is conspicuously absent in the subsequent chapters on Austria–Hungary. These chapters deal with culture wars and nationalist political conflicts, rather than the “conflicting nationalities” blamed for the inevitable breakup of the Dual Monarchy from the interwar work of Oscar Jászi forward.8 Judson joins a volume of essays from Hungarian historians in detailing the overriding social connections. Imperial celebration and architecture, and a common high culture helped to tie the empire together under Franz Joseph.9 Judson also acknowledges the parliamentary predominance of largely loyal landed nobility, especially in Hungary. Its plurality continued elections there, even after the expansion of the very narrow Austrian franchise in 1907 was not extended in Hungary to most of the peasantry. Little attention is however paid to the political conflicts over a common framework for two economies and the question of the army. They are the stuff of a comparative history of Austria and Hungary, to which this article now turns.

7 Okey, Habsburg Monarchy: From Enlightenment to Eclipse, 138–68.
8 Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy.
9 Ránki and Pók, eds. Hungary and European Civilization.
II.

The Introduction to the new Reader on comparative history (pp. 1–30) points out that the new global history generally neglects East Central and Southeastern Europe. Despite its prolonged division between the multi-ethnic empires attractive to this approach, the authors worry that a region with no colonies across several continents and no credentials as part of either the West or Global South is typically left out of narratives that favour post-colonial or subaltern studies. Before World War I, it was instead the denial of the Western credentials to Southeastern Europe that had begun to attract comparative scholarship, separating the backward Balkans from Central Europe, the Dual Monarchy included. The interwar emergence of small nation-states replacing the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, German, and Russian empires generated more publication comparing them, some of it asserting one state’s more Western credentials than its neighbours. With Germany’s defeat in World War II, the designation of Central Europe give way to Eastern Europe during the Cold War that followed. The new Communist regimes invited comparison not only with each other, Yugoslavia included, but with non-Communist Greece or Western Europe. East-West comparisons continued after the collapse of the Communist regimes in 1989. Set in a common political framework, comparative history for this Eastern Europe concentrated on the growing body of economic statistics both from the region and from alternative Western calculations. This concentration coincided with the rise of comparative economic history on both sides of the political divide. Joint publication based on country comparisons followed in the region’s interwar economic history.10

Starting with the West European struggles to recover from World War I, its comparative economic history received new attention from the work of Henri Pirenne forward. His aim was to overcome pre-war national exclusiveness and lament the economic division of his native Belgium from the Netherlands (“Henri Pirenne, On the Comparative Method in History”, pp. 65–66). After World War II, the long British interest in their own Industrial Revolution joined with French desire to demonstrate a comparable advance and German interest in disputing the post-1945 idea of its own Sonderweg leading to the Nazi regime. Drawing on historians from all these, the most comprehensive project was The Cambridge Economic History of Europe; its ten volumes reach from the Middle Ages to World War II. Volume VIII provides a lengthy contribution from Scott Eddie. Eddie’s analysis supported by 13 statistical tables provides a systematic comparison of the economic history of Austria and Hungary under the Dual Monarchy.11 Okey devotes an entire chapter to comparing the two economies, drawing on the work of David F. Good,

John Komlos, and Hungarian economic historians; more recently, we have com-
parative chapters in edited volumes of regional monetary and financial history to
1914. The growing rivalry between the two sets of political parties and within their
ranks over these economic issues have long been addressed in standard scholarship.
But none of this statistical record or party rivalry appear in Judson's work or for that
matter in Calic's and Baer's books on the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire.

A comparative history of Austria and Hungary provides the following account
of disputed support for a common army and the decennial renegotiation of a cus-
toms union and common tariffs. They fed political rivalries that divided the Dual
Monarchy and put its survival in jeopardy even before World War I. Their challenge
to the Habsburg Monarchy should at the start be balanced against earlier initia-
tives that evolved after 1867 to the advantage of a unified empire. A single bank of
currency issue, founded in 1816 as the Privileged Austrian National Bank, became
the Austro–Hungarian National Bank but remained in Vienna. The stability of a
single currency was secured by the informal adoption of the gold standard in 1892
and then the use of monetary policy in the forward exchange market to protect
gold reserves. Good makes a case for convergence not only on the basis of common
enterprise incorporation and bank-industry ties but also for market integration
from the narrowing of differences in interest rates between them, clearly between
the Austrian Crownlands and at least some Hungarian cities. The professional
staffing of the ministries with a new class of educated bureaucrats also became stan-
dard practice. They prided themselves on administrative efficiency within the exist-
ing political framework. They also helped to deny the royal leverage over military
funding that Bismarck had used to his advantage in Prussia. They were also freed
after its revocation in 1875 from the religious leverage that the 1855 Concordant
with the Catholic Church had provided. Public education was then free to rise to
the highest European level. But here the Hungarian commitment was only to spread
literacy and schooling in the Hungarian language. It was already required in county
government business despite the Nationality Law of 1868 guaranteeing local lan-
guage rights. This framework for a Hungarian nation-state faced a population then
less than half Hungarian. Between 1890 and 1914, the pressures and advantages of
assimilation had added one million people, largely German, Slovak, or Jewish, to a
Hungarian population that was still less than 55 percent of the total.

12 Jobst and Scheiber, "Austria–Hungary from 1863 to 1914". On the earlier work, see: Okey,
Habsburg Monarchy, 228–50; Good, Economic Rise, 96–256; Komlos, The Habsburg Monarchy
as a Customs Union, 198.
13 Good, Economic Rise, 116–21. On the use of foreign exchange to stabilize currency value, see:
Jobst, “Market leader.”
14 Jewish assimilation was encouraged by the economically liberal Hungarian constitution that
A series of economic disjunctures between and within the two halves of the Dual Monarchy also worked against its consolidation as a modern market economy and pushed ahead the political conflicts that threatened its survival even before the outbreak of World War I. The political threat came from the burden to co-existence imposed by an Austrian empire of competing Crownlands and a Hungarian Kingdom whose leaders saw it as an independent nation-state except for the acceptance of Franz Joseph as its king. These disjunctures went beyond the requirement under the Ausgleich that the customs union between Austria and Hungary be renegotiated by a joint delegation every ten years. The respective shares of joint expenses were also re-examined. The tax burdens in the two halves and among the Austrian Crownlands further engaged the political parties that were taking shape despite the limited franchise. The more prosperous northern Austrian and Czech Crownlands paid far more in the common indirect taxes on consumption than they received in state expenditures. The common state budget used these surpluses to cover the deficits in the southern provinces like Carinthia and Dalmatia, or Galicia to the east. The northern objections may be compared to the complaints from Slovenia and Croatia in the former Yugoslavia. Here, seeking the same confederal rights as the two Yugoslav republics would, the fiscal imbalance strengthened Czech support for a third subdivision of the Dual Monarchy to provide the same rights as Hungary.

The greater strains came from the separate procedures and interests of Cis-Leitanian Austria and Trans-Leitanian Hungary as they were called after a river dividing the two halves of the Monarchy. Tax burdens and trade patterns joined the familiar decennial debate on tariff rates as major points of conflict between their two delegations. From 1867, the division for funding the common budget was set at 70 percent for the Austrian side and 30 percent for the Hungarian side. This proportion reflected the significantly larger Austrian national product. Almost all of this common budget was devoted in one way or another to the military, but population determined the share of Austrian and Hungarian troops in the common army. Given the significant increases in both totals by the census of 1900, the need to reach agreement on the two annual drafts plus other army issues created a decade of dispute from 1902 forward over the annual military bill for the common budget. Its passage became a subject for repeated conflict in the common parliament and in the separate Austrian and Hungarian bodies. Only intervention from the Emperor broke several of the deadlocks. His support allowed the Austrian resistance to the main Hungarian demand for Hungarian officers in Hungarian units and the use of Hungarian in their all Trans-Leitanian units. But the Austrian demands for

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removed anti-Semitic restrictions in return. Another two million non-Hungarians were at least able to speak Magyar. Zsuppan, “The Hungarian Political Scene,” 105; Okey, Habsburg Monarchy, 215–16.
higher pay for a largely Austrian officer core were frustrated in turn by Hungarian opposition.

Any compromise between the two delegations was also limited by divisions within the two sides. By the 1907 elections for the Austrian lower house of the Reichsrat, the majority of Austrian German votes were divided between the emerging Social Democrats and Christian Social Party with the traditional Liberal Nationalists still holding the largest number of seats. There were similar divisions among the Czechs and the seven smaller ethnic groups holding over half of the seats. In Hungarian parliamentary elections, the long-ruling Liberal Party lost its majority to a new and uncompromising Independence Party in 1905 but won it back as a reconstituted and less compromising Party of Work in 1910. These internal rivalries encouraged the hardest line in dealing with the rival demands over the common army. The Emperor and his designated successor Franz Ferdinand stood firm against any language concession for the common army. The Hungarian side was also unable to win approval for its own central bank, a right more clearly associated with a separate nation-state. The Austrian side also won higher officers’ salaries in return for raising the Hungarian obligation to the common budget by two percent. By the end of this last peacetime decade, neither political spectrum was internally unified or comfortable with the other, as previous scholarship has long made clear.15

The larger and more industrialized Austrian economy ran a consistent export surplus in its trade with Hungary, enough to compensate for deficits in its external trade. Austrian textiles and machinery were exchanged for Hungarian grain, flour, and meat. The Hungarian Delegation used the decennial tariff renegotiations of 1876, 1886, 1896, and 1906 to press for higher tariffs on the competing agricultural exports of Romania and Serbia.16 They pushed the Dual Monarchy into tariff wars with Romania in 1886 and Serbia in 1906. Both were unsuccessful, only cutting Austrian imports from both of them until withdrawing the restrictions. More importantly, the Hungarian side used the bargaining to seek concessions in the frustrated struggle noted above to establish the use of Hungarian as an alternative language of command to German in the common army. In the 1906–1907 negotiations, the Hungarians did win a doubling of the tariff on foreign grain imports, thereby increasing the price of Hungarian grain, its main export to the Austrian economy which rose substantially. Austrian textile and machine sales to Hungary had already been similarly protected by import tariffs. Hungarian machinery sales to the common army were promised but

15 For instructive accounts of the divisive political decade, see Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis, 102–31; Zsuppán, “The Hungarian Political Scene.”
16 Full details comparing the foreign trade of the two halves of the Dual Monarchy may be found in the analysis and statistical tables in Eddie, “Economic Policy and Economic development,” 824–44.
their quotas were never met. On the Austrian side, the dispute with Serbia confirmed the loss of a major contract for its main arms manufacturer Škoda to a French rival, bringing two large French loans to cover the cost by 1907–1908. Serbian meat-packing and alternate markets through Salonika compensated for the veterinary ban on Serbian livestock that launched the tariff war. An often-neglected consequence for Austrian foreign trade was the denial of its needed agricultural imports and the reduction of the already small share of the Dual Monarchy’s imports in the European total to barely 5 percent by 1910.\(^\text{17}\)

III.

Serbian survival promoted its confrontation with the Monarchy’s imperial centre, the Emperor, his Foreign Minister and the army leadership that would lead to World War I. Frustration with Serbian ambitions for Bosnia had persuaded Emperor Franz Joseph and his Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal to approve the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and push Serbia into a presumed Russian alliance. Franz Joseph did resist the pressures for war with Serbia from the common army’s Chief of Staff, General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, dismissing him in 1911. The Monarchy’s credentials as a major European power were further threatened after Serbia’s victories in the two Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. Its reputation rose in Bosnia and the Monarchy’s other southern borderlands. The new Foreign Minister, Leopold Berchtold, joined the Great Powers’ European Concert in peace talks but lost faith in joint diplomacy after it failed to impose its full demands on Serbia after the Second Balkan War. Less confident than his predecessor, he turned away from Aehrenthal’s aversion to closer ties with Germany and quickly restored Conrad to his position as army Chief of Staff.\(^\text{18}\)

Austria–Hungary’s war with Serbia in response to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914 followed from decisions in this imperial chain of command. As Judson acknowledges, it was only in foreign and military policy that imperial authority remained unchecked. He does call attention to growing resentment in the military leadership of the rival and assertive civilian bureaucracy. It was indeed growing in Vienna and each of the Crownlands. He calls their demands for increased funding a first July crisis in that fateful month of 1914, possibly at the army budget’s expense. The Austrian diplomatic demand to punish Serbia for its responsibility for the Archduke’s assassination created the more familiar July crisis. Pressure mounted


\(^{18}\) See the dean of Western historians of Austro–Hungarian diplomatic history, Bridge, “The Foreign Policy of the Monarchy.”
within the Foreign Ministry by the last week in July to present an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia that would justify a declaration of war. His brief description of this week centres on the desire of the army leadership for war, neglecting the long diplomatic exchanges with Germany that ended with Kaiser Wilhelm’s endorsement of an unacceptable ultimatum. Nor does he mention that Conrad himself pressed for some weeks’ delay in mobilization for war through July because of the absence on summer leave of common army units from a dozen districts across the Monarchy. The diplomatic efforts, the subject of so much subsequent scholarship, ended only in strengthening the younger hardliners in the Austrian Foreign Ministry and reliance on an Austrian–German alliance that grew under Berchtold’s less resistant leadership as Foreign Minister. Judson’s account moves on quickly to condemn the army leadership not for its inept Serbian and Italian campaigns but for replacing civilian authority with repressive martial law once war was declared. (pp. 389–91) He calls the military’s assumption of dictatorial powers and the suspension of the common parliament and the Crownland Diets in Austria “a fundamental break in Austro-Hungarian history” (pp. 390–93). The Hungarian parliament remained in session, under the leadership of István Tisza. He had resisted an immediate declaration of war and any prospect of occupying Serbian territory permanently. Judson does not comment on the momentum from a sitting parliament for declaring Hungary’s full independence in October 1918.

The fateful chain of these events began, as argued above, with a set of internal economic disputes between the Austrian imperial framework and Hungarian representatives. Before the war, they had used the decennial trade negotiations to preserve the large urban Austrian access to Hungarian grain in the customs union as means to assert their language rights as a separate state at least in the common army. During the war, the multi-ethnic common army held together the Monarchy, minus only the Monarchy’s Serbs, until 1917, when some Poles and Czechs joined Romanians from Transylvania in going over to the Russians. From the start, the two halves of the economy faced an Allied blockade and common domestic problems in mobilizing resources from the civilian economy. They ranged from the mobilization of troops needed for the industrial and agricultural workforce to a shortage of rolling stock and coal to maintain their two rail networks. Only economic as well as military dependence on the German ally sustained its campaigns after initial defeats, as a comparative history of the two war efforts makes clear.20

19 For the most detailed account of the tangled diplomacy of July 1914, pushing Foreign Minister Berchtold and Austrian diplomats to press for attacking Serbia before the army high command could agree, see: Martel, *The Month that Changed the World, July, 1914*. For his review of the immense literature on the causes of World War I, see 401–31.

Comparing the problems posed by its two economies receives more attention than the common strains noted above in the analysis and statistical tables of a recent appraisal of the Dual Monarchy’s war economy. The pre-war problem of providing the huge surplus of Hungarian grain needed for Austrian cities soon reappeared. Arguments between the two sides began in 1914. As the demands of a war economy to supply the troops with food increased, the flow of Hungarian grain to Austrian cities declined. By 1915, the flow mainly to the army was reduced to less than 20 percent of the pre-war total and by 1917 to only two percent. Tisza even authorized some grain sales to Germany as a way of forcing Austrian concessions on the use of Hungarian troops. Finally granting an Austrian demand for a Joint Food Committee in 1917, Tisza did not increase the deliveries to starving Vienna. Ironically, Austrian representatives could only turn to Germany for emergency supplies, thereby increasing the dependence on the German alliance that the new Emperor Karl vainly sought to break.

Whether the common cultural image and social experience of a single empire could have survived without war is surely conceivable. Austria–Hungary would have faced another decennial conflict in 1917 but with the younger reforming Emperor in whom Judson based hopes for a revived legitimacy in a federalist framework (pp. 417–28). But whether it or any of the continent’s other three land-based, multi-ethnic empires could have survived World War I is not conceivable.

Literature


reliance on German troops and supplies in Conrad’s ill-considered Italian and Russian campaigns. Conrad remained in command of the common army until July 1918.

Schulze, “Austria-Hungary’s Economy in World War I.”

Herwig, First World War, 377–79.


